Wigent v. Science Applications International Corp. (19 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 2014)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ALAN C. KAY, Senior District Judge.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 7, 2013, Plaintiff Shannon Wigent (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Science Applications International Corporation, now known as Leídos Holdings, Inc. (“Leídos” or “Defendant”), in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. (Doc. No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”) Ex. A.) On March 13, 2013, Leídos removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. (Notice of Removal at ¶ 4.) On March 20, 2013, Leí-dos filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint. (Doc. No. 5.)

Plaintiffs Complaint pleads claims arising out of her termination of employment from Leídos. Plaintiffs first claim alleges that Leídos discriminated against her on the basis of her marital status in violation of Hawaii Revised Statute (“H.R.S.”) § 378-2(1). (Compl. at ¶¶ 31-36.) Plaintiff also brings retaliation claims, pursuant to H.R.S. 378-2(2). (Id. at ¶¶ 37-40, 42-46.)

Leídos filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion” or “Mot.”) along with a Concise Statement of Facts (“Defi’s CSF”) on February 18, 2014, seeking summary judgment as to all the claims asserted by Plaintiff. (Doc. Nos. 48-49.) On February 20, 2014, Leídos filed an Errata in order to correct Exhibit 1 of its Concise Statement of Facts. (Doc. No. 51.) In the original Exhibit 1, Leídos omitted the first half of Exhibit 1 and uploaded the second half twice. (Id.) A complete copy of Exhibit 1 is attached to the Errata. (Id.) On March 26, 2014, Plaintiff filed her Opposition to Defendant’s Motion (“Opp.”) along with a Concise Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s CSF”). (Doc. Nos. 54-55.) Leídos filed a Reply (“Reply”) on April 7, 2014. (Doc. No. 57.) Also on April 7, 2014, Leídos filed objections and a response to Plaintiffs Concise Statement of Facts (“Def.’s Obj.’s”). (Doc. No. 58.)

The Court held a hearing regarding Defendant’s Motion on April 21, 2014. (Doc. No. 62.)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Background, on Leídos, Formerly Known as SAIC

Prior to September 27, 2018, Leídos was known as Science Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”). (Def.’s CSF at 2, ¶ 1; Pl.’s CSF at 1, ¶ 1.) The original SAIC was a scientific, engineering and technology applications company that served commercial and government customers. (Id.) On September 27, 2013, SAIC changed its name to Leídos and spun off a separate new corporation, which kept the name SAIC. (Declaration of Jim Murray (“Murray Decl.”) ¶ 5.) The divisions which Plaintiff and her husband (collectively “the Wigents”) worked for remained under Leídos. (Id.)

In 2002, Leídos was awarded a federal government contract, the Maritime Synthetic Range (“MSR”), to be integrated on the island of Kauai, State of Hawaii. (Defi’s CSF at 3, ¶3; Pl.’s CSF at 1, ¶3.) In 2005, as a follow-up to the MSR program, the Pacific Region Integrated Test and Evaluation Capability (“PRITEC”) program was awarded to Leídos. (Defi’s CSF at 3, ¶ 4; Pl.’s CSF at 1, ¶4.) The PRITEC project lasted for several years and ended in 2011 when federal funding ceased. (Id.)

B. Plaintiff and Her Husband Begin Working at Leídos

Leídos hired Plaintiff as a Systems Engineer in October 2001. (Def.’s CSF Ex. 1 (“Pl.’s Dep.”) 20:10-23.) Plaintiff began working at the company’s Virginia office. (Id.) In March 2002, Plaintiff was transferred to Kauai to help implement the MSR program. (Def.’s CSF at 3, ¶ 5; Pl.’s CSF at 1, ¶ 5.)

Leídos hired Plaintiffs husband, Mark Wigent (“Mark”), in February 2002, also as a Systems Engineer to help implement a separate program located on Kauai. (Pl.’s Dep. 27:8-16.) On March 16, 2002, Leídos relocated Plaintiff and her husband from Virginia to Kauai. (Def.’s CSF at 3, ¶ 7; Pl.’s CSF at 1, ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff concedes that her husband was initially hired to implement a separate program on Kauai. (PL’s Dep. 27:8-16.) Plaintiff asserts, however, that by November 2002, both her and her husband had started working on the MSR program. (Decl. of Pl. ¶ 8.) Leídos contends that the Wigents only began working on the MSR program together in late 2004. (Def.’s CSF at 4, ¶ 9.)

C. SH-2 Policy Adopted

In 2004, Leídos adopted Staffing Policy SH-2 (“SH-2”). (Id. at 3, ¶ 8; Pl.’s CSF at 1, ¶ 8.) The purpose of SH-2 is to

[e]nsure that a supervisor or manager does not have closely related individuals (such as a spouse, domestic partner, person involved in a dating relationship, children, stepchildren, parents, in-laws, or siblings) under his or her direct or indirect supervision in order to prevent potential conflicts of interest and/or allegations of favoritism or sexual harassment.

(Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 2.) Section 3.6.1 of SH-2 defines the terms “direct supervision” and “indirect supervision” as follows:

Direct supervision Includes any of the following responsibilities: assigning work, conducting performance or salary reviews, approving timecards or expense reports, or making recommendations affecting the person’s employment, compensation, or retention.

Indirect supervision Having program management, profit and loss (P & L), or budgetary responsibility for the affected group, business unit, or organization.

(Id.)

D. 2005 Assessment

In late 2004, Plaintiff was working with the MSR program under division 1548, and Mark, under division 1805, became the Program Manager (“PM”) for the MSR program. (Def.’s CSF at 4, ¶ 9; PL’s CSF at 1, ¶ 9.) As the PM, Mark’s responsibilities included managing the people assigned to the MSR, interfacing with the customer, ensuring customer satisfaction, and ensuring the program remained within budget and on schedule. (Id.)

Mark’s supervisor, Steven Karwoski, in late 2004 raised the issue of whether the working relationship between Plaintiff and her husband violated SH-2 because Plaintiff was working on the MSR program while Mark was the Project Manager. (Id.) As a result, in January 2005, an assessment of whether the Wigents’ working relationship violated SH-2 was administered. (Defi’s CSF at 4, ¶ 11; PL’s CSF at 1, ¶ 11.) The assessment was conducted by Karwoski, Leídos’ Human Resources Senior Vice President Marjorie Bailey, and Plaintiff’s division supervisor Sam Mudrak. (Deck of Murray ¶ 13.)

Ultimately, Leídos did not find a violation of SH-2 policy because the Wigents, Karwoski, Bailey, and Mudrak agreed upon a “MSR Organizational Structure” plan in which Plaintiff was to become a program consultant to the MSR program. (PL’s Dep. 65:5-66:14 & Ex. 5; Def.’s CSF Exs. 3-4.) Under the MSR Organizational Structure plan, Plaintiff would also not receive work assignments from her husband, and she would work in future program development, rather than current project execution. (PL’s Dep. Ex. 5.) Although the Wigents’ supervisors and Leí-dos’ Human Resources representative approved the plan, they stated that “[i]f the business circumstances change, we will need to revisit the issue.” (Def.’s CSF Exs. 3-4.)

From 2005 to 2008, Plaintiff and her husband continued to work on the same project but in separate divisions and under different management chains. (Defi’s CSF at 4, ¶ 14; PL’s CSF at 1, ¶ 14.) During this time, Plaintiff also worked on a project that her husband was not assigned to: the Unmanned Test Bed. (PL’s Dep. 39:24-40:9, 56:22-24.)

E.2008 and 2009 Assessments

In 2007, Plaintiff began working on the PRITEC project where her husband was the PM. (Def.’s CSF at 5, ¶ 15; Pl.’s CSF at 1, ¶ 15.) On October 29, 2008, Leídos conducted an assessment of Plaintiff and her husband’s working relationship. (PL’s Dep. Ex. 6; Pl.’s CSF Ex. M.) The assessment report was prepared by Mudrak, Plaintiffs division supervisor, and sent to Iva Heflin (Leídos’ Human Resources Manager) and Reed Heddleston (Leídos’ Operations Manager). (Id.)

In the October 2008 assessment report, Mudrak found that the Wigents’ working relationship did not violate SH-2 because there was no direct or indirect supervisory relationship between Plaintiff and her husband, as defined by SH-2. (Id.) Specifically, Mudrak found that there was no direct supervisory relationship because (1) Plaintiff was a consultant on PRITEC and did “not receive specific tasking or work under direct supervision from Mark”; (2) Plaintiffs role on PRITEC was, “by its very nature, independent of the program execution work being directed by Mark”; (3) Mark did “not direct or provide any inputs” to Plaintiffs assignments or reviews; and (4) on all non-PRITEC projects, Plaintiff had no “programmatic link” to the work her husband was doing. (Id.) Mud-rak further determined that there was no indirect supervisory relationship because “[wjhile Mark is the PM on PRITEC[,] he has no responsibilities that impact [Plaintiff] within Division! ] 1548 ... All indirect matters regarding [Plaintiff] are dealt with by [Plaintiffs immediate supervisor] or me.” (Id.)

Accordingly, Mudrak concluded that there was “no direct supervision and no indirect supervision issues regarding Policy SH-2 that are applicable to the particular situation.” (Id.) (emphasis in original.) Mudrak further stated that he “will make certain that position and role assignments in the future are carefully reviewed” in the context of SH-2, prior to any changes to the Wigents’ work assignments. (Id.)

On November 30, 2009, Mudrak completed an additional assessment report on whether the Wigents’ working relationship violated SH-2. (Def.’s CSF Ex. 5.) The results of the assessment report were sent to Heddleston and Angela Marquez, Leí-dos’ Human Resources Manager. (Id.) For virtually the same reasons as those listed in the 2008 assessment report, Mud-rak found that there was no violation of the SH-2 policy because there was no direct or indirect supervisory relationship between Plaintiff and her husband. (Id.)

Consequently, Plaintiff continued to work on PRITEC and another project from 2007 through 2010, both with her husband as PM. (Def.’s CSF at 5, ¶ 18; PL’s CSF at 2, ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was considered a consultant to those projects, not subject to the direction of the PM. (Id.) Her work on Mark’s projects included: external customer interface and demonstrations; creating and keeping program documentation; and assisting the customer with any documentation they may need for annual reports or briefings. (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that the 2008 and 2009 reports only focus on the structural separation between the two divisions in which she and her husband worked, and do not place any significance in the amount of time she spent on a project in which her husband was the PM. (Decl. of Pl. ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff states that around the time Leídos performed the 2008 and 2009 assessments, she charged at least ninety percent of her time to Mark’s PRITEC project. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Leídos admits that “from 2008 to her removal from the PRI-TEC contract in 2011, Plaintiff charged 90-100% of her time to projects in which Mark Wigent was the Project Manager.” (PL’s CSF Ex. H at 4-5.)

F. 2011 Assessment

From January to mid-March 2011, Leidos conducted an assessment of the working relationship between Plaintiff and her husband. (Def.’s CSF Ex. 7.) The investigation into the Wigents’ working relationship was triggered by Edwin Foreman, Mark’s division manager, who questioned Mark’s submission of a budget proposal for a project called “EQDR.” (Id. Ex. 6.) Leidos contends that “Mark included Plaintiff on a staffing plan for the PRITEC program” and, as a result, Foreman reported to HR a potential violation of SH-2. (Def.’s CSF at 5, ¶ 19.) According to Plaintiff, her name had been placed on the EQDR proposal to merely represent the need in the budget for a systems engineer. (Decl. of .PI. ¶ 30.) In other words, Plaintiff asserts that her name was a “placeholder” and that the placement of her name on the proposal did not mean that she would be assigned work on the project. (Id.) Plaintiff further asserts that the amount of work her husband allocated on the EQDR proposal for the particular systems engineer represented by her name was approximately five percent of the total budget for the project. (Id.)

The 2011 assessment report was prepared by Jim Murray (Leidos’ Vice President of Human Resources), Foreman, and Sergio Nirenberg (Plaintiffs supervisor). (Def.’s CSF Ex. 7.) The report provides, in relevant part:

Background. During a recent proposal effort (EQDR), Mark, as the Program Manager, included [Plaintiff] in the staffing plan which raised concerns about a potential conflict with the SH-2 policy. This concern was raised by Division Manager Ed Foreman. Given the recent SAIC reorganization and the concerns raised by Ed Foreman, a reassessment of the possible nepotism issues regarding the relationship between [Plaintiff] & Mark is recommended to ensure compliance with SAIC policy SH-2 and to ‘prevent potential conflicts of interest and/or allegations of favoritism or sexual harassment.’

[Plaintiff] and Mark Wigent are married.

Direct Supervision Discussion. Although Mark’s responsibilities do not include conducting [Plaintiffs] performance or salary reviews, approving her timecards or expense reports, he does manage the overall work of the program, he may be assigning work to [Plaintiff] and he may affect [Plaintiffs] employment if there was a funding reduction on the program.

Indirect Supervision Discussion. Mark has overall Program Management responsibility over the programs that [Plaintiff] works. All of [Plaintiffs] work is in support of two programs on which Mark is the PM (PRITEC and DCDS). In previous SH-2 assessments, [Plaintiff] was working under TENA and not exclusively under PRITEC. The policy lists ‘program management’ as an indirect supervision area.

Conclusion: It is management and HR’s conclusion that there is a violation of SH-2 in the area of indirect supervision and potentially in the area of direct supervision. Management, in conjunction with HR, needs to address the working relationship to comply with the SH-2 policy.

(Id.) (emphasis in original).

Leídos contends that the 2011 assessment revealed that Plaintiffs involvement on her husband’s projects “was more extensive than was previously realized.” (Def.’s CSF at 5, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff asserts that Leídos’ HR personnel, the divisions, and the division managers were “fully aware of the extent to which Plaintiff worked on Mark’s projects.” (Pl.’s CSF at 2, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff further asserts that there had been no changes to the Wigents’ working relationship, the structure established by Leídos to comply with SH-2, or the nature of the Wigents’ work since the previous 2005, 2008 and 2009 assessments. (Decl. of PI. ¶ 32.)

Following the 2011 assessment report, Leídos’ supervisors and HR discussed various alternatives for restructuring the Wigents’ jobs in order to rectify the violation of SH-2. (Def.’s CSF at 6, ¶ 22; Pl.’s CSF at 2, ¶ 22.) On March 28, 2011, via teleconference, the Wigents, Foreman, Roger Medd (Mark’s immediate supervisor), Nirenberg, Alicia Larosa-Lowe (Leí-dos’ Senior Human Resources Generalist), and Murray discussed the best course of action to avoid a direct or indirect supervisory relationship. (Def.’s CSF Ex. 9.) Murray suggested having Plaintiffs husband step down as PM; but Mark “indicated that it didn’t make sense for him to not be the PM on the project.” (Id.) As a result, Leídos decided to remove Plaintiff from PRITEC effective April 5, 2011. (Id.) Nirenberg and Leídos’ HR personnel stated during the March 28, 2011 teleconference meeting that they would help “redeploy” Plaintiff. (Id.)

On April 5, 2011, Plaintiff was removed from PRITEC and notified that if she was unable to find another position she would eventually have to be laid-off from the company. (Def.’s CSF at 6, ¶ 25; PL’s CSF at 2, ¶ 25.) A few weeks later, on April 20, 2011, Plaintiff sent a letter to Leídos through her legal counsel stating her belief that being removed from PRI-TEC was unlawful and in violation of Hawaii’s antidiscrimination law. (Ph’s Dep. Ex. 10.)

G. Asserted Attempts to Restructure Plaintiff’s Employment

Leidos contends that, around April 2011, Plaintiff was asked if she would consider transferring to another location, which she declined. (Def.’s CSF at 7, ¶ 27.) Leidos further contends that in April and May 2011 Nirenberg (Plaintiffs supervisor) contacted the other program managers in his division and inquired whether there was work for her in those programs. (Def.’s CSF at 7, ¶ 28.) Nirenberg states in his declaration that due to both the location and Plaintiff not being a software developer, he was unable to find any work for her on these other programs. (Declaration of Sergio Nirenberg (“Nirenberg Deck”) ¶ 8.) Nirenberg further states that between April and August 2011 he worked with Plaintiff to respond to a proposal in which Plaintiff would have had full-time work as the systems engineer on another project; however, Leidos did not win the contract for that project. (Id. ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff disputes Leidos’ contentions and asserts that “[o]ther than vaguely asking if I would be interested in working ‘part-time’ [Nirenberg] did not contact me about specific and available jobs.” (Decl. of PI. ¶ 58.) Plaintiff further notes that Leidos did not attempt to place her on the “redeployment list” until after she was informed of her termination of employment from Leidos on November 4, 2011. (Deck of Murray ¶ 26.) According to Plaintiff, the “redeployment list is shared with managers and departments who are [in] need of employees currently employed but without ‘coverage.’ ” (Id. ¶ 57.) At the April 21, 2014 hearing, Leidos conceded that the company should have placed Plaintiff on the redeployment list following her removal from PRITEC. (Rough Transcript at 46.)

Plaintiff stated during her deposition that she had access to internal job postings on the company’s website in 2011, but she did not apply to any job listings on the website or discuss her resume or job options with Leidos’ HR personnel. (Ph’s Dep. 121:7-16; 135:21-138:1; 197:16-198:20.) Plaintiff further stated that she submitted an updated resume to the company website and regularly reviewed the website, but found no positions that could be performed from her home in Kauai. (Id. 139:18-141:4.)

On June 29, 2011, Nirenberg spoke with Plaintiffs husband about stepping down as PM in order to eliminate any potential violations of SH-2. (Def.’s CSF Ex. 13.) The following day, on June 30, 2011, Mark sent an email to Nirenberg stating that he declined to step down from his PM position. (Id.)

In August 2011, Nirenberg asked Plaintiff if she would consider working part-time in a marketing position. (Ph’s Dep. 171:19-172:17; Deck of Nirenberg ¶ 12.) On August 3, 2011, via email, Plaintiff declined the part-time offer and stated the following:

I believe that the reason stated by SAIC for not permitting me to continue in my position, violation of Policy SH-2, is unlawful. Therefore, I ask that SAIC permit me to continue working in the position for which I was hired, with the same terms and conditions.

(Def.’s CSF Ex. 14.) Plaintiff asserts that, in response to her August 3, 2011 email, Nirenberg told her that HR was going to begin the lay-off process. (Pl.’s Dep. 172:12-17.) Plaintiff further asserts that her husband offered to step down as PM in August 2011, but Leidos still continued with the lay-off process. (Decl. of Pl. ¶ 59.)

On November 4, 2011, Leidos issued a Notice of Lay-off to Plaintiff. (Def.’s CSF at 8, ¶ 36; Pl.’s CSF at 2, ¶ 36.) Plaintiff was given the option to terminate her employment on December 2, 2011, or take leave without pay for four extra weeks (until December 30, 2011) in order to remain covered under her benefit plans and seek any available positions within Leidos. (Def.’s CSF Ex. 15.) Plaintiff chose the first option. From November 11, 2011, to November 29, 2011, Plaintiff was placed on Leidos’ redeployment lists. (Def.’s CSF at 8, ¶ 37; Pl.’s CSF at 2, ¶ 37.) Plaintiff was officially separated from employment with Leidos on December 2, 2011. (Def.’s CSF at 8, ¶ 38; PL’s CSF at 2, ¶ 38.)

II. Plaintiff s Allegations of Discrimination

Plaintiff asserts that her and her husband’s working relationship that Leidos claimed violated SH-2 had not only been condoned by, but created by, the company for its benefit; and that it had been approved by the company’s HR department in 2005, 2008, and 2009. (Decl. of Pl. ¶¶ 25, 31-32, 41.) According to Plaintiff, Leidos applied SH-2 differently to non-married closely related employees and permitted them to continue working without penalty. (Id. ¶¶ 66-70.) Plaintiff also asserts that Plaintiff retaliated against her and her husband for complaining about the alleged marital status discrimination. (Compl. at ¶¶ 37-40, 42-46.)

On July 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed a “Pre Complaint Questionnaire” with the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission (“HCRC”). (Decl. of Pl. ¶ 46.) On September 24, 2011, Plaintiff filed a formal Charge of Discrimination with the HCRC alleging marital status discrimination and retaliation in violation of H.R.S. § 378-2. (PL’s Dep. Ex. 14.) After her termination, Plaintiff filed an Amended Charge of Discrimination on January 13, 2012, adding to her original charge “the fact that she has been laid-off from SAIC.” (PL’s CSF Ex. E.)

STANDARD

A party may move for summary judgment on any claim or defense — or part of a claim or defense — under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56. Summary judgment “should be granted ‘if the mov-ant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a)). Under Rule 56, a “party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion,” either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

The substantive law determines which facts are material; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

A genuine issue of material fact exists if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” United States v. Arango, 670 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Conversely, “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769.

The moving party has the burden of persuading the court as to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir.2010). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Sluimer v. Verity, Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir.2010). The nonmoving party must present evidence of a “genuine issue for trial,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), that is “significantly probative or more than merely col-orable.” LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir.2009) (citation omitted). Summary judgment will be granted against a party who fails to demonstrate facts sufficient to establish “an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Parth v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 630 F.3d 794, 798-99 (9th Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The court may not, however, weigh conflicting evidence or assess credibility. In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir.2008). Accordingly, if “reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” summary judgment will be denied. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiffs H.R.S. § 378-2(1) Marital Status Discrimination Claim

In her first claim, Plaintiff alleges that Leídos discriminated against her on the basis of her marital status in violation of H.R.S. § 378-2(1). (Compl. at ¶¶ 31-86.) H.R.S. § 378-2 provides in pertinent part:

(а) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:

(1) Because of ... marital status ...

(A) For any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment!.]

H.R.S. § 378-1 defines “marital status” as “the state of being married or being single.”

The Hawaii Supreme Court has stated that, when addressing employment discrimination claims brought under H.R.S. § 378-2, the courts look to “interpretation of analogous federal laws by the federal courts for guidance.” Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawai'i 408, 425, 32 P.3d 52 (Haw.2001) (citing Shoppe v. Gucci America, Inc., 94 Hawai'i 368, 377, 14 P.3d 1049 (Haw.2000)). Although Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not include “marital status” in its list of protected categories covered by the federal antidiscrimination statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, Hawaii courts in construing H.R.S. § 378-2 have analyzed federal court decisions involving other types of employment discrimination claims. See Shoppe, 94 Hawai'i at 378-81, 14 P.3d 1049 (analyzing H.R.S. § 378-2 age discrimination claim under federal law); Sam Teague, Ltd. v. Hawaii Civil Rights Comm’n, 89 Hawai'i 269, 281, 971 P.2d 1104 (Haw.1999) (analyzing H.R.S. § 378-2 sex discrimination claim under federal law); Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Soc’y, 85 Hawai'i 7, 12-14, 936 P.2d 643 (Haw.1997) (analyzing H.R.S. § 378-2 race discrimination claim under federal law). Accordingly, this Court will examine federal cases under Title VII in order to analyze Plaintiffs H.R.S. § 378-2(1) marital status discrimination claim.

The Ninth Circuit has held that a plaintiff may establish her Title VII case by “simply producing] direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated [the employer].” McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir.2004). Direct evidence is evidence “which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.” Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.2005). Such evidence is usually composed of “clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or actions by the employer.” Id. In contrast, circumstantial evidence constitutes “evidence that requires an additional inferential step to demonstrate discrimination.” Id. at 1095. A plaintiffs circumstantial evidence must be both specific and substantial in order to survive summary judgment. Becerril v. Pima Cnty. Assessor’s Office, 587 F.3d 1162, 1163 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Bergene v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. And Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.2001)).

Alternatively, in order to evaluate the evidence in an orderly way, federal courts may use the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to analyze Title VII employment discrimination claims. Hawn v. Executive Jet Management, Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir.2010); see Hac v. University of Hawaii, 102 Hawai’i 92, 101, 73 P.3d 46 (Haw.2003) (“This court has adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis in HRS § 378-2 discrimination cases.”) and Schefke, 96 Hawai’i at 441, 32 P.3d 52 (adopting a three-prong test for § 378-2(1) claim and noting that it “is consistent with the McDonnell Douglas framework this court has followed in Shoppe, Sam Teague, and Furukawa ”); see also Shoppe, 94 Hawai’i at 378-81, 14 P.3d 1049; Sam Teague, 89 Hawai’i at 279, 971 P.2d 1104; Furukawa, 85 Hawai’i at 12-14, 936 P.2d 643.

A. Direct Evidence: Whether SH-2 is Per Se Discriminatory

Although they have differing interpretations of its impact, both parties acknowledge that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decisions in Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii) Ltd., Inc., 72 Haw.350, 816 P.2d 302 (Haw.1991) (“Ross I”) and Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii) Ltd., Inc., 76 Hawai’i 454, 879 P.2d 1037 (Haw.1994) (“Ross IT’) (collectively “the Ross cases” or “the Ross decisions”) are the leading (and only) Hawaii cases directly addressing H.R.S. § 378-2(l)’s prohibition on marital status discrimination.

In the Ross cases, Stouffer Hotels terminated Harvey Ross as a massage therapist at Waiohai Resort on Kauai after determining that his wife, the principal massage therapist and Harvey’s direct supervisor, could not work in the same department due to the company’s “no-relatives policy.” Ross, 72 Haw. at 351, 816 P.2d 302. That policy prohibited persons related by blood or marriage from working in the same department. Id. With respect to married couples, the policy stated that if the couple married “after being employed ... one of the two will be asked to transfer or resign.” Id. The Hawaii Supreme Court concluded “that as a matter of law, the policy in question of terminating persons who marry other persons working in the same department violates H.R.S. § 378-2 unless the termination falls within one of the exceptions in H.R.S. § 378-3.” Id. at 354, 816 P.2d 302.

Pursuant to the Ross decisions, it appears that SH-2 constitutes direct evidence of per se discrimination unless one of the exceptions under H.R.S. § 378-3 applies. Like Stouffer Hotels’ no-relatives policy, SH-2 applies to both married couples and direct relatives. (See Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 2.) While Leidos notes that SH-2 also applies to employees involved in a “dating relationship” and to those related by marriage, the difference is immaterial and disregards that “spouses” are specifically included on the list of “closely related individuals” subject to scrutiny under the SH-2 policy.

Furthermore, the policy in the Ross cases prohibited a married couple from working in the same department. Similarly, SH-2 essentially bars married couples from working in the same program or project based on the policy’s broad definition of “indirect supervision.” Under the indirect supervision provision, one spouse is prohibited from working on a program or project where the other spouse has “program management, profit and loss (P & L), or budgetary responsibility.” (Id.) Moreover, SH-2 may be more restrictive in certain respects than the policy in the Ross cases. Stouffer Hotels’ no-relatives policy applied only if the two employees married after they started working at the resort. With respect to SH-2, a married couple is subject to the policy even if — as is the case with the Wigents — they were married prior to their employment with Leidos.

Leidos’ principal argument is that SH-2 “does not single out married people,” but rather “focuses on the nature of Plaintiffs relationship as a closely related individual, and not simply on her marital status.” (Def.’s Mot. at 21-22) (emphasis in original.) This very argument was made by the dissent in Ross II and explicitly rejected by the majority. Ross, 76 Hawai’i at 458-59, 879 P.2d 1037. Specifically, the majority held that

the dissent remains wedded to the notion that the definition of marital status contained in H.R.S. § 378-1 (1985) — ‘the state of being married or being single’— unambiguously permits employers to discriminate against married persons so long as the discrimination is based on the ‘identity and occupation of a person’s spouse’ ... and not solely on the fact that he or she is married, regardless of to whom.

That extremely restrictive reading of the statute ignores the simple fact of life that when a person marries, it is always to a particular person with a particular ‘identity.’ One does not ‘marry’ in some generic sense, but marries a specific person. Thus, the ‘identity’ of one’s spouse (and all of his or her attributes, including his or her occupation) is implicitly subsumed within the definition of ‘being married.’ The two cannot be separated. It makes no sense, therefore, to conclude, as the dissent does, that an employer who discriminates based on the ‘identity and occupation’ of a person’s spouse is not also discriminating against that person because he or she is married. An employer can’t do one without the other. Stated otherwise, a no-spouse policy, by definition, applies only to the class of married persons. Consequently, when an employer discharges an employee pursuant to such a policy, it necessarily discriminates ‘because of ... [the employee’s] marital status[.]’ H.R.S. § 378-2.

Granted, the ‘identity and occupation’ of Ross’s spouse was also a contributing cause of his discharge. That, however, does not diminish the fact that, but for Ross’s marital status, he would not have been fired.

Id. (emphasis in original).

The Hawaii Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of “marital status” in H.R.S. § 378-2 makes clear that the provision protects not only an employee’s status as married, but also the “identity and occupation ” of that employee’s spouse. Id. (emphasis added). Although the Ross decisions do not define the term in detail, it appears that SH-2’s “direct supervision” and “indirect supervision” categories are similar to Ross’s “occupation.” See Ross, 72 Haw. at 354, 816 P.2d 302 (“The problem raised by the conflict between company policies prohibiting married persons from working for the same company, or in the same department, or in a supervisory supervisee relationship (emphasis added). This Court’s reading of Ross’s “occupation” is “consistent with the overall purpose and design of Part I of H.R.S. Chapter 378, which ... defines prohibited discriminatory conduct in very broad terms and places the burden on the employer to justify its practices.” Ross, 76 Hawai’i at 459, 879 P.2d 1037; see also Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Min.1979) (relied upon by the Ross I court and holding that marital status “embrace[s] the identity or situation of one’s spouse”) (emphasis added).

The Hawaii Supreme Court in Ross II noted that “regardless of whether we believe that our construction of the statute amounts to good or bad public policy, we are constrained to reaffirm the holding of Ross I.” Ross, 76 Hawai’i at 459, 879 P.2d 1037. Likewise, this Court is constrained to follow the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Ross II. Accordingly, it appears that SH-2 as applied to Plaintiff “violates the plain language and purpose of H.R.S. § 378-2, unless the termination [or other adverse action] falls within one of the exceptions in H.R.S. § 378-3.” Id. at 459, 879 P.2d 1037. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether one of the exceptions in § 378-3 applies, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs marital status discrimination claim.

B. Circumstantial Evidence: Whether SH-2 Was Applied in a Discriminatory Manner

The Court further concludes that Leí-dos’ application of SH-2 to the Wigents in 2011 and Leídos’ finding a violation of the policy raises a genuine issue of material fact whether they constitute circumstantial evidence that SH-2 was applied in a discriminatory manner. Specifically, the record indicates that Leídos conducted three prior assessments in 2005, 2008, and 2009, concerning whether Plaintiff and her husband’s working relationship violated SH-2 and that the Wigents were never found to have violated the policy. (See PL’s CSF Ex. M; Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 5.) Further, the record shows that in 2005 the Wigents and Leídos agreed upon an organizational structure in which Plaintiff and her husband were placed in different divisions with separate supervisory chains of command. (Id.) Plaintiff submits evidence that the work structure agreed upon by the parties did not substantially change from 2005 to 2011, when Leídos found that the Wigents’ working relationship violated SH-2. (Decl. of Pl. ¶¶ 16-37.) Plaintiffs evidence is corroborated by the 2008 and 2009 assessment reports which provide that on all non-PRITEC projects, Plaintiff had no “programmatic link” to the work her husband was doing, and, on the PRI-TEC project, her role was, “by its very nature, independent of the program execution work being directed by Mark.” (PL’s CSF Ex. M; Def.’s CSF Ex. 5.)

Importantly, the 2011 assessment report stated that in previous SH-2 assessments Plaintiff was not working “exclusively” on programs managed by her husband; and, moreover, the company admits that from 2008 to 2011 she was billing a minimum of ninety percent and up to one-hundred percent of her time on projects in which Mark was the PM. (Pl.’s EX. H. at No. 7.)

Furthermore, the 2011 assessment report stated that the investigation into the Wigents’ working relationship was triggered when Mark placed Plaintiff on a budget proposal for the EQDR project. However, Leídos does not explain why the company did not simply restructure the Wigents’ working relationship to avoid a SH-2 violation, as the company had previously done in 2005. Even assuming (but not finding) Leídos could not have restructured the Wigents’ working relationship, the Court notes that the amount of work allocated to the systems engineer on EQDR represented only five percent of the total budget for the project. Consequently, the Court concludes that Leídos’ application of SH-2 to the Wigents in 2011 and Leídos’ finding a violation of the policy raises a genuine issue of material fact whether they constitute circumstantial evidence that the policy was applied in a discriminatory manner. In other words, like the Ross cases, it appears “but for” Plaintiff being married to Mark, she would not have been removed from PRITEC. See Ross, 76 Hawai’i at 458-59, 879 P.2d 1037.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs marital status discrimination claim.

C. Whether Plaintiff Establishes Marital Status Discrimination Through the McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework

1. Statutory Framework

Both Plaintiff and Leídos utilize the McDonnell Douglas framework in analyzing Plaintiffs marital status discrimination claim.

For the first step in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination that “gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1156. Plaintiff may establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence by showing that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for her position, (3) she experienced an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Id. (citing Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir.2004)).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action need produce very little evidence in order to overcome an employer’s motion for summary judgment.” Chuang v. Univ. of California Davis Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir.2000). “This is because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry — one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.” Id. (citing Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155.

If Defendant meets this burden, then Plaintiff must raise “a triable issue of material fact” as to whether Defendant’s proffered reasons for the adverse employment actions are “mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. “[A] plaintiffs burden is much less at the prima facie stage than at the pretext stage.” Id. at 1158.

“A plaintiff can show pretext directly, by showing that discrimination more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.2003). A plaintiff may show pretext through presenting direct evidence, or by presenting circumstantial evidence. See Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir.2011). “To show pretext using circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must put forward specific and substantial evidence challenging the credibility of the employer’s motives.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642.

2. Application

a. Prima Facie Case

Leídos agrees that the first two elements of Plaintiffs prima facie case are present here. (Mot. at 24.) Specifically, Leídos admits that (1) Plaintiff is a member of a protected class because she is married, and (2) she was qualified for her position.

Regarding the third element, Leí-dos asserts that the only adverse employment action Plaintiff suffered was her official termination on December 2, 2011. (Mot. at 34.) As discussed below, the Ninth Circuit “define[s] adverse employment broadly” and holds that “an action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 & 1243 (9th Cir.2000). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has found “that a wide array of disadvantageous changes in the workplace constitute adverse employment actions.” Id. at 1240.

The Court finds that Plaintiff was subject to several adverse actions in addition to her official separation from employment with Leídos on December 2, 2011. First, Plaintiffs removal from PRI-TEC was an adverse action because a reasonable employee would be deterred from engaging in protected conduct if the employee knew that it would result in their removal from a project in which they had been working on for several years. Second, Nirenberg’s statement to Plaintiff that HR would begin the termination process is an adverse action because a reasonable employee would be dissuaded from engaging in protected conduct if the employee knew that their company would initiate the process of terminating their employment. Finally, Leídos’ issuance of the Notice of Lay-off on November 4, 2011, was an adverse action because courts have consistently held that termination of employment constitutes an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir.2000).

Accordingly, the only remaining issue regarding Plaintiffs prima facie case is whether similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1156.

The Ninth Circuit has held that individuals “are similarly situated to the plaintiff when they ‘have similar jobs and display similar conduct.’ ” Earl, 658 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641). Although Plaintiff need not show that other employees were identical to her, she must show that they were “similar in material respects.” Id. Materiality depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1157. In other words, “[mjateriality depends on the context and is a question of fact that cannot be mechanically resolved.” Earl, 658 F.3d at 1114; see also Beck v. UFCW, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 885 n. 5 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that “whether two employees are similarly situated is ordinarily a question of fact”). The Ninth Circuit has noted that “it is important not to lose sight of the common-sense aspect of the similarly situated inquiry ... It is not an unyielding, inflexible requirement that requires near one-to-one mapping between employees.” Earl, 658 F.3d at 1115. (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff points to four sets of related, non-married employees who were subject to SH-2 assessments around the same time as the Wigents’ 2011 assessment. (Opp. at 19-22.) Plaintiff asserts that these non-married relatives had what could be considered an “indirect supervisory” or “direct supervisory” relationship but were not penalized by Leidos under SH-2. (Id. at 19.) As it did with the Wigents, Leidos prepared assessment reports discussing whether these non-married relatives’ working relationships violated SH-2. (See PL’s CSF Ex. L.)

First, on July 9, 2011, Leidos assessed whether the working relationship between Scott Smith and his son, James Smith, violated SH-2. (Id. at 1-2.) Leidos stated in the Background section that Scott is a Program Manager in Division 212, and James is an Engineering Intern in Division 346. (Id. at 1.) In the same section, Leidos stated that “James does not presently perform work on programs managed by Scott.” (Id.) Proceeding to the Indirect Supervision Discussion section, Leidos noted that “[although Scott has program management, profit and loss, or budgetary responsibilities within his programs, James does not report to Scott nor does he perform work on the programs that Scott manages.” (Id. at 2.) Leidos further noted that “if James’ specific skill set is required on a task under any program that Scott manages, those tasks will be managed by [another Program Manager].” (PL’s CSF Ex. L at 2.) Accordingly, Leidos concluded that there were no direct or indirect supervision issues regarding the SH-2 policy that were applicable to the Smiths’ working relationship. (Id.)

Next, on July 19, 2011, Leidos conducted an assessment of whether the working relationship between Amy Smith and her son, Sean Smith, violated SH-2. (Id. at 3-4.) In the Direct Supervision Discussion, Leidos stated that “Amy Smith is a branch (line) manager in the Ocean Sciences Research and Development Division (335 rate pool),” and “Sean, while working within Amy’s overall chain, is not” supervised by his mother. (Id. at 3.) The Indirect Supervision Discussion stated that Amy “has program management, profit and loss, and budgetary responsibilities for her projects,” but has no influence over the profit and loss or budgetary responsibilities of her son’s prospective project. (Id. at 3.) As such, Leídos concluded that there were no direct or indirect supervision issues that were applicable to the Smiths’ working relationship. (Pl.’s CSF Ex. L at 4.)

Third, Leídos’ report of June 28, 2011, assessed whether the working relationship between Susan Harris and her son, Zachary Harris, violated SH-2. (Id. at 5-6.) In the Direct Supervision Discussion, Leídos stated that “Susan Harris is a line manager (program manager) but will not be the line manager on Zachary Harris’s project and will not be his supervisor.” (Id. at 5.) In the Indirect Supervision Discussion, Leídos further stated that “Susan Harris has program management, profit and loss, and budgetary responsibility for her projects” but “has no supervisory responsibility over the profit and loss or budgetary performance of’ Zachary’s prospective project. (Id. at 5-6.) Importantly, however, the assessment report noted that Zachary was assigned to the “Cedar” project which fell under the “Timber” contract. (Id. at 6.) Susan was the PM for the Timber contract. (Pl.’s CSF Ex. L at 6.) As PM on the Timber contract, Susan was “to act as the liaison to the government COR for issues pertaining to the contract and programmatic planning activity” and did not have “cost, schedule and technical performance” oversight. (Id.) Because the individual PMs were responsible for these tasks, the report concluded that there were no direct or indirect supervision issues regarding SH-2 that were applicable to the Harris’ working relationship. (Id.)

Finally, on August 26, 2011, Leídos conducted an assessment of whether the working relationship between Daniel Kil-foyle and his nephew, Alex Kilfoyle, violated SH-2. (Id. at 7-8.) The Direct Supervision Discussion of the assessment report provides in relevant part:

Neither Dan nor Alex is a line manager. Although they report through the same cost center division, they do so through separate organizational structures and reporting lines....

In Dan’s capacity as senior technical staff, he provides technical leadership on programs across the EW division. As such, in past tasks under the Retriever Program in 2010, Dan provided technical leadership and direction to engineers assigned to the program, including Alex.

(Id.) Leídos further noted in the Indirect Supervision Discussion that neither Daniel nor Alex had “program management,] profit and loss, or budgetary responsibility within EW division, Cost Center 1758, or anywhere else in SAIC.” (Pl.’s CSF Ex. L at 8.) Like in previous reports, Leídos concluded that there were no direct or indirect supervision issues regarding SH-2 that were applicable to the Kilfoyles’ working relationship. (Id.)

Leídos argues that “none of the employees with whom Plaintiff seeks to compare herself were ‘similarly situated.’ ” (Reply at 5.) (emphasis in original.) Specifically, Leídos contends that “[ujnlike the Wig-ents, none of the four employees with whom Plaintiff compares herself were assigned to the very project where their employee-relative was the Project Manager.” (Mat 6.)

The Court agrees with Leidos that James Smith and his mother are not “similarly situated” to Plaintiff and her husband. However, the Court finds that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to her, Plaintiff meets her minimal prima facie burden by demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether three other sets of similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably than her and her husband. See Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir.2002) (“The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.”); Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir.1991) (“[T]he amount [of evidence] that must be produced in order to create a prima facie case is very little”) (quotation marks omitted).

In particular, Plaintiff points out that Leídos concluded that there were no direct or indirect supervision issues regarding Amy and Sean Smith’s working relationship, even though Sean was “working within Amy’s overall chain.” (Pl.’s CSF Ex. L at 3.) Leídos in its Reply asserts that Amy was not the PM on the project to which Sean was assigned. (Reply at 6.) The assessment report describes Amy as a “branch (line) manager.” (Id. at 3.) However, in the Direct Supervision Discussion of the Harris’ assessment report, Leídos appears to describe a “line manager” as a “program manager.” (See id. at 5.) It is thus unclear to the Court the extent to which a “branch (line) manager” differs from a “Project Manager.” Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Sean was working under Amy’s organizational structure; and Amy had substantial managerial responsibilities within that structure.

As discussed above, Leídos also found that Susan and Zachary Harris’ working relationship did not violate SH-2 even though Zachary was working on the Cedar project which “fell under” the Timber contract, where Susan was PM. (Id. at 6.) Leídos contends that Susan and Zachary Harris are not similarly situated to the Wigents because Susan’s role as PM was limited to that of a government liaison and thus did not have cost, schedule, or technical performance oversight of the program her son was assigned to. (Reply at 7.) However, drawing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the structural separation between Susan and Zachary does not appear materially different from the separation between Plaintiff and her husband. Plaintiff submits evidence that her role on PRITEC was limited to that of a consultant, and she was in a separate reporting and supervisory chain from her husband.

The degree of separation between the Wigents and the Kilfoyles is also similar in this respect. Like the Wigents, Daniel and Alex Kilfoyle were in “separate organizational structures and reporting lines.” (Pl.’s CSF Ex. L at 7.) Furthermore, the Wigents were in completely different divisions arguably creating an even greater degree of organizational separation than the Kilfoyles’ working relationship.

Again, taking the evidence as a whole, the Court finds that Plaintiff meets her minimal prima facie burden by demonstrating that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Amy and Sean Smith, Susan and Zachary Harris, and Daniel and Alex Kilfoyle were similarly situated individuals outside Plaintiffs protected class and were treated more favorably than her and her husband. In so finding, the Court rejects Leídos attempts to impose a strict construction of the “similarly situated” requirement and force Plaintiff to produce evidence of non-relatives employees who were in an identical employment situation to the Wigents. See Earl, 658 F.3d at 1114 (holding that the similarly situated inquiry does not require a “one-to-one mapping between employees”). The Ninth Circuit only requires that similarly situated individuals be “similar in all material respects.” Id. at 1114 (emphasis added). “Material” means “[h]aving some logical connection with the consequential facts.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Ed. p. 998 (2004). Plaintiff met her minimal prima facie burden by submitting evidence of non-married Leídos employees with some managerial or leadership responsibilities over a program or project that their relatives work on.

Even assuming (but not finding) that none of the four employees with whom Plaintiff compares herself were similarly situated, the Ninth Circuit holds that the fourth element of Plaintiffs prima facie case can be met by showing that “similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1156 (emphasis added). As indicated hereinbefore, the Court concludes that Leídos’ application of SH-2 to the Wigents in 2011 and Leídos’ finding a violation of the policy raises a genuine issue of material fact whether they constitute circumstantial evidence that SH-2 was applied in a discriminatory manner.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff establishes the fourth and final element of her prima facie case under either of Hawn’s alternative requirements.

b. Defendant’s Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons

Since Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of marital status discrimination, the burden now shifts to Leídos to show that its adverse employment actions were taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. at 1155.

Leídos submits that Plaintiff was removed from PRITEC on April 5, 2011, because the Wigents’ working relationship violated SH-2; and Mark declined to step down as PM on the project. Further, Leídos submits that Plaintiffs employment was terminated because she turned down a part-time offer and did not contact HR for help with redeployment; and the company could not find her any other available position.

Accordingly, the burden now shifts back to Plaintiff to raise “a triable issue of material fact” as to whether Leídos’ proffered reasons for its employment actions are “mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155.

c. Evidence of Pretext

Plaintiff must establish that Leí-dos’ reasons for its employment actions are pretextual by either directly persuading the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. Plaintiff attempts to show pretext by arguing that Leídos (1) deviated from company protocols; (2) gave false explanations for its employment actions; and (3) “applied policy SH-2 in a discriminatory manner in 2011 after finding no conflict of interest in 2004-2005, 2008, and 2009 under the same work structure it had established for Plaintiff and Mark Wigent.” (Opp. at 5,12, and 15.)

First, Plaintiff attempts to show pretext by asserting that Leídos failed to follow its protocols in (1) placing employees on the redeployment list upon removal from a program and (2) continuing to employ engineers despite lacking “coverage” for them. (Id. at 16.) The Ninth Circuit has found that deviations from an employer’s protocols may support an inference of pretext. See Porter v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885, 896 (9th Cir.2004).

Here, Plaintiff submits in her declaration that during the March 28, 2011 teleconference meeting Nirenberg (Plaintiffs supervisor) and Jim Murray (VP of HR) told her that she would be removed from PRITEC and “immediately” placed on the redeployment list, but was not actually placed on the list until after she received her November 4, 2011 termination notice. (Decl. of PI. ¶ 39, 43, 56.) At the April 21, 2014 hearing, Leídos conceded that the company should have placed Plaintiff on the redeployment list following her removal from PRITEC:

THE COURT: You do agree when an employee goes under no coverage they are meant to be put on the redeployment list.

MS. ING [Counsel for Leídos]: Yes, but the other side to that is that the employee needs to contact HR.

(Rough Transcript at 46.) Although Leí-dos argues that Plaintiff needed to contact HR in order to get placed on the redeployment list, the record indicates that HR was aware that Plaintiff was “without coverage.” (See Def.’s CSF Ex. 9.) Specifically, the record shows that Alicia Larosa-Lowe (Senior HR Generalist) was a participant in the March 28, 2011 teleconference meeting in which Leídos decided to remove Plaintiff from PRITEC and attempt to redeploy her. (Id.)

Leídos argues that the only evidence Plaintiff submits in support of her claim that the company failed to follow its protocols are “self-serving, conclusory statements.” (Reply at 12.) The Court observes that much of Plaintiffs evidence is derived from her declaration and deposition testimony. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[sjpecific testimony by a single declarant can create a triable issue of fact,” but that a court “need not find a genuine issue of fact if, in its determination, the particular declaration was ‘uncorroborated and self-serving.’” Neovi, 604 F.3d at 1159 (citing Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1061). However, as discussed above, the Ninth Circuit in Phan court held that self-serving declarations can create a genuine issue of material fact; and that courts can only disregard a self-serving declaration in certain instances, such as when the declaration is conclusory or is based on facts beyond the declarant’s personal knowledge. Phan, 500 F.3d 895, 909-10.

Here, the Court finds Plaintiffs statement in her declaration that other engineers continued to be employed despite losing “coverage” creates a triable issue of material fact as to whether Leídos failed to follow its protocols. (See Decl. of PI. ¶¶ 53, 61.) During her deposition,