Stillwagon v. City of Delaware (175 F. Supp. 3d 874, 2016)

OPINION AND ORDER

EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 29] filed by Defendants City of Delaware, Detective Benjamin Segaard, Former Detective Patrick Gerke, Officer Adam Willauer, and Detective Sergeant Jonathan Radabaugh (collectively, the “Municipal Defendants”). Plaintiff James R. Stillwagon’s (“Plaintiff” or “Stillwagon”) Motion to Strike [ECF No. 48] is also before the Court. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion to Strike [ECF No. 48] and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 29].

I. BACKGROUND

This case stems from a series of widely publicized events that occurred in Delaware, Ohio, and the surrounding highways on September 30, 2012. Given that the Court accepts all of Plaintiffs well-pleaded material allegations as true for purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court will outline the facts of this case as Plaintiff alleges them in his Complaint.

The Court begins with some biographical information. This information is relevant, Stillwagon claims, because it was “the subject of discussion by the defendants, including critical or insulting comments, at the time when the decision was made to prosecute [him].” (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11 [ECF No. 2].) Stillwagon played football at The Ohio State University in the late 1960s. (Id ¶ 10.) He excelled as a lineman. 0See id.) After college, Stillwagon played professionally in the Canadian Football League. (Id) Stillwagon has since retired from professional football. (Id ¶ 11.) He and his wife now own and operate two businesses based out of Dublin, Ohio. (Id)

A. Events on Route 42

On September 30, 2012, Stillwagon was driving northeast on Route 42 toward Delaware, Ohio. Stillwagon was riding his motorcycle. (See Compl. ¶ 19.) He was also carrying a handgun. (Id ¶ 20.) He carried the weapon legally, as he had obtained a concealed carry permit several years earlier. (Id) The pistol was stored in the tank bag of his motorcycle. (Id ¶ 21.)

Defendant Mattingly was also driving on Route 42 on September 30. (Id ¶ 22.) Mat-tingly had consumed “a large amount of alcohol at home.” (Id) He then continued drinking as he drove his pickup truck. (Id)

Stillwagon and Mattingly first came into contact at a Marathon station located at the intersection of Routes 42 and 33. (Id. ¶23.) Stillwagon had stopped to buy gas; Mattingly had stopped for beer. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) Both Stillwagon and Mattingly were parked at pumps. (Id. ¶ 24.) Mattingly was parked behind Stillwagon. (Id) As Still-wagon pulled out of the station, Mattingly followed. (Id ¶ 25.)

Just northeast of the Marathon station, Route 42 narrows from four lanes to two lanes. (Id ¶ 26.) As Stillwagon approached this merger, Mattingly “sped past him on the left, cutting off [Stillwagon] and nearly hitting him. The truck came within six inches of [Stillwagon’s] motorcycle, startling [Stillwagon].” (Id) As he made the pass, Mattingly was “looking directly at [Stillwagon], laughing and grinning.” (Id) Mattingly then sped off out of Stillwagon’s sight. (Id ¶ 27.)

Less than -two miles down the highway, Mattingly stopped his truck in the middle of the lane. “Mattingly was waving a blue metal baseball bat out of the driver’s side window, and signaling for the motorcycle to go around him.” (Id) Stillwagon did not drive around the truck; instead, he stopped and waited 40 to 50 yards behind the truck. (Id ¶ 28.) Eventually Mattingly started moving again. (Id) He fell in behind a slower moving car. (Id.) Stillwagon took this opportunity to distance himself from Mattingly. Stillwagon passed Mat-tingly and the slower moving car. (Id)

Moments later, Mattingly also passed the car. (Id ¶ 29.) After passing, Mattingly continued driving in the left lane of the two-lane highway. (Id) Several vehicles traveling in that lane (the southbound lane) had to swerve off the road to avoid a head-on collision with Mattingly’s truck. (Id ¶ 31.) Mattingly pulled up next to Still-wagon and shook the baseball bat at him. (Id ¶ 29.) Mattingly then “made several cut-in moves into [Stillwagon’s] bike, attempting to hit it.” (Id.) On the third cut-in, Stillwagon braked. (Id.) Mattingly responded by making a sharp right turn immediately in front of Stillwagon and slamming on his brakes. (Id) Stillwagon braked ^gain, just in time to avoid colliding with the back of Mattingly’s truck. (Id)

Mattingly and Stillwagon were approaching a traffic light by this point. (Id. ¶ 32.) The light was red. (Id.) Mattingly drove through the red light and continued toward Delaware. (Id.) Stillwagon stopped at the light and then, after the light turned green, pulled into a gravel parking area. (Id.) Stillwagon wanted to distance himself from Mattingly. (Id.) While Stillwagon waited in the parking area, two motorists who had witnessed Mattingly’s maneuvers stopped to ask if Stillwagon was alright. (Id.) One of the motorists called the police at Stillwagon’s request. (Id. ¶ 33.) The police indicated that there was nothing that they .could do other than take a report. (Id.) Stillwagon and the other motorists “felt that this would be pointless” and decided against filing a report. (Id.) Stillwag-on waited, for approximately ten minutes and then continued on his way. (Id. ¶ 34.) Stillwagon did not expect to see Mattingly again. (Id.) “As a precaution, however, [Stillwagon] removed his firearm from the tank bag and secured it on his person” before leaving the parking area. (Id.)

Mattingly, meanwhile, had circled his truck behind a budding four miles down the road; he was waiting for Stillwagon. (Id. ¶ 35.) Stillwagon passed the building and Mattingly pulled onto the road behind him. (Id. ¶ 36.) There were several cars between the two of them. (Id.) To catch up to Stillwagon, Mattingly entered the southbound lane and passed approximately eight cars. (Id. ¶ 37.) At least three cars in that lane had to pull off the road to avoid a head-on collision with Mattingly’s truck. (Id.) “Mattingly then pulled back into the right lane and accelerated his truck in an attempt to strike [Stillwagon] from behind.” (Id.) The truck came within inches of Stillwagon’s motorcycle. (Id.) To avoid being rammed by Mattingly, Stillwagon sped up to almost 85 miles per hour. (Id.)

■ Mattingly slowed down and backed away from the bike. (Id. ¶ 38.) However, he soon accelerated into the southbound lane and “started his cut-in moves again.” (Id.) Still-wagon braked. (Id.) Mattingly then cut in front of Stillwagon and slammed on his brakes,, “causing [Stillwagon] to nearly crash into the back of Mattingly’s track for the second time.” (Id.) Stillwagon narrowly avoided a collision by swerving and braking hard. (Id.)

Stillwagon attempted to distance himself from Mattingly, once again, by slowing down. (Id.) And once again, Mattingly continued down the mad until he was out of Stillwagon’s sight. (Id.)

B, Events on the Exit Ramp and in the AutoZone Parking Lot

Route 42 turns into a four-lane divided highway as it approaches Delaware. (Compl. ¶ 39 [EOF No. 2].) An exit ramp to the right leads to William Sti’eet. (Id.) As Still wagon came to this portion of Route 42, he kept to the right to take the William Street exit. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.) Mattingly, at this point, was ahead of Stillwagon and driving in the far left lane. (Id. ¶ 41.) Mattingly was traveling slowly — 10 to 20 miles per hour. (Id.) Mattingly had almost passed the William Street exit. (Id. ¶ 42.) But when Mattingly noticed that Stillwag-on was exiting the highway, he made a sudden right turn, crossing two lanes of traffic to merge onto the ramp. (Id.)

When Mattingly got to the bottom of the exit ramp, the traffic light was green. (Id. ¶ 43.) Mattingly, however, stopped his truck in the middle of the exit lanes and looked back toward Stillwagon, (Id.) The ramp is enclosed to. the left by a concrete wall and to the right by a heavily wooded hill and a guardrail. (Id. ¶ 44.) Rather than drive past Mattingly, Stillwagon decided to wait on the right side of the exit ramp. (Id.)

Seeing that Stillwagon had stopped, Mattingly put his truck in reverse and started backing up. (Id. ¶45.) Stillwagon “retrieved his pistol and pointed it at the oncoming truck. He did not intend or wish to shoot the driver, only to make the truck stop, so he aimed for an area on the rear of the truck bed by the tailgate latch, to the right of the driver’s position. [Stillwag-on] fired three times.” (Id.) Responding to the shots, Mattingly took his truck out of reverse, drove through a red light, and turned right onto William Street. (Id.)

After waiting at the light, Stillwagon turned right onto William Street. (Id. ¶ 46.) Once again, Mattingly was waiting. (Id.) Mattingly was stopped in the right lane of the street. (Id.) Stillwagon again attempted to avoid Mattingly. (Id. ¶ 47.) Stillwagon began to turn left into an Auto-Zone parking lot. (Id. ¶ 48.)

Mattingly preempted Stillwagon’s escape though. Mattingly “turned sharply to the left across William Street, and cut in front of the motorcycle, into the parking lot.” (Id.) Mattingly started to loop around toward Stillwagon. (Id. ¶49.) To protect himself from the truck, Stillwagon quickly parked next to a 2-foot high concrete light pole stand near the lot’s entrance. (Id.) Stillwagon retrieved his pistol and held it visibly in his hand. (Id.)

Mattingly finished his loop and drove by Stillwagon and the concrete pillar at a distance of only a few feet. (Id. ¶ 50.) The driver’s side of the truck was facing' Still-wagon. (Id.) Stillwagon “had no desire or intention to harm [Mattingly], only to disable the truck,” so he “pointed his firearm downward, toward the rear of the truck, [and] fired two rounds, [shooting] out the left rear tire.” (Id.) Mattingly drove past Stillwagon and back toward William Street. (Id. ¶ 51.) “His truck exited the parking lot, turned left, and began to head east down the street.” (Id.)

But rather than driving away, Mattingly reentered the parking lot and stopped his truck such that it was aimed directly at Stillwagon; there was nothing between Stillwagon and the truck. (Id. ¶ 52.) “Then Mattingly revved his engine loudly, pushed the accelerator to the floor and, with his tires squealing, sped across the lot directly toward [Stillwagon].” (Id.)

“When the truck got dangerously close, [Stillwagon] fired once.” (Id. ¶ 58.) “His purpose in firing was only to disable the vehicle, and deter [its driver],” (Id:) He “aimed specifically for the lowest portion of the truck engine, as far from the driver as possible.” (Id.) The truck swerved to the left after being-shot. (Id.) It came to a stop about ten feet in front of Stillwagon. (Id.)

“Mattingly kicked open the driver’s door of the truck in an aggressive manner,” (Id. ¶ 54.) Stillwagon approached from the passenger side and circled around the rear of the truck. (Id.) Mattingly was standing by the driver’s side door. (Id.) “When Mat-tingly began to turn, [Stillwagon] kicked him once, forcefully, in the left leg. This caused Mattingly to bend over. [Stillwag-on] then struck him once on the back of the head with the gun, and pushed Mat-tingly down to the ground.” (Id. ¶ 56.) As Stillwagon pressed Mattingly down, with the pistol still in his hand, “he unintentionally squeezed the trigger and the weapon discharged. The shot fired up into the air and away from Mattingly, never touching him at all.” (Id. ¶ 57.) Mattingly attempted to stand up again, but Stillwagon ordered him to stay on the ground. (Id. ¶ 58.) Still-wagon asked bystanders to call the police. (Id.) He then set his pistol down on a nearby planter. (Id.)

C. Stillwagon’s Arrest

When the police arrived, Stillwagon waved them over, acknowledged that he had fired the weapon, and indicated that Mattingly had just tried to kill him several times. (Compl. ¶ 58 [ECF No. 2].) Stillwag-on pointed out where he had set down his firearm. (Id. ¶ 62.) He did everything that the officers instructed him to do. (Id. ¶ 63.) “He was handcuffed, led to a cruiser[,] and locked in the back seat.” (Id.)

While sitting in the cruiser, Stillwagon described for the police the details of what had happened — from his first encounter with Mattingly to the final showdown in the parking lot. (Id. ¶¶ 65-66.) “[T]he uniformed Delaware Police on the scene concurred with [Stilhvagon’s] statements based upon their own observations.” (Id. ¶ 67.) One officer, referring to Mattingly, noted that “he just looks like he wasn’t shot.” (Id.) Another officer observed that “with the way the shots are, it’s almost like [Stillwagon] was just trying to scare [Mat-tingly].” (Id.) Defendants Gerke, Rada-baugh, and Willauer were present at the parking lot; Defendant Segaard was not. (Id.)

Stillwagon was eventually transported to the Delaware Police Department. (Id. ¶ 68.) At the station, Gerke and Segaard interviewed Stillwagon. (Id.) Stillwagon once again explained what had happened from beginning to end. (Id. ¶ 69.) Stillwag-on “denied any road rage, retaliatory conduct or other improper action.” (Id. ¶ 78.) “He explained.that he only fired his weapon to protect himself, and that he had intentionally aimed , for the truck, not at the driver.” (Id. ¶¶71, 73-74.) “I was in fear for my life,” Stillwagon attested. (Id. ¶ 71.) “The detectives asked explicitly whether [Stillwagon] had intentionally shot, or attempted to shoot, at Mattingly. [Stillwagon] was equally explicit that he did not, even though he certainly had the opportunity to do so numerous times.” (Id. ¶ 76.) The police at the scene were able to confirm Sfillwagon’s statements regarding the shots that he fired at the truck. (Id. ¶¶ 73-74.) During the interview, Gerke even “acknowledged receiving a text from the officers at the scene, confirming exactly what [Stillwagon] had said.” (Id. ¶ 73.) As to the last shot fired, Stillwagon explained that he had inadvertently fired his pistol when he was pushing Mattingly to the ground. (Id. ¶ 75.)

At the conclusion of the interview, Gerke thanked Stillwagon for his honesty in relating his account of the incident and answering the detectives’ questions. (Id. ¶ 76 (“I’m just going to tell you I appreciate you being honest about it.”).)

By the end of the interview, the police already knew several other facts. (Id. ¶ 79.) “[T]hey knew that [Mattingly] had been under the influence of alcohol that day,” had a “serious criminal background,” and was currently on paróle. (Id.) They knew that Stillwagon had no criminal record. (Id.) They knew the location of the shell casings at both the AutoZone parking lot and the William Street exit ramp. (See id. ¶ 100.) They knew - the location and close pattern of the bullet holes on Mat-tingly’s truck. (See id. ¶¶ 73, 100.) They knew that Mattingly’s head injury was inconsistent with a gunshot wound. (See id. ¶ 67.) They knew that an empty shell casing was stuck in the chamber of Stillwag-on’s pistol — indicating that the pistol’s slide was in contact with something when the gun was fired. (See id. ¶ 105.) And they had the testimony of “Mr. Powell,” an individual who observed the events in the parking lot beginning with Stillwagon’s' firing his last shot at Mattingly’s truck. (See id. ¶¶ 109-110.) From Mr. Powell’s perspective, it appeared that Stillwagon “’was shooting the motor, trying to stop the truck,”’ (Id. ¶ 109.)

That same evening, and potentially before Stillwagon was placed under arrest, the police also obtained the footage from an Eagles Club security camera overlooking the AutoZone parking lot. (See id. ¶ 101.) The camera recorded the events in the parking lot, including Mattingly’s feigned retreat and final charge toward Stillwagon. (See id. ¶¶ 101-102.) During that sequence of events, the footage revealed that Stillwagon had remained stationary by the concrete pillar; he “made no movement to pursue” Mattingly. (See id. ¶ 102.) Also, before Stillwagon was arrested, the police found a blue metal baseball bat in Mattingly’s truck. (See id. ¶ 90.)

After the interview — but before they had left to speak with Mattingly — Gerke and Segaard informed Stillwagon that he was under arrest for crimes that he had allegedly committed against Mattingly. (Id. ¶80.)

D. Stillwagon’s Indictment and Trial

According to Stillwagon, the Delaware Police obtained additional information in the days following the arrest that further confirmed his story. A witness — Ms. Ren-inger — corroborated significant portions of Stillwagon’s narrative. (See Compl. ¶ 91 [EOF No. 2].) Ms. Reninger informed the police that she was driving northeast on Route 42 on September 30 when a truck came speeding up behind her in the left lane. (Id.) To avoid the truck, vehicles in the southbound lane were swerving off the road. (Id.) She saw the truck “’swoop in front of the motorcycle’ and slam on its brakes, nearly causing the motorcyclist to wreck.” (Id.) Ms. Reninger stopped to talk with Stillwagon when he pulled off the road to distance himself from Mattingly. (Id.) She told the police that Stillwagon waited long enough to put many miles between himself and the truck. (Id.) She also observed that Stillwagon was “’not enraged’” when he got back on the road, (Id.) Several witnesses, including Ms. Ren-inger, also observed Mattingly’s subsequent “ambush.” (See id. ¶¶ 92-95.) Taken together, those witness statements supported Stillwagon’s account of Mattingly hiding near an intersection on Route 42, reemerging onto the highway, passing numerous vehicles, and slamming on his brakes after passing Stillwagon. (See id.) The police also obtained additional information regarding Mattingly’s purported gunshot wound. Mattingly’s injury description from the hospital, for example, indicated that Mattingly had suffered a cut, not a gunshot wound. (See id. ¶¶ 105-108.) And from observing Mattingly at the hospital, where he was limping due to “soreness and swelling to his left leg,” the police could purportedly deduce that Stillwagon had kicked Mattingly in the parking lot and, thus, had not shot him from a distance (as the police had speculated). (Id. ¶ 111.) Lastly, the police eventually admitted that Mattingly’s erratic driving on September 30 was not the result of mechanical failings. (See id. ¶97.) No mechanical problems were ever found on the truck. (Id.)

Irrespective of this alleged exculpatory evidence, Stillwagon was indicted by a grand jury and charged with four counts of felonious assault. (See id. ¶¶ 113, 155.) To obtain this indictment, the Police Defendants relied heavily on Mattingly’s testimony. (See id. ¶¶ 123-124, 145-146, 155.) Stillwagon alleges, however, that “[t]he detectives knew immediately upon meeting and speaking with [Mattingly] that he was certainly not a source of reasonably trustworthy information.” (Id. ¶ 121 (“[The detectives] have since admitted that they doubted [Mattingly’s] truthfulness.”).) Moreover, Stillwagon alleges that Defendants Gerke and' Segaard conspired with Mattingly to “manufactur[e] false testimony that would support the police narrative” and lead to Stillwagon’s indictment. (Id. ¶ 133.) Specifically, Gerke and Segaard allegedly pressured Mattingly to fabricate (i) his being shot in the head, (ii) Stillwagon’s road rage, and (iii) Stillwagon’s status as the aggressor on the exit ramp and in the parking lot. (See id. ¶¶ 123-146.)

In addition to manufacturing testimony, the Police Defendants also allegedly destroyed, failed to preserve, and failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. (Id. ¶¶ 147-154.) Specifically, the officers purportedly destroyed DNA evidence on Stillwagon’s pistol, destroyed drawings and diagrams prepared by Mattingly during his interviews with the police, refused to follow up on an exculpatory witness’s phone call to the police, disregarded skid marks from Mattingly’s truck on Route 42, failed to have Mattingly’s truck examined for mechanical problems, failed to obtain witness and security camera evidence regarding Mattingly’s ambush, and neglected to share with Stillwagon reports indicating that Mattingly’s head injury was not a gunshot wound. (See id.) By ignoring exculpatory evidence and relying only upon evidence that supported their theory, the Police Defendants allegedly “created materially false and misleading documents” to present to the grand jury. (See id, ¶ 155.)

Stillwagoii’s case went to trial on October 1, 2013. (Id. ¶ 159.) Finding no evidence in the record that could support a conviction, the trial court dismissed each of the counts brought against Stillwagon and entered a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Ohio Criminal Rule 29. (Id. ¶ 160.)

From Stillwagon’s perspective, the Municipal Defendants acted with “malice, bias and bad faith” in arresting and prosecuting him. (Id. ¶ 156.) In support of this allegation, Stillwagon identifies various pejorative statements that Defendants Segaard and Gerke made as they interviewed Mat-tingly. (See id. ¶¶ 156-158.) They ridiculed Stillwagon’s clothing and athletic accomplishments. (Id. ¶¶ 156-157.) They referred to him as “nuts” and “crazy.” (Id.) And they criticized his standing in the community. (Id. ¶ 157.) Additionally, Segaard and the Delaware Chief of Police both made purported false “public statements in the media [declaring Stillwagon’s guilt] within the first 24 hours or so of the [September 30 incident].” (Id. ¶ 158.) Prompted by the Delaware Police, Mattingly also provided an alleged false statement to the media soon after the incident. (Id.)

E. The Current Civil Case

Stillwagon filed' his Complaint in thé current case on July 10, 2014. (See Compl. at 1 [ECF No. 2].) Stillwagon asserts twelve claims: claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) false arrest; (2) malicious prosecution; (3) due process violations; (4) civil conspiracy; (5) supervisory liability (only against Radabaugh and Willauer); and (6) municipal liability (only against the City of Delaware); as well as claims under Ohio law for (7) malicious prosecution; (8) civil conspiracy; (9) abuse of process (only against Mattingly); (10) defamation (only ag;ainst Mattingly); (11) assault (only against Mattingly); and (12) spoliation of evidence. (Id. ¶¶ 169-180.)

On July 28, 2015, the Municipal Defendants filed their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (See Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 42 [ECF No. 29].) Stillwagon submitted a Memorandum in Opposition [ECF No. 40] to the Motion, and the Municipal Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 46]. Contending that the Municipal Defendants’ Reply improperly introduces new arguments and legal citations, Stillwagon subsequently moved to strike portions of the Reply. (See Mot. to Strike at 3-4 [ECF No. 48].)

The Court first considers Stillwagon’s Motion to Strike. The Court will then address the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Stillwagon insists that the Municipal Defendants’ Reply in Support of their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 46] contains “extensive authority and argument which was not. contained in their initial motion, and which -.is not truly responsive” to the arguments raised in Still-wagon’s Memorandum in Opposition [ECF No. 40]. (See Mot. to Strike at 2 [ECF No. 48].) The Municipal Defendants, for example, ■ purportedly offer new arguments when they contend that Stillwagon felo-niously assaulted Mattingly by pistol whipping him (rather than shooting or attempting to shoot him) and when they assert that Stillwagon’s statements to the arresting officers tracked the elements of Ohio’s felonious assault statute. (See id. at 5-6.) To remedy this situation, Stillwagon requests (1) that the Court disregard “the non-rebuttal authorities and arguments” contained in the Reply and (2) that the Court “strike those matters which are raised for the first time [in the Reply], and those which do not strictly address the issue of the Plaintiffs pleading itself.” (Id. at 6-7.) Stillwagon’s requests' are not well taken.

Stillwagon presumably moves to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (See generally Mot. to Strike.) Rule 12(f), however, does not authorize the Court to strike arguments made in a brief. Nelson v. Clermont Cnty. Veterans Serv. Comm’n, No. 1:11-cv-335, 2013 WL 5934393, at *5 (S.D.Ohio Nov. 1, 2013) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), which governs motions to strike, authorizes the Court to strike ‘any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter’ from a pleading, but does not authorize the Court to strike from the record affidavits or statements made in a brief.”); see also Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 F.R.D. 596, 599 (S.D.Ohio 2003) (emphasizing that Rule 12(f) only permits courts to strike material from pleadings).

The Court can disregard arguments that are made for the first time in a reply brief. See Baker v. Union Twp., Ohio, No. 1:12-cv-112, 2013 WL 4502736, at *13 (S.D.Ohio Aug. 22, 2013) (“An issue raised for the first time in a reply brief has not been fully briefed, and thus, is not appropriate for decision.”); see also Nelson, 2013 WL 5934393, at *5 (noting, in response to a motion to strike, that the more accurate “issue is whether the Court should disregard, rather than strike” tjhe challenged material). But here the Municipal Defendants properly limited their Reply to rebuttal arguments. In his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Stillwagon assumes that he could only have committed a felonious assault by shooting or attempting to shoot Mattingly. (Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 15-16 [ECF No. 40].) To rebut this argument, the Municipal Defendants assert that Stillwagon could have feloniously assaulted Mattingly by hitting him on the head with a pistol. (Reply in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 8-13 [ECF No. 46].)

Continuing this rebuttal, the Municipal Defendants analyzed why Stillwagon might be guilty of felonious assault for pistol whipping Mattingly. (See id.) The Municipal Defendants noted that Stillwagon’s admissions to the arresting officers tracked the elements of Ohio’s felonious assault statute. (See id. at 8-9.) The Municipal Defendants then cited a Sixth Circuit decision: “’when the facts known to the officer track the elements of an offense, we routinely grant qualified immunity on false-arrest claims even when the suspect asserts, or circumstances suggest, an applicable affirmative defense.’” (Id. at 9 (quoting Harvey v. Carr, 616 Fed.Appx. 826, 829 (6th Cir.2015))). Stillwagon insinuates that this citation constitutes a new argument — an assertion of a qualified immunity defense. (See Mot. to Strike at 6.) The Court disagrees. The Municipal Defendants only use the phrase “qualified immunity” when quoting Harvey. (Reply in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 9, 15.) And nowhere in their Reply do the Municipal Defendants affirmatively assert a qualified immunity defense. (See generally id.)

The Municipal Defendants cite new authorities in support of these rebuttal arguments. See Bishop v. Children’s Ctr. for Developmental Enrichment, No. 2:08-cv-766, 2011 WL 5506105, at *2 (S.D.Ohio Nov. 10, 2011) (“While it is true that in their reply memorandum Defendants relied upon several cases to which they had not previously cited, those cases were in support of arguments that had been previously made.”). Simply citing new “case law does not amount to the raising of new arguments.” Keith v. Aerus, LLC, No. 2:09-cv-297, 2010 WL 3883434, at *3 (E.D.Tenn. 2010 Sept. 29, 2010). Accordingly, Stillwagon’s Motion to Strike [ECF No. 48] is denied.

III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A court reviews a motion for judgment on the pleadings, brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), in the same manner as a court would review a motion brought under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir.2006). Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of actions that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generally, an action will be dismissed under this standard where “there is no law to support the claims made.” Stetu Farm, Ltd. v. Natural Res. Conservation Serv., 967 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1169 (S.D.Ohio Aug. 26, 2013) (citing Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir.1978)). The same holds where “the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim.” Id. Federal Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See also Bell Ml Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). To meet this standard, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion^]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). When considering a Rule 12(c) or 12(b)(6) motion, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded material allegations in the complaint as true. See Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1998).

A. Timeliness of the Motion

Before addressing the merits of the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Court will first consider Stillwagon’s assertion that the Motion is untimely. Stillwagon initiated this case in July 2014. Since then, “the parties have engaged in extensive and wide-ranging discovery.” (Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 8-9 [ECF No. 40].) The Municipal Defendants waited over a year (until July 2015) before moving for judgment on the pleadings. (Id. at 9.) Stillwag-on questions the utility of testing “the sufficiency of the pleadings” under Rule 12(c) when the parties, through extensive discovery, have already begun developing the facts that support those pleadings. (Id. at 11.) Given the amount of discovery that already took place prior to the Municipal Defendants filing their Motion, and the potential delay to the trial schedule that the Motion could cause, Stillwagon insists that the Court should deny the Motion for untimeliness. (Id. at 12.)

From the Municipal Defendants’ perspective, Rule 12(c)’s lack of a specific time limit resolves the issue. (See Reply in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 2 [ECF No. 46].) Rule 12(c) states that a party may bring a motion for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The Municipal Defendants note that they filed their Motion “well before the dispositive motion deadline of April 15, 2016” and that “no trial date has yet been set in this case.” (Reply in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 3 (emphasis deleted).) As such, they argue, the Motion will not delay trial. (Id.) Finally, the Municipal Defendants contend that Stillwagon “cannot demonstrate that he would be prejudiced by the Court’s consideration of the [Motion].” (Id.) Without a showing of prejudice or delay to the trial date, Stillwagon’s assertion of untimeliness purportedly fails.

Tbe Court does not consider the Motion to be untimely. As the Municipal Defendants correctly observe, Rule 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings at any point after the pleadings are closed, provided that the motion does not delay trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). And here, the Motion will not delay trial. The Municipal Defendants filed their Motion considerably in advance of even the dispositive motion deadline.

Stillwagon’s timeliness objection appears to stem partly out of his concern that the Court might dismiss a claim on the pleadings even though subsequent discovery has uncovered additional facts to bolster the claim. (See Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 11 (citing Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d 310, 324-26 (2d Cir.2011)).) The Court can, however, consider the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and allay Stillwagon’s concerns by permitting Stillwagon to amend any claims that he has inadequately pleaded. The Court will address the possibility of amendment on a claim by claim basis.

B. Federal Law Claims

Stillwagon brings several claims under § 1983: false arrest; malicious prosecution; due process violations; civil conspiracy; supervisory liability; and municipal liability (Claims 1 through 6).

1. False Arrest

• The Municipal Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on Stillwagon’s § 1983 false arrest claim (Claim 1), arguing that the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Stillwagon and that Stillwagon’s Complaint, even if accepted as true, fails to plausibly allege a lack of probable cause. The Court, however, disagrees with this assessment. Stillwagon’s Complaint states a plausible allegation that Stillwagon was arrested without probablé cause.

To prevail on a claim brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law. Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir.2015). A false arrest claim implicates “the Fourth Amendment right to be arrested only upon probable cause.” Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 579-80 (6th Cir.2003). Prevailing on a § 1983 false arrest claim thus “’requires a plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir.2005)).

Probable cause exists when the police have “’reasonably trustworthy information ... sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.’” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). “No overly burdensome duty to investigate- applies to officers faced with the prospect of a warrantless arrest.” Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir.2007). Nonetheless,' “[p]robable cause determinations involve an examination of all [the] facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge at the time of an arrest.” Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 315. That is, “the initial probable cause determination must be founded on ‘both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence’ known to the arresting officer.” Logsdon, 492 F.3d at 341 (quoting Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318). An officer “cannot simply turn a blind eye toward potentially exculpatory evidence.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir.1999). With respect to affirmative defenses, “where a reasonable police officer would conclusively know that [a suspect’s] behavior is protected by a legally cognizable affirmative defense, that officer lacks a legal foundation to arrest that person for that behavior.” Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 571 & n. 21 (6th Cir.1999) (“[A] peace officer, in assessing probable cause to effect an arrest, may not ignore information known to him which proves that the suspect is protected by an affirmative legal justification for his suspected criminal actions.”). “[T]he existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible.” Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.1995).

As a general rule, when a plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a grand jury indictment, “’the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.’” Webb, 789 F.3d at 660 (quoting Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir.2006)); see Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 307 n. 13 (6th Cir.2005). “An exception to this general rule applies when defendants knowingly or recklessly present false testimony to the grand jury to obtain the indictment.” Webb, 789 F.3d at 660 (citing Martin v. Maurer, 581 Fed.Appx. 509, 511 (6th Cir.2014)). Additionally, when a plaintiff is arrested and subsequently indicted by a grand jury, the indictment does not conclusively establish probable cause for the earlier arrest. Rad-vansky, 395 F.3d at 307 n. 13; Caudill v. Owen, No. 1:02-cv-663, 2005 WL 2654228, at *6 (S.D.Ohio Oct. 17, 2005).

a. The Grand Jury Indictment

Here, Stillwagon was indicted by a grand jury after he was arrested. (See Compl. [EOF No. 2] ¶¶ 145-146, 155.) The Municipal Defendants argue that this indictment-regardless of the fact that it occurred after the arrest — conclusively establishes that the police had probable cause to arrest Stillwagon, (Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 6 [EOF No. 29].) The Municipal Defendants imply that the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Davis v. McKinney, 422 Fed.Appx. 442, 443 (6th Cir.2011), overruled that court’s prior statements regarding subsequent grand jury indictments as articulated in Radvansky, 395 F.3d at 307 n. 13. (See Reply in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 6 [ECF No. 46].) The Municipal Defendants are mistaken.

In McKinney, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit recited the general rule that “the issuance of an indictment by a grand jury conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” 422 Fed. Appx. at 443. McKinney involved federal and state law claims for malicious prosecution. Id, at 442. By contrast, the relevant language from Radvansky discussed" the implications of a grand jury indictment on a false arrest claim. Radvansky, 395 F.3d at 307 n. 13. Like many plaintiffs alleging malicious prosecution, the plaintiff in McKinney was indicted by a grand jury before the alleged malicious prosecution commenced. See McKinney, 422 Fed.Appx. at 442-43. Given that McKinney did not involve a false arrest claim, the court in McKinney did not consider the implications of a grand jury indictment made subsequent to the plaintiff’s arrest. See id. McKinney does not contradict Radvansky. But even if the two cases conflicted, McKinney could not overrule Radvansky. “[Ajbsent an intervening Supreme Court decision or a change in the applicable law,” published Sixth Circuit precedent can only be overruled through an en banc decision. Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 507 (6th Cir.2004). McKinney is not an en banc decision.

The Municipal Defendants also cite Moore v. Pielech, No. 2:10-cv-453, 2012 WL 4432991, at *4-6 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 27, 2012), for the proposition that the subsequent grand jury indictment in this case conclusively establishes that the police had probable cause to arrest Stillwagon. (See Reply in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 4-5.) But like McKinney, Moore did not address the effect of a grand jury indictment made subsequent to a plaintiffs arrest. See Moore, 2012 WL 4482991, at *4-6. In Moore-, the court considered a malicious prosecution claim, not a claim for false arrest. Id-

b. Conclusive Knowledge of Self-Defense

Irrespective of the grand jury indictment, the Municipal Defendants still insist that the Court should dismiss Still-wagon’s § 1983 false arrest claim. The Municipal Defendants argue that “the only reasonable determination possible at the time of the Plaintiffs arrest, based upon the pleadings, was that there was probable cause to arrest him for felonious assault, in violation of [O.R.C] § 2903.11.” (Reply in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 8 (emphasis removed).) An individual violates § 2903.11 if he knowingly “[c]ause[s] or attempts] to cause physical harm to another or. another’s unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordinance.” O.R.C. § 2903.11(A)(2). In his Complaint, Stillwagon purportedly admits to conduct that violates that statute. (See Reply in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 13.)

As to Stillwagon’s claim of self-defense, the Municipal Defendants contend that the arresting officers were “under no obligation to give any credence” to Stillwag-on’s story, (id. (emphasis deleted) (quoting Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir.1988))), because the arresting officers did not “conclusively know” that Still-wagon acted in self-defense, (id. at 15 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Harvey v. Carr, 616 Fed.Appx. 826, 829 (6th Cir.2015))). Stillwagon purportedly fails to even allege that the arresting officers “conclusively knew” that he acted in self-defense. (Id. at 16.) “The Plaintiff merely alleged that ’[i]f the Plaintiffs statements were true, then there was no basis to charge him with any crime.’” (Id. (quoting Compl. ¶ 78),)

Stillwagon responds by outlining the exculpatory evidence known to the police at the time of his arrest. Stillwagon’s statements to the police, along with all of the “independent facts and circumstances known to the [police] at the time [of arrest,] overwhelmingly confirmed that [Stillwagon’s] conduct was justifiable and lawful rather than criminal.” (Mem. in Opp’n to Mot: for J. on the Pl’gs at 38 [ECF No. 40].) The police officers’ knowledge of this exculpatory information at the time of arrest purportedly creates a plausible allegation that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Stillwagon. (See id. at 16-18.)

As an initial matter, the Court agrees with the Municipal Defendants that Still-wagon’s statements to the arresting officers — setting aside any consideration of Stillwagon’s self-defense claim — would have established probable cause to arrest him for felonious assault. Stillwagon admitted to the arresting officers that he hit Mattingly in the back of the head with a gun. (Compl. ¶ 75.) This admission constituted reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that Stillwagon had feloniously assaulted Mattingly. See State v. Home, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91797, 2009-Ohio-4199, ¶¶ 23-24, 29, 2009 WL 2579523 (affirming a conviction for felonious assault where the victim was struck on the head with a gun).

An officer, however, cannot completely disregard an assertion of self-defense when determining whether probable cause exists to make an arrest. See Painter, 185 F.3d 557, 571 & n. 21. “[W]here a reasonable police officer would conclusively know that [a suspect’s] behavior is protected by a legally cognizable affirmative defense,” that officer lacks probable cause to arrest the suspect. Id. at 571 n, 21. Thus, the Court will deny the Municipal Defendants’ Motion as to the false arrest claim if, based on the factual allegations contained in Stillwagon’s Complaint, the Court can plausibly infer that the arresting officers conclusively knew that Stillwagon’s behavior constituted self-defense. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Lewis v. Taylor, No. 1:10-cv00108, 2010 WL 3785109, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 21, 2010) (determining that the plain-, tiff set forth sufficient factual allegations in his complaint from which the court could plausibly infer a valid claim for relief).

Prior to his arrest, Stillwagon allegedly explained to the arresting officers all of the events leading to the confrontations on the exit ramp and in the parking lot. (See Compl. ¶¶ 65-78 [ECF No. 2].) Stillwagon informed the arresting officers of Mattingly’s erratic driving, Mattingly’s cut-in maneuvers, Mattingly’s brake checks, Mattingly’s attempt to back his truck into Stillwagon on the exit ramp, Mattingly’s circling and head-on charge in the parking lot, and Mattingly’s possession of a baseball bat. (See id.) Stillwagon informed the arresting officers that he had acted in self-defense and out of fear' for his life. (See id. ¶¶ 66, 71.) He denied shooting Mattingly. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 75-76.) At the time of arrest, the officers also knew that Mattingly had been under the influence of alcohol that day, that Mattingly had a “serious criminal background,” that Stillwagon had no criminal record, that Stillwagon had fired his pistol from the middle of the exit ramp and from a position adjacent to a concrete pillar in- the parking lot, that Still-wagon had shot the truck in areas far from where Mattingly was seated, that Mr. Powell had interpreted Stillwagon’s last shot at the truck as an attempt to hit the engine and disable the vehicle, that Mat-tingly’s head injury was inconsistent with a gunshot wound, and that an empty shell casing was stuck in the chamber of Still-wagon’s pistol — suggesting that the pistol’s slide was in contact with Mattingly’s head when the gun was fired. (See id. ¶¶ 67, 73-74, 79, 98, 100, 105, 109-110.)

Additionally, prior to arrest, the officers might have retrieved a blue metal baseball bat from Mattingly’s truck and viewed footage from the Eagles Club security camera prior to arresting Stillwagon. (See id. ¶¶ 90,101.) Stillwagon does not explicitly allege that the officers discovered these two pieces of evidence prior to his arrest, which is significant. (See id.) The Complaint’s timeline, however, suggests that the officers may have uncovered this evidence prior to the arrest. (See id.) Given that the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court will assume that the arresting officers discovered the bat and viewed the,security camera footage prior to arresting Stillwagon,

Accepting Stillwagon’s allegations as true, and viewing those allegations in the most favorable light; the Court can plausibly infer that the arresting officers conclusively knew that Stillwagon had acted in self-defense.

To establish a claim of self-defense under Ohio law, the accused must prove by a preponderance-of the evidence that (1) he was not- at fault in creating the violent situation, (2) he had a bona fide belief that he-was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape was the use of force, and (3) that he did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Parks, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11 AP-98, 2011-Ohio-4056, ¶ 19, 2011 WL 3586177. Self-defense also involves a proportionality requirement: the accused “’is privileged to use only that force that is reasonably necessary to repel the attack.’” In re C.L., 197 Ohio App.3d 514, 2011-Ohio-6892, ¶24, 968 N.E.2d 34 (4th Dist.) (quoting State v. Hendrickson, 4th Dist. No. 08CA12, 2009-Ohio-4416, ¶ 23, 2009 WL 2682158). Clarifying the second element of a self-defense claim, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained that courts analyzing an accused’s fear of imminent harm must apply a combined subjective and objective test. State v. Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 326, 673 N.E.2d 1339 (1997). “The person’s belief must' be objectively reasonable -under the circumstances, and he must subjectively believe he needed to resort to force to defend himself.” In re C.L., 2011-Ohio-6892, ¶ 23, 968 N.E.2d 34.

Based on Stillwagon’s detailed explanation of the incident and the Eagles Club security camera footage, the arresting officers could have conclusively known that Stillwagon was not at fault in creating the confrontation with Mattingly. (See Compl. ¶¶ 65-66, 69; 101-102.) Stillwagon described Mattingly’s numerous unprovoked attacks. (See id. ¶¶ 65-66, 69.) He described several instances in which he attempted to distance himself from Mattingly. (See id.) And he described his attempt to shelter himself near a concrete pillar in the parking lot, (See id.) The security camera recorded Stillwagon’s attempt to take shelter in the parking lot. (See id. ¶¶ 101-102.) Moreover, Stillwagon specifically “denied any road rage, retaliatory conduct or other improper action.” (Id. ¶¶ 66, 78.) The bullet hole patterns on Mattingly’s truck and the location of the shell casings reinforced this assertion. The casings were'discovered in defensive positions: toward the middle of the exit ramp and next to a concrete pillar in the parking lot. (See id. ¶ 100.) The bullet' holes found on Mattingly’s truck also evidenced defensive action: Stillwagon was attempting to disable the vehicle rather than injure its driver. (See id. ¶¶73, 100.)

Based on much of the same information, the arresting officers could have also conclusively known that Stillwagon had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape was the use of force. Stillwagon informed the officers that he was afraid for his life and that Mattingly had nearly killed him multiple times. (Id. ¶¶ 58, 65-66, 69-71, 74.) The security camera footage supported those statements, as it revealed Mattingly’s maneuvers in the parking lot, Mattingly’s feigned retreat from the parking lot, and Mattingly’s final charge toward Stillwagon. (See id. ¶¶ 101-102.) The presence of a baseball bat in Mattingly’s truck bolsters the conclusion that Stillwagon’s fear for his life was objectively reasonable. (See id. ¶ 90.) Wielding a baseball bat, Mattingly could have seriously injured or killed Stillwagon even after the truck was disabled.

The arresting officers could have conclusively known that Stillwagon did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger posed by Mattingly. In his statements to the arresting officers, Stillwagon described his multiple efforts to distance himself from Mattingly while on Route 42, his attempt to distance himself from Mat-tingly on the exit ramp, and his attempt to shelter himself from Mattingly in the parking lot. (See id. ¶¶ 65-66, 69.) And again, the shell casings reinforced this conclusion. The shell casings were found toward the middle of the exit ramp and adjacent to a concrete pillar in the parking lot — positions from which retreat was unlikely or improbable. (See id. ¶ 100.) The exit ramp was bounded to the left by a concrete wall and to the right by a heavily wooded hill and a guardrail. (Id. ¶44.) And in the parking lot, Stillwagon had no time or opportunity to retreat beyond the concrete pillar. As described by Stillwagon and recorded by the security camera, Mattingly entered the parking lot immediately before Stillwagon and promptly began looping the truck around toward the pillar. (See id. ¶¶ 48-50,101-102.)

Finally, the arresting officers could have conclusively known that Stillwagon used only the amount of force reasonably necessary to repel Mattingly’s attacks. As an initial matter, the officers could have conclusively known that Stillwagon did not shoot Mattingly in the head based on the appearance of the wound, the presence of an empty shell casing in the chamber of Stillwagon’s pistol, and Stillwagon’s assertion that he never shot Mattingly; (See id. ¶¶ 67, 75-76, 105.) With respect to the shots that Stillwagon fired at the truck, the officers could have also conclusively known that Stillwagon used only the amount of force reasonably necessary. Stillwagon informed the officers that he purposefully avoided shooting at Mattingly when he shot the truck, (See id. ¶¶ 71, 78-74, 76.) The physical evidence once again supported this assertion, Stillwagon shot the truck’s tire and engine — to presumably disable the vehicle rather than harm Mat-tingly. (See id. ¶¶ 67, 71, 73-74.) And when Stillwagon shot at the truck bed, he aimed at a location far from Mattingly’s seat in the cab and he did so while trapped in the middle of an exit ramp. (See id.) Lastly, the officers could have conclusively known that Stillwagon used a proportionate amount of force in kicking and pistol whipping Mattingly. Stillwagon told the officers that Mattingly had just tried to kill him and that he feared for his life. (Id. ¶¶ 58, 65-66, 69-71, 74.) The officers could have known that this fear was reasonable given that Mattingly had brandished a baseball bat earlier in the encounter (evidenced by the bat found in Mattingly’s truck) and that Mattingly had just attempted to ram Stillwagon with a truck (evidenced by Mr. Powell’s statement and the security camera footage). (See id. ¶¶ 90,101-102.)

In sum, Stillwagon states sufficient factual allegations to, overcome the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the § 1983 false arrest claim. The Court emphasizes that the conclusions reached herein are based upon the pleadings only and not a review of testimony or exhibits, as- the motion at issue tests only the Complaint. From reading the Complaint, the Court can plausibly infer that the officers conclusively knew at the time of arrest that Stillwagon’s behavior constituted self-defense. Consequently, Stillwagon has plausibly alleged that he was arrested without probable cause.

2. Malicious Prosecution

The Municipal Defendants also move for judgment on the pleadings on Stillwagon’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Claim 2) against the Police Defendants. To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff; (2) there was no probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal proceedings, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial arrest; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiffs favor.” Webb, 789 F.3d at 659 (citing Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308-09).

According to the Municipal Defendants, Stillwagon was prosecuted based upon probable cause and an indictment issued by the Delaware County Grand Jury. (Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 8 [ECF No. 29].) As the Municipal Defendants point out, “’the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause’ for purposes of a § 1983 claim.” (Id. at 78 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Barnes, 449 F.3d at 715-16).) Stillwagon counters by highlighting the primary exception to the grand jury rule: a grand jury indictment does not conclusively determine the existence of probable cause “when defendants knowingly or recklessly present false testimony to the grand jury to obtain the indictment” Webb, 789 F.3d at 660. The Complaint, Stillwagon insists, contains plausible allegations that Mattingly and the Police Defendants presented false testimony to the grand jury and that the Police Defendants lacked probable cause to prosecute Still-wagon. (/See- Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for J. on the Pl’gs at 20 22 [ECF No. 40].) The Court agrees with Stillwagon.

As discussed in the previous section, Stillwagon alleges sufficient facts for the Court to plausibly infer that he was arrested without probable cause. However, when determining the existence of probable cause with respect to a malicious prosecution claim, courts in the Sixth Circuit “must consider not only whether probable cause existed to arrest the [plaintiff] but also whether probable cause existed to initiate the criminal proceeding against the [plaintiff].” Sykes, 625 F.3d at 310-11 (citing Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir.2007)). That is, the Court considers not only the information that the Police Defendants knew at the time, of arrest but also the information that they knew when they prosecuted Stillwagon.

In the days following Stillwagon’s arrest, prior to trial and likely before the grand jury indictment, Stillwagon alleges that the Delaware Police obtained additional information bolstering his self-defense claim and thus undermining the existence of probable cause to prosecute him. Ms. Reninger corroborated significant portions of Stillwagon’s self-defense narrative. (Compl. ¶ 91 [ECF No. 2].) Other witnesses corroborated Stillwagon’s account of Mattingly’s ambush. (See id. ¶¶ 92-95.) The police admitted that Mattingly’s erratic driving was not the result of mechanical failings. (See id. ¶ 97.) And the police obtained more information about Mattingly’s injuries — information allegedly further disproving the theory that Stillwagon shot Mattingly. (See id. ¶¶ 108, 111.) The hospital records revealed that Mattingly had a cut rather than a gunshot wound on his head. (Id. ¶ 108.) And Mattingly had a sore leg when Defendants Gerke and Segaard interviewed him on October 1 and 2, potentially demonstrating that Mattingly was kicked at a close range, not shot from a distance. (See id. ¶ 111.)

In the absence of a grand jury indictment, Stillwagon’s assertions would amount to a plausible allegation that the Police Defendants lacked probable cause to prosecute him. Because he was indicted by a grand jury, however, Stillwagon must overcome a presumption that the Police Defendants had probable cause to prosecute him. To overcome this presumption, Stillwagon must state a plausible allegation that the Police Defendants knowingly or recklessly presented false testimony to the grand jury to obtain his indictment. See Webb, 789 F.3d at 660.

Stillwagon devotes an entire subsection of his Complaint to the Police Defendants’ efforts at manufacturing false testimony for the grand jury. (See Compl. ¶¶ 120 146.) The Police Defendants allegedly presented Mattingly’s false testimony to the grand jury and then used this false testimony to create “materially false and misleading documents” for the grand jury’s review. (See id. ¶ 155.) As alleged by Still-wagon, Mattingly initially provided Gerke and Segaard with an unbelievable story of Stillwagon “being infuriated at him for no reason, and about his truck having a long list of alleged mechanical problems which made it slow down uncontrollably at times, speed up uncontrollably at other times, and at other times it would stall, or the steering would pull the truck sideways.” (Id. ¶ 120.) In that initial narrative, Mat-tingly never claimed to have been shot; “he said that [Stillwagon] was coming at his truck ‘shooting into the passenger side’ and yelling, and then ‘that’s all I remember.’” (Id.) According to Stillwagon, Gerke and Segaard doubted Mattingly’s truthfulness; they “knew immediately upon meeting and speaking with [Mattingly] that he was certainly not a source of reasonably trustworthy information.” (See id. ¶ 121.) Nonetheless, to further Stillwagon’s prosecution, Gerke and Segaard allegedly pressured Mattingly to further falsify his story. At Gerke and Segaard’s insistence, Mat-tingly purportedly invented (i) his being shot in the head, (ii) Stillwagon’s road rage, and (iii) Stillwagon’s status as the aggressor on the exit ramp and in the parking lot. (See id. ¶¶ 123-146.)

These assertions, if accepted as true, establish a plausible allegation that the Police Defendants knowingly or recklessly presented false testimony to the grand jury to obtain Stillwagon’s indictment. The Police Defendants purportedly knew, or were at least reckless to the possibility, that Mattingly had falsified key elements of his testimony. (See id. ¶¶ 120-146, 155.) Nonetheless, the Police Defendants still presented Mattingly’s testimony to the grand jury. (See id. ¶¶ 145-146, 155.) Still-wagon can thus overcome the presumption of probable cause created by the grand jury indictment. His § 1983 malicious prosecution claim survives judgment on the pleadings.

3. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Stillwagon asserts a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Claim 3). The Police Defendants allegedly violated Stillwagon’s procedural and substantive due process rights by

manufacturing and fabricating evidence, [knowingly using] false or fabricated evidence, coercing false testimony, knowingly creating false and materially misleading reports and other official documents used to support a prosecution, suppressing and destroying exculpatory evidence, [deliberately omitting] material evidence, failing to gather or preserve known exculpatory evidence, engaging in improper investigatory techniques so coercive and abusive that they would be known to yield unreliable • and false information, providing det