Murphy v. Farmer (176 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 2016)

ORDER

Timothy C. Batten, Sr., United States District Judge

This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ motions to- dismiss Plaintiff John H. Murphy’s initial complaint [11,13, 23 & 24]; Defendant Millard C. Farmer, Jr.’s motion to appoint a guardian ad litem [34]; Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint [36, 37, 38, 40 & 41]; the motion to strike filed by Defendants Deborah L. Beacham and My Advocate Center, Inc. (together the “Beacham Defendants”) [39]; the motion to stay filed by the Beacham Defendants and joined by Defendants Alfred L. King, Jr. and Larry King, P.C. (together, the “King Defendants”) [42 & 52]; Murphy’s motion for entry of default against the Beacham Defendants [46]; and Murphy’s motion to strike certain portions of the reply briefs filed by the Beacham Defendants and the King Defendants [60],

I. Background

On May 21, 2015, Murphy filed this action for damages under the state and federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statutes and state tort law. The acts alleged in the complaint arise out of a bitterly contested child custody battle that has been ongoing in the Georgia state courts. Murphy alleges that Defendants, as members of an enterprise led by Farmer, “have employed and continue to employ tactics in an illegal effort to extort payments, forced concessions, and other unjust benefits in exchange for, in Defendant Farmer’s own words, ‘restoring order’ to the individuals victimized ... by their illegal and unethically manufactured litigation chaos.” [31] ¶ 4. According to Murphy, participants in Farmer’s enterprise, referred to as the “Conflictineering Enterprise,” include Defendants as well as Michelle Murphy (Murphy’s ex-wife), Robert Hartman (Michelle Murphy’s brother), Kimellen Tunkle (Farmer’s assistant), T.B. (a minor child) and his mother, as well as other individuals.

The Court has attempted to summarize below the relevant allegations set forth in the 170-page amended complaint. For purposes of this summary, the Court assumes the facts set forth in the amended complaint are true. See Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777, 778 n. 1 (11th Cir.2015).

A. The Divorce and the Malpractice Action

In 2006, Murphy and his then-wife, Michelle Murphy, divorced. After the divorce they shared custody of their two children, who are referred to in the complaint as J.M. and T.M.

During the divorce proceedings, Michelle Murphy was represented by Delia Crouch. In December 2008, Farmer represented Michelle Murphy in a malpractice action against Crouch. In that action, Michelle Murphy claimed that Crouch had mishandled the equitable distribution of a pension, resulting in an alleged shortfall of approximately $50,000 to Michelle Murphy. In support of the complaint, King provided an affidavit expressing his opinion that Crouch had provided “substandard legal representation.” [31] It 37. Farmer paid King fees for his participation in the litigation.

In November 2010, Farmer moved to join Murphy as a defendant in the malpractice action. Murphy and his wife engaged in discussions with Farmer, but Farmer refused to accept the full amount in dispute to resolve the case. After Farmer-threatened to make the case expensive and painful, Murphy and his wife “capitulated to Defendant Farmer’s extortionate demands and paid him and Michelle Murphy $150,000” to resolve the case. Id. ¶ 41. Farmer and King became “acutely aware of the wealth of Mr. Murphy and his wife” as á result of the malpractice litigation. Id. ¶ 42.

B. The Child Custody Proceedings

In 2011, Murphy became concerned about Michelle Murphy’s custody of their children, and in April 2012, he filed an action in state court seeking to modify the child custody arrangement. (The Court will refer to the 2012 action filed in state court as the “child custody litigation.”) Farmer and King represented Michelle Murphy in the child custody litigation, with Farmer serving as lead counsel.

During the course of the child custody litigation, Farmer and King filed more than twenty motions to disqualify judges involved in the proceedings. In May 2012, Michelle Murphy filed an answer seeking an upward modification of child support. She also asserted “a patently frivolous and vexatious” third-party complaint against Murphy’s current wife. Id. ¶ 47. This claim was filed “solely to place pressure on her to persuade her husband to abandon his child custody claims and to secure a large shakedown payment for Defendants Farmer and King.” Id. ¶ 12. ■

Shortly after filing the third-party claim, King contacted Murphy’s current wife to resolve the dispute raised in the third-party complaint against her. King proposed to “privately discuss the core dispute and resolve this matter outside the courtroom.” [31] ¶ 49. King wrote, “My plan is simple, I have [Defendant Farmer’s] ear and he has the ability to develop a plan acceptable to Michelle.” [1-3]. King again reached out to Murphy’s wife about a week later and proposed a private meeting saying, “My role in this litigation is a lot different from Mr. Farmer’s. Mr. Farmer is a litigator. He only knows excessive litigation.” [31] ¶ 50 (emphasis omitted). Murphy alleges that “[t]he clear message conveyed” by King was that if Murphy’s wife did not persuade her husband to abandon his claims in the child custody litigation and settle, “they would be faced with escalated ‘excessive litigation’ at the hands of’ Farmer, who they knew would take unreasonable positions as he had done in the malpractice litigation and would file frivolous defamatory submissions as he had done with his motions to recuse the state court judge. Id. ¶ 51. Murphy’s wife declined King’s offer to discuss a resolution.

Murphy later amended his complaint, and in response Michelle Murphy filed an amended third-party complaint that was “replete with abusive, impertinent material, and fixated on the purported financial means and assets of’ Murphy and his wife. Id. ¶ 54. Murphy alleges that such allegations confirm “the Conflictineering Enterprise’s focus upon the assets they could target for themselves.” Id. ¶ 55. Murphy also alleges that throughout the litigation, Farmer and King used motions and appeals to delay adjudication of the merits of Murphy’s claims and intimidate participants in the litigation.

C. Attacks on Guardians ad Litem and Evaluators

Murphy alleges that King and Farmer “engaged in systemic attacks” against the individuals appointed to serve as a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for the children. After protesting the appointment of and refusing to pay for a GAL, Farmer and the enterprise “undertook to intimidate, harass, and badger the first GAL,” and as a result of these attacks she withdrew within two months of being appointed. Id. ¶ 65. In June 2012, a new GAL was appointed, and Farmer and King filed a “baseless and malicious” motion to disqualify her. Id. ¶ 66. The court denied their motion; they appealed; and the court of appeals ruled that the appeal was frivolous, imposing the maximum sanction available.

Farmer insisted upon the involvement of Dr. Patricia Nice, the children’s treating psychiatrist, but he failed to disclose to the court that he had previously represented Dr. Nice free of charge in connection with several employment-related matters. Farmer arranged a meeting with Dr. Nice before a court hearing, and during that meeting he informed her that he expected her to support Michelle Murphy in her position in the child custody litigation. Dr. Nice informed him that she found it difficult to do so, but Farmer refused to accept Dr. Nice’s view. Based on her observations of Farmer’s prior behavior, she “reasonably feared that he expected her to suppress” any evidence or information that would put Michelle Murphy in a negative light, and she understood that “Farmer would seek to ‘destroy1 her publieally, professionally, and personally if she” did so. Id. ¶ 76. Murphy alleges that as a result of Farmer’s influence and intimidation, Dr. Nice did not provide any testimony at the hearing that was harmful to Michelle Murphy’s interests.

Farmer then pushed to get Dr. Nice more involved with the litigation. Murphy avers that Farmer anticipated that Dr. Nice would capitulate to his threats and refuse to recommend a full custody evaluation, but Dr. Nice, along with psychologist Tony Johnson, Ph.D., issued a joint letter to the court recommending a full custody evaluation. Farmer and King filed a frivolous appeal to delay the court’s decision regarding the evaluation. In the meantime, at Farmer’s urging the children stopped attending their appointments with Drs. Johnson and Nice and became alienated from Murphy and his current wife.

D. Attempted Intimidation of Witnesses

In August 2013, Farmer engaged in several attempts to intimidate witnesses involved in the proceedings. Murphy submitted the affidavit of Bryan McLendon, who had rented a room to Michelle Murphy and provided transportation for the children. In his affidavit McLendon detailed disturbing conduct of Michelle Murphy and hazardous incidents involving the children. Shortly after the affidavit was filed, Farmer contacted McLendon, who was a former client of Farmer’s, “for the overt purpose of threatening him with imprisonment, intimidating him, and pressuring him to recant his sworn testimony against Michelle Murphy.” Id. ¶ 90.

Murphy also alleges that Farmer issued threats to Dr. Johnson and Dr. Nice to intimidate them and influence their testimony. ' Farmer represented to Dr. Johnson that he would cause difficulties with Georgia state licensing authorities if Dr. Johnson testified' negatively against Michelle Murphy. Similarly, Dr. Nice feared that Farmer would create similar problems for her and that he would use against her sensitive personal information that he obtained during the course of representing her. Days before the hearing, Farmer contacted Illinois licensing authorities to obtain written information regarding Dr. Nice’s license status. In furtherance of a good cop/bad cop technique, King intercepted Dr. Nice on her way into the courthouse for a hearing, and using a calmer approach he sought a preview of Dr. Nice’s testimony and attempted to influence and shape that testimony.

Dr. Nice still testified about her concerns for the children, and the court ordered the parties to submit to a full custody evaluation by Dr. Nancy McGarrah. After her testimony, Farmer filed a series of briefs revealing personal information regarding Dr. Nice. Despite the court’s order, Michelle Murphy refused to participate in the custody evaluation.

In September 2013, Farmer attempted to intimidate Dr. McGarrah and dissuade her- from serving as custody evaluator. Specifically, Farmer wrote a letter demanding various information from her and asking her irrelevant and inappropriate questions about the pleadings and orders in the case. Dr. McGarrah acknowledged receipt in a letter copying Murphy’s counsel. Farmer then sent Dr. McGarrah another letter attacking her for disclosing his prior letter and threatening to contact the APA Ethics Committee.

E. The Contempt Order and Other Intimidation

In the meantime, Murphy filed a motion for contempt against Michelle Murphy based on her failure to cooperate with the custody examination and statements by the children indicating that Farmer and Michelle Murphy were discussing the case with the children in violation of a court order. Farmer and Michelle Murphy did not appear at the contempt hearing, and the court found Michelle Murphy, Farmer, and King in contempt of court as a result of Michelle Murphy’s refusal to cooperate in the custody evaluation, the discussions that she and Farmer had with the children, and Farmer and King’s direction that she not appear at the hearing. They appealed the order, and the court of appeals held that Farmer and King could not be held in contempt for Michelle Murphy’s failure to appear at the hearing but otherwise confirmed the contempt order against Michelle Murphy and Farmer.

Michelle Murphy continued to refuse to cooperate with the custody evaluation, and Farmer and King filed a frivolous motion to disqualify Dr. McGarrah as custody evaluator. Murphy then filed a motion for a mental examination of Michelle. Murphy, which the court granted. After the hearing on that issue, Farmer sent Dr. McGar-rah another letter intended to intimidate her, indicating that Michelle Murphy would not participate in any examination in which Dr. McGarrah might be shielded from liability. The day after receiving this letter, Dr. McGarrah moved to withdraw as the custody evaluator and the psychiatrist appointed to conduct Michelle Murphy’s mental examination. The court subsequently appointed Dr. H. Elizabeth King as the new evaluator.

F. Murphy Is Awarded Temporary Custody and the Enterprise Reacts

In May 2014, after a hearing the court awarded temporary custody of the children to Murphy. Despite a court order prohibiting her from having any contact with the children, Michelle Murphy continued to contact them numerous times a day. At Farmer’s direction, she instructed the children to resist Murphy’s efforts to take their mobile phones away and to use any such effort as a pretext for an altercation.

In June of 2014, Murphy tried to take T.M.’s mobile phone away, and when T.M. resisted, he scraped one of his lips against his braces. Michelle Murphy instructed the children to get photographs to send with a message that Murphy caused the injury. . The next day, Farmer and King filed a court document representing, that Murphy had abused T.M.

That same day, ■ Michelle Murphy communicated with J.M. that she had a plan to get him out of Murphy’s home. Shortly after that, J.M. ran away from Murphy’s residence in St. Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Murphy believes that Michelle Murphy and/or Farmer encouraged J.M. to run away. J.M. spoke with Michelle Murphy and Farmer during the time he was missing. Murphy avers that one or both of them directed J.M. to demand that Murphy state in writing that he agreed the children would be better off with Michelle Murphy in Newnan, Georgia. At the demand of J.M., as instructed by Michelle Murphy or Farmer', Murphy sent J.M. a text message saying, “I will work with you to get you back to Newnan.” Id. ¶ 155. In her communications with J.M. the following day, Michelle Murphy asked if a flight had been scheduled and referenced the prior day’s events as involving “negotiations,” a “deal,” and “ransom.” Id. ¶ 158.

At almost the same time he discovered J.M. was missing, Murphy received a visit from a representative of the U.S. Virgin Islands Department of Human Services who stated that she had received a report of child abuse filed by Farmer. As a result, Murphy was unable to leave and immediately search for J.M. After investigating, the representative did not find any evidence to support the allegations.

G. Attempted Bribery and Intimidation

Also in June 2014, Farmer and King embarked upon a scheme to attempt to bribe the judge in the child custody litigation by threatening and filing frivolous litigation against the judge’s court reporter, Nan Freeman. Farmer sent Freeman a series of emails demanding that she provide him with audio tapes of hearings in the child custody litigation. The judge subsequently agreed to make them available to Farmer, but Farmer used the threat of a lawsuit to demand that he receive his own personal copy of the recording. The judge ultimately agreed to this, but Farmer and King had already filed a lawsuit against Freeman and her business the day before. Farmer contacted Freeman’s attprney shortly after he appeared in the case and said that he would dismiss the case if Freeman persuaded the judge in the child custody dispute to recuse himself and vacate his ruling granting temporary custody to Murphy. Freeman and her attorney declined, and Freeman ultimately prevailed in the litigation.

At the same time they filed their lawsuit against Freeman, Farmer also demanded the initiation of a criminal investigation of Freeman for allegedly overbilling the counties to which she provided services. The Cobb County district attorney’s office investigated and found the allegations to be without merit.

Michelle Murphy also threatened Dr. Johnson around the same time. On June 22, she approached him at the Newnan Target store and began harassing him in the checkout line, saying that he was the reason she lost custody of her children. After he left the line, Michelle Murphy followed him and stated that she was going to “take him down.” Id. ¶ 174.

H. The Enterprise Seeks Evidence Against Murphy and Begins Social Media Campaign; King Retires

In the summer of 2014, Michelle Murphy also met with a minor friend of the children, T.B., to develop a scheme whereby T.B. would travel to the Virgin Islands to visit the children and attempt tó manufacture false evidence that Murphy was abusing the children so that the entérprise could raise additional claims of child abuse. During a visit, T.B. enticed the children to engage in delinquent and criminal acts. Among other things, he urged them to steal and consume alcoholic beverages, persuaded them to purchase and manufacture marijuana pipes, and helped them roll “blunts” consisting of marijuana mixed with cigar tobacco. T.B. remained in contact with Michelle Murphy, and King and Farmer filed an emergency motion for relief alleging that the children were consuming alcohol and drugs. Farmer met with T.B. upon his return, and Farmer and King filed an amendment to their emergency motion expanding their allegations.

On August 26, 2014,. King suddenly moved to withdraw as co-counsel for Michelle Murphy, indicating that he was retiring. On September 10, the court granted his motion. ¡Murphy avers that King foresaw the continuing activities of the enterprise to extort money from Murphy and his wife and to pressure Murphy to abandon his claims in the child custody litigation. “Nevertheless, Defendant King did not take any action to disavow or defeat the objectives of the” enterprise. Id, ¶ 188. Murphy therefore asserts that King did not withdraw from the enterprise.

In August of 2014, Hartman and perhaps other members of the enterprise trespassed onto Murphy’s property in St. Thomas to give the children new cell phones and deliver J.M. a “runaway kit.” Id. ¶ 189. Around the same time, Michelle Murphy and other members of the enterprise launched a social media campaign to bring additional pressure on Murphy to relinquish his claims and pay off the enterprise. Shortly after that, the Beacham Defendants joined the enterprise to further the objectives of the enterprise and their own closely related objective of increasing the profile and profitability of My Advocate Center.

I. The Beacham Defendants’ Scheme to Defraud

Beacham owns and operates My Advocate Center. She is not a licensed attorney or social worker and has no training in psychology. Her involvement in family matters arises from her own divorce.

In 2011, Beacham began operating My Advocate Center. .According to the organization’s website, it offers an array of tools and resources to assist parents and professionals in custody disputes. The website states that it'“offers a collection of experts and resources to give individuals a way to know they are on the right path and in good hands when entering into or navigating through a legal conflict,” and it refers to the skill and experience of the organization’s “team” and its advisory council. Id. ¶¶ 205, 209. The website also refers to the organization as having analysts and legal counsel, and it promises to refer parents to “M-A-C-Qualified Professionals.” Id. ¶ at 207. It urges litigants to consult with the organization before filing or if they have just hired an attorney.

Murphy alleges that the representations on the My Advocate Center website are false. He avers that My Advocate Center does not have a team of experts or an advisory council, and in fact Beacham operates My Advocate Center as a “one-woman shop” that does not provide any legitimate support services. Id. ¶ at 204. According to Murphy, Beacham has served as the only full-time employee of the organization, and “Rebecca Bennett,” the only other employee listed on the website, is an alias for Beacham. He alleges that the only service provided by My Advocate Center is “the dissemination of false accusations by disappointed family court litigants.” Id. ¶ 214.

My Advocate Center offers services for a consulting fee. The website also solicits donations. Murphy alleges that Beacham operates My Advocate Center as a scheme or artifice to defraud whereby she entices clients and donors “to line her own pockets by holding My Advocate Center out as a legitimate organization providing case management services to child custody litigants.” Id. ¶ 219. Murphy avers that the Beacham Defendants viewed the child custody litigation as “a prime opportunity to enhance the profile of My Advocate Center.”

J. Kidnapping and Dissemination of False Statements

On or before August 29, 2014, with the knowledge and support of other members of the enterprise, Beacham traveled to St. Thomas. There, she enticed the children to sneak off Murphy’s property and get into the back seat of a waiting van. Beac-ham then engaged the children in a heavily-scripted videotaped interview, asking the children highly leading questions with the “obvious purpose” to “elicit false or distorted allegations of child abuse or other alleged misconduct” by Murphy. Id. ¶ 195. The enterprise intended to use this video to further pressure Murphy into giving up his child custody claims and making “a shakedown payment to terminate the continuing terroristic attacks and deliberate endangerment of the Children.” Id. ¶ 196. The enterprise showed portions of Beacham’s interview with the children at town hall meetings organized and conducted by Farmer, Michelle Murphy, and Beacham. Portions of the video were also posted to My Advocate Center’s website.

In September 2014, members of the enterprise posted on social media detailed information about the children and about Murphy and his wife that according to Murphy made them an attractive target for kidnapping. Around the same time, they created false and misleading posts indicating that the children had been placed with Murphy as a result of purported bribery of judicial and quasi-judicial officials.

That month, members of the enterprise disseminated false and misleading statements through newspaper articles and town hall meetings. For example, the financial publication FINalternatives published an article regarding the child custody litigation after being contacted by Beacham. Farmer and Michelle Murphy made numerous false statements to the journalist, and the article quoted Michelle Murphy as saying that the children were being “held against their will” and “imprisoned.” Id. ¶ 238.

On September 18, Farmer, the Beacham Defendants, and Michelle Murphy conducted a town hall meeting that was publicized through social media. At the meeting, Beacham claimed to have 200 cases in Atlanta and dozens more in Augusta. She also admitted that Michelle Murphy paid for her trip to the Virgin Islands, and she had agreed to tape the secret interview of the boys because Michelle Murphy would have been arrested for attempted kidnapping.

On September 23, Farmer, the Beacham Defendants, and Michelle Murphy held their second town hall meeting that was also “replete with false accusations against” Murphy, his wife, and others involved in the child custody litigation. Id. ¶253. Michelle Murphy and others also organized various pickets in Newnan, Georgia. Murphy avers that these activities were intended to bring additional pressure on Murphy and his wife to withdraw the child custody litigation and capitulate to the demand for attorney’s fees.

In October 2014, Farmer and Michelle Murphy called the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services and filed another false report of child abuse. Murphy and his wife were visited and questioned in their home in Chattanooga. Also in October 2014, as a response to a frivolous motion filed by Farmer, the state court entered an order prohibiting Farmer from filing further motions without its permission.

Murphy alleges that Michelle Murphy and other members of the enterprise have engaged in a social media campaign to disseminate false, defamatory statements. Among other things, they have accused Murphy and/or his wife of physically and emotionally abusing the children, abusing alcohol, engaging in bribery, witness tampering, and other illegal acts, using the children to secure tax advantages. Murphy also alleges that Beacham has made similar defamatory statements, through the My Advocate Center website, and using that organization to give the statements greater credibility. In September 2014, Beacham posted statements that the children were “purchased in Georgia with the help of certain court professionals”; “silenced by custody experts paid to ensure the case turns out a certain way”; and “held against their will.” Id. ¶ 270-71.

In March 2015, she posted another story. In that post, Beacham accused family court professionals of “trafficking” children, referred to “fraud and racketeering practices,” referred to kids being “bought and sold,” stated that “this mess and related damages could have been avoided if laws were upheld, and ethics rules and judicial canons upheld,” insinuated that child custody experts were “known for abandoning abused children, falsifying reports, committing perjury, and participating in fraud,” stated that “the court was using extortion tactics to force the mother to work with” the two doctors involved, and indicated that a law firm had been hired “to ensure that the trial court was not investigated for wrongdoing and that the higher courts did not get to learn that transcripts were incomplete and that fraud had occurred.” Id. ¶ 272.

In January 2015, in a conversation with Murphy, Michelle Murphy stated that Farmer had told her that she owed him $500,000 and that the child custody litigation could not be resolved unless Murphy paid this to him. Murphy avers that when he and his wife refused to capitulate to the demand to pay Farmer $500,000, the enterprise intensified its defamatory attacks on Murphy and his wife by, among other things, making defamatory radio broadcasts.

The Beacham Defendants began a radio show known as “Pro Advocate Radio.” In March 2015, they broadcast two shows in which they made numerous defamatory statements. Among other things, they falsely accused Murphy and others of participating in criminal acts and stated that it was “pre-arranged” for the children to be removed from Michelle Murphy. Id. ¶ 285. In response to a defamation retraction demand letter that Murphy sent to it, the radio station stated that Farmer had reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of the content and the facts prior to the show. In June 2015, the state court entered an order enjoining Michelle Murphy or anyone acting on her behalf from posting any information regarding the child custody litigation on the Internet.

K. Murphy’s Claims

Based on the foregoing facts, Murphy brings Georgia and federal RICO claims against all Defendants. Murphy alleges nine separate predicate acts in support of his Georgia RICO claims:

(1) attempted theft by extortion (in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-16) “by unlawfully seeking to obtain payments and other property of or from” Murphy, “including the relinquishment of his custody claims and payment of excessive attorney’s fees” through the actual and threatened commission of criminal offenses and the dissemination of false or negative information “designed to promote hatred, contempt, and ridicule,” id. ¶ 383;

(2) attempted bribery of a state court judge (in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2) by offering to dismiss the lawsuit against Freeman in exchange for the judge’s retroactive recusal from the child custody litigation;

(3) intimidation of a court officer (in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-1097) by issuing threatening communications to and filing a-lawsuit against Freeman and by making inflammatory accusations against a guardian ad litem in motions and on the Internet;

(4) influencing witnesses (in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-93) by “threaten- ■ ing harm or damage to the property or employment of witnesses” in the child custody litigation, including Dr. Nice, Dr. McGarrah, Dr. Johnson, Harwell, and McLendon, with the intent to deter them from testifying truthfully, id. ¶ 361;

(5) kidnapping and kidnapping for extortion (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201 & 1952 and' 14 ' V.I.C. § 1052) by enticing the children away from Murphy and detaining them while Beacham “used thé children to manufacture false evidence in the” child custody litigation to intimidate Murphy and obtain extortionate payments, id. ¶ 402;

(6) filing a false report of child abuse via interstate wires (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 14 V.I.C. §§ 2144(a) & 2146(c), T.C.A. § 37-1-413), through Farmer’s filing of false reports of child abuse with authorities in the Virgin Islands and Tennessee;

(7) interference with custody (in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-45), through the actions of Farmer and the Beac-ham Defendants in enticing J.M. to run away and later enticing the children away from Murphy so that Beacham could conduct her interview;

(8) wire fraud (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343) through Beacham’s operation of My Advocate Center as a “scheme or artifice to defraud” for the purposes of soliciting clients and donations and conveying legitimacy in order to lend credibility to false accusations that are disseminated over the Internet to pressure parties, id. ¶¶ 432-33; and

(9)mail and wire fraud (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343) through communi- ■ cations between King and Murphy’s ex-wife to bring pressure on Murphy to relinquish his claims and pay the enterprise.

Murphy also brings claims for conspiracy to violate Georgia RICO, and he alleges that'Defendants violated and conspired to violate the federal RICO statute. Murphy’s federal RICO claims are based on the allegations of attempted theft by extortion, attempted bribery, kidnapping and kidnapping for extortion, filing a false report of child abuse via interstate wires, wire fraud, and mail and wire fraud listed above. Finally, Murphy brings defamation claims against Farmer and the Beac-ham Defendants for defamatory statements made at town hall meetings, on the Internet, and through radio.

II. Motion for Default Judgment

Murphy has moved for default judgment against the Beacham Defendants in light of their failure to file a timely answer or otherwise respond to the amended complaint. Murphy filed his amended complaint on August 5, 2015. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(3) provides that unless the Court orders otherwise, any required response to an amended pleading must be made by the later of the deadline for responding to the original, pleading or fourteen days after service of the amended pleading.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants were required to respond to the amended complaint on or before August 24, 2015. However, the Beacham Defendants did not respond until August 25, when they filed their motions to dismiss. In those motions, the Beac-ham Defendants neither requested an extension of time to respond to the amended complaint nor explained their failure to timely respond. On August 31, Murphy pointed out that the Beacham Defendants were in default in his response to their motion to stay.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” However, pursuant to Rule 55(c), the Court “may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” In this case, default has not yet been entered, but because the Court sees no point in granting default only to set it aside, it will look to the “good cause” standard in Rule 55(c) to determine whether to grant Murphy’s motion.

The Beacham Defendants do not contest that their motions to dismiss were filed a day late, but they contend that the one-day delay in filing these motions does not warrant the entry of default. They explain that their counsel “inadvertently miscalculated” the due date for their responsive motions and was unaware that the motions were late at the time they were filed. [48] at 2. But they argue that they have not failed to plead or otherwise defend the action as required for entry of default, noting that they filed timely motions to dismiss Murphy’s initial complaint and have participated in other aspects of the case, including the parties’ initial discovery conference. They also note that Murphy has not shown or even alleged any prejudice resulting from their one-day delay in filing their motions to dismiss. See Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir.2002) (concluding that exceptional circumstances to justify entry of a default judgment were not present where the defendant failed to file an answer but filed a motion to dismiss “a short time after the deadline for responsive pleadings”). Thus, they argue that their one-day delay in filing motions to dismiss is merely a “technical default” that “does not warrant the harsh sanctions sought by” Murphy. Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F.Supp. 1442, 1444 (N.D.Ga.1984).

Focusing on their reasons for the delayed filing, Murphy notes that it is well-established that “attorney error based on a misunderstanding of the law was an insufficient basis for excusing a failure to comply with a deadline.” Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 998 (11th Cir.1997). Murphy cites several cases finding that an attorney’s missed deadlines did not constitute “excusable neglect” to warrant, for example, an extension of time to file a notice of appeal or relief from a judgment. However, none of those cases appears to have involved the situation the Court is confronted with here.

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “ ‘good cause’ is not susceptible to a precise formula.” Compania Interamericana Exp.-Imp., S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir.1996). But courts have generally evaluated considerations such as “whether the default was culpable or willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether the defaulting party presents a meritorious defense.” Id.

Here, the Beacham Defendants filed a motion to dismiss that was a day late. There is no indication that their mistake, or that of their counsel, was willful, and Murphy has not shown that he was prejudiced by this in any way. Further, the Beacham Defendants filed a timely response to Murphy’s motion for default judgment explaining the reason for the late filing. Considering the circumstances and the fact that a default judgment “is a drastic remedy which should be used only in extreme situations,” Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir.1985), the Court concludes that even if Murphy would be entitled to default based on the Beacham Defendants’ delay in filing their motions to dismiss, they have shown good cause for setting aside any default. The Court will therefore deny Murphy’s motion for default.

III. Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Reply Briefs

Pending before the Court are two separate sets of motions to dismiss — Defendants’ motions to dismiss Murphy’s original complaint and their motions to dismiss his amended complaint. “As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint unless the amendment specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading.” Schreane v. Middlebrooks, 522 Fed.Appx. 845, 847 (11th Cir.2013) (quoting Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. & Can., 674 F.2d 1365, 1370 n. 6 (11th Cir.1982)). Because Murphy’s amended complaint supersedes his original complaint, and Defendants have separately moved to dismiss the amended complaint, the Court will deny Defendants’ motions to dismiss the original complaint as moot. See Thomas v. Alcon Labs., 116 F.Supp.3d 1361, 1365 n. 5 (N.D.Ga.2013) (“[A] motion to dismiss is rendered moot by an amended pleading.”)

Also before the Court is Murphy’s motion to strike new arguments raised for the first time in reply briefs filed by the Beac-ham Defendants and the King Defendants. Murphy notes that both sets of Defendants presented in their reply briefs new arguments that they did not raise in their initial motions. Specifically, the Beacham Defendants challenge the “nexus” or causation between the alleged racketeering acts and Murphy’s injuries. The King Defendants raise new arguments that Murphy has not alleged an enterprise or that he has not sufficiently alleged the King Defendants’ participation in an enterprise. Murphy asks the Court to strike new arguments raised for the first time in the reply briefs. Alternatively, he requests leave to file a sur-reply. In response, the King Defendants and the Beacham Defendants do not dispute that they raised new arguments for the first time in their reply briefs. Instead, they ask the Court to permit the arguments in their reply briefs and allow Murphy to file a sur-reply.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that a reply brief is not the proper subject of a motion to strike. Rule 12(f) permits the Court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” A reply brief is not a “pleading” as defined by Rule 7(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (narrowly defining “pleadings”); see also Circle Grp., L.L.C. v. Se. Carpenters Reg’l Council, 836 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1349 (N.D.Ga.2011) (noting that Rule 7(a) “applies to pleadings, not to motions or briefs filed in support of motions”). For that reason, the Court will not “strike” the new arguments in the reply brief.

However, the Court agrees with the substance of Murphy’s argument. “It is common practice for the Court not to hear arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Kelley v. Washington Mut. Fin. Inc., No. 1:11-cv-2497-RWS, 2013 WL 5530351, at *4 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 4, 2013); see also Tafel v. Lion Antique Invs. & Consulting Servs., 459 Fed.Appx. 847, 849 (11th Cir.2012) (“The district court had no obligation to consider an argument raised for the first time in the reply brief.”).

The King Defendants and Beacham Defendants have not offered any reason for their failure to raise their new arguments in their motions, and the Court is not inclined to consider them at this juncture. However, Defendants may raise these arguments in a subsequent motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion for summary judgment, as appropriate. The Court now proceeds to the arguments properly raised in Defendants’ motions to dismiss Murphy’s amended complaint.

A. Legal Standard

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Chandler v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir.2012). The Supreme Court has explained this standard as follows:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not aldn to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citation omitted); Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir.2012). Thus, a claim will survive a motion to dismiss only if the factual allegations in the complaint are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. All well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.2011), but the Court need not accept as true Plaintiffs legal conclusions, including those couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

B. King Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The King Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Murphy’s claims for several reasons. First, they contend that Murphy cannot show the pattern necessary to establish his federal RICO claims. Second, they argue that Murphy’s state law RICO claims are precluded by O.C.G.A. § 51-7-85, which serves as the exclusive state-law remedy for abusive litigation. Alternatively, they assert that Murphy has failed to establish a pattern under Georgia law. Finally, they argue that res judicata bars any claims addressed in the state court’s contempt order or that the Court should dismiss the action under the prior action pending doctrine,

1. Federal RICO — Pattern of Racketeering

The federal RICO statute “makes it unlawful ‘to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise [that affects interstate commerce] through a pattern of racketeering activity.’ ” Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 948 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). “[T]o state a prima facie civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), a plaintiff must establish ‘three essential elements’: first, that the defendant committed a pattern of RICO predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. § 1962; second, that the plaintiff suffered injury to business. or property; and, finally, that the defendant’s racketeering activity proximately caused the injury.” Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 744 F.3d 702, 705 (11th Cir.2014) (quoting Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.1991)). In their motion, the King Defendants challenge only the first of these elements, arguing that Murphy has failed to sufficiently allege a pattern of racketeering activity.

Congress has defined “racketeering” activity as a violation of the criminal statutes listed in § 1961(1). “To successfully allege a pattern of racketeering activity, [Murphy] must charge that: (1) the defendants committed two or more predicate acts within a ten-year time span; (2) the predicate acts were related to one another; and (3) the predicate acts demonstrated criminal conduct of a continuing nature.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1264 (11th Cir.2004). The King Defendants contend that Murphy’s complaint does not satisfy the two-predicate-acts requirement or the continuity requirement.

Regarding the two-predicate-acts requirement, the King Defendants appear to make two general arguments, neither of which the Court-finds persuasive. First, without citation, the King Defendants argue that where multiple predicate acts, are simply constituent parts of the same scheme, there is no pattern of racketeering. They note that in Jackson, where the alleged fraudulent acts all related to settlement negotiations of a single lawsuit, the Eleventh Circuit found no pattern of racketeering activity. However, Jackson did not address-whether the plaintiffs in that case had alleged two predicate acts; instead, it addressed whether they had established continuity. The King Defendants have cited no authority for their suggestion that a pattern can never be established where the predicate acts are all in furtherance of the same scheme. Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to have rejected a similar argument. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 196 (1989) (finding no support in the statute or its legislative history “for the proposition ... that predicate acts of racketeering may form a pattern only when they are part of separate illegal schemes”).

The King Defendants also note that “[c]ourts have been particularly unwilling to find a pattern of racketeering in allegations of abusive litigation.” [38] at 14. In support, they note that the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned that “prosecuting litigation activities as federal crimes would undermine the policies of access and finality that animate our legal system.” United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1208 (11th Cir.2002). But Pendergrafl concerned the legal sufficiency of charges for extortion and mail fraud based on a threat to seek damages in a lawsuit against a governmental entity. Although Pendergrafl might speak to whether Murphy has sufficiently alleged the elements of the specific predicate acts of extortion and mail fraud, the King Defendants do not appear to expressly raise this argument in their motion. Rather than attacking the sufficiency of individual predicate acts, they make only the general argument that Murphy’s RICO claims should be dismissed because they are related to abusive litigation. Although the Court shares the King Defendants’ concerns about permitting claims such as these to proceed under RICO, that in and of itself is not a basis for dismissal.

The Court now turns to the crux of the King Defendants’ arguments with respect to the federal RICO statute— that Murphy has not sufficiently alleged continuity. Establishing a “‘pattern of racketeering’ activity requires proof of something beyond the two predicate acts themselves. That something is the threat of continuing racketeering activity.” Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Jones v. Childers, 18 F.3d 899, 912 (11th Cir.1994)). Continuity may be established in one of two ways. A plaintiff may prove closed-ended continuity by showing “a closed period of repeated conduct,” or the plaintiff may prove open-ended continuity by showing “past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.” Id. (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241-42, 109 S.Ct. 2893).

Murphy alleges a pattern of racketeering that spans a three-year-plus period of time. The predicate acts alleged in the complaint include attempted extortion, attempted bribery of a state court judge, kidnapping, wire fraud, and mail fraud. According to the complaint, “[a]ll of these crimes were perpetrated with the goals of placing illicit and undue pressure on Mr. Murphy and his wife to relinquish his claims” in the child custody litigation, “extorting a ‘pay off to Defendant Farmer and the Conflictineering Enterprise,” and “enhancing the public profiles and revenue streams of’ Defendants. [31] ¶ 14.

The King Defendants rely heavily on Jackson in support of their contention that Murphy has failed to established continuity. In Jackson, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that there was no closed-ended continuity in part because “the alleged racketeering activity was related to the settlement of a single lawsuit, and, notably, was not designed to perpetrate racketeering with respect to a series of cases.” Id. at 1267. The court noted that schemes lasting less than a year generally cannot show closed-ended continuity, and “where the RICO allegations concern only a single scheme with a discrete goal, the courts have refused to find a closed-ended pattern of racketeering even when the scheme took place over longer periods of time.” Id. The King Defendants contend that this case too concerns only a single scheme with a discrete goal, and therefore the Court should find that there is no continuity.

Murphy distinguishes Jackson from the present litigation in several ways. As he points out, the scheme in Jackson stretched over only nine months, which is a much shorter period of time than the three-year-plus scheme alleged in this case. Murphy' also contends that while Jackson involved the settlement of a single lawsuit, the allegations in the amended complaint encompass much more than that. He points to the three-and-a-half-year battle in the child custody litigation as well as the 2010 settlement of the malpractice litigation filed against Crouch, Michelle Murphy’s former attorney, and the lawsuit filed against court reporter Nan Freeman in furtherance of Defendants’ alleged scheme to bribe a state court judge. Murphy also distinguishes this case from Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. Papageorge, 31 F.Supp.3d 1, 12-13 (D.D.C.2014), which the King Defendants also cite. In that case, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to plead a “pattern” of racketeering where the alleged pattern, which spanned several years, consisted of a single scheme, a single injury, and a single victim. Murphy argues that here, there is more than one victim of the scheme alleged in his complaint. Murphy also contends that unlike the plaintiff in Papageorge, whose allegations focused exclusively on prior litigation, he has identified extensive extra-litigation conduct as part of the pattern of racketeering.

Having considered the arguments on both sides, the Court believes the question of whether Murphy has established closed-ended continuity is a close one. The scheme alleged here is longer than the scheme in Jackson and in Ferrell v. Durbin, 311 Fed.Appx. 253, 256 (11th Cir.2009), where the court held that a scheme spanning approximately eighteen months did not .establish closed-ended continuity because of “the scant allegations, the limited time frame, the single scheme and the existence of only two victims.” Indeed, courts have found closed-ended continuity where the alleged scheme was shorter than this. See Chesapeake Employers’ Ins. Co. v. Eades, 77 F.Supp.3d 1241, 1256 (N.D.Ga.2015) (finding allegations that the defendants committed multiple acts of mail and wire fraud over two years and two months adequate to survive a motion to dismiss). However, as the King Defendants point out, the scheme has a discrete goal that is explicitly tied to the child custody litigation. Additionally, Murphy appears to allege , only six or seven predicate acts in support of his federal claims, a relatively small number over such a long period of time. Nevertheless, in comparison to many of the schemes involved in the cases cited by the King Defendants, the scheme here involved the commission of a larger variety of predicate acts, and the alleged victims include not only Murphy, the direct target of the scheme, but also others involved in the litigation. Given the length of the scheme, the variety of predicate acts and variety of victims, the Court concludes that Murphy has established a sufficient basis for closed-ended continuity to survive a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court need not address open-ended continuity.

2. State Law Claims

The Georgia RICO statute was modeled after the federal RICO statute and contains similar language for a similar purpose. See Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 279 Ga. 428,614 S.E.2d 758, 760 (2005). Under the Georgia RICO statute, it is “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.” O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(b). Like the federal RICO statute, the Georgia RICO statute provides for a civil right of action. See id. at § 16-14-6(c). The King Defendants argue that Murphy’s claims under the Georgia RICO statute fail for two reasons; First,‘they contend that these claims are precluded by Georgia’s abusive litigation statute, which is the exclusive remedy under Georgia law for abusive litigation. Second, they argue that Murphy has failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity under the Georgia RICO statute.

Georgia’s abusive litigation statute provides that “[a]ny person who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or procurement of civil proceedings against another shall be liable for abusive litigation” if that person acts “[w]ith malice” and “[without substantial justification.” O.C.G.A. § 51-7-81. Malice “means acting with ill will or for a wrongful purpose and may be inferred in an action if* the party initiated, continued, or procured civil proceedings or process in a harassing manner or used process for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based.” Id. § 51-7-80. Wrongful purpose includes “[attempting to unjustifiably harass or intimidate another party or witness to the proceeding” or “[ajttempting to unjustifiably accomplish some ulterior or collateral purpose other than resolving the subject controversy on its merits.” Id. And a proceeding is without justification if it is frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or vexatious. Id.

The foregoing statute is the exclusive remedy for abusive litigation in Georgia. It provides that “no claim other than as provided in” that article or in O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 “shall be allowed, whether statutory or common law, for the torts of malicious use of civil proceedings, malicious abuse of civil process, nor abusive litigation,” Id. § 51-7-85. And it expressly states that it “is the exclusive remedy for abusive litigation.” Id. Georgia courts have applied the exclusivity provision to exclude various tort claims based on the filing of abusive litigation. See Meadow Springs Recovery, LLC v. Wof-ford, 319 Ga.App. 79, 734 S.E.2d 100, 103 (2012) (concluding that claims against a law firm for, among other things, tortious interference with business and contractual relationships were preempted by O.C.G.A. 51-7-85 because they sought “damages solely for the conduct of counsel in pursuing litigation on behalf of their clients”); Nairon v. Land, 242 Ga.App. 259, 529 S.E.2d 390, 392 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff is precluded from filing a claim of either intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress as a remedy for abusive litigation.”); Phillips v. MacDougald, 219 Ga.App. 152, 464 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1995) (establishing precedent “precluding a claim of tortious interference as a remedy for the alleged improper or unwarranted filing of a lawsuit”). As the Georgia Court of Appeals has explained, the “proliferation of unnecessaxy causes of action for the alleged improper filing of lawsuits would have a chilling effect on the exercise* by citizens of their right of access to the courts.” Phillips, 464 S.E.2d at 395.

Georgia courts “look to the substance and not the style of a particular claim to determine whether it amounts to a claim for abusive litigation.” Meadow Springs Recovery, 734 S.E.2d at 102; accord Nairon, 529 S.E.2d at 392 (“The gravamen of both emotional distress claims is the defendants’ act of filing an abusive lawsuit.”); Phillips, 464 S.E.2d at 395 (“Clearly, the tortious interference claim in the case sub judice is grounded on a contention that the lawsuit at issue was improperly filed being without legitimate legal foundation.”). Here, the King Defendants argue that Murphy’s claims are precluded by that statute because he “is essentially and indisputably claiming that Defendants engaged in abusive litigation tactics,” and the “list of predicate acts consists exclusively of purportedly illegitimate court filings and alleged crimes designed to influence the custody proceedings.” [38] at 20,

But Murphy contends that O.C.G.A. § 51-7-85 does not apply because he is not challenging mere abusive litigation. He argues that not one of the nine predicate acts alleged in the complaint depends on proof of a false accusation or , frivolous position in litigation. He also contends that the acts he alleges are criminal acts that go beyond mere abusive litigation. In support, he cites several cases upholding convictions arising out of an attorney’s or law firm’s criminal conduct in the course of litigation.

The Court agrees with Murphy that lawyers are not automatically shielded from prosecution for criminal acts simply because those acts took place in the context of litigation. However, the question before the Court is not whether state or federal authorities could bring criminal charges against Defendants for the conduct alleged in the complaint. It is whether Murphy, a plaintiff in a civil action, may bring Georgia RICO claims for damages based on that conduct.

Neither party appears to cite any decisions concerning the application of the abusive litigation statute to RICO claims arising out of litigation. However, it appears that in at least one case, the Georgia Court of Appeals has concluded that the abusive litigation statute precluded RICO claims based on “a pattern of racketeering activity with predicate acts of perjury, forgery, and theft” where the wrongful acts “all occurred during litigation of [a] dispos-sessory action.” Slone v. Myers, 288 Ga. App. 8, 653 S.E.2d 323, 327 (2007), overruled on other grounds by Reeves v. Upson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 315 Ga.App. 582, 726 S.E.2d 544 (2012). In Slone, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants continued with the dispossessory proceeding “knowing the evidence of unpaid rents to be forged,” the swearing out of a dispossessory warrant and appearances in court “constituted perjury,” and one of the defendants “committed theft by deception by making false statements during her deposition.” Id.

In this case, Murphy alleges a pattern of racketeering based on a variety of predicate acts, all with the alleged purpose of pressuring Murphy to relinquish his claims in the state child custody litigation and extracting extortionate payments from Murphy. However, the mere fact that the purposes of the alleged enterprise include litigation does not mean that the actions of the enterprise are covered by the abusive litigation statute. It appears to the Court that the statute is concerned with the abusive use of litigation for improper purposes, not the use of unlawful tactics to influence or stop what is alleged to be otherwise proper litigation. That said, the Court agrees with the King Defendants that to the extent the predicate acts are based on the use of court filings to threaten or extort victims, the abusive litigation statute provides a remedy for such actions.

Murphy alleges nine specific predicate acts in support of his Georgia RICO claim. Although all of these acts were allegedly taken to pressure Murphy to relinquish his claims in the child custody litigation, only a handful of them appear to involve the abusive use of litigation or process to achieve those goals. Acts like kidnapping and kidnapping for extortion, interference with child custody, and wire fraud arising out of the Beacham Defendants’ statements are not directly connected to litigation and do not involve the use of litigation. Murphy also alleges that Defendants used threats and communications outside of the courtroom as well as motions, hearings, and other court filings in his acts or attempted acts of extortion, bribery, intimidation of a court officer, and influencing witnesses. It appears to the Court that actions involving the use of court filings and legal proceedings, such as the lawsuit against a judge’s court reporter, motions to disqualify guardians ad litem, and briefs attacking a psychiatrist who testified in the litigation, all fall within the scope of the abusive litigation statute. However, the parties have cited no authority suggesting that the allegations involving extortionate demands or threats communicated by letters, emails, and other communications would fall within the scope of the abusive litigation statute. And because these acts do not involve the malicious initiation, continuation, or procurement of civil proceedings, the Court concludes that they would not.

The parties have not addressed the effect of the determination that Murphy is precluded from recovering for some but not all of the predicate acts. As with several of the other issues raised, the parties take an all-or-nothing approach. At present, the Court need not determine the precise effect of this determination because even without the predicate acts based on filing threatening or coercive motions and briefs, Murphy has alleged enoug