Till v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. (182 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 2016)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W. Keith Watkins, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff brings this suit pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Before the court is Defendant Lincoln National Life Insurance Company’s (“Lincoln”) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Doc. # 36) and brief in support (Doc. #37). Plaintiff responded (Doc. # 56-1), and Lincoln filed a brief in reply to Plaintiffs response (Doc. # 62-1). Also before the court is Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #39) and brief in support (Doc. #40). Lincoln responded (Doc. #58), and Plaintiff filed a brief in reply to Lincoln’s response (Doc. # 64-1), After careful consideration of the evidence, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant law, the court concludes that Plaintiffs motion is due to be denied and Defendant’s motion is due to be granted.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs ERISA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case involves federal questions arising under ERISA, over which the court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the inferences from- that evidence -in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir.2010).

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. Alternatively, a movant who does not have a trial burden of production can assert, without citing the record, that the nonmoving party “cannot produce admissible evidence to support” a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (“Subdivision (c)(1)(B) recognizes that a party need not always point to specific record materials. ... [A] party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact.”). If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving, party to establish—with evidence beyond the pleadings—that a genuine dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.2001).

Cross-motions for summary judgment “must be considered separately,” and “each movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir.2004); see also Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int’l Union of Am., Local Union No. 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir.1975) (“Cross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed”). In some cases, “[cjross motions for summary judgment may be probative of the nonexistence of a factual dispute.” Shook v. United States, 713 F.2d 662, 665 (11th Cir.1983). However, the existence of cross motions for summary judgment “ ‘do[es] not automatically empower the court to dispense with the determination whether questions of material fact exist.’ ” Ga. State Conference of NAACP v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir.2015) (quoting Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 349 (7th Cir.1983)). This is so because “each party moving for summary judgment may do so on different legal theories dependent on different constellations of material facts. Indeed, cross-motions for summary judgment may demonstrate a genuine dispute as to material facts as often as not.” Bricklayers, 512 F.2d at 1023.

“ ‘[W]hen both parties proceed on the same legal theory and rely on the same material facts[,] the court is signaled that the case is ripe for summary judgment.” Shook, 713 F.2d at 665. Even then, however, “[a] court may discover questions of material fact even though both parties, in support of cross-motions for summary judgment, have asserted that no such questions exist.... Thus, before the court can consider the legal issues raised by the parties on cross-motions for summary judgment, it must have no doubt as to the relevant facts that are beyond dispute.” Griffis v. Delta Family-Care Disability, 723 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting order of district judge on summary judgment).

III. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff was employed as a radiology technologist by Gilliard Health Services, d/b/a Evergreen Medical Center (“Gilli-ard”). (Doc. # 40, at 4.) Gilliard purchased long term disability insurance for its employees, including Plaintiff. (Doc. # 37, at 2.) Gilliard was the plan administrator and plan sponsor for the disability insurance. (Lincoln/Till 000063.)

Plaintiff has a long history of back problems and has not worked since December 5, 2012, when she exacerbated her back condition. (Doc. # 40, at 5-6.) She has been diagnosed with spondylotic disease of the thoracic spine and multilevel spondylotic disease of the lumbar spine. (Lincoln/Till 000890.) On February 6, 2013, Plaintiff applied for long term disability benefits under the disability plan. (Lincoln/Till 001120-21.) Lincoln denied the claim because it determined that the “medical documentation contained in [her] claim file [did] not support Total Disability as defined by [the] policy.” (Lincoln/Till 001001.) Plaintiff administratively appealed the decision twice, and- Lincoln upheld the denial of benefits on both appeals. (Lincoln/Till 000075, 001059.)

On August 1, 2014, Plaintiff filed her complaint alleging that Lincoln is a plan' fiduciary charged with certain duties under ERISA and that Lincoln has breached several of its duties. (Doc. # 1.) She also alleges that Lincoln is a de facto plan administrator and that Lincoln violated federal law by failing to provide her requested documents that Lincoln used to support its decisions to deny her benefits. The complaint does not set out numbered counts against Defendant. Plaintiff seeks to recover “all benefits under the Plan to which she may be entitled,” “waiver of premiumfs] ... under disability, life, accidental death and dismemberment or accident policies,” and “any other benefits available through [t]he Plan.” (Doc. # 1, at ¶2.) All of the benefits sought by Plaintiff are based on the court determining that she is “disabled.” (Doc. # 1, at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff further seeks an award of past benefits, prejudgment interest, costs and expenses including attorney’s fees, a declaratory judgment concerning Plaintiffs entitlement to future benefits, and other injunctive relief. (See Doc. # 1, at 17-18.) She requests, as an alternative form of relief, that the court “remove Lincoln from its fiduciary role in the administration of [t]he Plan(s),and to appoint a special master to substitute for [Lincoln].” (Doc. # 1, at 17-18.)

Lincoln filed a motion to dismiss seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs claims under § 502(a)(3) and § 502(c)(1)(B). (Doc. # 9.) The court granted ■ dismissal of Plaintiffs claim under § 502(a)(3) that alleged that Lincoln breached a fiduciary duty. It denied the motion as to her claim arising under § 502(c)(1)(B) that Lincoln, as de facto plan administrator, failed to provide her with requested documents that supported its decisions to deny benefits. (Doc. # 21, at 14-15.) The court found that “[t]he question of whether a defendant is acting as plan administrator is fact intensive and [is] better decided at a later stage of this litigation.” (Doc. # 21, at 15.)

Lincoln,now.seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs remaining claims, which are a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim to recover benefits, and a § 502(c)(1)(B) claim for failure to provide documents, (Doc. #37, at 2.) Lincoln argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient proof of Total Disability as defined by the plan and that the statutory penalties under § 502(c)(1)(B) are only permitted for plan administrators, and it was not the plan administrator or de facto plan administrator. Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on her claims because she asserts that (1) she is disabled as a matter of law, (2) Lincoln' denied her a full and fair review, (3) Lincoln’s denial of benefits was arbitrary and’ capricious, and (4) as de facto plan administrator, Lincoln violated ERISA by failing to produce the entire ERISA record at Plaintiffs request and therefore penalties are due Plaintiff under § 502(c)(1)(B). (Doc. #40, at 14-16, 33.)

B. Factual Background

Plaintiffs back problems started when she had a laminectomy in 1982. (Lincoln/Till 000891.) An MRI of her lumbar spine on September 25, 2003, shows degenerative changes, loss of disc height, and mildly bulging discs. (Lincoln/Till 000751.) Clinical notes from Dr. John E. Hackman dated October 7, 2003, stated that Plaintiff had back pain with burning and numbness down both legs and that her x-ray showed minor spinal stenosis. Follow-on notes from Dr. Hackman indicate that an MRI of the neck showed degenerative changes. (Lincoln/Till 000744.) A November 11, 2003 MRI indicates stenosis, bony spurring, mild disc bulging, and congenital narrowing. (Lincoln/Till 000750.) Despite these problems, Plaintiff was able to work. (Doc. # 40, at 5-6.)

In 2004, Plaintiff began working as a radiology technologist for Gilliard. (Doc. #40, at 4.) Plaintiffs job summary, according to her employer, is to “operatfe] conventional, fluoroscopic, or portable radiology equipment to obtain routine radio-graphs of designated body portions according to physicians’ specifications.... position[ ] patients and adjust[ ] x-ray equipment to correct setting for each examination.... [and] [a]ssist[] physicians in carrying out examinations by mixing and preparing contrast media, and assisting in sterile procedures.” (Lincoln/Till 000329.) Her employer indicates that the physical demands of her job include lifting up to ten pounds more than two-thirds of the time, lifting up to twenty-five or fifty pounds from one-third to one-half of the time, and lifting up to one hundred pounds up to one-third of the time. The position also includes standing or walking up to two-thirds of the . time. (Lincoln/Till 000332.)

An x-ray of Plaintiffs back on March 26, 2008, shows mild multi-level dischogenic change throughout her cervical spine and severe. multi-level dischogenic change along with compression deformity of her thoracic spine. (Lincólri/Till 000817.) A lumbrosacral spine study on April 4, 2012, revealed degenerative arthritis of the lumbar spine and osteophytes. (Lincoln/Till 000837.)

Plaintiff continued to work until December 4, 2012, when she exacerbated the condition of her back by assisting and repositioning á patient. (Doc. # 40, at 6.) She sought treatment at Evergreen Primary Care on December 5 and December 10, 2012. The practitioner diagnosed Plaintiff with low back pain with radiculopathy, prescribed pain medications, referred her for an MRI, and set up an appointment with Dr. Barry Lurate. (Lincoln/Till 001077-79.) Dr. Lurate is an orthopedic doctor who works at Pensacola Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine in Pensacola, Florida. (Lincoln/Till 000891.)

Plaintiff had the MRI on December 12, 2012, and the report from the MRI described disc herniation at L5-S1 producing spinal stenosis and minimal narrowing of the foramina, a posterior bulge at L4-5 that slightly narrowed the foramina, and a posterior bulge of the disc producing spinal stenosis and bilateral foramina! encroachment at L2-3 and L3-4. (Lincoln/Till 001118-19.) Plaintiff first visited Dr. Lu-rate on December 18, 2012. At the visit, he checked the MRI but found it mostly unreadable, He noted that x-rays indicated multilevel degenerative disc disease throughout the lumbar spine and into the lower thoracic spine and that the MRI highlighted the multilevel spondylotic disease of the spine. (Lincoln/Till 000891-92.)

Dr. Lurate’s notes from the December 18, 2012 visit indicate that he performed a physical exam. He said that the pain was localized mid back and thoracic back and then into the lower lumbar area, with no mass effect, no scoliosis, and no paraspinal muscle spasm. He found her voluntary range of motion to be poor on flexion and extension, but that Plaintiff tolerated hip rotation well without pain and that straight leg raise and heel stretch were both negative. He stated that, although Plaintiff complained of numbness in her toes and tingling dysesthesias in the posterolateral thigh and anterolateral leg, those symptoms were not present that day. Dr. Lu-rate also notated that Plaintiffs deep tendon reflexes in her knees and ankles, were normal and that there were no motor or sensory deficits. Dr. Lurate diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic low and mid back pain with right lumbar radiculitis and an elevated BMI. He recommended avoiding surgery if possible, referred Plaintiff to physical therapy for core strengthening, fitted her for a lumbar corset to help with the pain, and referred Plaintiff to a pain management specialist. (Lincoln/Till 000892.)

Plaintiff had another MRI on January 16, 2013. The report states that the thoracic cord signal appears, normal, there are disc desiccation and small disc bulges at several levels of the thoracic spine, no spinal stenosis is noted, vertebral body heights are within normal limits, and thoracic spine alignment is unremarkable. It indicates a diagnosis of multilevel thoracic spondylosis. (Lincoln/Till 001117.)

On January 22, 2013, Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with Dr. Lurate. He stated that her dysesthesias down the right lower extremity was “largely improved,” although he mentioned that her primary complaint was still right low back pain with occasional numbness in her toes, He reviewed the January 16, 2013 MRI and said that it shows spondylotic disease of the thoracic spine. He again said that surgery was not a good option and said that they would set Plaintiff up with pain management in Pensacola. No physical exam is indicated on Dr. Lurate’s notes from the January 22, 2013 visit. (Lincoln/Till 000890.)

Dr. Lurate referred Plaintiff to physical therapy two to three times a week for four weeks. (Lincoln/Till 000839-54.) Plaintiff attended physical therapy at Evergreen Medical Center six times from January 7, 2013, through January 24, 2013, when she stopped attending. At the initial appointment, she had a lumbar range of motion of 25% and strength of two out of five. Repetition sets for her exercises began with ten repetitions for each exercise. (Lincoln/Till 000841-42.) On January 10, 2013, Plaintiff was able to increase her repetitions of each exercise and add standing curls; she continued to add repetitions each session, up to fifteen repetitions on January 14 and twenty repetitions on January 21, 2013. She also showed progress on her exercises from two minutes initially up to three minutes on January 16, 2013. The notes showed that she cried out in pain and grimaced during the progressive exercise. The notes from January 21, 2013, indicate that her pain level remained at a constant of about five out of ten from the initial session through that date. (Lincoln/Till 000851.)

On January 24, 2013, Plaintiff attended her last physical therapy session. At the session, she stated that she would be joining a wellness center so that she could continue her exercises at home. The therapist also initiated dynamic stretching during treatment that day. Plaintiff stopped attending physical therapy after six sessions. The notes from the therapist indicate that she had met her short-term goals of a 50% lumbar range of motion, worst pain level at seven out of ten, and strength at a three-minus out of five. (Lincoln/Till 000853-54.)

Dr. Jeffrey Voreis is Plaintiffs primary care doctor. The records from Dr. Voreis’s office show visits on January 24, 2013, February 7, 2013, and March 4, 2013. On January 24, 2013, Dr. Voreis indicated in the physical exam section of the notes that Plaintiff had a tender mid and low back and positive straight leg raise. (Lin-eoln/Till 000498.) At the February 7, 2013 visit, he noted that she limped on her left leg and could not sit, stand, lift, push, or pull for any period of time, that she had difficulty with performing activities of daily living (ADLs) and needed her husband’s help with them, and that she had para-spinal muscle spasm. (Lincoln/Till 000497.) He prescribed Tramadol for the pain. On March 4, 2013, Dr. Voreis indicated that Plaintiff still had severe back pain, but could function with Tramadol. Her husband continued to help her perform her ADLs, and she had a belated positive on the straight leg raise.

Dr. Voreis filled out the physician’s statement for Plaintiffs initial long-term disability claim. On the undated statement, he indicated that Plaintiff could not lift, push, pull, climb, lift patients, pull on patients, or climb stairs. He also stated that her recovery was uncertain and that she appeared to have been at a level of intractable pain for three months. (Lincoln/Till 0001037-39.)

On March 4, 2013, he filled out an abilities form on which he indicated that she could occasionally carry up to twenty pounds, sit, stand, walk, bend, drive, finger, handle, operate foot controls, and climb a few steps, but never kneel. (Lincoln/Till 001090.) On March 5, 2013, Dr. Voreis wrote an office note about the condition of Plaintiffs back. In the note, he stated that she limited her daily activities due to the pain. Before the injury on December 4, 2012, her back pain would return to a “baseline,” but after that date, the pain was only manageable when she was on Tramadol. However, he said that even with the Tramadol, she was limited to her ADLs. (Lincoln/Till 000495.)

On April 12, 2013, Dr. E. Arnold Johnson evaluated Plaintiff for her Social Security benefits claim. He indicated that she declined to perform any task during her physical exam, because she claimed that she could not do it. He said her grip strength was fifteen pounds in her right hand and five pounds in her left hand. He also stated that surgery was not an effective treatment option due to the extensive nature of the disc disease shown on the MRI studies. (Lincoln/Till 000677.) He found that Plaintiff could only sit or stand five to ten minutes without having to change positions to relieve the pain, and was only able to tolerate thirty minutes seated in a car at one time. (Lincoln/Till 000678.) In his opinion, Plaintiff is “unable to work at all.” (Lincoln/Till 000677.)

Dr. Voreis performed a long term disability exam for Plaintiffs Social Security Disability claim. His letter about the results of the examination and Plaintiffs physical condition is undated, and the last page of the attached medical source statement is unsigned and undated. (Lincoln/Till 000689-90, 000696.) In the examination letter, Dr. Voreis noted that Plaintiff is only able to sit for thirty minutes, walk for twenty to thirty minutes, and stand for ten to twenty minutes. He stated that when Plaintiff takes Tramadol she is “functional,” but he does not indicate what he means by functional.

Dr. Voreis indicated that Plaintiff could not abduct her shoulders beyond ninety degrees without extreme discomfort. He also indicated that she appeared to have bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome, a grip strength of three and a half out of five, and that she was too weak to elevate to her toes or tandem walk. In his opinion, Plaintiff has “progressive lumbar problems with multi-level disc disease, spondylosis, and spinal stenosis ... with extensive herniated discs and spinal stenosis.” (Lincoln/Till 000690.)

• On the attached medical source statement, Dr. Vóreis indicated that Plaintiff could occasionally lift up to ten pounds and carry up to two to three pounds. He noted that she could sit, stand, or walk for twenty to thirty minutes uninterrupted, that she used a cane to walk when she was unaccompanied on uneven ground, and that she frequently drops things because her hands go numb. He stated that during an eight-hour work day, she is able to sit for two hours, stand for one hour, and walk for two hours. (Lincoln/Till 000692.) Dr. Voreis said that Plaintiff cannot reach overhead, push/pull, climb a ladder or scaffold, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. He also indicated that she is occasionally able to reach, handle, finger, feel, operate foot controls, and climb ramps and up to four steps. (Lincoln/Till 000693-94.) He noted that she was likely to be absent from work for up to four days per month due to the impairment. (Lincoln/Till 000696.) The form has several locations for the physician to indicate medical or clinical findings to support these restrictions, but Dr. Voreis did not fill in any of these sections. (Lincoln/Till 000691-96.) He does not explain the basis for the increased restrictions from his previous assessment of Plaintiff in March 2013.

The Social Security administrative law judge determined that beginning December S, 2012, Plaintiff was disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. ■ When making the decision, he gave “great weight” to Dr. Voreis’s and Dr. Johnson’s assessments, and listed all of the restrictions Dr. Voreis had placed on her physical activity. (Lincoln/Till 000367-76.)

C. The Plan

The Summary Plan Description designates Gilliard as the plan administrator. (Lincoln/Till 000063.) The Plan grants discretionary authority to Lincoln under its claims provisions:

COMPANY’S DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY. Except for the functions that the Policy clearly reserves to the Policyholder or Employer, the Company has the authority to manage the Policy, interpret its provisions, administer claims and resolve questions arising under it. The Company’s authority includes (but is not limited to) the right to:

1. establish administrative procedures, determine eligibility and resolve claims questions;

2. determine what information the Company reasonably requires to make such decisions; and

3. resolve all matters when an internal claim review is requested.

Any decision the Company makes in the exercise of its authority shall be conclusive and binding; subject to the Insured Employee’s rights to request a state insurance department review or to bring legal action.

(Lincoln/Till 000049.) The Plan further provides that:

“Total Disability” or “Totally Disabled” will be defined as follows.

1. During the Elimination Period and Own Occupation Period, it means that due to an Injury or Sickness the Insured Employee is unable to perform each of the main duties of his or her regular occupation.

2. After the Own Occupation Period, it means that due to an Injury or Sickness the Insured Employee is unable to perform each of the main duties of any- gainful occupation which his or her training, education or experience will reasonably allow.

The loss of a professional license, an occupational license or certification, or a driver’s license for any reason does not, by itself, constitute Total Disability.

(Lincoln/Till 000054.) The “ELIMINATION PERIOD means the number of days of Disability during which no benefit is payable.” (Lincoln/Till 000042.) The elimination period under Plaintiffs policy is ninety days. (Lincoln/Till 000038.) Main duties are defined as follows:

MAIN DUTIES or MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DUTIES means those job duties which: ■

1. are normally required to perform the Insured Person’s regular occupation; and

2. cannot reasonably be modified or omitted.

It includes those main duties as performed in the national workforce; not as performed for a certain firm or at a certain work site.

(Lincoln/Till 000044.) Under the definition of “Regular Occupation or Own Occupation,” the policy provides that the definition “includes the main duties of that occupation as performed in the national workforce; not as performed for a certain firm or at a certain work site.” (Lincoln/Till 000045.)

The claims procedures in the policy require that a “[pjroof of claim ... be provided at the Insured Employee’s own expense.' It must show the date the Disability began,'its cause and degree.” (Lincoln/Till 000047.) The policy provides what documentation is required to support a claim and also that proof of continued disability must be provided upon Lincoln’s request in order for benefits to continue.

D. Plaintiff’s Claim

a. Initial Claim

Plaintiff filed her claim for long term disability benefits under the plan on February 6, 2013. (Lincoln/Till 001120-21.) In order to review the claim, Lincoln requested an employee statement from Plaintiff, a statement from her employer, a statement from her attending physician, a signed authorization; and a formal job description from her employer. (Lincoln/Till 001116, 001127.) It also requested medical records from Dr. Yearwood, Dr. Lurate, and Dr. Voreis. (Lincoln/Till 001115.) Lincoln determined that no benefits were payable on Plaintiffs claim and in the letter of denial explained that the medical documentation in her file did not support a total disability as defined in the policy. (Lincoln/Till 001084-87.)

Before making its initial benefits determination, Lincoln had Nancy Bruemmer, a Senior Disability Nurse Consultant and Registered Nurse, review Plaintiffs MRI results and the records from Plaintiffs visits to Dr. Lurate. (Doc. # 37, at 8; Lincoln/Till 000016.) In her written review, Ms. Bruemmer discussed all of Dr. Lu-rate’s records, notes, and opinions. She noted that there were no records of treatment from Dr. Voreis to support the level of pain and impairment that he indicated. Ms. Bruemmer’s conclusion was that it was reasonable to allow until January 22, 2013, for therapy and treatment.' She determined that as of January 22, 2013, Plaintiffs symptoms had improved, that thére was only one physical exam on file without sufficiently abnormal exam findings, no evidence of loss of strength, neuro, or motor findings, and that Plaintiff tolerated the three-hour drive to Dr. Lurate’s office in Pensacola, so that there was not any support for restrictions beyond January 22, 2013. (Lincoln/Till 000016.)

The denial letter noted that the documentation in the claim file included the office and treatment notes from Andalusia Regional Hospital from November 2, 2012 through January 16, 2013; an undated attending physician statement from Dr. Vo-reis; office and treatment notes from Dr. Barry Lurate from December 18, 2012 to January 22, 2013; and an abilities form filled out by Dr; Voreis on March 4, 2013. The letter informed Plaintiff that Dr. Vo-reis’s attending physician statement did not contain treatment notes or other medical documentation to support the level of impairment and pain that he noted on the .statement. It also discussed the records from Dr. Lurate and noted that the physical exam performed at the December 18, 2012 visit did not show evidence of scoliosis or paraspinal muscle spasm, although x-rays of the lumbar spine showed multilevel disc disease in the lower and thoracic spine, The letter evaluated the visit to Dr. Lurate on January 16, 2013, noting that the records indicated that the dysesthesias she had reported at the previous visit had improved, that an MRI of the thoracic spine showed spondylotic disease, and no physical examination findings were noted. (Lincoln/Till 001085.) ‘

Regarding Plaintiffs occupation, the letter explained that the policy considers the main duties of her “occupation” and not her specific job and that the term “occupation” .means “a collective description of a number of individual jobs that are performed, with variations, in many establishments,” so that “there will be similarities between the main duties of [Plaintiffs] occupation .and those of [her] job,” and “[tjhere .may also be some differences.” (Lincoln/Till 001085.) It indicated that Lincoln had considered Plaintiffs written job description, her employer’s description of Plaintiffs job duties, and the description of her occupation from the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupation Titles (“DOT”) to determine the material and substantial duties of Plaintiffs occupation. (Lincoln/Till 001086.) Based on Lincoln’s occupational assessment, it determined that the material and substantial duties of Plaintiffs occupation included:

• Operates radiologic, conventional, fluoroscopic, or portable equipment to produce radiographs (x-rays) of the body for diagnostic purposes

• Positions patient on examining table and adjusts immobilization devices to obtain optimum views of specified area of body requested by physician

• Moves x-ray equipment into specified position and adjusts equipment controls to set exposure factors, such as time and distance, based on knowledge of radiographic exposure techniques and protocols

(Lincoln/Till 001086.) The letter stated that based on these material duties, Lincoln had determined that the medical evidence did not support a finding that Plaintiff was unable to perform the material and substantial duties of her regular occupation.

In summary, Lincoln’s letter told Plaintiff that the medical documentation in the claim file did not support total disability as defined in the policy. The letter stated that it appeared that she had an exacerbation of chronic mid and low back pain, but that the symptoms had improved by January 22, 2013, that there was only one physical examination included in the documentation, that the file lacked sufficiently abnormal examination findings and lacked documentation of a loss of strength, neurological deficits, or motor findings. Based on these findings, Lincoln had determined that there was no support for a limitation after January 22, 2013, “which would be reasonable to allow for therapy and treatment.” (Lincoln/Till 001086-87.)

b. First Appeal

Plaintiff appealed Lincoln’s denial of benefits on September 16, 2013. (Lincoln/Till 001073.) The claim file on appeal included the entire file from the initial claim, as well as medical notes from Evergreen Primary Care, where Plaintiff was seen on December 5 and December 10, 2012, and on January 7, 2013. Lincoln also referred Plaintiffs file for a peer review to Dr. Vicki Kalen, who is Board Certified in Orthopedic Surgery. (Lincoln/Till-001061-62.)

Dr. Kalen reviewed Plaintiffs claim file and determined that the clinical findings in the MRIs showed degenerative changes consistent with Plaintiffs age and weight, but without significant neural compression. In her report she stated that there were subjective complaints of pain without objective findings of impairment. She said that the spondylosis would restrict Plaintiff from lifting more than ten pounds frequently and twenty-five pounds occasionally and that Plaintiff should only bend at the waist occasionally. However, Dr. Kalen stated that there were no restrictions for sitting, standing, walking, crouching, crawling, kneeling,- reaching, fingering, handling, or operating foot controls.. (Lincoln/Till 001066-67.)

Dr. Kalen also reported that because the restrictions were based on Plaintiffs degenerative disease, they were effective from December 5, 2012, forward, and even if Plaintiffs symptoms improved, the restrictions would still be appropriate. She said that Dr. Voreis’s statements that Plaintiff could not work and could never work again were not reasonable or consistent with medical findings. (Lincoln/Till 001067.) She noted that the March 4, 2013 abilities form completed by Dr. Voreis did not include office visit notes with a history or examination. (Lincoln/Till 001066.)

Dr. Kalen reviewed Lincoln’s requirements for a light duty occupation, which include lifting no more than twenty pounds occasionally and up to ten pounds frequently, standing or walking for six hours in an eight-hour day, possibly continuously sitting with the consistent use of either hand or foot controls, and carrying up to ten pounds. (Lincoln/Till 001066.) She also looked over Plaintiffs employer’s job description, which indicated it was a heavy level job occasionally requiring lifting of up to 100 pounds. (Lincoln/Till 001065.) Dr. Kalen determined that Plaintiff could work at the light level as described by Lincoln because those requirements were within the restrictions she placed on Plaintiff, but also stated that Plaintiff could not work at the heavy level because she should not lift more than twenty-five pounds. (Lincoln/Till 001068.)

During the appeal process, Lincoln had Plaintiffs occupational assessment reviewed by Cathy McDonald, a vocational rehabilitation coordinator, to ensure that the correct “Own Occupation” had been selected. Ms. McDonald also evaluated Dr. Kalen’s report and its impact on Plaintiffs ability to perform her own occupation. Ms. McDonald determined that the Radiologic Technologist occupation was appropriate and that it is a light duty occupation. The restrictions outlined in Dr. Kalen’s report showed that Plaintiff had a medium lifting capacity so that she was able to perform the main duties of her own occupation. (Lincoln/Till 000153.)

Lincoln upheld its initial denial of benefits after its review of Plaintiffs claim file and Dr. Kalen’s report. The letter denying benefits explained that Lincoln determined Plaintiffs occupation based on information from her employer, the DOT, and an evaluation from vocational professionals. The main duties of her occupation were stated slightly differently from the first letter. They were defined as follows:

• Positions patient on examining table and adjusts immobilization devices to obtain optimum views of specified'area of body requested by physician ■

• Explains procedures to patient to reduce anxieties and obtain patient cooperation

• Moves x-ray equipment into specified position and adjusts equipment controls ..to set exposure factors, such as time and distance, based on knowledge of radiographic exposure techniques and protocols

• Practices radiation protection techniques, using beam restrictive devices, patient shielding skills, and knowledge of applicable exposure factors, to minimize radiation to patient and staff

(Lincoln/Till 001060.) Lincoln explained that the physical capacity of a Radiologic Technologist in the national workforce is a light physical capacity occupation so that it includes occasionally lifting no more than twenty pounds, frequently lifting up to' ten pounds, and typically requires standing and walking for six hours out of an- eight-hour day. (Lincoln/Till 001060.) The summary of appeal noted that the entire file was reviewed for the appeal, and it summarized the medical documentation in the file. Lincoln noted that when Dr. Lurate saw Plaintiff on January 22, 2013, her right leg dysesthesias had improved, although it was not gone. It also stated that Dr. Yoreis had restricted Plaintiff to occasionally lifting and carrying up to twenty pounds and occasionally sitting, standing, walking, driving, fingering, handling, and working foot controls. He also stated that she could never kneel. However, the letter also noted that there were no office visit notes from Dr. Voreis providing a history or examination to support the restrictions.

Lincoln based its decision on the report from Dr. Kalen and its review of the file.- It also noted that “[t]he sole occupational opinions, from Dr, DiVoreis [sic], are unsupported by clinical findings.” (Lincoln/Till 001062.) It found that the medical documentation did not support a finding that Plaintiff could not perform the main duties of her own occupation as defined by the policy.

c. Second Appeal

On November 11, 2013, Plaintiff appealed the denial of benefits a second time. (Lincoln/Till 000918.) For the second appeal, Plaintiff provided additional medical records, including her physical therapy records, and the Social Security determination that she is totally disabled. (Doc. #40, at 12.) During the review for the second, appeal, Lincoln sent the claim file to Dr. Heidi Klingbeil, who is board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation and board certified in pain medicine, for review by a second independent physician. (Doc. # 37, at 10; Lincoln/Till 000667.) The medical documentation provided to Dr. Klingbeil included the Social Security medical' evaluation by Dr. Johnson and the Social Security examination by Dr. Voreis. (Lincoln/Till 000663, 000666.) Dr. Klingbeil first noted that she had thoroughly reviewed all of the received documentation and then briefly summarized some of the medical records. Dr. Klingbeil completed her review on May 29, 2014. She noted that the last physical exam performed on Plaintiff was in 2013 because Plaintiff had declined the physical exam attempted by Dr. Johnson. (Lincoln/Till 000663-66.) Dr. Klingbeil concluded that Plaintiffs current physical exam findings were unknown, and based on this lack of an updated physical exam, the medical documentation did not support any current restrictions. (Lincoln/Till 000665.) She stated that “[t]he attending physician’s restrictions are not supported as reasonable or necessary for this claimant, as there are no updated physical exam findings demonstrating objective evidence of functional impairment that correlates with recent imaging that would support medically appropriate restrictions.” (Lincoln/Till 000666.)

On July 9, 2014, Lincoln sent Plaintiff a letter denying benefits after its second review of her file. (Lincoln/Till 000075.) It stated that during the review, the entire claim file and all the additional documentation that she had submitted were used to make the determination. The letter reiterated the vocational summary of Plaintiffs occupation, which it said was based upon the information from her employer, the DOT, and an evaluation from vocational professionals. The summary determined that Plaintiffs occupation as a Radiologic Technologist in the national workforce is a light physical capacity occupation, which is defined as lifting no more than twenty pounds occasionally and up to ten pounds frequently and requiring standing or walking for six out of eight hours in a day. (Lincoln/Till 000076-77.) The letter summarized the report from Dr. Klingbeil and noted that the report had been sent to Plaintiffs counsel on June 3, 2014, to allow Plaintiff time to send a copy to her treating physicians to review it and provide additional information. It also stated that it had received a copy of Plaintiffs favorable Social Security determination on July 7, 2014, but no new medical information. (Lincoln/Till 000078-79.)

In the decision portion of the letter, Lincoln recognized that Plaintiff had several medical diagnoses, including chronic thoracic and lumbar pain, abdominal pain, hyperlipidemia, esophageal reflux, fatigue, obesity, and depression. However, Lincoln determined, after reviewing the medical documentation and consulting Dr.- Kling-beil’s report, that the documentation did not support a finding that Plaintiff was unable to perform the main duties, of her occupation through the elimination period. Lincoln noted that the records did not indicate motor sensory deficits, loss of coordination or range of motion, loss of strength, or other specific deficits; it also stated that the record did not show functional impairment or a need for restrictions or limitations. (Lincoln/Till 000079.) Lincoln acknowledged that Plaintiff was receiving Social Security benefits, but informed Plaintiff that its policy and review provisions were independent of Social Security processes, plan provisions, and independent information, received by the Social Security -Administration. (Lincoln/Till 000079.)

E. Lincoln’s Policies and Procedures

Lincoln maintains its disability claims and appeals unit as separate and independent entities from its financial and underwriting departments. The employees in the disability claims department and appeals unit are paid fixed annual salaries and are not compensated based on the outcome of their claims, (Doc. #57-2, at 1.) These employees are eligible for annual bonuses, which are based on the overall financial performance of Lincoln and its related entities in all areas of its business and an individual employee’s performance. (Doc. # 57-2, at 2; Doc. # 57-3, at 64.) Evaluations of the employees who handled Plaintiffs claim demonstrate that several areas of competency are considered, including customer experience, operational execution, quálity/risk management, and professional development. (See Doc. # 57-1.) The operationál execution portion of the evaluation includes a discussion of an employee’s inventory management, percentage of claims that are pending, and number of decisions made. (Doc. # 57-1, at Lincoln/Till 001500.)

Lincoln’s policies include a method for evaluating a Social Security award. The policy indicates that, if Lincoln determines that a benefits claim will be denied even when a Social Security decision is favorable, that the letter should explain the differences in the decision. (Lincoln/Till 001694-95.) Lincoln’s procedures also give its employees examples of how to distinguish the two decisions.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Disabled as a Matter of Law

Plaintiff asserts that she is disabled as a matter of law and therefore should be awarded long term disability benefits under the plan. (Doc. # 40, at 14.) She insists that all of the evidence before the court supports that she is disabled. She also argues that, while Lincoln is not legally bound by the Social Security determination, its vocational analysis is “far more comprehensive than that undertaken by Lincoln” so that it “stands alone and is uncontested.” (Doc. #40, at 15.) She asserts that Lincoln disregarded her complaints of pain, and that the subjective nature of pain is not grounds for denial of benefits. Lincoln responds by asserting that the administrative record does not demonstrate that Plaintiff is disabled under the terms of the plan and cites Plaintiffs medical records that support its finding that Plaintiff is not disabled.

Plaintiff does not cite, nor has the court discovered, any legal authority that supports her argument that she is disabled as a matter of law. This argument by itself with no evidentiary support has no merit. Nor is a favorable Social Security decision dispositive of disability under an ERISA plan. See Oliver v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 613 Fed.Appx. 892, 897 (11th Cir.2015) (citing Whatley v. CNA Ins. Cos., 189 F.3d 1310, 1314 n. 8 (11th Cir.1999)); In order to show that she is entitled to benefits under the ERISA plan, Plaintiff must show that Lincoln’s decision was de novo wrong and arbitrary and capricious. See Blankenship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350,1355 (11th Cir.2011). The court turns to the issues of whether Plaintiff received a full and fair review and whether Lincoln’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.

B. Full and Fair Review

Plaintiff asserts that Lincoln did not provide her a full and fair review of its denial of benefits as required by ERISA. (Doc. # 40, at 16.) She insists that Lincoln committed multiple procedural violations, including (1) allowing its conflict of interest to taint the claim process, (2) disregarding her submission of supporting evidence for her administrative appeal, (3) failing to provide her with all relevant documents, (4) disregarding the Social Security determination and vocational analysis, and (5) disregarding the actual requirements of her job description. (Doc. # 40, at 15-27; Doc. # 56-1, at 19.) She argues that these procedural violations are so egregious, that rather than remand with instructions to provide a full and fair review, she is entitled to a judgment requiring Lincoln to pay her long term disability benefits. (See Doc. #40, at 15-16, 34.)

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1133, an administrator is required to “afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review ... of the decision denying the claim.” 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2); accord Glazer v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 524 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir.2008). “The administrator must ‘[pjrovide ... upon request ... all documents, records, and other information relevant to the claimant’s claim for benefits’ to qualify as a ‘full and fair review.’” Glazer, 524 F.3d at 1245 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iii)). In order for a review process to be deemed a “full and fair review,” the procedures must “[pjrovide for a review that takes into account all comments, documents, records, and other information submitted by the claimant relating to the claim, without regard to whether such information was submitted or considered in the initial benefit determination.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(h)(2)(iv); accord Glazer, 524 F.3d at 1245. An administrator must have substantial support to deny benefits and must promptly notify a plan participant,

in writing and in language likely to be understood by laymen, that the claim has been denied with the specific reasons therefor. The [administrator] must also inform the participant of what evidence he relied upon and provide him with an opportunity to examine that evidence and to submit written comments or rebuttal documentary evidence.

Grossmuller v. Int’l Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 715 F.2d 853, 857-58 (3d Cir.1983).

The Eleventh Circuit has found procedural unfairness when an administrator failed to obtain and consider a Social Security disability award. Melech v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 739 F.3d 663, 675-76 (11th Cir.2014) (determining that, “having sent [the plaintiff] to seek alternative compensation, [the defendant] was not free to ignore the evidence generated by the SSA process as soon as it no longer had a financial stake in the amount of money the SSA decided to award”). Other courts have found ERISA procedural violations based on a deficient letter denying benefits or upholding a denial of benefits. Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir.1993) (determining that ERISA procedural guidelines were violated because the defendant had not provided the plaintiff with a specific reason for the denial of benefits); Grossmuller, 715 F.2d at 858 (affirming district court’s finding that the plaintiff did not receive a full and fair review because the letter informing him that his benefits were being terminated did not specify the evidence used to support the determination or allow the plaintiff an opportunity to respond to or rebut the evidence); Olds v. Retirement Plan of Int’l Paper Co., 782 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1302 (SD.Ala.2011) (finding that the plaintiff was denied a full and fair review because the defendant upheld a denial of benefits without taking into account comments and records that confirmed the existence of the condition upon which the plaintiffs claim was based).

When a court determines that an administrator has violated ERISA procedure's, the usual remedy is to remand the case for a full and fair review. Id. at 1303 (quoting Weaver, 990 F.2d at 159). The one exception to a remand is when “the record establishes that the plan administrator’s denial of the claim was an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Gagliano v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 230, 240 (4th Cir.2008)). For this exception to apply, “the ease [must be] so clear cut that it would be unreasonable for the plan administrator to deny benefits on any ground.” Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 287 F.3d 1276, 1289 (10th Cir.2002) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

1. Lincoln’s Conflict of Interest

Plaintiffs first ground for asserting that she was denied a full and fair review is that Lincoln allowed its conflict of interest to taint the review process. (Doc. # 40, at 17-18.) Lincoln does not deny that there is a structural conflict of interest but asserts that it takes “active steps to reduce potential bias” so that any conflict from its dual role of both administering and funding benefits, is de minimis. (Doc. # 58, at 21.)

In her motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff makes conclusory statements about “cherry-picking” and Lincoln’s procedural abuses during the review process. (Doc. # 40, at 18.) However, she does not provide evidence to support these accusations. She does not mention the conflict of interest in her reply to Lincoln’s response to her motion for summary judgment. (See Doc. # 64-1.) In her response to Lincoln’s summary judgment motion, she alleges that the evidence demonstrates that Lincoln’s claims and appeals employees were not insulated from Lincoln’s profit interests. (Doc. # 66-1, at 22-23.) Lincoln maintains that Plaintiff has taken quotes from employee evaluations out of context in order to create an illusion of improper impact of the structural conflict. (Doc. # 62-1, at 13.) It insists that when the performance evaluations are read in their entirety and in context, the comments do not indicate that the decision'was tainted by the conflict of interest.

The Supreme Court has held “that for ERISA purposes a conflict exists” when an insurance company “both evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits claims.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112-115, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008). The Eleventh Circuit has applied Glenn to its six-step analysis. When a conflict of interest is present, the sixth step is modified and the “conflict should merely be a factor for the court to take into account when determining whether an administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.” Blankenship, 644 F.3d at 1354-55. The effect of a structural conflict of interest does not need to be considered until the sixth step of the analysis. See Blair v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 955 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1254 n. 16 (N.D.Ala.2013). Plaintiff does not provide, nor has the court been able to discover, precedent that holds that a decision influenced by a conflict of interest is a denial of a full and fair review so that a claimant should be granted benefits. Plaintiff has not shown that she was denied a full and fair review based upon Lincoln’s conflict of interest. The analysis of the conflict of interest is in the court’s discussion of the last step of the six-step analysis (part IV.C.4.).

2. Lincoln’s Alleged, Disregard of Plaintiff’s Submission of Evidence

Plaintiffs second ground for asserting that she was denied a full and fair review is that Lincoln disregarded her submission of evidence supporting her claim. (Doc. #40, at 18.) She insists that Lincoln ignored many “physical exam findings ... including the many MRI studies and radiological reports and physician and physical therapy records.” (Doc. #40; at 19; see Doc. #64-1, at 4-5.) The only evidence Plaintiff cites to support this assertion is her attorney’s letter to Lincoln, which contains unsupported conclusory allegations about the review process.' In the letter, counsel accuses Lincoln of writing Dr. Klingbeil’s report for her, but the only basis for the allegation is that the report does not support his client’s claim for disability benefits. (Doc. #40, at 20; Lincoln/Till 000364.) Plaintiff also claims that Lincoln refused to credit any of her medical records that were dated prior to December 4, 2012, and takes issue with the fact that these records were not requested by Lincoln on the initial review and were only included in the claim file when her counsel undertook to collect and send them to Lincoln. (Doc. # 64-1, at 2.) She insists that “[n]ot a single piece of evidence outside these dates was discussed.” (Doc. # 64-1, at 3.)

Lincoln counters Plaintiffs assertion by citing evidence in the administrative record where it stated that it had reviewed all of the information in her file including any newly submitted evidence. (Doc. # 58, at 17.) Lincoln also asserts that each of the reviewing physicians considered all of the documentation in the claim file. (Doc. # 58, at 17.)

An administrator conducting a “full and fair review” must take into account any and all documentation, comments, and information provided, whether or not the information was available during the initial claims decision. 29 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iv); accord Glazer, 524 F.3d at 1245.

In Lincoln’s initial letter denying benefits, and in both of the letters denying benefits after the appeals, Lincoln stated that it had reviewed the entire claim file and all evidence, including any newly submitted evidence. (Lincoln/Till 000075, 001059, 001084.) In Lincoln’s letter denying benefits after Plaintiffs second appeal, Lincoln stated that “[Plaintiff] is also being treated for abdominal pain, hyperlipide-mia, esophageal reflux, fatigue, obesity, and depression but the records ... do not show any significant abnormalities or impairment due to these conditions.” (Lincoln/Till 000079.) A review of the administrative record reveals that most of these conditions are noted in medical records that pre-date December 4, 2012. (See e.g., Lincoln/Till 000757 (office note dated October 26, 2012 that indicates fibromyalgia); 000763 (office note dated July 6, 2011 that indicates depression); 000764 (office note dated November 18, 2009 indicating hyper-lipidemia); 000765 (office note dated November 20, 2007 indicating hyperlipidemia and fatigue); 000766 (office note dated October 23, 2007 indicating hyperlipidemia and esophageal reflux); 000767 (office note dated October 29, 2008 indicating abdominal pain and hyperlipidemia).)

Dr. Kalen’s report from the first appeal discusses each of the records that the file indicates she received; (See Lincoln/Till 001065-69.) Plaintiff does not allege that Lincoln withheld any available medical documentation from Dr. Kalen when she reviewed Plaintiffs file. Dr. Klingbeil’s report from the second review states that all of the “records provided were thoroughly reviewed.” (Lincoln/Till 000663.) After listing the records that had been provided, Dr. Klingbeil briefly summarizes the records. (Lincoln/Till 000664-65.) Plaintiff does not allege and the court has not discovered that Lincoln withheld any available medical documentation from Dr. Klingbeil when she reviewed Plaintiffs file.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Lincoln failed to review any of her submitted medical evidence during the pendency of her claim and appeals. Under the terms of the plan, Plaintiff bore the burden to prove that she was disabled. (Lincoln/Till 000047.) Therefore, Plaintiff was not denied a full and fair review based on. the fact that Plaintiffs counsel collected and provided some of the medical documentation for the second appeal or that the documentation was not collected by Lincoln for the initial claim or first appeal. Plaintiff has not shown that Lincoln disregarded her submission of medical documentation. .

3. Lincoln’s Alleged Failure to Provide All Relevant Documents

Plaintiffs third ground for asserting that she was denied a full and fair review is that Lincoln violated ERISA procedural tenets by not providing her with all relevant documents. Plaintiff insists that because Dr. Klingbeil’s report was noted in the claim file to be a “final report” that there must have been several drafts that were not provided to her. (See Doc. # 40, at 20-21; Doc. #41, Ex. 28.) She argues that she was also denied a “meaningful opportunity!’, to respond to Dr. Klingbeil’s report and provide, rebuttal evidence and that “[sjimply asking for commentary on that review” was not enough for a full and fair review process. (Doc. # 40, at 24-25.) Other than these drafts of the report, Plaintiff does not identify which documents Lincoln failed to provide. In her response to Lincoln’s summary judgment motion, she insists that Lincoln has still not complied with discovery and states that she would be filing a motion to enforce in order to get the necessary information from Lin'coln. (Doc. # 56-1, at 22.) Lincoln insists that it has complied with discovery and that Plaintiff “failed to identify how [its] response was deficient.” Lincoln states’ that its counsel sent two letters to Plaintiffs counsel inquiring about the assertion and never received an explanation. (Doc. # 62-1, at 16 n.7.) Plaintiff never filed the motion to enforce.

An administrator is required to provide “ ‘all documents, records, and other information relevant to the claimant’s claiih for benefits’ for the review to qualify as a ‘full and fair review.’ ” Glazer, 524 F.3d at 1245 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iii)). However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that an administrator is not' required to provide a,claimant with a copy of a report by an independent appeal-level reviewing physician until after the administrator has made its decision on the appeal. Id. An administrator has not “relied upon” such a report until the benefit determination has been made; therefore, the report does not have to be produced to the claimant until after the final decision. Id.

The only documents that Plaintiff alleged that she did not received are early drafts of Dr. Klingbeil’s report. There is no affirmative representation that such drafts exist. Lincoln asserts that it has responded to discovery as ordered by the court. Plaintiff did not respond to Lincoln’s counsel’s attempt to clarify what discovery was sought and did not file the motion to enforce. The court concludes, therefore, that all discovery issues are resolved and that the record is complete.

Dr. Klingbeil reviewed Plaintiff’s file on the second appeal; therefore, Lincoln did not rely on the report until it made its determination during the second appeal. Thus, Lincoln was not required to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the report until after it made its determination on the second appeal. Lincoln provided Plaintiff with a copy of the report prior to its determination and allowed her time to forward it to her treating physicians for review. In the letter accompanying the report, Lincoln stated that “If your client’s physicians should disagree with the assessment then we would appreciate any information that he/she could provide to us that would dispute the enclosed findings.” (Lincoln/Till 000661.) Plaintiff was given twenty-one days to complete this process but did not submit additional evidence or a rebuttal to the findings.

Based on the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Glazer, the court finds that Lincoln provided Plaintiff with Dr. Klingbeil’s report before it was required to do so under ERISA procedures. See Glazer, 524 F.3d at 1245. Lincoln also allowed Plaintiff adequate time to review and provide rebuttal information to the report. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that Lincoln denied her a full and fair review by failing to provide all relevant documents to her or by not allowing her a proper opportunity to respond to Dr. Klingbeil’s report.

4. Lincoln’s Alleged Disregard of the Social Security Determination and Vocational Analysis

Plaintiffs fourth ground for asserting that she was denied a full and fair review is that Lincoln disregarded the Social Security determination and vocational analysis. (Doc. # 40, at 25-26.)