Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc. (185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 2016)

OPINION AND ORDER

JED S. RAKOFF, United States District Judge

Before the Court - is the .motion of defendant Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc. (“CIR”), for judgment on the pleadings, as well as CIR’s Rule 11 motion for sanctions against plaintiff Erica Almeciga and her counsel. Subsumed within defendant’s Rule 11 motion is a Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs handwriting expert, Wendy Carlson. On March 31,' 2016, the Court issued a bottom-line Order granting CIR’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the Amended Complaint with prejudice against all defendants (including defendants Livesey and Hooper). This Opinion and Order explains the reasons for that ruling, addresses CIR’s remaining motions, and directs the entry of final judgment. In particular, the Court grants defendant’s motion to exclude Carlson’s “expert” testimony, finding that handwriting analysis in general is unlikely to meet the admissibility requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and that, in any event, Ms. Carlson’s testimony does not meet those standards. Additionally, because the Court finds that plaintiff has fabricated the critical allegations in her Amended Complaint, the Court imposes sanctions, though because of her impecunious status, the sanctions are non-monetary in nature. The Court declines, however, to impose sanctions on her counsel.

I. Defendant CIR’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A Rule 12(c) motion is governed by the same standard as that of motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006). Accordingly, to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). As a result, for purposes of deciding defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion, the following allegations drawn from plaintiffs Amended Complaint are assumed to be true.

Defendant CIR is an investigative reporting organization that produces reports in various media formats on such subjects as criminal justice, money and politics, and government oversight. See Amended Complaint (“Am.Compl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 50. In August 2012, CIR entered into a partnership with Univision Communications, Inc. (“Univision”) pursuant to which “CIR agreed to provide Univision with access to CIR stories and documentaries focusing on Latin America.” Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff Erica Al-meciga alleges that in March 2012 defendant Bruce Livesey, a producer for CIR, contacted plaintiff in connection with a story on which Livesey was working regarding plaintiffs romantic partner at the time, Rosalio Reta. Id. ¶¶ 5, 9-13. Reta was and remains an inmate at Woodville Penitentiary in Texas and was a former member of the Los Zetas Drug Cartel, id. ¶¶ 8-9, a drug trafficking organization that is “among the most brutal in all of Mexico” and “among the most violent in the world,” id. ¶27.

Almeciga travelled to Woodville, Texas to meet with Livesey and his co-producer, defendant Josiah Hooper, for an interview on August 14, 2012. Id. ¶ 15. According to the Amended Complaint, Almeciga’s participation in the interview was “conditioned upon the explicit requirement” that defendants conceal her identity, id. ¶ 14, which defendants orally agreed to do, id. ¶ 16. Around the same time, Almeciga was interviewed by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) for a different story about Reta, which ultimately aired in June or July 2012 with Almeciga’s face concealed “per the Plaintiffs demand.” Id. ¶ 11. In that interview, a reporter stated that the network could not show Almeciga’s face “for her own safety.” Id. ¶ 12.

Sometime in late 2013, CIR and Univision posted the CIR video report about Reta and the Los Zetas cartel (the “CIR Report”) to their respective YouTube channels. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. The CIR Report, entitled “I was a Hitman for Miguel Trevino,” id. ¶ 5, has since been viewed over 250,000 times on CIR’s YouTube channel and over 3,000,000 times on Univision’s YouTube Channel. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Plaintiff was featured in the report without her identity concealed. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of this alleged breach of contract, she has “endured public humiliation, demeaning and often threatening remarks from the viewers, as well as the overwhelming fear that [the] Los Zetas cartel ... may take retribution against her.” Id. ¶ 31. She has “move[d] to different locations in an effort to avoid interaction with outsiders,” has “developed paranoia,” and “has been treated for depression and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.” Id. 1132.

In August 2014, plaintiff’s counsel sent CIR a letter demanding that CIR cease and desist from showing the CIR Report without concealing Almeciga’s identity. Id. ¶ 33. In response, defendant produced a standard release form (the “Release”) purportedly signed by plaintiff, authorizing CIR to use plaintiffs “name, likeness, image, voice, biography, interview, performance and/or photographs or films taken of [her] ... in connection with the Project.” Id.; Def. CIR’s Answer to Am. Compl., Ex. A, ECF No. 48-1. Plaintiff denies having ever seen or signed the Release. See Am. Compl. ¶ 34.

On April 23, 2015, plaintiff filed this action in New York Supreme Court against defendants CIR, Livesey, Hooper, Univision, and Univision Noticias, asserting a breach-of-eontract claim against CIR, fraud and fraudulent-concealment claims against CIR, Livesey, and Hooper, and a negligence claim against Univision. Plaintiff subsequently added unjust enrichment claims against CIR and Univision in the operative Amended Complaint filed on July 24, 2015.

On June 4, 2015, CIR, with the consent of Hooper and Livesey, removed the action to this Court, asserting that the Univision defendants,. both of which, are citizens of New York, were fraudulently joined, and that, without them, the Court had diversity jurisdiction. On June 26, the Univision defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them, and, on July 1,’ plaintiff moved to remand. The Court denied plaintiffs motion, finding that the Univision defendants were not properly joined under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) because plaintiffs claims against Univision failed as a matter of law. See Memorandum Order dated Aug. 17, 2015, at 6-16, ECF No. 49. For the same reason, the Court granted the Univision defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. Id. at. 16.

CIR then filed the instant Rule 12(c) motion, contending that plaintiffs breach of contract claim must be dismissed because it is barred by New York’s Statute of Frauds and that plaintiffs remaining fraud claims and unjust enrichment claim must be dismissed because they are dupli-cative of her barred' breach of contract claim and impermissibly attempt to circumvent the Statute of Frauds.

New York’s Statute of Frauds renders “void” any oral contract that “[b]y its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof or the performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime.” N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law. § 5-701(a)(1). Put differently, if a contract is not capable of complete performance within one year, it must be in writing to be enforceable.

Here, the alleged oral agreement entered into by plaintiff and defendants was by its (alleged) terms intended to apply in perpetuity. Plaintiff does not plead that defendants’ agreement to conceal Al-meciga’s identity was in any way limited in duration; indeed, reading such a limitation into the agreement would frustrate its purpose given the severe consequences of breach that plaintiff alleges. See Robins v. Zwirner, 713 F.Supp.2d 367, 375 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (where oral agreement was premised on third party “never learning” of .a given fact, the agreement "could not be fully performed within one year” and was therefore barred by the Statute of Frauds).

Plaintiff, misapprehending the Statute of Frauds, argues that the “contract at issue was not only ‘capable’ of being performed within one year, but that the contract was actually performed by Plaintiff within one year of its making.” PI. Erica Almeciga’s Mem. of Law in Opp. to CIR Defs. Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 3, EOF No. 59. On plaintiffs view, the fact that plaintiff upheld her end of the bargain to participate in the interview (within one year) precludes any Statute of Frauds argument. Id. at 4. Plaintiff thus appears to be laboring under the mistaken impression that the Statute of Frauds is concerned with partial performance of an oral contract. It is not. Rather, it requires that an oral agreement be capable of complete performance within a year to be enforceable.

New York law is well settled on this point. See, e.g., Cron v. Hargro Fabrics, Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 362, 368, 670 N.Y.S.2d 973, 694 N.E.2d 56 (1998) (the Statute of Frauds “relates to the performance of the contract and not just of one party thereto”); Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir.2007) (“[F]ull performance by all parties must be possible within a year to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he fact that the plaintiff has fully completed her performance under the contract as that contract is described by her is of no moment” where “the defendant’s performance ... will continue in perpetuity,” as it would here under the alleged contract. Myers v. Waverly Fabrics, 101 A.D.2d 777, 475 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (1st Dep’t 1984), aff'd in part sub nom. Meyers v. Waverly Fabrics, Div. of F. Schumacher & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 75, 489 N.Y.S.2d 891, 479 N.E.2d 236 (1985). Nor would it matter if defendants had performed for a year or more after entering into the alleged agreement and then breached. The dispositive point is that defendants could not complete their performance within one year since their obligation was an ongoing one.

Turning to plaintiffs fraud claim (Count Two), under New York law plaintiff must plead: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact (2) made by defendant with knowledge of its falsity (3) and intent to defraud; (4) reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff; and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff.” Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir.2006).

However, New York law bars fraud claims that “arise[ ] out of the same facts as plaintiffs breach of contract claim, with the addition only of an allegation that defendant never intended to perform the precise promises spelled out in the contract between the parties.” Telecom Int’l Am., Ltd. v. AT & T Corp., 280 F.3d 175, 196 (2d Cir.2001). In such circumstances, “the fraud claim is redundant and plaintiffs sole remedy is for breach of contract.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). In other words, a plaintiff may not “bootstrap a breach of contract claim into a fraud claim by simply including in his complaint an allegation that defendant never intended to uphold his end of the deal.” Sudul v. Computer Outsourcing Servs., 868 F.Supp. 59, 62 (S.D.N.Y.1994). Nor are plaintiffs permitted to “avoid the statute of frauds by calling the breach of contract claim a fraud claim.” Massey v. Byrne, 112 A.D.3d 532, 977 N.Y.S.2d 242, 243 (1st Dep’t 2013); see also Gora v. Drizin, 300 A.D.2d 139, 752 N.Y.S.2d 297, 298-99 (1st Dep’t 2002) (“Defendant cannot avoid [the Statute of Frauds] by re-characterizing the claim as one for fraud.... ”).

Trying to avoid this bar, plaintiff submits that her fraud claim is premised, not on the same underlying facts as her breach of contract claim, but rather on the’ allegedly forged Release. This characterization is at odds with her Amended Complaint, which, in pleading the fraud claim, alleges that defendants “provided Plaintiff and Reta with intentionally misleading information, such as promises to conceal her identity ... which the Defendants were reasonably certain promoted Ms. Almeciga’s reliance and' ultimate participation” (Am. Compl. ¶ 53 (emphasis added)) and that defendants’ “promise to Plaintiff that her identity would be protected, and that her face would not appear in their Report, was made without any intention of performance ” (id. ¶ 54 (emphasis added)). To be sure, plaintiff also alleges that defendants forged the Release, id. ¶ 44, and that defendants “benefited substantially by using the Release as justification to air the interview of [p]laintiff without concealing her identity,” id. ¶ 46. But that does not state , any cause of action by itself, since, among much else, plaintiff plainly did not rely in any respect on the Release she maintains she never, signed and was a forgery. Rather, the gravamen of her fraud claim is that defendants entered into an oral (contractual) agreement with plaintiff that they had no intention of honoring, which is precisely the sort of duplicative fraud claim that is not cognizable under New York law.

Plaintiffs fraudulent concealment claim (Count Three) must also be dismissed as duplicative of her breach of contract claim. To plead fraudulent concealment under New York law, plaintiff must allege “(1) that the defendant failed to meet its duty to disclose ... (2) that the defendant had an intent to defraud or scienter, (3) [that] there was reliance on the part of the plaintiff, and (4) damages.” Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 152 (2d Cir.1993). “A duty to disclose information can arise under New York law where (1) there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties; (2) one party makes a partial or ambiguous statement that requires additional disclosure to avoid misleading the- other party; or (3) one party to a transaction possesses superior knowledge of the facts not readily available to the other, and knows that the other is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge.” Fertitta v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 2015 WL 374968, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015) (internal quotation mark omitted). “However, the intention to breach does not give rise to a duty to disclose. Instead, the duty to disclose must exist separately from the duty to perform under the contract.” TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Grp., 412 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir.2005). Here, plaintiff appears to plead that defendants were under a duty to disclose that plaintiffs identity would not be concealed in the CIR Report (i.e., their intention to breach) “based upon their relationship with Ms. Almeciga regarding her appearance in the Report.” Am. Compl. ¶ 65. Thus, plaintiffs fraudulent concealment claim is impermissibly duplicative of her breach of contract claim.

Although plaintiffs pleading of her fraudulent concealment claim does not even mention the Release, plaintiff once again pivots in her briefing and argues that defendants were under a duty to disclose to plaintiff their intent to use a forged release to license the CIR Report to Univision as well as their intent to use the Release to avoid litigation with plaintiff. See Pl.’s Opp. at 13. This arguments fails, however, because the Release is simply the mechanism by which defendants allegedly concealed then- breach of contract: it cannot support an independent fraud claim under the circumstances. Indeed, it is well settled under New York law that “alleged concealment of a breach is insufficient to transform what would normally be a breach of contract action into one for fraud.” Rosenblatt v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd., 2005 WL 2649027, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2005) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also, e.g., Compagnia Importazioni Esportazioni Rapresentanze v. L-3 Commc’ns Corp., 2007 WL 2244062, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2007) (dismissing fraud claims on this basis); Ray Larsen Assocs., Inc. v. Nikko Am., Inc., 1996 WL 442799, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1996) (same); Fisher v. Big Squeeze (N.Y.), Inc., 349 F.Supp.2d 483, 489 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (dismissing fraudulent concealment claim on this, basis where defendants were alleged to have fraudulently calculated profits subject to distribution under contract through the creation of false or misleading financial statements).

The facts of IKEA North American Services, Inc. v. Northeast Graphics, Inc., 56 F.Supp.2d 340 (S.D.N.Y.1999) are instructive. There, plaintiff IKEA engaged the defendants (a graphic designer and mass-mailer distributor) to produce a holiday brochure to be mailed to millions of homes throughout the United States and Canada. Id. at 341-42. In response to inquiries as to the status of the project, the defendants assured IKEA and its agent that the project was proceeding apace and created thirteen fraudulent postal register statements purportedly confirming the mailing of nearly 3 million brochures. Id. at 342. Applying the principle that “attempted concealments of contractual breach” do not give rise to independent actions for fraud, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the fraud claims with prejudice. Id. at 342-43. Like the forged postal register statements in IKEA the alleged forged Release at issue here constitutes, at worst, an attempted concealment of contractual breach. As such, plaintiff’s fraud claims are no more than dressed-up breach of contract claims and are hereby dismissed.

With respect to plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim against defendant CIR, plaintiff posits that because there is a “bona fide dispute concerning the existence of the contract at issue ... [she] is not required to elect her remedies, and may proceed on her unjust enrichment claim as well as her breach of contract claim.” Pl.’s Opp. at 15. While that may be true in the main, there are exceptions, and this case involves one of them: “A party may not circumvent the Statute of Frauds by repleading an already barred breach of contract claim as a claim for unjust enrichment.” Four Star Capital Corp. v. Nynex Corp., 183 F.R.D. 91, 108 (S.D.N.Y.1997); see also Almazan v. Almazan, 2015 WL 500176, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2015) (“[Plaintiffs may not pursue unjust enrichment claims if such claims are based on an oral agreement that is barred by the Statute of Frauds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); KJ Roberts & Co. v. MDC Partners Inc., 2014 WL 1013828, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014) (“[T]he Statute of Frauds applies to the Alleged Agreement; therefore, Plaintiff cannot use a theory of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment to escape it.”), aff'd, 605 Fed.Appx. 6 (2d Cir.2015). If the law were otherwise, plaintiffs could easily achieve “an end-run around the statute of frauds.” Komolov v. Segal, 40 Misc.3d 1228(A), 2013 WL 4411232, at *3 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Aug. 14, 2013). Plaintiff cites no case in which a court sustained an unjust enrichment claim where a breach of contract claim had been dismissed under the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim is hereby dismissed.

While the Rule 12(c) motion was brought on behalf of defendant CIR, and not defendants Livesey or Hooper (neither of whom had been served at the time the motion was brought), the claims against Livesey and Hooper fail for the same reasons they fail against defendant CIR, and the Court has ample authority in such circumstances to dismiss them as to these defendants as well. See Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v. Bloomsbury Pub., PLC, 467 F.Supp.2d 394, 399 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“[Wjhile dismissing a complaint as to a non-moving defendant is not an ordinary practice, a district court may dismiss claims sua sponte for failure to state a claim, at least so long as the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, plaintiffs Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as against all remaining defendants.

II. Defendant CIR’s Rule II Motion for Sanctions

Defendant CIR seeks sanctions against plaintiff for allegedly perpetrating a fraud upon the Court, and against her counsel for willfully blinding himself to her misrepresentations. Since the outcome of defendant’s Rule 11 motion is affected by the admissibility vel non of the proffered opinion of plaintiffs handwriting expert that the Release was forged, the Court first addresses the admissibility of that expert opinion.

A. The admissibility of the proffered expert testimony under Rule 702.

Shortly before the expert disclosure deadline -in this case, plaintiff engaged a reputed handwriting expert, Wendy Carlson, to provide an opinion on the authenticity of plaintiffs signature on the Release. The signature on the Release appears as follows:

See Decl. of Thomas Burke dated Sept. 14, 2015 (“Sept. 14 Burke Decl.”), Ex. 2, EOF No. 58-2.

On August 18, 2015, plaintiffs counsel sent an email to Carlson asking her to provide a Rule 26 report by the next day that analyzed the Release against purported “known” signatures of the plaintiff. Plaintiffs counsel provided numerous purported “known” signatures to Carlson (all of which were either dated after the initiation of the parties’ dispute or were undated), a representative example of which is as follows:

Sept. 14 Burke Deck, Ex. 16 (“Carlson Expert Report”) at Ex. Kl. After comparing these “known” signatures to the signature on the Release, Carlson opined, in an expert report submitted August 20, 2015, that “[biased on [her] scientific examination” the signature on the Release was a forgery. Id. at 7.

On December 4, 2015, the Court held a combined evidentiary hearing on CIR’s Rule 11 motion and a “Daubert ” hearing on the admissibility of Carlson’s testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). At the hearing, Carlson admitted that she had no basis for knowing (other than the representation of plaintiffs counsel) that the purported “known” signatures she had received were actually plaintiffs, such that she could not definitively state whether the “known” signatures had been forged or whether the Release had been forged. See Transcript dated Dec. 4, 2015 (“Dec. 4 Transcript”), at 55-57, ECF No. 88. For that reason, the Court asked plaintiff to write her signature on a piece of paper 10 times in open court (the “In-Court Signatures”). Id. at 90. Although Carlson observed that plaintiff was writing these signatures “very slow[ly],” id. at 104, nonetheless, at the Court’s request and on consent of all involved, Carlson prepared a supplemental report following the hearing, submitted on December 9, 2015, in which she found that the author of the In-Court Signatures (ie., plaintiff) was the author of the purported “known” signatures .that formed the basis of Carlson’s initial expert report, and that, once again, her opinion, “[biased on [her] scientific examination,” was that the signature on the Release was made by someone other than plaintiff, ie., was a forgery, see Forensic Handwriting and Document Examiner Expert Report Suppl. (“Supplemental Expert Report”) at 8, EOF No. 87.

In order for expert' testimony to be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 requires that an “expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” that “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data” and “is the product of reliable principles and methods,” and that “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of- the case.” Fed.R.Evid. 702. “[T]he proponent of expert testimony has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied.” United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir.2007).

While “Rule 702 embodies a liberal standard of admissibility "for expert opinions," Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395 (2d Cir.2005), “nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the' ipse dixit of the expert.” Gen. Elec. Co.v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). Rather, Daubert has “charged trial judges’ with' the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony” and junk science from the courtroom. Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. With respect to expert-opinions purporting to offer scientific conclusions in particular, Daubert states that courts should ordinarily pay particular attention to whether the expert’s methodology has or can be tested, whether it has been subject to peer review and publication, whether it has a known error rate, whether it is subject to internal controls and standards, and whether it has received general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. See' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. While expert testimony that does not fare well under these particular standards may still sometimes be admissible as non-scientific expert testimony pursuant to the doctrine of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (discussed infra), it is the Court’s role to ensure that a given discipline does not falsely lay claim to the mantle of science, cloaking itself with the aura of unassaila-bility that the imprimatur of “science” confers and thereby distorting the truth-finding process. There have been too many pseudo-scientific disciplines that have since been exposed as profoundly flawed, unreliable, or baseless for any Court to take this role lightly.

Handwriting analysis, or “forensic document examination” as its practitioners prefer to call it, involves the “asserted ability to determine the authorship vel non of a piece of handwriting by examining the way in which the letters are inscribed, shaped and joined, and comparing it to exemplars of a putative author’s concededly authentic handwriting.” D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification § 33:1, in 4 Modem Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2015-2016) (footnote omitted). Before assessing the discipline under Dau-bert, some historical context is in order. Unlike, say, physics or chemistry, or even DNA analysis, handwriting identification is not a field that arose from scientific inquiry or that developed independent of the courtroom. It was a purely forensic development, intended to deal with cases like this one in which the question of whether someone authored a particular document might be a dispositive issue in the case, or even make the difference between a guilty verdict or an acquittal. Id. § 33:3 (“[Wjhen expert handwriting identification testimony was first declared admissible in America and England, there were no experts .... When the legal system agreed to accept such testimony, however, it created a demand which was to be met by people who turned their entire attention to filling it.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 Va. L.Rev. 1723, 1727 (2001) (“Handwriting identification is an unusual form of expert evidence because it was the first kind of expertise that was primarily forensic, invented specifically for use in the legal arena.”).

Initially, testimony by putative handwriting experts was met with skepticism by U.S. courts. Through the late 19th century, many jurisdictions did not admit it at all and the enterprise was viewed with suspicion. See Risinger, Handwriting Identification § 33:3; Hoag v. Wright, 174 N.Y. 36, 42, 66 N.E. 579 (1903) (“The opinions of experts upon handwriting, who testify from comparison only, are regarded by the courts as of uncertain value, because in so many cases where such evidence is received witnesses of equal honesty, intelligence, . and experience reach conclusions not only diametrically opposite, but always in favor of the party who called them.”). To persuade the courts that their expertise was legitimate, the early handwriting experts therefore “claimfed] the mantle of science”:

The experts argued that they had well-developed methods by which they could distinguish the penmanship of one writer from that of another. Their knowledge, they claimed, resulted not simply from experience or innate talent, but from careful application of well-honed procedures, rigorous attention to methodology, and the precision and detail of measurements. Aspiring handwriting experts thus drew upon the arsenal of scientific methods, but. equally important, they invoked the- rhetoric of science to buttress their own authority. By proclaiming themselves scientific, they hoped to persuade judges and juries that their conclusions were both objective and warranted.

Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, 87 Va. L.Rev. at 1786-87.

Against this background, the tide shifted in favor of admissibility when Albert Osborn, widely recognized as a progenitor.of modem forensic document examination, embarked with John Henry Wigmore (of Wigmore on Evidence fame) on a decades-long campaign to promote handwriting analysis as a scientific endeavor. Risinger, Handwriting Identification § 33:3 (“Osborn’s book, Osborn’s personality, and Osborn’s relationship with Wigmore, are the cornerstones upon which respect for asserted handwriting identification expertise in the "United States was built.”). The vision was perhaps best realized when Osborn (among other handwriting experts) testified that the man accused of kidnapping and murdering Charles Lindbergh’s baby had written the ransom notes at issue. “Osborn became a celebrity” and the place of handwriting analysis in the courtroom became firmly entrenched: “In the half century after the [Lindbergh case], no reported opinion rejected handwriting expertise, nor was much skepticism displayed towards it.” Id. This was despite some highly-publicized instances where handwriting experts got it wrong. Indeed, when the notorious journalist Clifford Irving convinced a book publisher in the early 1970’s that Howard Hughes had authorized him to write Hughes’s autobiography, it was Osborn’s firm that mistakenly authenticated Irving’s forgeries of Hughes’s handwriting as genuine, concluding that it was “impossible” that anyone other than Hughes could have authored the forgeries. See Robert R. Bryan, The Execution of the Innocent: The Tragedy of the Hauptmann-Lindbergh and Bigelow Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 831, 844 n.48 (1991), Thereafter, however, Irving confessed that he had forged Hughes’s signature and pled guilty to a federal felony arising therefrom. Id.) see also Lawrence Van Gelder, Irving Sentenced to 2½ Year Term, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1972, at 1, 34.

In recent years, however, Daubert has spurred some courts to scrutinize handwriting analysis anew, and several district courts have found testimony from purported handwriting experts inadmissible under Daubert. See, e.g., United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F.Supp.2d 961, 966 (D.Ariz.2002) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Hines, 65 F.Supp.2d 62, 70-71 (D.Mass.1999) (admitting such testimony “to the extent that [the expert] restricts her testimony to similarities or dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the robbery note” but prohibiting the expert from “render[ing] an ultimate conclusion on who penned the unknown writing”). At least as many courts, however, continue to fully admit testimony by handwriting experts, often invoking the field’s historical pedigree and affirming the validity of the field as a general matter. See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 271 (4th Cir.2003) (noting that “handwriting comparison testimony has a long history of admissibility” and finding that the “the fact that handwriting comparison analysis has achieved widespread and lasting acceptance in the expert community gives us the assurance of reliability that Daubert requires”). While the reasoning of cases such as Crisp may be questioned — since, even if handwriting expertise were always admitted in the past (which it was not), it was not until Daubert that the scientific validity of such expertise was subject to any serious scrutiny — such pedigree often provided a vehicle for affirming a district judge’s admission of handwriting analysis on the ground that it was not an abuse of discretion.

In the Second Circuit, however, the issue of the admissibility and reliability of handwriting analysis is an open one. See United States v. Adeyi, 165 Fed.Appx. 944, 945 (2d Cir.2006) (“Our circuit has not authoritatively decided whether a handwriting expert may offer his opinion as to 'the authorship of a handwriting sample, based on a comparison with a known sample.”); United States v. Brown, 152 Fed.Appx. 59, 62 (2d Cir.2005) (same). As such, the Court is free to consider how well handwriting analysis fares under Daubert and whether Carlson’s testimony is admissible, either as “science” or otherwise.

Carlson, like other handwriting experts, purports to use the “ACE-V” methodology in conducting handwriting comparison, an acronym for “Analyze, Compare, Evaluate, and Verify.” Carlson Expert Report at 6. In her report, Carlson explains this methodology in largely conclusory terms:

The identification of any signature or handwriting is based on the agreement, without unexplainable difference, of the handwriting characteristics displayed. These characteristics include the form of the letters, the beginning, connecting, and ending strokes, the proportions of letters, both inter-letter and intra-letter, the slope, size, and curvature of the writing and/or printing, the spacing and arrangement, the skill of the writer, and line quality. The alignment, positioning and outstanding significant features are other factors used to analyze, compare and evaluate. The elimination of an author is based on a lack of some or all of the above-noted comparisons.

Id. at 5.

At the Daubert hearing, Carlson elaborated on the ACE-V method as follows:

The A is analyze. I examine and analyze the purported knowns to determine that they were authored by the same person, that all the knowns were authored by the same person.

I then take the questioned signature, also enlarge that to 200 percent and do the comparison, which is C. I compare to determine similarities or dissimilarities within the writings and make a determination as to what is really significant, what is just maybe a factor of writing that needs to be taken accounted for. And then we move to E which is evaluation and I take my findings of similarities and dissimilarities and- evaluate the weight of the evidence that I have and make a determination as to authorship, whether similar authorship, different authorship, In many cases what I do is verification. I don’t do that with every case. With science I know that every experiment is not verified. With this case I felt like the differences were so dramatic and striking that I did not do a verification. I didn’t feel it was necessary in this matter.

Dec. 4 Transcript, at 69-70.

Carlson further explained:

[WJhat I am looking for are, again, habits that are repeatedly seen, patterns within the writing; Does this person make a loop clockwise or counterclockwise? What do the ending stroke, the beginning stroke, the connecting strpkes look like? I am looking at a portion of one letter to another like ratios. One thing that I really find to be very helpful and significant are the angles in writing. For example, if I am drawing an angle from the top of maybe the first initial in the first name to the first initial in the last name, you sign your name a specific way every time so that angle is going to be very similar most every time.

Id. at 61.

On its face, this bears none of the indicia of science and suggests, at best, a form of subjective expertise. Indeed, in her testimony at the Daubert hearing, Carlson appeared to concede as much, affirming that what she was “chiefly relying on [ ] is not what we would call science in the sense of physic[s] or chemistry or biology,” but rather “experience” such that she knows what “to look for ... in a way that the everyday layperson would not.” Dec. 4 Transcript, at 63. Yet this did not stop her from stating, in her second report submitted a few days after this testimony, that her latest opinions were “[biased on [her] scientific examination” and “scientific methodology.” Supplemental Expert Report at 6, 8. It therefore behooves the Court to examine more specifically whether the ACE-V method of handwriting analysis, as described by Carlson, meets the common indicia of admissible scientific expertise as set forth in Daubert.

The first Daubert factor is whether the methodology has been or can be tested. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“[Sjcience .., represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement.” (quoting Brief for American Association for the Advancement of Science et al, as Amici Curiae 7-8)). To this Court’s knowledge, no studies have evaluated the reliability or relevance of the specific techniques, methods, and markers used by forensic document examiners to determine authorship (as opposed to their overall ability to “get it right” — a subject discussed under the rubric of error rate, infra). For example, there are no studies, to this Court’s knowledge, that have evaluated the extent to which the angle at which one writes or the curvature of one’s loops distinguish one person’s handwriting from the next. Precisely what degree of variation falls within or outside an expected range of natural variation in one’s handwriting — such that -an examiner could distinguish in an objective way between variations that indicate different authorship and variations that do not — appears to be completely unknown and untested. Ditto the extent to which such a range is affected by the use of different writing instruments or the intentional disguise of. one’s natural hand or the passage of time. Such things could be tested and studied, but they have not been; and this by itself renders the field unscientific in nature. See United States v. Johnsted, 30 F.Supp.3d 814, 818 (W.D.Wis.2013) (“The lack of testing also calls into question the reliability of analysts^ ] highly discretionary decisions as to whether some aspect of a questioned writing constitutes a difference or merely a variation; without any proof indicating that the distinction between the two is valid, those decisions do not appear based on a reliable methodology.”).

As such, it is hardly surprising that Carlson’s expert report reads more like a series of subjective observations than a scientific analysis {e.g., “the ‘e’, ‘c’s, upper ⅛’ loop, and ‘a’s in the questioned signature are more narrow than the known signatures which display fuller, rounder letters” (Carlson Expert Report at 6)). Indeed, as noted, Carlson herself conceded as much at the Daubert hearing.

To be sure, “no one has ever doubted that there [is] information in a handwriting trace that might be used for attribution of authorship under some circumstances.” D. Michael Risinger, Appendix: Cases Involving the Reliability of Handwriting Identification Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 Tulsa L.Rev. 477, 494 (2007). The rub “is simply that we don’t know what those circumstances are, and when humans are or are not good at such attributions, regardless of their own claims at skill.” Id. Until the forensic document examination community refines its methodology, it is virtually untestable, rendering it an unscientific endeavor.

The second Daubert factor concerns whether the methodology has been subject to peer review and publication. Of course, the key question here is what constitutes a “peer,” because, just as astrologers will attest to the reliability of astrology, defining “peer” in terms of those who make their living through handwriting analysis would render this Daubert factor a charade. While some journals exist to serve the community of those who make their living through forensic document examination, numerous courts have found that “[t]he field of handwriting comparison ... suffers from a lack of meaningful peer review” by anyone remotely disinterested. United States v. Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1103 (D.Alaska 2001) (“[S]ome articles are presented at professional meetings for review [but] there is no evidence that any of these articles are subjected to peer review by disinterested parties, such as academics.”). “There is no peer review by a ‘competitive, unbiased community of practitioners and academics,’ ” as would be expected in the case of a scientific field. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d at 68 (quoting United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F.Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y.1995)); United States v. Fujii, 152 F.Supp.2d 939, 940-41 (N.D.Ill. 2000) (“[T]here has been no peer review by an unbiased and financially disinterested community of practitioners and academics _”).

Relatedly, as the National Academy of Sciences found in a comprehensive report issued on the forensic sciences in 2009, “there has been only limited research to quantify the reliability and replicability of the practices used by trained document examiners.” Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community, Nat’l Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward [“NAS Report”] 167 (Aug. 2009). This is hardly surprising given that forensic document examination “has no academic base.” Risinger, Handwriting Identification § 33:11 n.5. Indeed, as Carlson testified at deposition, “there are no colleges or universities that offer degrees in forensic document examination.” Deck of Thomas R. Burke dated Nov. 24, 2015 (“Nov. 24 Burke Deck”), Ex. A at 9, ECF No. 83-1 at 6.

In sum, to the extent the field has been subject to any “peer” review and publication, the review has not been sufficiently robust or objective to lend credence to the proposition that handwriting comparison is a scientific discipline.

Turning to the third Daubert factor, “[tjhere is little known about the error rates of forensic document examiners.” Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d at 1103. While a handful of studies have been conducted, the results have been mixed and “cannot be said to have ‘established’ the validity of the field to any meaningful degree.” Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d at 69. Certain studies conducted by Dr. Moshe Kam, a computer scientist commissioned by the FBI to research handwriting expertise, have suggested that forensic document examiners are moderately better at handwriting identification than laypeople. For example, in one such study, the forensic document examiners correctly identified forgeries as forgeries 96% of the time and only incorrectly identified forgeries as genuine .5% of the time, while laypeople correctly identified forgeries as forgeries 92% of the time and incorrectly identified forgeries as genuine 6.5% of the time. Ri-singer, Appendix, 43 Tulsa L.Rev. at 491. Furthermore, forensic document examiners incorrectly identified genuine signatures as forgeries 7% of the time, while laypeople did so 26% of the time. Id.

Although such studies may seem to suggest that trained forensic document examiners in the aggregate do have an advantage over laypeople in performing particular tasks, not all. of these results appear to be statistically significant and the methodology of the Kam studies has been the subject of significant criticism. In any event, in contrast to the study cited above (which involved attempted simulations of genuine signatures), the immediate task for the proffered expert in this case, as Carlson implicitly acknowledged at the Daubert hearing, was to determine whether a signature that does not look anything like plaintiffs purported “known” signatures was or was not authored by plaintiff. See Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 874 F.Supp.2d 169, 172 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“Under Rule 702 and Daubert, the district court must determine whether the proposed expert testimony ‘both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’” (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786)). Put differently, the task at hand, so far as expertise is concerned, is to determine whether plaintiff intentionally disguised her natural handwriting in producing the “known” signatures. And in this respect, the available error rates for handwriting experts are unacceptably high.

For example, in a 2001 study in which forensic document examiners were asked to compare (among other things) the “known” signature of an individual in his natural hand to the “questioned” signature of the same individual in a disguised hand, examiners were only able to identify the association 30% of the time. Twenty-four percent of the time they were wrong, and 46% of the time they were unable to reach a result. See Risinger, Handwriting Identification § 33:34. Similarly, and strikingly, in an unpublished study conducted by the Forensic Sciences Foundation in 1984, participating labs were supplied with three handwritten letters (the “questioned” documents) and handwriting exemplars for six suspects. Two of the three letters were written by one person, who was not among the suspects for whom the examiners had exemplars, and the third letter was written by a suspect who had written his exemplars in his normal hand, but who had tried to simulate the writing of the other two letters when producing his letter. Of the 23 labs that submitted responses, 74% perceived the difference in authorship between the letters, but exactly 0% recognized that the third letter was written by a suspect who had disguised his handwriting. These results suggest that while forensic document examiners might have some arguable expertise in distinguishing an authentic signature from a close forgery, they do not appear to have much, if any, facility for associating an author’s natural handwriting with his or her disguised handwriting. See Risinger, Appendix, 43 Tulsa L.Rev. at 549 (“[T]here is absolutely no empirical evidence to support the skill claim in regard to distinguishing between disguised exemplars and normal hand exemplars independent of comparison to some ... everyday writing pre-existing the obtaining of the demand exemplars”).

As such, the known error rates, as they apply to the task at hand, cut against admission.

As for the fourth Daubert factor, the field of handwriting comparison appears to be “entirely lacking in controlling standards,” Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d at 1104, as is well illustrated by Carlson’s own amorphous, subjective approach to conducting her analysis here. At her deposition, for example, when asked “what amount of difference in curvature is enough to identify different authorship,” Carlson vaguely responded, “[y]ou know, that’s just a part of all of the features to take into context, so I wouldn’t rely on a specific stroke to determine authorship.” Deck of Thomas R. Burke dated Jan. 21 (“Jan. 21. Burke Dec!.”), Ex. 2 at 49, ECF No. 95-2 at 43. Similarly, when asked at the Daubert hearing how many exemplars she requires to conduct a handwriting comparison, Carlson testified:

You know, that’s really — that has been up for debate for a long time. I know that a lot of document examiners, myself included, I would prefer — I ask for a half a dozen to a dozen. That at least gives me a decent sampling. Others request 25 or more. I feel like if you get too many signatures you have got so much information it is overwhelming and you tend to get lost in it.

Dec. 4 Transcript, at 62-63; see also Starzecpyzel, 880 F.Supp. at 1046 (noting that forensic document examiners “lack objective standards in regard to the number of exemplars required for an accurate determination as to genuineness”).

Nor is there any “agreement as to how many similarities it takes to declare a match.” Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d at 69; see also United States v. Rutherford, 104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1193 (D.Neb.2000) (“[The forensic document examiner] testified that unlike fingerprint Identification, there is no specific number of characteristics an [examiner] is required to find before declaring that a positive match has been made. Rather, [the examiner] testified- that a match is declared upon the subjective satisfaction of the [examiner] performing the handwriting analysis based on his education, training, and experience.”); And because there are no recognized standards, it is impossible, to “compare the opinion reached by an examiner with a standard protocol - subject, to validity -testing.” Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d at 69.

Furthermore; “there is no standardization of training - enforced either by any licensing agency- or by professional tradition,” nor a “single accepted professional certifying body” of forensic document examiners. Risinger, Handwriting Identification § 33:11 n.5. Rather, training is by apprenticeship, which in Carlson’s case, took the form of a two-year, part-time internet course, involving about five to ten hours of work, per week under the tutelage of a mentor she met with personally when they were “able -to connect.” Nov. 24 Burke Decl., Ex. A at 13, ECF No. 83-1 at 10. . -

As for the final Daubert factor— general acceptance in the expert community — handwriting experts “certainly find ‘general acceptance’ within their own community, but this community is devoid of financially disinterested parties.” Starzecpyzel, 880 F.Supp. at 1038. Such acceptance cannot therefore be taken for much. A more objective measure of acceptance is thé National Academy of Sciences’ 2009 Report, which struck a cautious note, finding that while “there may be some value in handwriting analysis,” • “[t]he scientific basis for handwriting comparisons needs to be strengthened.” NAS Report at 166-67. The Report also noted that “there may be a scientific basis for handwriting comparison, at least in the absence of intentional obfuscation or forgery ” — a highly relevant caveat for present purposes. Id. at 167 (emphasis added). This is far from general acceptance.

For decades, the forensic document examiner community has essentially said to courts, “Trust us.” ' And many courts have. But that does not make what the examiners do science.

Of course, just because Carlson’s testimony flunks Dambert does not mean it is inadmissible under Rule 702 altogether. If, Carlson has (among other requirements) “technical” or “other specialized knowledge” that “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” her testimony may be admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 702(a). Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kumho Tire “made clear that while [Dau-bert ’s] basic requirements of reliability-— as they are now articulated in Rule 702— apply across the board to all expert testimony, the more particular [Daubert ] standards for scientific evidence need not be met when the testimony offered” is not scientific in nature. United States v. Glynn, 578 F.Supp.2d 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y.2008). “[T]he test of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167.

But while courts are free under Kumho Tire to apply different factors than are called for by Daubert based on what factors best “fit” the inquiry, “the particular questions that [Daubert] mentioned will often be appropriate for use in determining the reliability of challenged expert testimony.” Id. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Here, the Court finds that the Dau-bert criteria suit the instant inquiry well. See Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d at 1101 (“Factors that ‘fit’ the instant case are whether the theories and techniques of handwriting comparison have been tested, whether they have been subjected to peer review, the known or potential error rate of forensic document examiners, the existence of standards in making comparisons between known writings and questioned documents, and the general acceptance by the forensic evidence community.”). It remains the case that the methodology has not been subject to adequate testing or peer review, that error rates for the task at hand are unacceptably high, and that the field sorely lacks internal controls and standards, and so forth. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that, as a general matter, a court should be cautious in admitting testimony from a forensic document examiner even under the flexible approach of Kumho Tire — particularly when an examiner offers an opinion on authorship — and should not do so without carefully evaluating whether the examiner has actual expertise in regard to the specific task at hand.

In this case, Carlson’s testimony is far too problematic to be admissible under Rule 702 as technical or otherwise “specialized” expert testimony, even on a Kumho Tire approach, for at least four reasons.

First, as a threshold matter, plaintiffs counsel sought to bias Carlson from the start. In plaintiffs counsel’s email to Carlson seeking to retain her, plaintiffs counsel stated flatly that “[t]he questioned document was a Release that Defendant CIR forged” and that a Rule 26 Report (to this effect) was needed from Carlson by the next day. Nov. 24 Burke Deck, Ex. B., ECF No. 83-2. He continued:

I understand that we are asking a lot, in a short period of time, however, this is what we need, and you’re the expert that we want and feel comfortable working with. You were a rock star for us at our last case! We are asking the same performance here. Our client was really taken advantage of by this Defendant, and it put her, and her young children in danger, and we need your help to right this wrong. If you need anything else, please let us know. We can’t thank you enough.

Id.

In the same vein, one of the “known” signatures that plaintiffs counsel provided to Carlson was an affidavit signed by plaintiff reciting her claim that the Release is a “fake” which “does not contain my signature.” Carlson Expert Report, Ex. Kl. The affidavit concludes with Almeci-ga’s averment that she is “truly disgusted and deeply disturbed with the manner in which CIR has forged these documents. CIR’s conduct has destroyed my life!” Id.

Plaintiffs counsel also sent Carlson the letter from plaintiffs prior (uncalled) expert stating that the Release was forged, see Nov. 24 Burke Decl., Ex. B. (though Carlson testified that she did not recall reviewing it, see Dec. 4 Transcript, at 74). All of this is contrary to the well-established principle that , experts must, to the maximum extent possible, proceed “blindly,” that is, without knowledge of the result sought by the party seeking to retain them. Indeed, even one of the earliest treatises on handwriting analysis, authored in 1894 by William Hagan, stated that “[t]he examiner must depend wholly upon what is seen, leaving out of consideration all suggestions or hints from interested parties [as] it best subserves the conditions of fair examination that the expert should not know the interest which the party employing him to make the investigation has in the result.” William E. Hagan, Disputed Handwriting 82 (1894). Plaintiffs counsel’s blatant biasing tactics compromised Carlson’s ability to provide a neutral examination, a danger made even greater by the highly subjective nature of Carlson’s methodology.

Second, the subjectivity and vagueness that characterizes Carlson’s analysis severely diminishes the reliability of Carlson’s methodology. Carlson describes letters in the questioned signature as “oversized” and “formed incorrectly;” as characterized by “very smooth strokes and curves” as opposed to the “very jerky, angular strokes” of the known signatures; as “more narrow” compared to the “fuller, rounder letters” of the known signatures; as “too tall when compared to the respective letters in the known signatures;” as “very symetrical [sic]” compared to the “wider, distorted loops” of the known signatures; and so on. Carlson Expert Report at 6; Supplemental Expert Report at 7. Based on such observations, Carlson concludes that the Release was not signed by Erica Almeci-ga, But the. critical missing link is why any of these observed differences indicate different authorship at all, let alone in a context where someone has potentially disguised his or her handwriting.

Third, and relatedly, while testimony that accounted for the possibility of disguise and addressed why the “known” signatures were not the product of intentional disguise could at least have potentially assisted the trier of fact, Carlson did not offer such testimony. To the contrary, Carlson confirmed at her deposition that she was “relying on the plaintiffs representations that [the known signatures] are accurate representations of her signature.” Nov. 24 Burke Decl., Ex. A at 47 (emphasis added), ECF No. 83-1 at 21; see also id. at 60, ECF No. 83-1 at 29. This is a critical flaw in Carlson’s methodology because it assumes away a key issue: whether Almeciga intentionally disguised her handwriting in producing the known samples after this dispute was initiated or whether the known samples accurately represent her actual handwriting. By relying on plaintiffs counsel’s representation that the “known” signatures were accurate representations of plaintiffs signature, the result of Carlson’s analysis was effectively pre-ordained and her testimony cannot be considered the “product of reliable principles and methods.” Fed.R.Evid. 702. In fact, Carlson’s testimony has been excluded by at least one other court in part on such a basis. See United States v. LeBeau, 2015 WL 4068158, at *8 (D.S.D. June 10, 2015) (“[Carlson’s] analysis and opinions entirely hinge on whether she received an accurate ‘known’ signature from [the defendant].”).

The tainting effect of Carlson’s assumption in this regard may be gleaned from what she infers on the basis of her observation that the “signature on the questioned document is written with great fluidity and a faster speed, unlike the known signatures that display a slower, more methodical and unrefined style of writing.” Carlson Expert Report at 6. To Carlson, who took on faith that the “known” signatures were accurate representations of plaintiffs handwriting, this discrepancy is evidence that the Release was forged. Yet, at the Daubert hearing, Carlson confirmed that slower, methodical handwriting was “equally consistent ... or maybe even more consistent ] with someone trying to fake the known signatures,” Dec. 4 Transcript, at 65, and she observed that the exemplars written by plaintiff in open court were written slowly, id. at 104. While Carlson further testified that she was able to assure herself that plaintiff did not disguise her handwriting because “subconscious traits and ... characteristics” will reveal themselves in disguised writing, this testimony cannot be considered of much value in light of Carlson’s earlier, contrary deposition testimony and the complete absence of any indication in her reports that she was accounting for the possibility of disguise. Id. at 78.

Fourth, also diminishing Carlson’s credibility are a number of striking contradictions between her Report and her in-court testimony. Thus, while Carlson purported to apply the ACE-V method in her expert report, see Carlson Expert Report at 6, she admitted at the Daubert hearing that she did not have time to obtain a verification of her opinion in this case and that her report was inaccurate in this respect, see Dec. 4 Transcript, at 70-71, 76. Virtually by definition, then, Carlson failed to “reliably appl[y] the principles and methods” in question “to the facts of this ease.” Fed.R.Evid. 702(d); see also United States v. McDaniels, 2014 WL 2609693, at *5 (E.D.Pa. June 11, 2014) (disqualifying handwriting expert who purported to apply ACE-V method but who failed to provide evidence that she had actually done so). Moreover, in her initial expert report, Carlson s