Citations
- 187 F. Supp. 3d 249
Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Table of Contents
I. BACKGROUND... 255
II. PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION. . .256
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION.. .257
A. The Pulnev Patents .. .257
1. “thread” and “threads” .. .261
2. “elongate[d] element[s]” and “elongate member” .. .260
3. “helix,” “helical,” “opposite senses of helix,” “opposite helical lines,” “common direction of winding,” and “opposite to the first direction”.. .261
4. “interlaced,” “interlacing pattern,” and “interwoven”... .266
5. “configured to slide with respect to one another” .. .268
6. “a shape and orientation substantially different from shape and orientation of any of the elongated elements”,. .271
7. “free ends” and “said first and second ends” .. .273
8.-“mesh structure” ., .275
9. “merging sections,” “bending- points,” “bend(s),” “connection elements,” “curvilinear segment,” and “circle arc segment” ...276
B. The Hankh Patents ... 280
1. “truncated conical segment”' and “trun-catéd conical portion” .. .280
2. “intermediate segment” and “second tubular segment” .. .282
3. “distal segment” and “third tubular segment” ...284 ...
4. “the steep angle varies along the truncated conical segment in the longitudinal direction,” “the steep angle increases along the truncated conical portion in the proximal direction,” “the. steep . angle varies along the second tubular segment,” and “the steep angle increases in the proximal direction along the second tubular segment” ... .287
5. “strand,” and “a first strand and a second strand” ... 289
6. “radial force” .. .290
7. “wound helically,” “wound in opposite directions,” and “a strand wound helically in a direction [different from the first direction]” ...292
8. “interbraided” ., .293
9. “are selected-to facilitate a placement of the tubular 101 wall at a junction of the esophagus with the stomach” .. .294
C. The Thompson Patent .. .296
1.“circumscribing the stent over substantially ■ the entirety of said axial length”., .296
2. “open weave construction” .. .297
3. “braided helical strands” .. .298
IV. CONCLUSION.. .300
V. APPENDIX: CLAIM CONSTRUCTION SUMMARY.. .300 .
A. Pulnev Patents ,.. 300
B. Hankh Patents ... 302
C. Thompson Patent .. .305
Plaintiffs Boston Scientific Corporation; Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.; Boston Scientific Limited; and Endovascular Technologies, Inc., bring this suit against Defendants Cook Incorporated; Wilson-Cook Medical Inc.; Cook Medical Incorporated; Cook Ireland Ltd.; Taewoong Medical Co., Ltd.; Chek-Med Systems, Inc. d/b/a GI Supply; Standard Sci-tech, Inc.; Endo-choice, Inc.; and Sewoon Medical Co., Ltd. for infringement of ten United. States Patents related to medical stents. Before me are the parties’ respective briefs regarding the construction of several claim terms in the patents.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege infringement of United States Patent Nos. 6,007,574 (“’574 Patent”); 6,309,415 (“ ’415 Patent”); 7,160,323 (“ ’323 Patent”); 7,419,502 (“ ’502 Patent”); 7,419,503 (“ ’5Ó3 Patent”); 7,736,386 (“ ’386 Patent”); 7,763,068 (“ ’068 Patent”); 6,533,-8Í0 (“ ’810 Patent”); 6,818,015 (“ ’015 Patent”); and 5,876,448 (“ ’448 Patent”). Both parties address the patents in groups characterized by common inventors and siihilar specifications, and both address the disputed terms as having the same meaning when used in any of the patents within a given group. The parties label the' ’574 Patent, the ’415 Patent, the ’323 Patent, the ’502 Patent, the ’503 Patent, the ’386 Patent, and the ’068 Patent as the “Pulnev Patents.” They similarly label the ’810 Patent and the ’015 Patent as the “Hankh Patents.” Finally, they label the ’448 Patent as the “Thompson Patent.” In light of this protocol among the parties, I adopt the same nomenclature and assumptions regarding claim construction within each group.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued the Pulnev Patents on various dates between December 28, 1999, and July 27, 2010. The Abstract of each of the Pulnev Patents explains that the Patent teaches:
[a] stent shaped as a three-dimensional body which is formed by interlaced threads (1) arranged in multistart turns of a helical line. The threads (1) are arranged in at least two groups (2 and 3) of the helical turns featuring opposite senses of helix. The stent ends are established by sections (5) where the turns of one helical line merge into those of the other helical line, said sections appearing as a single length of the thread CD-
Abstract, Pulnev Patents. The numbers in parentheses refer to labels on a set of five figures incorporated within the specifications of each of the Pulnev Patents.
The PTO issued the Hankh Patents on March 18, 2003, and November 16, 2004. The Abstract of each of the Hankh Patents explains that the Patent teaches:
[a] stent having a flexible self-expandable braided tubular wall having a proximal segment having an outer diameter, and a distal segment having an outer diameter smaller than the outer diameter of the proximal segment. An intermediate segment is formed between the proximal and distal segments, which forms a truncated cone of which the base is forming the proximal end of the intermediate segment and of which the top is forming the distal end of the intermediate segment. A covering layer is arranged within the tubular wall.
Abstract, Hank Patents. The specifications of the two Hankh Patents are materially identical.
The PTO issued the Thompson Patent on March 2, 1999. The Abstract of the Thompson Patent explains that the Patent teaches:
A radially self-expanding stent particularly suited for treating esophageal strictures, includes a medial region and proximal and distal cuffs having diameters greater than the medial region diameter when the stent is in the relaxed state. A silicone coating circumscribes the medial region, but the cuffs are not coated and retain their open weave construction.
Abstract, Thompson Patent. The Abstract also describes a “deployment device” and a “low durometer sleeve.” Id. The written description explains that “in accordance with the présent invention, a radially self-expanding stent can be positioned accurately at a desired treatment site within a body lumen, based on an accurate positioning of the interior tubing or other stent delivery means. The stent may be allowed to radially self-expand over the majority of its axial length, and yet be retracted if necessary or desired, all while its axial position with respect to the delivery tool is maintained.” Thompson Patent at 4:21-28.
II. PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
A patent must include “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). The construction of those claims “is exclusively within the province of the court.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). “As a general rule, claim terms should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to persons of skill in the art as of the effective date of the patent application.” Eon Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
To interpret the terms in a claim, “we look to the words of the claims themselves, the specification, the prosecution history, and any relevant extrinsic evidence.” Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co,, 653 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “[T]he claims themselves provide substantial- guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms.” Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009)(quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). “A patent’s specification provides necessary context for understanding the .claims,” and “sometimes the specification offers practically incontrovertible directions about claim meaning.” Id. The final piece of “intrinsic evidence,” the prosecution history, “can inform the meaning of-the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
Courts may also consider “extrinsic evidénce,” which is evidence outside of the patent and prosecution history,' including dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony. Id. at 1318. Although “extrinsic evidence can help; educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim terms to mean,” id. at 1319, it is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history.” Id: at 1318. Thus, extrinsic evidence is “unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1319.
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
A. The Pulnev Patents
1. “thread” and “threads”
The claims óf the ’574, ’323, ’502, ’503,-’386, and 068 Patents all refer to “thread” and/or “threads.” Plaintiffs contend that “thread” means “portion of wire” and “threads” means “portions of wire.” The Defendants 'contend that “thread” means “length of material that is not a monofilament” and “threads” means “two or more threads.”
In support of their proposed construction, Defendants offer definitions culled from several dictionaries. First, Textile Terms and Definitions 254 (8th ed. 1988) (¿‘Textile Terms”) defines “thread” as, inter alia, “[t]he result of twisting together in one or more operations two or more single, folded, or - cabled yarns.” Similarly, Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 1389 (1991) (“Webster’s College Dictionary”) defines “thread” as, “a fine cord of flax, cotton, .or other fibrous material spun .out to a considerable length, esp; when composed of two or more filaments twisted together.” Finally, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2381 (1993) (“Webster’s Third Dictionary”) defines “thread” as, “a filament, a group of filaments twisted together, or a filamentous length formed by spinning and twisting short textile fibers into a continuous strand.”
These definitions refer to the wrong art. The art relevant to the patents in this case is that of medical stents, not textile manufacturing. It is implausible that Plaintiffs’ patents claim only medical stents made of yarn. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Charles Taylor, has stated that the textile arts are an unrelated field and Defendants have offered no compelling rebuttal. Taylor Reply Affidavit ¶ 11. The Defendants point only to other terms related to the textile arts that are used in the Pulnev Patents-⅛ such as “interlaced” and “interwoven,” and to expert testimony, that such braided stents are created using machines similar to textile braiders. However, the use of terms like “interlaced” and “interwoven” does not indicate that the material that is interlaced or interwoven in stents is the same material that is interlaced or interwoven in textiles. Likewise, the fact that a medical professional making a stent may have used a tool common to the textile industry does riot change the lexicon x-elevant to this case from a medical one to one regarding textile manufacturing. A textile manufacturer does not have ordinary skill in the art of making medical stents because the two arts share a common tool. We would not look to a construction worker’s understanding of terms in a patent related to orthopaedic surgery simply because both professions use drills and saws, and the same is true in this case.
Dr. Taylor has further stated that he is unaware of any self-expanding stent that is not made of monofilaments and that' he believes that such a stent would be' insufficiently elastic and therefore ineffective. Taylor Reply Affidavit ¶¶ 4-5. Defendarits do not rebut this assertion. Defendants have thus failed to show that a person of skill in the art would believe that the term “thread” as used in the Pulnev Patents refers to a “length of material that is not a monofilament.”
By contrast, Plaintiffs’ argument that a “thread” is a “portion of wire” is rooted in the claims, specifications, and prosecution histories of the Pulnev Patents as well as in supporting extrinsic evidence in the form of expert opinion and relevant art.
The specification of the ’574 Patent teaches that in prior art the threads of a stent were often joined by “welding, soldering or other similar means”. See’574 Patent at 3:7-10 (“[IJnstead of joining the threads at both ends of the stent by welding, soldering or other similar means, [in the present invention] these ends are connected by curvilinear segments made of the same piece of thread.”). Welding, soldering, and similar means are techniques for joining pieces of metal, such as wire, not fibrous material, such as yarn. The specification thus teaches that “threads” are made of a metallic monofilament.
The specification of the ’574 Patent also discusses prior art in which “[t]he thread is made of a material featuring the SME.” ’574 Patent at 2:38-39. The specification defines SME as a “shape memory effect.” Id. at 1:63. Dr. Taylor explains in his affidavit that shape memory effect “is a term generally associated with certain metallic alloys.” Taylor Reply Affidavit ¶9. Similarly, the specification discusses a preferred embodiment of the invention in which “the stent is made of a material possessing, a SME or of a - superelastic material.” ’574 Patent at 4:16-18. Dr. Taylor states that both SME and superelastic “are terms that are almost always associated with various metallic alloys.” He further explains that metallic alloys “are types of materials that would be used .to form ‘wire.’ ” Taylor Reply Affidavit ¶ 9.
The ■ patent prosecution history of- at least one of the Pulnev Patents, also supports Plaintiffs’, interpretation. During the prosecution of the ’574 Patent, the paten: tee argued:
In contrast to [the] Palmaz [prior art], at least some elongated helical members ... of the present invention merge into each other, that is at least some selected pairs of these elements are made from a single piece of wire, or a thread, and that elements of each selected pair are joined together by a connecting portion of the same thread.
(emphasis added). Van Eman Decl., pg. 81. The patentee thus referred to wire and thread interchangeably.
The Defendants contend that this portion of the prosecution history of the ’574 Patent “confirms that the applicants knew perfectly well the distinction between ‘wire’ and ‘thread.’ ” I disagree. If the applicants had intended to treat the “single piece of wire” and the “thread” as separate and distinct entities, they would have completed the phrase “elements of each selected pair are joined together by a connecting portion of the same ...” with “váre or thread,” not, as they did, only the single word “thread.” The applicants used the phrase “connecting portion of the same thread” to refer back to the previous phrase “a single piece of wire, or a thread.” The sentence structure demonstrates that “a single piece of wire, or a thread” was not used to describe two separate materials, but instead two alternative labels for the same material.
Defendants argue that the manner in which the specification of the ’574 Patent distinguishes prior art stents indicates that “thread” does not mean “wire.” The specification states:
One more stent embodiment presents its construction as a hollow tubular element established by the coils of a wire or the turns of a strip. The construction of such a stent is more elastic since the stent is deformable both radially and axially.
However, with this stent it is not always possible to provide an optimum value of the pitch of spring coils or of strip turns because with too a large pitch a uniform pressure distribution over the surface being prosthesized is affected, which may result in partial vessel stenosis, whereas in the case of too a small pitch stent implantation may cause hyperpla-sia of the intima of the vascular wall in the organ under reconstruction, as well as early thrombotic complications.
’574 Patent at 1:65-2:11. Defendants argue that the use of the word “wire” in the specification indicates that the word “thread” in the claims- does not mean “wire.” ■ '
To the extent that the Defendants cite to this portion of the specification in support of the proposition that all wire stents were disclaimed, it is clear from the specification that it was not the wire material— the problematic stent embodiment could also be made of “the turns of a. strip”— that the patentees distinguished but instead the form taken by the wire or strip in that particular embodiment. To the extent that Defendants cite to this portion of the specification in order to argue that the patentees knew the word wire and “[i]f the patentees wanted to claim a stent made from wire, they could have done so,” this is not a compelling argument. If “thread” and “wire” are used interchangeably in the field, then the choice tó use one synonym does not disclaim the other.
Plaintiffs’ construction, however, does not interpret “a thread” to mean “a wire” but rather “a portion of wire.:” The claims indicate that the term should be construed to mean a “portion” of wire because of the way in which the claims relate the terms “thread” and “threads.” Claim 1 of the ’323 Patent teaches “a three-dimensional body whose surface is formed by at least two groups of turns made of interlaced elastic threads,” ’323 Patent at 6:32-34, and Claim 2, which is dependant on Claim 1, teaches that “the turns of all helical lines are made of a single segment of the thread,” id. at 6:42-43. By including the word “portion,” the Plaintiffs’ construction accommodates the language of - the claims teaching an invention that may simultaneously be composed of both multiple “threads” and one “thread” by interpreting the invention to be composed of smaller “portions of thread” within one larger “portion of thread.”
Plaintiffs bolster the intrinsic evidence with extrinsic evidence in the form of an affidavit by their expert, Dr. Taylor, who states his opinion that “threads” refers to portions of wire because self-expanding stents are generally made from wire. Taylor Affidavit ¶ 13. He supports this opinion with three articles relating to self-expanding metal stent designs, each of which refers to stents made of “a single thread of ... nitinol wire.” See Ko, G. et al, Obstruction of the Lacrimal System: Treatment with a Covered, Retrievable, Expandable Nitinol Stent versus a Lacrimal Polyurethane Stent, 227 Radiology 270, 270 (2003); Song, H. et al., Covered Retrievable Expandable Nitinol Stents in Patients with Benign Esophageal Strictures: Initial Experience, 217 Radiology 551, 551 (2000); Jung, G. et al., Malignant Gastroduodenal Obstructions: Treatment by Means of a Covered Expandable Metallic Stent-Ini-tial Experience, 216 Radiology 758, 758 (2000).
Defendants do not refute Dr. Taylor’s assertion. Instead, the Defendants challenge the relevance of Dr. Taylor’s expert opinion. The Defendants contend that “Dr. Taylor does not even attempt to provide the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art in 1993, nor has he demonstrated that he is qualified to even render an opinion on this point” because he “has not demonstrated that he himself had any experience with stents, or, indeed, any medical device as of 1993.”
However, Defendants have not demonstrated that the understanding in the relevant field of the term “thread” changed between 1993 and the present, nor presented any expert testimony that the meaning of the term was anything other than the definition Dr. Taylor advanced. While Dr. Taylor’s affidavit would have been even more convincing had he expressly and directly addressed the meaning of thread in the field as of 1993, his statements regarding the term’s meaning thereafter remain relevant to its past meaning, and Defendants have not raised any challenge to undermine that relevance. I therefore decline Defendants’ invitation to disregard Dr. Taylor’s affidavit and his opinions.
In light of the evidence that the Plaintiffs have marshaled from the claims, specifications, and patent prosecution histories of the Pulnev Patents, as well as the extrinsic evidence that they present in support of their interpretation, I construe “thread(s)” to mean “portion(s) of wire.”
2. “elongate[d] elements]” and “elongate member”
Both parties agree that the terms “elongated elements]” and “elongate member” should have the same meaning as “thread(s).” In large part, I agree, because the elongated elements are composed of thread. See’574 Patent at 6:28. However, not every thread in the claimed inventions makes up an elongated element.
The term “elongated element[s]” is used only to describe the threads making up the side surface of the stent. The term “thread,” by contrast, is used to describe all portions of wire in the stent. For example, in Claim 1 of the ’574 Patent, the “side surface” is described as “being formed by two groups ... of elongated elements.” ’574 Patent at 6:25-27. The claim also describes “connecting elements” that are formed as “curvilinear segment[s].” These “connecting elements are described as distinct from the “elongated elements]” and yet also made of thread. ’574 Patent at 6:44-49.
In light of my construction of “thread(s)” and the necessary distinction between “elongated elements” and “connecting elements,” I construe “elongate[d] element^]” and “elongate member” to mean “portion(s) of wire forming the side surface.”
3. “helix,” “helical,” “opposite senses of helix,” “opposite helical lines,” “common direction of winding,” and “opposite to the first direction”
The claims in each of the Pulnev Patents incorporate one or both of the terms “helix” and “helical.” For example, numerous claims in the Pulnev Patents teach threads with a “helical configuration” or threads that are “arranged along helical lines having opposite senses of helix.” See, e.g., ’574 Patent at 6:29; ’323 Patent at 6:34-35; ’502 Patent at 6:38-39. Plaintiffs contend that “helix” should be construed to mean “spiral form or structure” and that “helical” should be construed to mean “approximating a helix.” Defendants contend that both terms should be construed to mean “a smooth, continuously-spiraling, three dimensional curve that lies on a cylinder or cone and follows a path having one of either a consistent left-handed or right-handed screwing motion.”
Plaintiffs argue that language within the claims supports their construction because many of the asserted claims require that threads be “arranged along helical lines having opposite senses of helix.” See, e.g., ’323 Patent at 6:34-35. Plaintiffs contend that “[s]uch language makes clear that a complete helix extending from one end of the stent to the other in a ‘continuously spiraling path,’ as alleged by Defendants, is not required by the claim” because “[a] thread can be ‘arranged along helical lines’ without continuing along the same line indefinitely.” This argument fails because it does not address the relevant term. Even if threads can be “arranged along helical lines” without continuing along the same lines indefinitely, the modification applies to what it means to be “arranged,” and how long an “arrangement” must continue, instead of what it means to be “helical.” The phrase “arranged along helical lines” does not illuminate the definition of “helical.”
Defendants’ argument based on the claims is similarly unavailing. Defendants .contend that the claims support their construction .because many of the asserted claims refer to the threads in helical configurations as having a “direction of winding,” see, e.g., ’574 Patent at 6:30 or “having opposite senses of helix,” see, e.g., ’323 Patent at 6:36. Their contention is also based on similar terms in the specification, which describe “turns of a helical line and ... at least two groups featuring opposite sense of the helix line.” ’574 Patent at 2:65-3:3.' Defendants argue that a path would not have a “sense” or a “direction” unless it is actually wound into a helix. This argument is conclusory. A line need not be “smooth” and the spiral need not be “continuous” to be considered a spiral or for the spiral to have a general “direction.”
Defendants additionally contend that their construction must be adopted because U.S. Patent No. 4,733,665 (“Palmaz Patent”), cited in the background section in each of the Pulnev Patents, see, e.g., ’574 Patent at 1:34, distinguishes between a “helical” pattern and a “zig-zag” pattern, see Palmaz Patent at 1:30-52. This argument fails for two reasons. First, although the Pulnev Patents refer to the Palmaz Patent, they do not state that terms used in the Pulnev Patents must be construed in the same manner in which they would be construed in the context of the Palmaz Patent. Instead, they merely distinguish the prior art presented in the Palmaz Patent (without referring to helices at all). Second, the Palmaz Patent itself does not define “helical” or explicitly state whether a form “approximating a helix” would be “helical” under the claims of the patent. A line could approximate a helix, instead of a zig-zag, without being “smooth” and “continuous.” The Palmaz Patent does not, on its face, require adoption of the construction that Defendants proposed.
Finally, Defendants contend that because each of the five figures presented in the Pulnev patents depicts a helix featuring a continually spiraling path without zig-zags or hooks, that every “helical” line under the claims must also feature those characteristics. However, each of the Pul-nev Patents describes these figures only as “some illustrative embodiments” of the invention, see, e.g., ’323 Patent at 4:65-66. They are not described as representing every possible embodiment. “[I]t is improper to read a limitation from the specification into the claims.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed.Cir.2004). “[M]ere inferences drawn from the description of an embodiment of the invention cannot serve to limit claim terms,” Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 992 (Fed.Cir.1999), and I will not use inferences drawn from the diagrammatic description of particular embodiments to limit the claim terms of the Pulnev Patents.
While Plaintiffs do not point to particular components of the claims or the specification in support of their own proposed construction, they do argue that two of the illustrative figures demonstrate the inaccuracy of Defendants’ proposed definitions. They contend that, based on these illustrations, the term “helical” as used in the claims cannot limit a helical configuration to either a “curve that lies on a cylinder or cone” ór a “smooth, continuously spiraling” curve.
First, Plaintiffs argue that Figure 3 indicates that a “helical” configuration need not be a “curve that lies on a cylinder or cone.” Figure 3 depicts lines that are arranged as if around a sphere and not as if around a cylinder or cone: Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ definition is therefore too limited.
Defendants respond that the ’415 Patent distinguishes between “spherical” and “helical” embodiments. Claim 1 of the ’415 Patent teaches stent defined by a single elongate element without specifying the shape of the elongate element or of the body of the stent. ’415 Patent at 6:26-31. Claim 2 teaches “[t]he device of claim 1, wherein said elongate element follows a helical line.” Id. at 6:32-33. Claim 9 teaches “[t]he device of claim 1, said body having a first end, a second end and a plurality of merging sections defining each of said first and second ends.” Id. at 6:50-52. Claim 13 teaches “[t]he device of claim 9, wherein a central portion of said body has a cross-sectional profile that is much larger than a cross-sectional profile of said ends of said body.” Id. at 6:60-62. Claim 14 teaches “[t]he device of claim 13, wherein said ends of said body are joinecj to provide the body with a generally spherical configuration.” Id. at 63-65. Defendants argue that the separate language and embodiments in Claims 2 and 14 differentiate the spherical and helical configurations, I disagree.
Claim 2 teaches any embodiment of Claim 1 in which the “elongate element follows a helical line.” Without conclusorily accepting Defendants’ definition of “helical,” I must consider that, among other embodiments, the description in Claim 2 could include an embodiment of Claim 1 in which the “body” has “a generally spherical configuration.” Similarly, Claim 14 teaches a variety of embodiments of Claim 1 in which the “body” has “a generally spherical configuration.” Therefore, I must also consider that the description in Claim 14 could include an embodiment of Claim 1 in which the “elongate element follows' a helical line.”; It is possible that the two claims are distinct but not mutually exclusive—that is, while each is applicable to some embodiments that the other does not describe, certain embodiments are fairly described by both. Thus, the claims in the ’415 Patent do not refute the Plaintiffs’ contentions that a “helical line” can lie on a sphere as well as a cylinder or cone.
. By contrast, the claims in the ’574 Patent do clarify the relationship between a “helical” line and a spherical body. Claim 1 of the ’574 Patent teaches that the side surface of the stent is formed of elongated elements “extending in a helical configuration.” ’574 Patent at 6:29. Every other claim in the ’574 Patent is dependent on Claim 1. Thus, the wires in all embodiments of the claiméd invention extend in a “helical” configuration, including the wires depicted in Figure 3, which the specification describes as an “illustrative embodiment ]”, id. at 4:51-52, and in which body of the stent is spherical. .The specification of the ’574 Patent clarifies that “helical” lines can lie on a sphere and therefore cannot.be limited to those that lie “on. a cylinder or cone.”
Plaintiffs’ second argument, based on Figure 5, is less compelling. The Plaintiffs point to Figure 5, which each of the Pulnev Patents describes as depicting “a stent embodiment .., provided with the additionally interwoven threads 1 on a section 8, which features a higher interlacing density of the threads 1.” See, e.g., ’415 Patent at 5:54-58. .The numbers “1” and “8” refer to labeled sections of Figure 5:
The Plaintiffs contend that the interwoven threads in Figure 5 include bends along the stent body and that therefore the threads are not “continuously spiraling” as the Defendants’ proposed definition requires.
Defendants contend that the “additionally interwoven threads” do not need to follow a helical path and therefore their configuration is irrelevant to the definition of “helical.” I disagree. Claim 5 of the ’574 Patent, utilizing the same identifying label “8” as the diagram, teaches “[t]he stent as set forth in claim 1, wherein a portion (8) of the side surface is provided with third and fourth groups of the elongated elements, the elongated elements of the third and the fourth groups being formed by an elastic thread and extending in a helical configuration along a longitudinal axis of the body .... ” ’574 Patent at 6:58-63 (emphasis added). Thus the elongated elements making up the “additionally interwoven threads” as described in Claim 5 must indeed extend “in a helical configuration.”
However, a close look at Figure 5 indicates that Plaintiffs’ argument is nonetheless misleading. Plaintiffs point to the bends at the ends of the helical lines, which connect two lines spiraling in opposite directions. Plaintiffs present no reason to believe that these connecting elements are considered to be part of the “helical configuration.” The bends do not extend “along a longitudinal axis of the body.” Id. at 6:62-63. Claim 21 of the ’502 Patent describes a stent with additionally interwoven elements in which “free ends of the elements are joined to the elements that form the bending points and/or to one another,” ’502 Patent at 7:40-42, indicating that the bends at the end of the additionally interwoven elements are not considered to be a part of the elements themselves but instead are connectors. Plaintiffs’ argument based on Figure 5 is therefore unconvincing.
In addition to the intrinsic evidence above, both parties present dictionary definitions in support of their respective proposed constructions. Plaintiffs point out that The American Heritage College Dictionary 642-43 (4th ed. 2002) (“American Heritage Dictionary”) defines “helical” as “[h]aving a shape approximating that of a helix,” and defines “helix” as “a spiral form or structure.” Defendants point out that the same dictionary provides an alternate definition of helical as “[o]f or having the shape of a helix, spiral” and an alternate definition of “helix” as “[a] three-dimensional curve that lies on a cylinder or cone, so that its angle to a plane perpendicular to the axis is constant.” Defendants gather similar definitions from Webster’s Third Dictionary 1050 (defining “helical” as “relating to, or having the form, of, a helix” and “something helical in form (as in a coil extension spring)” and defining “helix” as “something spiral in form,” “a coil formed by winding wire around a uniform tube,” and “a curve traced on a cylinder by the rotation of a point crossing its right sections at a constant oblique angle”) arid Webster’s College Dictionary 621-22 (defining “helical” as “pertaining to or having the form of a helix; spiral” and defining “helix” as, inter alia, “a spiral” and “the curve formed by a straight line drawn on a plane when that plane is wrapped around a cylindrical surface of any kind, esp. a right circular cylinder, as the curve of a screw”).
Given the lack of uniformity áiriong the definitions, and the lack of reasoning regarding why any one of these definitions ought to be preferred over another, I cannot draw any conclusions from these dictionary entries: The Federal Circuit has noted a common difficulty with the use of general dictionaries in construing technical terms: “it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321. That is precisely the trouble here. None of the dictionaries indicates which meaning is appropriate in the context of medical stents as discussed in the Pulnev Patents.
Plaintiffs offer the opinion of their expert, Dr. Taylor, to address the issue. Dr. Taylor states in his affidavit that “[i]n the stent field, we do not use the term ‘helical’ to mean that the wire forming the stent must continue in a single direction along the entire length of the stent. Rather, ‘helical’ could refer to a variety .of configurations.” Taylor Reply Affidavit ¶ 12. Dr. Taylor’s affidavit supports a broader construction of the terrris “helix” and “helical” than that provided by Defendants.
Defendants contend that Dr. Taylor’s statements should be discounted in light of his affidavit submitted in support of Plaintiffs in a separate matter before Judge Stearns. In Orbunsneich Medical Co. Ltd., BVI v. Boston Scientific Corporation, No. 1:09-cv-10962, Dkt. No. 110, Dr. Taylor submitted an affidavit stating:
For a “helical segment” to be a natural constituent of the stent, one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the patents-in-suit were filed would recognize that such a segment would have the mechanical properties of a helix. I do not believe that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing would understand the phrase “helical segments” as it is used in the asserted patents to mean any arbitrary line drawn around the stent in a helical direction. In fact, it was well known in the art at the time that such artificial paths having a helical direction could be drawn on nearly every stent ever designed.
Ex. EE, Taylor Affidavit ¶ 8. In its brief in the case before Judge Stearns, Boston Scientific argued that the “mechanical properties” of a helix must characterize a segment in order to make a segment helical, because otherwise a shape approximating a helix could be drawn atop the wires of almost any stent. Boston Scientific provided diagrams demonstrating how such patterns could be drawn.
Dr. Taylor’s affidavit in Orbunsneich may undermine the extremely loose definition proposed by Plaintiffs in this case (defining “helical” as merely “approximating a helix” (emphasis added)), but it does not contradict the affidavit that Dr. Taylor has submitted here. Dr. Taylor did not state in the Orbunsneich affidavit that a “helical” wire must continue in a single direction along the entire length of the stent. Even in its brief in Orbunsneich, Boston Scientific did not contend that the “mechanical properties” of a helix required a helical line to advance smoothly, continuously spiral, lie on a cylinder or cone, or follow a path having a consistent left-handed or right-handed screwing motion. Boston Scientific cited to the prosecution of a related European Patent in which Orbusn-eich had claimed a “substantially continuous winding ... advancing substantially helically along a longitudinal axis of [a] tubular body.” Ex. EE, p. 8. Boston Scientific did not quibble with the requirement of “substantiality.”
Dr. Taylor’s opinion that continuous winding in one direction is not a part of the understanding of “helical” in the field of medical stents is due some deference, particularly in light of the briefing submitted and prosecution histories discussed in Orbunsneich. While Dr. Taylor’s affidavit in Orbunsneich undermines the term “approximating” as employed in Plaintiffs’ proposed definition, it does not undermine the general proposition that he expresses, namely, that in the field of medical stents, “ ‘helical’ could refer to a variety of configurations” and is not limited to the narrow definition proposed by Defendants.
Although the evidence in the record regarding the meaning of “helix” and “helical” is notably thin, I construe “helix” to mean “a spiral form” and “helical” to mean “substantially in the form of a spiral.” Defendants have not shown that the particular requirements that they have incorporated into their definition are justified by the intrinsic or extrinsic evidence. The term “substantially” remedies the difficulty that Defendants have raised regarding Plaintiffs’ proposed definition without contradicting the only expert opinion presented.
In light of these constructions, I also reject Defendants’ proposed definitions for “opposite senses of helix,” “opposite. helical lines,” “common [first/second] direction of winding,” and “opposite to the first direction.” Each of these proposed definitions incorporates the idea that a helical line must smoothly and continuously curve in a consistent screwing motion. Instead, I construe the terms as the Plaintiffs have proposed. I construe “opposite senses of helix” and “opposite helical lines” to mean “one helical direction and the other helical direction.” I construe “common [first/second] direction of winding” to mean “common [first/second] direction of winding.” I construe “opposite to the first direction” to mean “in the other helical direction.” In light of the definition of “helical” as I have construed it, these terms do not require further construction.,
4. “interlaced,” “interlacing pattern,” and “interwoven”
. The claims in each of the Pulnev Patents incorporate one or more of the terms “interlaced,” “interlacing pattern,” and “interwoven.” Plaintiffs suggest that “interlaced” should mean “interwoven,” “interlacing pattern”- should mean “interwoven pattern,” and “interwoven” should mean “woven.” Defendants suggest that all three terms mean “arrangement in which a length of thread continuing in a direction passes alternatively over and under each successively . encountered length of thread.”
The parties support their- proposed definitions of “interlaced” and “interlacing” with citations to various dictionaries. Plaintiffs note that The American Heritage Dictionary 723 defines “interlace” as “[t]o connect by or as if by lacing together; interweave.” Defendants cite to three die-tionaries, (1) Webster’s College Dictionary 703 defining “interlace” as “to unite or arrange ... so as to intercross one another, passing alternatively over and under; intertwine”; (2) Webster’s Third Dictionary 1179 defining “interlace” as “to unite by or as if by lacing together,” “to vary or diversify by alternation, interpolation, or intermixture,” and “to cross one another as if woven together”; and (3) Textile Terms 255 defining “thread interlacing” as “[t]he arrangement of the warp and weft threads over and under one another,” providing a note with an example in which the warp is “passing over three, under two, over one, and under two weft threads” and defines “weave, plain” as “[t]he simplest of all weave interlacings in which the odd warp threads operate over one and under one weft thread throughout the fabric with the even warp threads reversing this order to under one, over one, throughout.”
These definitions—even those offered by Defendants—support Plaintiffs’ proposed definitions and refute Defendants’. As discussed above, see supra Section 111(A)(1), textile dictionaries refer to an unrelated art, and are therefore unhelpful in construing the meaning of terms in a patent for medical stents. Furthermore, Defendants’ cited definition in Textile Terms only includes the “one over, one under” pattern as “the simplest of all weave interlacings.” The other dictionary definitions do not limit interlaced patterns to that particular pattern. And none of the definitions includes Defendants’ requirement that the length of thread must continue in one direction.
Nor do the intrinsic records of the Pul-nev Patents support the specific pattern advocated by Defendants. Neither the claims nor the specifications require that the “thread passes alternatively- over and under each successively encountered length of thread.” Defendants argue that if the lines did not alternately pass over and under each other, the resulting arrangement would not be interlaced or interwoven helical lines but instead one set of helical lines set on top of another. Defendants overlook the multiplicity of potential patterns that might be described as interwoven or interlaced patterns, many of which do not follow the “one over, one under” pattern.
Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Taylor further illuminates the meaning of “interlace,” “interweave,” or “weave” in the field of medical stents. In his affidavit,, he explains that “[s]tents are known to have a variety of different weave patterns, and such patterns do not uniformly require ‘thread(s)’ forming the stents to continue in one direction without hooks,” but instead “can include combinations of hooks, loops, and crossing portions.” Taylor Reply Affidavit ¶ 15. He states that stents are “made using a variety of techniques, such as weaving, braiding, ‘knitting, laser cutting[, and] stamping”' and that “[t]he term ‘interwoven,’ as used in stent technology, identifies the method by which the stent was made, but does not imply any specific weaving pattern.” Id. at ¶ 16. Dr. Taylor provides as an example a stent sold by Defendant TaeWoong that is described as including “D weaving technology.” The pattern in this stent includes wires hooking onto one another and does not conform to Defendants’ proposed definition of “interweaving.” Id. at ¶ 18.
In light of the dictionary definitions, Dr. Taylor’s affidavit, and Defendants’ failure to tether the limitations that they seek to impose tó any part of the intrinsic or extrinsic evidence, I construe “interlacing” and “interlaced” as “interwoven.” Although Defendants protest that this definition “do[es] not clarify the actual meaning of the disputed' term[ ],” they have not raised any intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to justify any limitations on the phrase “interlacing pattern.” Where no limitations are justified by the evidence, I will not import them in order to clarify a term that Defendants have not shown is in any need of clarification.
I will not, however, adopt Plaintiffs’ proposed definition of “interwoven” as simply “woven.” Plaintiffs have noted that the specifications of the Pulnev Patents use “interlacing” and “interwoven” interchangeably. See, e.g., ’574 Patent at 5:52-58 (describing Figure 5 as presenting a stent embodiment “provided with additionally interwoven threads ... on a section ..., which features a higher interlacing density of the threads ,... ”). Defendants similarly define “interlacing” and “interwoven” identically. Where “interlacing” and “interlaced” are defined as “interwoven,” it is a puzzle to me why Plaintiffs would seek to define “interwoven” as “woven,” so that the terms are no longer synonymous. Neither party has demonstrated that the term "interwoven” requires construction. I therefore decline to construe it.
5. “configured to slide with respect to one another”
Several of the Pulnev Patents teach that the crossing portions of the threads or elongate elements are “configured to slide with respect to one another.” See, e.g., ’502 Patent at 6:43^45. Plaintiffs contend that the phrase means “not fixedly secured with respect to one another.” Defendants contend that it means “configured to move along the length with respect to one another.” The primary point of disagreement between the .parties’ proposals is whether threads “configured to slide with respect to one another” would include threads that merely rotate or pivot with respect to one another.
The specifications of the Pulnev Patents indicate that Defendants’ construction is unduly narrow. Each specification states:
In the case of longitudinal stent deformation the threads slide with respect to one another, with the result that the angle of their mutual arrangement changes, the stent diameter decreases and becomes equal in length. Hence the stent diameter is much reduced, whereas its length changes but rather incon-siderably.
See, e.g., ’574 Patent at 3:29-35. The specifications describe one situation in which “the threads slide with respect to one another,” explaining that when the stent lengthens, the angles between the threads change so that the stent’s diameter is minimized. Sliding is therefore not necessarily characterized by or limited to movement along the length of the threads. Pivoting or rotating, as the threads do when the angles between them change during longitudinal stent deformation, is sufficient to satisfy the “configuration to slide” limitation. Defendants’ limitation of “along the length” is unwarranted in light of the words of the Pulnev Patents’ specifications.
While this is the only part of the specifications addressing the term, both parties draw from prosecution history—in particular, the prosecution of the ’415 Patent—in attempts to bolster their proposed definitions. During prosecution, the applicants added the phrase “wherein portions of said elongate element cross to define said interlacing pattern, and crossing portions being configured to slide with respect to one another” in order to resolve the patent examiner’s objection that the claims were anticipated by the Palmaz Patent. Plaintiffs note that the Palmaz Patent states that “it is preferable that the plurality of elongate members ... are fixedly secured to one another where the elongate members ... intersect with one another.” Pal-maz Patent at 6:36-40. Plaintiffs thus argue that because “configured to slide with respect to one another” must have been added to distinguish the Palmaz Patent with regard to that characteristic, the phrase must mean “not fixedly secured with respect to one another.”
Plaintiffs disregard a basic rule of claim construction. “The problem with [their] argument is that there is no principle of patent law that the scope of a surrender of subject matter during prosecution is limited to what is absolutely necessary to avoid a prior art reference that was the basis for an examiner’s rejection,” Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1366, 1361 (Fed.Cir.2005), such as surrendering only stents in which the elongated elements are “not fixedly secured with respect to one another” here. “To the contrary, it frequently happens that patentees surrender more through amendment than may have been absolutely necessary to avoid particular prior art. In such cases, we have held the patentees to the scope of what they ultimately claim.” Id. at 1361-62.
The question here is not merely what was distinguished during the prosecution of the ’415 Patent, but rather instead what the phrase “configured to slide with respect to one another” means in the context of the Pulnev Patents. While the phrase must be construed to exclude stents in which the elongated elements are fixedly secured to one another in order to avoid the characteristic that was disclaimed, it need not be construed to exclude only these types of stents. The prosecution history of the ’415 Patent shows that Plaintiffs’ proposal is a necessary component of the phrase’s construction but does not show that it is sufficient.
Defendants for their part attempt to support their definition with a misinterpretation of the ’415 patent prosecution history. Defendants point to diagrams contained within the specification of the Pal-maz Patent labeled Figures 1A and IB. The figures show elongated elements that pivot with respect to one another:
The Defendants contend that based on this, the applicants .could only distinguish Palmaz by claiming that the elements move lengthwise with respect to one another; mere pivoting or rotating is insufficient. .
It is unclear from Figure 1A and IB whether the depicted elongated elements are fixedly secured to one another. Defendants point out that the specification only states that “it is preferable” that a plurality of the elongate members are fixedly secured to one another, Palmaz Patent at 6:36-40, which, of course, does not specifically exclude embodiments in which the elongate members are not fixedly secured. However, no part of the Palmaz Patent specifically includes the limitation that the elongate members must not be fixedly secured to one another. Thus, if Plaintiffs’ construction is adopted, and the phrase is interpreted to mean only “not fixedly secured with respect to one another,” it would have resolved the anticipation objection posed by the patent examiner.
Defendants also attempt to support their more limited construction of the phrase by reference to a dictionary. They cite Webster’s Third Dictionary 2142, which defines “to slide” as “to go with a smooth continuous motion: glide.” However, this definition does not require that the smooth movement be linear. Nothing in the definition excludes a smooth continuous rotation or pivot. Moreover, even if the definition did 'limit “sliding” in that way, it would exclude the more general use of “configured to slide” in the description of longitudinal stent deformation included within the specification of each of the Pulnev Patents (described above). The dictionary definition cannot be used to exclude something impliedly included by the specifications. Vitronics Corp. v, Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed.Cir.1996)(extrinsic evidence may not “contradict the import of other parts of the specification.”).
In light of the specifications, which indicate that rotating and pivoting are included among the ways that a thread may slide with respect to another thread; in light of the prosecution history of the ’415 Patent, which indicates that elements configured to slide with respect to one another may not be fixedly secured to one another; and in light of the general definition of “to slide,” which requires a smooth continuous motion, my construction is a combination of the parties’ pro-posáis. I construe “configured to slide with respect to, one another” to mean “configured to move in a smooth continuous motion with respect to one another without being fixedly secured to one another.”
6, “a shape, and orientation substantially different from shape .and orientation of any of the elongated elements”
Claim 1 of the, ’574 Patent teaches that the elements connecting the helical elongated elements are each formed as a curvilinear segment having “a shape and orientation substantially different from shape and orientation of any of the elongated elements.” ’574 Patent at 6:44-49. Plaintiffs contend that this phrase means a “a shape and orientation substantially different than that of any portions of wire along the body?’ Defendants contend that .the phrase cannot be construed and, thus, should be invalid for indefiniteness.
Patent law has always required a patentee to describe his invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in terms that are “precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed,” and definite enough to clearly spell out the design and use of the patented product. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., — U.S.—, 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2129, 189 L.Ed.2d 37 (2014). In the past, the § 112 definiteness inquiry would uphold a patent “so long as the claim is ‘amenable to construction,’ and the claim, as construed, is not ‘insolubly ambiguous.’” Id. at 2124 (citing Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898-99 (Fed.Cir.2013), rev’d, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2120, 189 L.Ed.2d 37 (2014)). In Nautilus, the Supreme Court reconfigured this standard to provide a better fit for the wording and intention of § 112. The new standard holds “that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, 134 S.Ct. at 2124.
Although the new Nautilus standard may invalidate some particularly ambiguous patents that may have survived the previous test, the relevant inquiry remains the same: whether 'or not “a skilled artisan at the time of the patent application” would construe the patent’s claims with sufficient definiteness to understand the “scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Id., 134 S.Ct. at 2129-30. The defendants urge a reading of Nautilus that heavily discounts the input of any extrinsic evidence (such as expert testimony), and must rely on what is contained within the four corners of the patent application and its, prosecution history. However, “claim construction calls for ‘the necessarily sophisticated, analysis of the whole document,’ and may turn on evaluations of expert testimony.” Id. (quoting Markman, 517 U.S. at 389, 116 S.Ct. 1384). To understand whether .a “skilled, artisan” working in. the relevant field would understand the scope of a given patent, expert testimony should not be considered extrinsic evidence with little value; to the contrary, it is essential to understand what meaning such a person would take from the wording of the patent’s claims and specifications.
The Defendants have argued .that three phrases should be found indefinite under the new Nautilus standard: the phrase construed in this section, the phrase “radial force” in Section 111(B)(6), and the phrase “diameters are selected to facilitate a placement of the tubular wall at a junction of the esophagus with the stomach”, analyzed in Section 111(B)(9). Each phrase requires renewed analysis under the new standard. But the new standard does not change the end result with regard to any of the phrases in question. I will take up each argument in turn in its relevant section.
As to the phrase at issue here, first, Defendants argue that the word “orientation” is ambiguous and cannot be construed. f)efendants state that the word “orientation” is a relative term, citing its definition' in Webster’s College Dictionary 954 as “position in relation to true north, to points on the compass, or to a specific place or object.” Defendants contend that, by contrast to the term’s definition, the claim language “requires ‘orientation’ to be a measure of a specific characteristic (other than ‘shape’) of the curvilinear segment independent of the elongate elements rather than a relative comparison between the curvilinear segment and the elongated elements.” The argument appears to be that because the ’574 Patent does not designate the specific orientations of any of these elements, the meaning of “orientation” cannot be construed. I do not find it to be so ambiguous.
The claim requires the segment to have an orientation “substantially different” from that of any of the elongated elements. The claim does not state that the curvilinear or the elongated elements must be oriented in a specific way. It only requires that the orientation of the curvilinear segment must be substantially different from the orientations of the elongated elements. This is a relative definition and relative definitions are not now invalid under the relevant standard. In the wake of Nautilus, the Federal Circuit clarified that it does not hold that “terms of degree are inherently indefinite. Claim language employing terms of degree has long been found definite where it provided enough certainty to one of skill in the art when read in the context of the invention.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2014) (citation omitted). A reading of the phrase in question here would lead one skilled in the relevant field to understand the intended relative position of the elements in question. Defendants’ characterization otherwise contorts the language beyond recognition.
Second, Defendants contend that the word “any” is ambiguous because “[t]he intrinsic evidence nowhere clarifies whether this means that the curvilinear segment must merely be different than any one particular helical elongated element or, rather, different from any (i.e., all) helical elongated elements.” This contention also seeks to introduce unnecessary confusion into the claim language. The American Heritage Dictionary 64 defines “any” as “[o]ne, some, every or all without specification.” “Any” does not refer to a particular element. Defendants provide no rationale for any other meaning. If “any” is read to mean that the curvilinear segments must have a different shape and orientation than one elongated element, the claim would not make sense. However, if “any” is read to mean that the curvilinear segments must have a different shape and orientation than all of the elongated elements, the meaning is clear. The fact that “any” can somehow be rendered to suggest two alternative definitions, one coherent and one nonsensical, does not justify a declaration that the term is indefinite, as Defendants suggest. Rather, it logically leads to the conclusion that the definition leading to a coherent reading must be the correct one. It is therefore unambiguous that the phrase refers to a curvilinear segment with a shape and orientation substantially different from that of any (i.e., all) of the elongated elements.
Third, Defendants contend that because the intrinsic record does not teach how to measure the orientation of any of the elements, the term cannot be construed. However, Defendants do not present expert testimony or any other evidence showing different ways to measure orientation or that choosing between different measurement methods would create a material difference in determining whether or not the orientations of the elongated elements differ from the curvilinear segments. In the absence of any evidence that it matters how the orientation is measured, I will not find the term ambiguous on these grounds.
Fourth, Defendants contend (in a footnote and without further analysis), that “[w]hether the claimed orientations are ‘substantially different’ is its own entirely subjective analysis that the intrinsic r