Federal Trade Commission v. Lanier Law, LLC (194 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 2016)

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, United States District Judge

THIS CAUSE is brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), pursuant to its authority under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 45, against Defendants Lanier Law LLC, Fortress Law Group LLC, Surety Law Group LLP (Surety), Liberty & Trust Law Group of Florida LLC (Liberty & Trust), Fortress Law Group, PC (Fortress DC), Redstone Law Group, LLC (Redstone DC), Michael W. Lanier, Rogelio Robles and Edward William Rennick III (Defendants). The FTC alleges that Defendants violated Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule (MARS Rule), 16 C.F.R. Part 322, recodified as Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (Regulation 0), 12 C.F.R. Part 1015 (Regulation 0), and the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), 16 C.F.R. Part 310, in connection with the marketing and sale of mortgage assistance relief services. See generally Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission’s Amended Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief (Doc. 91; Amended Complaint), filed December 22, 2014. At the outset of these proceedings, on the FTC’s motion, the Court entered a temporary restraining order against Defendants Lanier Law LLC, Fortress Law Group LLC, Surety, Liberty & Trust, and Michael Lanier. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order with an Asset Freeze and Other Equitable Relief (Doc. 10; TRO), entered July 11, 2014. Thereafter, the Court dissolved a portion of the TRO and granted, in part, the FTC’s request for preliminary injunctive relief against those Defendants with respect to Counts I, III, and VII of the original Complaint (Doc. 4). See Preliminary Injunction Order with Asset Freeze and Other Equitable Relief (Doc. 59), entered August 1, 2014. The FTC amended the complaint to add additional Defendants and after appropriate briefing the Court expanded the preliminary injunction to those Defendants as well. See Preliminary Injunction Order with Asset Freeze and Other Equitable Relief (Doc. 115), entered February 6, 2015.

This matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission’s Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment (Doc. 246; FTC Motion), filed on December 29, 2015, and Defendant Michael W. Lanier’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 248; Lanier Motion), filed on December 30, 2015. On January 20, 2016, Defendants Fortress DC and Rogelio Robles (collectively, Fortress Defendants), as well as Defendant Michael W. Lanier filed responses in opposition to the FTC Motion. See Defendant, Fortress Law Group, PC and Rogelio Robles’, Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 252; Fortress Response); Defendant Michael W. Lanier’s Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Judgment (Doc. 253; Lanier Response). On March 10, 2016, with leave of Court, see Order (Doc. 263), Lanier filed a supplement to the La-nier Response. See Defendant Michael W. Lanier’s Supplementary Affidavit in Opposition to the FTC Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 264; Lanier Supplement). The Federal Trade Commission responded to the Lanier Supplement on March 29, 2016. See Plaintiffs Reply to Lanier Defendants’ Supplement to the Affidavit Opposing Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 267; FTC Reply). In addition, the FTC filed a response to the Lanier Motion on January 20, 2016. See Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant Michael W. Lanier’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 255; FTC Response). The Court granted Lanier permission to file a reply to the FTC Response, see Order (Doc. 259), and he did so on February 2, 2016. See Defendant Michael W. Lanier’s Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Lanier’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 261; Lanier Reply). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Rule 56(c)(1)(A). An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. See Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir.1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). “When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir.1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir.1994)).

II. Evidentiary Challenges

In his Response, Lanier challenges the FTC’s use of declarations as evidence in support of the FTC Motion. According to Lanier, these declarations are inadmissible because the FTC has not moved to admit them under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 807, and even if the FTC had done so, the declarations fail to satisfy the residual hearsay exception. See Lanier Response at 2. In support, Lanier relies on cases in which courts have considered the admissibility of declarations in lieu of testimony at trial, such as F.T.C. v. Washington Data Resources, No. 8:09-cv-2309-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2669661, at *3-5 (M.D.Fla. July 7, 2011) and F.T.C. v. Direct Benefits Group, LLC, No. 6:11-cv-1186-Orl-28TBS, 2012 WL 5508050, at *1 (M.D.Fla. Nov. 14, 2012), as well as F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-2394, 2013 WL 4545143, at *2-3 (N.D.Ohio Aug. 27, 2013), in which the court addressed whether consumer complaints • to other agencies, as opposed to declarations made under penalty of perjury, were appropriate evidence at summary judgment. See Lanier Response at 3-5. However, La-nier’s argument is specious and the authorities he cites in support are not relevant to the current posture of this case. The issue before this Court is the use of declarations to support a motion for summary judgment, and thus Rule 5⅜ not FRE 807, is the applicable authority.

As stated above, pursuant to Rule 56, a party may support a motion for summary judgment by citing to: “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only) admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” See Rule 56(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). To rely on a declaration, the Rule requires that it: “be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Rule 56(c)(4). In the declarations submitted by the FTC, the declarants state that they are over 18 years of age, have personal knowledge of the facts stated, and would testify to those facts if called. See, e.g., FTC Motion, Exs. 1A, 1B, 2-25, 300-338. Moreover, each declaration is signed under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Id. As such, to the extent the declarations contain testimony that would be admissible in Court if the declarant were called to testify, the Court may appropriately consider these declarations in resolving the instant Motions. See Rule 56(c)(1)(A), (c)(4); McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1584 (11th Cir.1996) (explaining that otherwise admissible evidence may be “submitted in inadmissible form at the summary judgment stage, though at trial it must be submitted in admissible form”). Significantly, Lanier fails to identify any declaration of record that does not comply with these requirements, nor does he raise any hearsay, personal knowledge, or other relevant challenge to any specific portion of a declarant’s testimony. Thus, the Court rejects Lanier’s wholesale challenge to the FTC’s use of declarations as evidence.

Lanier also challenges the credibility of the FTC investigators who filed declarations in support of the FTC Motion. See Lanier Response at 20-21. “Generally, judicial credibility determinations are not proper at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.” Young v. Rios, 390 Fed.Appx. 982, 983 (11th Cir.2010). However, upon review; Lanier’s credibility challenge does little to undermine the testimony of the investigators and instead reflects Lanier’s fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between a legal and a factual question. See Lanier Response at 20. Moreover, to the extent La-niér takes issue with the way the FTC divided the investigatory tasks among the investigators and the attorneys, he fails to explain how this is relevant to the matter of credibility. Notably, the testimony of the. FTC investigators, is largely supported by extensive documentary evidence, the authenticity of which Lanier does not challenge. Thus, in the absence of any specific argument regarding a particular aspect of an investigator’s testimony, the Court finds that Lanier’s general credibility attack is insufficient under the circumstances to create an issue of fact. See Curl v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he opposing party may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,’ and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” (internal quotation omitted)).

III. Background

A. The Participants

Defendant Michael W. Lanier is an attorney, licensed to practice law in the State of Florida. See Lanier Response at 6. In approximately 2011, Lanier established Lanier Law, LLC, which operated under various names, including “The Law Offices of Michael W. Lanier,” “Fortress Law Group,” “Redstone Law Group,” and “Vanguard Law Group” (collectively, Lanier Law). See FTC Motion, Ex. 200: Deposition of Michael W. Lanier (Doc. 269; Lanier Dep.) at 14-15. Under these various names, Lanier offered mortgage assistance relief services, such as foreclosure defense and loan modifications, to consumers nationwide who were in danger of losing their homes. See Declaration of Michael W. Lanier (Doc. 25; Lanier Decl.) ¶ 5. Lanier contracted with a company called Pinnacle Legal Services (Pinnacle), owned by Defendant Rogelio Robles, Defendant Edward W. Rennick III, and Wil-lem Young, to provide legal staffing for Lanier Law. See Lanier Dep. at 20; see also FTC Motion, Ex. 201: Deposition of Rogelio Robles (Doc. 270; Robles Dep.) at 55-56. Pinnacle also provided legal staffing for Lanier’s operations as Redstone and Vanguard. See Lanier Dep. at 67. Another company, Fortress Legal Services, owned by Robles, provided legal staffing for the work Lanier did as Fortress Law Group. See id. at 67-68; see also Robles Dep. at 92. As such, according to Lanier, he was the only employee of Lanier Law, see Lanier Dep. at 164, and the individuals working in his office, answering the phone, and managing his case files were employees of the staffing companies, id. at 63-65. Lanier Law paid Pinnacle and Fortress Legal Services for the hours these employees worked at the firm. Id. at 68.

Robles owned another business called the Department of Loss Mitigation and Forensics (DOLMF), located at 4327 Salisbury Road, which at one point also provided legal staffing, “employee-leasing,” and processing services to Lanier. See Robles Dep. at 19, 27, 43,112. Although employed by DOLMF, because DOLMF serviced Lanier Law, Robles represented himself to consumers as the Operations Manager for the Law Offices of Michael W. Lanier. Id. at 57-58. Robles hired, trained and supervised DOLMF’s employees, was kept apprised of any issues that arose with consumers, and spoke to consumers with complaints, Id. at 41-42, 44-45, 123, 128-29. DOLMF also provided staffing to a company called First United Relief Foundation (FURF), owned by Anthony Gresham, an employee or former employee of DOLMF. See id. at 45, 68, Robles was “in charge” of FURF as well, and the company largely functioned as another name for DOLMF. Id. at 42-43, 68-71 (“I guess [FURF] was just a different name that the staff that was employed by [DOLMF] picked up the phone as.”). Significantly, DOLMF paid Avanti Media Solutions, a company located at 6821 Southpoint Drive North, Suite 125, Jacksonville, Florida, and owned by Young, to print and mail flyers, including a flyer titled Economic Stimulus Mortgage Notification. See Robles Dep. at 36, 38-39, 108-111, Ex. 97 (Doc. 246-1 at 66; the Economic Stimulus Flyer). This Flyer, discussed further below, solicited consumers to contact DOLMF for mortgage relief services.

In December of 2011, the Florida Bar began investigating Lanier’s law practice. See Lanier Deck ¶ 10. On November 5, 2012, the Florida Bar served Lanier, through his attorney, with a Complaint alleging violations of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Florida Bar Rules) with respect to Lanier’s foreclosure defense services. See FTC Motion, Ex. 1A: Declaration of Michael Liggins (Liggins Deck), Att. LL (the Bar Complaint). Lanier entered a conditional guilty plea to the Bar Complaint, id. Att. MM (the Guilty Plea), and on July 24, 2013, the Supreme Court of Florida entered judgment against Lanier suspending him from the practice of law for forty-five days, commencing August 23, 2013, id. Att. NN. Following his suspension, on October 31, 2013, Lanier formed Liberty & Trust and resumed his foreclosure defense practice, this time limiting his clientele to Florida consumers. See Lanier Deck ¶¶ 29-30. Liberty & Trust also does business as Lighthouse Law Group. See Lanier Dep. at 16.

In July, August, and September of 2012, Surety, Fortress DC, and Redstone DC, respectively, were formed in the District of Columbia (collectively, the DC Entities). See Liggins Decl., Atts. M, N; FTC Motion, Ex. 28: Declaration of Roberto C. Menjivar (Menjivar Decl.), Att. L. Pursuant to its equity and partnership agreement, Surety was a partnership of Pablo Santiago, Jr., Esq., an attorney licensed in the District of Columbia (D.C.), as well as Rennick, Robles, and Young. See Menjivar Deck, Att. K. Robles and Tina Greene, a member of the D.C. Bar, entered into a partnership agreement forming Fortress DC. See Liggins Deck, Att. N; Robles Dep., Ex. 115. Redstone DC’s members were Rennick, Lanier, Robles, Young, and John James Kane Jr. See Menjivar Deck, Att. M: However, Lanier held only a six percent interest in Redstone DC, id. which he later abandoned. See Lanier Deck at 6 n.2; Rennick Dep. at 29. Robles, Rennick, Lanier and Young decided to open the DC Entities after they “figured out that there was a way that a nonattorney could own a law firm out of DC —” See Robles Dep. at 32. Although these businesses were formed in D.C. and had D.C. addresses, their D.C. offices were merely “virtual offices” to which mail could be delivered, but was then forwarded to Jacksonville, Florida. See Rennick Dep. at 33; Kane Dep. at 19-20; FTC Motion, Ex. 204: Deposition of Tina Greene (Doc. 273; Greene Dep.) at 56.

In August and October of 2012, respectively, Lanier stopped accepting new clients for Lanier Law d/b/a Redstone, and Lanier Law d/b/a Fortress. See Lanier Deck ¶¶ 11, 12. Lanier maintains that in October of 2012, he transferred his law practice to the DC Entities. See Lanier Dep. at 68-69. Specifically, on October 8, 2012, Lanier sold the “Foreclosure Defense; Loss Mitigation; Debt Management and Debt Defense Litigation,” areas of his law practice to Redstone DC, and transferred “all of Lanier’s existing cases, consenting clients, and fees from Lanier to Redstone.” See Menjivar Decl., Att. O. Lanier also transferred his foreclosure defense clients to Fortress DC. See Lanier Response at 8. At that time, Pinnacle stopped working for Lanier and transitioned to the DC Entities, see Lanier Dep. at 68-69; Rennick Dep. at 48-49, such that the Pinnacle employees who had previously serviced clients of Lanier Law continued their involvement with those clients on behalf of the respective DC Entity. See Lanier Dep. at 24. Likewise, the employees of DOLMF working on behalf of Lanier Law transitioned to working for Fortress DC. See Robles Dep. at 43. Lanier left in place his “Moneygram portal” and “Merchant Account portal,” by which consumers could submit payments, and allowed the DC Entities to “take over” those accounts to “accommodate[]” the “reasonable requests” of his “friends,” the principals of those Entities. See Lanier Response at 12; Supplemental Declaration of Michael W. Lanier (Doc. 46; Lanier Supp. Decl.) ¶10. In addition, according to Lanier, he continued to recruit and maintain the of-counsel network for Redstone DC, as well as Surety. See Lanier Response at 19-20; Lanier Dep. at 121-22. In doing so, Lanier would call and speak with the lawyers, hire them on behalf of Redstone DC, and on occasion, fire them. See Lanier Supp. Decl. ¶ 9. La-nier maintains that Redstone DC paid him for these services, but on the occasions that he assisted Surety with its attorney network, he was not compensated. Id.

According to Alexis Wrenn, who identifies herself in- a declaration executed on January 27, 2016 as the office manager for Surety and former office manager for Red-stone DC, Surety and Redstone DC ceased taking clients for mortgage related services in June 2013, and July 2014, respectively. See DC Entities Prelim. Inj. Resp., Ex. 1. Pamela Thomas, whose January 27, 2015 declaration states that she is the office manager for Fortress DC, asserts that Fortress DC stopped accepting clients for mortgage related services in July 2014 as well. Id., Ex. 2. In March of 2014, Rennick, Kane and Pamela Randle formed a new partnership called Ameritrust Law Group, which also has a virtual office in D.C., with all mail forwarded to a Florida location. See Kane Dep. at 22, 35-36.

B. The Lawyers

Lanier Law and the DC Entities utilized a substantially similar business model. These companies operated as “law firms” in two ways: (1) they entered into agreements with attorneys throughout the United States to act as “of counsel” attorneys for the firms, see Lanier Response at 7; Lanier Decl. ¶ 5; Rennick Dep. at 128-30; FTC Motion, Exs. 400-406, and (2) each law firm was formed with one attorney as a member or partner, see Lanier Response at 7; Menjivar Decl., Atts. K, M; Robles Dep., Ex. 115. With respect to the “of counsel” attorney network, Lanier found and hired these attorneys, both for Lanier Law and later, for Redstone DC and Surety. See FTC Motion, Exs. 400-06; see also Supp. Lanier Decl. ¶9. Some of the “of counsel” attorneys who began their relationship with Lanier Law, subsequently transitioned to working for Redstone DC, Fortress DC and/or Surety. See FTC Motion, Exs. 401-04, 406. The principals of Lanier Law and the DC Entities associated “of counsel” attorneys in other states so that these businesses could expand then-operations to those states. See Rennick Dep. at 129-30 (“We absolutely knew that if we were going to have a client in another state, we needed to have an attorney.;.. We needed an attorney in that state to be able to provide foreclosure defense services.”). As such, the client agreements that Lanier Law and the DC Entities provided to consumers refer to the law firm retaining “outside counsel” or working with “counsel local to Client,” to provide the consumer with legal representation. See, e.g., FTC Motion, Ex. 321, Att. D (2014 Redstone Application for Foreclosure Defense Services); Ex. 323, Att. A (2013 Fortress Application); Ex. 335, Att. A (2012 Surety Application) Ex.337, Att. A (2011 Lanier Law Contract).

Regardless of which firm was involved, the “of counsel” attorneys signed substantially similar agreements setting forth the terms of their relationship with Lanier Law or a DC Entity. See e.g., FTC Motion, Ex. 404, Atts. A-C, Ex. 405, Att. A; Ex. 406, Atts. A-C (Of Counsel Agreements). Pursuant to the Of Counsel Agreements, the attorneys agreed that they were independent contractors, responsible for their own overhead expenses and taxes. Id. They were paid “a monthly non-refundable retainer,” either $150 or $300 a month, which represented either 3 or 6, “pre-paid billable hours from Lawyer to Firm during the course of the month.” See e.g., FTC Motion, Ex. 400, Att. A; Ex. 403, Att. A-D. The “of counsel” attorneys were paid these sums in recognition that “[fjrom time to time, there may be matters where the Firm will want Lawyer to assist the Firm because of Lawyer’s particular background and expertise.” Id. In addition, the attorneys would be compensated at a rate of $75/hour for hours, worked in excess of the pre-paid amount, and would be paid separately for appearances at any hearings. Id

The Of Counsel Agreements also contained confidentiality clauses requiring, niter alia, that “once client paper work has been transferred back to the Firm, Lawyer must shred copies of all client documents and retain nothing on file that is connected to the client. Lawyer may not contact or work with client in any way, without the express- consent of the Firm.” Id. Some, although not all, of these agreements contained paragraphs similar to the following:

The Firm anticipates having clients in [state where “of counsel” is located] who need foreclosure defense, debt management, or similar service. The Firm will receive initial communications from such clients, draft and tender appropriate documents in order to ‘sign up’ such clients. That document will be from the firm and signed by [lawyer-member of firm, e.g., Kane, Lanier, Santiago] or another firm partner and co-signed by electronic signature of associated [relevant state] counsel.

The Firm will then refer the client to Lawyer for Limited Scope Representation pursuant to his own local Bar’s Rules and Ethics Opinions. The Firm may, if Lawyer agrees, suggest drafts correspondence [sic] and documents on Lawyer’s letterhead and for Lawyer’s signature, as soon as Lawyer has reviewed, revised, and approved the final draft of such. Facsimile signatures may be used for final drafts approved by Lawyer, so that the Firm can assemble and deliver such approved final drafts to appropriate parties, including the client who may file pleadings, etc., with the court.

If and when pleadings, including, but not limited to, Petitions for Temporary Restraining Order, etc., become appropriate, such may be preliminarily drafted by the Firm, based upon the availability to the firm of the underlying documents and details. The Firm will email, or otherwise expeditiously transfer the proposed pleading to Lawyer in order that (s)he may exercise his/her independent judgment on the content and form of whatever (s)he signs and files locally on the client’s behalf.

The Lawyer will always have the last word and responsibility for the ultimate form, content and disposition of the work that (s)he does on behalf of his/her and the Firm’s clients. The Firm and all of its resources are always available to assist local Lawyer on any case that the firm may send to him/her.

See, e.g„ FTC Motion, Ex. 405, Att. A; Ex. 406, Atts. B & C (with language), Att. A (without language). However, despite these provisions, several “of counsel” attorneys aver that the work they actually performed on behalf of the law firms was very limited.

For example, from August 2012 to July 2014, Chanda Roby worked for the Law Offices of Michael Lanier, Fortress DC, and Redstone DC, and declares that: ■

7. I would occasionally be sent documents to look over or be notified to access the firm’s database to review documents of certain consumers. For example, I usually would look to see that documents were properly signed and that the documents were in order. The requests were very random.

8. There was actually not a lot to do. Much of what was done was performed by the firms’ employees in Jacksonville, Florida.

See FTC Motion, Ex. 404: Declaration of Chanda Roby (Roby Decl.) ¶¶ 6-8, 16, Att, A. In the nearly two years that Roby worked for these firms, she does not recall ever contacting any client or potential client, and no client or potential client ever contacted her. Id. ¶ 10. She maintains that neither Lanier nor anyone else from the firms requested that she “call consumers after they signed up as clients and introduce [herself] as the local attorney.” Id. Nor did she ever have any contact with a bank, lender, or mortgage servicer. Id. ¶ 11. Indeed, Roby states that she “had nothing to do with loan modifications or any attempt to obtain one.” Id. The other six “of counsel” attorneys who submitted declarations in this matter all describe a similar experience. See FTC Motion, Ex. 4G0 ¶¶ 4-8, Ex. 401 ¶¶6, 8-9, Ex. 402 ¶¶4, 7-10, Ex. 403 ¶¶ 5-9, Ex. 405 ¶¶4, 6-10, Ex. 406 ¶¶ 4, 7, 9-10. Some of these attorneys assert that Lanier specifically told them that the work only involved reviewing files “to see that they were properly completed, signed and dated,” with “no litigation, no court appearances, and no legal research.” See FTC Motion, Ex. 402: Declaration of Ralph Estrada (Estrada Decl.) ¶4; see also id., Ex. 403 ¶ 5 (“[Lanier] told me that the work consisted mainly of checking files to make sure the addresses were correct, and that if there was a lawsuit in Nevada involving one of his clients, I would help with that.”); Ex. 405 ¶ 4 (“[Lanier] told me that I would mainly be checking retainer agreements to ensure that there was contact information and to be sure they were signed and dated. At some point, Mr. Lanier told me that I would not have and did not have any fiduciary relationship to any of his or Surety’s clients.”); Ex. 406 ¶4 (“[Lanier] told me that I would ... review agreements to see that they were properly completed, signed and dated. There would be no litigation, no court appearances, and no legal research.”). Estrada maintains that “[t]here was nothing of substance that [he] did,” he was given no instruction, and it “seemed to [him] that they were just paying [him] to have an of counsel designation.” See Estrada Deck ¶ 8. Andrew Taylor, an “of counsel” attorney with Surety, states that when he “asked someone in the Surety office if contact with the client was necessary, they told [him] that no followup by [him] was needed.” See FTC Motion, Ex. 405: Declaration of Andrew Taylor (Taylor Deck) ¶ 10.

Some of these attorneys do recall being asked to review pleadings that a consumer would file in court pro se. See FTC Motion, Exs. 400, '401, 403, 405, 406. However, the review was largely editorial, correcting typographical errors, grammar, syntax and formatting. See Taylor Deck ¶ 8; FTC Motion, Ex. 401: Declaration of Carolyn Dale (Dale Deck) ¶ 6. Dale states that, she “did not warrant that the pleadings would work, and [she does] not know how any case was resolved.” See Dale Deck ¶ 6. Notably, at least two of the “of-counsel” attorneys refused to review pro se filings because they felt uncomfortable or unqualified to do so. See FTC Motion, Ex. 400 ¶ 7, Ex. 403 ¶ 8. In addition, Taylor asserts that a consumer did contact him on one occasion and “wanted an attorney to accompany him to a court hearing in a foreclosure proceeding, which turned out to be a very short-one — about five minutes.” See ■Taylor Deck ¶ 9. Nonetheless, Taylor maintains that he “did not have an attorney-client relationship with any of Lanier’s or Surety’s clients,” and specifically refrained from contacting clients because he “did not want to do anything that implied that [he] was the consumer’s attorney.” Id. ¶¶ 9-10.

In addition, Deron Tucker, who contracted with Lanier Law, as well as all of the DC Entities, states that he was contacted by consumers who “were under the impression that [Tucker] represented them in their quest for loan modifications.” See FTC Motion, Ex. 406: Declaration of Der-on Tucker (Tucker Decl.) ¶ 7. However, Tucker “assured them that [he] did not represent them,” and was particularly concerned by the fact that, in some cases, the calls were from consumers whose files he had not even reviewed. Id. Troublingly, Taylor and Dale recount that their names and signatures were used on documents without their authorization. See Taylor Decl. ¶ 14 (“A few months before I was terminated, I complained that Lanier and Surety had used my name on a document that I had not reviewed.”); Dale Decl. ¶ 10 (“Although my signature appears on certain correspondence, I never physically signed or authorized that my signature be placed on any such correspondence.”); see also FTC Motion, Ex. 300: Second Supplemental Declaration of Michael S. Liggins (2nd Supp. Liggins Deck), Att. PP.

Each “law firm” entity also had a licensed attorney as a member or partner. Specifically, Lanier “was at all times a sole practitioner” with respect to Lanier Law and Liberty & Trust, see Lanier Response at 7, Tina Greene, an attorney licensed in the D.C., was the attorney member of Fortress DC, Surety was formed in partnership with Pablo Santiago, Jr., Esq., who was later replaced by John James Kane, Jr., Esq., and Redstone was formed with Kane as its attorney member. See Menji-var Decl., Atts. K (Surety Partnership Agreement), M (Redstone DC Operating Agreement); Robles Dep., Ex. 115 (Fortress DC Partnership Agreement). However, Kane and Greene were paid a salary and were contractually excluded from receiving any profits of the foreclosure defense or debt management aspects of the firm’s business. See Fortress DC Partnership Agreement ¶ 7 (“Ms. Greene will be a non-equity partner, also known as salaried and not share in the profits of any foreclosure defense, loss mitigation, loan modification, debt management or some bankruptcy cases brought in through the firm.”); Redstone DC Operating Agreement ¶ 3.06(a) (“Mr. Kane will also be paid 10% of the net fees earned from any new business of the firm which in any month are in excess over his salary of $4,000, but not including, and all exclusive of, debt management services and foreclosure defense matters.”); Menjivar Decl., Att. K (amendment to the Surety Partnership Agreement replacing Santiago with Kane and providing that “Kane will have no initial salary, and will participate financially in the fees generated in areas other than, and to the exclusion of, foreclosure defense, loss mitigation, and debt management, to the extent of 10% of the net fees generated therein”). Moreover, Kane and Greene both maintain that they had no involvement in the debt mitigation or foreclosure defense aspects of the business. See Kane Dep. at 31-32, 49, 81, 106; Greene Dep. at 37, 43, 53-54, 81.

Although Greene did provide legal' services to clients that were referred to her from Fortress, those services pertained to “bankruptcies or issue[s] with probate or issue[s] with taxes or something like that _” See Greene Dep. at 53. While Greene’s relationship with the client “typically started off’ with the client trying to save their home from foreclosure, the legal services Greene provided were always something other than foreclosure defense. Id. at 39-40, 53-54. Greene states that she “never worked in foreclosure defense.” Id. at 54. According to Greene, “[i]f they wanted to go through bankruptcy then I would help with their bankruptcy. If they had some other issue that was ancillary to their foreclosure, I would handle that.” Id. Indeed, Greene does not view foreclosure defense and loan modifications as “legal work,” and testifies that: “I didn’t handle loan modifications or foreclosure defense. I just handle legal work. When I say legal work, I’m saying things where you would need a JD and a license in that jurisdiction in order to perform.” Id. at 81. Aside from those consumers to whom Greene provided bankruptcy counsel, she kept no records on Fortress DC clients. Id. at 59-61, 67-68, 83-85. She handled none of the client funds for Fortress DC, and she neither trained nor supervised the Jacksonville employees of Fortress DC. See Greene Dep. at 42, 44, 58, 67-68. Greene does recall talking'to Pam Thomas and Robles periodically when a legal question would arise regarding one of the Fortress DC clients, such as a bankruptcy question or an insurance dispute. Id. at 15-17. Greene also states that she frequently talked to attorneys, independently retained by a Fortress client, concerning that client’s situation or his or her bankruptcy options. See id. at 14-15, 23, 26, 37-38. Notably, Greene maintains that if she spoke to a client who needed legal assistance in a state where Greene herself was not licensed, Greene would advise that client to secure an attorney and Greene would communicate with that outside attorney. Id. at 15, 23-26, 47. Although Greene was aware that Fortress DC had an “of counsel” attorney network, she did not understand that Fortress DC had agreements with those attorneys, and “would have been against it given the fact that [she] wanted each and every client to be able to secure their own attorneys.” Id. at 28-29, 46. Indeed, Greene expressed to Robles her opposition to any scenario where Fortress DC obtained attorneys on behalf of clients. Id. at 26. Greene maintains that she was adamant that clients must secure their own attorneys. Id.

According to Kane, his only role in the foreclosure defense practice was to set-up and maintain the attorney network. See Kane Dep. at 16-17, 23-24, 30. He did not have any part in the drafting of the consumer representation contracts, he did not prepare any pleadings or filings for any consumer to file in their loan modification, foreclosure defense, or loss mitigation case, and he did not talk to any consumer about those matters. H. at 80-81, 106, 115. Kane further maintains that he did not supervise the performance of such work, nor did he have discussions with, or conduct training of, any personnel in Jacksonville regarding this work. Id. at 37-38,115. Notably, during his deposition, Kane testifies that a signature purporting to be that of John James Kane, Jr., attached to several documents, is not his actual signature and those documents were not reviewed or signed by him. See id. at 65-68, 79, 81-82, 103-04,114,126-28,132-33,142-43.

C. The Sales Pitch

Both Lanier Law and the DC Entities used separate companies, such as DOLMF, Pinnacle, and FURF (the “staffing” agencies), to solicit consumers, answer calls from consumers, and convince consumers to retain a law firm’s services. According to Robles, these employees would answer calls and “speak to the people on the other line, see what product they were looking for,” and then “do a financial statement, determine kind of where they were at with the whole process of their debt, and at that point they would determine where that lead would go to.” See Robles Dep. at 44. Liberty & Trust operated with its own employees and did not directly make use of the third-party staffing companies, see Lanier Dep. at 164, although its employees largely came from Redstone DC or had some connection to Rennick. Id at 141-43. Consumers would call after receiving a letter or flyer in the mail, ostensibly from one of the “staffing” agencies, or after finding one of the Law Firms on the internet. See, e.g., FTC Motion, Ex. 13 (FURF for Surety), Ex. 19 (Surety website), Ex. 312 (DOLMF for Lanier Law); Ex. 321 (Safepoint for Red-stone DC), Ex. 328 (Fortress DC website), Ex. 332 (Fortress DC). Liberty & Trust also obtained clients through the use of solicitation letters. See Lanier Dep. at 167-69, Ex. 152; FTC Motion, Ex. 315 ¶ 3, Ex. 325 ¶3. Other consumers hired Lanier Law or the DC Entities after someone employed by a law firm or- one of the “staffing” agencies contacted the consumer by telephone. See FTC Motion, Ex. 3 ¶ 4 (Fortress DC); Ex. 14 ¶ 4 (FURF with a referral to Fortress DC); Ex. 15 ¶ 3 (Red-stone DC); Ex, 21 ¶¶ 3-4 (DOLMF with a referral to Lanier as Fortress); Ex. 26 ¶ 3 (DOLMF with a referral to Lanier Law); Ex. 308 ¶ 4 (Redstone DC); Ex. 323 ¶ 6 (Fortress DC); Ex. 326 ¶ 5 (Forfress DC); Ex. 327 ¶ 6 (Redstone DC); Ex. 329 ¶¶ 6-7 (FURF with a referral to.Fortress DC); Ex. 335 ¶¶3-4 (Surety); see also Guilty Plea (admitting that individuals working for DOLMF contacted consumers). Four of these consumers assert that they received the calls at a telephone number registered on the National Do-Not-Call List. See FTC Motion, Ex. 21 ¶¶ 3-4 (DOLMF recommending Lanier d/b/a Fortress), Ex. 326 ¶ 5 (Fortress DC), Ex. 329 ¶¶ 6-7 (FURF recommending Fortress DC), Ex. 335 ¶¶ 3-4 (Surety).

Several consumers contacted a Defendant after receiving the Economic Stimulus Flyer mentioned above. This Flyer had the appearance of an official government notice and was titled “Economic Stimulus Mortgage Notification,” and “Form 009 Payment Reduction Notification” or “Mortgage Relief Notification.” See, e.g., FTC Motion, Ex. 311, Att. A (2012 Flyer from DOLMF), Ex. 324, Att. A (2013 Flyer from Safepoint). Although the language varies slightly in different versions, the Flyer generally began:

You are hereby notified that the property located at [specific address] has been pre-approved for a special program by the Government Insured Institutions. In addition this property is prequalified for an Economic Advantage Payment or Principle Reduction Program, designed to bring your house payments current for less than you owe or your principal balance down. There are no restrictions on equity, credit ratings, or mortgage delinquencies.

See e.g., id., Ex. 13, Att. A (2012 Flyer from FURF). The Flyer urged the consumer to contact “your Non Profit Housing Counseling Organization for your county” and listed an 800 number. Id. It further explained that the consumer “must contact us to complete the registration process by reviewing your pending entitlements of savings such as: Reduced Principal Interest Payments, Loan Payment Reduction, Debt Reduction, Budget Counseling, Delinquent Mortgage Payment Assistance and the New Home Savers Advantage Program.” Id. Although the third paragraph of the Flyer does inform the reader that the organization “is independent of all government agencies and departments,” it also states that “[t]hese programs may require the use of Government Insured Funds.” Id.

The record contains various copies of the Economic Stimulus Flyer which identify the sender as DOLMF, see FTC Motion, Exs. 311, 312, 317, FURF, id., Exs. 13, 17, Safepoint, id., Exs. 25, 324, or simply “Processing & Enrolment Center,” id. Ex. 18. The consumers who received the Flyer from DOLMF, upon calling the number listed, were referred to a Lanier Law entity. Id., Exs. 311, 312, 317. Consumers who called the number after receiving a Flyer from Safepoint Financial Relief either reached a Redstone DC representative or were referred to Redstone DC by someone working for Safepoint. Id, Exs. 25, 324. In addition, those calling in response to a FURF Flyer were referred to Surety Law Group, id., Ex. 13, or Lanier Law d/b/a as Fortress Law Group, id., Ex. 17. As to the Economic Stimulus Flyer sent from the “Processing & Enrolment Center,” the fine print of this Flyer references Surety Law Group, but when the consumer called he was told he had reached Redstone Law Group. See id., Ex. 18. Consumers received these Flyers from early 2012 until late 2013. See id., Exs. 17, 25, 317, 324. The FTC also submits copies of this same Flyer, provided in discovery or found in its search of Defendants’ premises, which include references to DOLMF, FURF, Safepoint, and Redstone Law Group, and are dated from 2011 to 2014. See 2nd Supp. Liggins Decl. ¶ 19, Att. BB. The FTC investigators also obtained a July 22, 2013 email exchange between Young and C.O. Jones of Pinnacle regarding the contents of the letter, with copies of the Economic Stimulus Flyer attached. See id. ¶ 20, Att. CC. Although Robles maintains that he did not draft the Economic Stimulus Flyer, he concedes that he hired and paid Avanti Media to send out “something” on behalf of DOLMF, and what they sent was the Flyer. See Robles Dep. at 36-39, 108-09. Lanier denies any part in “drafting, sending, approving or [using]” the Economic Stimulus Flyer. See Lanier Response at 9.

The FTC submits declarations from over sixty consumers who largely recount similar experiences with Lanier Law, the DC Entities and Liberty & Trust (the Law Firms).As previously summarized during the Preliminary Injunction Hearings, these declarations describe conversations with salespersons which were replete with misrepresentations about the Law Firms. See Aug. 1 TV. at 6-9, 16-17; Feb. 19 Tr. at 14-33. Often, a consumer would first speak to an employee of one of the “staffing” agencies, either DOLMF, FURF, or Safepoint, who would tell the consumer that one of the Law Firms would be able to help the consumer obtain a loan modification. See, e.g„ FTC Motion, Ex. 7 ¶3 (FURF for Fortress DC); Ex. 13 ¶ 3 (FURF for Surety); Ex. 333 ¶4 (Safepoint for Redstone DC); Ex. 337 ¶3 (DOLMF for Lanier Law). Other consumers spoke directly to representatives of a Law Firm. See, e.g., id., Ex. 9 ¶ 4 -(paralegal at Redstone DC); Ex. 22 ¶ 4 (Lanier Law as Fortress representative); 'Ex. 24 ¶ 4 (Lanier -Law representative); Ex. 325 ¶¶ 3-4 (Liberty & Trust representative); Ex. 335 ¶ 5 (Surety representative). Sometimes the third-party representatives would enroll the consumers and provide them with a Law Firm’s'paperwork, other consumers were referred to “case managers” who would complete the enrollment process. See, e.g., id. Ex. 4 ¶¶3-6 (Safepoint refers to Redstone DC case manager); Ex. 333 ¶¶ 3, 6 (Safepoint enrolls consumer for Redstone DC); Ex. 337 ¶¶ 3-4 (DOLMF enrolls consumer La-nier Law). In these introductory conversations, either the initial contact person or the case manager, would tell the consumer that the Law Firm could obtain a loan modification for the consumer with significantly lower payments and a lower interest rate. See, e.g., id., Ex. 7 ¶3 (FURF for Fortress DC); Ex. 9 ¶ 5 (Redstone DC); Ex. 13 ¶ 3 (FURF for Surety); Ex. 325 ¶4 (Liberty & Trust); Ex. 337 ¶¶ 3, 5 (DOLMF for Lanier Law). Sometimes, the representative would specifically state the amount of the anticipated reduced mortgage payment, see, e.g., id., Ex. 322 ¶5 (Fortress DC); Ex. 329 ¶ 9 (FURF for Fortress DC); Ex. 333 ¶ 4 (Safepoint for Redstone DC), and/or that the interest rate would be lowered to 2 or 3%, id., Ex. 3 ¶4 (Fortress); Ex. 8 ¶4 (Lanier Law); Ex. 335 ¶ 6 (Surety). Many consumers were told that the Law Firm could get the consumer a reduction in principal, removal of fees, or amounts past due wiped away. See, e.g., id., Ex. 302 ¶7 (Fortress DC), Ex. 306 ¶ 4 (Lanier Law), Ex. 309 ¶ 8 (Redstone DC), Ex. 317 ¶ 6 (DOLMF recommending Lanier Law), Ex. 318 ¶¶ 9-10 (Redstone DC), Ex. 319 ¶ 8 (Lanier Law as Fortress); Ex. 335 ¶ 6 (Surety). Some consumers recall that they were even “promised” or “guaranteed” a loan modification. See, e.g., id., Ex. 309 ¶ 8 (Redstone DC representative “promised that I would be able to get a loan, modification”); Ex. 311 ¶4 (DOLMF representative recommending Lanier Law d/b/a Fortress “sounded like the modification would be a sure thing”); Ex. 316 ¶ 6 (Lanier Law representative stated that “service was almost guaranteed to stop the foreclosure and I would be able to get a loan modification. She also promised that Lanier Law could substantially” lower her monthly payments and interest rate); Ex. 317 ¶ 6 (representative recommending Lanier Law stated “we can almost guarantee” a loan modification); Ex. 332 ¶ 8 (“I told him that I could not afford to pay Fortress [DC] unless I was sure that I would be able to get the modification. He promised that Fortress would get me the modification and that I should not worry.”).

Consumers were often reassured that the Law Firm had success rates upwards of 80 and 90%. See id., Ex. 10 ¶ 5 (Red-stone DC), Ex. 19 ¶ 4 (Surety), Ex. 22 ¶ 4 (Lanier Law as Fortress), Ex. 321 ¶ 5 (Safepoint regarding Redstone DC), Ex. 322 ¶ 5 (Fortress DC), Ex. 334 ¶ 5 (Lanier Law as Fortress). Sometimes representatives convinced consumers that these modifications were possible by explaining that the firm would perform an “audit” or examination of their loan documents to find errors made by the lender which would increase the consumer’s bargaining power or even “require” the lender to approve a modification. See, e.g., id., Ex. 13 ¶¶ 5, 9 (Surety); Ex. 22 ¶ 6 (Lanier Law as Fortress); Ex. 25 ¶¶ 4, 8 (Redstone ’ DC); Ex. 321 ¶7, Att. B (Redstone DC); Ex. 324 ¶¶ 7-8 (Redstone DC); Ex. 335 ¶ 7 (Surety). In some cases, consumers were told that they had been “approved” or that they “qualified” for programs designed to keep them in their homes. See, e.g., id., Ex. 7, Att. A (letter from Lanier as Fortress congratulating consumer on being approved for the “Homeowner Retention Program” and “Homeowner Bailout Program); Ex. 17 ¶ 6, Att. C (same letter from Fortress); Ex. 21 ¶ 10, Att. B (same letter from Lanier as Fortress); Ex. 317, Att. B (substantially similar letter from Lanier Law); Ex. 25 ¶ 5, Att. B (email from Safe-point that consumer’s enrollment application in Redstone DC’s “Foreclosure Defense Program” was approved); Ex. 312, ¶ 5 (letter from DOLMF recommending Lanier Law and congratulating consumer on being approved for “loan modification program” by the “underwriting department”); Ex. 329, ¶8 (informed by FURF on behalf of Fortress DC of a “homeowner bailout program” designed for people like her); Ex. 335 ¶ 5 (Surety representative told consumer she and her husband were “qualified applicants”). Many consumers believed, and some were explicitly told, that a, lawyer would work on their case, see, e.g., id., Ex. 306 ¶ 4 (Lanier Law);, Ex. 324 ¶¶ 7-11 (Redstone DC); Ex. 325 ¶3 (Liberty & Trust), Ex. 328 ¶ 5. (Fortress DC), and some consumers were specifically told that they needed the help of a lawyer to obtain a loan modification. See, e.g., id., Ex. 303 ¶ 6 (consumer was told that working with Fortress would make it easier to get a modification because Fortress was a law firm); Ex. 308 ¶¶ 4-5 (Redstone DC); Ex. 311, ¶ 5, Att. B (received letter from DOLMF recommending Lanier d/b/a Fortress and explaining “you are going to need legal counsel in order to have a reasonable chance to accomplish your goals”). In reliance on the foregoing or similar representations, even skeptical consumers were eventually persuaded to hire one of the Law Firms to save their homes. See, e.g„ id., Ex, 20 ¶¶ 6-7 (FURF for Fortress DC); Ex. 327 ¶¶ 6-11 (Redstone DC); Ex. 312 ¶ 6 (Lanier Law); Ex. 311 ¶4 (Lanier Law as Fortress).

D. The Contracts & Disclaimers

In the initial stages of enrollment, consumers were assigned to a case manager who was to provide the promised foreclosure defense services. All consumers were told that they must pay an advance fee before the Law Firm would perform any work. See Feb. 19 Tr. at 18-33; see also FTC Motion, Ex. 7 ¶ 9 (stating that Pamela Thomas told him that “Fortress could not begin working on my case ... until all of my payments had been made.”), Ex. 16 ¶ 9 (asserting that “Pam at Fortress” stated in a message that “they were going to stop working on the modification if no more money arrived.”)- If consumers were unable to pay the entire fee at once, they were told they could pay in several installments. After the initial payments were completed, some consumers were told that additional work was necessary and that to have the Law Firm continue working on their case they must pay a monthly fee. See, e.g., id., Ex. 307 ¶ 10 (Redstone DC); Ex. 314 ¶ 8 (Liberty & Trust); Ex. 330 ¶ 8 (Fortress DC). Notably, many consumers were instructed to stop making their mortgage payments, or advised to pay the Law Firm instead of their mortgage, including a consumer who had been making full mortgage payments up to that point, See, e.g., id., Ex. 306 ¶ 4 (Lanier Law); Ex. 327 ¶¶ 9-10 (Redstone DC); Ex, 313 ¶7 (Fortress DC); see also id., Ex. 332 ¶ 11 (consumer states he had made full mortgage payments until he stopped based on advice of Fortress DC representative).

The Law Firms had consumers execute several forms as part of an “Application for Foreclosure Defense Services” which included documents such as “Scope of Representation” and “Borrower’s Certification” forms, a “Third Party Authorization to Release Information,” a “Service/Retainer Agreement,” and payment instructions. See, e.g., id., Ex. 308 (Red-stone DC Forms); Ex. 311, Atts. C, E (Lanier as Fortress Forms); Ex. 312, Att. C (Lanier Law Forms); Ex. 325, Att. A (Liberty & Trust Forms); Ex. 322, Att. A (Fortress DC Forms); Ex. 335, Att. A (Surety Forms). Although there are slight variations, the forms for each Law Firm are noticeably consistent in content, structure, and appearance. • .

For example, Lanier states that the La-nier Law entities regularly utilized an agreement similar to that found at Exhibit 21, Attachment A of the FTC Motion. See Lanier Decl. ¶78. This 2012 agreement sets out a “Description of Services” which includes an “audit” review for violations of “RESPA, Truth in lending and predatory lending,” as well as:

Negotiating with loss mitigation and or bank appointed negotiator regarding client’s file on one of our loss mitigation services or resolutions (I.E. loan modification offer, loan restructure, loan forbearance offer, short sale negotiation, short refinance negotiation, suspension of a foreclosure sale date, deed in lieu of foreclosure, or cash-for-keys negotiation.[) ] The modification process may vary depending on your bank, and your current mortgage situation. The process may take a few weeks to several months to complete and receive a modification offer. Please note that your lender may deny your loan restructure several times before we achieve a desired result.

See FTC Motion, Ex. 21 at 11. On the sixth page of the packet of documents, the agreement states:

Please note: The client acknowledges that the attorney has made no guarantees concerning the outcome of this case and that all expressions relative to the results hoped for are opinions of the attorney and are made based on the facts and law known to the attorney at the time such opinion is rendered.

Please note: We never at no time recommend that homeowners miss their scheduled mortgage payments.

Id., Ex. 21 at 12. The agreement explains that “while we can make no guarantee as to the outcome of your matter, we shall keep you generally apprised as to the status of your case.” Id. Pursuant to this agreement, the consumer agreed to pay an upfront fee of $8,900 “for negotiating your first mortgage,” and further acknowledged that if the consumer canceled the “services during the negotiation process,” the Law Firm had “the right to retain any amounts already paid towards services.” Id. Although the agreement includes a payment schedule and a list of acceptable methods of payment, including cash deposits into specific bank accounts, the document makes no mention of a client trust account. See id., Ex. 21 at 7,14.

Fortress DC utilized a substantially similar client retainer agreement. See id., Ex. 322, Att A. A July 2013 version of the Fortress DC agreement includes a nearly verbatim “Scope of Representation” introduction, including a statement that Fortress DC “assures Client timely, effective, and professional legal representation.” Id. An October 2013 version of the Fortress DC agreement modifies the “Scope of Representation” to state that Fortress DC is providing “limited scope representation” and explains that “Local counsel provides the representation, not Fortress Law Group. Fortress Law Group provides the non-lawyer support, but does not practice law outside D.C.” See id., Ex. 323 at 6. The Fortress DC agreements include a description of services similar to that specified in the Lanier Law agreement, including the same “audit review” and negotiation process. Id., Ex. 322 at 7, Ex. 323 at 7. They list similar “typical negotiation outcomes” and caution that “The process may take a few weeks to several months to complete and receive a foreclosure defense offer or until we are notified that a foreclosure defense will not be offered. Please note that your lender may deny your loan restructure several times before we achieve a final result.” Id. These agreements also contain the same “Please note” disclaimers as the Lanier Law contract specifying that the attorney has made no guarantees concerning the outcome, as well as a disclaimer stating: “We never at any time recommend that homeowners miss their scheduled mortgage payments.” Id. With respect to fees, these agreements instruct the consumer that “[i]f you cancel our services at any time during the negotiating process, we will have the right to keep any fees paid to the law firm for services and time allocated to your case.” Id., Ex. 322 at 8, Ex. 323 at 7, 9. The Fortress DC agreements go further than the Lanier Law retainer and emphasize that “The Fees noted below are intended as a pure retainer and are fully earned and non-refundable upon engagement of the firm.” Id., Ex. 322 at 8, Ex. 323 at 8. The Fortress DC client agreements do mention the use of a trust account in a statement that: “You shall pay into trust to Fortress Law Group (the “Retainer”) to be billed against for negotiating your mortgage.” Id., Ex. 322 at 8; see also id., Ex. 323 at 8 (“You shall pay into trust to Fortress Law Group the retainer that includes your locally licensed counsel’s fee to be billed against for negotiating your mortgage.”).

The Redstone DC and Surety agreements are largely identical to the structure and content of the Lanier Law and Fortress DC agreements. See id., Ex. 321, Att. D, Ex. 335, Att. A. They begin with an introductory letter titled “Application for Foreclosure Defense Services” which explains that Redstone DC, or Surety, has “successfully worked, with lenders across the country in reducing interest rates, fixing adjustable rate mortgages, reallocating mortgage arrears, postponing foreclosure sale dates and other foreclosure defense services.” See id., Ex. 321 at 14; Ex. 335 at 6. The letter states that Redstone DC or Surety “makes no promises or guarantees on interest rate or loan terms, but will work diligently on your behalf to negotiate and obtain the best possible offer from your lender.” Id Substantially similar letters accompany some copies of the Fortress DC agreements in the record. See, e.g., id.,' Ex. 323 at 5. The Redstone DC and Surety contracts also contain a “Scope of Representation” page which includes much of the same verbiage used in the Lanier Law and Fortress DC contracts, compare id., Ex. 321 at 17, Ex. 335 at 10 with Ex. 21 at 11, but utilize a disclaimer that:

[The firm] is not associated with the government, and our service is not approved by the government or your lender. Even if you accept this offer and use our service, your lender may not agree to change your loan. You may stop doing business with us at any time. You may accept or reject any offer of mortgage ■ assistance we obtained from your lender [or servicer]. If you stop paying your mortgage, you could lose your home and damage your credit rating.

See id., Ex. 321 at 17; Ex. 335 at 10. These contracts also modify the language in the Description of Services to refer to “foreclosure defense” rather than “loss mitigation,” and caution that the lender may deny a loan restructure several times “before we achieve a final result.” Id. The Redstone DC and Surety agreements include a disclaimer which provides: “Please note: Redstone Law Group, LLC [or Surety Law Group] does not make any promises on specific rate or terms of your loan restructure offer.” Id., Ex. 321 at 17; Ex. 335 at 10. As with the Fortress DC and Lanier Law contracts, the Surety and Redstone DC agreements state that: “If you cancel our services during the negotiation process, we have the right to retain any amounts already paid towards services.” Id., Ex. 321 at 18; Ex. 335 at 11. Notably, both the Surety and Redstone DC agreements set forth in bold that:

This agreement does not cover any appearances in court, appearances to settlement conferences, answers of default for summons and complaint, representation in the overall foreclosure action, appeals from any judgments or orders of the court. This agreement does not cover any litigation services, which can be provided at additional costs to our clients.

Id., Ex. 321 at 18; Ex. 335 at 11. Similar to the Fortress DC agreement, the Surety and Redstone DC agreements explain that the consumer will “pay into trust” a retainer fee “to be billed against” for negotiating the mortgage. See id., Ex. 321 at 18, Ex. 335 at 11. '

The Liberty & Trust client agreement is built on the same structure and appearance as the Surety and Redstone DC agreements. See id., Ex. 325, Att. A. However, the introductory letter modifies the language slightly to read that Liberty “acts as Client’s Attorney-in-Fact, to provide Limited Scope Representation - and may engage third party vendors on Client’s -behalf .,” See id., Ex. 325 at 6. The letter includes a disclaimer that “[w]e can make no promises or guarantees of your outcome, particularly on interest rate or loan terms, but will employ our best efforts and experience on your behalf to negotiate and obtain the best possible offer from your lender.” Id. On the “Scope of Representation” form, the contract' includes the same disclaimer found in the Rédstone DC and Surety contracts regarding the lack of affiliation with the government and the client’s ability to reject any offers obtained. Id., Ex, 325 at 9. It also includes the same cautionary language about discontinuing mortgage payments. Id. The description of services omits any reference to an audit and describes the negotiation process as: “Negotiating with lender’s representative regarding any potential foreclosure defense offer. The loss mitigation application may take a few weeks to several months to complete and receive a decision. Please note that your lender may deny your loan restructure several times, before we exhaust every available avenue.” Jd. As in the Surety and Redstone DC agreements, the description of services includes the disclaimer that the law firm “does not make any promises on specific rate or terms of any loan restructure offer.” Id. The “Service/Retainer Agreement” form references payment “into our trust account” as a monthly retainer “to be billed against for the above work,” and still advises consumers that “[i]f you cancel our services during the negotiation process, we have the right to retain any amounts already