United States v. Louisiana (196 F. Supp. 3d 612, 2016)

ORDER AND RULING ON THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANTS AND THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

I. INTRODUCTION

As his second term neared its end, Thomas Jefferson wrote: “[T]hat .government ,.. [is] the strongest of which every man feels himself a part.” Long after the franchise had expanded to more than the free men envisioned by this president and determined to realize its duty to promote the exercise of this most fundamental right, the United States Congress passed and the President signed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA,” “National Voter Registration Act,” or “Act”), described by the latter as this nation’s “newest civil rights law,” Michael Waldman, The Fight to Vote Í7Ó (2016).

On April 19, 2011, pursuant to Section 1983 of the United State Code’s forty-second (42) title and as permitted by this law’s ninth section, Messrs. Roy Ferrand (“Ferrand”) and Luther Scott, Jr. (“Scott”) and the Louisiana State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored' People (“NAACP”) (collectively, “Scótt Plaintiffs”) sued the Defendants for purported violations of the NVRA in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, their case captioned Scott v. Schedler, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW (“Scott Matter”). In the Scott Matter, after multiple hearings and a lengthy trial, the district court (“Scott Court”) entered a permanent injunction against Defendants on January 22, 2013 (“First Injunction”). After the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed this order in part, the Scott Court issued an amended injunction on July 10, 2015 (“Amended Injunction”). On June 15, 2016, the Amended Injunction, appealed by Schedler, was vacated for its lack of specificity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), the Scott Court’s underlying factual findings still intact.

Based on this same law and many of the same circumstances, this case began on July 12, 2011, with the filing of the Complaint by the United States of America (“US,” “United States,” “Government,” or “Plaintiff’) pursuant to § 20510(a). At present, four issues must be resolved by this Court: (1) the relevance of the Scott Matter, including the Fifth Circuit’s partial affirmation; (2) the NVRA’s reach over transactions at voter registration agencies (“VRAs”) that take place by phone, email, or online (“remote transactions”); (3) the minimal legal standard for compliance with this voting rights statute; and (4) whether the Defendants have run afoul of the NVRA and, if so, which remedy is most appropriate based on the evidence so far uncovered. In other words, jurisdictional and statutory questions have been squarely presented, even as many facts remain disputed.

Defendants and Plaintiff (collectively, “Parties”) have filed the six dispositive motions now before this Court: (1) the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Schedler’s MSJ”), (Doc. 336), filed by J. Thomas Schedler, the Louisiana Secretary of State and a defendant (“Schedler” or “SOS”); (2) the Motion to Dismiss Based on Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel or Mootness (“DCFS’ MTD), (Doc. 340), tendered by two defendants, the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) and the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”); (3) the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (“LA’s First MTD”), (Doc. 341), submitted by LA; (4) the Motion to Dismiss by Secretary of State for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (“Schedler’s MTD”), (Doc. 342); (5) LA’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(c) (“LA’s Second MTD”), (Doc. 345), a second such filing made by LA; and (6) the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“US’ MSJ”), (Doc. 360) (collectively, “Dis-positive Motions”). Schedler, SOS, DCFS, DHH, LA, and these entities’ varied administrative heads, sued in their official capacities, (collectively, “Defendants”), oppose the US’ MSJ. Invoking Rule 12, Defendants seek dismissal of the Complaint for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a failure to state a claim. In their filings, the US and three Defendants — Schedler, joined by DCFS and DHH — request judgment in their favor pursuant to Rule 56.

Each of these six motions has engendered distinct yet interrelated replies and responses. To Schedler’s MSJ, the US has responded with the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“US’ Opposition to Schedler’s MSJ”), (Doe. 382), to which Schedler has replied with the Memorandum in Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Schedler’s MSJ Reply”), (Doc. 395). After the US submitted its Surreply Brief in Support of its Opposition to Defendant Schedler’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“US’ Surreply to Schedler’s Reply”), (Doc. 420), Schedler was allowed to file the Sur-Sur Reply to United States Surreply Submitted and Attached to Doc 411 (“Schedler’s Surreply”), (Doc. 423).

The US has countered DCFS’ MTD with the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Based on Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel or Mootness (“US’ Opposition to DCFS’ MTD”), (Doc. 385); DCFS and DHH responded with the Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (“DCFS’ Reply”), (Doc. 407).

LA’s First MTD spawned its own series of filings, including the US’ Response Brief in Opposition to the State of Louisiana’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (“US’ Opposition to LA’s First MTD”), (Doc. 384), and Defendant State of Louisiana’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (“LA’s First Reply”), (Doc. 409).

Schedler’s MTD was opposed by the United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to SOS’s Motion to Dismiss (“US’ Opposition to Schedler’s MTD”). (Doc. 388.) DCFS and DHH joined the opposition via the Response to Defendant Schedler’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (“DCFS’ Joinder Response”), (Doc. 389), defended by Schedler’s Reply Memorandum to United States’ Opposition to Schedler’s Motion to Dismiss as Moot (“Schedler’s MTD Reply”), (Doc. 415).

LA’s Second MTD is supported by the Defendant State of Louisiana’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(c) (“LA’s Second Reply), (Doc. 414), and opposed by the United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to the State of Louisiana’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(c) (“US’ Opposition to LA’s Second MTD”), (Doc. 394).

The US’ MSJ, supported by numerous exhibits, (Docs. 347-56), elicited DHH’s Opposition to USA’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“DHH’s First Opposition to US’ MSJ”), (Docs. 398, 399); Defendant State of Louisiana’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (“LA’s Opposition to US’ MSJ”), (Doc. 400); and DCFS’ Opposition to USA’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“DCFS’ Opposition to US’ MSJ”), (Doc. 402), to which exhibits were separately docketed, (Docs. 403-06). The arguments raised in the US’ MSJ were defended by the Combined Reply Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“US’ MSJ Reply”), (Doc. 444). Inevitably, the arguments in some of these filings mirror the assertions made in others.

Having waded through these papers, and considered the oral argument made by the Parties on May 17, 2016, this Court reaches four conclusions based on existing jurisprudence. First, neither preclusion nor mootness prevent the United States from maintaining this suit against the Defendants. While the Scott Court determined much, it did not decisively establish Defendants’ requisite compliance with the NVRA and thus absolve them of liability for pre- and post -Scott violations. As this case’s docket reveals, many of the factual allegations advanced herein either postdate or were left unexplored by the Scott Court, and as Defendants’ own words attest, at least some purported violations lay beyond the Scott Court’s purview. Since a finding of preclusion is rarely proper absent unequivocal congruence of fact and law, estoppel does not bar the US’ present suit. Equally as importantly, as a matter of law, the US was never so intimately aligned with the Scott Plaintiffs as to make the latter the former’s virtual representative or dominant director. In short, the doctrines of mootness and preclusion cannot foreclose this suit, the US too unique of a litigant and issues unresolved in Scott remaining.

Second, as the NVRA not only passes constitutional muster but also lodges responsibility for conformity with its dictates onto forty-four (44) “States,” including LA, LA remains bound by its prescriptions. As such, it cannot, by pointing to its assignment of duties to subsidiary agencies and departments that it created, invoke state law as a mean of voiding liability imposed by a plainly written federal law. The same conclusion applies to DHH’s attempt to absolve itself of any legal responsibility for the actions of subordinate actors with which it has contracted to perform services covered by the NVRA. Just as a state may not amend a federal statute by such delegation of both action and responsibility and thereby defy the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, neither can its own artificial and subordinate creations, like DHH and DCFS. Defendants, quite simply, must obey what Congress has duly passed and the Constitution unambiguously allows.

Third, in accordance with well-established principles of statutory construction, the NVRA must be read to encompass remote transactions. As Defendants insist, its structure arguably creates a modicum of ambiguity. But a rigorously contextual analysis, wedded to basic semantic and syntactic canons and informed by this law’s obvious purposes, renders any other construction unconvincing. Once properly derived, therefore, the NVRA’s plain and unambiguous meaning reveals that its ambit extends to transactions done remotely. Defendants look for comfort in a brief excerpt from a congressional report, but no court and no party may so tinker with a statute’s enacted text. This Court will hon- or the statute’s plain meaning.

Fourth, in weighing the merits of a motion for summary judgment, because this Court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that a reasonable jury is not required to believe, two ostensibly discordant conclusions follow. First, this Court cannot conclude with absolute certainty that the US’ requested remedy— perpetual monitoring of a sovereign state — is proper. Factual issues regarding the nature and extent of the violations remain, issues which are relevant to the proper remedy. Though the US has requested this recognized and occasionally awarded form of relief, when both a fundamental right and a sovereign’s liability for its contravention clash, a court must tread with , care and await the chance to consider evidence that has withstood assault. Here, at least for the moment, this Court chooses such caution. Second, because the incontrovertible evidence nonetheless attests to continuing and ongoing violations, this Court must' declare Defendants to be in violation of Section 7 of the NVRA. Described by Defendants as “minor” and “isolated,” they remain, by definition, violations.

For these reasons, as more fully explained below, this Court DENIES Defendants’ Dispositive Motions and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the US’ MSJ.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. CAST OF CHARACTERS

Plaintiff is the United States, suing to enforce the NVRA’s statutory guarantees. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4 at 2; Doc. 2 at 1; Doc. 37 at 1; Doc. 38 at 1-3) In particular, “[t]he United States’ Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy Louisiana’s previous and ongoing noncompliance with Section 7, and also ensure the state’s future compliance with Section 7.” (Doc. 38 at 3; accord Doc. 1 ¶ 1 at 1, ¶¶ 15-25 at 4-8.) There are six Defendants: (1) LA, a state allegedly subject to the NVRA; (2) Sche-dler, being sued in his official capacity as the chief election official responsible for coordinating LA’s statutory obligations under the NVRA; (3) DHH, which bears responsibility for the administration of a variety of public assistance and disability programs arguably subject to § 20506(a)(2) and (a)(3); (4) Mr. Bruce D. Greenstein (“Greenstein”), seemingly sued in his official capacity as DHH’s former Secretary; (5) DCFS, which bears responsibility for the administration of a variety of public assistance and disability programs arguably subject to § 20506(a)(2) and (a)(3); and (6) Ms. Suzy Sonnier (“Sonnier”), in her official capacity as Secretary of DCFS. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 5-10 at 2-3; Doc. 27 at 4; Doc. 35 at 2-4; Doc. 59 at 1-2; Doc. 60 at 1-2.) With the exception of LA, the defendants named in this action and the Scott Matter are the same. (Doc. 2 at 2; Doc. 37 at 1.) Nevertheless, as the Honorable James J. Brady first observed in September 28, 2011, “[t]his action is broader than the action filed in the Eastern District [of Louisiana].” (Doc. 37 at 4; accord Doc. 92 at 1-2.)

B. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND: NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT

1. Constitutional Reach

The United States Constitution provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the place of chusing [sic] Senators” (“Elections Clause”). U.S. Const, art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Ariz. State Logis, v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2659, 192 L.Ed.2d 704, 716 (2015); Smith v. Clark, 189 F.Supp.2d 503, 510 (S.D.Miss.2002). Even as numerous state restrictions on voting have been upheld, see, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681, 93 S.Ct. 1211, 1212-13, 35 L.Ed.2d 627, 629-30 (1973); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 686-87, 93 S.Ct. 1209, 1210, 35 L.Ed.2d 633, 634-35 (1973), this two-part clause has been construed as establishing and .guaranteeing a right — that of a citizen to vote in “federal elections” — and a power — that of Congress to legislate (relatively) untrammeled in this area, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-15, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1037, 85 L.Ed. 1368, 1377 (1941); accord Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-24, 121 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 149 L.Ed.2d 44, 56-57 (2001) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366, 52 S.Ct. 397, 76 L.Ed. 795, 800 (1932)); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-31, 91 S.Ct. 260, 264-68, 27 L.Ed.2d 272, 281-85 (1970); see also, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1009-10 (5th Cir.1981) (describing the Elections Clause as “the basis of Congressional authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections” (quoting Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366, 52 S.Ct. 397)); Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, No. A-06CA-459-SS, 2006 WL 1851295, at *8 (W.D.Tex. July 6, 2006) (quoting Cook, 531 U.S. at 523-24, 121 S.Ct. 1029), aff'd, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir.2006); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220, 226 (1886) (“Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless ... [‘the political franchise of voting’] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”).

With the Elections Clause so construed, the Necessary and Proper Clause has been read to authorize legislation deemed essential to the realization of principal aims animating the Elections Clause. S. Rep, No. 103-6, at 3-4 (1993). Consequently, in ratifying the Constitution or joining the Union, every then existent state and every subsequent one not only gave “Congress plenary authority over federal elections but also explicitly ensured that all conflicts with similar state laws would be resolved wholly in favor of the national government” in accordance with the Supremacy Clause. Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 454-55 (6th Cir.2008); see also Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role of State Election Administrators in Promoting Democracy and Access to Democracy, 27 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 343,347 (2008).

Passed pursuant to these two constitutional provisions, Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 793-94 (7th Cir.1995), the NVRA became binding and supreme federal statutory law on January 1, 1995, Pub. Law No. 103-31, § 13, 107 Stat. 77 (1993); Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 277, 117 S.Ct. 1228, 1231, 137 L.Ed.2d 448, 453 (1997); Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 399 (5th Cir.2013). The NVRA’s constitutionality provoked a debate eventually resolved in its favor, and its preemptive effect was soon widely recognized. Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir.2014) (“[W]hen Congress acts pursuant to the Elections Clause, courts should not assume reluctance to preempt state law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 159, 210-11 (2015). That fact may explain why the NVRA’s substantive provisions were seldom litigated as this statute entered its twenties, see True the Vote, 43 F.Supp.3d at 699-700, though several states continued to resist compliance and the Act’s impact was judged to be “positive,” Waldman, supra, at 170; see also, e.g., Bruce Ransom, The National Voter Registration Act and National-State Conflict: The Case of South Carolina, 7 Public Budgeting & Fin. Mgmt. 440, 452-60 (1995)

2. Statutory Purposes

The NVRA’s obvious and well-known purposes appear in its bare text. See Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir.1968), cited in, e.g., United States v. DuBose, 598 F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir.2010). To justify its requirements, Congress made three findings; “(1) “the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right; (2) it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the exercise of that right; and (3) discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal office and disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.” 52 U.S.C. § 20501(a)(l)-(3); see also, e.g., Valdez v. Herrera, No. 09-668 JCH/DJS, 2010 WL 6231194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142209, at *22-23 (D.N.M. Dec. 21, 2010) (“In enacting the NVRA, Congress found that federal, state, and local governments have a duty to promote the exercise of the right to vote and it sought to mitigate discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures!.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)); President’s Remarks on Signing the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 29 Weekly Comp. PRes. Doc. 914, 915 (May 20, 1993) (“[T]he failure to register is the primary reason given by eligible citizens for their not voting. The principle behind this legislation is clear: Voting should be about discerning the will of the majority, not about testing the administrative capacity of a citizen.”); cf. Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 747, 755-56 (2016) (summarizing NVRA’s provisions).

So convinced, Congress passed the NVRA so as “to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office,” “to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office,” and “to protect the integrity of the electoral process”; and “to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1)-(4); Arcia v. Sec’y of Fla., 772 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir.2014); see also Robert A. Kengle, To Accept or To Reject: Arizona v. Intertribal Council of Arizona, the Elections Clause, and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 57 HOW. L.J. 759, 769 (2014).

As adopted and construed, the NVRA hence seeks to accomplish two general goals. In certain respects, the NVRA strives to “protect the integrity of the electoral process.” Nearman v. Rosenblum, 358 Or. 818, 823, 371 P.3d 1186 (2016); accord Gonzalez v. Ariz., 677 F.3d 383, 403 (9th Cir.2012). Yet, its “primary emphasis” has always been to simplify the methods for registering to vote in federal elections and maximize such opportunities for a state’s every citizen. Colón-Marrero v. Vélez, 813 F.3d 1, 9 n. 13 (1st Cir.2016) (relying on Young, 520 U.S. at 275, 117 S.Ct. 1228); accord Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 209-10 (3d Cir.2012); cf. Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Defense Fund v. Scales, 150 F.Supp.2d 845, 854 (D.Md.2001) (“A main thrust of the legislation was for states to play a more aetive role in promoting the enfranchisement of eligible voter.”). To Congress, a plethora of byzantine and ambiguous state registration procedures too often denied voters the chance to register with ease and convenience. S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 2-3; see also Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of City Comm’rs Voter Reg. Div., 28 F.3d 306, 339-40 (3d Cir.1994) (combing the NVRA’s legislative history); cf. Peyer Dreier, America’s Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1351, 1400 (1993) (“A major reason for the low rate of urban voting is the nation’s complex, crazy-quilt voter registration laws.”). If only by a fraction, the NVRÁ was intended to ameliorate this “unfortunate” fact. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 339.

3. General Structure

The NVRA “prescribes three methods for registering voters for federal elections,” subject to two inapposite exceptions. 52 U.S.C. § 20503; Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 394; Broyles v. Texas, 618 F.Supp.2d 661, 690 (S.D.Tex.2009). First, pursuant to Section 5, “[e]ach State motor vehicle driver’s license application (including any renewal application) submitted to the appropriate State motor vehicle authority under State law shall serve as an application for voter registration with respect to elections for Federal office unless the applicant fails to sign the voter registration application.” 52 U.S.C.

§ 20504(a)(1); Keathley v. Holder, 696 F.3d 644, 646-47 (7th Cir.2012). Second, per Section 6, “[e]ach State shall accept and use the mail voter registration application form prescribed by the Federal Election Commission pursuant to ... § 20508(a)(2) for the registration of voters in elections for Federal office,” though a state “may develop and use a mail voter registration form that meets all of the criteria stated in ... § 20508(b).” 52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)(1)-(2); Voting for Am., Inc., 732 F.3d at 400; Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 324 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1365-66 (N.D.Ga.2004). Lastly, in accordance with Section 7, “[e]aeh State shall designate agencies for the registration of voters in elections for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(1); Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir.2015). As this section’s second subparagraph adds, a state “shall designate” as VRAs “all offices in the State that provide public assistance” and “all offices in the State that provide State-funded programs primarily engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities.” 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(2)(A)-(B); Krieger v. Loudon Cnty., No. 5:13cv073, 2014 WL 4923904, at *6 (W.D.Va. Sept. 30, 2014); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-66, at 19 (1993) (explaining that Section 7 is intended to increase registration of “the poor and persons with disabilities who do not have driver’s licenses and will not come into contact with the other princip[al] place to register under this Act”).

As a statutory matter, the two categories listed in § 20506(a)(2) are neither exclusive nor exhaustive, for each state must still “designate other” unspecified “offices within the State as voter registration agencies.” 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(3)(A); cf. N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, Nos. 1:13CV658, 182 F.Supp.3d 320, 398-99, 2016 WL 1650774, at *61 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2016). These additional offices “may include [s]tate or local government offices such as public libraries, public schools, offices of city and county clerks (including marriage license bureaus), fishing and hunting license bureaus, government revenue offices, and unemployment compensation offices, and offices not described in ... [§ 20506(a)(2)(B)] that provide services to persons with disabilities” and “[f]ederal and nongovernmental offices, with the agreement of such office.” 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(3)(B)(i)-(ii); Natl Coalition for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Defense Fund, 152 F.3d at 291. Notably, this section refers to other entities, requiring “[a]ll departments, agencies, and other entit[i]es of the executive branch of the Federal Government” to cooperate, “encouraging]” nongovernmental entities to do so, and setting unique procedures as to armed forces’ recruitment offices. 52 U.S.C. § 20506(b)-(c).

In accordance with the NVRA, each VRA must distribute voter registration application forms for voting in federal elections, assist applicants in completing these forms, and accept completed applications for transmittal to the appropriate state official. Id. § 20506(a)(4)(A); Valdez v. Squier, 676 F.3d 935, 944-45 (10th Cir. 2012). The foregoing duties appear in paragraph (a)(4) of Section 7, whose prefatory phrase reads — “At each voter registration agency.” — and appears nowhere else in this particular section. 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4)(A).

Section 7, meanwhile, does contain other paragraphs. Thus, in addition to the duties specified in paragraph (a)(4), each VRA must both “distribute with each application for such service or assistance, and with each recertification, renewal, or change of address form relating to such service or assistance-... the mail voter registration application form described in” § 20508(a)(2) “unless the applicant, in writing, declines to register to vote” and provide a form with specified content. 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6)(A)-(B). The NVRA further forbids any partisan involvement or discouragement and the use of any “information relating to a declination to register to vote in connection with an application” at a VRA for “any purpose other than voter registration.” Id. § 20506(a)(5), (7). “Nothing” in the NVRA “authorizes or requires conduct that is prohibited by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” Id. § 20510(d)(2).

4. Enforcement and Responsibility

Like many statutes, cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)-(b); Carter ex rel. United States v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 230-31 (S.D.Cal.2015), the NVRA affords two coequal enforcement methods, 52 U.S.C. § 20510; see also 138 Cong. Rec. 10,736 (1992) (statement of Sen. Wendell Ford) (explaining that the language providing for a private cause of action substituted “person” for “individual” to “permit organizations as well as individuals, and the Attorney General to bring actions under the [A]ct”). A private person “aggrieved by a violation” may sue for declaratory or injunctive relief once “written notice of th[is] violation” has been provided “to the chief election official of the State involved” and a certain number of days have passed. 52 U.S.C. § 20510(b)(1)-(3); Nat’l Council of La Raza, 800 F.3d at 1035; Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 912 F.Supp. 976, 981 (W.D.Mich.1995). A prevailing private party may be allowed “reasonable attorney fees, including litigation expenses, and costs.” 52 U.S.C. § 20510(c); Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 363 (5th Cir.1999).

Independently, on behalf of the United States, “[t]he Attorney General may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court for such declaratory or in-junctive relief as is necessary to carry out” the NVRA. 52 U.S.C. § 20510(a); Harkless, 545 F.3d at 450. The NVRA thereby “provides broad authority to the United States in ensuring compliance with the provisions of the statute.” United States v. New York, 700 F.Supp.2d 186, 197 (N.D.N.Y.2010); see also United States v. New York, 255 F.Supp.2d 73, 78 (E.D.N.Y.2003). According to one appellate court, “[t]he statute envisions the federal government predominantly will enforce the NVRA.” United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 851 (8th Cir.2008). These remedies “are in addition to all other rights and remedies provided by law.” 52 U.S.C. § 20510(d)(1); Miller, 912 F.Supp. at 981.

Throughout its sections, the NVRA opts for a particular introductory formulation: “Each State shall .... ” 52 U.S.C. §§ 20503(a), 20506(a) (emphasis added). Among the many duties enumerated in the NVRA is one of delegation, as “[ejach State” must “designate a State officer or employee as the chief State election official to be responsible for coordination of State responsibilities under this ... [Act].” 52 U.S.C. § 20509 (emphasis added); United States v. Louisiana, No. 11-470-JWD-RLB, 2015 WL 893034, at *1 (M.D.La. Mar. 2, 2015). Within this circuit, this designated official’s power to coordinate encompasses “enforcement power.” Scott v. Schedler, 771 F.3d 881, 838 (5th Cir.2014); accord Harkless, 545 F.3d at 453-54; cf. Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 838 (6th Cir.1997) (holding “that Congress structured the notice requirement [in § 20510(b)(l)-(2)] in such a way that notice would provide states in violation of the Act an opportunity to attempt compliance before facing litigation,” so that the official required to receive notice under state law must also have the concomitant power to cure a violation).

Overall, then, Congress’ chosen terms lead to an inescapable textual conclusion. While some NVRA provisions “envision delegation, and do not require the states to do more than delegate,” “[u]nder the plain language of the statute, states must take specific actions” and thus bear ultimate liability and final responsibility for any contrary nonaction. Missouri, 535 F.3d at 849 (emphasis added). In Louisiana, by virtue of the statute from which he derives his authority, the SOS has been classified as the official responsible for the NVRA’s coordination and enforcement. See La. R.S. §§ 18:18A(6). As surely as this state’s governor, the SOS has always been an “instrumentality] of the state” who has no greater power than that afforded by Louisiana’s constitution and laws. La. Const, art. IV, §§ 1(A), 7.

C. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Scott Matter

a. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Scott Matter

“Intermittently homeless,” Scott received benefits pursuant to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), a hybrid federal-state program providing nutrition assistance to millions of eligible, low-income individuals and families managed by DCFS. (Doc. 436 at 5, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW; see also Doc. 1 ¶¶ 102-06 at 27-28, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) Scott applied for SNAP in September 2009 and December 2009 and renewed his application on November 2010 at a local DCFS office.” (Doc. 436 at 5-6, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW; see also Doc. 1 ¶¶ 102-06 at 27-28, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.)

The initial application forms submitted by Scott in 2009 did contain a section entitled “Voter Registration,” which contained “the proper language under” and was generally “in compliance with” the NVRA. (Doc. 436 at 6-9, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) At least once he discussed voter registration with a DCFS-managed office. (Id.) However, the document that he submitted in November 2010 did “not contain the voter registration language as required under the NVRA,” and voter registration was discussed with Scott only on his first recorded visit. (Id. at 9, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW; see also Doc. 1 ¶ 106 at 28.) More problematically, Scott “did not receive a voter registration form[s] [with] ... [his] benefits form[s]” (Doc. 436 at 8-9, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW; see also Doc. 1 ¶¶ 102-06 at 27-28, No. 2:1 l-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.)

On the bases of these factual findings, “Scott suffered an actionable injury during ... [these] transactions with DCFS when ... [its employees] failed to meet their obligation to Scott” under the NVRA. (Doc. 436 at 10, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW; see also Doc. 1 ¶ 106 at 28.) In sum, Scott had “been in person to ... [a] DCFS office several times and did not receive the information required under the NVRA.” (Doc. 436 at 11, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW see also Doc. 1 ¶ 106 at 28, No. 2:11-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) Adducing extensive evidentiary support for its factual findings, (Doc. 436 at 26-27, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW), the Scott Court found DCFS equally guilty of sundry violations:

(1) DCFS did not provide voter registration services with every remote transaction; (2) DCFS did not provide voter registration services with every renewal of benefits prior, to October 31, 2010; (3) DCFS did not require its staff to distribute a voter preference form at every change of address transaction; (4) DCFS policy did not require that voter registration services be provided during any remote change of address transaction; (5) DCFS change of address forms, such as the CCAP 10 and the OFS 4SR, did not contain voter registration questions; (6) DCFS policy did not expressly require that voter registration be provided with the CCAP, KCSP, and DSNAP programs; (7) DCFS policy gave employees discretion to give voter registration forms to clients, or to advise the client about the SOS’s website; [and] (8) DCFS did not require staff to distribute voter registration forms unless the client checked “yes.”

(Id. at 25-26, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW; see also Doc. 1 ¶¶ 57-81 at 16-24, Ño. 2:11-cv-00926-JTM-J CW.)

The Scott Court went further. Having never interacted with Scott, DHH had nonetheless “engaged in numerous NVRA violations” prior to August 11, 2011. (Doc. 436 at 5, 20, 25, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW; see also Doc. 1 ¶ 56 at 16, ¶¶ 61-77 at 17-22, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) Documenting each violation, (Doc. 436 at 21-25, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW), the Scott Court proceeded to identify at least seven separate violations by DHH:

(1) DHH did not provide voter registration services with any remote transactions prior to July 2011; (2) DHH did not provide voter registration services with address changes; (3) DHH did not require staff to distribute voter registration forms unless the client checked the “yes” box; (4) DHH Medicaid application and renewal forms did not include a voter registration question; (5) DHH’s “Motor Voter Form” lacked a disclaimer that registering to vote will not affect the “amount” of assistance received; (6) DHH’s [Woman, Infants, and Children Program • (“WIC”) ] ... did not advise clients of the disclaimers required by the statute; and (7) while DHH checked benefits application forms and followed up for missing information, it did not do so with voter registration forms.

(Id. át 20; see also Doc. 1 ¶¶ 61-77 at 17-22, 84-97 at 24-26, No. 2:ll-ev-00926-JTM-JCW.)

SOS was adjudged next. As the Scott Court concluded, SOS had provided NVRA training and materials, but had not “engage[d] in any other measures to ensure that individual public assistance offices are complying with their responsibilities under the NVRA.” (Doc. 436 at 28, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) The SOS’ training was found to be “inconsistent and inaccurate.” (Id.) For support for this conclusion, the Scott Court emphasized three facts: (1) SOS had provided no NVRA training for DCFS employees from 2008 to the spring of 2011; (2) it had falsely informed DHH personnel “that DHH clients were only afforded an opportunity to register to vote only if ... [they] appeared in person at a DHH officer”; and (3) it did not “Advise DCFS or DHH with regard to distributing voter registration application forms to clients who did not respond to the voter declaration question.” (Id.)

For all these reasons, the Scott Court entered the First Injunction. (Doc. 437, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.)

b. Fifth Circuit’s Scott Decisions

In considering the SOS’ appeal of the First Injunction, the Fifth Circuit left it mostly undisturbed. The panel did “dismiss Scott’s claims on standing and notice grounds,” and it did “vacate in part the relief that the district court granted to the Louisiana NAACP.” Scott, 771 F.3d at 833. Thus, “[b]ecause it found that the plaintiffs before it lacked standing to raise the issue, the Fifth Circuit did not address the question whether Section 7 requires voter registration agencies to offer voter registration services and assistance to persons who engage in remote transactions,” (Doc. 174 at 2 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).) Accordingly, with neither DCFS nor DHH having appealed, the court also resolved “the only question” before it: as to “the validity of the injunction against the Secretary of State,” it held “that the Act gives the Secretary of State enforcement authority, and that consequently he has an obligation to require the two state agencies to comply with the other miscellaneous portions of the Act.” Scott, 771 F.3d at 833. After the Amended Injunction was appealed, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded due to this latest order’s lack of specificity. Scott v. Schedler, No. 15-30652, 826 F.3d 207, 209-10, 2016 WL 3345277, at *1 (5th Cir. June 15, 2016).

2. Alleged “Facts”: Pre-Scott and Post-Scott

a. US’ Version

Before and after the Scott Matter’s adjudication, other facts relating to several statutory violations have been unearthed. Three alleged violations involve paragraph (a)(4)(A) of Section 7, which begins: “At each voter registration agency, the following services shall be made available_” 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4)(A (emphasis added); Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Ridge, Civ. Nos. 95-7671, 1995 WL 136913, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 30, 1995). Thereupon § 20506(a)(4)(A)(i) requires each VRA to “distribute] ... mail voter registration application forms” that satisfy the minimal content requirements set in § 20506(a)(6). 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4)(A)(i); Krieger, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138293, at *15, 2014 WL 4923904, at *6. Section 20506(a)(4)(A)(ii) requires that “assistance to applicants in completing voter registration application forms, unless the applicant refuses such assistance,” be provided. 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4)(A)(ii); Scales, 150 F.Supp.2d at 854. Paragraph (a)(4)(A)’s final subpara-graph then compels each VRA to transmit each “completed voter registration application forms” to “the appropriate State election official.” 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(4)(A)(iii); Valdez, 676 F.3d at 944.

Paragraph (a)(6) is the focus of a separate series of purported violations. As this paragraph commands, each VRA must “distribute” a certain approved type of mail voter registration application, a form including a series of questions, and finally “provide each applicant who does not decline to register to vote the same degree of assistance with regard to the completion of the [voter] registration application form as is provided by th[at VRA] office with regard to the completion of its own forms, unless the applicant refuses such assistance.” . 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(6)(A)-(C). Unlike paragraph (a)(4)(A), this paragraph does not contain an “at” or any similar preposition. Instead, it begins: “A voter registration agency that is an office that provides service or assistance in addition to conducting voter registration shall .... ” Id. § 20506(a)(6); see also Cegavske, 800 F.3d at 1035 (“Voter registration agencies are required to ‘distribute’ voter registration application forms with each application for assistance” (emphasisadded)).

According to the. US, multiple entities operating under the umbrella of DCFS and DHH have run afoul of these subsections. First and foremost, DCFS itself does not distribute voter registration applications via its Common Access Front End system (“CAFÉ”), this agency’s online portal, thereby violating this NVRA provision in two ways. First, it does “not include an integrated option for users to download and print a voter registration application”; second, it does not “allow users to request that DCFS mail a voter registration system.” (Doc. 360-1 at 17; see also Doc. 1 ¶ 23 at 7-8.).) Instead, “CAFÉ routes users to a website maintained by the SOS where an individual can either register to vote through that website or print out a hardcopy voter registration application.” (Doc. 360-1 at 17; see also Doc. 1 ¶ 23 at 7-8.).) DCFS, moreover, continues not to “distribute voter registration applications every time a client changes their address with the agency,” whether or not CAFÉ is used, and “does not include more than one copy of a declaration form and voter registration form with each benefits application,” though more than one eligible voters can apply for services using a single application. (Doc. 360-1 at 18; see also Doe. 1 ¶ 23 at 7-8.)

The US contends that the Medicaid program managed by DCFS is also rife with compliance issues. “Prior to the initiation of this '... and the Scott litigation, Medicaid applications and renewal forms did not contain the required voter registration forms, and Medicaid offered no voter registration services or assistance to clients and applicants who did not appear in person at a parish office or [Medicaid Application Centers.” (Doc. 3601-1 at 18; see also, e.g., Doc. 360-2 ¶ 12 at 4, ¶ 27 at 7.) Up to August 2015, “Medicaid was still failing to offer voter registration forms and declaration forms to all adult citizens who applied for Medicaid using the standard application form,” opting to provide such forms “only to the first-named applicant.” (Doc. 360-1 at 18; see also, e.g., Doc. 360-2 ¶ 29 at 8.)

Meanwhile, prior to April 11, 2013, the Office for Citizens with Development Disabilities (“OCDD”), classified as a VRA under § 20506(a)(2)(B) and a component of DHH, “failed to provide voter declaration forms, voter registration application forms, and related assistance with easy initial application for the State-funded development disabilities services offered through its Early Steps program.” (Doc. 360-1 at 19; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 59 at 15.) The' same inaction typified OCDD’s regional offices prior to February 2011. (Doc. 360-1 at 19; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 60 at 15.) DHH’s Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH”) has similarly failed. (Doc. 360-1 at 19-20; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶¶ 66-67 at 17.) The Louisiana Commission for the Deaf (“LCD”), prior to February 2011, and the Office of Aging and Adult Services (“OAAS”), prior to May 15, 2013, have also not provided “voter registration application, voter declaration forms, [and/]or related assistance with each initial, renewal, recertification application, or change-of-address transaction.” (Doc. 360-1 at 20; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 45 at 12, ¶ 50 at 13.) An LGE, Jefferson Parish Human Services Authority (“JPHSA”), is currently failing to “offer voter declaration forms, voter registration application forms, and related assistance to the parents or guardians of minor children or other incapacitated wards who apply, recertify, or renew for, or change their addresses.” (Doc. 360-1 at 20; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 94 at 25.)

The US argues that the many colleges and universities within the University of Louisiana System (“ULS”), the Southern University System (“SUS”), and the Louisiana State University System (“LSU”) are not “routinely providing” these forms. (Doc. 360-1 at 21-23; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 149 at 40-41.) Lastly, OAAS and two more LGEs — the Metropolitan Human Services District (“MHSD”) and Capital Area Human Services District (“CAHSD”) — fail to offer “the same degree of assistance” in completing voter registration forms mandated by § 20506(a)(6). (Doc. 360-1 at 23-24; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 46 at 12, ¶¶ 91-92 at 24.)

Moving on to § 20506(a)(4)(A)(iii) and (d), the US documents these same and other entities’ purported failure to comply with the NVRA’s transmittal obligations. By virtue of its reliance on CAFÉ, DCFS “ignores its acceptance and transmittal duties almost entirely by solely providing a link to the SOS’s online voter registration portal, which is a different mode of voter registration altogether.” (Doc. 360-1 at 25; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 118 at 32, ¶ 125 at 33-34, ¶ 131 at 35.) Moreover, throughout 2013, 2014, and 2015, photocopied registration applications were being sent by DCFS document processing centers, though such photocopied materials cannot “result in valid voter registration” under Louisiana law. (Doc. 3601- at 25; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 131 at 35.) In addition, “DCFS also continues to hold voter registration applications it receives longer than the 10 [and/]or five day deadlines mandated by the NVRA.” (Doc. 360-1 at 25 (referring to § 20506(d)(1)); see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 132 at 35-36.) In fulfilling its duty, the US maintains that DCFS has arguably stumbled in one more particular. Specifically, it “still fails to ensure that all completed voter registration applications transmitted to registrars of voters are properly marked as originating from a public assistance agency.” (Doc. 360-1 at 25; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 132 at 35-36.)

Like DCFS, DHH has also failed to transmit voter registration with the rigor expected by § 20506(a)(4) and (d). (Doc. 360-1 at 25-26; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶¶ 67-67A at 17-18.) Relatedly, since DHH’s contracts with each LGE provide that it “shall monitor this Contract and conduct compliance monitoring consistent with the provisions of the AIP, and all applicable statutes, rules, and regulations, assuring corrective action through coordination with the LGE,” (Doc. 360-2 ¶ 77 at 20), these LGEs’ many documented failings to comply with the NVRA must be attributed to DHH. (Doc. 360-1 at 26-28.)

Noting that the SOS’ coordination power includes “enforcement power” pursuant to Scott, 771 F.3d at 838-39, the US turns to those facts bearing on SOS’ defiance of the NVRA. Broadly, the SOS has “failed to identify and designate” as VRAs “all offices of the State that provide public assistance,” as required by § 20506(a)(2)(A). (Doc. 360-1 at 29 (internal citations omitted); see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 163 at 45.) Moreover, having promulgated administrative rales regarding NVRA compliance in March 2013 after a two-year delay, (Doc. 360-2 ¶ 169 at 47; cf. Doc. 360-1 at 30), the SOS has defied his own regulations. Thus, the SOS “requires that mandatory voter registration agencies appoint NVRA department and site coordinators to be responsible for ensuring that the offices under their supervision comply with the NVRA,” but “none of Louisiana’s four public college and university systems has appointed an NVRA department coordinator.” (Doc. 360-2 ¶ 172 at 48; see also Doe. 360-1 at 30-31.) Indeed, the SOS has not ensured that coordinators are appointed at each of more than 600 DHH-eertified MACs or at each of more than 200 DCFS-certified community partners. (Doc. 360-1 at 31; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 173 at 48.) No regular annual trainings regarding NVRA compliance have been given, and the SOS’ list of physical VRAs “remains incomplete and infrequently updated.” (Doc. 360-1 at 31-32; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶¶ 176-81 at 49-50.)

More violations are alleged by the US: the SOS does not include instructions on voter registration declaration and application forms outlining the duties of applicants and agencies and uses a model form that does not include information required by Louisiana’s own Election Code. (Doc. 360-2 ¶¶ 186-87 at 52.) The SOS has even given voter registration agencies advice or instructions that “directly ... conflict” with the NVRA. (Doc. 360-1 at 32; see also Doc. 360-2 ¶ 182 at 51-52.) Even his classification system for voter forms runs afoul of federal law’s clear requirements, with many applications not being coded as having been received or generated through a public assistance agency. (Doc.. 360-2 ¶¶ 193-96 at 54-55; cf Doc. 1 ¶ 23 at 7-8.) One more example suffices: though SOS has required DCFS to submit quarterly activity reports as of January 2014, “DCFS did not submit any of the required quarterly reporting information until January 2015.” (Doc. 360-2 ¶ 104 at 28.)

b. Defendants’ Version

As to the foregoing failings predating the Scott Matter, DHH and DCFS have acknowledged their noncompliance “with the NVRA in every respect.” (Doc. 398 at 1; Doc. 399 at 1; Doc. 402 at 2.) More importantly, while they challenge the propriety of the present suit, DHH and DCFS aver no more than their “substantial compliance” with the NVRA and characterize any “current ... violation” as “minimal, at best.” (Doc. 398 at 2; Doc. 399 at 2; Doc. 402 at 2.) Hence, DCFS and DHH do not truly deny every “fact,” characterized as such by the US. (Doc. 398 at 2; Doc. 399 at 2; Doc. 402 at 2; Doc. 399-1; Doc. 402-1.) Instead, these allied defendants repeatedly insist “substantial compliance with the NVRA” has occurred since the First Injunction was entered, (Doc. 398 at 9-38; Doc. 399 at 9-38), though SOS attempted to do so with a belated motion, (Doc. 448).

c. Summary: Selected Comparison

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Scott Court stated its conclusions plainly and unmistakably: “[p]rior to August 15, 2011,” DHH, DCFS, and SOS had not not “in full compliance with the [NVRA’s] mandates.” (Doc. 436 at 3, 25, 27, 29, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) This court did award a broad remedy, requiring the SOS “to implement such policies, procedures, and directives as to each [qualifying’] program,” (Doc. 437, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW), and was eventually reversed for this seeming “vagueness” pursuant to Rule 65(d), Scott, 826 F.3d at 212-13, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10919, at *12-13, 2016 WL 3345277, at *4. However, as its actual opinion reveals, the Scott Court adjudicated NVRA compliance by SOS, DHH, and DCFS as to only three specific state programs: Medicaid, WIC, and the Louisiana Children’s Health Insurance Program (“LaCHIP”). (Doc. 436 at 3, 25, 27, 29, No. 2: ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.)

Examples gleaned from Defendants’ own filings and the US’ MSJ disclose as much. Thus, DCFS and DHH have already-conceded that certain “disability services programs,” including the regional service centers of several LCDs, OBH, and OAAS, were “not raised or litigated in Scott.” (Doc. 398 at 9; Doc. 399 at 9.) Yet, according to these Defendants, these VRAs “were not consistently providing voter registration with each application” as required by the NVRA. (Doc. 398 at 10-13; Doc. 399 at 10-13.) Similarly, DCFS has acknowledged that the Scott Court never discussed or determined CAFÉ’s compliance with the NVRA. (Doc. 402 at 7.) Indeed, in DHH’s First Opposition to US’ MSJ, DHH identifies only two programs as having been litigated to a final judgment in Scott: WIC and Medicaid. (Doc. 398 at 9.) No mention of any deficiencies in the services provided by Louisiana’s higher education system or several LGEs, moreover, can be found in Scott. (Compare Doc. 346-1, with Doc. 436, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) Despite their multiple motions, DCFS and DHH admit that “instances of program-specific NVRA violations” still regularly occur. (Doc. 398 at 2.)

D. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Eighty-four (84) days after the Scott Matter had begun, Plaintiff filed the relevant complaint on July 12, 2011, charging Defendants with violating Section 7 of the NVRA. (Doc. 1; see also Doc. 1, No. 2:11-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) Dated January 25, 2016, Schedler’s MSJ prompted the filing of the US’ Opposition to Schedler’s MSJ on February 24, 2016, (Doc. 382), which was followed by Schedler’s MSJ Reply on March 15, 2016, (Doc. 395), the US’ Surre-ply to Schedler’s Reply on March 23, 2016, (Doc. 420), and Schedler’s Surreply on March 28, 2016, (Doc. 423). DCFS’ MTD, filed on January 29, 2016, (Doc. 340), led to the tendering of the US’ Opposition to DCFS’ MTD on February 29, 2016, (Doc. 385), and the DCFS’ Reply on March 21, 2016, (Doc. 407). Stamped January 29, 2016, (Doc. 341), LA’s First MTD prompted the US’ Opposition to LA’s First MTD on February 29, 2016, (Doc. 384), and LA’s First Reply on March 21, 2016, (Doc. 409). Schedler’s MTD, filed on January 31, 2016, (Doc. 342), was followed by the US’ Opposition to Schedler’s MTD on March 1, 2016, (Doc. 388), DCFS’ Joinder Response on March 1, 2016, (Doc. 389), and Sche-dler’s MTD Reply on March 23, 2016, (Doc. 415). LA’s Second MTD was filed on February 1, 2016, (Doc. 345), the US’ Opposition to LA’s Second MTD on March 2, 2016, (Doc. 394), and Schedler’s MTD Reply on March 23, 2016, (Doc. 414). The US’ MSJ, an incorrect version filed on February 1, 2016, (Doc. 346), and a corrected one on February 2, 2016, (Doc. 360), was trailed by DHH’s First Opposition to US’ MSJ, (Docs. 398-99), LA’s Opposition to US’ MSJ, (Doc. 400), and DCFS’ Opposition to US’ MSJ on March 18, 2016, (Doc. 402). The US’ MSJ Reply came on April 18, 2016. (Doc. 444.) Twenty days earlier, on March 29, 2016, in response to the Parties’ Joint Motion to Set Dispositive Motions for Oral Argument, (Doc. 421), the Court scheduled oral argument on these motions for May 17, 2016. (Doc. 426.) On May 17, 2016, this Court heard the Parties’ arguments (“Motions Hearing”) and took the matter under advisement. (Doc. 452.)

On January 23, 2013, the Scott Court issued the First Injunction. (Doc. 437, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) The Fifth Circuit affirmed and vacated in part on November 5, 2014. Scott, 771 F.3d at 881, 841-42. In response, the Scott Court issued the Amended Injunction on July 10, 2015. (Doc. 538, No. 2:ll-cv-00926-JTM-JCW.) Neither DCFS nor DHH appealed the Scott Court, as both the Amended Injunction, (Id. at 1 n.l.), and the Fifth Circuit emphasize, Scott, 771 F.3d at 835. (See also Doc. 174 at 3.) The Amended Injunction was reversed and remanded on June 15, 2016. Scott, 826 F.3d 207, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10919, 2016 WL 3345277.

III. SUMMARY OF PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

A. LA’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSAL: NVRA’S APPLICABILITY TO STATE

In its first dispositive motion, (Docs. 341), and its supporting reply, (Doc. 409), LA invokes Rules 12(b)(1), contesting this Court’s jurisdiction for three reasons.

First, LA argues that this court has always lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Parties’ dispute based on the Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. 341 at 2; Doc. 341-1 at 2-4; see also Doc. 414 at 6-8.) This amendment “bars a state’s citizens from filing suit against ... [a sjtate in federal court unless it has waived its immunity.” (Doc. 341 at 2-3, 3 n.3.) LA has not done so, as both case law and state law reveal, and Plaintiffs suit must therefore be dismissed.' (Id. (referring to LA. R.S. § 13:5106(A); Patterson v. Stalder, Civ. No. 06-752-P, 2007 WL 2479830 (W.D.La. Aug. 27, 2007); and Kiper v. La. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 592 F.Supp. 1343 (M.D.La.1984)); see also, e.g., Doc. 341-1 at 4-6; Doc. 409 at 7-8.)

Second, LA asserts that only one “very narrow” and inapplicable exception — the so-called “Ex Parte Young exception”— exists. (Doc. 341 at 2.) In general, this exception allows “[a] state official in his or her official capacity ... [to] be sued for prospective injunctive relief [so as] to prevent or cure an ongoing violation of the Constitution or federal law.” (Doc, 341-1 at 6.) Here, however, “the Plaintiff [has] fail[ed] to show that the State of Louisiana has the requisite connection with the enforcement of the act challenged necessary to establish the Ex Parte Young Exception.” (Doc. 341 at 2; see also, e.g., Doc. 341-1 at 6-7; Doc. 409 at 8-9.) Young does not apply, and' Young alone could' justify the US’ present suit.

Third, “other officers and agencies,” not LA, “are actually responsible for specific enforcement of the provisions of the National Voter Registration Act challenged.” (Doc. 341 at 2.) LA “cannot singularly enforce the policies of the NVRA,” and since “[t]his court” has already held the SOS “responsible, for NVRA compliance/’ it was and is “not necessary or proper for ‘the State’ to be a named Defendant in connection with this case,” (Doc. 341 at 3; see also Doc. 409 at 2-6.) For support for this contention, LA directs this Court to un order regarding the Plaintiffs motion to compel, (Doc. 315), issued by the Honorable Richard L. Bourgeois and identifying the SOS as “the entity responsible for NVRA compliance” (“Order on Motion to Compel”), (Doc. 327 at 5). (Doc. 341-1 at 7-8; see also Doc. 409 at 6; cf. Doc. 414 at 8.) In LA’s First Reply, this.point is emphasized: as LA has designated the SOS as its chief election officer, it “has completed its duty” under the NVRA and “is no longer directly responsible or liable for enforcement of the NVRA.” (Doe. 409 at 3.)

To LA’s First MTD, the US makes three responses. First, the Eleventh Amendment does forbid suits by a state’s citizens against a state, but it does not proscribe a suit against a state by the United States. (Doc. 384 at 3-4; see also Doc. 444 at 14.) While there are limited exceptions, none apply here, and the present action is thus unimpeded by the Constitution. (Doc. 384 at 4-5; see also Doc. 444 at 14.) Second (and relatedly), LA is “mistaken” when it insists the Ex Parte Young Exception could alone justify this suit, as “Ex Parte Young does not apply to the United States’ suing the State.” (Doc. 384 at 6-7; see also Doc. 444 at 14.) Third, “[qjuestions about whether the United States has sufficiently alleged acts and omissions on the part of the State that violate the NVRA, or about whether the State has the ability to enforce the NVRA” go to the merits, more properly advanced in a motion to dismiss predicated on Rule 12(b)(6) or (c). (Doc. 384. at 7; see also Doc. 444 at 14.) The US even advises LA that Rule 12(c) is “the proper vehicle for resolving such issues.” (Doc. 384 at 7; see also Doc. 444 at 14.)

Within days of its first motion, (Doc. 341; Doc. 384 at 7), LA submitted its second dismissal motion, (Doc. 345). In essence, this motion argues that “no statutory authority is given [by the US] to support a suit against the State of Louisiana under the NVRA,” (Doc. 345 at 2; see also Doc. 414 at 9), as “none of the[ ] provisions [cited by the US] give the ... [US] the authority to actually bring suit against the state,” (Doc. 345-1 at 2). LA goes further, contending that the Complaint contains “no allegations against the State of Louisiana or that the State of Louisiana caused the deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right of the Plaintiff.” (Doc. 345 at 2.) Once more, LA maintains that “the State of Louisiana, as a whole, is not responsible for enforcement of the NVRA” and attacks the US for not having alleged “any action by the State of Louisiana that was unreasonable or unconstitutional” and “not specifically identify[ing] what laws they [sic] want changed.” (Id.; see also Doc. 345-1 at 2-6.) According to LA’s understanding of Scott, “other state agencies and officers ... have been held by the Fifth Circuit to be the proper parties to enforce the NVRA.” (Doc. 345 at 2; see also Doc. 345-1 at 5-6; Doc. 414 at 4-5, 10.) Therefore, “for this reason alone, a claim against the State of Louisiana, as a separate defendant, is improper.” (Doc. 345-1 at 2; see also Doc. 414 at 2, 8-10.) Again citing to the Order on Motion to Compel, (Doc. 327), LA insists that “[t]his court has found that another defendant state official is responsible for NVRA compliance.” (Doc. 345 at 3; see also Doc. 414 at 8.) In sum, then, LA’s Second MTD repeats the third reason for dismissal advocated in LA’s First MTD, (Compare Doc. 341-1 at 8, with Doc. 345 at 2), entire paragraphs being indistinguishable replicas, (Compare Doc. 345-1 at 3-4, with Doc. 409 at 4-5).

The US responds to LA’s Second MTD with statutory citations and jurisprudential distinctions. By its reckoning, “as a ‘State of the United States