In re National Hockey League Players' Concussion Injury Litigation (189 F. Supp. 3d 856, 2016)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant National Hockey League’s Motion to Dismiss Master Complaint Based on Labor Law Preemption [Doc, No. 37] and Defendant’s Motion to Stay Further Discovery Pending Resolution of Its Motion to Dismiss Master Complaint [Doc. No. 344], In essence, Defendant asks this Court to find that labor law preemption entirely precludes this putative class action strictly on the face of the Master Complaint. In order to so find, Defendant asks this Court to consider numerous meeting minutes, letters, memoranda, and agreements that reflect four decades of collective bargaining between it and the National Hockey League Players Association (“Players’ Union”), as well as documents that reflect the history of collective bargaining between the Players’ Union and the NHL club teams before the NHL became a party to any collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), as embraced by the pleadings. This, is so, even though not'one of the eight CBAs in effect during that forty-year time-frame is mentioned in the Amended Complaint, and even though all Plaintiffs in this class action are retired and are no longer subject to any CBA. According to Defendant, these documents that were neither attached to nor referenced in the pleadings demonstrate that any duties it may have owed to Plaintiffs regarding Plaintiffs’ health and safety arise under the CBAs or would require interpretation of the CBAs in order to determine their scope. But, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court must rely only on the pleadings, or documents fairly embraced by the pleadings, and not a cherry-picked record introduced solely to contradict Plaintiffs’ allegations.

Furthermore, the pleadings do not support Defendant’s argument. Rather, discovery is necessary to shed light on the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, when those claims accrued, and which — if any — CBAs might be relevant. If a full record ultimate:ly reveals that Plaintiffs’ claims accrued while they were subject to a CBA, and that those claims are substantially dependent on interpretation of the CBA, then the Court could properly determine that the claims are preempted by labor law preemption. In the meantime, however, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is premature and must be denied, and, therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Stay is denied as moot.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties and the Underlying Factual Allegations

This litigation was initiated as a class action by retired National Hockey League players who allege that Defendant National Hockey League (“NHL”) is responsible for “the pathological and debilitating effects of brain injuries caused by concussive and subconcussive impacts sustained ... during their professional careers.” (PL’s First Am. Consolidated Class Action Compl. [Doc. No. 351] (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 1.) The NHL is an unincorporated association that operates the major professional hockey league in North America and that consists of separately-owned member teams (“Club Teams”) in various States and Canada. (Id. ¶ 161.)

There are now six named Plaintiffs who seek to represent retired NHL players. (See id. ¶¶ 27-85, 400-01.) Dan LaCouture, Michael Peluso, Gary Leeman, Bernie Nic-holls, David Christian, and Reed Larson seek to represent Class 1:

All living Retired NHL Hockey Players who have not been diagnosed with dementia, ALS, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, CTE, or other neurodegenerative disease or conditions (collectively, “Brain Disease”).

(Id. ¶ 400; see id. ¶¶ 27-79, 387.) Although Stephen Ludzik was identified as the representative of Class 2, he intends to withdraw from that capacity. Class 2 constitutes:

All living and deceased Retired NHL Hockey Players who have been diagnosed with a Brain Disease, and their Representative Claimants and Derivative Claimants, where such Brain Disease was not diagnosed at the time the player retired or otherwise permanently ceased playing professional hockey.

(Id. ¶ 401; see id. ¶¶ 80-85.) Mr. LaCou-ture played in the NHL from 1998 through 2008 and suffered roughly twenty concussions and numerous sub-concussive injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) Mr. Peluso played in the NHL from 1989 through 1998 and suffered at least five concussions. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.) Mr. Leeman played in the NHL from 1983 through 1996 and suffered numerous concussions and sub-concussive hits to the head. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 53.) Mr. Nichols played in the NHL from 1982 through 1999 and suffered at least three concussions and numerous süb-concussive hits to the head. (Id. ¶¶ 56-57.) Mr. Christian played in the NHL from 1979 through 1994 and suffered numerous concussions and sub-concussive hits to the head. (Id. ¶¶ 63, 65.) Mr. Larson played in the NHL from 1977 through 1989 and suffered numerous concussions and sub-concussive hits to the head. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 72.)

' According to Plaintiffs, former NHL players “signed up to play hockey knowing that they might get injured and dinged, but they did not sign up for avoidable brain damage.” (Id. ¶2.) Plaintiffs allege that, unbeknownst to them, decades’ worth of scientific evidence links brain trauma to long-term neurological problems, and that Defendant knew or should have known of this evidence but did not sufficiently protect the players or inform them of the dangers of repeated brain trauma. (E.g., id. ¶¶ 4-6, 9; see id. ¶¶ 182-243.) This inaction persisted, Plaintiffs claim, despite Defendant’s assumption of “a duty as a guardian against head-trauma in players” by virtue of instituting a helmet requirement in 1979 and creating a Concussion Program in 1997 to research and study brain injuries in players. (Id. ¶ 10; see, e.g., ich ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiffs claim that they and their families looked to Defendant for guidance on issues regarding player health and safety because of Defendant’s vastly superior resources, knowledge, and access to medical and health-related information; because Defendant’s fortune depended on Plaintiffs; and because Plaintiffs were brought up and trained to trust their coaches and teams’ medical personnel. (E.g., id. ¶¶ 15, 89, 91, 94-95, 98-100, 103, 129-30, 133, 135-36, 138, 141, 148-49, 151-54, 156, 336-37, 342-49, 351-54, 358-62, 364.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant has caused injuries and increased risks to Plaintiffs by refusing to cease its glorification of fist-fighting and violence in the NHL. (See, e.g„ id. ¶¶20, 296, 306, 309-11.)

B. Plaintiffs’ Claims

In their First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“Amended Complaint”), Plaintiffs assert eight counts against the NHL. (See id. ¶¶ 412-477.) In Count I, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the NHL knew, or reasonably should have known, that the head impacts Plaintiffs and class members endured were likely to expose them to substantially-increased risks of developing neurodegener-ativo diseases and conditions; that the NHL had a duty to advise Plaintiffs and class members of that risk, but willfully and intentionally concealed material information from, and misled, Plaintiffs concerning that risk; and that the NHL recklessly endangered Plaintiffs and class members. (Id. ¶414.) In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the NHL’s misconduct, they experienced injuries that have increased their risk of developing neurodegenerativo disorders, and that costly medical monitoring procedures are necessary to enable Plaintiffs and class members to obtain early detection and diagnosis of those conditions and to enable effective treatment. (See id. ¶¶ 421-29.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs “seek the creation and funding of a Court-supervised, NHL-funded medical monitoring regime.” (Id. ¶ 430.)

Counts III and IV assert claims ' for negligence and negligent misrepresentation by omission, respectively. In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that the NHL has “historically and voluntarily assumed an independent tort' duty of reasonable care regarding player safety and head trauma”; has assumed a duty “to manage player safety, particularly with regard to head injuries and concussions”; and has “a duty of reasonable care to act in the best interests of the health and safety of NHL players[,] to provide truthful information to NHL players regarding risks to their health[,] and to take all reasonable steps necessary to ensure the safety of players.” (Id. ¶¶ 434-35.) Plaintiffs further allege that, as a part of its duty of reasonable care, the NHL was required to inform NHL players of neurological risks of head injuries suffered while playing hockey in the NHL, and not to omit material information about the risks. (Id. ¶ 436.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendant breached that duty by, for example, promoting a culture of violence and' failing to inform or warn players of the potential negative effects of such head injuries. (Id ¶¶437.) Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of these breaches, they have suffered long-term neurological damage and the risk of developing long-term neurological damage. (Id. ¶¶ 438-39.)

In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that a special relationship existed between the NHL and Plaintiffs by virtue of the NHL’s superior knowledge of material medical information that was not readily available to players and by virtue of the NHL’s undertaking to communicate some safety information to players and the public, such that the NHL had a duty to disclose accurate information to Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶442.) According to Plaintiffs, the NHL breached its duty by negligently and actively omitting material information regarding the link between the type of head injuries sustained while playing in the NHL and the resulting negative neurological effects. (See id. ¶¶ 443-44, 448.) Plaintiffs assert that they justifiably and reasonably relied to their detriment on these negligent misrepresentations by omission. (See id. ¶¶ 445-46, 449.)

Counts V and VI assert fraud-based causes of action. In Count V, Plaintiffs assert a claim for fraudulent concealment based on the NHL’s alleged knowing concealment of material information regarding the risks of brain trauma suffered while playing in the NHL, the NHL’s alleged intent and expectation that Plaintiffs would rely on its silence and fraudulent concealment, and Plaintiffs’ alleged reasonable reliance on that silence to their detriment. (See id. ¶¶ 451-58.) And, in Count VI, Plaintiffs assert a claim for fraud by omission and failure to warn. (See id. ¶¶ 459-67.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he NHL had a duty to promptly disclose and speak the full truth regarding the health risks caused by concussive and subconcussive impacts.” (Id. ¶460.) Plaintiffs assert that this duty arose by virtue of the NHL’s superior knowledge of material medical information that was not readily available to players and by virtue of the NHL’s undertaking to communicate some safety information to players and the public. (Id.) According to Plaintiffs, the NHL breached this duty by fraudulently and intentionally failing to disclose material information regarding the link between the type of head injuries sustained while playing in the NHL and the resulting negative neurological effects, and that Plaintiffs justifiably and reasonably relied on these fraudulent omissions to their detriment. (See id. ¶¶ 461-64, 466.)

C. Procedural Posture

The NHL originally filed two motions to dismiss, based on two distinct grounds. First, the NHL filed a Motion to Dismiss Master Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b), seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred. (See Mem. Opinion and Order dated Mar. 25, 2015 [Doc. No. 126], at 8.) The Court denied that motion because it could not determine, from the face of the Master Complaint, when Plaintiffs’ causes of action accrued and, therefore, whether those claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (See id. at 13, 33.) In particular, the Court explained that when the alleged injuries (e.g., “an increased risk of developing serious latent neurode-generative disorders and diseases” and “latent or manifest neurodegenerative disorders and diseases”) “occurred” or “resulted,” and when Plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the link between the type of injuries they suffered and the increased risk of developing neurodegener-ative disorders, are matters that are proper subjects of discovery. (Id. at 13-14.) Only after additional discovery is completed can it be determined within which of (at least) four potential categories each Plaintiff-retiree belongs: (1) retirees whose cause of action arose while they were active players, and who filed a lawsuit as retired players within the statute of limitations; (2) retirees whose cause of action arose while they were active players, and who filed a lawsuit as retired players outside of the statute of limitations; (3) retirees whose cause of action arose after they retired, and who filed a lawsuit within the statute of limitations; and (4) retirees whose cause of action arose after they retired, but who filed a lawsuit outside of the applicable statute of limitations.

Second, the NHL filed a Motion to Dismiss Master Complaint Based on Labor Law Preemption, seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). That Motion is now before the Court.

III. DISCUSSION

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court assumes the facts in the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986). However, the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, see Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir.1999), or legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts pled, Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990). In addition, the Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “Matters outside the pleadings” — and, thus, matters that should be excluded — “include any written or oral evidence in support of or in opposition to the pleading that provides some substantiation for and does not merely reiterate what is said in the pleadings.” Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 187 F.3d 941, 948 (8th Cir.1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may, however, consider exhibits attached to the complaint and documents that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings, Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n. 4 (8th Cir.2003), and may also consider public records, Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.2007).

In its Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief because their claims are preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). Section 301 governs “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). This provision “not only provides the federal courts with jurisdiction over controversies involving collective-bargaining agreements but also authorizes ■the courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 368, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 109 L.Ed.2d 362 (1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Before analyzing whether the Court can rule on the face of the Complaint that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted, however, the Court must first determine which type of preemption — “complete” or “ordinary” — is being asserted.

A. Complete Preemption vs. Ordinary Preemption

“Sometimes there is confusion between complete preemption and what has been termed ‘ordinary’ preemption.” Johnson v. MFA Petroleum Co., 701 F.3d 243, 248 (8th Cir.2012); see Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 598 F.3d 932, 935-36 (8th Cir.2009) (Colloton, J. dissent from denial of rehearing en banc) (expressing concern about the Eighth Circuit’s cases confusing “ordinary preemption” with “complete preemption”). Complete preemption is a corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule, both of which concern subject matter jurisdiction, and the proper forum — federal or state — in which a plaintiffs claim should be litigated. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). “Complete preemption only applies where a federal statute ‘so completely preempts] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal.’” Johnson, 701 F.3d at 247 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 65, 107 S.Ct. 1542). If the plaintiffs claim is not preempted, then the case remains in state court or is remanded to state court. See Meyer v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that the plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by § 301, and therefore, was not removable to federal court). If the plaintiffs claim is preempted, then the case either remains in federal court or is removed to federal court. See Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, *1, *6 (N.D.Ill. May 11, 2012) (holding that the case was properly removed to federal court because the plaintiffs claim was completely preempted and, therefore, arose under federal law).

In contrast, “[ojrdinary preemption is a federal defense that exists where a federal law has superseded a state law claim.” Johnson, 701 F.3d at 248; see Trustees of the Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 329 & n. 3 (8th Cir.2006) (stating that the Defendant’s ordinary preemption defense was “distinct from the jurisdictional doctrine of complete preemption used to remove state claims to federal court”). Ordinary preemption may be invoked in both state and federal court as an affirmative defense to a plaintiffs claims. See, e.g., Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d at 329 & n. 3 (analyzing whether the plaintiffs state common law claims, which it raised in federal district court, were preempted under the doctrine of ordinary preemption); Roddy v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., No. 271208, 2007 WL 258310, at *1-2 (Mich.Ct.App. Jan. 30, 2007) (explaining that the Sixth Circuit had properly remanded the case to state court because the plaintiffs claim was not completely preempted, but stating that the issue of ordinary preemption properly remained before the state court). Because ordinary preemption is a defense to a plaintiffs claim, the doctrine does not authorize removal to federal court. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542. If the plaintiffs claim is not preempted, then the case may remain in whichever court has original jurisdiction. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 402, 407, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (holding that the employee’s state tort claim was not preempted by § 301 and permitting the case to continue in federal district court because that court had diversity jurisdiction). If the plaintiffs claim is preempted, then it must be dismissed. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220-21, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985).

Relevant to the present matter, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that certain claims may be completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, and thus are claims that arise under federal law for purposes of federal courts’ exercise of original jurisdiction. See Rawson, 495 U.S. at 368, 110 S.Ct. 1904 (explaining that § 301 provides federal courts with jurisdiction over controversies involving CBAs and that “[sjtate law is ... ‘pre-empted’ under § 301 in that only the federal law fashioned by the courts under § 301 governs the interpretation and application of collective-bargaining agreements”); Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (holding that a state-law tort action against an employer may be preempted by § 301 if the employer’s alleged duty is created by a CBA and does not exist independently of the agreement). Likewise, the LMRA may supersede a plaintiffs claims under ordinary preemption principles, in which case those claims must be construed as § 301 claims, or dismissed and pursued through the grievance procedure set out in the controlling CBA. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 219-20, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (explaining that claims which are preempted under the doctrine of ordinary preemption must be resolved through the grievance and arbitration procedure set out in a CBA).

“[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 208, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Congress expressly stated that the purpose of the LMRA is:

to promote the full flow of commerce,-to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.

29 U.S.C. § 141(b). Thus, Congress through § 301 intended to provide federal jurisdiction over law suits for violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations “in order to fashion a body of federal common law for the purpose of resolving labor disputes in a uniform manner -across the country,” Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d at 330 (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209, 105 S.Ct. 1904), and “to preserve[ ] the central role of arbitration in our system of industrial self-government, Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 219, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, the two forms of preemption, complete and ordinary, each align with one of the dual purposes of the LMRA. Complete preemption necessarily transforms a state-law claim that is based upon a CBA or is inextricably intertwined with a CBA into a federal claim and provides federal courts with jurisdiction. Thus, complete preemption aligns with § 301’s congressional mandate to fashion a body of federal common law for disputes arising out of labor contracts. In contrast, ordinary preemption prevents either a state or federal court from hearing a claim that should initially have been taken through the arbitration procedure established in the controlling CBA. Thus, the ordinary preemption doctrine aligns with the second purpose of § 301 — i.e., the need to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration.

B. Defendant’s Motion — Ordinary Preemption

Neither Defendant nor Plaintiffs directly address whether the principles of complete preemption or ordinaiy preemption apply in this case. However, Defendant does not dispute that this Court has original jurisdiction because this case fits the contours of class actions identified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). (See Am. Compl. ¶24.) Therefore, complete preemption is not at issue. Rather, Defendant’s preemption arguments are simply defenses to Plaintiffs’ state common law claims. Thus, the ordinary preemption doctrine guides the court’s analysis of the issues in this case.

In order to determine if a plaintiffs claim is preempted, a court must determine “if the resolution of [the] state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877. The Supreme Court has stated that “a suit in state court alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under § 301 and be resolved by reference to federal law,” and, therefore, “[a] state rule that purports to define the meaning or scope of a term in a contract suit ... is pre-empted by federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 210, 105 S.Ct. 1904. However, the Court explained, “the preemptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations,” id. to suits alleging liability in tort where the “state-law rights and obligations ... do not exist independently of private agreements” and “the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract,” id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. In other words, § 301 preemption applies in two situations:

First, a “state-law claim is preempted if it is ‘based on’ [a] ... provision of the CBA[,]” meaning that “[t]he CBA provision at issue” actually sets forth the right upon which the claim is based. Second, section 301 preemption applies where a state-law claim “is ‘dependent upon an analysis’ of the relevant CBA,” meaning that the plaintiffs state-law claim requires interpretation of a provision of the CBA.

Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir.2009) (internal citations omitted); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (“Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In interpreting this Supreme Court precedent, the Eighth Circuit has adopted a “narrow[] approach.” Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1051; see Graham v. Contract Transp., Inc., 220 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that the Eighth Circuit “applies federal [§ 301] preemption more narrowly”). “[T]he crucial inquiry is whether resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a [CBA].” Williams, 582 F.3d at 877. “An otherwise independent claim will not be preempted if the CBA need only be consulted during its adjudication.” Id. at 876 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, mere reference to the CBA is not enough for a court to hold that preemption applies. See Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1051. Additionally, a state-law claim is not preempted simply because it involves an event in the workplace that may be subject to grievance procedures under the CBA, or because a CBA creates rights and duties that are similar to those on which the state-law claim is based. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904; Graham, 220 F.3d at 913; Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1051. In other words, the mere fact that the state law analysis “parallels” the contractual CBA analysis, does not render the state law claim preempted. As the Supreme Court explained in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.:

We agree with the [court of appeals’] explanation that the state-law analysis might well involve attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination of whether [the plaintiff] was fired for just cause. But we disagree with the court’s conclusion that such parallelism renders the state-law- analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis. For while there may be instances in which the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state law on the basis of the subject matter of the law in question, § 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, and says nothing about the substantive rights a State -may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such agreements. In other words, even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is “independent” of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.

486 U.S. at 408-10, 108 S.Ct. 1877 (footnotes omitted).

Here, Defendant argues that all of Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted because they are based on duties that arise under, or depend on an interpretation of, the CBAs. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Master Compl. Based on Labor Law Preemption [Doc. No. 39] (“Def.’s Mem.”), at 7-9, 15, 18, 31-32.)

1. Negligence (Count III)

, As discussed above, Plaintiffs assert a claim for negligence in Count III of their Amended Complaint. To succeed, Plaintiffs must establish that Defendant owed them a duty,. Defendant breached that duty, they were injured, and Defendant’s breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury. See Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn.2001). Plaintiffs’ claim is premised on Defendant’s alleged duties to exercise reasonable care regarding player safety and head trauma (i.e., to manage NHL player safety — in particular, with regard to head injuries and concussions; to act in the best interests of the health and safety of the players; to provide truthful information to the players regarding risks to their health; and to take all reasonable steps necessary to ensure the Players’ safety).

Defendant argues that Coopt III is preempted, first, because these alleged duties arose, if at all, under the CBAs entered into on their behalf by the Players’ Union, and, second, because an evaluation of the existence and extent of those duties would require interpretation of the terms of the CBAs. (See Def.’s Mem. at 8-31.) In opposition, Plaintiffs point out that the Amended Complaint does not reference any provision of a CBA. (Pis.’ Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Master Compl. Based on Labor Law Preemption [Doc. No. 53] (“Pis.’ Opp.”), at 1, 6 n. 5.) Moreover, they argue, not only are Plaintiffs not alleging any CBA breaches, but none of the CBAs addresses a duty imposed on Defendant to warn players of the long-term neurological damage of head trauma — let alone a duty to warn “retirees,” who are indisputably not covered by the CBAs. (See id. at 5, 20, 24, 41-45.) Instead, Plaintiffs assert that they allege general duties of care that arose independently of any CBA provision. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiffs point to allegations in the Amended Complaint regarding: “the NHL’s relationship to the players, without whom the NHL would be nothing”; the foreseeability of harm to the players resulting from Defendant’s conduct; Defendant’s special relationship to the players by virtue of its superior resources and knowledge; and Defendant’s assumption of a “special duty of care” by concerting the Concussion Study. (Id. at 13-1‡) According to Plaintiffs, even if these duties are tangentially related to subject matter covered in the CBAs, “[m]ere ‘parallelism’ between a ‘state-law analysis’ and a CBA is insufficient for preemption.” (Id. at 9 (quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408, 108 S.Ct. 1877).) The Court will address each prong of the preemption analysis in turn.

a. Duties purportedly arising under the CBAs

According to Defendant, Plaintiffs allege three bases for their contention that Defendant voluntarily assumed any duties toward them: (1) the institution of a helmet requirement, (2) the undertaking of a study of concussions in the Concussion Program, and (3) the maintenance of unilateral authority to promulgate and enforce rules of play. (Def.’s Mem. at 10.) First, citing to a document titled “Owner-Player Council Minutes of Meeting — August 6 and 7,1979,” Defendant argues that the helmet requirement was implemented pursuant to a CBA between the NHL and Player’s Union and is thus “necessarily” based on a CBA. (Id at 11 (citing Daly Decl. [Doc. No. 40], Ex. 15).) Second, Defendant asserts that the Concussion Program, Concussion Program Report, and Concussion Evaluation and Management Protocol and revisions thereto, were all “created by agreement with the [Players’ Union]” and so are “squarely” based on the CBAs. (Id. at 12-14.) In support, Defendant cites to a September 1997 memorandum from the NHL Neuropsychological Assessment Advisory Board to the NHL Consulting Neuropsychologists, an unsigned October 1997 letter to “Player,” a January 2010 memorandum to Club Team personnel attaching the Concussion Evaluation and Management Protocol, memo-randa notifying players and Club Team personnel of changes to the Protocol, and the Concussion Program Report. (Id. (citing Daly Deck, Exs. 9-11, 13-14, 16).) Third, Defendant argues that playing rules and disciplinary procedures are part of the Players’ terms and conditions of employment as set forth in Articles 18, 22, and 30 of the CBA (which purportedly state that players are bound by the NHL’s playing rules, amendments can only be made with the Union’s consent, and a Competition Committee has the authority to recommend changes to the rules). (Id. at 14-15.) Although Defendant cites to the current CBA, it states that similar provisions may be found in some predecessor CBAs. (See id. at 14 n. 10,15 n. 11-13.)

Defendant argues that each of these bases of their allegedly voluntarily-assumed duties is “rooted in obligations that arise (if at all) under the [CBAs].” (Id. at 10.) As such, Defendant asserts, Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are preempted by § 301. (See id. at 15-18.) In support of its argument, Defendant relies heavily on the'Supreme Court’s opinions in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), and United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 109 L.Ed.2d 362 (1990). (See id.)

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, as the Court must on a motion to dismiss, the Court cannot find from -the face of the Amended Complaint, or any documents properly embraced by the pleadings, that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are preempted on the grounds that the allegedly breached duties arose out of a CBA. Not only does the Amended Complaint not reference any CBAs, but — notably—in arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted to the extent that they relate to the helmet requirement and Concussion Program, Defendant does not cite to any CBA provisions that purportedly imposed a duty upon which Plaintiffs’ claims are based. Instead, Defendant relies on numerous other documents — meeting minutes, letters, memoranda, and reports dated between 1979 and 2013. But, these documents constitute cherry-picked evidence in opposition to the Amended Complaint that, “[do] not merely reiterate what is said in the pleadings.” Hamm, 187 F.3d at 948. Accordingly, those documents are outside the pleadings, and the Court may hot rely on them as a basis for dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims at this stage of the proceedings.

While Defendant does point to various CBA provisions in support of its argument that its authority to, promulgate and enforce the rules of play is rooted in the CBAs, it is questionable whether those CBAs are embraced by the pleadings or even relevant, given that they are not referenced in or attached to the Amended Complaint and given that Plaintiffs are retired.players who are no longer subject to collective bargaining. In order for the Court to determine whether the retired players are subject to any CBAs, the parties would have to demonstrate when the causes of action accrued for each player in this class action, a matter which this Court has previously stated cannot be decided on the pleadings and must be the subject of further discovery. And, even if some or all of Plaintiffs were subject to a CBA at the time their cause of action accrued, Defendant acknowledges that different versions of the CBAs may not contain the language upon which it relies. In other words, even if the Court considers the evidence that Defendant insists is embraced by the pleadings, there are major fact questions that cannot be resolved until a fuller record is developed.

Allis-Chalmers and Rawson do not mandate a different result. In Allis-Chalmers, the plaintiff was a member of a union that had a CBA with the defendant employer. 471 U.S. at 203-04, 105 S.Ct. 1904. The CBA incorporated contract grievance procedures and a disability plan that provided benefits for union member employees. Id. at 204, 105 S.Ct. 1904. According to the plaintiff, after he was injured and his disability claim was approved, his employer interfered with his receipt of benefits. Id. at 205, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Instead of seeking to resolve the issue through the CBA’s grievance procedures, the employee filed a lawsuit against the employer in state court for bad-faith handling of his claim under the disability plan included in the CBA. Id. at 206, 105 S.Ct. 1904. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that the claim was preempted by federal labor law. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the alleged breach of duty was independent of any contractual obligations. Id. at 206-07, 105 S.Ct. 1904.

The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, finding that whether the CBA’s express recitation of the duty to pay benefits created an implied right to make those payments in a timely manner was a question of federal contract interpretation because “the extent of either duty ultimately depended] upon the terms of the agreement between the parties.” Id. at 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904. The Court also determined that the tort of bad-faith handling of a claim under a disability plan “intrinsically relates to the nature and existence of the contract”: “[T]he tort exists for breach of a ‘duty devolve[ed] upon the insurer by reasonable implication from the express terms of the contract,’ the scope of which, crucially, is ‘ascertained from a consideration of the contract itself.’ ” Id. (quoting Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413, 414-15 (1931)). In other words, “[t]he duties imposed and rights established through the state tort ... derive from the rights and obligations established by the contract,” id at 217, 105 S.Ct. 1904, and will, therefore, involve contract interpretation, id. at 218, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Accordingly, the Court held that the state-law cause of action was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 220-21, 105 S.Ct. 1904.

In Rawson, the survivors of four deceased miners filed a lawsuit against the miners’ union, alleging that the miners’ deaths were caused by the union’s negligent enforcement of the CBA’s accident prevention clause. 495 U.S. at 364-65, 110 S.Ct. 1904. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, under the CBA, the union had caused a labor safety committee to be established and that the committee was inadequately trained and negligently performed inspections that it had promised to conduct. Id. at 365, 110 S.Ct. 1904. After the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the union, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, with three of the five justices stating that a decision on preemption could not be made until there was “ ‘full factual deyelopment’ ” because the precise nature of the Plaintiffs’, claims was unclear. Id. (quoting Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of Am., 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21, 25 (1979)). On remand, and “[a]fter extensive discovery,” the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the union, finding that the negligence claim was preempted because it was based on the Plaintiffs’ complaints about the manner in which the union carried out the CBA. Id. at 366, 110 S.Ct. 1904. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the standard of care regarding the activity undertaken by the union was imposed by state law without reference to the CBA. Id. at 367, 110 S.Ct. 1904.

On review, the U.S. Supreme Court found that “the only possible interpretation” of the Plaintiffs’ allegations was that the duty that formed the basis of the tort action was one allegedly assumed by the union in the CBA, and, therefore, the tort claim was not “independent” of the CBA. Id. at 370-71, 110 S.Ct. 1904. According to the Court:

If the Union failed to perform a duty in connection with inspection, it was a duty arising out of the [CBA] signed by the Union as the bargaining agent for the miners. ... Pre-emption by federal law cannot be avoided by characterizing the Union’s negligent performance of what it does on behalf of the members of the bargaining unit pursuant to the terms of the [CBA] as a state-law tort.

Id. at 371-72, 110 S.Ct. 1904. Thus, the Court held that the state law claim was preempted. Id. at 372, 110 S.Ct. 1904.

• These cases are readily distinguishable from the present matter. First, both Allis— Chalmers and Rawson were decided on summary judgment at the trial-court level. Notably, Rawson was decided on a second motion for summary judgment after the state supreme court remanded the matter for “full factual development.” Accordingly, the courts’ decisions were based on consideration of a full record. Here, however, Defendant .seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ negligence claims based solely on the Amended Complaint and a handful of cherry-picked documents that are not embraced by the pleadings. This record is insufficient to form the basis of the court’s opinion on this matter.

Second, at the time the claims of the plaintiffs in Allis-Chalmers and Rawson arose, the injured parties were current employees and union members subject to the one CBA that the defendants asserted served to preempt the Plaintiffs’ claims. In contrast, Plaintiffs in this case are retired and are no longer subject to any CBA. Moreover, Defendant was not a party to any CBA until 1995. (See Daly Aff., Ex. 1 (1975-1980 CBA), Introduction; id., Ex. 2 (1981-1984 CBA), Introduction; id., Ex. 3 (1984-1988 CBA), Introduction; id., Ex. 4 (1988-1991 CBA), Introduction; id., Ex. 5 (1991-1993 CBA), Preamble; id., Ex. 6 (1995-2004 CBA), Preamble; id., Ex. 7 (2005-2011 CBA), Preamble; id., Ex. 8 (2012-2022 CBA), Preamble.) Because, as discussed above, it is not clear from the current record when Plaintiffs’ claims accrued, it cannot be determined at this stage which — if any — CBAs might be relevant to those claims.

Third, the plaintiffs in Allis-Chalmers and Rawson specifically alleged that their claims were based on the defendants’ negligent performance of a provision in the relevant CBA: in Allis-Chalmers, the payment of disability benefits required by the disability plan incorporated in the CBA; and, in Rawson, the negligent performance of mine inspections by the labor safety committee established pursuant to the CBA. Here, however, Plaintiffs have not specifically referenced any provisions of— or requirements imposed by — any CBA in their Amended Complaint. Neither, for the most part, has Defendant pointed to any such provisions or requirements, instead relying on various letters and memoranda.

Finally, the tort of bad-faith handling of a disability benefits claim alleged in Allis-Chalmers could only be asserted if there was a contractual basis to support it — i.e., the requirement that such benefits be paid. In contrast, a general negligence claim, as alleged in this case, is not dependent upon the existence of any contractual provision or requirement. For these reasons, Defendant has not convinced the Court at this stage of the proceedings that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are preempted on the grounds that any allegedly-assumed duties arose under a CBA.

b. Duties purportedly requiring interpretation of a CBA

Defendant next argues that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are preempted because they are inextricably intertwined with the CBAs’ provisions governing health and safety, rales and discipline, and management rights, and because they would require interpretation of the collectively-bargained Concussion Program. (See Def.’s Mem. at 21-31.) As for health and safety provisions, Defendant points to the CBAs’ purported allocation of responsibilities among the players and Club Teams for reporting and treating injuries and making fitness-to-play determinations, as well as provisions addressing the Players’ right to receive their medical records. (Id. at 21-22.) Defendant contends that the extent of any alleged duty that it had to protect Players’ safety would have to be evaluated in light of the express .delegation of responsibility in the CBAs to. the Club Teams. (Id. at 22-23.)

Regarding rules and discipline, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims rely heavily on the proposition that fighting should be eliminated from the NHL, but that resolution of.those claims would require analysis of the playing rules- and disciplinary procedures that 'are incorporated into the CBAs. .(Id. at 26-27.) For example, according to- Defendant, the success of Plaintiffs’ claims would depend on an analysis of the CBAs’ limitations on Defendant’s authority to change rules and impose discipline. (See id. at 27-29.) Similarly, Defendant asserts that resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendant should have, for example, taken action to reduce the occurrence of concussions and implement better treatment protocol, is dependent upon an interpretation of the management rights clause in the CBAs to determine whether the Union waived its rights to bargain over these subjects. (See id. at 29-30.)

Finally, Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint’s repeated references to Defendant’s conduct related to the Concussion Program demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are substantially dependent upon an analysis of the Program. (Id. at 23.) More specifically, Defendant asserts that the Court'-would have to determine whether the Concussion Program imposed any unilateral obligations on Defendant (such as to make the game of hockey safer for the players and to inform the players of safety information) and whether Defendant’s actions were reasonable in light of the' Program. (See id. at 23-26.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs' contend that § 301 preemption is applied much more narrowly than Defendant suggests, and that mere subject matter congruence between a CBÁ’s provisions and a state law cause of action is insufficient to compel preemption. (Pis.’ Opp. at 7-8.) Along those lines, Plaintiffs assert that the health and safety provisions in the CBAs are only tangentially connected to Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant because whether, for example, a Club Team was required to provide its players with a doctor does not erase Defendant’s duty to inform players of the danger they were in. (Id. at 15-16.) Relatedly, Plaintiffs argue that those health and safety provisions are duties of the Club Teams — not the NHL itself — -and that reliance -on those provisions merely raises a defense to liability and is not a basis for preemption. (Id. at 15-16.)

As for player rules and discipline, Plaintiffs note that preemption is not triggered simply because facts that are relevant to a CBA grievance are also relevant to an independent state law claim. (Id. at 24.) Instead, resolution of the state law claim must require interpretation of the CBA and, here, none of the provisions regarding player rules and discipline need to be interpreted. (Id.) Rather, Plaintiffs contend that the simple fact of the helmet requirement demonstrates that Defendant was aware of the dangers it concealed from them, and that the Competition Committee’s ability to make “recommendatiops” regarding rule changes does not eviscerate Defendant’s duties where there is no simultaneous obligation imposed on Defendant to accept those recommendations. (Id. at 25-26.) Similarly, Plaintiffs assert that their allegations concerning the Concussion Program merely serve to provide an example of Defendant’s long-standing, self-proclaimed, voluntarily-assumed duty of care toward Plaintiffs. (See id. at 21-22.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the management rights clause is not relevant because they are not claiming that Defendant breached that clause and because whether the Union waived any rights to bargain over certain subjects is not at issue. (Id. at 19-20.)

In addition to these arguments, Plaintiffs point to numerous documents that they claim show Defendant’s long-standing recognition of a “non-CBA-based independent duty of care to players.” (PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Notice of Supplemental Authority in Supp. of Mot, to Dismiss Master Compl. Based on Labor Law Preemption [Doc. No. 354] (“PL’s Boogaard Resp.”), at 3.) For example, Plaintiffs cite to a September 2013 presentation made by the NHL Department of Player Safety at a Board of Governors Meeting, which states that "[t]he NHL has always assumed the responsibility of making the game safer through rule changes, medical treatment policies, equipment analysis, enhancements to the playing environment, and supplemental discipline,” (Zimmerman Decl. [Doc. No. 353], Ex. A, at 3.) They also cite to a September 2013 NHL document showing a Concussion Program timeline that describes Defendant’s formation of the Concussion Committee and the NHL-imposed “mandate” that the Clubs install more flexible arena shielding glass and boards, (id. Ex. D, at 1, 3), as well as an October 1997 letter from the NHL to the Players’ Union in which the NHL states:

The NHL does not believe it was or is required to negotiate this topic with the [Players’ Union], In our view, requiring players to wear safe helmets does not constitute a change which affects the ‘terms or conditions or employment’ pursuant to Article 30 of the CBA, and that if requiring safe helmets were found to constitute a change in the ‘terms or conditions of employment,’ we feel the [Players’ Union’s] refusal to consent to such a policy would clearly be removable pursuant to Article 30.

Without any involvement whatsoever of the [Players’ Union], ... comprehensive guidelines [regarding baseline neurological testing and review of hits resulting in concussions] were developed and adopted. ...

(Id. Ex. B, at 1, 3.) Similarly, in an email to NHL personnel, NHL Deputy Commissioner Bill Daly stated in regard to concussion video analysis: [Redacted] (Id. Ex. C, at 1.) Mr. Daly also commented in a news article and in an email to the Players’ Union that the NHL Board of Governors can enact rule changes without the Players’ Union’s approval. (See id. Ex. E, at 1 (“‘Our board can enact rule changes at any time with or without competition committee (Players’ association) approval[.]’ ”); id. Ex. F, at 1 (“[A]s we have previously and repeatedly stated both publicly and privately, nothing in the CBA precludes the NHL Board of Governors from enacting rule changes with or without the approval of the Competition Committee _”).) According to Plaintiffs, these documents show that “a duty of care exists outside the CBA.” (PL’s Boogaard Resp. at 4.)

Again, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, as the Court must at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot find from the face of the Amended Complaint, or any documents properly embraced by the pleadings, that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are preempted on the grounds that they are inextricably intertwined with.the CBAs. As the Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit have held, § 301 preemption only applies if resolution of the claim “must require the interpretation of some specific provision of a CBA.” Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1051 (emphases added); see Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408-10, 108 S.Ct. 1877. But, the mere fact that a CBA creates rights or duties similar to those on which a state-law claim is based, or that the parties involved in the dispute are subject to a CBA, or that the event giving rise to the dispute may be subject to a CBA’s grievance procedures, is not sufficient to trigger preemption. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408-10, 108 S.Ct. 1877; Meyer, 163 F.3d at 1051; Graham, 220 F.3d at 913.

Here, as discussed above, the Amended Complaint does not reference any CBAs, and to the extent that Defendant has identified particular provisions that purportedly must be interpreted in order to resolve Plaintiffs’ claims, it is questionable whether those CBAs are embraced by the pleadings or are even relevant given that Plaintiffs are retired players who are no longer subject to collective bargaining. Again, in order for the Court to determine whether the retired players are subject to any CBAs, the parties would have to demonstrate when the causes of action accrued for each player, a matter which this Court has previously stated cannot be decided on the pleadings and must be the subject of further discovery. And, even if some or all of Plaintiffs were subject to a CBA at the time their cause of action accrued, Defendant acknowledges that different versions of the CBAs contain different language. In other words, even if the Court considers the evidence that Defendant insists is embraced by the pleadings, there are major fact.questions that cannot be resolved until a fuller record is developed.

Moreover, Plaintiffs have identified several documents — a presentation, a letter, emails, and a ■ news article that seem to demonstrate even Defendant’s belief that it was not bound by the CBA when dealing with certain matters of player safety. Again, however, these documents constitute cherry-picked evidence that are outside of the pleadings and do not necessarily reflect the full record; Accordingly, the Court finds that it is premature to decide the preemption issue on a motion to dismiss.

The’ cases relied upon most heavily by Defendant—Williams v. National Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir.2009); Stringer v. National Football League, 474 F.Supp.2d 894 (S.D.Ohio 2007); Boogaard v. National Hockey League, 126 F.Supp.3d 1010 (N.D.Ill.2015); and Duerson v. National Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353 (N.D.Ill. May 11, 2012) — are not to the contrary. (See Def.’s Mem. at 18-21; Def.’s Reply to Pis.’ Resp. to Notice of Supplemental Authority in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Master Compl. Based on Labor Law Preemption [Doc. No. 369] (“Def.’s Boogaard Reply”), at 1-4.) For example, in Williams, which is the only Eighth Circuit case cited by Defendant on this issue, several NFL players were suspended after testing positive for a substance banned by their CBA’s expressly-incorporated Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related Substances. 582 F.3d at 868-70. That Policy adopted a ru[le of strict liability for use of a prohibited substance and addressed the consequences stemming therefrom, warning players that any use of dietary supplements was at their own risk. Id. at 868-69. The CBA also noted that both the players and NFL were bound by the CBA. Id. at 868. After appealing their suspensions through the CBA’s grievance procedure, the players filed a lawsuit against the NFL, asserting Minnesota statutory and common law claims based on the NFL’s failure to inform them that a certain dietary supplement contained the banned substance. See id. at 870-72. The NFL argued on summary judgment that the Players’ claims were preempted, and the district court granted that motion in part, finding that the common law claims were preempted by § 301. Id. at 872-73. The Eighth Circuit agreed on appeal. Id at 881. As for the negligence claims in particular, the court held that whether the NFL owed the plaintiffs a duty to provide a warning could not be determined without examining the parties’ relationship and expectations as established by the CBA and Policy. Id. However, unlike the present matter, Williams was decided after the parties had engaged in discovery and developed a factual record; the players were members of the bargaining unit — and parties to the relevant CBA — at the time them claims arose; the players and the NFL were indisputably bound by that CBA; and the CBA contained specific provisions dealing with the issues raised by the players.

The other cases are no more on point. In Stringer, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the NFL on behalf of her deceased husband, who died from complications of heatstroke suffered during practice, and a class of similarly-situated persons. 474 F.Supp.2d at 898. In Count I, she alleged that the NFL breached its duty to players to use ordinary care in overseeing the NFL teams to minimize the risk of heat-related illness and to provide competent information to NFL team personnel regarding heat-related illness. See id. at 898-99. According to the plaintiff, this duty arose from the NFL’s decision to voluntarily publish “Hot Weather Guidelines” in its Game Operations Manual. Id. at 905. In Count IV, the plaintiff alleged that the NFL breached its duty to ensure that the players had safe equipment. Id. at 899.

The NFL moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were preempted by the CBA entered into between the Players’ union and the NFL’s teams. Id. at 900-01. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio determined that the plaintiffs negligence claim in Count I did not “arise from” the CBA because neither the Hot Weather Guidelines nor Game Operations Manual was incorporated into the CBA, the NFL was not a party to the CBA, and the NFL was not contractually obligated to take any action to protect players from illness. See id. at 905-07. However, the court did find that resolution of the claim was inextricably intertwined with an analysis of the CBA. Id. at 911. In that regard, the court determined that the plaintiffs claim was “predicated on the theory that because the NFL failed to use reasonable care in publishing the guidelines, the [teamj’s athletic trainers, team physicians, and other staff members were not adequately prepared to diagnose [the decedent’s] symptoms, or to treat him when he fell ill.” Id. at 909-10 (emphasis added). Thus, the degree of care owed by the NFL was dependent upon, and had to be considered in light of, the contractual duties imposed by the CBA on the beams- concerning player health and safety. Id. For example, the court explained, á CBA provision requiring that team athletic trainers be certified by the National Athletic Trainers Association could diminish or increase the degree of care owed by the NFL depending on whether the certification process independently prepared the trainers to handle heat-related illnesses. Id. at 910. As for Count IV, the court determined that the claim neither arose out of the CBA (for the .same reasons stated in regard to Count I) nor required interpretation of the CBA, which was mostly silent on the issue of equipment safety. Id. at 912.

In Boogaard, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the NHL on behalf of Derek Boogaard, an NHL player who died of an accidental drug overdose after being temporarily released from a rehab facility without a chaperone. 126 F.Supp.3d at 1014-15. Mr, Boogaard had been placed in the rehab facility pursuant to the Substance Abuse and Behavioral Health Program (“SABHP”) that was negotiated between the NHL and the Players’ union. Id. at 1015. In addition to the SABHP, the NHL and Players’ union had negotiated a CBA that governed the relationship ■ between the NHL, the NHL players, and the teams. IdL The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the NHL negligently failed to prevent the decedent from becoming addicted to painkillers and breached its voluntarily-assumed duties to protect his health (including protecting him from brain trauma during his NHL career, which allegedly caused him to develop CTE and impacted his judgment and behavior). Id. at 1015-16. After the case was removed to federal court, the NHL sought dismissal on grounds of § 301 preemption. Id. at 1014, 1016.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois converted the motion to summary judgment and permitted the parties to engage in discovery for over a year before fully briefing the motion. Id. at 1014. Thereafter, the court determined that the plaintiffs claims were preempted because resolution of those claims would require the court to interpret the CBA to determine the scope of any duty owed by the NHL. Id. at 1018. More specificall