Ratajack v. Brewster Fire Department, Inc. (178 F. Supp. 3d 118, 2016)

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Plaintiff William Ratajack (“Plaintiff’), a former member of the Brewster Fire Department, Inc. of, the Brewster-Southeast Joint Fire District (the “Department”), brings this action against the Department, Donald Goodwin (“Goodwin”), Philip McMurray (“McMurray”), Albert Jacobs (“Jacobs”), the Brewster-Southeast Joint Fire District (the “District”), John Klosow-ski (“Klosowski”), Martin Miller (“Miller”), and Steven Miller (“Steven”) (collectively, “Defendants”),, asserting claims of defamation and violation of his rights to due process and free speech. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on each cause of action, and Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on his procedural-due process claim. For the reasons to follow, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on his procedural due process claim, and Defendants’ Motion is granted with respect to Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation, defamation, and substantive due process claims.

I. Background

A. Facts

The following facts are taken from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement in support of summary judgment, Plaintiffs response, Plaintiffs statement of additional facts creating a material dispute; Plaintiffs Local Rule 56.1 statement in support of his motion for partial summary judgment, Defendants’ response, Defendants’ counter statement of facts, and. other documents in the record. The facts as described below are not in dispute, except to the extent indicated.

1. The Department, The District, and Plaintiffs History There

Plaintiff is self-employed as the owner of Southeast Mechanical Corp., a company in the business of installing commercial heating and plumbing systems. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts (“Defs.’ 56.1”) ¶¶ 1-2 (Dkt. No. 40); PL’s Resp. to Defs.’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl.’s 56.1”) ¶¶ 1-2 (Dkt. No. 48).) In 1999, Plaintiff became a member of the Department, and, after a probationary period, was made Lieutenant and was then promoted by the Fire Chief to Captain. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 3 — 4; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 3-4; Att’y Decl. (“Mas-succi Decl.”) Ex. C (“PL’s Dep. Tr.”) 16-18 (Dkt. No. 38).) Additionally, Plaintiff was elected by the members of the Department to Second Assistant Chief and, in 2012, to First Assistant Chief. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 4; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 4; PL’s Dep. Tr. 16-18.) Plaintiff had earlier served as captain. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 13; PL’s 56.1 ¶13.) He resigned that position, however, over concerns relating to how the Fire Department was being managed, including that certain members were not attending calls, such as members Michael Miller (“Michael”), Steven, and Paul DeBartolomeo (“DeBartolo-meo”). (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 12-13; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 12-13.) Michael and Steven are brothers, and their father, Miller, is also a member of the Department. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 8; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 8; Massucci Decl. Ex. H (“Miller Dep. Tr.”) 13-14.) All three are Caucasian, but Miller also has two mixed-race, African-American children. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10; Miller Dep. Tr. 14.) Arguably consistent with Plaintiffs concerns over Steven’s, Michael’s, and others’ responsiveness, the Department or the District in 2013 hired paid EMS workers to cover daytime calls during the week due to concerns over an insufficient number of Fire Department members choosing to respond to calls. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 17; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 17.)

This case involves two distinct but related entities: the District and the Department. The District was and is a political subdivision of the State of New York. (Pl.’s FRCP 56.1 Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“PL’s Cross 56.1”) ¶ 14 (Dkt. No. 53); Resp. to Pl.’s FRCP 56.1 Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute and Counter Statement of Facts (“Defs.’ Cross 56.1”) ¶14 (Dkt. No. 56).) Formed under New York state law and required to operate in compliance with such law, the District has the authority to tax, organize, and operate fire companies within the District. (PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 15-16; Defs.’ Cross. 56.1 ¶¶ 15-16.) The Department is one such fire company. The Commissioner of the District serves a term of five years, and Klosowski is currently in his fourth term and sixteenth year as Commissioner. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 81; PL’s 56.1¶ 81; Massucci Decl. Ex. J (“Klosow-ski Aff.”) ¶2.) In contrast, the Fire Department has a chief, first assistant chief, and a second assistant chief, who are elected by the membership and can serve two terms of one year each. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 73-74; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 73-74.) The chief of the Department appoints lieutenants, with advice from the assistant chiefs. (Defs.’ 56.1 If 95; PL’s 56.1 ¶95.) In 2013, Bill Rieg (“Rieg”) was elected chief, and was a member of the Department Board of Directors (the “Board of Directors”) at the same time. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 75; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 75; PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶ 5; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶ 5.) Additionally, sometime around mid-July to mid-August 2013, Goodwin, the Vice President of the Board of Directors, served as the acting president of the Board of Directors. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 90-91; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 90-91; PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 6-7; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 6-7.) Jacobs — who would vote to expel Plaintiff from the Department — was another member, as was McMurray, who has been with the Department for 25 years. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 94; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 94; PL’s Cross 56.1¶¶ 8-9; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 8-9.)

The Department is governed in part by a set of bylaws approved by the Board of Fire Commissioners (the “Board of Commissioners”). (See Massucci Decl. Ex. L (“Bylaws”); see also PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶ 17; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶ 17.) The bylaws provide how membership in the Department may end, including for cause, and require that any member be notified of the charges brought against him or her. (See PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 18-21, 58-59; Defs.’ Cross 56.1¶¶ 18-21, 58-59.) Article 12 of those Bylaws, in part, reads:

Section 1

The Board of Directors may remove a member from the rolls of the department, upon due notice via a registered letter from the recording secretary, for the following reasons:

d) For conduct unbecoming an officer, firefighter, or detrimental to the best interests of the department

Section 2

Any member may be expelled from the department or penalized for misconduct as determined by the Board of Directors. Upon written request, such member will be entitled to a hearing, whereupon arguments and evidence may be presented in his/her defense. Upon receipt of his/her written request]),] he/ she is entitled to be furnished with a written copy of the charges against him. He/she shall receive those written charges at least one week prior to the regular or special meeting before which his case is to be heard. All expulsions and removals, except as provided for by state law, shall be by a majority vote made by ballot by the Board of Directors.

(Bylaws Art. 12.)

2. The July Incident

On July 11, 2013, when he was First Assistant Chief, Plaintiff marched in the Mahopac parade dressed in uniform. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 19-20; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 19-20; Defs.’ Counter Statement of Facts (“Defs.’ Counter Cross”) 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3 (Dkt. No. 56); Massucci Decl, Ex. M (“Aug. 15 Letter”).) Plaintiff had George Hill (“Hill”), another member of the Fire Department, drive him to the parade, and Plaintiff drank beer before, during, and after the parade at the firehouse. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 21-22; Pl.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 21-22; Pl.’s Dep. Tr. 97.) That evening, after returning from the parade, while at the firehouse, Plaintiff claims to have seen some members who did not participate in the parade in a vehicle in the parking lot. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 23; PL’s 56.1 ¶23; see also Defs.’ Counter Cross 56.1 ¶ 5.) Plaintiff recognized Steven in the passenger seat of the vehicle, which Plaintiff believed belonged to DeBartolomeo. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 24-25; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 24-25; see also Defs.’ Counter Cross 56.1 ¶¶5-6.) After seeing these non-participating members, Plaintiff testified that he spoke with Hill, Robert Burns, and Dave O’Hara (“O’Hara”). (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 26; PL’s 56.1 ¶26.) In so doing, according to Plaintiff, he referred to the non-participating members, including some of the people in the car, as “a piece of shit” and “a bunch of niggers,” and further used some “generic curse words,” (PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 27-28), although Defendants claim that Plaintiff used these words to refer to Steven, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 27-28), or the Millers more generally, (see Defs.’ Counter Cross 56,1 ¶ 8).

According to Defendants, Plaintiff then proceeded downstairs with McMurray, and continued the angry exchange with McMurray on the front steps of the firehouse, (Defs,’. 56,1 ¶ 29 (citing PL's Dep. Tr. 107-08; Massucci Decl. Ex. I (“Aug. 14 Meeting Tr.”) 88-91)), which Plaintiff disputes, (see PL’s 56.1 ¶ 29 (citing PL’s Dep, Tr. 107-08; 114)). While on the front steps of the firehouse, Plaintiff testified that he spoke in a “passionate” manner with a “raised” voice and was “angry” and “animated.” (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 30; PL’s 56.1 ¶30.) The Parties dispute, however, whether Plaintiff continued to use the word “nigger” while outside the firehouse. (Compare Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 32 (“Mr. Ratajack continued to curse and use racial slurs including.the word ‘nigger’ while speaking in a raised, passionate, animated[,] and angry voice while on the front steps of the firehouse.” (citing Massucci Deck Ex. K (“McMurray Aff.”); Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 11-16, 23-26, 55-57, 90-96)) imth Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 32 (“Deny that ‘Ratajack continued to curse and use racial slurs including the word ‘nigger’ while speaking on the front steps of the firehouse.’ ” (emphasis omitted) (citing Pl.’s Dep. Tr. 117-21,124)).)

Indeed, Defendants indicate that McMurray tapped Ratajack on the shoulder after he screamed “nigger,” and reminded Plaintiff that he was in uniform and could not scream racial slurs in public, to which Plaintiff responded that he could say whatever he wanted, before again yelling “niggers” and referring to Mexicans in a derogatory manner, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 45-47 (citing, inter alia, Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 93-94, 96-99; McMurray Aff.); see also McMurray Aff. ¶¶ 14-16; Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 93-94), an assertion Plaintiff denies; (see PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 45^47 (citing PL’s Dep. Tr. 119-21, 124)). According to Defendants, Plaintiff continued to yell “niggers” while pointing at the vehicle in which Steven was a passenger, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 48 (citing Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 95; McMurray Aff.)), which Plaintiff disputes, (see PL’s 56.1 ¶ 48 (citing PL’s Dep. Tr. 120-21, 124; Miller Dep. Tr. 11)). The Parties agree, however, that at no time did Plaintiff see Steven exit the vehicle in the parking lot, nor did Plaintiff see Steven or any other member who did not march enter the firehouse to socialize. (Defs.’ 56.1 II50; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 50.) Indeed, Plaintiff does not know why the vehicle was in the parking lot, and never inquired as to why Steven was there. (Defs.’ 56.1 1151; Pi’s 56.1 ¶ 51.) Nevertheless, according to Defendants, Plaintiff was loud enough that people at the gas station across the street stopped and looked when Plaintiff screamed “nigger.” (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 31 (citing Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 95).)

In disputing whether Plaintiff simply does not remember using or in fact did not use the word “nigger” while outside, both sides cite Plaintiffs deposition transcript. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶33 (citing PL’s Dep. Tr. 118-19);. PL’s 56.1 ¶ 33 (citing PL’s Dep. Tr. 118, 120, 121, 124).) However, Plaintiffs deposition transcript is less than perfectly clear. In pertinent part, it reads:

Q. Do you recall more specifically what you said to Chief McMurray?

A. Just that it was a bunch of bullshit that he was allowing non-marchers to come down, and he shouldn’t be allowing this to go on.

Q. Did you use the word “nigger” again? A. Not that I recall.

Q. Did you use that word [nigger] at all when you were speaking with- Chief McMurray?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. Do you remember telling Chief McMurray because of. niggers like this, this firehouse has gone to shit?

A. That’s news to me.

Q. That would be a no?

[Ms. Maurer]: Answer the question.

A. No, I didn’t say that.

Q. Do you have any recollection of speaking any other racial or derogatory terms while on the steps speaking with Chief McMurray?

A. I believe I cursed.

Q. Did you use any type of racial terms while on the steps with Chief McMur-ray?

A. Not that I remember.

Q. If I were to tell you that people at the gas station [across the street from the firehouse] heard you scream nigger, would that surprise you?

A. Yes.

(PL’s Dep. Tr. 117-21,124.)

According to Defendants, while speaking with McMurray, Plaintiff also exclaimed “fuck you, fuck them, fuck everybody.” (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 34 (citing, inter alia, Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 90); see also McMurray Aff. ¶ 18.) Additionally, according to Defendants, Plaintiff threatened McMurray, stating that he “better get on the same page or there [would be] a fucking problem” and that is “what [he] wants.” (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 35 (second alteration in original) (citing, inter alia, Pl.’s Dep. Tr. 120; McMur-ray Aff.; Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 90-91, 94-95).) Indeed, Plaintiffs deposition transcript supports the notion that he told McMurray that they had better get on the same page or there would be a “fucking problem.” (PL’s Dep. Tr. 120 (“Q. Did you indicate to Chief McMurray during that conversation that he had better get on the same page or there will be a fucking problem? A. Yes.”)) According to Plaintiff, by that, he meant that McMurray “kept usurping [Plaintiffs] power and that he was allowing non-marchei-s and the likes [sic] to just come and not be part of the solution, be part of the problem.” (Id. 120-21.) Additionally, Defendants claim that Plaintiff told McMurray that he better get on the same page or they would be “fighting,” and that Plaintiff would take McMur-ray out of office, (see Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 36 (citing McMurray Aff. ¶ 17; Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 94-95)); however, Plaintiff denies that (see PL’s Dep. Tr. 121 (“Q. Did you indicate to [McMurray] that he’d better be on board with you or we’re going to be fucking fighting? A. No. I don’t recall that.”).) Additionally, according to McMurray, Plaintiff “stated ... that he wanted to get rid of certain members when he became chief,” (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 37 (citing McMurray Aff.; Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 94-95)), although Plaintiff disputes this, (PL’s 56.1 ¶ 37 (eit-ing PL’s Dep. Tr. 121)).

Sean Crowley (“Crowley”), a member of the Fire Department, testified under oath that he observed and heard Plaintiff threatening McMurray, and screaming at him that Plaintiff was going to have the Millers removed from the department, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶38 (citing Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 11-16)); however, Plaintiff disputes the truth of those statements, (see Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 38 (citing Pl.’s Dep. Tr. 121)). Likewise, Thomas Giambattisto (“Giambattisto”) testified under oath that same evening that he observed and heard Plaintiff yell “nigger” at fellow members, and saw McMur-ray attempting to calm Plaintiff down, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶39 (citing Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 23-26)), which Plaintiff again disputes, (see PL’s 56.1 ¶ 39 (citing PL’s Dep. Tr. 120-21, 124)). In addition, according to Defendants, Michael Bizarro, an engineer lieutenant for the Fire Department, testified that he observed and heard Plaintiff scream at fellow members, “it’s because of niggers like that why this fire department is going to shit;” yell “nigger” or “fucking niggers” additional times; and make a derogatory comment about Mexicans. (Defs.’ 56.1¶¶ 40-41 (citing Aug. 14 Meeting Tr. 55-57).) Plaintiff disputes that he said this, however. (PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 40-41 (citing PL’s Dep. Tr. 119, 120-21, 124).) In total, according to testimony from McMurray, at some point in the evening, Dean Silver-blade (“Silverblade”), Robert Burns, Timothy Thomas, Katie Lanning, Giambattisto, Kenneth Clair (“Clair”), Hill, Michael Bizarro, and Jen Xavier were all in the parking lot that evening. (See Massucci Decl. Ex. G (“McMurray Dep. Tr.”) 112-14; see also PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶ 43; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶ 43.)

3. Investigation and Vote To Expel Plaintiff

Miller became aware of the July 11 incident the following day, when several members contacted him to advise him as to what had transpired. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶100, PL’s 56.1 ¶ 100.) Specifically, Crowley and others informed Miller that Plaintiff, appearing angry, used racial slurs, referred to Miller and his family as worthless “niggers,” and made further threats against the Miller family. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 101, 103; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 101, 103.) Miller, perceiving a threat to his family and himself, contacted Rieg within a few days after the incident, and informed him that Miller felt threatened and considered Plaintiff’s behavior inappropriate for an officer. (Defs.’ 56.1¶¶ 102, 104; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶102, 104.) Rieg assured Miller that he would investigate the matter. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 105, PL’s 56.1¶ 105.) Additionally, Miller sent a letter to the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Directors relating to what he had been told about Plaintiffs behavior. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 106; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 106.)

Sometime after the incident, Rieg asked to speak with Plaintiff. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶52; Pi’s 56.1 ¶ 52.) When Rieg asked Plaintiff if he had called the Millers a bunch of niggers, Plaintiff responded yes, and Rieg suspended him for 30 days. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 53-54; Pi’s 56.1 ¶¶ 53-54; PL’s Cross 56.1¶¶ 22, 25; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶¶22, 25; Defs.’ Counter Cross 56.1 ¶ 9.) In his deposition, Plaintiff recounted his conversation in the following manner:

Q. Did you go to speak with [Rieg] or did he request to speak with you?

A. He approached me.

Q. Was there anyone else around when you had the conversation with him?

A. Yes. I’m sorry. No.

Q. Was there someone else there when he asked to speak with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was there?

A. I don’t remember.

Q. Was it more than one person?

A. One or two.

Q. Where did you actually have the conversation with him?

A. In the chiefs office.

Q. Was it just you and him?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me the sum and substance of that conversation?

A. He asked me if I called the Millers a bunch of niggers.

Q. What did you respond?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any more detail regarding the circumstances of you calling the Millers niggers discussed?

A. No.

Q. Did Chief Rieg ask you anything else?

A. No.

Q. Was there any more to the conversation other than..what you just told me?

A. No.

Q. Were you suspended?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that by Chief Rieg?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it during that meeting or conversation?

A. It was at the end of that question.

Q. When you say “question,” you’re referring to when he asked you if you called the Millers a bunch of niggers?

A. Yes.

Q. For how long did he suspend you?

A. 30 days.

Q. Did you apologize for what you did?

A. No.

Q. Other than simply responding yes, did you say anything else to Chief Rieg?

A. No.

Q. After he advised you were suspended for 30 days, did you say anything to him?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you say?

A. I asked him for a ride to my shop. Q. Did he give you a ride?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any further conversation?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me the sum and substance of that conversation?

A. We discussed what was going on and — I don’t think I apologized to him, but I told him that I had always worked hard for him, and I would see him after my suspension.

Q. What, if anything, did he say?

A. Not much.

Q, Was this a conversation that continued while he was driving you to the shop?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever speak with him again after that conversation about this incident?

A. No.

Q. Have you spoken to him at all since that conversation?

A. No.

(PL’s Dep. Tr. 127-30.) Sometime after that conversation, according to Plaintiff, he spoke with mechanic named Joe Dexter (“Dexter”) who advised Plaintiff to get a lawyer because “there were discussions at the firehouse about trying to throw [Plaintiff] out.” (Id. at 130-31.) Apart from this conversation with Dexter, according to Plaintiff, he was never informed that he may be removed from the Department before receiving notification of his expulsion. (Id. at 137.)

On July 30, 2013, the Board of Commissioners held a meeting, notice of which was not sent to Plaintiff, at which Miller’s letter relating to Plaintiff and the underlying incident' were to be discussed. (See Mas-succi Decl. Ex. F (“Goodwin Dep. Tr.”) 44; see also 'Pl.’s Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 26-27; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 26-27.) In that letter, dated July 22, 2013 to Giambattisto, the Fire District’s Secretary, Miller described the incident of July 11. (See Massucci Decl. Ex. N (“Miller Letter”).) According to Plaintiff, the letter included a number of incorrect assertions, including that Plaintiff had previously been suspended for “conduct unbecoming,” had to be restrained by certain members of the Department, had tried to discredit the Miller family, made,threats toward the Millers, and was a racist who posed a safety threat to others, (see Pl.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 66(b) — (gg); Pi’s Counter 56.1, at unnumbered 52-57 ¶¶ 1-35), when, according to Plaintiff, these assertions were incorrect, (see Pl.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 66(b)-(gg) (citing, inter alia, Massucci Decl. Ex. D (“Jacobs Dep. Tr.”) 162, 166, 170; Massucci Decl. Ex. E (“Klosowski Dep. Tr.”) 19; Goodwin Dep. Tr. 41-42, 76-78, 82-84; McMurray Dep. Tr; 92-96, 99, 102,105-06,108-09; Attys Decl. (“Maurer Decl.”) Ex. 2 (“Hill Dep. Tr.”) 46-47 (Dkt. No. 48); Miller Letter); PL’s Counter 56.1, at unnumbered 52-57 ¶¶ 1-35 (citing, inter alia, Jacobs Dep. Tr. 162,166,170; Klosowski Dep. Tr. 19; Goodwin Dep. Tr. 41-42, 76-78, 82-86; McMurray Dep. Tr. 82-85, 92-96, 99, 102, 105-06, 108; Miller Letter; Hill Dep. Tr. 46-47).) When asked at his deposition, Plaintiff indicated that he was not aware of this letter being sent to anyone beyond its original distribution to the District. (PL’s Dep. Tr. 188-89.)

On August 14, 2013, the Board of Commissioners had its regular meeting, which Klosowski attended, and advance notice of which was not sent to Plaintiff. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 83; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 83; PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶¶11, 29; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 11, 29.) The Board of Directors was invited to the meeting to discuss the issue involving Plaintiff. (Klo-sowski Dep. Tr. 60.) However, the Board of Commissioners did not have quorum because Clair was a witness to the' incident, and therefore had to excuse himself. (Id. at 61.) The Board Of Commissioners, consequently, adjourned its meeting, and the Commissioners were invited to the Board of Directors meeting on the same date to hear testimony of witnesses to the incident involving Plaintiff, after which time the Board of Commissioners reconvened its regular meeting. (Defs,’ 56.1 ¶¶ 85-86; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 85-86.) Plaintiff did not testify at that meeting, nor did Silver-blade, Burns, Steven, Miller, DeBartolo-meo, Timothy Thomas, O’Hara, James Friedlander, or John Nelson. (See PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 44-53; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 44-53.) The Board of Directors voted to expel Plaintiff, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 79; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 79; Defs.’ Counter Cross 56.1 ¶ 18), in part based on Miller’s letter, (PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶ 56; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶ 56), although the Parties dispute whether Goodwin voted to expel Ratajack, (compare Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 91 (“Goodwin was present at the July 30, 2013 meeting of the Board of Directors but did not vote to expel [Plaintiff] at the August 13th meeting”) with PL’s 56.1 ¶ 91 (“Deny that Goodwin did not vote.”)).

There is no question that Plaintiff did not call any witnesses at the July 30 or August 14 meetings, (PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶ 31, 55; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶ 31, 55); however, the Parties dispute whether Plaintiff was allowed to have his attorney present and more generally to tell his side of the story. (Compare Pl.’s Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 30, 32, 54 with Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 30, 32, 54.) In support of their positions, both Parties cite Jacobs’ testimony, which reads in pertinent part:

Q. And so in .that comment where you said there’s two sides to every story—

A Mm-hmm.

Q. —you never heard anything from [Plaintiff] regarding this incident, did you?

A. Did I hear?

Q. You never heard any testimony from [Plaintiff]?

A. No, I didn’t.

Q. And [Plaintiff] was never allowed to call a witness, even one; is that correct?

Ms. Nanis: Objection

A. He was allowed.

Q. At the hearing — at the meeting on August 14th?

A. That’s not how you supposed [sic] the question, Counsel.

Q. So on August 14th, was there an attorney present for [Plaintiff]?

A. No, there wasn’t.

Q. Was there any witness that was called at [Plaintiffs] request?

Ms. Nanis: On August 14th? On August 14th?

Ms. Maurer: There hasn’t been any other hearings. So, yes, on August 14th.

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. So you just said—

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. —there’s two sides to every story.

A. Yes, there is.

Q. And you never heard [Plaintiffs], did you?

A. No, I didn’t. But we offered him a hearing.

(Jacobs Dep. Tr. 171-72.) However, Hill expressed surprise that Plaintiff did not have more of an opportunity to share his side of the story, testifying to the following in his deposition:

Q. Were you surprised when they expelled [Plaintiff]?

Ms. Nanis: Objection. You can answer. A. Totally.

Q. Can you tell me why?

A. Why?

Q. Yeah.

A. I just didn’t understand how you could possibly do that without even letting the man have anything to say as to what happened. I thought this was America.

Q. So you thought that he should have an opportunity to dispute the claims in

[Miller’s] letter?

A. Definitely.

Ms. Nanis: Objection.

(Hill Dep. Tr. 60.)

By letter dated August 15, 2013, Plaintiff received notice that he was removed from the Fire Department for violations of the bylaws. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 56; Pi’s 56.1 ¶ 56; Defs.’ Counter Cross 56.1 ¶ 11; see also Aug. 15 Letter.) Plaintiff did not participate in a hearing before the removal. (See PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶39; Defs.’ Cross 56.1 ¶ 39.) Just over one week later, by letter dated August 23, 2013, counsel for Plaintiff submitted a letter, which read in part:

Please accept this letter as Chief Rata-jack’s appeal of the decision of the Board of Fire Commissioners and the Board of Directors pursuant to Article 12 Sec. 2 of the By-Laws of Brewster Fire Department, Inc. of the Brewster-. Southeast Joint Fire District. Considering that the Board of Directors has rendered a decision without the minimal due process of prior notice and a right to be heard, I would suggest that the Boards consider voluntarily nullifying their decision and revisiting this with a neutral fact finder and after providing me with the following documents ....

(Massucci Deck Ex. 0 (“PL’s Att’y’s Letter”) 1; see also Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 57; Pi’s 56.1 ¶57; Defs.’ Counter Cross 56.1 ¶ 12.) Several months later, on November 26, 2013, Plaintiff was offered a “hearing” at which he could present “arguments and. evidence in his defense.” (Massucci Deck Ex. P (Letter from' Kelly to Maurer (Nov. 26, 2013)); see also Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 58; Pi’s 56.1 ¶ 58; Defs.’ Counter Cross 56.1 ¶ 13.) The next week, by letter dated December 6, 2013, Plaintiff through his attorney declined the offer, protesting that the “Board of Directors and/or the Fire Commissioners have rendered a decision without the minimal due process of prior notice and a right to be heard,” and further stating that, “if the boards are unwilling to nullify their prior decision and provide an independent neutral fact finder, [Plaintiffs counsel] must advise [her] client to decline to participate.” (Massucci ■ Deck Ex. Q (Letter from Maurer to Kelly (Dec. 6, 2013)); see also Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 51; Pi’s 56.1 ¶ 51; Defs.’ Counter Cross 56.1 ¶ 14.)

The Parties, however, dispute exactly why Plaintiff was dismissed. The stated reason for Plaintiffs termination, however, was he engaged in conduct unbecoming of an officer and detrimental to the best interest of the Department, that his behavior was threatening in nature and intimidating to other members of the Department, and that his behavior was discourteous, obscene, and abusive toward fellow' officers and members of the Fire Department. (See Aug. 15 Letter 2-3.) For their part, Defendants assert that Plaintiff was “expelled exclusively for his behavior and use of the derogatory racial slurs on the firehouse steps while in uniform and threatening an officer in violation of the Brewster Fire Department by-laws Article 12,” and that Plaintiff “admits he was expelled for the use of derogatory and racially charged language.” (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 64-65 (citing Pk’s Dep. Tr. 171-72; Bylaws; Aug. 15 Letter).) Plaintiff, howevér, disputes this while admitting that he received a letter stating that he was discharged for “conduct unbecoming,” (see Pl.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 64-65 (citing Pl.’s Dep. Tr. 172; Aug. 15 Letter)), and Plaintiff further asserts, among other things, that no Department member has been expelled in the past 10 years except Plaintiff, that there is no record of a member being disciplined for the use , of a racial slur, that McMurray referred to an African-American member as a “nigger” in his presence, that Giambattisto testified to hearing racial slurs at the Department all the time, and that some Department members as well as Commissioner Richard Tofte (“Tofte”) have used foul language. (PL’s Counter 56.1, at unnumbered 49 ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 15). Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that the Silverblade was suspended in July 2013 for telling members and their guests to “get the fuck out” because some members were socializing instead of cleaning; that using the word “nigger” would not violate the bylaws unless the person to whom it was directed found it offensive; and that the bylaws are violated whenever a member uses racial slurs and someone complains, such that whether something violates the bylaws “depends on the subjective hearer and the tone,” (Id., at unnumbered 49-51 ¶¶ 8,10-14.)

Plaintiff has .further claimed that his freedom of speech was violated because he was speaking out on an issue of public concern, including that members were becoming increasingly unwilling to participate in the non-firefighting activities of a volunteer fire department. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 61; Pi’s 56.1 ¶ 61.) According to Plaintiff, posts appearing on the social networking website Facebook in or before July 2011 revealed that staff were boycotting coming to the firehouse. (PL’s Dep. Tr. 161; Mas-succi Decl. Ex. S (Facebook posts).) Plaintiff, however, stresses that his concerns were not limited to Michael’s, Steven’s, and DeBartolomeo’s boycott of non-fire calls during Plaintiffs tenure as captain, but that he was also concerned that a number of the members who also worked in paid fire departments were unwilling to do fundraising and community service, and that Klosowski, the Chairman of the District, acknowledged that members refused to attend EMS calls so frequently that the District had been forced to hire paid workers in 2013 for the majority of each week, and that the District had been informed of this “public safety hazard” by the Chiefs of the Fire Department, (see PL’s 56.1 ¶ 61) (citing Klosowski Aff. ¶¶ 4, 5-7; Hill Dep. Tr. 31-33).

Nevertheless, to hear Defendants tell it, this was not the first occasion upon which Plaintiff was subject to disciplinary action: In a matter allegedly involving Plaintiff, Defendants assert that Plaintiff had been involved in a fist fight with O’Hara and was suspended for “conduct unbecoming” in connection with the incident. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 108, 110 (citing Miller Dep. Tr. 49-51).) Plaintiff denies that he was suspend: ed, however, noting that the Department has no record of Plaintiff being suspended for a fistfight with O’Hara. (PL’s 56.1 ¶ 110 (citing Jacobs Dep. Tr. 172-73).) Additionally, although they do not assert that he was disciplined as a result, Defendants claim that Plaintiff threatened Tim Sullivan, DeBartolomeo, and Crowley in the past. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 109 (citing Miller Dep. Tr. 49-50).) For his part, Plaintiff asserts that he has never been disciplined in any manner by the Department prior to the incident at hand. (PL’s Cross 56.1 ¶¶ 23, 57 (citing Klosowski Dep. Tr. 19; Goodwin Dep. Tr. 41-42; Jacobs Dep. Tr. 37).)

B. Procedural History

On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against the Department, Rieg, Goodwin, Julie Kuklevsky (“Kuklevsky”), George Godfrey (“Godfrey”), McMurray, Jeff Bergstrom (“Bergstrom”), David Beshears (“Beshears”), Dominick Consen-tino (“Consentino”), Jacobs, the District, Klosowski, Clair, R. Gerald Schramek (“Schramek”), Tofte, Miller, Michael, and Steven. (Dkt. No. 1.) On March 20, 2014, the defendants — including several who have subsequently been dismissed from this case — filed their Verified Answer. (Dkt. No. 4.) By letter dated January 28, 2015, Defendants requested a pre-motion conference in advance of their anticipated Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 25.) The next day, Plaintiff also submitted a pre-motion letter, requesting a pre-motion conference in order to file a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Complaint’s first cause of action, his due process claim. (Dkt. No. 28.) On January 30, 2015, Plaintiff submitted his response to Defendants’ pre-motion letter, (Dkt. No. 30), and Defendants submitted their response to Plaintiffs on February 3, 2015, (Dkt. No. 32). On March 11, 2015, the Court held a pre-motion conference, at which a briefing schedule for the Parties’ Motions was set. (Dkt. (minute entry for Mar. 11, 2015).)

On May 1, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment and accompanying papers. (Dkt. Nos. 37-40.) Pri- or to submitting his Motion for Summary Judgment, on May 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Voluntary Dismissal of claims against Rieg, Kuklevsky, Godfrey, Bergstrom, Beshears, Consentino, Clair, Schramek, Tofte, and Michael,. (Dkt. Nos. 41-42), which the Court granted the next day, (Dkt. No. 43). On. June 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 48), and, on June 8, 2015, his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with accompanying papers, (Dkt. Nos. 50-53). Defendants filed their Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and accompanying papers as well as their reply in support of their own Motion for Summary Judgment on June 25, 2015. (Dkt. Nos. 54-56.) On July 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Reply in support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 57.) On July 10, 2015,' Defendants submitted a letter to the Court concerning an argument made in Plaintiffs Reply, (Dkt. No. 59), which the Court denied as a sur-reply, (Dkt. No, 61).

II. Discussion

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs due process, First Amendment retaliation, and his slander claims. Plaintiff, in contrast; seeks summary judgment on his procedural due process claims.

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir.2014) (same). “In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,” a court must “construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and ... resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Borough of Upper Saddle River v. Rockland Cty. Sewer Dist. No. 1, 16 F.Supp.3d 294, 314 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (same). Additionally, “[i]t is the movant’s burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists.” Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir.2004); see also Aurora Commercial Corp. v. Approved Funding Corp., No. 13-CV-230, 2014 WL 1386633, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2014) (same). “However, when the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmov-ing party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim,” in which case “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” CILP Assocs., L.P. v. PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP, 735 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir.2013) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[tjo survive a [summary judgment] motion ...., [a nonmovant] need[s] to create more than a ‘metaphysical’ possibility that his allegations were correct; he need[s] to ‘come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,’ ” Wrobel v. Cty. of Erie, 692 F.3d 22, 30 (2d Cir.2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), and “cannot rely on the mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings,” Walker v. City of N.Y., No. 11-CV-2941, 2014 WL 1244778, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia, Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir.2009) (“When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documents or other eviden-tiary materials, the party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading

“On a motion for summary judgment, a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 746 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). At summary judgment, “[t]he role of the court is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried.” Brod, 653 F.3d at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. M21-88, 2014 WL 840955, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014) (same). Thus, a court’s goal should be “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

B. Analysis

1. Due Process

a. Procedural Due Process

The United States Constitution forbids any “State [from] depriving] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1, an interdiction which binds volunteer fire departments, see Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17, 22-25 (2d Cir.1979) (concluding that the actions of a local fire department constituted state action). The Parties seek summary judgment on the question of whether the Department’s actions comported with this constitutional guarantee. (See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) 4-8 (Dkt. No 39); Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of his Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Cross Mem.”) 7-15 (Dkt. No. 51).) They did not, and judgment in Plaintiffs favor is appropriate on this claim.

To begin, in order to “plead a violation' of procedural due process, ... a plaintiff must first identify a property right, second show that the government has deprived him of that right, and third show that the deprivation was effected without due process.” J.S. v. T’Kach, 714 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir.2013) (alteration, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Chrebet v. Cty. of Nassau, 24 F.Supp.3d 236, 244 (E.D.N.Y.2014) (same), aff'd, 606 Fed.Appx. 15 (2d Cir.2015). The Second Circuit teaches that “[t]he threshold issue is always whether the plaintiff has a property ... interest protected by the Constitution.” Morales v. New York, 22 F.Supp.3d 256, 276 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (quoting Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trs., 850 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1988)). “Such property interests cannot be found on the face of the Constitution, but rather ‘are created, and their dimensions are defined by, existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits.’ ” Looney v. Black, 702 F.3d 701, 706 (2d Cir.2012) (alterations omitted) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). Thus, “[w]hen determining whether a plaintiff has a claim of entitlement, [courts] focus on the applicable statute, contract[,] or regulation that purports to establish” it. Brown v. New York, 975 F.Supp.2d 209, 242 (N.D.N.Y.2013) (quoting Martz v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 22 F.3d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1994)). However, “[a] ‘unilateral expectation’ is not sufficient to establish a constitutionally protected property right.” Looney, 702 F.3d at 706 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701). “Rather, a plaintiff must have ‘a legitimate claim of entitlement to’ the alleged property interest.” Id. (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701); see also Harrington v. Cty. of Suffolk, 607 F.3d 31, 34 (2d Cir.2010) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire and more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (quoting Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005))).

Here, the Parties apparently do not dispute that Plaintiff had a property interest in his position as a volunteer firefighter. (See PL’s Cross Mem. 8 (arguing that Plaintiff had a property interest in his position as a volunteer firefighter); see generally Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Cross Opp’n”) (Dkt. No. 54) (not arguing lack of property interest in Plaintiffs position).) And for good reason: “[I]t is well-settled that in New York, volunteer firefighters are considered public employees and must be afforded due process in disciplinary proceedings ....” Reed v. Medford Fire Dep’t, Inc., 806 F.Supp.2d 594, 610 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bigando v. Heitzman, 187 A.D.2d 917, 590 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (1992) (“It is undisputed that volunteer firefighters are considered public employees and must be afforded due process in disciplinary proceedings .... ”). Additionally, there is no disputing that Plaintiff was deprived of this property interest when he was expelled from the Department. See Reed, 806 F.Supp.2d at 610 (finding a volunteer firefighter was deprived of property when he was discharged). .

The next question, then, is “whether the government deprived the plaintiff of that interest without due process,” an inquiry that “asks what process was due to the plaintiff, and inquires whether that constitutional minimum' was provided in the case under review.” Narumanchi, 850 F.2d at 72 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). As a general proposition, in conducting this inquiry, the Second Circuit has held that “[a]n employee who has a property interest in his employment” — like Plaintiff — “‘is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story,’ before he is subjected to the loss of employment,” Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 285 F.3d 201, 212 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)); see also Amato v. Hartnett, 936 F.Supp.2d 416, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same), although “procedural due process is satisfied if the government provides notice and a limited opportunity to be heard prior to termination, so long as a full adversarial hearing is provided after-wards,” Munafo, 285 F.3d at 212 (quoting Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 171 (2d Cir.2001)); see also Amato, 936 F.Supp.2d at 437 (same).

Despite these general principles, “due process does not require the impossible,” DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir.2003) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128-29, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990)), and “[wjhere a deprivation at the hands of a government actor is ‘random and unauthorized,’ hence rendering it impossible for the government to provide a pre-deprivation hearing, due process requires only a post-deprivation proceeding,” id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)), for which purposes an Article 78 proceeding may well be sufficient, see Giglio v. Dunn, 732 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2d Cir.1984) (finding an employee who alleged he was coerced into resigning from his former job was “not deprived of due process simply because he failed to avail himself of the opportunity” to bring an Article 78 proceeding, where such proceeding “gave [him] a meaningful opportunity to challenge the voluntariness of his resignation”). In contrast, “[w]hen the deprivation occurs in the more structured environment of established state, procedures, rather than random acts, the availability of postdeprivation procedures will not, ipso facto, satisfy due process.” Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of N.Y. (“HANAC”), 101 F.3d 877, 880 (2d Cir.1996); see also Dushane v. Leeds Hose Co. #1 Inc., 6 F.Supp.3d 204, 214 (N.D.N.Y.2014) (“[I]f an employee’s termination is authorized by the state and therefore predictable, the availability of post-deprivation procedures will not, ipso facto, satisfy due process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This basic distinction “rests on pragmatic considerations.” HANAC, 101 F.3d at 880. Indeed, “[w]hen a deprivation occurs because of a random, arbitrary act by a state employee ‘[i]t is difficult to conceive of how the [s]tate could provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place.’ ” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 582, 104 S.Ct. 3194).

Thus, in order to determine what sort of process Plaintiff was entitled to, it is incumbent upon the Court to determine whether his firing was “random and unauthorized.” DiBlasio, 344 F.3d at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted).’ “The controlling inquiry is solely whether the state is in a position to provide- for predeprivation process,” HANAC, 101 F.3d at 880 (internal quotation marks omitted), and, so, it makes sense to begin with the statute that, as the Parties rightly recognize, sets forth the procedures by which volunteer firefighters can be removed from their positions, (see Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“PL’s Opp’n”) 9 (Dkt. No. 48); Defs.’ Cross Opp’n 4-7). That statute in its entirety states:

1. The authorities having control of fire departments of cities, towns, villages and fire districts may make regulations governing the removal of volunteer officers and volunteer members of such departments and the companies thereof.

2. Such officers and members of such departments and companies shall not be removed from office, or, membership, as the case may be, by such authorities or by any other officer or body, except for incompetence or misconduct.

3. Removals on the ground of incompetence or misconduct, except for absenteeism at fires or meetings, shall be made only after a hearing upon due notice and upon stated charges and with the right to such officer or member to a review pursuant to article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules. Such charges shall be in writing and may be made by any such authority. The burden of proving incompetency or misconduct shall be upon the person alleging the same. 4. a. Hearings upon such charges shall be held-by the officer or body having the power to remove the person charged with incompetency or misconduct or by a deputy or employee of such officer, or body designated in writing for that purpose. In a case where a deputy or other employee is so designated, he or she shall, for the purpose of such hearing, be vested with all the powers of such officer or body, and shall make a record of such hearing;, which shall be referred to such officer or body for review within ninety days from the close of such hearing along with his or her recommendations.

b. The notice of such hearing shall specify the time and place of such hearing and state the body or person before whom the hearing will be held.

c. Such notice and a copy of such charges shall be served personally upon the accused officer or member at least ten days but not more than thirty days before the date of the hearing.

d. A stenographer may be employed for the purpose of taking testimony at the hearing.

5. The officer or body having the power to remove the person charged with incompetence or misconduct may suspend such person after charges are filed and pending disposition of the charges, and after the hearing may remove such person or may suspend him or her for a period of time not to exceed one year.

The provisions of this section shall not affect the right of members of any fíre company to remove a volunteer officer or voluntary member of such company for failure to comply with the constitution and by-laws of such company.

N.Y. Gen, Mun. Law § 209-1 (emphasis added). Seizing on this last line, New York courts have made clear that the hearing guarantee contemplated by § 209-1(3) does not apply when charges are brought pursuant to a fire company’s bylaws. See Armstrong v. Centerville Fire Co., 83 N.Y.2d 937, 615 N.Y.S.2d 314, 638 N.E.2d 959, 960 (1994) (observing that the “[petitioner was not statutorily entitled to a hearing before being expelled for having violated respondent’s bylaws” and that “[t]he controlling statute (General Municipal Law § 209-1) only grants volunteer officers and volunteer members of fire departments the right to a hearing (upon written, notice of charges) before being removed on the ground of incompetence or misconduct”); Pawlowski v. Big Tree Volunteer Firemen’s Co., 12 A.D.3d 1030, 784 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (2004) (“Where ... charges brought against volunteer firefighters concern a violation of the bylaws or constitution of the fire company, the firefighters are not entitled to a hearing.”); Ferrara v. Magee Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 191 A.D.2d 967, 594 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (1993) (“[The] [petitioner was charged with a violation of the by-laws of the [department; therefore, General Municipal Law § 209-1 does not apply.”)

Although, to be sure, Plaintiff disputes that his conduct on the night in question is the actual reason he was terminated, there is no real dispute that he was at least procedurally removed from his position pursuant to the bylaws. (See Aug. 15 Letter 3.) Likewise, it is also clear that Article 12, § 1 of the Bylaws provide that “[t]he Board of Directors may remove a member from the roles of the [Department, upon due notice via a registered letter form the recording secretary, for [a number of] reasons,” including, “[f]or conduct unbecoming an officer, firefighter, or detrimental to the best interests of the department.” (See Bylaws Art. 12.) Indeed, the letter that Plaintiff, through his counsel, sent to the Boards of Directors and Commissioners is consistent with the notion that, procedurally speaking, Plaintiff was terminated in accordance with the Bylaws, inasmuch as the letter requests that the recipients “accept th[e] letter as [Plaintiffs] appeal ... pursuant to Article 12 Sec. 2 of the ByLaws.” (Pl.’s Attys Letter (emphasis added).)

Defendants, however, characterizing Plaintiffs position as that Defendants failed to follow the bylaws and dictates of § 209-1, contend that Plaintiff’s allegations amount to a claim that Defendants’ acts were random and unauthorized, such that an Article 78 proceeding is sufficient. (See Defs.’ Cross Opp’n. 9-10.) In support of this proposition, they cite Byrne v. Ceresia, 503 Fed.Appx. 68 (2d Cir.2012), a Second Circuit summary order affirming the district court’s judgment that the plaintiff was not deprived of his procedural due process rights when fired from his position as court officer-captain for the New York State Office of Court Administration, reasoning that Plaintiff “d[id] not challenge [his employer’s] established procedures for terminating disabled employees,” but rather “claim[ed] that [the] [defendants failed to follow those procedures.” Id. at 69-70. It is possible — and, indeed, tempting — to read Byrne broadly to suggest that, whenever a plaintiff alleges that he has been terminated in violation of the law, he must not possess a procedural due process claim because surely then his termination would have been random and unauthorized. Cf. Martinez v. O’Leary, No. 11-CV-1405, 2013 WL 3356983, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (“The Second Circuit has endorsed state court Article 78 review as a sufficient post-deprivation remedy in the context of a deprivation claim based on a change in employment status.” (citing Byrne, 503 Fed.Appx. at 69)); Camhi v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 920 F.Supp.2d 306, 312 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (concluding that the revocation of a teacher’s tenure on the grounds that giving her tenure had been an ultra vires act was “random and unauthorized”). However, an argument that Byrne brings all illegal firings within the purview of the so called “Parratt-Hudson” exception — or at least those not carried out by a “high-ranking official with final authority over significant matters,” see Byrne, 503 Fed.Appx. at 70 (quoting DiBlasio, 344 F.3d at 302) — overlooks the unique factual context in which Byrne was decided. In Byrne, the Plaintiff was terminated through a letter that “failed to apprise him of (1) the reasons for his termination; (2) his right to contest the decision; (3) the process for contesting the decision; and (4) that, upon contesting the decision, his termination would be held in abeyance pending a final determination,” Byrne v. Ceresia, No. 09-CV-6552, 2011 WL 5869594, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011), aff'd, 503 Fed.Appx. 68 (2d Cir.2012), despite 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 25.27, the regulatory provision, which, according to the hearing officer in the case, governed the plaintiffs termination, see id; see also 22 NY.C.R.R. § 25.27(c). In other words, in Byrne, the plaintiff was fired not because the defendants merely played fast and loose with the rules, but because they never took the rulebook off the shelf. See id. at *4 (noting that the plaintiff alleged that “state officials acted in flagrant violation” of required procedures (internal quotation marks omitted)). In such a scenario, “[i]t is difficult to conceive of how the [s]tate could provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place,” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532, 104 S.Ct. 3194, because there is simply no basis to think that the defendants’ conduct would have been any different had the applicable rules been different.

In contrast, here, there is a very real thread of logic uniting Plaintiffs termination with New York law: Section 209-1 authorizes expulsion pursuant to the bylaws, and the bylaws permit expulsion for “conduct unbecoming” “upon due notice via a registered letter.” (See Bylaws Art. 12.) In other words, it makes perfect sense to conclude here, that, in contrast with Byrne, had § 209-1 or the bylaws been written differently, the relevant procedures followed in Plaintiffs expulsion may well have been different. And, indeed, the Second Circuit itself has indicated that a deprivation is less likely to be random and unauthorized when preceded by a hearing. See Rivera-Bowell v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 466 n. 8 (2d Cir.2006) (“[T]o the extent that the purpose of the Parratt-Hudson inquiry is to determine whether the government actor could have provided pre-deprivation process, that question must clearly be answered in the affirmative here, because the [b]oard actually conducted a hearing before [the action at issue].”) Therefore, the Court declines to read Byrne — which, in any event, the Second Circuit considered sufficiently short of revolutionary to merit summary affirmance; — as dispositive here.

Rather, the more relevant case law comprises those decisions which directly confront the issue of whether an allegedly wrongful termination made pursuant to § 209-1 requires a pre-deprivation hearing. In Dushane v. Leeds Hose Co. # 1 Inc., 6 F.Supp.3d 204 (N.D.N.Y.2014), a case in which a volunteer firefighter was suspended for the stated reason that he made “a derogatory sexual reference to a female member under the age of eighteen,” and ultimately terminated “due to multiple counts of insubordination,” the court concluded that, because “[the] [defendants acknowledge^ that [the] [p]laintiff was removed for his violation of [the department’s] by-laws,” and because § 209-1 does not affect a department’s ability to remove volunteer members pursuant to department bylaws, the plaintiffs termination could not be labeled as “random and unauthorized.” 6 F.Supp.3d at 208, 215 (internal quotation marks omitted). This was so, even though, as the court later noted at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff firefighter claimed that he “had no opportunity ‘to present his side of the- story,’ ” insofar as he was permitted to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard , before his- suspension only with respect to the alleged sexually derogatory statement, and not with respect to the counts of insubordination, for which he was also, ultimately, terminated. See Dushane v. Leeds Hose Co. #1 Inc., No. 13-CV-677, at 22-23 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2016).

Similarly, in Reed v. Medford Fire Department, 806 F.Supp.2d 594 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), the plaintiff volunteer firefighter received a letter informing him that he was suspended for violating the department’s sexual harassment policy until the department’s next general meeting on March 7. Id. at 600. On March 7, the fire department sent the plaintiff a notice that -the charges against him would be considered at a meeting pursuant to § 209-1 and the department’s bylaws on March 26, but nonetheless voted through its members to find the plaintiff guilty and to withdraw notice of that meeting. Id. After the plaintiff brought a successful Article 78 proceeding, a New York Supreme Court justice ordered that the department conduct a hearing in accordance with § 209-1 and the department’s bylaws, which was eventually held in December. Id. at 601-02. In addressing the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs subsequent procedural due process claim, the court found a dispute of material fact surrounded whether the department’s conduct in terminating the plaintiff was “random and unauthorized.” See id. at 611. In so doing, the court expressly noted that “the fact that the [pjlaintiff contends that the ... [d]efendants[’j actions violated the municipal law and [department by-laws does not require a finding that the Medford [d]efendants[’l conduct was ‘random and unauthorized.’” Id, at 612. Therefore, to the- extent that Plaintiff was terminated without a pre-deprivation hearing of some kind, he was denied due process. Cf. Dushane, 6 F.Supp.3d at 216-17 (“[A]s alleged, [the plaintiff] did not receive oral or written notice of all of the charges against him. [The] [p]laintiff has therefore sufficiently alleged that the pre-suspension and pre-termination process he received was inadequate.” (citation omitted)); Leonardi v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Mastic Beach Fire Dist., 643 F.Supp. 610, 613 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (“[T]he ... failure [by the board of fire commissioners] to provide [the plaintiff volunteer firefighter] with a pre-termi-nation hearing constitutes a deprivation of a property interest without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

Having concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to a pre-termination proceeding of some kind, there remains the question of what process was due. While “[t]he pretermination process ‘need not be elaborate’ or approach the level of a ‘full adversarial evidentiary hearing,’ ” (Otero v. Bridgepor