Gilson v. Pennsylvania State Police (175 F. Supp. 3d 528, 2016)

Citations

175 F. Supp. 3d 528

Full opinion text

OPINION

Mark R. Hornak, United States District Judge

Plaintiff William Gilson filed this civil action against the Pennsylvania State Police and certain of its present or former officers and officials after he was terminated from his position as a Pennsylvania State Trooper. In this lawsuit, Gilson alleges that the Defendants violated his rights under the U.S. Constitution, federal and state employment discrimination laws, and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,1334(b), and 1367.

Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts in Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 74), the operative pleading in this case. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion will be granted.

1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former Pennsylvania State Trooper who was employed by the Pennsylvania State Police (hereafter, “PSP”) from 1994 to 2011. (PSAF ¶1.) During his tenure with PSP, Plaintiff served at the Troop E Headquarters in Erie, Pennsylvania under his commanding officer, Captain Mark Schau (later Major Schau). (Id. ¶8.) Defendant William Sibbald, Jr. also served as a Pennsylvania State Trooper in Troop E, along with Plaintiff. (Id ¶2.)

According to Plaintiff, Trooper Sibbald harbored a personal animosity toward him as a result of Plaintiff having previously inquired into Sibbald’s relationship with a female high school informant. (PSAF ¶24.) Plaintiff claims that Sibbald referred to him as a “freak” and a “pervert” in the presence of others and commented that Plaintiff “didn’t belong on this job.” (Id.)

A. The August 17, 2009 Incident

On August 17, 2009, various PSP Troopers, including Plaintiff and Trooper Sib-bald, were dispatched to assist in an incident involving the involuntary mental health commitment of a twenty-year old male who was acting erratically and threatening to harm himself. (PSAF ¶13.) Also present at the scene was a female crisis service worker by the name of Sandra Grgic. (Id. ¶14.) After the subject of the call was successfully handcuffed, Plaintiff and Grgic exited the premises. (Id. ¶¶17-18.)

What happened next is hotly disputed by the parties. Plaintiff maintains that he tapped the elbow of Grgic, who: was walking in front of him, and inquired’ to which hospital the individual was being taken. (Declaration of William Gilson at ¶13, ECF No. 99-1.) Grgic told Plaintiff the name of the hospital, and Plaintiff then entered his vehicle and departed the scene. (Id. ¶¶14-15.) While Plaintiff acknowledges touching Grgic’s elbow in order to get her attention, he denies any further physical contact between the two. (Id. 1ÍH16-17.) According to Defendants, however, Plaintiff touched Grgic inappropriately during their brief verbal exchange by placing his left arm around Grgic’s waist and pulling her-toward himself. (See PL’s Ex. 26, ECF No. 99-3; PSAF ¶35.)

Following this incident, Sibbald twice attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach Grgic at' her place of employment. (PSAF ¶¶ 23, 29.) When the two subsequently spoke, Sibbald told Grgic that he had witnessed the incident, and he informed her that she could file a complaint about it if she wished to do so. (PSAF 1130.) On August 24, 2009, Grgic called PSP to complain about Gil-son’s conduct. (Id. ¶34.)

B. The Internal Affairs Division Investigation

Sergeant Mark Noce, an investigator in PSP’s Internal Affairs Division (IAD), was subsequently assigned to investigate the incident. (PSAF ¶47.) In the course of his investigation, Noce twice interviewed Grgic, who (according to Noce) “related that the contact was not appropriate, [was] unwanted, and [occurred] on a personal area of her body (above her left hip on her waist).” (PL’s Ex. 26, Attachment 10, ECF No. 99-3; Def.s’ Resp. to PSAF ¶35, ECF No. 104.)

Noce also interviewed Plaintiff on two occasions — October 26 and November 18, 2009. (PSAF ¶52.) During the course of his interviews, Noce repeatedly asked Plaintiff about the incident in question and Plaintiff repeatedly denied any wrongdoing, consistently maintaining that he had only touched Grgic on the elbow. (PSAF ¶¶ 59-GO.) Noce described these exchanges in his report as follows:

• “You didn’t touch her on the left waist area?” Trooper GILSON said he at “no time” touched Ms. GRGIC on her left waist area and at no time did he move her in towards his body at all. (Pl.’s Ex. 26, p. 9 of 22.)

• Sergeant NOCE: I said to Trooper GILSON that at no time did he reach with his left hand or arm and put it around her left waist area and pull her towards him, so they were touching body to body as Ms. GRGIC alleged. Trooper GILSON said that was correct. (Id. at p. 13 of 22.)

• Sergeant NOCE: I asked Trooper GILSON what his answer was ... If he did not remember doing it or he did not do it. Trooper GILSON stated, “I did not do it.” He said he did not touch her as far as putting his arm around her waist and he did not pull her into him under any circumstances. (Id. at p. 14. of 22.)

• I asked Trooper GILSON if he was denying touching Ms. GRGIC anywhere other than the elbow. Trooper GILSON advised he did not remember pulling Ms. GRGIC to him or reaching around her waist. (Id. at p. 17 of 22.)

• I asked Trooper GILSON if there was any physical contact of Ms. GRGIC other than the right elbow that he had previously said. Trooper GILSON stated, “No Sir, I do not, I do not, recall her, her side of the story (unintelligible) at all Sir.” (Id. at p. 18 of 22.)

• I asked Trooper GILSON if he grabbed Ms. GRGIC by the left side of her body and pull her into his body. Trooper GILSON stated, “No I did not.” (Id. at pp. 18-19 of 22.)

• After further discussion, I asked Trooper GILSON if he disagreed with how it was alleged he touched Ms. GRGIC. Trooper GILSON said, “That is correct Sir.” (Id. at pp. 20-21 of 22.)

Noce also interviewed others present on the scene or nearby, including the parents and neighbors of the individual who was involuntarily committed and other PSP Troopers who had been dispatched to assist in the incident. (PSAF ¶52.) None of these other individuals witnessed contact between Plaintiff and Grgic. (Pl.’s Ex. 26.) The only other witness to the incident was Sibbald, who generally corroborated Grgic’s version of the incident, except that Sibbald claimed that Grgic “quickly pushed herself away” from Plaintiff, whereas Grgic indicated in her verified statement that she merely “walked away.” (See PL’s Ex. 26 at Attachment 3 and Attachment 10.)

C. The December 2009 Summary Report and Disciplinary Action Report 1

On November 23, 2009, Noce generated a report of his investigation which was forwarded to Schau in his capacity as Plaintiffs commanding officer. (PSAF ¶63.) Schau then prepared a summary of the investigation, entitled “Summary Report,” which he issued to Plaintiff on December 8, 2009. (PL’s Ex. 27, ECF No. 99-3; Schau Dep. 90:7-25, ECF No. 99-4.) In his Summary Report, Schau noted that the “crux of the investigation focuse[d] around a complaint that TFC GILSON while on-duty had inappropriate physical contact with a female crisis services worker.” (PL’s Ex. 27, ECF No. 99-3.) The Summary Report included Schau’s determination that the allegation agaiqst Plaintiff had merit and that, as a result, Schau was considering the issuance of a Disciplinary Action Report. (Id.; PSAF ¶64.)

As Schau explained, the purpose of the Summary Report was to put Plaintiff on notice that he was the subject of a complaint that might result in discipline. (Schau Dep. 90:21-25.) When Schau met with Plaintiff on December 8, 2009, he provided Plaintiff a copy of the IAD investigatory file, including any attachments, interviews and CDs, along with the Summary Report. (Schau Dep. 90:8-14; 91:1-5.) Pursuant to PSP procedure, a Trooper under investigation is given a chance to review the Summary Report and accompanying investigatory file and must then indicate, within a three-day period, whether he or she wants an opportunity to be heard at a pre-disciplinary conference or “PDC.” (Id. at 91: 8-13.) At the PDC, the Trooper can ask questions and/or point out inconsistencies in the evidence or mitigating factors' to the PSP Captain, who then makes the final determination whether the allegation of misconduct will be sustained. (Id. at 91:16-25.) In Plaintiffs case, Schau met with Plaintiff briefly on December 8, 2009 in order to proyide him a copy of the Summary Report and Noce’s investigative file, (Arbitration Hr’g Tr. 91:15-25, Jan. 6, 2011, Defs. Ex. D, ECF No. 83-2.) During this meeting, Schau asked Plaintiff if he wished to have a union representative present and Plaintiff indicated he did not, because he wanted to keep the incident quiet. (Id.)

Schau then scheduled a pre-disciplinary conference for December 11, 2009. Because he had to be out of town on that date, Schau arranged for Operations Lieutenant Bradley Allen to meet with Plaintiff for his PDC. (PSAF ¶70; Schau Dep. 92:1-5.) Although not personally present, Schau had authored a Disciplinary Action Report (“DAR”) to be issued against Plaintiff in the event that Plaintiff “did not bring anything forward” at his PDC. (PSAF ¶71; Schau Dep. 92:6-93:7.) Schau instructed Allen that, if Plaintiff had “something to offer,” then the DAR should not be issued, and Schau would consider “whatever [Plaintiff] brought forward” upon his return. (Schau Dep. 92:16-23.) According to Schau, Allen issued the DAR to Plaintiff on December 11 after determining that Plaintiff had nothing to offer concerning his alleged misconduct. (PSAF ¶72; Schau Dep. 92:6-93:7; Arbitration Hr’g Tr. 91:1-14, Jan. 6, 2011, ECF No. 83-2.) In relevant part, the DAR stated:'

[t]he investigation revealed that Trooper First Class William L.. GILSON while speaking with a crisis services worker grabbed her by the waist pulling her against him. The physical contact was inappropriate, unwanted and against a personal area of her body. This behavior was also witnessed by another member. I have determined the allegation of improper On-Duty Conduct against you is sustained. You were also found to be less than truthful during several administrative interviews conducted during this investigation.

In accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association, all information, evidence, and statements used in my decision to issue the D.A.R. were furnished to you in a Summary report, on December 8, 2009.

(Pl.’s Ex. 29, ECF No. 99-3.)

On December 17, 2009, the DAR was forwarded by Schau’s commanding officer, Major Terry L. Seilhamer, to the PSP Deputy Commissioner of Administration and Professional Responsibility for further action. (PSAF ¶83.) In a memorandum of that same date, Seilhamer documented his concurrence with Schau’s determination sustaining the allegation of misconduct. (Pl.’s Ex. 28, ECF No. 99-3.) Seilhamer found the evidence of inappropriate physical contact to be “overwhelming.” (Id.) He concluded that Plaintiff had “obviously lied to the investigator regarding his misconduct,” (id.), and he noted that Plaintiff “was the subject of a previous IAD investigation ... which was sustained and in which he was found to be less than truthful.” (Id.) Despite these events, Plaintiff was not immediately removed from his position as a State Trooper or restricted in his job duties; in fact, he continued to serve as a Trooper until November 16, 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.)

D. The Referral of Noce’s Investigatory Report to the EEOO

In March of 2010, PSP’s Department Discipline Office in Harrisburg forwarded the IAD Investigatory Report for further review to PSP’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office (“EEOO”). (PSAF ¶85.) Sergeant Kristal M. Turner-Childs was tasked with determining whether Gilson’s alleged misconduct violated PSP’s internal regulations prohibiting “sexual misconduct” and/or “sexual harassment.”

In a memorandum dated March 2, 2010, Turner-Childs opined that Plaintiff had violated PSP’s regulations prohibiting its police officers from engaging in sexual misconduct and sexual harassment. (PL’s Ex. 99, ECF No. 99-3.) In a subsequent memorandum dated June 8, 2010, Lt. Turner-Childs concluded that Plaintiff had violated PSP’s policy against harassment. Turner-Childs reasoned that:

... Sexual misconduct includes any uninvited or unwelcome sexual touching, sexual contact, or conduct of a sexual nature which victimizes another. Sexual touching or sexual contact includes intentional touching or other physical contact of a sexual nature, done either directly or through the clothing, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, arouse, or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Prohibited harassment shall also include inappropriate behavior with any persons whom Department personnel may interact with as a result of work-related business or assignments. It is my belief that Trooper GILSON while in uniform and on duty, grabbed Ms. Sandra GRGIC, crisis worker by the left hip/waist area ahd pulled her against him. Ms. GRGIC immediately pulled herself away from Trooper GILSON. Ms. GRGIC reported the physical contact she received was inappropriate, unwanted and on a personal area of her body.

(Pl/s Ex. 99, ECF No. 99-3.)

E. The November 9, 2010 Notice of Disciplinary Penalty

In light of Turner-Child's Memorandum, PSP’s Department Discipline Office determined that Plaintiff had committed the offenses of “Discrimination and Harassment,” in violation of Field Regulation (F.R.) 1-1.25, and “Sexual Impropriety,” in violation of F.R. 1-1.38. (Pl.’s Ex. 35, ECF No. 99-3.) On December 9, 2010, after reviewing Plaintiffs case and consulting with Major Lisa Christie, Sergeant Kyle R. Teter of PSP’s Department Discipline Office issued a Notice of Disciplinary Penalty stating that Plaintiff would be terminated from his job and immediately suspended without pay pending the outcome of any arbitration proceedings. (Id.; PSAF ¶4.) As set forth in the notice, Plaintiff was found to have violated seven PSP field regulations (“F.R.’s”) - namely: (1) F.R. 1-1.02, “Unbecoming Conduct,” (2) F.R. 1-1.28, “Internal investigations,” (3) F.R. 1-1.25, “Discrimination or Harassment,” (4) F.R. 1-1.38, “Sexual Impropriety,” (5) F.R. 1-2.02, “Performance of Duty,” (6) F.R. 1-2.05, “Competency,” and (7) F.R. 1-2.30, “Providing False Information.” (PSAF 11110; Pl.’s Ex. 35, ECF No. 99-3.)

Plaintiff received the Notice of Disciplinary Penalty on November 15, 2010. (PSAF ¶109.) Thereafter, he initiated grievance arbitration proceedings.

F. The Arbitration Proceedings

On January 6, 2011, arbitration proceedings were held before Arbitrator Steven M. Wolf, Esq. (PSAF ¶122.) At the hearing, PSP asserted that, “[bjecause Trooper Gilson lied about the incident numerous times during his IAD interview, the State Police has charged him with a serious act of deception.” (PSAF ¶117.) PSP’s counsel therefore framed the relevant issue as “whether the grievant committed a serious act of deception during an Internal Affairs investigation in violation of Article 26.” (Id.)

Under the terms of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), a “serious act of deception” was one of the so-called 12 “deadly sins” that would warrant termination without consideration of mitigating circumstances. (PL’s Ex. 104, ECF No. 99-3; PSAF ¶115.) The specific infraction was defined in the CBA appendix as “[t]he commission of a serious act of deception during a criminal, civil or administrative investigation or proceeding, when under a specific, official obligation to be truthful, involving intentional (1) lying; (2) fabrication; (3) misleading acts or words; (4) civil or criminal fraud; or (5) perjury.” (PL’s Ex. 104; PSAF ¶116.) It is undisputed that the November 9, 2010 Notice of Disciplinary Penalty did not expressly reference the CBA’s “serious act of deception” provision.

At the hearing, PSP’s lawyer represented that, “[although we consider Trooper Gilson’s act of pulling Sandra Grgie to him in an embrace ... as very serious, it is the serious act of deception here which is the primary focus of the case and which has resulted in Trooper Gilson’s dismissal.” (PSAF ¶125; Arb. Hr’g Tr. at 12:4-8, Jan. 6, 2011, ECF No. 99-13.) To that end, PSP elicited testimony from Noce concerning the fact that Plaintiff had repeatedly denied touching Grgie inappropriately on August 17, 2009. (PSAF ¶124.) Although Plaintiff claims that he and the union’s arbitration lawyer were surprised by PSP’s position and were unprepared to defend against the “serious act of deception” accusation, there is no indication in the arbitration record that either Plaintiff or the union’s lawyer ever raised any objection along these lines.

On May 4, 2012, Arbitrator Wolf issued his opinion and award in favor of PSP. (PSAF ¶131, PL’s Ex. 41, ECF No. 99-3.) The arbitrator concluded that the “heart” of the case concerned “the presence or absence of a ‘serious act of deception.’” (PL’s Ex. 41 at p. 12, ECF no. 99-3.) Although the union had “suggested] that this phrase is ambiguous,” Arbitrator Wolf felt it “prudent to conclude that a State Trooper’s conscious choice to fabricate testimony well over a dozen times during the course of an IAD investigation (most of those times being conclusive, but on oceasion equivocating by not recalling) constitutes a ‘serious act of deception.’” (Id.; PSAF ¶133.) Moreover, the arbitrator concluded that, under the terms of the governing CBA, Plaintiffs generally favorable work record could not be considered as a basis for mitigating his dismissal. After acknowledging evidence concerning Plaintiffs positive performance evaluations and the recognitions he had received for commendable actions on the job, Arbitrator Wolf concluded that:

[the union’s] evidence here is trumped by Appendix E’s unequivocal language providing that, when a “deadly sin” is established, “the proper level of discipline is termination of employment, notwithstanding any mitigating circumstances.” Given my finding above of a “serious act of deception” on the part of the grievant, Appendix E therefore expressly requires me to find that PSP’s dismissal of the grievant was proper.

(PL’s Ex. 41 at p. 12, ECF No. 99-3; see PSAF 1Í134.).

G. Post-Arbitration Events

On May 4, 2011, Christie drafted a memo to Schau and Plaintiff regarding the “Imposition of Arbitration Award.” (PSAF 1Í159.) Ip relevant part, the memorandum stated:

1. A Disciplinary Action Report was issued to Trooper William L. Gilson on December 11, 2009 .... It was determined that the actions of Trooper Gilson in this matter was [sic] in violation of the following Field Regulations:

SECTION TITLE

F.R. 1-1.02, Unbecoming Conduct

F.R, 1-1,28, Internal Investigations

F.R. 1-1,35, Discrimination or Harassment

F.R. 1-1.38, Sexual Impropriety

F.R, 1-2.02, Performance of Duty

F.R. 1-2.05, Competency

F.R. 1-2.30, Providing False Information

2. On October 7, 2010, Trooper Gilson was notified he was accused of offenses which would subject him to court-martial proceedings and that he could challenge said accusations through court-martial proceedings or the grievance procedure. Trooper Gil-son elected the grievance procedure.

3. On November 15, 210, Trooper Gilson was notified that ... he was to be dismissed from the Pennsylvania State Police, and remain in a suspension without pay status pending the filing of a grievance, and if applicable, a subsequent decision by an arbitrator.

4. Trooper Gilson grieved the dismissal penalty and on January 6, 2011 an arbitration hearing was held. The arbitration award, dated May 2, 2011, denies Trooper Gilson’s grievance. Therefore, the resolution of charges against Trooper Gilson has been concluded and the following action is taken: by the authority of the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, Trooper Gilson shall be dismissed from the Pennsylvania State police effective midnight, May 2, 2011.

(Pl.’s Ex. 42, ECF No. 99-3.)

On September 19, 2011, Christie’s memorandum was forwarded to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry (“L&I”) by Debra Facciolo, PSP’s Director of Human Resource Management Division in the Bureau of Human Resources, (Pl.’s Ex. 92, ECF No. 99-3.) At the same time, Facciolo also forwarded copies of the arbitrator’s award and the November 9, 2010 Notice of Disciplinary Penalty. (Id.)

Plaintiff claims that he had a number of promising job interviews following his termination as a State Trooper, but several prospective state agency employers who initially planned to hire him later refused to do so as a result of PSP’s publication to L&I of Christie’s May 4, 2011 memorandum. According to Plaintiff, publication of Christie’s memorandum by its transmittal (along with the arbitration award) to the Department of Labor and Industry gave prospective employers the false impression that Plaintiff had been fired for committing sexual harassment and sexual impropriety and that these charges had been sustained by the arbitrator.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Based on the foregoing events, Plaintiff filed this civil action January 6, 2012. Following extensive pretrial proceedings, Plaintiff filed his Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC,” ECF No. 74) against PSP, Commissioner Frank Noonan, Major Schau, Sergeant Teter, Major Christie, Trooper Sibbald, and Ms. Facciolo.

The FAC sets forth thirteen (13) separate causes of action. Count 1 asserts a claim against Schau, Teter, Christie, and Sibbald for alleged violations of Plaintiffs procedural due process rights based on the Defendants’ respective roles in Plaintiffs investigatory and termination proceedings. Count 2 asserts a claim against these same Defendants for the alleged violations of Plaintiffs equal protection rights based pn Plaintiffs gender. Count 3 alleges that these same Defendants conspired to deny Plaintiffs equal protection rights. In Count 4, Plaintiff asserts a claim against PSP for the alleged violation of his rights under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”). Counts 5 and 6 assert Pennsylvania state law claims against Sibbald for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively. Counts 7 and 8 assert claims against PSP for alleged gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). These claims are premised on theories of discriminatory discharge (Count 7) and hostile work environment (Count 8). Counts 9 and 10 set forth similar claims against Teter and Sibbald for alleged gender-based employment discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). Count 11 asserts a due process claim against Schau, Teter, and Christie under the theory that the term “serious act of deception” was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him personally. In Count 12, Plaintiff asserts a due process claim against Schau, Teter, Christie, Facciolo, and Noonan premised on the theory that these Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his protected liberty interest in future employment when they published information about his termination proceedings. Count 13 alleges a due process claim against these same individuals based on the theory that Plaintiff was deprived of his constitutionally protected interest in his employment, without due process of law, when PSP pursued the “serious act of deception” charge at the arbitration proceeding without having provided him any - prior notice of this particular charge. ■

On January 30,2015, Defendant filed the pending motion (ECF No. 80) and supporting materials (ECF Nos. 81, 82, and 83) requesting summary judgment on all counts in the FAC. Plaintiff filed his materials in opposition to the pending motion (ECF Nos. 96, 97, 98, and 99) on April 9, 2015. Defendants filed their materials in reply to Plaintiffs position (ECF No. 104, 105) on May 7, 2015. As a result of these filings, the issues raised in .Defendants’ motion are adequately joined and ripe for disposition.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all reasonable inferences . from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Emerson Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales, Inc., 253 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir.2001). “When there is a disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn from them, a trial is required to resolve the conflicting versions of the parties.” Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir.2009) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). “To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must raise more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and the court must determine that a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented.” Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir.2011) (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).

IY. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Many of the claims in the FAC pertain to. alleged violations of Plaintiffs rights under the U.S. Constitution. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff has a private right of action to redress the violation of his federal constitutional rights, provided he can prove: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir.2005) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)). Here, there is no dispute that the named Defendants acted at all relevant times under color of state law, so the Court will focus its inquiry on whether Plaintiff has identified sufficient record evidence that the named Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights.

To the extent a constitutional deprivation can be shown, the Court must also consider whether there is sufficient personal involvement on the part of each Defendant identified in Plaintiffs § 1983 claims to support constitutional liability. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir.2005) (“‘A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”’)(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988)) (alteration in the original). With these principles in mind, the Court will examine Plaintiffs various theories of § 1983 liability.

1. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claims Premised on Unfair Termination Proceedings (Counts 1 and 13)

In Count 1 of the FAC, Plaintiff claims that Schau, Teter, Christie, and Sibbald, by virtue of their respective roles in Plaintiffs investigatory and disciplinary proceedings, deprived him of constitutionally protected - interests in his reputation and in continued employment without due process of law. Plaintiff alleges that Teter failed to properly review exculpatory evidence during the course of the investigation and also failed to properly consider and/or develop possible motives on the part of Grgic and Sibbald for making false accusations against him. (FAC ¶¶174-76.) Plaintiff accuses Schau, Teter and Christie of failing to conduct the investigation in a timely manner and failing to produce sufficient evidence of an inappropriate touching or other misconduct on his part. (Id. ¶¶ 177-79.) Plaintiff accuses all four Defendants collectively of over-penalizing him for a minor infraction, unfairly punishing him for defending himself, and “unfairly branding]” him a liar and sexual harasser. (Id. ¶¶ 194-96.)

In Count 13 of the FAC, Plaintiff asserts a procedural due process claim against Schau, Teter, Christie, Facciolo, and Noo-nan premised on the theory that these Defendants unconstitutionally deprived Plaintiff of his protected property interest in continued employment by pursuing the “serious act of deception” charge at the arbitration hearing without prior notification to Plaintiff. (FAC ¶¶459-61.) Plaintiff claims that, due to the lack of proper notice, he was unable to properly defend himself against the charge that he had engaged in a “serious act of deception” at any point during the termination proceedings, including at the arbitration hearing. (Id. ¶472.)

In his brief in opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff articulates a slightly different version of these claims under three (3) distinct theories. He first argues that Schau’s Summary Report was constitutionally insufficient because it did not provide him notice of all of the charges against him. In particular, Plaintiff maintains that the report failed to formally advise him that he could be disciplined for his conduct during the investigation-namely, repeatedly denying that he had touched Grgic inappropriately. Plaintiff objects that, despite this deficiency in Schau’s Summary Report, he was later “disciplined” on December 11, 2009 (by virtue of Schau’s DAR) in part for being “less than truthful” in his two interviews concerning his contact with Grgic.

Plaintiff next maintains that PSP violated his rights in connection with Teter’s November 2010 Notice of Disciplinary Penalty. According to that document, Plaintiff was fired for having violated seven (7) PSP regulations, including “Internal Investigations,” “Providing False Information,” “Discrimination or Harassment,” and “Sexual Impropriety.” Here again, Plaintiff argues that, prior to receiving this “discipline,” he never received notice of, or an opportunity to respond to, the charges stemming from his conduct during the IAD investigation, including his alleged violations of PSP’s regulations governing “Internal Investigations” or “Providing False Information.” In addition, Plaintiff objects that he never received pre-disci-pline notice that he was or would be charged with sexual harassment under PSP’s “Discrimination or Harassment” regulation or sexual misconduct under PSP’s “Sexual Impropriety” regulation. As a result, Plaintiff argues, he never had an opportunity to rebut these “highly charged” violations prior to PSP’s issuance of the dismissal notice. (PL’s Mem. Law. Opp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 7, ECF No. 98.)

Finally, Plaintiff reiterates his theory that PSP denied him an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” (see Pl’s Br. Opp. at 8, (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976))), when, at the arbitration hearing, it pursued the accusation that Plaintiff had engaged in a “serious act of deception.” Plaintiff points out that Teter’s Notice of Disciplinary Penalty did not make any specific reference to a “serious act of deception,” which constitutes one of the twelve (12) “deadly sins” in the CBA, resulting in automatic termination. Plaintiff maintains that this particular charge was qualitatively-different 'from the violation of an internal regulation, because it did not permit consideration of any mitigating circumstances. Plaintiff insists that, because he did not have prior notice of this particular charge, he and arbitration counsel were not prepared to defend against it, resulting in a denial of his constitutional right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that a State may not “deprive any person of fife, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. To successfully state a procedural due process violation, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was - deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty,- or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.2000)); see Emigh v. Steffee, Civil Action No. 08-1726, 2009 WL 1472916, at *10 (W.D.Pa. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 442 Fed.Appx. 660 (3d Cir.2011), Here, Plaintiff alleges that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued employment. (FAC 1Í164.) Defendants do not dispute this allegation, so the question becomes whether Plaintiff was deprived of that interest without “due process of law.”

Our Court of Appeals has held that, where a plaintiff has a property interest in employment, due process generally requires a pre-deprivation hearing. Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 595-97 (3d Cir.2011). In Schmidt, that Court explained that:

[o]rdinarily, a pre-deprivation hearing “need not be elaborate.” [Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)]. Where adequate post-deprivation procedures are available, an employee is entitled only to “notice of the chárges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Id. The hearing can be informal and “need not definitively resolve the propriety” of the deprivation. Id, “It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions — essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action.” Id. An employee is generally not entitled to notice of the reasons for his discharge in advance of a pre-deprivation hearing, Gniotek [v. City of Phila., 808 F.2d 241, 244 (3d Cir.1986)], or to present his case to an impartial decision-maker at such a hearing, McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 460 (3d Cir.1995).

Schmidt, 639 F.3d at 596-97.

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that he received both a- pre-termination notice of misconduct (i.e., Schau’s Summary Report) and a pre-termination informal hearing (i.e., the pre-disciplinary conference with Allen on December 11, 2009). Nevertheless, he insists that these measures were constitutionally insufficient because they failed to notify him of all the relevant charges against him — that is, Plaintiff claims he never got pre-discipline notice that he might be punished for: (1) his repeated denials of inappropriate contact with Grgic during the IAD investigation, or (2) allegedly committing sexual harassment or sexual misconduct.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a genuinely disputed issue of material fact relative to his procedural due process claims. In judging the sufficiency of Plaintiffs pre-discipline process, the Court finds it relevant to consider not only the information provided in Schau’s summary report, but also the evidence pertaining to Noce’s investigation. See Leader v. Noonan, No. 1:12-cv-2570, 2014 WL 3557105, at *5 (M.D.Pa. July 17, 2014) (“[T]he Third Circuit has made it clear that a formal hearing, such as the [Pre-Disciplinary Conference] ... is not required pre-suspension in order to satisfy due process.”) (citing Schmidt, 639 F.3d at 596) (emphasis in the original). Here, it is undisputed that Noce interviewed Plaintiff twice during the investigatory process. At the time of his first interview on October 26, 2009, Plaintiff was given a written notice of Grgic’ allegation that Plaintiff had touched her in a nonconsensual fashion by putting his left hand or arm around her left waist area and pulling her to his body. (See Pl.’s Ex. 26, Attachment 13, ECF No. 99-3.) Plaintiff was advised that Grgic considered the contact to be inappropriate, unwanted, and on a personal area of her body. (Id.) Before being questioned about the incident, Plaintiff was further advised, both orally and in writing that, “[s]ince this is an administrative matter within the Pennsylvania State Police, you are required to answer questions truthfully and completely or you may be subjected to administrative action.” (Pl.’s Ex. 26, Attachment 12, ECF No, 99-3; Pl’s Ex. 86, p. 1, ECF No. 99-3.) Plaintiff received the same written warning at the time of his second LAD interview on November 18, 2009¡ (Pl’s Ex. 26, Attachment 12, ECF No. 99-3.) During the course of his investigatory interviews, Plaintiff was confronted with the evidence against him, which consisted chiefly of Grgic’s account of the incident and Sibbald’s corroborating account. (See generally Pl’s Ex. 26.) Noce specifically inquired about whether either witness might have a motive to be untruthful about their accounts. Plaintiff responded that he and Sibbald were not friends and that Sibbald had “burned” other troopers with regard to “how he words things.” (Id. at pp. 17, 19.) Plaintiff could provide no explanation as to why Grgic would fabricate her allegations. (Id. at pp. 4, r 13.). Plaintiff was asked on numerous occasions during the interview whether he touched Grgic as alleged, and he consistently denied doing so, even to the point of stating that Grgic must not have been telling the truth. (Id. at pp. 13,19.)

At the time he received Schau’s Summary Report of the investigation, Plaintiff also received a copy of Noce’s IAD file, which included detailed information about all of the interviews Noce had conducted concerning the incident. Again, this included Grgic’s statements that the touching was not appropriate, unwanted, and on a personal area of her body, consistent with “how a man would hold his wife or someone he knew.” (Ex. 26, Attachment 10.) Plaintiff was given several days to review this material before meeting with Allen on December 11, 2009 for his pre-disciplinary conference. At the time of the PDC, Plaintiff was given another opportunity to address Grgic’s allegations, tell his side of the story, or otherwise comment on the evidence Noce had collected. Only after these events was Schau’s Disciplinary Action Report issued to Plaintiff advising him that he would be disciplined both for his inappropriate contact with Grgic and for being less than truthful during his interviews.

Based on this collective evidence, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs pre-disci-plinary process gave Plaintiff constitutionally adequate notice of his alleged misconduct, an explanation of PSP’s evidence in support of that misconduct, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. See Schmidt, 639 F.3d at 596 (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487). Consistent with the teachings of Louder-mill and Schmidt, the pre-termination proceedings served as an adequate “check” against erroneous decision-making and allowed PSP to ensure there were reasonable grounds to believe that Plaintiff had touched Grgic inappropriately and was lying when he repeatedly denied it. See id. at 596-97 (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487).

Plaintiff contends that a jury could find Schau’s summary report to be constitutionally deficient because it faded to include a specific charge that Plaintiff had been untruthful during his interviews. The Court does not agree. For purposes of procedural due process, notice is meaningful and sufficient if it “apprises the individual of the substance of the matter at hand and permits adequate time to present any counter information and response.” Andrekovich v. Chenoga, No. 2:11cv1364, 2012 WL 3231022, at *5 (W.D.Pa. Aug. 6, 2012) (citing McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 454-57 (3d Cir.1995)). As of the time that Plaintiff attended his pre-disciplinary conference, he was aware that Grgic’s allegation of inappropriate contact turned on a credibility determination which pitted his own version of the facts against the statements of Grgic and Sibbald. After being twice advised by Noce that untruthfulness could result in adverse administrative action, Plaintiff had been repeatedly questioned concerning his account of the incident. He was aware that his own account of the incident was diametrically different from the accounts offered by Grgic and Sibbald, and he was given a chance to offer any explanation he might have for these differing accounts. Plaintiff therefore knew, as of the December 11, 2009 pre-disciplinary conference that his credibility was at issue and that he could be disciplined for untruthfulness. He does not indicate any additional facts that he would have offered at the time of his PDC to rebut the charge of untruthfulness, had it been more specifically included in the Summary Report. See Gniotek v. City of Phila., 808 F.2d 241, 244 (3d Cir.1986) (notice was sufficient where it was of “such specificity to allow [plaintiff] the opportunity to determine what facts, if any, within his knowledge might be presented in mitigation of or in denial of the charges”). Consequently, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff had constitutionally adequate pre-deprivation process relative to the charge of untruthfulness.

For similar reasons, the Court is not persuaded that a jury could find Schau’s summary report constitutionally deficient simply because it omitted a specific charge of sexual harassment or sexúal misconduct. As another district court has recognized, “Third Circuit precedent indicates that notice need only contain enough specificity to make the nature of the plaintiffs conduct clear, and in such an instance a failure to identify a specific broken ’rule’ does not offend due process.” Leader v. Noonan, No. 1:12-cv-2571, 2014 WL 3557117, at *6 (M.D.Pa. July 17, 2014) (citing Schmidt, 639 F.3d at 599-600) (granting summary judgment and concluding that, where notice “described in sufficient detail the alleged conduct,” the Defendants’ failure -to “identify the specific rules that they claimed his conduct violated” did not deprive the plaintiff of due process). See also Copeland v. Phila. Police Dep’t, 840 F.2d 1139, 1145-46 (3d Cir.1988) (affirming grant of summary judgment and holding that plaintiffs due process rights were not violated simply because the “city did not prepare the formal, written charges against [plaintiff] until after he had been dismissed”; “formal charge was based on the same information previously made available to [plaintiff], which he had the opportunity to refute”). As of the date of his pre-diseiplinary conference, Plaintiff knew all of the facts that served as the basis both for Grgic’s allegation of inappropriate contact and for PSP’s subsequent charge of sexual harassment and sexual impropriety. Plaintiff was disciplined only after he was given a chance to respond to this evidence and present his own side of the story. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs pre-deprivatioii process was constitutionally adequate.

The Court also concludes, as a matter of law, that no due process violation occurred by virtue of the fact that Teter’s November 9, 2010 Notice of Discipline omitted any specific reference to a “serious act of deception.” Plaintiff argues that, because of this omission, he was not prepared to defend against the “serious act of deception” charge at the arbitration hearing and was therefore denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (noting that due process requires the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”), but the evidence before the Court does not plausibly support Plaintiffs claim. The record from the arbitration hearing reflects that the arbitrator inquired about the proper framing of the issues at the start of the proceeding. PSP’s lawyer indicated at the outset that she was proposing a two-part inquiry: the first issue would be whether Plaintiff committed a serious act of deception during the IAD investigation in violation of the CBA and, if not, the second (alternative) issue would be whether PSP otherwise had just cause to dismiss him. (See Arbitration Hr’g Tr. 8:22-9:8, January 6, 2011, ECF No, 83-2.) The Union’s lawyer- proposed a different framing of-the issues: whether Plaintiff had violated department policy relative to both administrative and field regulations supporting just cause for discipline; and, if not, what- the proper remedy should be. (Id. at 9:10-14.) The arbitrator indicated he would leave that matter open for further consideration pending completion of the testimony. (Id. at 9:15-20.)

Although each side proposed their own way of framing the relevant issues, the record does not reflect that the Union’s lawyer ever objected to PSP’s proposal on the grounds that it would unfairly disadvantage Plaintiff or the Union or otherwise result in a deprivation of due process. Simply put, neither Trooper Gilson or his lawyer claimed any sort of surprise or lack of notice. Had the Union’s lawyer perceived a due process violation or some sort of unfair surprise, he could have sought a continuance of the hearing in order to adequately prepare a defense, but that did not occur. On the contrary, the record reflects that the Union pursued Plaintiffs defense consistent with the position Plaintiff had previously taken in his interviews — namely, that no inappropriate contact ever occurred and that the testimony of Grgic and Sibbald was simply not credible. In pursuing this line of defense, the Union offered Plaintiffs testimony and called three other witnesses on his behalf. It also entered exhibits and cross-examined PSP’s witnesses. Following the arbitration hearing, the parties had the opportunity to submit further written argument on. a number of points, including how the issues before the arbitrator should be framed, whether Plaintiffs conduct constituted a serious act of deception, and whether that phrase was ambiguous. (See Arbitration Hr’g Tr. at 198:5-199:24, ECF NO. 83-2; see also Pl.’s Ex. 42, ECF No, 99-3.)

When viewed collectively, the foregoing evidence belies Plaintiffs assertion that his arbitration.proceeding failed to afford him a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the “serious act of deception” charge. Moreover, even if the arbitration proceeding could be viewed as constitutionally deficient, Plaintiff had access to judicial review under state law in the Commonwealth Court, which the record does not indicate he ever pursued. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Ass’n, 540 Pa. 66, 656 A.2d 88, 89-90 (1995) (holding that a court reviewing an arbitrator’s award in an Act 111 grievance arbitration involves questions regarding: (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, (2) the regularity of the proceedings, (3) an excess of the arbitrator’s powers, and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights). The' Third Circuit has advised that, “[i]f there is a process on the books that appears to provide due process, the plaintiff cannot skip that process and use the federal courts as a means to get back what he wants.” Alvin v. Suzuki 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.2000) (citations omitted); see Pedersen v. South Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 677 F.2d 312, 315-17 (3d Cir.1982) (grievance and arbitration hearing procedures under a collective bargaining agreement and state law fully satisfy due process requirements); see Boysza v. Thompson, No. 02:03CV1526, 2005 WL 2467617 at *4 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 5, 2005) (where rights of public employee are addressed under collective bargaining agreement with state court review, due process provided) (collecting cases). If, notwithstanding his apparent full participation in the arbitration, Plaintiff believed its conduct was irregular under state law,- or was unconstitutional, the same state law which created his “due process” in this disciplinary setting also created more “due process” to redress it. Given that the question in this Court is whether the state gave him “due process,” his apparent failure to fully use that process does not mean he was deprived of “due process.” It simply means he elected to not use it. See Dykes v. SEPTA, 68 F.3d 1564, 1571 (3d Cir.1995) (post-deprivation procedures under a collective bargaining agreement and state law fulfill post-deprivation due process). Based on the totality of these circumstances, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could not reasonably conclude that, by virtue of Teter’s failure to include the “serious act of deception” charge in his November 9, 2010 Notice of Disciplinary Penalty, Plaintiff was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard concerning that charge. Consequently, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Counts 1 and 13.

2. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claim Premised on the Alleged Deprivation of Future Employment Opportunities (Count 12)

In Count 12 of the FAC, Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendants Schau, Christie, Teter, Facciolo, and Noonan premised on the theory that these Defendants deprived him of a protected liberty interest in future employment without due process of law. Plaintiffs theory is that Defendants stated and/or misled others into believing that he was terminated for having committed sexual harassment and sexual impropriety and that these charges were upheld in arbitration. (FAC ¶442.) In doing so, Plaintiff claims, the Defendants “imposed on [him] a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities and which might seriously damage his standing and associations in the community.” (Id. ¶441.)

In his brief opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff clarifies that Count 12 is premiséd 'on Facciolo’s act of publishing Christie’s May 4, 2011 “Imposition of Arbitration Award.” Plaintiff claims that,' as a result of this publication, he has lost a number of promising jobs with employers who have indicated that they would not hire a former Commonwealth employee found guilty of sexual harassment and sexual misconduct.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim fails as a matter of law for two reasons. First, Defendants maintain that the publication in question did not involve any statements that were untrue. Assuming, however, that Plaintiff suffered a constitutionally significant injury to his reputation, Defendants nevertheless maintain that Plaintiff received an adequate name-clearing hearing by virtue of Ms. arbitration proceeding.

In order “to make out- a due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation, a plaintiff must show a stigma to his reputation plus deprivation of some additional right -or interest.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir.2006) (citations omitted); see also McCarthy v. Darman, 372 Fed.Appx. 346, 351 (3d Cir.2010). In the context of public employment, this “’stigma-plus’ test has been applied to mean that when an- employer ‘creates and -disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his termination, it deprives the employee of a protected liberty interest.” Hill, 455 F.3d at 236 (quoting Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977)). “The creation and dissemination of a false and defamatory impression is the ‘stigma,’ and the termination is the ‘plus.’” Hill, 455 F.3d at 236. When such a deprivation occurs, the employee is entitled to a name-clearing hearing. Id.

In this case, Defendants challenge only Plaintiffs ability to establish the “stigma” part of the “stigma-plus” test. To establish this criterion, a plaintiff must allege that the purportedly stigmatizing statements (1) were made publicly and (2) were false. Hill, 455 F.3d at 236 (citations omitted). Upon review of the record, this Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not satisfied the “stigma” criterion because the publication in question did not communicate information that was false.

As noted, Plaintiff claims that he was stigmatized when Facciolo sent Christie’s May 4, 2011 “Imposition of Arbitration Award” memo to the Commonwealth’s Department of Labor and Industry. The relevant portions of Christie’s memo state as follows:

SECTION TITLE

F.R. 1-1.02, Unbecoming Conduct

F.R. 1-1.28, Internal Investigations

F.R. 1-1.35, Discrimination or Harassment

F.R. 1-1.38, Sexual Impropriety

F.R. 1-2.02, Performance of Duty

F.R, 1-2.05, Competency

F.R. 1-2.30, Providing False Information

(PL’s Ex. 42, EOF No. 99-3.)

Plaintiff maintains that Christie’s memorandum was materially false and misleading because it asserted that Plaintiff had been terminated for committing sexual harassment and sexual impropriety and that those findings were upheld by an arbitrator. The memorandum does indeed state that Plaintiffs termination was premised, in part, on PSP’s determination that Plaintiff had violated internal regulations proscribing “discrimination or harassment” and “sexual impropriety.” However, there is nothing false about this statement. Plaintiffs Notice of Disciplinary Penalty expressly invoked these regulations as grounds for dismissal only after its Equal Employment Opportunity Office had rendered an opinion that the field regulations were, in fact, violated.

In addition, Christie’s memorandum referenced the fact that Plaintiff grieved his termination and the grievance was denied. Once again, however, this was a true statement that did not necessarily imply that the arbitrator had specifically “upheld” the sexual harassment and/or sexual impropriety violations. To the extent Christie’s memorandum was ambiguous about this point, however, any ambiguity was sufficiently resolved by the fact that Facciolo forwarded the actual arbitration decision to the Department of Labor & Industry, along with Christie’s memo. Thus, that “publication” to the Department of Labor and Industry considered as a whole (as it must be, see Forrest v. Owen J. Roberts Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 09-3014, 2011 WL 1549492, at *17 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 1, 2011)(in determining whether a communication is capable of defamatory meaning, the allegedly defamatory statements must be viewed “in context”) (citing Baker v. Lafayette College, 516 Pa. 291, 532 A.2d 399, 402 (1987))), was both complete and accurate. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to establish that his protected liberty interests were infringed by the publication of a false and stigmatizing statement.

At bottom, Plaintiffs due process theory is premised on several flawed assumptions that are not supported by the record. Plaintiff first argues that Turner-Childs should never have found him to be in violation of PSP’s “discrimination or harassment” and “sexual impropriety” regulations in the first place because his alleged inappropriate contact with Grgic did not, in fact, meet the definitions of “sexual harassment” or “sexual misconduct” set forth in those regulations. Plaintiff next argues that PSP realized it could not defend these charges and therefore “abandoned” them at the arbitration hearing. Finally, Plaintiff reiterates that the arbitrator never actually ruled on his grievance that he was not in violation of the “Discrimination or Harassment” or “Sexual Impropriety” regulations. Collectively, Plaintiff states, this evidence demonstrates the materially false and misleading nature of PSP’s statements that he was dismissed for violating sexual harassment and sexual misconduct regulations and that those findings were upheld by the arbitrator.

This line of argument is unavailing. To begin with, Plaintiffs theory essentially asks this Court to engage in what is tantamount to an administrative review of Turner-Child’s opinion for the purposes of determining whether she correctly applied PSP’s own internal policies. Absent some evidence suggesting that Turner-Child’s decision-making, in and of itself, involved a constitutional deprivation, this Court is not the proper forum for obtaining a substantive review of PSP’s administrative decision-making. To the extent this type of review is appropriate, however, the Court finds insufficient evidence in this record from which a jury could reasonably con-elude that Turner-Childs misapplied the regulations in question.

Moreover, the record does not support Plaintiffs assertion that PSP abandoned the “sexual harassment” and “sexual misconduct” charges at arbitration because it realized it could not defend them. In fact, PSP’s counsel framed the relevant analysis as a two-part inquiry; while focusing chiefly on the “serious act of deception” issue, PSP argued in the alternative that it had just cause to terminate Plaintiff based on the violations charged in the Notice of Disciplinary Penalty. (See Arbitration Hr’g Tr. at 8:23-9:3, EOF No. 83-2.) While Plaintiff makes much of the fact that PSP did not enter Turner-Child’s memoranda into evidence, or offer any sexual misconduct/ sexual impropriety cases in support of those charges, the record reflects that PSP did offer other evidence concerning these charges. In particular, Teter testified about each of the grounds for dismissal listed in his Notice of Disciplinary Penalty, including the charges relating to “discrimination or harassment” and “sexual impropriety.” (Arbitration Hr’g Tr. 114:18-115:16.)

Finally, the fact that the arbitrator did not specifically pass on the “harassment or discrimination”/ “sexual impropriety” issues in his decision does not support Plaintiffs theory that Facciolo’s publication therefore involved a false and stigmatizing publication. It is true that Arbitrator Wolf premised his ruling solely on his conclusion that Plaintiffs conduct constituted a “serious act of deception.” He therefore had no reason to rule one way or the other on the charges that Plaintiff had violated the “discrimination or harassment” and “sexual impropriety” regulations. However, this does not change the fact that PSP itself found Plaintiff to be in violation of those regulations and dismissed him partly on those grounds. Because all of this information was made known to the Department of Labor & Industry through Facciolo’s publication of Christie’s memorandum, accompanied by the arbitrator’s decision, no false publication occurred.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not produced evidence sufficient to establish the “stigma” element of the “stigma-plus” test. Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the deprivation of a protected liberty interest, his due process claim at Count 12 fails as a matter of law. See McCarthy v. Barman, 372 Fed. Appx. 346, 351 (3d Cir.2010) (where allegedly stigmatizing statements were not false, they did not show a “stigma,” and consequently, plaintiff failed to show that he was deprive