Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION Amit P. Mehta, United States District Judge I. INTRODUCTION In August 2010, Plaintiff Dr. Brett Steele, then 47 years old, was hired on ,a probationary basis as an Associate Professor at the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (“CISA”). Plaintiffs first year was not all smooth sailing. Twice, Plaintiff met with his supervisors, who expressed displeasure—sometimes vigorously—with aspects of Plaintiffs teaching strategies and curriculum decisions. Despite these issues, however, Plaintiff felt that his time at CISA. had been successful. As a consequence, he was surprised when, in May 2011, he was notified that he would be terminated from his position at the end of the summer semester. Two months later, after CISA refused to provide Plaintiff with a reason for his dismissal, Plaintiff filed an informal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Commission. In August 2011, after receiving complaints from two employees regarding Plaintiffs behavior, CISA. placed Plaintiff on administrative leave with pay, rescinded his security status, and barred him from entering Fort McNair and Fort Bragg, where CISA classes are taught. Several days later, on August 19, 2011, Plaintiff resigned. Plaintiff then filed a formal EEO complaint, alleging that he had been subject to disparate treatment based on age and prior EEO activity, as well as a hostile work environment. Plaintiffs EEO complaint was denied on May 10, 2013. He then filed'suit in this court, alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), as well as constructive discharge and a claim for equitable relief. Before the court is Defendant Ashton Carter’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. After reviewing the pleadings and the accompanying exhibits, the court will enter summary judgment in favor of Defendant on all of Plaintiff’s claims. II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Before turning to the facts, the court explains how it evaluated the record evidence. As required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7(h), Defendant appropriately submitted a statement of facts as to which it contends there is no material dispute. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 25, Def.’s Mem. in Support of its Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 25-1 [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.], Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, ECF No. 25-2 [hereinafter DSMF]. Plaintiff, however, did not respond pursuant to the requirements of the rule. Instead, he filed both (1) a Statement of Material Facts in Dispute, Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.,’ ECF No. 28 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n], Statement of Material Facts in Dispute, ECF No. 28-1 [hereinafter PL’s Disputed Facts], and (2) a Response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, PL’s Opp’n, Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, ECF No. 28-2 [hereinafter PSMF]. In the latter document, Plaintiff frequently states that a fact proffered by Defendant is “disputed” “to the extent that the Agency is offering th[e] statement” as evidence that Plaintiff “was not terminated because of his age” or “was not placed on administrative leave because of engagement in protected EEO activity.” See, e.g., PSMF ¶¶ 21, 22, 24, 28-30, 32-33. As support for those contentions Plaintiff does not cite record facts, but instead, cross-references paragraphs in his own Statement of Material Facts in Dispute. Often, however, the cross-referenced paragraphs themselves do not contain assertions of fact based on the record evidence. Instead, they contain legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. For instance, Plaintiff offers as a disputed material “fact” that he was “terminated because of his age” or that adverse actions were taken against him “because of his engagement in protected EEO activity.” See, e.g., PL’s Disputed Facts ¶¶2, 11-13. Such statements, of course, are not assertions of-fact, but rather are legal conclusions. , As a consequence of Plaintiffs practice, it has been difficult to separate the facts that are not in genuine dispute from those that are. The court nevertheless has done its best to make that determination. In reciting the facts below, the court cites to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts and Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute when the parties expressly agree that facts are not in dispute. It generally cites to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute when Plaintiff has provided no evidence to rebut the undisputed fact stated by Plaintiff. See LCvR 7(h) (“In determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.”). Otherwise, the court cites directly to the record. 1. CISA’s Decision to Hire Plaintiff In the spring of 2010, Plaintiff Dr. Brett Steele (DOB 1963), then age 47, applied to become a professor at the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (“CISA”). DSMF ¶¶ 1, 8; PSMF ¶¶ 1, 8; Am. Compl, ECF No. 16, ¶ 1. CISA serves to provide “interagency and international security education [which] promotes] a common understanding among agencies, nations, and military services.” DSMF ¶2; PSMF ¶2. It has two campuses—one at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., and one at Fort Bragg in North Carolina—and includes a variety of programs funded by a hodgepodge of sources. DSMF ¶¶ 2-3. As part of the CISA hiring process, Plaintiff was interviewed twice by multiple professors, iíicluding Dr. Alejandra Bola-nos and Dr. Querine Hanlon, who were to (and did) serve as first and second level supervisors, respectively, for the new hire. DSMF ¶4; PSMF ¶4. Plaintiff initially was offered a position at Fort Bragg, which he declined. DSMF ¶ 6; PSMF ¶ 5. He then was offered an Associate Professor position at Fort McNair, ■ which he accepted. DSMF ¶ 6; PSMF ¶ 5. The position was a renewable three-year professorship that was probationary for the first year. DSMF ¶8; PSMF ¶8. Plaintiff began teaching in August 2010. Am. Compl. ¶ 14. %. Conflict Involving Plaintiff’s Teaching Methods Over the course of the 2010-2011 academic year, Plaintiff taught or co-taught several classes: Geostrategy; Origins .'of Conflict in War; Strategic Thought; and Cyber Strategy. DSMF ¶9; PSMF ¶9. Early in the spring 2011 semester, conflict began to arise between Plaintiff and his supervisors regarding his teaching methods and curriculum decisions. On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff attended a meeting with his supervisors, Dean Hanlon and Dr. Bo-lanos, who admonished Plaintiff about his use of an unapproved concept in his Strategic Thought sections, as well as his decision to stray from the syllabus he was required to follow. DSMF ¶ 11; PSMF ¶ 11; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1, Dep. of Brett Steele, ECF No. 28-4 [hereinafter Pi’s Steele Dep.], at 52-66. As a result of this conversation, Plaintiff “modified his teaching instruction to conform to Dean Han-lon’s request.” DSMF ¶ 11; PSMF ¶ 11. Sometime after Plaintiffs meeting with Dean Hanlon, Dr. Bolanos—Plaintiffs first-level supervisor—informed Plaintiff that she had heard that students had complained to Colonel Bell, the Chancellor of CISA, about Plaintiffs instruction. DSMF ¶ 12; PSMF ¶ 12. Shortly .thereafter, on March 18, 2011, Plaintiff met with Colonel Bell, Dean Hanlon, and Dr. Bolanos to discuss alleged student and ¡faculty concerns about his teaching methods and his decision to present information to the class that was neither on the syllabus nor the final exam. DSMF ¶ 18; PSMF ¶ 13. Among other issues, the administrators stated that students were concerned that Plaintiffs decision to veer off the syllabus in Strategic Thought would put the students in his section at a disadvantage, because the students were graded by professors from other sections who did not teach that material. DSMF ¶ 13; PSMF ¶ 13. All parties agree that this “academic debate” between Colonel Bell and Plaintiff became heated, with Plaintiff alleging that Colonel Bell “scream[ed] and yell[ed] at [him],” Am. Compl. ¶ 27, and Colonel Bell .admitting “I had raised my voice in that meeting to get [Plaintiffs] attention,” PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 2, Dep. of Michael Bell, ECF No. 28-5 [hereinafter Pl.’s Bell Dep.], at 11. S. Termination of Plaintiff’s Employment at CISA In 2010, the Department of Defense experienced a reduction in its budget. Anticipating that the National Defense University (“NDU”) would face a 10 to 15 percent budget cut, the administration determined that CISA, as part of NDU, would need to eliminate three faculty positions. PSMF ¶ 15; PL’s Bell. Dep. at 34-36, 44-45; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 25, Def.’s Mem. in Support, ECF No. 25-1 [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.], Ex. 2, Dep. of Michael Bell, ECF No. 25-4 [hereinafter Def’s Bell Dep.], at 10-14; PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 6,. Aug. 31, 2012, Fact-Finding .Conference [hereinafter PL’s Ex. 6], at 117-19. Ultimately, CISA administrators determined that only employees who were on probationary status would be considered and selected for termination. PL’s Bell Dep. at 41-42 (testi-ftring that “[CISA] did not look at terminating anyone who was past their probationary year”). NDU sought a waiver to avoid making staff reductions, but learned in May 2011 that the waiver request had been denied. DSMF ¶ 17; PSMF ¶ 17; Dot’s Bell Dep. at 91-92; PL’s Bell Dep. at 34. At the time, only six CISA employees definitively held probationary status: Plaintiff, Dr. Art Westneat, Dr. David Ucko, Dr. Jay Parker, Dr. Paul Miller, and Seth Malaguerra. Def.’s Mem., Decl. of Michael Bell, ECF No. 25-6 [hereinafter Bell Decl.], at 4. Colonel Bell and Dean Hanlon made the decision to recommend to Admiral Ann Rondeau, the President of NDU, that Plaintiff, Westneat, and Malaguerra be terminated. DSMF 1Í1Í17; PSMF 1Í1Í17. Admiral Rondeau approved their recommendation. DSMF ¶¶ 17; PSMF ¶¶ 17. On May 18, 2011, Dean Hanlon met with Plaintiff to inform him that he would be terminated from employment at CISA when the summer semester ended on August 17, 2011. DSMF ¶ 22; PSMF ¶ 22. Dr. Bolanos and Dean Herman Meyer, CISA’s Dean of Students, also were present at the meeting. DSMF ¶ 22; PSMF ¶ 22. Dean Hanlon did not provide a reason for the termination. DSMF ¶ 22; PSMF ¶ 22. Two months later, on July 20, 2011, Plaintiff filed an informal EEO complaint alleging that he had been removed due to his age. DSMF ¶ 23; PSMF ¶ 23. In the last few weeks of the summer semester, two CISÁ employee's lodged complaints against Plaintiff, stating that they “felt threatened by [Plaintiff] who was acting erratically and aggressively.” DSMF ¶ 24; PSMF ¶24. On August 2, 2011, Plaintiff was called into Colonel Bell’s office for a meeting, DSMF ¶25; PSMF ¶ 25, at which Colonel Bell intended to inform Plaintiff that he was being placed on administrative leave, Pl.’s Bell Dep. at 15-16. Once - again, the meeting became heated. At some point during the encounter, Colonel Bell hit his fist on the desk, causing Plaintiff to get up to leave the room. DSMF ¶¶ 26-27; PSMF ¶¶ 26-27; PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 9, Aug. 31, 2012, Fact-Finding Conference, ECF 28-12 [hereinafter PL’s Ex. 9], at 30-31. On his way out, Plaintiff was blocked—it is unclear whether accidentally or intentionally—by two CISA administrators, Dean Herman Meyer and Dean Craig Deare, both of whom had been present at the meeting. DSMF ¶ 27; PSMF ¶27; PL’s Ex. 9 at 31. Once outside the office, Plaintiff was met by security officials and Military Police Officers, who collected his ID and keys and escorted him to his office to collect his belongings. DSMF ¶ 27; PSMF ¶ 27. Later that day, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave with pay and was banned from Fort McNair and Fort Bragg. DSMF ¶ 29; PSMF ¶ 29. Plaintiff resigned 15 days later on August 17, 2011. See PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 18, ECF No. 28-21. During the next semester, three faculty members—Dr. Sean McFate (DOB 1969), Dr. Jay Parker (DOB 1952), and Dr. Peter Thompson (DOB 1973)—took over Plaintiffs teaching duties. DSMF ¶28; PSMF ¶ 28. B. Procedural Background Two and a half months after his resignation, on or about November 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the Department of Defense’s EEO office. Am. Compl. ¶10. On May 10, 2013, the EEO office issued a Final Agency Decision rejecting Plaintiffs claims and giving Plaintiff the right to file a complaint in federal court. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. On August 9, 2013, Plaintiff timely filed his Complaint, alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment'under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), as well as constructive discharge and a claim for equitable relief. Am, Compl.; see also Compl., ECF No. 1. Following discovery, on May 4, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and/or for Summ. J., ECF No. 25. Defendant’s Motion is now ripe for consideration. III. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Motion for Summary Judgment Summary judgment will only be granted if the movant can show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, the court reviews all “[underlying facts and inferences ... in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party, while a fact is “material” only if it is capable of affecting the outcome of litigation. Id. at 248, 106 5.Ct. 2505. A non-material factual dispute is insufficient to prevent the court from granting summary judgment. Id, Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, [] on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and identifying those portions of the record that it believes “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has made an adequate showing that a fact cannot be disputed, the burden Shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to “set forth specific facts showing that there‘is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citation' and internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). The nonmoving party may oppose the motion using “any of the kinds of eviden-tiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the meré pleadings themselves, and' it is from this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving party to make the showing to which [the Court has] referred.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The evidence of the non-mov-ant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences ’ are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). However, “to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must offer more than mere unsupported allegations or denials.” Dormu v. District of Columbia, 795 F.Supp.2d 7, 17 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548). In other words, if the non-movant’s evidence is “merely col-orable” or “not significantly probative,” summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment, then, is appropriate when the nonmoving party fails to offer “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. IV. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiffs Discrimination Claim Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the federal government is prohibited from discriminating against its employees due to their age. Specifically, Section 633a(a) of the ADEA states that “[a]U personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment [in the federal government] who are at least 40 years of age ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). To pursue a discrimination claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff may use either direct or circumstantial evidence. Mianegaz v. Hyatt Corp., 319 F.Supp.2d 13, 18 (D.D.C.2004) (citing Dunaway v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002)); Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C.Cir.1999). Where a plaintiff offers “only indirect evidence” of discrimination, however, the court must follow the three-part, burden-shifting framework originally established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), for use in Title VII cases. See Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C.Cir.1999) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claims); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (assuming the McDonnell Douglas framework applied to ADEA claims). Because the framework for determining ADEA and Title VII claims overlaps significantly, the court cites throughout this opinion—as applicable—case law from both ADEA and Title VII cases. The McDonnell Douglas framework involves three steps. First, the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance' of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 144 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citations omitted). This burden, however, “is not' onerous.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Here, to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA, Plaintiff must show that he: (1) is a member of the protected class (ie., is over 40 years old); (2) was qualified for the position at CISA; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was disadvantaged in favor of a substantially younger person. Martin v. District of Columbia, 78 F.Supp.3d 279, 294-95 (D.D.C.2015) (citing Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1155 (D.C.Cir.2004) (observing that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case when she neglected to show that, she was disadvantaged in favor of a “substantially younger” person)); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (noting that in discrimination- cases, “[t]he fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age”). Second, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer then must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Stella, 284 F.3d at 144. If the employer proffers such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the legitimate reason provided by the employer was in fact pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817. At the summary judgment stage, however, once an employer sets forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the employment action, “the question whether the employee actually made out a prima facie case is no longer relevant and thus disappears and drops out of the picture.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493-94 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 758 (D.C.Cir.2016) (“At the summary judgment stage, once the employer has claimed a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, [the McDonnell Douglas] burden-shifting framework disappears.”); Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp., Inc., 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C.Cir.2013) (applying the Brady framework to the ADEA). At that point, the court must determine whether “the employee [has] produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-diseriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of’ some prohibited ground. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 (citations omitted); Nurriddin, 818 F.3d at 758 (“The ‘one central inquiry’ that remains is whether a reasonable jury could infer retaliation or discrimination from all the evidence.”) (citation omitted)). Courts consider this issue “in light of the total circumstances of the case,” asking whether the jury could infer discrimination from the combination of (1) the plaintiffs prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff ... or any contrary evidence that may be available to the employer. Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1351 (D.C.Cir.2012) (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C.Cir.1998))' (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nurriddin, 818 F.3d at 758. Although a plaintiff suing a private employer only may succeed on an ADEA claim by “proving] by a preponderance of the evidence ... that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employment action,” Spaeth v. Georgetown Univ., 943 F.Supp.2d 198, 205 (D.D.C.2013) (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted), this is not the same for plaintiffs who sue federal employers. A plaintiff suing the federal government need only show that “age was a factor in the employer’s' decision” in order to earn declaratory and possibly injunctive relief. Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 206 (D.C.Cir.2010). A government employee who desires to receive reinstatement or backpay,’ however, must meet the higher burden of proving that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employment action. Id. at 207. 1. Direct Evidence of Discrimination Before the court turns to the circumstantial evidence of discrimination offered by Plaintiff, it first must address whether Plaintiff has offered the type of “direct evidence” that “would generally entitle a plaintiff to a jury trial.” Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1246-47 (D.C.Cir.2011) (analyzing a case under the D.C. Human Rights Act, which is analyzed “in the same way that [the court] analyze[s] discrimination claims under the federal anti-discrimination laws”); Hampton v. Vilsack, 760 F.Supp.2d 38, 49-50 (D.D.C.2011), aff'd, 685 F.3d 1096 (D.C.Cir.2012) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)). One example of direct evidence is “a statement that itself shows racial or gender bias in the [employment] decision.” Vatel, 627 F.3d at 1247. Plaintiff asserts that he has provided direct evidence of discrimination. PL’s Opp’n at 12. He points to his own deposition testimony, during which he recounted that his first level supervisor, Dr. Bolanos, made “[statements ... that were highly praising younger people and [showing] dislike for certain older employees.” PL’s Steele Dep. at 35-36. Plaintiff, however, provided only one concrete instance in which Dr. Bolanos made such statements. Plaintiff recalled that, when he met with Dr. Bolanos for the first time after he had started his job, PL’s Ex. 9 at 46-47, Dr. Bolanos commented that young people “are such a breath of fresh air” and “eager to please,” while older employees are more “difficult to work with” and “stubborn,” id. at 47; see also PL’s Steele Dep. at 40. Dr. Bolanos then allegedly negatively referred to an administrative employee in her 50s, describing to Plaintiff how CISA had fired the woman, but then was forced to rescind the termination decision after she filed an EEO complaint. PL’s Ex. 9 at 48; PL’s Steele Dep. at 40. Dr. Bolanos denies making such statements. PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 10, August 3Í, 2012, Fact-Finding Conference, ECF No. 28-13 [hereinafter PL’s Ex. 10], at 12-13. At the summary judgment stage, however, the court must draw all credibility determinations in favor of the non-movant and thus assumes that Dr. Bolanos made the statements attributed to her. Nevertheless, those statements are not the kind of direct evidence of discrimination that would entitle Plaintiff, without more, to get to a jury. “Direct evidence does not include stray remarks in the workplace, particularly those made by non-decision makers or statements made by decision makers unrelated to the decisional process itself.” Waterhouse v. District of Columbia., 124 F.Supp.2d 1, 12 (D.D.C.2000), aff'd 298 F.3d 989 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citing Kalekiristos v. CTF Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F.Supp. 641, 665 (D.D.C.), aff'd without op., 132 F.3d 1481 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citations omitted)); Siragy v. Georgetown Univ., 1999 WL 767831, at *6 (D.D.C.1999); cf. Wilson v. Cox, 753 F.3d 244, 247 (D.C.Cir.2014) (finding that two separate statements made by decision-maker regarding employment were sufficient to constitute direct evidence of age discrimination); cf. Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 670, 2016 WL 3254902, at *7 (D.C.Cir.2016) (noting that “[although ... an isolated race-based remark unrelated to the relevant employment decision could not, without more, permit a jury to infer discrimination, ..., [the Court of Appeals] ha[s] not categorically labeled such comments immaterial” and instructing courts to consider such statements “alongside any additional statements—and all other evidence—to determine whether a plaintiff has met her burden”). Dr. Bolanos’ statements do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination for two reasons! First, Plaintiff does not dispute that only Colonel Bell, Dr. Hanlon, and Admiral Rondeau were involved in the decision to terminate him and that Dr. Bolanos was not involved. DSMF ¶22'; PSMF ¶ 22. Nor has Plaintiff argued that Dr. Bolanos had any input into the decision. See Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 293 (D.C.Cir.2001) (noting that when “decision makers, or those who have input into the decision, express such discriminatory feelings around the relevant time in regard to the adverse, employment action ... then it may be possible to infer that the decision makers were influenced by those feelings in making their decisions” (emphasis added)). Thus, any statements attributable to Dr. Bolanos cannot constitute direct evidence of discrimination because they were not made by someone who participated in the decision to terminate Plaintiffs employment. See Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C.Cir.1999) (holding that there was no- direct evidence of discrimination where there was no evidence that the statements at issue were made by an individual involvéd in the employment decision); cf. Wilson, 753 F.3d at 247 (finding that statements could serve as direct evidence where they came from the person who made the decision that caused the plaintiffs termination). Second, Dr. Bolanos’ alleged statements were no more than “stray remarks ... unrelated to the decisional process.” Waterhouse, 124 F.Supp.2d at 12. Dr. Bolanos allegedly uttered the ageist statements 'at the very start of Plaintiffs employment and therefore long before the issue whether to terminate him or someone else arose. That such statements might, in fact, have been made does not “alone . -.. carry enough weight to establish evidence of age discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Siragy, 1999 WL 767831, at *6 (holding that similar statements were not evidence of direct discrimination where they were infrequent and made by an employee with little to no role in the termination decision at issue); Newman v. D.C. Courts, 125 F.Supp.3d 95, 105 (D.D.C.2015) (finding that “stray remarks” “unrelated to the decisional process itself’ do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination). 2. Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination Because there is no direct evidence sufficient to permit Plaintiff to reach trial, the court begins its review of Plaintiffs circumstantial evidence. This often would mean that the court would turn to the McDonnell Douglas framework. In this case, however, because Defendant has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiffs termination—budget cuts resulting in the decision to reduce probationary staff, Defi’s Mem. at 5-7—the court need not, and in fact should not, “decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case,” Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 (D.C.Cir.2008). “[Ojnce the employer asserts a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the question whether the employee actually made out a prima facie case is ‘no longer relevant’ and thus ‘disappear[s]’ and ‘drops out of the picture.’ ” Id. at 493-94 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097). Plaintiff thus has the burden of demonstrating to the court that he has “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that [Defendant’s] asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason” for terminating his employment and that Defendant “intentionally discriminated against [Plaintiff]” on the basis of age. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 (citations omitted). To make this determination, the court reviews three categories of evidence: (1) Plaintiffs prima facie case; (2) evidence indicating that Defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason is pre-textual; and (3) any other evidence of discrimination. Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1351 (citations emitted); see also Nurriddin, 818 F,3d at 759. a. Prima faeiecase The elements of a prima facie case under the ADEA are as follows: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the protected class (ie., is over 40 years old); (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was disadvantaged in favor of a significantly younger person. Martin, 78 F.Supp.3d at 294-95; O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 310-13, 116 S.Ct. 1307. At this stage in the proceedings, however, the court is not looking for the mere existence of a prima facie' case. Instead, it weighs the evidence put forth to establish the prima facie case as part of its evaluation of the overall sufficiency of the evidence supporting discrimination. Here, the court finds that the evidence supporting a prima facie case of age discrimination is weak. The first three elements of Plaintiffs prima facie case clearly are present—(1) Plaintiff is older than 40; (2) he was qualified for the position at CISA; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action. But the fourth element— that Plaintiff was disadvantaged in favor of a significantly’ younger person—is not as evident. Plaintiff largely relies on allegedly, similarly situated employees to establish the fourth prima facie element. See generally PL’s Am. Compl.; PL’s Opp’n; see also Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 296-97 (D.C.Cir.2015), cert. denied,— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1685, 194 L.Ed.2d 771 (2016) (noting that evidence indicating that favorable treatment of similarly situated persons outside the protected class can be “probative of discrimination”); George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C.Cir.2005) (finding that a plaintiff can create an inference of discrimination to support her prima facie' case by, among other techniques, “demonstrating that she was treated differently from similar situated employees”). Plaintiff attempts to show that he was disadvantaged in favor of a significantly younger person because younger employees were retained by CISA while two older employees were terminated; PL’s Opp’n at 11. Yet to raise an inference of discrimination based on such evidence, all relevant aspects of each individual's employment situation must be “nearly identical.” Burley, 801 F.3d at 301. On closer examination, as discussed in the next section, the similarly situated employees identified by Plaintiff are not highly similar to Plaintiff in important respects, undermining the 'strength of Plaintiffs prima facie case. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 857-58 (7th Cir.2012) (citations omitted) (“Our precedents [] teach that the similarly-situated inquiry and the pretext inquiry are not hermetically sealed off from one another. We have often noted that ‘the prima facie case and pretext anal-yses often overlap.’ ”). Nevertheless, because the prima facie burden is “not onerous,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, the court accepts that there has been a prima facie showing here—but only a weak one that provides minimal weight to Plaintiffs overall claim of discrimination. b. Pretext A plaintiff successfully can demonstrate that his employer’s explanation for an adverse action is pretext “by showing that a non-discriminatory reason offered by a defendant is false, or otherwise presenting enough evidence to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Chavers v. Shinseki, 667 F.Supp.2d 116, 124-25 (D.D.C.2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); George, 407 F.3d at 413 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089). A plaintiff must not only show that the reason offered was pretext generally, but more specifically, pretext for discrimination. Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 519 (D.C.Cir.2000); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (“In other words, it is not enough to dis believe the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination.”); Brady, 520 F.3d at 494; Román v. Castro, No. 12-cv-01321, 149 F.Supp.3d 157, 175-76, 2016 WL 829874, at *13 (D.D.C.2016). In order to show that a reason is not only pretext, but pretext for discrimination, a plaintiff may present evidence that allows “the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Such evidence may include: the employer’s better treatment of similarly situated employees outside the plaintiffs protected group,[] its inconsistent or dishonest explanations, its deviation from established procedures or criteria, [ ] the employer’s pattern of poor treatment of other employees in the same protected group as plaintiff, or other relevant evidence that a jury could reasonably conclude evinces an illicit motive. Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812 F.3d 1109, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2016) (quoting Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C.Cir.2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, however, where “the employer’s stated belief about the underlying facts is reasonable in light of the evidence ... there ordinarily is no basis for permitting a jury to conclude that the employer is lying about the underlying facts.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. In other words, “an employer’s action may be justified by a reasonable belief in the validity of the reason given even though that reason may turn out to be false.” George, 407 F.3d at 415; see also Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“Once the employer has articulated a nondiscriminatory explanation for its action ... the issue is not the correctness or desirability of the reasons offered but whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.”). Plaintiff here faces an even heavier burden of showing pretext than usual. In the higher education setting, employer explanations and decisions are to be given heightened deference. As the Supreme Court has observed, a federal court is ill-suited to “evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions—decisions that require ‘an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.’” Elam v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of D.C., 530 F.Supp.2d 4, at 16-17 (D.D.C.2007) (quoting Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978)); cf. Spaeth, 943 F.Supp.2d at 210-11 (noting that “triers of fact cannot hope to master the academic fields sufficiently to review the' merits of [tenure] reviews and resolve the differences of scholarly opinion”). Accordingly, courts must “show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment” when reviewing a “genuinely academic decision.” Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Elam, 530 F.Supp.2d at 16 (collecting cases to. show that “[t]he Supreme Court has cautioned that courts should be especially solicitous of academic decisions in the higher education setting”). Although Plaintiff does not provide evidence directly disputing that Defendant faced budget cuts, see n.3, supra, he does contend that those alleged budgetary issues were not the real reason for his termination. See. Pl.’s Opp’n at 8-14; see Cones, 199 F.3d at 520 (noting that the plaintiff did not dispute that the agency was downsizing, but that “the critical question is what motivated the [employer’s] decision not to promote [the plaintiff]— downsizing or discrimination”). As discussed in detail immediately below, upon a thorough review of the evidence, the court finds that there “is no basis for permitting a jury to conclude that the employer is lying about the underlying facts.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. i. Similarly situated individuals identified by Plaintiff To prove that Defendant’s explanation is pretext and raise an inference of discrimination, Plaintiff—as he did when establishing his prima facie case—heavily relies on comparisons between himself and other CISA employees. Plaintiff suggests that employment decisions made by CISA in regard to these other employees demonstrate that Defendant (through Colonel Bell and Dean Hanlon) made its employment decisions based on age, rather than economic necessity. These comparisons prove inapt, however, due to important differences in the employment situations of Plaintiff and the other individuals. In order to successfully use similarly situated individuals to establish pretext and thus raise an inference of discrimination, a plaintiff must establish that “all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were nearly identical to those” of the comparators. Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding that two individuals were not similarly situated where others had testified that their behavior in the office was different and where the two individuals had different levels of seniority). For example, the comparators “must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Waterhouse, 124 F.Supp.2d at 14 (quoting Phillips v. Holladay Prop. Servs., Inc., 937 F.Supp. 32, 37 (D.D.C.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Elam, 530 F.Supp.2d at 15 (comparing academic and professional credentials, as well as disciplinary focus, of possible comparators who worked at a university); Guerrero v. Univ. of D.C., 251 F.Supp.2d 13, 24 (D.D.C.2003) (noting that the discipline in which one teaches and the salary and rank of one’s position are important factors to consider when determining if individuals are similarly situated); cf. Burton v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 10-1750(BAH), 153 F.Supp.3d 13, 69-70, 71-72, 79-81, 2015 WL 9907798, at *42, *44, *51 (D.D.C.2015) (finding that where the evidence presented provided minimal information about proposed comparators’ race, rank, past offenses, and disciplinary history, individuals were not similarly situated). Whether employees are similarly situated ordinarily presents a question of fact for the jury. See Wheeler, 812 F.3d at 1116. At the summary judgment stage, however, “[i]f a reasonable jury would be unable to find that the plaintiff and the comparator were similarly situated, the court may decide, as a matter of law, that the two are not similarly situated.” See Burton, 153 F.Supp.3d at 67, 2015 WL 9907798, at *40 (citing George, 407 F.3d at 414-15). In addition, a plaintiff in an ADEA case must show that he was disadvantaged in favor of a substantially younger person. Or, to put it in other terms, a plaintiff must show that a “substantially younger ... employee[ ] [was] treated more favorably.” Clifton v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass’n, 36 F.Supp.2d 20, 25 (D.D.C.1999). This means that a plaintiff, when attempting to show pretext in an ADEA case, can demonstrate such pretext by showing that a substantially younger employee was advantaged by the plaintiffs termination. Cf. Martin, 78 F.Supp.3d at 293 (“A plaintiff can demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason was not the actual reason by producing evidence suggesting that the employer treated other employees of a different ... sex ... more favorably in the same factual circumstances or by showing that the employer is making up or lying about the underlying facts.” (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 495) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, in addition to ensuring that a proposed comparator is similarly situated to a plaintiff generally, a court must assess the relevance of a comparator by “looking at the employee most similarly situated to the plaintiff, and examining the age disparity, if any, between the plaintiff and that ‘comparator’ employee.”. Clifton, 36 F.Supp.2d at 25. Plaintiff contends that “Associate Professors under the age of 40 were not terminated or forced to resign during the relevant time period” and “were not subject to the age discrimination to which [Plaintiff] was subjected.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 51. In support of this claim, he references a wide variety of colleagues. Pl.’s Opp’n at 9-13. Most of these comparators can be categorized into two main groups: (1) fellow probationary employees and (2) employees hired after his termination. The court considers each in turn, a) Probationary employees Because the Court of Appeals has held that “probationary employees and permanent employees [within the federal government] are not similarly situated ... [because] probationary employees may be terminated for problems even if those problems would not be good cause for terminating a permanent employee,” George, 407 F.3d at 415, the court reviews that subset of employees separately from other allegedly similarly situated employees. This focus on probationary employees is particularly appropriate here, where CISA decided that in áddressing the need for budget cuts it would consider only probationary employees for termination. Def.’s Bell Dep. at 24. Although Plaintiff contends that CISA did not have to consider only probationary employees as candidates for termination, PL’s Bell Dep. at 41, he offers no proof that the decision to focus the budget cuts only on probationary employees was motivated by discrimination. Each of the five probationary employees offered by' Plaintiff as comparators have distinctive characteristics that call into question their similarity—and thus their comparability—to Plaintiff. First, two of the probationary comparators cited by Plaintiff—Jay Parker (who was retained) and Art Westneat (who was terminated)—are older than Plaintiff. Parker, born in 1952, is approximately 11 years older than Plaintiff. Westneat, born in 1947, is approximately 16 years older than Plaintiff. Therefore, neither person can function as a comparator, because they provide no evidence that a substantially younger person was advantaged over Plaintiff. Cf. Martin, 78 F.Supp.3d at 293. Second, one employee offered by Plaintiff as a possible comparator—John Harrison (who was retained)—is not “substantially younger” than Plaintiff. Defendant’s internal employment records show that Harrison was at least 41 years old at the time of Plaintiffs employment, PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 27, ECF No. 28-30 [hereinafter PL’s Ex. 27]. In this Circuit, an age difference of six years cannot provide support for an inference of discrimination. Breen v. Mineta, No. Civ. A. 05-654 RWR, 2005 WL 3276163, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2005) (“[A]n age difference of less than ten years is not sufficient to support a prima facie inference of age discrimination.”); Dunaway, 310 F.3d at 767 (finding seven years difference in age to be insufficient to support a prima facie inference of discrimination). The two remaining probationary employees who were considered for termination but not released—Hans D. Ucko and Paul Miller—both are significantly younger than Plaintiff and thus are potential comparators. Ucko is 16 years younger than Plaintiff; Miller is 15 years younger than Plaintiff. See PL’s Ex. 7. And both men were advantaged over Plaintiff—they, unlike Plaintiff, were permitted to stay in their positions at CISA despite the budget cutbacks. Bell Decl. at 4. Neither Ucko nor Miller, however, was similarly situated to Plaintiff in important respects. Ucko “supported the International Counterterrorism Fellowship Program and was extremely highly rated.” Bell Decl. at 4. Plaintiff,- in contrast, does not allege that he similarly served any specific program. Further, unlike the funding for Plaintiff, “[t]he funding for [Ucko’s] program remained secure” and was “subject to oversight from the Department of Defense and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.” Id. -[23] These distinctions are critical. Employees who serve different programs that are funded in different ways with different oversight are not similarly situated. Nee Wheeler, 812 F.3d at 1116 (evaluating employee roles, responsibilities, pay grades, supervisors, offenses to determine if the individuals were similarly situated). Employers are allowed to consider such distinctions when making employment decisions, as Colonel ■ Bell describes doing here. Bell Deck at 4-5. And the court .must defer to the employer’s evaluation of these differences. See Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183 (noting that a court “may not second-guess an employer’s personnel decision absent demonstrably discriminatory motive” (quoting Milton v. Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94, 100 (D.C,Cir.l982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Ucko, therefore, was not similarly situated to Plaintiff and cannot be used as comparator. Miller also was hot similarly situated to Plaintiff. Miller had particular skills and experiences that Plaintiff did not have— such as military experience in Afghanistan, time at the National Security Council as the Director for Afghanistan, and experience with the Central Intelligence Agency pertaining to Afghanistan—which allowed him to fill a unique role in a specific CISA program known as AFPAK Hands. Bell Decl. at 4; Def.’s Bell Dep. at 17-20; see also Def.’s Steele Dep. at 27 (agreeing that experience in Afghanistan would be useful for the AFPAK Hands program); DSMF ¶ 13; PSMF ¶ 13. These types of distinctions in expertise and experience are particularly relevant in the academic context. See, e.g., Elam, 530 F.Supp.2d at 15 (comparing academic and professional credentials, as well as disciplinary focus, of possible comparators who worked at a university); Guerrero, 251 F.Supp.2d at 24 (noting that the discipline in which one teaches and the salary and rank of one’s position are important factors to consider when determining if individuals are similarly situated). In short, not one probationary employee who was advantaged by Defendant’s deci-sión to terminate Plaintiff is both substantially younger than Plaintiff and similarly situated to him. Thus, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that comparison of Plaintiff with the other probationary employees would provide sufficient evidence to indicate that Defendant’s reason for Plaintiffs termination- was pretext—particularly in the context of higher education. b) Employees hired soon after Plaintiffs termination Plaintiff also claims that there is evidence of pretext in that several “individuals who were under 40 were hired as faculty members shortly after [Plaintiff] was terminated.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 10. These individuals were Gregory Gresh; Jeffrey Meiser; Heather Greg; Elena Pokalova; and Barrack Salmoni. Id.-, Def.’s Mem. at 10. In response, Defendant argues that none of these employees were similarly situated to Plaintiff. Upon review of the evidence, the court agrees with Defendant. Two of the individuals—Gresh and Meiser—“each had different teaching specialties than Plaintiff and worked in a different department than Plaintiff.” Def.’s Mem. at 24 (citing Bell Decl.). According to Colonel Bell, when “last minute reductions across NDU enabled the hiring of two expert faculty members,” CISA chose to hire instructors specifically “to support the South and Central Asia Security Studies Program.” Bell Decl. at 5. The court is not in a position to question Defendant’s determination that Gresh and Meiser were the best candidates to fill those needs. See, e.g., Elam, 530 F.Supp.2d at 15. Two other individuals—Greg and Salmo-ni—cannot be used as comparators with Plaintiff because Plaintiff has not shown that they were substantially younger than he. Plaintiff provided no evidence of Greg’s age or when she was hired. As discussed above, the court need not credit an assertion lacking such important details. Jones v. Mukasey, 565 F.Supp.2d 68, 78 (D.D.C.2008). Plaintiff does provide evidence regarding Salmoni’s age—he concedes that Salmoni was in his 40s. Pl.’s Steele Dep. at 73. At most, therefore, Plaintiff was seven years older than Salmoni. That is not a substantial age difference and therefore Salmoni also is not an appropriate comparator. Dunaway, 310 F.3d at 767. Finally, Pokalova was hired through and worked as a contractor for Booz Allen at the time Plaintiff was released. Def.’s Steele Dep. at 30-31. As a contractor, her position apparently did not count against the hiring cap on full-time equivalent, government employees. See Bell Decl. at 3 (stating that another employee could be hired as a Booz Allen contractor despite a hiring cap being in place, but could not be hired as a government employee until the hiring cap had more flexibility); Pl.’s Bell Dep. at 35 (describing the hiring cap). She thus was not similarly situated to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not dispute these facts regarding his proposed comparators, but rather points to the allegedly inferior academic qualifications of several of them, presumably to discredit Defendant’s hiring decisions. PL’s Opp’n at 10. Plaintiffs own perception of his allegedly superior qualifications, however, is insufficient to establish an inference of discrimination. Waterhouse, 124 F.Supp.2d at 5 (D.D.C.2000) (finding that plaintiffs self-serving statements as to her competence or superior performance did not raise material issues of fact regarding defendants’ proffered reasons for plaintiffs termination). Again, this is particularly true in the context of higher education. Elam, 530 F.Supp.2d at 17-18. ii. Shifting explanations for Defendant’s termination Plaintiff also appears to make the argument that evidence of pretext can be inferred from Defendant’s allegedly shifting explanations for his termination. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4 (alleging that “[a]fter his termination, [Plaintiff] was told that he was terminated because he was an ‘irresponsible professor’”); Pl.’s Opp’n at 9 (noting that “shifting explanations ... creates an inference of pretext” (citing Jones, 565 F.Supp.2d at 80)); Pl.’s Disputed Facts ¶¶3, 55. In support of this claim, Plaintiff cites to his deposition, interrogatory answer, and interview during the EEO fact-finding process; several course evaluations; an email and a letter from two students; and a statement from Dr. Bolanos made during; her fact-finding testimony. PL’s Disputed Facts ¶¶ 3, 55. On closer inspection, none of these citations provides support for Plaintiffs allegation of shifting explanations. The course evaluations and. student letters might show that Plaintiff was well-liked as a teacher, but they provide no indication that Defendant ever asserted that Plaintiff was being terminated due to his teaching performance. The statement from Dr. Bolanos, made in the course of EEO fact-finding, merely' says “there was a decision made that maybe [Plaintiff] was possibly not the best match for the organization.” "PL’s Ex. 10 at 9. It does not claim anything about the underlying reasons regarding why Plaintiff was not the best match. Nor do Plaintiffs testimony or interview answers aid his argument; The only comment that provides a hint of evidence of shifting explanations is found within Plaintiffs fact-finding interview, during which he alludes to a letter from Colonel Bell’s office to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which allegedly “con-clud[es] that [Plaintiff] was a very irresponsible professor.” PL’s Ex. 9 at 33. This comment appears to reference a memo written on August 30, 2011, which was designated by Plaintiff as an exhibit. See PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 20, ECF No. 28-23. This memo, however, nowhere states that Plaintiff was terminated because he was an irresponsible professor. Id. Rather, it reiterates Defendant’s consistent claim that Plaintiffs termination was due to budget cuts. Id. In short, Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence of shifting explanations for his termination to support a showing of pretext. c. Other evidence In addition to evidence supporting a plaintiffs prima facie case and pretext, the court also must review “any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff ... or any contrary evidence that may be available to the employer.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289. Among other possibilities, this “further evidence” may include “independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the employer” or “evidence of a strong track record in equal opportunity employment.” Id. Here, both parties offer several types of evidence, as discussed below. Upon review, the court finds that this “other evidence” also cannot support a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent. i Statistical evidence of a pattern of discriminatory practices Plaintiff attempts to use statistical evidence to show that “[i]t is undisputed that younger individuals were more favorably treated and were sought after by CISA.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. “As evidence of the Agency’s preference for younger faculty,” he states, “in 2011, the Agency had 6 faculty members under 40 and 25 faculty over 40 .... In 2012, the amount of faculty members under 40 increased to 15 and the number of faculty member[s] over 40 decreased to 13.” Id.-, see also PL’s Opp’n, Ex.- 24, EOF No. 28-27. After “a simple average calculation,” Plaintiff testified that “the best conclusion [he] reached is that not a single person below the age of 40 has ever been terminated from CISA as a faculty member.” PL’s Steele Dep. at 97. ■ ■ Generally, statistical calculations can be used to demonstrate pretext. Jones, 565 F.Supp.2d at 78; Forman, 271 F.3d at 292. That does not mean, however, that evidence of statistical disparity is dis-positive in- the context of a summary judgment motion or that a court cannot evaluate the weight of the statistical evidence within its review of the evidence as a whole. Shea v. Kerry, 961 F.Supp.2d 17, 48 (D.D.C.2013), aff'd, 796 F.3d 42 (D.C.Cir.2015) (emphasizing the “rigorous, exacting analysis courts in this circuit have applied to-this kind of statistical evidence”); Burton, 153 F.Supp.3d at 68-69, 2015 WL 9907798, at *41 (finding a statistical report to be insufficient to show that any individual plaintiff was subject to disparate disciplinary action). Nor must a court permit clearly deficient statistical evidence to go to a jury. See Burton, 153 F.Supp.3d at 68-69, 2015 WL 9907798, at *41 (noting in the court’s discussion of statistical evidence that “to survive summary judgment, the plaintiffs must each point to competent record evidence” (emphasis added)). Here, several factors lead the court to conclude that the statistical evidence proffered by Plaintiff is not a useful indicator of discrimination. First, the statistics directly Compare employees above the age of 40 with employees under the age 40. As Defendant rightly contends, this is “the very type of analysis rejected by the Supreme Court.” Def.’s Reply, EOF No. 31, at 9. A simple comparison of the numbers of employees above 40 and below 40 does not provide any evidence regarding how employees were treated in comparison to one another, show differences in the treatment of employees' in the above-40 age group with those in the under-40 age group, or identify if there were significant age differences between employees who allegedly were treated differently from one another. See O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307 (noting the lack of probative value in an ADEA .case that someone inside the protected class was replaced by someone outside the protected class). Absent such additional facts, the statistical evidence has little value. Second, “[t]he case law in this circuit overwhelmingly finds that this kind of [statistical] analysis requires proof as to its statistical significance.” Shea, 961 F.Supp.2d at 47. Plaintiff has provided no such proof. He calculated the statistics himself, but has not offered evidence that he has any sort of specialized skill or knowledge of statistics. Cf. Jones, 565 F.Supp.2d at 78 (using statistical evidence, calculated and provided by an expert, to establish pretext). Nor has he addressed if and how his statistical calculations account for issues such as retirement; the range of ages, experiences, and skills available in the hiring pool; employees who “aged out” of the under-40 group into the over-40 group; or changes in the administrative staff responsible for making employment decisions. Burton, 153 F.Supp.3d at 68-69, 2015 WL 9907798, at *41 (highlighting the need for statistical evidence to be competent record evidence). But see Jones, 565 F.Supp.2d at 78 (“[A]ny dispute regarding the reliability of the data hardly defeats the sufficiency of plaintiffs showing of pretext; rather, at best, it only raises an issue of fact for the jury.”). Finally, Plaintiffs statistical calculation does not highlight any information specific to the decision to terminate Plaintiff and therefore is minimally useful. Burton, 153 F.Supp.3d at 68-69, 2015 WL 9907798, at *41 (noting the need for a plaintiff to prove that she in particular was subject to discrimination). Due to the obvious deficiencies in Plaintiffs “statistical analysis,” no reasonable jury could find that such analysis weighs in favor of Plaintiffs discrimination claim. ii Anecdotal evidence of discrimination Plaintiff also offers several types of anecdotal evidence to support his discrimination claim. First, as discussed above, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Bolanos, his first level supervisor, made negative comments that demonstrated “dislike for certain older employees” at Plaintiffs first .meeting with her after he was hired. See supra at 13-15; Pl.’s Steele Dep. at 35-36. But the same factors that prevent those comments from serving as direct evidence of discrimination—it was a stray remark spoken by someone without the power to make the employment termination decision-^also lessen its value as circumstantial proof of discrimination. Second, Plaintiff claims that he was a “ ‘place holder’ for [CISA] to keep [his] position funded while waiting to hire younger individuals who had- not either earned their Ph.[D]. or not gone far enough into the Ph.D. process to hire.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. Plaintiffs own self-perception of why he was hired—standing alone without corroboration—does not offer any credible evidence of discriminatory intent. Third, Plaintiff cites to the testimony of Sheila DeTurk, who worked with