United States v. Ramos (194 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 2016)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

James O. Browning, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed March 21, 2016 (Doc. 26)(“Motion”). The Court held an eviden-tiary hearing on May 25, 2016. The primary issues are: (i) whether New Mexico State Police Officer Joshua Campos unreasonably delayed Defendant Everett Ramos during his traffic stop without reasonable suspicion; (ii) whether Ramos’ consent to allow Campos to search his vehicle was voluntary; and (iii) if Campos unlawfully detained Ramos, whether the unlawful actions were too attenuated from Ramos’ voluntary consent to be suppressed. First, Campos did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop when he questioned Ramos and Perez and inspected the vehicle’s VIN. Second, after the traffic stop had ended, Ramos voluntarily consented to answer further questions. Although this questioning evolved into a lawful detention justified by reasonable suspicion, Ramos nonetheless freely and voluntarily consented to a vehicle search during the detention. Accordingly, Campos’ vehicle inspection was lawful. Third, even if Campos had unlawfully extended the traffic stop, Ramos’ consent was too attenuated from any unlawful actions to suppress the evidence. The Court therefore denies the Motion and will not suppress the evidence.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the Court state its essential findings on the record when deciding a motion that involves factual issues. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(d) (“When factual issues are involved in deciding a [pretrial] motion, the court must state its essential findings on the record.”). This Memorandum Opinion and Order’s findings of fact shall serve as the Court’s essential findings for rule 12(d) purposes. The Court makes these findings under the authority of rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires a judge to decide preliminary questions relating to the admissibility of evidence, including the legality of a search or seizure, and the voluntariness of an individual’s confession or consent to search. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1269-70 (10th Cir.1982). In deciding such preliminary questions, the other rules of evidence, except those with respect to privileges, do not bind the Court. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”). Thus, the Court may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)(noting that “the interests at stake in a suppression hearing are of a lesser magnitude than those in the criminal trial itself’); United States v. Ramirez, 388 Fed.Appx. 807, 810 (10th Cir. 2010)(“The Supreme Court has not yet indicated whether the Confrontation Clause applies to hearsay statements made in suppression hearings.”); United States v. Garcia, 324 Fed.Appx. 705, 708 (10th Cir.2009)(unpublished)(“We need not resolve whether Crawford[ v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)]’s protection of an accused’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right applies to suppression hearings, because even if we were to assume this protection does apply, we would conclude that the district court’s error cannot be adjudged ‘plain.’ ”), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 890, 130 S. Ct. 223, 175 L.Ed.2d 154 (2009); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d at 1269 (“The purpose of the suppression hearing was, of course, to determine preliminarily the admissibility of certain evidence allegedly obtained in violation of defendant’s rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In this type of hearing the judge had latitude to receive it, notwithstanding the hearsay rule.”); United States v. Ramirez, 388 Fed.Appx. at 810 (“It is beyond reasonable debate that Ramirez’s counsel were not ineffective in failing to make a Confrontation Clause challenge to the use of the confidential informant. The Supreme Court has not yet indicated whether the Confrontation Clause applies to hearsay statements made in suppression hearings.”); United States v. Gonzalez, 121 F.Supp.3d 1094, 1103 (D.N.M.2015)(Browning, J.)(“Thus, the Court may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress.”); United States v. Christy, 810 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1224 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J.)(concluding the that the Court “may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress”). The Court has previously held that Crawford v. Washington does not apply to pre-trial hearings, because “the Sixth Amendment is a trial right and does not apply to pretrial proceedings.” United States v. Hernandez, 778 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1226 (D.N.M.2011) (Browning, J.)(concluding “that Crawford v. Washington does not apply to detention hearings”).

I. CAMPOS IS TRAINED IN PERFORMING HIGHWAY INTERDIC-TIONS.

1. Campos currently serves on the New Mexico State Police’s Criminal Enforcement Unit. See Transcript of Hearing at 4:9-12 (Campos)(taken May 25, 2016)(“Tr.”).

2. The Criminal Enforcement Unit is a “K-9 unit,” meaning that Campos is trained to use a dog. Tr. at 4:15-16 (Campos).

3. As part of this unit, Campos received additional training, including a specialty course on highway interdiction. See Tr. at 5:15-21 (Campos).

4. He tries to attend various highway interdiction trainings “at least once a year.” Tr. at 6:5-6 (Campos).

5. At those classes, he learns traffic stop techniques, different trends for smuggling narcotics, tools that traffickers use to avoid detection, and recent federal case law regarding traffic stops. See Tr. at 6:9-22 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

6. Campos has also been trained as a Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”) Inspector, so he can better determine whether vehicles have been tampered with, and whether a car is stolen. See Tr. at 107:22-25 (Campos).

7. At the VIN training, Campos learned about a VIN’s characteristics, how to identify when a certain car make or model should have a longer VIN, where “hidden VINs can be located” if an officer is unable to verify a VIN from the dashboard or the doorjamb, and how to identify if a VIN has been replaced. Tr. at 108:5-110:11 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

8. As part of Campos’s normal citation writing and traffic stop process, Campos checks a vehicle’s VIN so he can ensure that the vehicle was not stolen. See Tr. at 20:19-21:2 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

9. State police officers are not trained to check VINs and a vehicle’s VIN is not on the citation form. See Tr. at 106:12-107:2 (Campos, Pori).

10. Even though state police officers do not always check the VIN, the Criminal Enforcement Unit officers, who perform highway drug interdictions, routinely compare both of a vehicle’s VINs during traffic stops because either or both VINs might reveal tampering or other evidence of crime. See Tr. at 18:13-19:18 (Campos, Mysliwiec); id. at 112:2-5 (Campos).

11. Checking the VIN ensures that the officer writes the correct ticket for the correct driver and the correct car in every traffic stop. See Tr. at 104:24-105:2 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

12. Although the Court does not have extensive evidence of how long an individual VIN inspection usually takes, the Court does not believe that Campos needed one minute and twenty-six seconds to inspect this particular VIN, when it took him only six to eight seconds to inspect the dashboard VIN and he did not write down any numbers to use as comparison. See Tr. at 23:5-10 (Campos, Mysliwiec); id. 65:4-8 (Campos)(explaining that, to adequately check that the VIN has not been tampered with, Campos needed to check each of the rivets on the dash and the stamp on the door, as well as all of the letters and numbers in the VIN); id. at 67:15-22 (Campos)(noting that he did not write anything down and he did not remember how he compared the two VINs, but maintaining that he did actually compare the VINs).

13. The Court acknowledges, however, that Campos may have spent some time trying to locate the VIN on the rental agreement so he “could compare it to their contract to make sure that vehicle actually belonged to the contract that they had.” Tr. at 73:7-21 (Campos, Pori).

II. THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP WAS LAWFUL.

14. On October 14, 2015, Ramos rented a Mercedes G-300 Sedan in Southern California. See Tr. at 14:18 (Campos).

15. At about 8:40 a.m. on October 15, 2015, Campos saw the Mercedes speeding on Interstate 40, west of the Route 66 hotel and casino, near mile marker 134, outside of Albuquerque, New Mexico. See Tr. at 8:6-8 (Campos); id. at 11:8-24 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

16. Campos would later learn that the driver was Ramos and that a female passenger was Laura Perez, Ramos’ wife at the time. See Tr. at 24:7-9 (Campos).

17. Before initiating the traffic stop, Campos spoke with the Albuquerque area State Police dispatcher and provided her with the Mercedes’ license plate number. See Tr. at 11:11-16 (Campos).

18. In response, the dispatcher told Campos that the vehicle was “negative on any wants or warrants.” Tr. at 60:7-10 (Campos).

19. Campos thus knew from the conversation with his dispatcher that there were no warrants associated with the Mercedes’ license plate and that the Mercedes had not been reported stolen. See Tr. at 11:11-16 (Campos).

20. Campos stopped the Mercedes for speeding. See Tr. at 11:11-16 (Campos).

21. Campos drove a marked police car and was dressed in a uniform. See Tr. at 7:20-25 (Campos).

22. When the Mercedes came to a stop, Campos approached the Mercedes from the passenger side, as is standard for officer safety reasons, and observed there was one male in the driver’s seat and one female in the front passenger’s seat. See Tr. at 12:9-13 (Campos).

III. CAMPOS’ YIN INSPECTION AND QUESTIONING DID NOT UNLAWFULLY EXTEND THE TRAFFIC STOP.

23. Campos’ vehicle was equipped with a dashboard camera that recorded the events. See Tr. at 43:12-18 (Campos, Pori); State Police Dashboard Cam of Stop (October 15, 2015)(“Dashboard Cam”).

24. From the Dashboard Cam, the Court can observe Campos, Ramos, and Perez when they are near the Mercedes and in front of the patrol car.

25. The Court can hear all of Campos’ statements clearly, and it can hear most, but not all, of Ramos’ and Perez’ statements clearly.

26. Campos identified himself as a police officer, advised Ramos of the reasons for the stop, and then asked Ramos for his driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. See Tr. at 12:9-19 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 8:41:35-8:41:46.

27. In response, Ramos protested that he did not believe that he was speeding, but then produced the requested data. See Tr. at 12:15-19 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 8:41:45-8:41:52.

28. After Ramos gave Campos his driver’s license and the rental agreement for the Mercedes, Campos asked Ramos to exit the vehicle and meet Campos at the front of Campos’s patrol car, which is standard procedure for the New Mexico State Police and for Campos in every traffic stop, for officer safety reasons and for other reasons. See Tr. at 12:15-14:12 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 8:42:8-8:42:12.

29. Ramos complied with the request. See Tr. at 14:13-14 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 8:42:12-8:42:23.

30. Campos then provided the State Police dispatcher with Ramos’ California driver’s license information. See Tr. at 14:21-25 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 8:42:40-8:43:35.

31. The dispatcher confirmed that Ramos had a valid driver’s license. See Dashboard Cam at 8:43:36-8:43:44; Tr. at 14:21-25 (Campos).

32. Campos noticed that the rental agreement allowed Ramos to drive the vehicle “ONLY” in California, Nevada, and Arizona. See Tr. at 28:15-29:3 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 8:55:30-8:55:40; Enterprise Rental Agreement (Defendant’s Exhibit B).

33. While Campos was retrieving his citation book and starting to write the citation, Ramos asked Campos a question and engaged him in a brief conversation. See Dashboard Cam at 8:43:45-8:44:22; Tr. at 96:11-16 (Campos).

34. As he was filling out the form, Campos asked Ramos several questions about his travel plans, including: (i) what brought Ramos to New Mexico; (ii) if Albuquerque was his ultimate destination; (iii) what he was planning to do in Albuquerque; (iv) what time he left his last stop; (v) if he was planning on staying in Albuquerque; and (vi) how long he rented the car. See Dashboard Cam at 8:44:32-8:48:09; Tr. at 17:2-3 (Campos)(asserting that Campos asked these questions while he wrote the citation).

35. Ramos answered each of Campos’ questions and engaged Campos in further conversation. See Dashboard Cam at 8:44:32-8:48:09.

36. In response to one of Campos’ questions, Ramos stated that he and his wife travelled from California to Las Vegas to Albuquerque, and were in Albuquerque to see the sights. See Tr. at 17:22-25 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 8:44:50-8:44:55; id. at 8:45:50-8:46:05.

37. Ramos stated that, after seeing Albuquerque, they were heading to San Antonio, Texas to visit Perez’ friend. See Tr. at 17:25-18:2 (Campos).

38. Ramos also stated that they were “passing by” Albuquerque. Dashboard Cam at 8:46:30-8:46:35; Tr. at 24:5-7 (Campos).

39. Campos thought it was interesting that Ramos chose this particular route to get to San Antonio when it was such a significant detour from the fastest route. See Tr. at 23:24-24:7 (Campos)(stating that “the route that they were taking to San Antonio was [ ] completely off.... The fastest would have been down through southern Arizona, through 1-10 across to San Antonio, which would have cut their trip approximately about four hours shorter”).

40. Campos routinely asks similar questions while he completes traffic citations, in accordance with New Mexico State Police policy. See Tr. at 16:15-23 (Campos, Mysli-wiec).

41. This routine questioning does not generally extend or delay the time it takes to write a traffic citation. See Tr. at 17:4-7 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

42. Campos’ travel plan conversation did not substantially extend the time that it took Campos to write Ramos’ traffic citation. See Dashboard Cam at 8:44:32-8:48:09; See Tr. at 17:4-7 (Campos, Mysli-wiec).

43. Campos asked Ramos to wait to ask further questions until after Campos finished filling out the citation form. See Dashboard Cam at 8:47:40-8:48:00.

44. When Campos had nearly completed the citation, he told Ramos that he needed to check the VIN for the Mercedes. See Tr. at 97:2-9 (Campos, Court); Dashboard Cam at 8:48:09-8:48:16.

45. Even though the dispatcher had told Campos that the vehicle was not stolen and Campos had the information he needed to write the citation, Campos checked the vehicle’s VIN to confirm that there was no evidence of tampering and that the vehicle matched the license plate, because some vehicles are not reported stolen. See Tr. at 121:6-22 (Campos, Mysliwiec); id. at 97:24-98:7 (Campos).

46. After ordering Ramos to remain at the patrol car, Campos approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and then examined the VIN in the lower portion of the windshield on the driver’s side. See Tr. at 66:2-67: 11 (Campos, Pori); Dashboard Cam at 8:48:26-8:38:40.

47. One of the places that the VIN is located is inside the doorjamb of the driver’s door. See Tr. at 63:25-64:3 (Campos).

48. Campos routinely compares the VIN on the front dashboard with the VIN in the doorjamb, because either or both locations might reveal tampering or other evidence of crime. See Tr. at 18:13-19:18 (Campos, Mysliwiec); id. at 112:2-5 (asserting that the Criminal Enforcement Unit officers, who perform highway drug inter-dictions, routinely compare both VINs during traffic stops).

49. Campos did not write down any of the VIN numbers when checking them, but sought to determine whether there was evidence of tampering. See Tr. at 65:24-66:1 (Campos, Pori); id. at 65:4-8 (Campos).

50. Campos spent approximately six to eight seconds examining the VIN on the front dashboard, see Tr. at 67:8-11 (Campos, Pori); Dashboard Cam at 8:48:32-8:48:40, while he spent approximately one minute and twenty seconds checking the VIN located in the doorjamb, see Tr. at 69:8-13 (Campos, Pori).

51. Campos opened the driver’s door of the Mercedes, but did not reach his hand into the passenger compartment to touch any items inside of the vehicle. See Tr. at 68:23-7 (Campos, Pori); Dashboard Cam at 8:48:40-8:50:00.

52. Campos was looking at the rental agreement “to see if it had any of the vehicle VIN number on it so [he] could compare it to their contract to make sure that vehicle actually belonged to the contract that they had,” because normally, a VIN is included in the vehicle’s registration, but Ramos did not hand him the vehicle’s registration. Tr. at 73:7-21 (Campos, Pori).

53. While Campos checked the vehicle’s VIN at that location, he engaged Perez in conversation and proceeded to engage in extensive questioning. See Tr. at 21:16-22:7 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 8:48:40-8:50:00.

54. Campos observed that Perez appeared “nervous” and “very distracted,” her hands were shaking, she paused before answering Campos’ questions, and she kept receiving multiple phone calls on one of two cell phones. See Tr. at 22:1-7 (Campos).

■ 55. Based on his training and experience, Campos determined that her -hands were shaking because she was nervous. See Tr. at 22:15-18 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

56. Campos looked at the VIN for a moment, then turned his head toward Perez. See Dashboard Cam at 8:48:42-8:48:45.

57. The Court cannot see where Campos looked after that because of the video’s poor quality, but it has no evidence to contradict Campos’ statement that he looked back and forth between Perez and the VIN number so that he could watch Perez while she answered his questions and ensure that she was not trying to reach for anything that could injure him. See Tr. at 93:2-5 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

58. Campos was not looking at the VIN toward the end of the time that he was questioning Perez. See Tr. at 92:24-5 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Tr. at 72:4-6 (Campos)(admitting that, toward the end of his VIN inspection, he “wasn’t looking at the VIN at that time. I was looking at Ms. Perez.”).

59. Campos did not intend to delay or extend the traffic stop. See Tr. at 22:24-23:2 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

60. Campos asked Perez about her travel plans. See Tr. at 21:16-22:7 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

61. Perez gave different answers to the travel-plan questions than the answers that Ramos gave, and she also changed her story throughout the conversation. See Tr. at 21:16-22:7 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

62. Specifically, she stated that she was “going to Albuquerque for a few days, and then they were going to go on them way back to California,” and then corrected her story to say that they were going to Texas. Tr. at 21:23-22:1 (Campos). See Dashboard Cam at 8:49:08-8:49:12.

63. Ramos had informed Campos that they were going to San Antonio for a few days to stay with Perez’ friend. See Tr. at 24:1-10 (Campos).

64. Perez further informed Campos that they had come straight from California and had not stopped anywhere, see Dashboard Cam at 8:49:30-8:50:00, even though Ramos said that they went through Las Vegas, Nevada. See Dashboard Cam at 8:44:46-8:44:52.

65. Campos noted the discrepancy between Ramos’ story and Perez’ story. See Tr. at 23:17-24:10 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

66. Campos testified that he developed reasonable suspicion that “something was going on prior, more than ... the speeding issue,” which is “why [he] asked — was talking more to Ms. Perez.” Tr. at 71:11-17 (Campos).

67. In total, Campos asked Perez the following questions in the following order: (i) what brought her to New Mexico; (ii) whei-e she was headed; (iii) how long she was planning on staying at her final destination; (iv) when she was traveling back to California; (v) the purpose of her travel; (vi) where Ramos and Perez would stay when they arrived at their destination; (vii) whether Ramos was her husband; (viii) when Ramos rented the Mercedes; (ix) from where Ramos and Perez were coming; (x) what time they left California; (xi) whether they left California in the morning or the evening; (xii) whether they were traveling straight through to their final destination; and (xiii) whether they had made any stops along the way. See Dashboard Cam at 8:48:47-8:50:00.

68. Campos’ conversation with Perez increased the time that it took Campos to inspect the vehicle’s VIN and observe evidence of tampering. See Tr. at 23:6-7 (Campos).

69. Campos returned to his patrol car, handed Ramos his driver’s license and rental contract, and explained to Ramos that he could contest his citation in court or admit guilt and pay a fine. See Tr. at 24:14-25 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 8:50:01-8:51:00.

70. The citation is a one-page document that contains the following fields: (i) the driver’s name; (ii) the license number; (iii) the speed at which the vehicle was traveling; (iv) the vehicle’s information, including the vehicle’s make and model; and (v) whether the driver chooses to contest the citation or to pay it. See Tr. at 56:18-57:1 (Campos, Pori); Speeding Citation Issued to Everett Ramos (Defendants’ Hearing Ex. C).

71. After Ramos chose to pay the fine, Ramos signed the citation, stated that he had no further questions, and shook Campos’ hand. See Tr. at 25:2-16 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 8:51:01-8:51:25.

72. Campos then told Ramos he was “free to leave,” and Ramos began to walk back to his vehicle. Tr. at 25:20-21 (Campos). See id. at 76:3-5 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 8:51:26-8:51:29.

73. From the time that Campos approached the vehicle to the time that he told Ramos he was free to leave, the traffic stop took approximately nine minutes and fifty four seconds.

74. Campos typically takes ten to fifteen minutes to issue a citation. See Tr. at 16:6-7 (Campos).

75. Officers routinely take more than ten minutes to perform all the tasks involved in a traffic stop. See United States v. Sampson, 388 Fed.Appx. 950, 953 (11th Cir.2010)(“[W]e cannot conclude that a fifteen to twenty minute total detention was unreasonable” in light of the various interruptions involved.); United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2001)(holding that a fourteen-minute detention was not unreasonable and citing cases upholding traffic stops of thirty and fifty minutes); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 269 (6th Cir.1999)(concludirig that the officer did not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop when it took a “little more than twelve minutes”); United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996)(concluding that a thirty-minute wait for a computer check during a traffic stop was reasonable); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 761 (11th Cir.1988)(stating that a fifty-minute traffic stop, by itself, did not invalidate the detention, but demonstrating “some unease” about the detention’s length). Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)(coneluding that a ninety-minute stop was too long for a Terry stop).

IV. THE CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER.

76. As Ramos was walking back to his vehicle, approximately seventeen seconds after Campos told Ramos he was free to leave, Campos called out, “Excuse me, sir,” in a polite, respectful tone. Tr. at 26:12-18 (Campos, Mysliwiec); id. at 77:20-77:2 (Campos, Pori); Dashboard Cam at 8:51:46-8:51:47.

77. Ramos turned around and walked back toward Campos’ police car, where Campos asked Ramos if Campos could ask a few questions, and Ramos agreed to answer the questions. See Tr. at 26:1-2 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 8:51:48-8:51:53.

78. Campos did not tell Ramos that Ramos was under no obligation to answer the questions. See Tr. at 77:8-16 (Campos, Pori).

79. Campos asked Ramos detailed questions about Ramos’ travel plans, including: (i) from where Ramos and Perez were coming; (ii) when they left California; (iii) where they travelled and stayed; (iv) whether they had friends and family in the area; (v) whether they planned to spend the night in Albuquerque; and (vi) where they planned to stay while in San Antonio. See Tr. at 27:16-28:8 (Campos): Dashboard Cam at 8:51:54-8:55:40.

80. During the initial traffic stop, Campos noticed that the rental agreement did not allow Ramos to drive the car in New Mexico, so he asked Ramos whether the rental company made a mistake. See Tr. at 28:15-29:3 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 8:55:30-8:55:40.

81. Ramos stated that Perez altered the rental agreement. See Dashboard Cam at 8:55:30-8:55:40.

82. Ramos did not know the last name of the person with whom he would be staying when he arrived in Texas, despite allegedly knowing her since 1989. See Dashboard Cam at 8:53:40-8:54:30; Tr. at 28:18-29:4 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

83. Ramos further asserted that Perez’ friend did not know they were coming to visit and that it was a surprise. See Tr. at 28:1-8 (Campos).

84. Campos noticed that the rental agreement required Ramos to return the vehicle in three days, but Ramos intended to stay in Texas for longer than three days and would not be able to return it in that time period if he planned on visiting his friend for as long as he said he would. See Dashboard Cam at 8:54:40-8:54:55.

85. Ramos did not appear afraid. He discussed his fear of airplanes, his business plans, and fun events in Albuquerque, including the Sandia Peak Tramway. See Dashboard Cam at 8:51:54-8:55:40.

86. Campos did not retain any of Ramos’ personal items during this encounter. See Tr. at 27:7-11 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

87. During the questioning, Perez left the vehicle, starting walking toward Campos, and told Campos that she needed to use the restroom. See Tr. at 29:10-12 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 8:54:25-8:54:55.

88. Campos told Perez to “go ahead and have a seat in the car,” and that he would “be right there.” Dashboard Cam at 8:54:55-8:55:00.

89. The Court cannot fully hear Perez, but Campos testified that she suggested that she wanted to take the car to the nearest gas station to use the restroom. See Tr. at 83:7-11 (Campos)(“[S]he’s indicating to me that she wants to leave to go use the restroom at an enclosed restroom facility ....”); id. at 160:19-161:24 (Mysliwiec).

90. Campos again said: “Just hang out in the car. I’ll be there in a second.” Dashboard Cam at 8:55:02-8:55:05.

91. Perez protested again and took a few more steps toward Campos before he said: “Ma’am just sit in the car for me, ok?” Dashboard Cam at 8:55:06-8:55:14.

92. Campos raised his voice and used a stern tone when he instructed Perez to remain in the vehicle. See Dashboard Cam at 8:54:55-8:55:14.

93. Campos had to raise his voice largely because the highway was loud and Perez was a good distance from Campos. See Dashboard Cam at 8:54:55-8:55:14.

94. As Perez returned to the vehicle, Ramos explained that Perez suffers from a bladder condition. See Dashboard Cam 8:55:00-8:5515.

95. Campos explained to Ramos that he needed Perez to remain in the car for officer safety reasons, because he “deal[s] with dangerous people all day long.” Dashboard Cam at 8:54:55-8:55:20. See Tr. at 29:12-30:3 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

96. Campos testified that it endangers his safety if he has to keep his eye on two people standing or sitting close to him. See Tr. at 30:21-24 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

97. Campos “would have let her use the restroom on the side of the road” had she asked, but he “didn’t think of telling her that.” Tr. at 83:1-3 (Campos).

98. After Campos finished questioning Ramos, Campos — using a conversational tone — told Ramos to “hang out” near the police car while he asked Perez some questions. See Tr. at 30:6-12 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 8:55:43-8:55:46.

99. At the Mercedes, Campos asked Perez if he could ask her some questions, and Perez agreed to answer them. See Tr. at 30:6-8 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 8:55:54-8:56:00.

100. Perez’ telephone received multiple calls during the conversation. See Tr. at 31:2-8 (Campos).

101. Campos asked Perez the same questions that he had asked Ramos, but this time, Perez’ story aligned with Ramos’ story. See Tr. at 31:10-14 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 8:56:00-8:57:43.

102. Campos did not know whether Perez received any text messages from Ramos when he could not see her or Ramos. See Tr. at 33:18-22 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

103. Perez did not explain why she changed her story about their travel plans. See Tr. at 33:23-34:2 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

104. After Campos finished questioning Perez, he returned to his police car where Ramos was standing and told Ramos that Campos had a few more questions for him. See Dashboard Cam at 8:57:48-8:57:54.

105. Campos asked Ramos what was wrong with Perez’ bladder. See Dashboard Cam at 8:57:55-8:58:00.

106. After Ramos explained the problem, Campos asked Ramos several more questions, including whether the vehicle contained any narcotics. See Dashboard Cam at 8:58:01-8:59:24.

107. Again, Ramos did not appear afraid and instead discussed his wife’s health and his travel plans in a conversational and upbeat manner. See Dashboard Cam at 8:58:01-8:59:24.

108. Campos clarified that he was not insinuating that Ramos used narcotics, and was asking only whether the vehicle contained narcotics. See Dashboard Cam at 8:58:01-8:59:24.

109. Campos then asked Ramos for consent to search Ramos’ vehicle and his property within the vehicle. See Tr. at 34:23-35:1 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 8:59:25-9:00:00.

110. Campos did not lean on Ramos’ vehicle or touch Ramos while asking for consent to search. See Dashboard Cam at 8:59:25-9:00:00.

111. Ramos consented and agreed to fill out a form acknowledging that he consented to a vehicle search. See Dashboard Cam at 8:59:25-9:00:00; Tr. at 35:4-5 (Campos).

112. Campos asked whether Ramos preferred to read English or Spanish to ensure that Ramos could understand the consent form. See Dashboard Cam at 8:59:40-8:59:47.

113. Campos explained that the form granted Campos consent to search the vehicle and asked Ramos to read it. See Dashboard Cam 8:59:49-9:00:17.

114. Campos ensured that Ramos signed the consent form only after reading it and understanding what it meant. See Dashboard Cam at 8:59:49-9:00:17 (instructing Ramos to “sign after you read these two paragraphs”)(emphasis added).

115. Campos asked Ramos to let him know if Ramos had any questions about the form. See Dashboard Cam at 8:59:49-9:00:17 (“If you have any questions, let me know.”).

116. Campos gave Ramos the option to retract his consent when he said: “If you can read this form ... if everything is still ok, you can sign.” Dashboard Cam at 8:59:49-9:00:17.

117. The consent form states:

I _ hereby grant my consent to _ officers of the New Mexico Department of Public Safety, to search the following vehicle described below including luggage, containers, and contents therein. If search reveals a false or altered compartment, access to such compartment ’ will be made by any means available; including drilling and/or cutting of compartments.

I understand I have the right to refuse to consent to the search described above and to refuse to sign this form. I further state that no promises, threats, force, physical or mental coercion of any kind whatsoever have been used against me to get me to consent to the search described above or to sign this form. DATE: _ TIME: 1_2_

United States v. Harmon, 785 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1154 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J.)(citing the Department of Public Safety, Search and. Seizure Vehicle Consent to Search Form),

118. After Ramos verbally consented and started filling out the consent form, Campos told Ramos: “I know your wife has to use the restroom, but I’ll get you guys out of here as soon as I can.” Dashboard Cam at 9:00:00-9:00:12.

119. Campos’ statement that he would “get [them] out of here as soon as [he could]” did not implicitly threaten Ramos that Ramos had to consent to' a search. Dashboard Cam at 9:00:00-9:00:12.

120. Although Campos was wearing his sidearm when he asked for consent to search the vehicle, it was holstered. See Tr. at 35:6-12 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

121. Although Campos’ K-9 was in the patrol car, there were no other human officers around and Campos did not take any physical actions intended to' threaten Ramos into signing the consent form. See Tr. at 35:13-36:2 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

122. Campos did not physically touch Ramos. See Tr. at 35:19-20 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

123. Ramos agreed to allow Campos to search the vehicle verbally and in a written consent form. See Tr. at 35:2-5 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

124. Campos also obtained Perez’ verbal consent to search the vehicle and her property within the vehicle. See Tr. at 36:5-11 (Campos, Mysliwiec); Dashboard Cam at 9:00:55-9:01:26.

125. Before Perez filled out the consent form, she again explained her bladder problem to Campos, who said that he understood, but did not offer to let her use the restroom on the side of the road. See Dashboard Cam at 9:01:50-9:02:20.

126. Campos directed Perez to exit the vehicle and stand off to the right shoulder while he conducted the search. See Tr. at 36:14-20 (Campos); Dashboard Cam at 9:02:40-9:03:17.

127. Campos then informed Perez that she could urinate behind a tree if she did not want to wait until after the search. See Tr. at 83:16-21 (Campos, Pori); Dashboard Cam at 9:02:53-9:03:00,

128. Campos instructed Ramos and Perez where to stand, and emphasized that they needed to remain separate for Campos’ safety. See Dashboard Cam at 9:03:00-9:04:50..

129. After Campos performed a preliminary vehicle search to remove dangerous items from the vehicle, he deployed his K-9, who alerted Campos to the presence of drugs in the trunk area. See Tr. at 38:1-19 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

130. While Campos continued the search, other officers arrived at the scene to assist. See Tr. at 38:25-39:3 (Campos).

131. Campos informed Ramos and Perez that they could ask any questions, but they did not do so. See Tr. at 39:16-19 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

132. At no point throughout the search did Perez or Ramos revoke their consent or ask the officers to stop the search. See Tr. at 39:4-9 (Campos, Mysliwiec).

133. Throughout various places in the car, Campos found approximately six packages with black axle grease covering them. See Tr. at 40:1-41:1 (Campos).

134. Drug-trafficking organizations -use axle grease to conceal a narcotic’s odor. See Tr. at 40:7-10 (Campos).

135. Campos then placed Ramos and Perez under arrest. See Tr. at 41:2-3 (Campos).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2015, a grand jury indicted Ramos for possession of more than 500 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(A)(1) and (B)(1)(a). See Indictment, filed November 5, 2015 (Doc. 12). Ramos moves the Court, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and rule 12(b)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to suppress the evidence seized from the rental ear under his control on October 5, 2015. See Motion at 1. Ramos submits that the Court must suppress the evidence, because it was seized without a warrant after an unreasonable and excessive detention that produced his involuntary consent to search. See Motion at 1.

Ramos argues that “[n]o part of the stop on October 15, 2015 was consensual.” Motion at 9. Ramos contends that, instead, he was “unreasonably and excessively detained without any reasonable suspicion or probable cause and for a period which was far longer than necessary to complete a routine traffic citation.” Motion at 9. He asserts' that Campos had all of the information he needed to complete a traffic citation within minutes, but “impermissibly extended the duration of the traffic stop without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by extensively questioning Mr. Ramos and Ms. Perez” and by pretending to check the car’s Vehicle Identification Number, even though he “had no information of any kind to suspect that the vehicle was stolen.” Motion' at 12-13. Consequently, Ramos contends, the VIN inspection and questioning “unduly prolonged the traffic stop in an effort to develop reasonable suspicion.” Motion at 13. Moreover, Ramos asserts, “his subsequent consent to search the vehicle was involuntarily obtained during this unlawful and prolonged detention and represented nothing more than a submission to a claim of lawful authority.” Motion at 9.

The United States responded that “Campos engaged in a consensual encounter with Defendant,” and “received Defendant’s voluntary and knowing permission to search the car.” United States’ Response to Defense Motion to Suppress at 5, filed April 4, 2016'(Doc. 29)(“Response”). The United States first explains that Campos’ routine questioning “did not extend the time it took Officer Campos to write the defendant’s traffic citation.” Response at 2. The United States notes that Campos “routinely checks the VIN both on the front dashboard and in the door well,” and that Campos’ questioning Perez occurred while he was carrying out this routine inspection. Response at 2. The United States argues that the limited detention remained lawful as long as Campos’ questioning did not unreasonably extend the traffic stop’s duration. See Response at 6. Here, the United States, contends, Campos’ questioning and inspections did not- “extend[ ] the traffic stop beyond the amount of time it would reasonably take to perform that traffic stop.” Response at 6. The United States asserts that Campos obtained reasonable suspicion to search the car while he was conducting his lawful traffic stop, because, Perez and Ramos “gave different answers to the travel plan questions.” Response at 3.

Second, the. United States asserts that the traffic stop ended and Ramos began to walk back to his vehicle, demonstrating that Ramos was free to leave. See Response at 3-4. Furthermore, the United States argues, Campos did not brandish a weapon, employ multiple officers, use physical force, or request that Ramos accompany Campos to the police station. See Response at 9. The United States explains that Ramos voluntarily decided to answer Campos’ further questioning and voluntarily allowed Campos to search his vehicle “without protesting or refusing.” Response at 4. Finally, the United States asserts that, even if there was an illegal detention during the first traffic stop, there was no causal connection between that illegality and Ramos’ consent to search the vehicle. See Response at 9-10.

Ramos responded on April 15, 2016. See Defendant’s Reply to the Government’s Response to the Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed April 15, 2016 (Doc. 33)(“Re-ply”). Ramos “does not challenge the initial stop for speeding,” but insists that Campos’ VIN inspection and questioning Perez “unreasonably exceeded the scope and duration of the traffic stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Reply at 4-5. Ramos asserts that police officers conducting traffic stops may “generally inquire about a driver’s travel plans,” but only “so long as the questioning does not prolong the stop.” Reply at 5. Here, Ramos contends, Campos “measurably extended]” the stop. Reply at 5. Ramos argues that this Fourth Amendment violation tainted all of Ramos’ subsequent actions. See Reply at 12-15.

Second, Ramos reiterates his Motion’s arguments that he did not voluntarily give his consent. See Reply at 8-10. Ramos argues that, even if the questioning began as a consensual encounter, because Campos “repeatedly ordered Ms. Perez to return to the interior of the Mercedes and be seated and then directed Mr. Ramos to remain by the side of the police cruiser,” a reasonable person would not have understood he or she was at liberty to ignore the police and leave. Reply at 11.

The Court held a hearing on May 25, 2016. At the hearing, the United States called Campos. See Tr. at 3:5-7 (Mysli-wiec). Campos described the October 15, 2015 traffic stop. See Tr. at 8:6-41:9 (Campos, Mysliwiec). Campos explained his normal procedure for conducting traffic stops, which includes engaging the driver in conversation while he issues the citation. See Tr. at 16:11-23 (Campos, Mysliwiec). Campos then described his routine process of checking VINs both on the windshield and inside of the ear door to confirm that a car is not stolen. See Tr. at 19:2-18 (Campos, Mysliwiec). He noted that he is trained to inspect VINs. See Tr. at 19:22-20:18 (Campos, Mysliwiec); id at 107:15-109:8 (Campos, Mysliwiec). Campos later explained his extensive training in conducting traffic stops, and stated that he was instructed to always check the VIN on the inside of the car, because it would better reveal whether the car was stolen. See Tr. at 101:17-107:15 (Campos, Mysliwiee)(asserting that he could not rely on the dashboard VTN alone, but instead relied on the tamper-proof sticker in the car door, because it reveals tampering).

On cross-examination, Campos admitted that the citation form did not require him to record the VIN. See Tr, at 74:5-6 (Campos). He stated that he compared the VIN to the rental agreement “to make sure that vehicle actually belonged to the contract that they had.” Tr. at 73:7-11 (Campos); id. at 98:1-3 (Campos)(explaining that he checks VINs, because vehicles may be stolen, even if the owner does not report them as stolen). He noted that the rental agreement did not contain the vehicle’s VIN, but asserted that he could also verify that the car was not stolen by comparing the VINs to the dispatcher’s information. See Tr. at 73:12-74:9 (Campos, Pori). Throughout much of the cross-examination, Campos watched the video dashboard recording and identified how long it took him to perform certain tasks involved in the traffic stop. See Tr. at 76:20-78:2 (Campos, Pori). Finally, Campos described his interaction with Perez and explained that he instructed her to remain in the car for “officer safety reasons.” Tr. at 79:18-86:24 (Campos, Pori).

The parties then argued the Motion. Ramos asserted that Campos’ unconstitutional behavior began when he started checking the VINs. See Tr. at 127:8-20 (Court, Pori). He stated that “there was no evidence that there was [sic] any wants or warrants” or that the car was stolen, because “the license plate, the rental agreement all confirm that that car belonged to Enterprise Rent-a-Car and [h]e had a rental agreement in the name of Edward Ramos.” Tr. at 127: 10-16 (Pori). Further, Ramos argued, there is no evidence “that Enterprise was in possession of a VIN-switehed Mercedes.” Tr. at 127:17-20 (Pori). Ramos clarified that he did not dispute Campos asking him to leave his vehicle -and stand in front of the police car and to provide proof of license and insurance. See Tr. at 127:21-129:10 (Court, Pori). The Court asked Ramos what is different about an officer asking to check the VIN. See Tr. at 129:11-12 (Court). Ramos responded that Campos used the VIN inspection as “a ruse to get to the interior portions of the vehicle without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” Tr. at 129:16-20 (Pori).

Ramos asserted that, if officers can conduct VIN checks in the same way that they investigate proof of insurance, “the officer’s actions should be limited to actually checking the VIN” that “is visible in the exterior portion of the windshield” to avoid intruding into the driver’s privacy rights. Tr. at 134:19-23 (Pori). Ramos further contended that Campos’ questions did not relate to checking the VIN. See Tr. at 135:17-23 (Pori). Ramos concluded that “the scope of the investigation was excessive when the door was opened, and the length of the detention and the questioning completely unrelated to any VIN analysis” caused the detention to extend further. Tr. at 136:1-4 (Pori). Ramos argues that Campos obtained Ramos’ consent only through the illegal search. See Tr. at 136:6-22 (Pori).

The United States clarified that Campos did not have reasonable suspicion that there was a stolen car. See Tr. at 145:10-12 (Mysliwiec). The United States instead took the position that “the VIN check is properly and legally allowed by the law categorically in every traffic stop without requiring its own reasonable suspicion.” Tr. at 145:17-19 (Mysliwiec). It explained that, like proof of insurance and registration, the VIN confirmed that “this person can operate this car on this highway.” Tr. at 146:2-3 (Mysliwiec). The Court asked whether the interior VIN check was lawful when it took so long. See Tr. at 153:10-16 (Court)(“[T]hat’s a long time to check the VIN, even if you’re trying to keep an eye on Ms. Perez.”). The Court stated that an officer’s “primary responsibility has to be on checking the VIN, not on watching her or talking to her, right?” Tr. at 153:13-16 (Court). The United States responded that Campos’ primary responsibility was not only to check the VIN, but to ensure that Perez did not pull out any weapons, so he had to keep an eye on her while he was inspecting the VIN. See Tr. at 153:17-21 (Mysliwiec).

RELEVANT LAW REGARDING FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It also commands that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In . determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, courts must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 132 S.Ct. 945, 950, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012)(Scalia, J.)(alteration in original)(quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)(Scalia, J.)).

“Not all searches require a warrant, The hallmark of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” United States v. Harmon, 785 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1157 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J,). See United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1260 (10th Cir.2011)(“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”)(quoting Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)). “In the criminal context, reasonableness usually requires a showing of probable cause.” Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 792 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1184 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J.)(quoting Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002)). The Supreme Court of the United States has stated in the law enforcement context that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)(footnotes omitted).

1. Reasonable Government Searches.

“[B]ecause ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,’ ” when a search implicating the Fourth Amendment has occurred, the district court must determine whether the search is reasonable. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)). See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006)(“‘[U]nder our general Fourth Amendment approach’ we ‘examin[e] the totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,”)(quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001)). “Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term ‘probable cause,’ a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587 (citing, as an e.g. cite, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct, 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)(“Terry”)). The Supreme Court has justified this balancing test with the recognition that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not protect all subjective expectations of privacy, but only those that society recognizes as ‘legitimate.’” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995)(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985)).

“Whether a search is reasonable ‘is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. at 848, 126 S.Ct, 2193 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118,122 S.Ct. 587). See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir.2007)(stating that the Supreme Court “described the totality-of-the-circumstances test as one where ‘the reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy, and on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests’ ” (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. 587)).

As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is “reasonableness.” At least in a case ... where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard “ ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ”

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. at 652-53, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995)(quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)). The Supreme Court has held that the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not a concrete test:

The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case [determining reasonableness] requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

In analyzing the first factor — the intrusion on the individual’s privacy— courts and the Tenth Circuit look to the individual’s privacy expectations. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-120, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001)(noting that the petitioner had a “significantly diminished ... reasonable expectation of privacy,” because a condition of his probation was to consent to search of his apartment without notice or probable cause, and because he was clearly notified and informed of the provision); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d at 1186-87 (noting that the plaintiffs, convicted felons on probation, have a more limited expectation of privacy than the ordinary citizen, and noting that “[w]hat is ‘reasonable’ under the fourth amendment for a person on conditional release, or a felon, may be unreasonable for the general population”); Boling v. Bomer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir.l999)(“[W]hile obtaining and analyzing the DNA or saliva of an inmate convicted of a sex offense is a search and seizure implicating Fourth Amendment concerns, it is a reasonable search and seizure. This is so in light of an inmate’s diminished privacy rights ....”)

As Justice Kagan has noted, property law informs society’s expectations about what government intrusions are reasonable: “It is not surprising that in a case involving a search of a home, property concepts and privacy concepts should so align. The law of property ‘naturally enough infiuence[s]’ our ‘shared social expectations’ of what places should be free from governmental incursions.” Florida v. Jardines, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1419, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring)(quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006)). Similarly, in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority noted: “What expectations are legitimate varies, of course, with context, depending, for example, upon whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is at home, at work, in a car, or in a public park.” 515 U.S. at 654, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (internal citations omitted).

2. Traffic Stops.

A traffic stop is an investigative detention, see United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 819, 823-24 (10th Cir.1997), and is thus analyzed according to the principles that the Supreme Court set forth in Terry, see United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir.2011)(concluding that a traffic stop is a Terry stop); United States v. Leos-Qujjada, 107 F.3d 786, 792 (10th Cir.1997). In Terry, the Supreme Court authorized police officers to conduct limited seizures and to search a person’s outer clothing when the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The Tenth Circuit has concluded that traffic stops fall into the category of Terry stops. See United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d at 823-24 (“A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment^ but] it is characterized as an investigative detention, which requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before a seizure can be made, rather than a full custodial arrest, which requires probable cause.”). See United States v. Sedillo, No. CR 08-1419 JB, 2010 WL 965743, at *10 (D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2010)(Browning, J.); United States v. Hanrahan, No. CR 04-1978 JB, 2005 WL 2312746, at *4 (D.N.M. Aug. 12, 2005)(Browning, J.), aff'd, 508 F.3d 962 (10th Cir.2007).

For officers to lawfully stop a vehicle, they must have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular persons stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d at 792 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Police officers may stop a vehicle only when they have “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the detainee has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Elkins, 70 F.3d 81, 83 (10th Cir.1995)(citing United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 987 (10th Cir.1993)). Reasonable suspicion is not determined by any one factor, but by the totality of the circumstances that the officer knew. See United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. 226, 229-30 (10th Cir.2009)(unpublished); United State v. Elkins, 70 F.3d at 83 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). Even if the officer does not form subjective reasonable suspicion, if the circumstances of which he is aware would lead an officer to develop reasonable suspicion, the stop is proper. See United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 229 (holding that an officer’s “subjective characterization of his actions is irrelevant”).

If a police officer observes a traffic violation, the officer has cause to execute a traffic stop. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)(“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”); United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139, 1144 & n. 1 (10th Cir.2002)(acknowledging that Whren v. United States “indieate[d] that probable cause is a sufficient ground for a stop,” but explaining that reasonable suspicion is all that is necessary) (quoting United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir.2001)). Even if the officer has an ulteri- or motive for executing the traffic stop— i.e., to investigate some other suspected illegal conduct — the officer can lawfully pull over a vehicle that he or she observes violating the traffic laws. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 813-14, 116 S.Ct. 1769; United States v. King, 209 Fed.Appx. 760, 762 (10th Cir.2006)(“The constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the officer involved.”)(citing Whren v. United States). In other words, there is no constitutional prohibition on what are colloquially referred to as “pretext stops,” so long as the officer also had a constitutional basis for executing the stop. United States v. Sedillo, 2010 WL 965743, at *10.

“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998)(observing that the investigation into the traffic offense is “a relatively brief encounter” that is “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ ... than to a formal arrest” (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984))). The “tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’ — to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, ... and attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. at 1614. Because the officer’s purpose is to address the traffic infraction, the stop may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). The authority for the seizure therefore ends when the officer completes — “or reasonably should have [] completed” — the tasks tied to the traffic infraction. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. at 1614. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir.1998)(observing that the traffic stop must last no longer than necessary to confirm or deny the suspicion that justified the stop — the traffic offense). In short, absent reasonable suspicion to justify an extended detention, an officer cannot “measurably extend” the stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to complete his traffic-related inquiries. United States v. Rodriguez, — U.S.—, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015).

Beyond writing the traffic citation, an officer’s mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834. Typically, these inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, as well as determining whether any outstanding warrants for the driver exist. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). These checks serve the same purpose as the traffic code: to ensure that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-59, 99 S.Ct. 1391; 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), 507-517 (5th ed. 2012). Similarly, a VIN inspection confirms that the driver can. legally operate this particular vehicle — because it is not stolen — on the highway. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 115, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986)(concluding that “a demand to inspect the VIN, like a demand to see license and registration papers, is within the scope of police authority pursuant to a traffic violation stop”). The Supreme Court has held VIN searches “constitutionally permissible in light of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN and the fact that the officer’s observed r