United States Steel Corp. v. United States (179 F. Supp. 3d 1114, 2016)

OPINION AND ORDER

Kelly, Judge:

This consolidated action comes before the court on USCIT Rule 56.2 motions for judgment on the agency record, challenging the Department of Commerce’s (“Department” or “Commerce”) final determination in the antidumping duty (“ADD”) investigation of imports of certain oil country tubular goods (“OCTG”) from India for the period of July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013. See Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From India, 79 Fed.Reg. 41,981 (Dep’t Commerce July 18, 2014) (final determination of sales at less than fair value and final negative determination of critical circumstances) (“Final Determination”); see also Issues and Decision Memorandum for Final Affirmative Determination in the Less than Fair Value Investigation of Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from India, A-533-857, (Jul. 10, 2014), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/india/ 2014-16868-l.pdf (last visited April 17, 2016) (“Final Decision Memo”).

United States Steel Corporation (“U.S.Steel”) commenced this action pursuant to section 516A of the Tariff Act -of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (2012). The court consolidated U.S. Steel’s challenge with an action filed by GVN Fuels Limited (“GVN”), an individual exporter of OCTG, Maharashtra Seamless Limited (“MSL”) and Jindal Pipes Limited, (“JPL”), individual producers of OCTG (collectively “GVN Plaintiffs”). See Order, Jan. 21, 2015, ECF No. 25. U.S. Steel, Consolidated Plaintiffs GVN Plaintiffs, and Plaintiff-intervenors Maverick Tube Corporation (“Maverick”) filed motions for judgment on the agency record pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2. See Mot. Pl. United States Steel for J. Agency R. Under Rule 56.2, Mar. 24, 2015, ECF No. 34; Consolidated Pls.’ Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R., Mar. 23, 2015, ECF No. 32; Mot. Pl.-Intervenor Maverick Tube Corporation J. Agency R., Mar. 23, 2015, ECF No. 30 (“Maverick Mot.”).

BACKGROUND

On July 29, 2013, in response to a petition filed by U.S. Steel and other petitioners, including Maverick, Commerce initiated a less-than-fair-value (“LTFV”) investigation of OCTG from India. See Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from India, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Thailand, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 78 Fed.Reg. 45,505 (Dep’t Commerce Jul. 29, 2013) (initiation of ADD investigations). On August 26, 2013, Commerce selected GVN and Jindal SAW as mandatory respondents for examination in its LTFV investigation. See Anti-dumping Duty Investigation of Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from India: Respondent Selection at 5, PD 57, bar code 3151642-01 (Aug. 26, 2013).

On February 18, 2014, Commerce issued its preliminary determination. See Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From India, 79 Fed.Reg. 10,493 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 25, 2014) (preliminary determination of sales at less than fair value, preliminary affirmative determination of critical circumstances, in part, postponement of final determination) (“Prelim. Results”); see also Decision Memorandum fór the Preliminary Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of Oil Country Tubular Goods from India, A-533-857, (Feb. 14, 2014), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/india/ 2014-04106-l.pdf (last visited April 17, 2016) (“Prelim. Decision Memo”). Commerce preliminarily determined that certain OCTG from India “are being, or are likely to be, sold in the United States at [LTFV].” Prelim. Determination, 79 Fed.Reg. at 10,493. Commerce preliminarily granted GVN a duty drawback for exports through the Advance License Program (“ALP”) offered through the Indian government. Id. at 14. Commerce applied the mixed alternative methodology of its differential pricing analysis (i.e., average-to-transaction (“A-T”) methodology to Jin-dal SAW’s U.S. sales passing the Cohen’s d test) to calculate the weighted-average dumping margins for Jindal SAW and calculated GVN’s weighted-average dumping margin using the average-to-average (“AA”) methodology for all sales. See Prelim. Decision Memo at 12. As a result, Commerce preliminarily assigned weighted-average dumping margins of 55.29% to Jin-dal SAW, 0.00% to GVN, MSL, and JPL, and an all others rate of 55.29%. See Prelim. Determination, 79 Fed.Reg. at 10,494.

In its final determination, issued July 11, 2014, Commerce continued to grant GVN its requested duty drawback under the ALP. See Final Decision Memo at 15. Commerce had relied upon GVN’s submitted cost of production (“COP”) data in its preliminary determination, but in its final determination Commerce assigned GVN’s N/L-80 grade sales of OCTG the highest costs associated with L-80 grade products because cost data for N/L-80 products was missing from GVN’s cost database and Commerce’s practice is to assign costs of products meeting the strictest performance requirements where such cost information is not reported by a respondent. See id. at 30. Commerce continued to apply the mixed alternative methodology to calculate the weighted-average dumping margin for Jindal SAW and the A-A methodology to all of GVN’s sales in its final results. See Final Decision Memo at 12; see also Final Determination, 79 Fed.Reg. at 41,981. Therefore, Commerce assigned a weighted average dumping margin of 9.91% to Jindal SAW, 2.05% to GVN, MSL, and JPL, and an all others rate of 5.79%. See Final Determination 79 Fed.Reg. at 41,982.

U.S. Steel challenges Commerce’s determination: (1) to apply the ratio test within its differential pricing analysis, Br. PI. United States Steel Corporation Supp. Mot. J. Agency R. Confidential Version 65-74, ECF No. 31, Mar. 23, 2015 (“U.S. Steel Br.”); (2) that Jindal SAW was not affiliated with certain suppliers, id at 15-31; (3) to use Jindal SAW’s reported yield losses rather than partially applying adverse facts ayailable (“AFA”) to those costs, id at 31-39; (4) to grant GVN a duty drawback adjustment, id at 39-44; (5) to collapse GVN with affiliated producers MSL and JPL, id at 45-56; and (6) that MSL and JPL’s home market sales of OCTG only included one level of trade. Id at 56-65. Maverick adopts U.S. Steel’s arguments. Maverick Mot. 1. GVN Plaintiffs challenge what they characterize as Commerce’s apparent application of AFA to fill gaps in its reporting of COP for dual grade merchandise as contrary to law. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Consolidated Pls.’ Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. 10-17, Mar. 23, 2015, ECF No. 32-1 (“GVN Plaintiffs Br.”).- Defendant, United States (“Defendant”), responds that the. court should deny the motions of Plaintiff and Consolidated Plaintiffs and sustain Commerce’s Final Results in full. See Def.’s Corrected Resp. Opp. Pls.’ and Pl.-Intervenors’ Mots. J. Administrative R. Proprietary Version 2, Sep. 30, 2015, ECF No. 58 (“Def.’s Resp. Br.”). In addition, U.S. Steel filed a response, as defendant-inter-venor, in opposition to the motion of GVN Plaintiffs. See Mem. United States Steel Corporation Opp. Mot. J. Agency R. Filed By Pls. GVN Fuels Limited, Maharashtra Seamless Limited, and Jindal Pipes Limited Confidential Version, Sep. 21, 2015, ECF No. 49 (“U.S. Steel Resp. Br.”).

For the reasons that follow, the court sustains Commerce’s determinations: (1) granting GVN a duty drawback adjustment under the advance license export program operated by the Indian government; (2) collapsing GVN with MSL and JPL, its affiliated producers; and (3) finding that all of MSL and JPL’s home market sales occurred within the same level of trade. However, the court remands Commerce’s determination with respect to its differential pricing analysis, specifically Commerce’s application and explanation of its ratio test in this case, for further explanation and consideration. Further, the court remands Commerce’s determinations for further explanation and consideration that: (1) Jindal SAW was unaffiliated with certain suppliers of inputs; (2) Jindal SAW’s yield loss data reasonably reflected its costs of production; and (3) the highest COP in GVN’s cost database should be assigned to its dual-grade products. The court defers its decision on U.S. Steel’s claim that Commerce acted contrary to law in declining to apply partial AFA to Jindal SAW’s reported yield loss data.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2012), which grant the court authority to review actions contesting the final determination in an ADD investigation. The court “shall hold unlawful any determination, finding or conclusion found ... to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law....” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).

DISCUSSION

I. Commerce’s Use of the Ratio Test in its Differential Pricing Analysis

U.S. Steel challenges Commerce’s use of the ratio test in its differential pricing analysis as inconsistent with the statute and Commerce’s own practice. U.S. Steel Br. 65. U.S. Steel argues that the thresholds used generally in the ratio test portion of Commerce’s differential pricing analysis are arbitrary, see id. at 68, and that Commerce has never provided a reasoned explanation for these thresholds. Id. at 69-70. Further, U.S. Steel argues that Commerce’s ratio test is unreasonably applied in this investigation. See id. at 72. In response, Defendant argues that Commerce acted within its statutory authority to reasonably fill statutory gaps left by Congress to establish its differential pricing methodology, and that Commerce properly applied that methodology. Def. Resp. Br. 83-34; 35-39. The court finds that, although Commerce has considerable discretion to decide when to apply an alternative methodology to calculate dumping margins for respondents, it failed to adequately explain why the thresholds it has developed as part of the ratio test in its differential pricing methodology were reasonably applied in this investigation.

To determine whether merchandise is being sold in the United States at less than fair, value and,- if so, to calculate the ADD rate for the individually examined exporters and producers, Commerce must compare normal value to the export price of each entry of subject merchandise. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(A)(ii); 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A). The statute provides that Commerce shall ordinarily use the A-A methodology to calculate dumping margins in an investigation, but Commerce may use the A-T methodology as an alternative to the default A-A method if:

(i) there is a pattern of export prices ... for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time, and

(ii) [Commerce] explains why such differences cannot be taken into account using a method described in paragraph (1)(A)(i) [(A-A)] or (ii) [ (transaction-to-transaction) ].

19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B). The statute provides no methodology for how Cóm-merce shall identify and measure a pattern of export prices, how significantly those prices must differ among purchasers, regions, or periods of time; or what form of “export prices” Commerce must consider in its pattern analysis. See id, § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B)(i). Commerce has implemented and continues to develop a practice, which it calls its differential pricing analysis, “for purposes of examining whether to apply an alternative comparison method in this LTFV investigation.” Prelim. Decision Memo at 10.

.The court affords Commerce significant deference in determinations “in-volv[ing] complex economic and accounting decisions of a technical nature.” Fujitsu Gen. Ltd v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1039 (Fed.Cir.1996). Despite Commerce’s wide discretion, it “must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48-49, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). Fashioning a test to evaluate what constitutes a pattern under the statute is sufficiently complex and technical to warrant significant deference. See Fujitsu, 88 F.3d at 1039. Commerce’s methodological. approach must nevertheless be a “reasonable means of, effectuating the statutory purpose” and its conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence in order to be afforded deference. Cera-mica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 10 CIT 399, 404-05, 636 F.Supp. 961, 966 (1986), aff'd, 810 F.2d 1137, 1139 (Fed.Cir.1987).

Commerce’s differential pricing analysis requires a finding pf “a pattern of [export prices] ... for comparable merchandise that differs significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods.” Prelim. Decision Memo at 10. “If such a pattern is found, then the [differential pricing] analysis . evaluates whether such differences can be taken into account when using the [A-A] method to calculate the weighted-average dumping margin.” Id. Regarding the mechanics of the application of its differential pricing analysis, Commerce explained that it first applied the Cohen’s d test, as it has in other investigations, to measure the extent of the price “difference between the mean of a test group and the mean of a comparison group.” Id. at 11,

Next, Commerce’s differential pricing analysis employed the ratio test, which “assesses the extent of the significant price differences for all sales as measured by the Cohen’s d test.” See id. Commerce described the mechanics of its ratio test as follows:

If the values of sales to purchasers, regions, and time periods that pass the Cohen’s d test accounts for 66 percent or more of the value of total sales, then the identified pattern of [export prices] ,., that differ significantly supports the consideration of the application of the [A-T] method to all sales as an alternative to the [A-A] method. If the value of sales to purchasers, regions and time periods that pass the Cohen’s d test accounts for more than 33 percent and less than 66 percent of the value of total sales, then the results support consideration of the application of an [A-T] method to those sales identified as passing the Cohen’s d test as an alternative to the [A-A] method, an application of the [A-A] method to those sales identified as not passing the Cohen’s d test. If 33 percent or less of the value of total sales pass the Cohen’s d test, then the results of the Cohen’s d test do not support consideration of an alternative to the [A-A] method.

Id. However, Commerce explained that the Cohen’s d test- only evaluates sales where both the test and comparison groups have at least two observations and where the sales quantity for the comparison group accounts for at least five percent of the total sales quantity. See id. Commerce further explained that the value of sales that pass the Cohen’s d test, which is the numerator for the ratio test, only includes the sales that are evaluated. See id. Yet, Commerce further explained that in this investigation, when

accumulating the results of the Cohen’s d test under the ratio test, these results must be considered with respect to all U.S. sales and not a.subset of respondent’s U.S. sales. If the Department is unable to evaluate some sales then it simply cannot find these sales contributed to a pattern of prices that differ significantly, as required by the statute.

Final Decision Memo at 13. Thus, as Commerce described its application of the ratio test the denominator includes all sales, not just those that pass the Cohen’s d test although some sales may be excluded from the numerator. See id.

In the final step of its differential pricing analysis, if the results of the Cohen’s d test and the ratio test “demonstrate the existence of a pattern of [export prices] ... that differ significantly,”- Commerce examines “whether -using only the [A-A] method can appropriately account for such differences.” Prelim. Decision Memo at 11. It does so by comparing the weighted average dumping margin obtained through the A-A method versus that obtained through using the A-T method. See id. “If the differences between the two calculations is- meaningful,” Commerce presumes that the A-A method cannot account for the differences. Id. In such circumstances, Commerce considers using A-T appropriate. Id.

After applying its differential pricing analysis, Commerce preliminarily found “that 60.68 percent of Jindal SAW’s U.S. sales pass the Cohen’s d test, and confirm the existence of a pattern of export prices ... for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions or time periods.” Id. at 10. Notwithstanding Commerce’s pattern finding, Commerce elected to apply its A-A methodology to all of Jindal SAW’s U.S. sales because it found no “meaningful difference in the weighted-average dumping margins when calculated using the [A-A] method and an alternative method based on the [A-T] method applied to all U.S. sales which pass the Cohen’s d test.” Id. With regard to GVN’s U.S. sales, Commerce preliminarily determined to use its A-A methodology for all transactions because Commerce found “that 22.54 percent of GVN’s U.S. sales pass the Cohen’s d test and therefore the analysis does not confirm the existence of a pattern of export prices ... for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers regions or time periods.” Id. at 12.

In its final determination, Commerce rejected U.S. Steel’s objections that its application of the ratio test of its differential pricing analysis was unreasonable or unlawful. See Final Decision Memo at 9. As it had in its preliminary determination, Commerce applied its A-T methodology to Jindal SAW’s sales passing the Cohen’s d test because Commerce asserted that the statute gave it the discretion to determine how it “should measure whether there is a pattern of [export prices] that differed significantly or how the [A-T] method may be applied as an alternative to the standard [A-A] method.” See Final Decision Memo at 10 (referencing SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040); see also Prelim. Decision Memo at 10-12. Commerce found that “24.14 percent of GVN’s sales pass the Cohen’s d test, which does not confirm the existence of a pattern of prices that differ significantly.” Final Decision Memo at 12. Accordingly, Commerce applied the A-A method to all of GVN’s U.S. sales. Id.

In applying the ratio test, Commerce continued that it

finds reasonable, given its growing experience of applying [the statute] and the application of the [A-T] method as an alternative to the [A-A] method, that when two thirds or more of a respondents sales are at prices that differ significantly, then the extent of these sales is so pervasive that it would not permit the Department to separate the effect of the sales where prices differ significantly from those where prices do not differ significantly.... Finally, when the Department finds that between one third and two thirds of U.S. sales are at prices that differ significantly, then there exists a pattern of prices that differ significantly, and the effect of this pattern can reasonably be separated from the sales whose prices do not differ significantly. Accordingly, in this situation, the Department finds that it is appropriate to address the concern of masked dumping by considering the application of the LA-TI method as an alternative to the [A-A] method for only those sales which constitute the pattern of prices that differ significantly.

Id. at 11. In addition, Commerce continued to decline to exclude sales for which comparisons were not made in the Cohen’s d test from the denominator of its ratio test. Id.

Initially, U.S. Steel argues that, even if Commerce has reasonably filled the gaps in the statute by developing the ratio test, the ratio test is inconsistent with Commerce’s past practice. See U.S. Steel Br. 67-68. However, all of the proceedings cited by U.S. Steel involve Commerce’s application of the Nails test to determine whether respondents were engaged in targeted dumping. Commerce explained that its “approach in this matter has changed over time as the Department has gained experience in examining whether the [A-T] method is an appropriate method.” Final Decision Memo at 10. Commerce’s explanation is reasonable and sufficient. Therefore, Commerce was not obliged to follow its practice under the Nails test, see NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed.Cir.2009), and U.S. Steel’s argument that Commerce’s use of the ratio test conflicts with its practice under the Nails test does not undermine Commerce’s authority to apply its new practice.

Nonetheless, while Commerce has reasonably explained why its differential pricing methodology is generally tailored to the statutory purpose, see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48-49, 103 S.Ct. 2856, Commerce has failed to adequately explain why its thresholds as applied in this investigation are reasonable. U.S. Steel argues that the effect of Commerce’s practice of limiting the application of the Cohen’s d test to sales where the test and comparison groups have at least two observations was to exclude over [[ ]]% of the value of GVN’s sales and almost [[ ]]% of the value of Jindal SAW’s sales from testing under Commerce’s differential pricing analysis. See U.S. Steel Br. 72. Here, Commerce has relied exclusively on its thresholds developed for different circumstances, i.e., where a significant value of sales is not excluded from testing. See Prelim. Decision Memo at 11; Final Decision Memo at 11. Commerce must explain why its ratios are reasonable even though a significant value of respondents’ sales were excluded.

If the denominator of Commerce’s ratio test (i.e., the value of all of respondents’ sales) remains constant, then the ratio of the value of sales passing the Cohen’s d test relative to the value of all sales may differ substantially from another investigation where a lesser value of sales is excluded from application of the Cohen’s d test. Because the breadth of Commerce’s application of its A-T methodology is significantly determined by the ratio of the value of export sales that pass the Cohen’s d test to the value of all export sales, Commerce could not rely upon its explanation for the thresholds developed in investigations where such a significant value of respondents’ sales were not excluded from the numerator without explaining why these ratios were reasonable in circumstances where a significant value of sales were excluded. If two otherwise similar investigations identified similar patterns of prices that differed by purchaser, region, or time period, the results of Commerce’s differential pricing analysis may differ significantly if, in one investigation, a significant value of sales is excluded from Commerce’s ratio analysis. This result has at least the potential to treat the same behavior differently. Given the value of sales excluded from the analysis here, the court remands Commerce’s determination to provide further explanation as to why its thresholds as applied in this investigation are reasonable or otherwise reconsider the parameters of its differential pricing methodology in such contexts.

As a separate argument, U.S. Steel asks the court to read the statute as requiring the application of the A-T methodology to all sales. See U.S. Steel Br. 66-67. Citing the SAA, U.S. Steel argues that “[t]he SAA does not require—or even suggest—that there is any precondition to applying the A-T methodology beyond” those contained in the statute. See U.S. Steel Br. 66 (citing SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 at 843, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4178). But this argument presumes that the statute does not delegate to Commerce the question of when and to what extent the A-T methodology should be employed once the statutory preconditions for application of A-T have been satisfied. U.S. Steel claims that Congress’s intent was to apply the A-T methodology to as many sales as possible. See U.S. Steel Br. ’66. Yet, the statute, the regulation, and the SAA all express that the A-A methodology will be the default rule and A-T the exception. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B); 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(c) (2013); SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 at 843, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4178. If Congress had had such an intent, it knew how to convey it in the language of the statute. The provision of the SAA cited by U.S. Steel is nothing more than a general explanation that the conditions recited in the statute govern Commerce’s use of the A-T methodology. See id. No language in the statute explicitly indicates Congress mandated the application of A-T to all sales. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B).

U.S. Steel’s arguments that the tiers established by Commerce’s ratio test are arbitrary in a general sense are similarly unavailing. See U.S. Steel Br. at 68-69. So long as Commerce’s rationale for adopting such thresholds is reasonably explained, the court’s standard of review does not require that Commerce explain the statistical calculations and methodologies that allowed it to arrive at such thresholds. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48-49, 103 S.Ct. 2856; Ceramica Regiomontana, 10 CIT at 404-05, 636 F.Supp. at 966. U.S. Steel’s argument that “Commerce has not provided a reasoned basis why it cannot ‘separate the effect’ of differential pricing when 67% of sales are affected but it can make such a distinction where 65% of sales are affected,” U.S Steel Br. at 70, amounts to nothing more than a general philosophical criticism of the concept of a threshold. See U.S. Steel Br. at 68-69. It is inherent in the concept of a threshold that observations that fall on the margins of either side will be treated disparately from those on the other side. Such a criticism would no less apply if Commerce had set its threshold at 33% as it would at 66%. So long as Commerce has explained its rationale behind such a threshold, the court will defer to Commerce’s significant statistical and economic expertise in fashioning it. See Fujitsu, 88 F.3d at 1039.

Commerce has explained that “when a third or less of a respondent’s U.S. sales are not at prices that differ significantly, then these significant price differences are not extensive enough to satisfy the first requirement of the statute,” which requires Commerce to find a pattern of export prices for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions or period of time. See Final Decision Memo at 11. Likewise, “when two thirds or more of a respondent’s sales are at prices that differ significantly, then the extent of these sales is so pervasive that it would not permit the Department to separate the effect of the sales where prices differ significantly from those where prices do not differ significantly.” Id. Additionally, when Commerce finds that • “between one third and two thirds of U.S. sales are at prices that differ significantly, then there exists a pattern of prices that differ significantly, and the effect of this pattern can reasonably be separated from the sales whose prices do not differ significantly.” Id. The court can discern from Commerce’s explanation that Commerce ■ has developed its ratio test to identify the existence and extent to which there is a pattern of export prices for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions or periods of time. U.S. Steel fails to show that Commerce’s ratio test fails to reveal such a pattern-that in fact exists.

II. Claims Relating to Mandatory Respondent Jindal SAW

A. Affiliation of Jindal SAW with Suppliers of Inputs

U.S. Steel argues that Commerce lacked substantial'evidence for finding Jin-dal SAW unaffiliated with its suppliers of steel billets and electricity, the primary inputs for producing subject merchandise. U.S. Steel’s Br. 25. U.S. Steel argues that Commerce ignored evidence that Jindal SAW’s two suppliers: (1) “are under the common control of the O.P. Jindal Family and Group and are affiliated,” id. at 13; (2) “[t]he O.P. Jindal family, through the O.P. Jindal Group, exercises control over Jindal SAW [and its suppliers of steel billets and electricity] due to family relationships, stock ownership, and a close, supplier relationship,” id. at 18; and (3) “these ‘members of [the family] ... and lineal descendants’ hold the top leadership positions in each flagship company that makes up the O.P. Jindal Group,” id. at 19. Lastly, U.S. Steel asserts that “[t]he O.P. Jindal family exercise control over Jindal SAW [and its suppliers of steel billets and electricity] by way of stockholdings in all three companies that [[ ]] the 5% threshold established in the statute.” Id. at 22-23. Defendant argues that U.S. Steel’s claims depend on a “skewed reading of the record” and that Commerce “reasonably based its determinations on record evidence.” Def.’s Resp. Br. at 11. The court finds that, -given the record evidence of indirect ownership and close supplier relationships, Commerce has failed to adequately explain why it was reasonable to conclude that Jindal SAW and its suppliers of steel billets and electricity were not under the common control of the O.P. Jindal family. • Therefore, the court remands this issue to Commerce for further consideration and explanation.

The statute defines affiliated persons through the following categories:

(A) Members of a family, including brothers and sisters (whether by whole or half blood), spouse ancestors, and lineal descendants.

(B) Any officer or director of an organization and such organization.

(C) Partners.

(D) Employer and Employee.

(E)- Any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 percent or more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of any organization and such organization.

(F) Two or more persons directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, any person.

(G) Any person who controls any other person and such other person.

19 U.S.C. § 1677(33). Commerce’s regulations incorporate the statutory definition of “affíliatéd persons” and “affiliated parties” and further clarify the non-exhaustive list of considerations Commerce shall take into account in assessing whether control over another person exists as an element of affiliation. 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(3). In evaluating whether control exists within § 1677(33), Commerce will consider “[c]or-porate or family groupings; franchise or joint venture agreements; debt financing; and close supplier relationships.” Id. However, Commerce “will not find that control exists on the basis of these factors unless the relationship has the potential to impact decisions concerning the production, pricing, or cost of subject merchandise.” Id. Under Commerce’s practice, in cases involving control through corporate or family groupings, Commerce has noted that the control factors of individual members of the group are considered in the aggregate. See, e.g., Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the 2001-2002 Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bar from the Republic of Korea, A-580-844, (Apr. 13, 2004), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/ korea-soutlV04-8375-l.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).

Commerce must further explain its determination that Jindal SAW and its suppliers of steel billets and electricity were not directly or indirectly under the common control of members of the O.P. Jindal family under § 1677(33)(F). Defendant does not dispute that Commerce’s regulation requires that it evaluate family groupings and supplier relationships in determining whether control exists under §§ 1677(83)(F). See Def.’s Resp. Br. 15; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(3). Nor does Defendant dispute that Commerce’s practice is to evaluate the control factors of individual members of the family grouping (e.g. stock ownership, management positions, board membership) in the aggregate. See Def.’s Resp. Br. 15-16. Indeed, Commerce did investigate the aggregated direct interests of Ó.P. Jindal family members as well as the O.P. Jindal family members’ board positions in various O.P. Jindal Group entities. See Verification of the Cost Response of Jindal SAW Limited in the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Oil Country Tubular Goods (“OCTG”) from India at 5-7, CD 343,. bar code 3195642-01 (Apr. 14, 2014) (“Jindal SAW Cost Verification Report”). However, Commerce did not evaluate the collective stock ownership (including indirect stock ownership), management positions, and board memberships held by O.P. Jindal family members in Jindal SAW, JSPL, and [[ ]] as its practice requires. Commerce failed to explain why it deviated from its practice here.

Commerce acknowledged that the relatedness of the members of the O.P. Jindal family. Prelim. Decision Memo at 6. Likewise, Commerce acknowledged the existence of corporate groupings and close supplier relationships among Jindal SAW and its suppliers, noting that

[according to the record, the respondents are members of two “informal” groups of companies associated with the Jindal family. These two groups originated with two brothers: Mr. O.P. Jin-dal (now deceased) and Mr. B.C. Jindal. Mr. B.C. Jindal’s son, Mr.- D.P. Jindal, then separated from his father and created a third group of companies, “the D.P. Jindal group.” Jindal SAW belongs to the O.P. Jindal group_ The O.P. Jindal group includes suppliers of inputs used by the OCTG producers in all three groups.

Id. However, without examining the family’s management positions and board memberships, Commerce’s examination of the collective direct stock ownership of O.P. Jindal family members alone was insufficient to reasonably conclude that the family was not legally or operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction over Jindal SAW, JSPL, and [[]]. This was particularly true in light of record evidence indicating that the O.P. Jindal family may have had the capacity to exercise control through the promoter groups of these entities.

With respect to Jindal SAW, Commerce reviewed the following individual direct holdings of each of the four sons of O.P. jindal: P.R. Jindal ([[ ]]%), Sajjan Jindal ( [[ ]]%), Naveen Jindal ([[ ]]%), and Rattan Jindal ([[ ]]%). See Jindal SAW Cost Verification Report at 5-6. However, Commerce limited its examination of the family’s indirect holdings in Jindal SAW to reviewing the family’s holdings of [[ ]], the largest shareholder in Jindal SAW. See id. at 6. Commerce justified its limited examination of indirect holdings by explaining that the other ten largest shareholders in Jindal SAW were not publicly traded, so Commerce was unable to obtain a list of shareholders of those entities. See id. Commerce determined that the aggregated direct holdings of Jindal family members in [[ ]] was [[ ]]%. Id. at 6. In its Jindal SAW Cost Verification Report, Commerce made no finding regarding the aggregate total direct and indirect holdings of the O.P. Jindal Family in Jindal SAW. See id. at 6. Nor did Commerce trace the aggregated direct and indirect holdings of the O.P. Jindal family members in either JSPL or [[ ]]. See id. at 6.

U.S. Steel cites record evidence in a Jindal SAW financial prospectus that Jin-dal SAW’s promoters were P.R. Jindal, the Jindal Family, and persons or entities controlled by them (directly or indirectly). U.S. Steel Reply Br. 6 (citing U.S. Steel Deficiency Comments on Jindal SAW Questionnaire Response at Ex. G, PD 167-171, bar codes 3167500-01-05 (Dec. 6, 2013) (“U.S. Steel Comments Jindal SAW Questionnaire Response”)). U.S. Steel also noted at oral argument that the prospectus limits the promoters of Jindal SAW to P.R. Jindal, his family members, and entities that they control. See Conf. Oral Arg., 00:20:47-00:20:56, Mar. 3, 2016, ECF No. 94 (“Conf. Oral Arg.”); see also U.S. Steel Comments Jindal SAW Questionnaire Response at Ex. G. U.S. Steel cites additional information, albeit at times from slightly outside the period of review, that the promoters and promoter groups of each of Jindal SAW, JSPL, and [[]] collectively held significant percentages of the total shareholdings in each entity relative to non-promoter group shareholders. See Conf. Oral Arg. 00:21:23-00:26:27 (citing Jindal SAW Cost & Sales Verification Exhibits at Ex. 4, CD 260-295, bar codes 3190334-01-05 (Mar. 25, 2014); U.S. Steel Supplemental 'Comments Jindal SAW Questionnaire Response at 177, 181, CD 216, bar code 3181479-02 (Feb. 14, 2014)).

In light of this record evidence indicating that O.P. Jindal family members controlled the promoter groups and the fact that the statute requires Commerce to look at indirect holdings, Commerce must explain why it was reasonable for it to conclude that O.P. Jindal’s indirect holdings through promoter groups were not significant enough to indicate control. The fact that Commerce' did not specifically refer to the' direct or indirect holdings of any Ó.P. Jindal family member in either JSPL or [[]] underscores the unreasonableness of Commerce’s ’ conclusion given the record evidence.

Moreover, -although Commerce traced the board memberships and management positions of Jindal family members in Jin-dal SAW, JSPL, and [[■]], Commerce failed to explain why it was reasonable to conclude that these memberships and positions did not create the potential to impact decisions concerning production, pricing, and cost of subject merchandise, or indicate that the O.P. Jindal family was not in a position to exercise restraint and direction over all of these entities. Commerce recognized that P.R. Jindal is the Chairman of Jindal SAW, see Jindal SAW Cost Verification Report at 4, and that “Indresh Batra (husband of and Sminu Jindal) holds the.position of Managing Director of Jindal SAW. [It] noted from a review of the Annual Reports of the other companies that ... Mr. Ratan Jindal, brother of P.R. Jindal, is the Chairman and Managing Director of [JSPL].” Id. at 7.

Commerce discounted the control significance of these board memberships and management positions because “none of the Jindal brothers (i.e., P.R. Jindal, SaljJjan Jindal, Ratan Jindal or Naveen Jindal) appears as a director of another brother’s company nor do they hold a management position in another brother’s company.” Id. Although Commerce recognized that Savitri Jindal sat on the boards of both Jindal SAW and JSPL, it failed to explain why it attached no control significance to this fact, nor did it explain why her presence on boards of both companies did not detract from its other control findings. Further, U.S. Steel pointed to record evidence that Sajjan Jindal is the Chairman and Managing Director of [[ ]]. U.S. Steel Br. 2 (citing Jindal SAW Section A Response at Ex. A-4, PD 93-104, bar codes 3159648-1-12 (Oct. 24, 2013)). Commerce, however, did not make findings as to the board composition and memberships in Jindal SAWs electricity supplier.

Commerce also relied on the fact that Jindal SAW’s Articles of Association provided that “each director has a single vote and the Board may only take action with a majority of the votes except in case of a tie where the Chairman may place a tie-breaking vote,” to discount the control significance of the board membership and management positions of the various Jin-dal family members. Jindal SAW Cost Verification Report at 7. However, Commerce did not investigate voting patterns or the existence of voting trust agreements that could impact the Jindal family’s ability to take action notwithstanding its non-majority status on the board of Jindal SAW. See id. In order for its control findings to be supported by substantial evidence, on remand Commerce must explain why its conclusion was reasonable in light of the detracting evidence relating to board memberships and management positions of the various Jindal family members.

Commerce also failed to evaluate the nature of supplier relationships in its final determination, which Commerce’s regulation provides it will consider among the factors in evaluating a relationship of control within its affiliation determination. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(3). Where Commerce finds that a close supplier' relationship “has the potential to impact decisions concerning the production, pricing or costs” of such' merchandise, Commerce may also find control sufficient to establish affiliation under § 1677(33). See 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(3). U.S. steel cites record evidence indicating that Jindal SAW purchases approximately [[ ]]% of its steel billets from JSPL, U.S. Steel Br. 27 (citing Jindal SAW Supplemental Section D Questionnaire Response at Ex. D-16, CD 117-118, bar codes 3172116-01-02 (Jan. 6, 2014))] This evidence suggests the relationship has the potential to impact production, pricing, or cost decisions. Therefore, Commerce must consider the close supplier relationships between Jindal SAW and JSPL and explain why it did not indicate the O.P. Jindal family controlled both Jindal SAW and JSPL.

Defendant argues that U.S. Steel points to “no evidence—such as an.exclusive sales contract—that, might demonstrate such reliance.” Def.’s Resp. Br. 17. Although a close supplier relationship may be an arm’s length relationship, the regulation indicates that Commerce shall evaluate such a relationship and consider if the supplier has become reliant upon the buyer. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(3); SAA, H.R.Rep. No. 103-316, vol. 1 at 838, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4,175. A legal obligation requiring one entity to purchase from the other, such as an exclusive sales contract, is not the only relationship that has the potential to impact decisions concerning the production, pricing or costs. In fact, Commerce’s practice, consistent with the SAA’s definition of such a relationship, is to evaluate whether a buyer company has become reliant on the seller, or vice versa. See Certain Cold-Rolled and Corrosion Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products From Korea, 62 Fed.Reg. 18,404, 18,417 (Dep’t Commerce Apr, 15, 2007) (final results of antidumping administrative reviews); see also SAA, H.R.Rep. No. 103-316, vol. 1 at 838, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4,174-75. Here, Commerce’s analysis did not address these reliance considerations.

Defendant argues that after Commerce traced the indirect share ownership of O.P. Jindal family members in Jindal SAW, Commerce found “the record evidence did not provide a basis to impute control by the Jindal family through the promoter groups identified by U.S. Steel.” Def.’s Resp. Br. 16 (citing Jindal SAW Cost Verification Report at 5-7). Defendant argues that U.S. Steel relies on promoter entities to support its indirect control argument, and U.S. Steel has not shown that the Jindal family’s ownership in the promoter companies is significant. See id. at 15. Yet, Defendant’s statement that Commerce searched publicly available databases of the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange of India, and found no entity listed called the “O.P. Jin-dal Group,” see id. at 15-16; see also Jindal SAW Cost Verification Report at 5, does not relieve Commerce from explaining how it could conclude the O.P. Jindal family did not control Jindal SAW, JSPL, and [[]].

Commerce failed to address the significance of the corporate and family relationships among the O.P. Jindal family members that held direct and indirect interests in Jindal SAW, JSPL, and [[ ]] as well as their roles as managers and directors of these companies. Commerce also failed to analyze whether close supplier relationships made Jindal SAW reliant on JSPL or [[ ]], or vice versa. Therefore, the court remands Commerce for further consideration and explanation.

B. Commerce’s Acceptance of Jindal SAW’s Reported Yield Loss Data

U.S. Steel argues Commerce lacked substantial evidence to conclude that Jindal SAW’s cost reporting methodology allocated yield losses on a basis that reasonably reflected differences in the processing costs for merchandise with differing physical characteristics. U.S. Steel Br. 31-32. To remedy such deficiencies in Jindal SAW’s COP data, U.S. Steel argues Commerce should have applied AFA to Jindal SAW’s yield losses. Id. at 37-39. In response, Defendant argues “Commerce verified the accuracy of Jindal SAW’s yield loss methodology,” and, in any event, Commerce reasonably refused to apply AFA because “Jindal SAW cooperated with Commerce’s requests for information.” Def.’s Resp. Br. 59. Commerce lacked substantial evidence for its conclusion that Jindal SAW’s reported yield loss data reasonably reflected its COP for each specific category of subject merchandise.

Commerce generally “shall consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of costs ... if such allocations have been historically used by the exporter or producer.” Id. According to the statute,

[c]osts shall normally be calculated based on the records of the exporter or producer of the merchandise, if such records are kept in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country ... and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the merchandise.

19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A). If Commerce determines that the records of the respondent cannot properly form an accurate basis upon which to calculate that respondent’s COP, then Commerce shall use facts otherwise available in reaching the determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). Commerce may apply AFA in selecting from among the facts otherwise available where it “finds that an interested party has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with [its] request for information.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b).

Commerce initially evaluates the respondent’s COP data, as reported, to ensure that the reported COP reporting methodology complies with generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) of the exporting country. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A). Thereafter, Commerce evaluates whether a respondent’s COP data, as reported, “reasonably reflectfs] the costs associated with the production and sale of the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A).

The statute does not define what it means for reported cost information to reasonably reflect that party’s COP. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has broadly defined when costs “reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the merchandise” to mean that the costs, as reported would not distort the company’s true costs. Am. Silicon Techs, v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2001); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A). Given the record evidence before it, Commerce inadequately explained why Jindal SAW’s yield loss data reasonably reflected its COP.

Commerce’s determination to accept Jindal SAW’s reported yield losses is not supported by substantial evidence. Commerce’s finding that Jindal SAW’s books and records captured total yield loss [[]] does not permit it to conclude that products with different physical characteristics generated [[ ]] yield losses, as Jindal SAW reported. See Cost of Production and Constructed Value Calculation Adjustments for the Final Determination—Jindal SAW at 7,. PD 354, bar code 3215359-01 (Jul. 10, 2014) (“Jindal SAW Cost Calculation Memo”). Commerce concedes that Jindal SAW’s yield loss allocation methodology allocated yield losses [[ ]] production stages regardless of specific physical characteristics (i.e., wall thickness or diameter) of its product. Final Decision Memo at 36, 40. Commerce stated that, “[although yield is not calculated by' production stage as advocated by the petitioners, we do not find evidence that the reported yield is unreasonable” because “reallocation of conversion costs after a certain proprietary production stage would result in an insignificant change in the reported costs and therefore the reported costs are reasonable.” . Id. at 40.

Yet, Commerce cites to no record evidence to support its conclusion that such costs were [[ ]] distributed or that allocating such COP differently would have resulted in an insignificant change. By comparison, Commerce measured whether Jindal SAW’s conversion cost data was distorted by comparing two equal lengths of subject merchandise with different diameters and wall thicknesses that represented the largest production quantity in Jindal SAW’s cost database. Jindal SAW Cost Calculation Memo at 3. Commerce then used length to weight conversion factors provided by Jindal SAW, and Commerce found that the difference between calculating costs on a [[]] and on a [[]] resulted in a difference in allocated cost of [[]]%. Id. Based on this comparison, Commerce concluded that “the reported product specific conversion costs for the [[]] are inaccurate and unusable.” Id. Commerce conducted no such comparison between yield losses allocated by physical characteristic or production stage versus costs [[ ]] across all products with different physical characteristics or stages of production. See id. Since Commerce merely accepted Jindal SAW’s reported yield losses without comparing costs, as it had with respect to conversion costs, Commerce could not have determined if this yield loss reporting methodology potentially distorted Jindal SAW’s yield losses. Therefore, Commerce’s determination that Jindal SAW’s yield losses accurately reflected its COP was not supported by substantial evidence.

Defendant argues - that tracking yield losses by stage of production or CON-NUM-specific characteristics would result in the total yield losses reported by Jindal SAW over the overall course of its production of subject merchandise. See Def.’s Resp. Br. 61. This argument misses the point. Even if Jindal SAW’s total yield losses over its overall course of production are accurately reported, Commerce has failed to explain, or to test, whether the costs for two CONNUMs with different characteristics would have different yield losses. Without doing so, any conclusion that such yield losses did not vary by product could not have been supported by substantial evidence.

Defendant further seeks to justify Commerce’s determination that Jindal SAW’s reported yield losses reasonably reflected its COP by arguing that “[e]ven if different production stages could generate different yields, Commerce noted that [[]] of the OCTG that Jindal SAW produced went through precisely the same production stages—namely, threading and coupling.” Def.’s Resp. Br. 61. Even if [[]]% of Jindal SAW’s product went through the same production stages, that would not confirm that products with [[]] physical characteristics [[]] lose [[]] amounts of material during those production stages. It stands to reason that pipes of [[ ]] would lose [[]] amount of material. Commerce may have had a basis to conclude that yield losses that occurred at later production stages were insignificant, but it cites to no record evidence to support this assertion. Commerce does not indicate it undertook any investigation to test whether certain production stages resulted in insignificant generation of scrap. Therefore, Commerce’s implicit conclusion that yield losses [[ ]] by physical characteristic or production stage could not have been supported by substantial, evidence.

On remand,' Commerce must explain why Jindal SAW’s reported yield loss data, which clearly did not track yield losses by production stage or physical characteristics of the merchandise, nonetheless did not distort Jindal SAW’s COP for specific CONNUMs of subject merchandise or reconsider its determination. The court defers any review of Commerce’s decision to decline to apply AFA to Jindal SAW’s yield loss data until Commerce supports its determination regarding whether its yield loss data reasonably reflects its COP with substantial evidence.

III. Claims Relating to Mandatory Respondent GVN

A. Collapsing of GVN with MSL and JPL

U.S. Steel argues that “Commerce improperly collapsed GVN with its affiliated suppliers, MSL and JPL.” ■ U.S. Steel Br. 45. Defendant responds that U.S. Steel’s arguments are belied by the record evidence in support of Commerce’s collapsing determination. See Def. Resp. Brief 18. The court finds Commerce’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.

Commerce’s regulations permit it to

treat two or more affiliated producers as a single entity where those producers have production facilities for similar or identical products that would not require substantial retooling of either facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities .. and [Commerce] concludes that there is a significant potential for the manipulation- of price or production.

19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(1). Commerce’s regulations provide that the factors Commerce may- consider in assessing whether there is a “significant potential for manipulation of price or production” for collapsing affiliated producers include:

(i) The level of common ownership;

(ii) The extent to which managerial employees or board members of one firm sit on the board of directors of an affiliated firm; and

(iii) Whether operations are inter- . twined, such as through the sharing of sales information, involvement in production and pricing decisions, the sharing of facilities or employees, or significant transactions between the affiliated producers.

19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(2).

Although Commerce’s collapsing regulation speaks of treating two or more affiliated producers as a single entity, Commerce has developed a practice of collapsing exporters with affiliated producers of subject merchandise under certain circumstances. See Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwa ter Shrimp From Brazil, 69 Fed.Reg. 76,-910, 76,912 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 23, 2004) (notice of final determination of sales at less than fair value); see also Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Antidump-ing Duty Investigation of Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp From Brazil, A-351-838, (Dec. 23, 2004), available at http://ia.ita.doc-.gov/frn/summary/ braziV04-28110-l.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (“Shrimp From Brazil I & D Memo”). In outlining its practice, of collapsing exporters with affiliated producers, Commerce noted that

[w]hile 19 C.F.R. § 361.401(f) applies only to producers, the Department has found it to be instructive in determining whether non-producers should be collapsed and used the criteria outlined in the regulation in its analysis.

Accordingly, we have looked to the criteria articulated in section 351.401(f)(2) in determining whether to treat these affiliates as a single entity.

Shrimp From Brazil I & D Memo at 14. Therefore, Commerce’s practice for collapsing .exporters with affiliated producers is to look solely at the second requirement under its regulation that the relationship between the affiliated companies raises “a significant potential for manipulation of price or' production.” See Shrimp From Brazil I & D Memo at 14; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(1).

In assessing whether such significant potential for manipulation of price or production exists, Commerce has incorporated the criteria from 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(2), as well as other criteria Commerce finds indicate “a significant potential for manipulation.” See Shrimp From Brazil I & D Memo at 14.- For Commerce’s collapsing determination to be supported by substantial evidence, the evidence must be sufficient that a reasonable mind might accept the evidence as adequate to support its conclusion while considering .contradictory evidence. See Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197,229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); see also Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 985 (Fed.Cir.1994). Since the structure of the regulation, which is incorporated in Commerce’s practice, makes clear that Commerce need not consider all of the § 351.401(f)(2) factors, Commerce need not conclude on the basis of any one factor listed in the regulation alone that the potential for manipulation of price or production was significant. See Shrimp From Brazil I & D Memo at 14 (adopting a practice based upon 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(2)).

Commerce’s collapsing determination is supported by substantial evidence. First, although Commerce recognized that the D.P. Jindal family’s ownership in GVN is “less than majority ownership, it is considerable, particularly given GVN’s otherwise diffused ownership by corporate entities with numerous layers of cross-ownership.” Final Decision Memo at 24. The level of common ownership supported Commerce’s finding that there was a significant potential for manipulation because the family held significant majority holdings in both MSL and JPL, [[]] GVN’s [[ ]] suppliers of subject merchandise. Id. Commerce cited the companies’ sharing of sales information and price coordination to support its conclusion that the companies’ intertwined operations indicated a significant potential for manipulation. Id. at 25. Commerce found that MSL was involved in GVN’s pricing decisions. Commerce based this finding on evidence it obtained at verification that

the company has internal price guidelines that are based on market price and demand, and are set by the héads of GVN, MSL and JPL on an ad hoc basis. MSL is the driver of the price determination discussion because it is the company that is actually producing the merchandise. MSL has limited capacity, and must decide how much to sell to each market on a monthly basis.... If GVN needs to go below the lowest price set in the price list, they must seek approval from MSL.

Verification of the Sales Response of GVN Fuels Ltd in the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Oil Country Tubular Goods from India at 9, CD 340, bar code 3200010-01 (May 5, 2014) (“GVN Sales Verification Report”).

U.S. Steel seeks to undermine Commerce’s finding that the companies are involved in each other’s pricing decisions by pointing out that GVN plays no role in the domestic sales of MSL or JPL. See U.S. Steel Br. 50; see also Shrimp From Brazil I & D Memo at 14; 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(2)(iii). Yet, nothing in Commerce’s practice requires Commerce to find that the involvement in production or pricing decisions must flow in both directions in order to collapse affiliated companies. See Shrimp From Brazil I & D Memo at 14; 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(f)(2)(iii). Moreover, given GVN’s reported role as the export arm of MSL and JPL, see GVN Sales Verification Report at 3, it is unsurprising that GVN is not involved in the domestic sales of MSL and JPL. Although the sharing of sales information and GVN’s markup could have been a reflection of a market-based commission for a sales agent, trading company, or distributor, Commerce’s conclusion to the contrary was not unreasonable in light of its separate finding that the companies coordinated pricing and that MSL drove the pricing discussion. See GVN Sales Verification Report at 9.

Second, Commerce relied in part upon the fact that the companies shared the same chart of accounts to conclude the companies shared sales information. See Final Decision Memo at 25. Although Commerce acknowledged that GVN used a different accounting system from MSL and JPL, Commerce concluded that the companies still shared sales information because GVN said it shared such information with MSL at verification, and .Commerce determined that GVN and JPL used identical product codes. See GVN Sales Verification Report at 11. Commerce’s finding that MSL drove GVN’s sales price determinations, particularly in light of the fact that it found MSL decides what types of products it will produce, GVN Sales Verification Report at 9, reasonably indicated that MSL was involved in GVN’s pricing decisions and potentially influenced by GVN’s customer expectations in the export market. Further, Commerce relied upon the fact that the companies had significant transactions among them and that GVN did not produce merchandise but exported for both MSL and JPL. See Final Decision Memo at 24-25.

Third, Commerce also found that MSL and JPL shared a chairm