Full opinion text
Memorandum Opinion and Order Honorable Edmond E. Chang, United States District Judge Harry Ploss brings suit on behalf of himself and a proposed class, alleging that Kraft Food Group, Inc. and Mondeléz Global LLC manipulated the market by maintaining a large position of wheat futures in an attempt to influence prices, and not for any legitimate need for wheat (the “long wheat futures scheme”). (For simplicity, the Opinion will refer to the Plaintiffs collectively as “Ploss” and to the Defendants collectively as “Kraft”) Ploss also alleges that Kraft manipulated the market by engaging in unlawful wash trades and reporting them to the public as legitimate transactions, in order to create an impression of greater market activity (the “wash trading scheme”). Ploss brings seven total counts: (1) manipulation under Section 9(a)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) for the long wheat futures scheme; (2) manipulation under Section 6(c)(1) of the CEA for the long wheat futures scheme; (3) principal-agent liability under Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the CEÁ for the long wheat futures scheme; (4) manipulation under Section 9(a)(2) of the CEA for the wash trading scheme; (6) manipulation under Section 6(c)(1) of CEA for the wash trading scheme; (6) violation of the Shqr.-man Antitrust Act; and (7) unjust enrichment. Kraft now moves to dismiss the entire Complaint, arguing that Ploss has not stated any viable claim. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies the motion in part as to the CEA, Sherman Act, and unjust enrichment claims related to the long wheat futures scheme (Counts One, Two, Three, Six, and Seven). The Court grants Kraft’s motion as to the CEA claims involving the wash trading scheme (Counts Four and Five) and dismisses those claims without prejudice. I. Background For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations in the Consolidated Class Action Complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 651 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). (For simplicity, the Court will refer to the operative Consolidated Class Action Complaint as the “Complaint”) Defendant Kraft Foods Group is one of the largest food and beverage companies in North America. R. 71, Compl. ¶23. In 2012, Kraft changed its corporate structure and became Mon-deléz International, Inc., which in turn owned Mondeléz Global LLC; the latter operates the North American snack foods division. Id. ¶ 25. Kraft, which needs a lot of wheat for its food products, processes 90% of its wheat at its primary flour mill in Toledo, Ohio. Id. ¶ 51. In order to save on transportation costs, -Kraft buys most of its wheat—in particular, No. 2 soft red winter wheat—from the local Toledo cash wheat market. Id. ¶¶ 1, 51, 55. The Toledo mill allegedly processes around 15 million bushels of wheat every 6 months, but is riot large enough to store that much wheat. Id. ¶¶ 51, 85-86. In November 2011, Kraft allegedly had around 4.2 million bushels of wheat stored at its Toledo mill, representing more than 80% of its storage capacity of about 5 million bushels. Id. ¶ 51. A. The Alleged “Long Wheat Futures Scheme” In addition to buying wheat from the local Toledo cash market, Kraft is also able to obtain wheat from the futures market on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). Id. ¶¶ 56-57. A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell a commodity at some point in the future, but at a predetermined price, Id. ¶ 27. The trader who purchases a futures contract has a “long” position and is obligated to take delivery and pay for the commodity at the future date. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. The trader who sells a futures contract has a “short” position and is obligated to make delivery of the commodity at the future date. Id. End-users of a commodity like Kraft often use futures markets to hedge against the risk of increasing prices—in other words, “to offset price risks incidental to commercial cash or spot operations ....” Id. ¶ 43. Because Kraft is a commercial end-user of wheat, it can apply for an exemption that releases it from the position limits that bind speculators (who, in contrast, have no use for the underlying commodity). Id,. Speculators are subject to a limit of 600 contracts (long or short) a month, while a hedge exemption allows commercial end-users like Kraft to maintain 5,460 long positions and 6,660 short positions in wheat. Id. ¶¶ 2, 40, 44, 57-59; R. 77-1, 10/22/10 Hedge Exemption Letter. Traders must apply for exemptions to CBOT’s Market Regulation Department, which approves or denies the request. Id. ¶ 44. Hedge exemptions expire one year from the date of issuance and must be renewed. Id. Ploss alleges that Kraft applied for an exemption limit in October 2010 and was approved on December 1, 2010. Id. ¶ 57. That exemption expired a year later on December 1, 2011, but Kraft did not submit a renewal application until December 28, 2011. Id. ¶44, 59. So from December 2 to at least December 28, Kraft did not have a hedge exemption and was bound by the 600-contract limit that applied to speculators. Id. GBOT wheat futures contracts expire in March, May, July, September, and December of each year, and the last trade date for a contract month is the business day before the 15th calendar day of that month. Id. ¶ 33. By the date of expiration, a party must close out, or satisfy its futures obligations. Id. ¶¶ 30, 33. One way that traders meet their obligation is by physically accepting or delivering the goods. Id. ¶ 28. A seller makes a delivery by issuing a “shipping certificate,” which is a commitment by a facility to deliver the commodity to the buyer. Id. ¶ 46. Shipping certificates themselves can also be traded or exchanged for futures positions. Id. ¶ 47. But the buyer, or holder of the shipping certificate, cannot specify the delivery location of the commodity. Id. In reality, however, physical deliveries from futures trades are rare. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Instead, traders often close their positions by making an offsetting trade—for example, a buyer of one futures contract (a long position) can liquidate her position by selling one futures contract (a short position), and vice versa. Id. “The difference between the initial purchase price and the sale price represents the realized profit or loss for the trader.” Id. ¶30. The total number of futures contracts that a trader has entered into but has not yet liquidated by an offsetting transaction is called the “open interest.” Id. ¶ 31. The Complaint alleges that in the summer and fall of 2011, Kraft “radically” changed its wheat sourcing strategy when the cash price of No. 2 soft red winter wheat in the Toledo market rose from $5.74 to $7.72 per bushel. Id. ¶ 55. During that same time, the price of December 2011 wheat futures contracts increased from $6.57½ to $7.97. Id. ¶ 55. Even though there was enough wheat in the Toledo market to satisfy Kraft’s needs, senior management allegedly devised “a strategy to use its status as a commercial hedger to acquire an enormous long position in December 2011 wheat futures contract[s],” purchasing $90 million worth of December 2011 contracts. Id. ¶¶ 55-56, 82. The purpose of obtaining this long position was “to induce sellers to believe that Kraft would in fact take delivery, load out, and use that wheat in its mill in Toledo.” Id. ¶56. In other words, by signaling to the market that Kraft was satisfying its need for wheat from the futures market rather than the cash market, Kraft caused the wheat price in the Toledo cash market to drop, because that cash market now believed that there was greater supply than demand. Id. ¶¶ 55-56, 82. On October 20, 2011, Kraft’s Senior Director of Global Procurement allegedly wrote to the Chief Financial Officer: Given our proposal to “take physical delivery in Dec” of 15 mm bushels at 50 cents per bushel below the commercially offered price results in the savings of $7mm +. In addition, there is a key market dynamic that is important to understand: Once the market sees that Kraft is “stopping” December wheat, we anticipate the futures curve will begin to flatten, reducing the profitability of wheat storage, thereby reducing the commercial wheat basis to Kraft. We will then have the option of redelivering the wheat acquired through the futures market. This will then quickly reverse the negative cash flow impact. Id. ¶ 83. Ploss alleges that Kraft’s scheme worked: the price of wheat in the Toledo market indeed dropped, and Kraft was able to obtain wheat in the cash market at more favorable prices. Id. ¶¶ 82-83, 87, 89. Ploss alleges that the $90 million long position was not a bona-fide futures trade because Kraft never intended to use futures market wheat to meet its commercial needs. Id. ¶¶ 51, 81. Before its 2011 purchase, Kraft had not accepted delivery of CBOT wheat since 2002. Id. ¶ 3. Buying wheat on the futures market was inconvenient and uneconomical (compared to buying wheat in Toledo); for one, Kraft could not choose the delivery location of futures market wheat and would have incurred substantial transportation and storage costs. Id. When Kraft attempted a test run in September 2011 of accepting wheat from the futures market, it concluded that this strategy was not viable because of the additional costs. Id. ¶¶ 80-81. Another problem with futures market wheat was that it was of lower quality, because it could have vomitoxin (fungus) levels of up to 4 parts per million, while wheat on the cash market had vomitoxin levels of only 2 parts per million. Id. ¶ 51. So to use CBOT wheat, Kraft would have had to buy additional higher-quality cash wheat for mixing so that the CBOT wheat would meet baking specifications. Id. ¶ 86. In fact, Kraft’s cash contracts typically specified that it would not accept wheat from the futures markets because of the lower quality. Id. ¶51. In addition, Ploss alleges that the lack of storage capacity for $90 million worth of wheat—-or a 6-month supply of 15 million bushels—shows that Kraft did not have a real commercial need for that much wheat. Id. ¶ 85. In November 2011, Kraft already had 4.2 million bushels of wheat at its Toledo facility, occupying 80% of its storage capacity of around 5 million bushels. Id. ¶ 86. Taking delivery of 15 million additional bushels would have meant paying to store almost all of it at an additional cost of 5 cents a bushel. Id. Because purchasing wheat from the CBOT market was practically and finan-daily unsound, Ploss alleges that there was only one reason for taking a long position in December 2011 wheat contracts: to affect the market price of wheat in ways that would benefit Kraft. Id. ¶ 87. In addition to profiting from the lower prices of Toledo wheat, as detailed above, Kraft also allegedly intended to “inflate the futures price of wheat” and benefit from the price differential between December and March wheat. Id. ¶ 82. In December, Kraft held 3,150 long December 2011 wheat futures contracts and 87% of the December 2011 open interest in wheat, causing these futures prices to be artificially high. Id. ¶¶ 49, 65, 82. Kraft simultaneously obtained a “huge” short position in March 2012 wheat contracts. Id. ¶ 1. This is called a “bull spread position,” where the holder is long in nearby futures contracts and short in deferred futures contracts. Id. ¶¶ 35-36, 61. Because Kraft’s long position caused December 2011 prices to rise artificially, Ploss alleges that the spread between the December and March futures contract narrowed; in other words, Kraft’s large long position “caused, the market to shift from contango to backwar-dation ... as the prices of December 2011 CBOT wheat futures contracts became more expensive than those for March 2012.” Id. ¶ 168. This price differential allegedly led to even larger profits. Id. ¶¶49, 61, 87. Kraft’s Senior Director of Global Procurement wrote another email that month to explain its spread strategy: As you may recall, we established a long Dec Wheat/Short March Wheat spread at 35 cents (Mar premium to Dec) for the purpose of taking delivery of CME wheat, representing a $7MM+ saving over commercially sourced wheat. Since Monday we have “stopped” 2.2MM bushels of wheat at a cost of $13.2MM. As expected, the Dee/Mar spread has narrowed to approximately] 11 cents resulting in a marked to market gain of $3.6MM on our open spread position. Meanwhile, with the narrowing spread, the cash wheat basis has declined from + 80 cents to +50 cents over Dec futures. As we begin purchasing this cheaper basis commercial wheat, we will unwind the existing spread position. If all goes according to plan, we will still save $7MM on the commercial cost of wheat vs where it was a few weeks ago as well as make $2-3MM on reversing out of the Dec/Mar wheat spread. Id. ¶ 89. Out of the 15 million bushels of wheat (equal to around 3,000 shipping certificates) that it held in futures contracts, Kraft ultimately obtained only 1,320 shipping certificates of December 2011 wheat, or 6.6 million bushels. Id. ¶¶ 86, 91. But Kraft only loaded out 660,000 bushels (132 contracts), which was less than 5% of its original December 2011 wheat position; it sold the remaining 1,188 shipping certificates for $35,725,074. Id. ¶ 91. And on December 9, Kraft offset its remaining 826 contracts of December 2011 wheat, amounting to 78.3% of the trading volume that day. Id. ¶ 92. Ploss alleges that Kraft’s failure to purchase a similar quantity of wheat in the. cash market demonstrated that it did not actually need this wheat for the Toledo mill. Id. - In total, Ploss alleges that Kraft made more than $5.4 million in trading profits and savings from this strategy of manipulating prices in the Toledo wheat market and on the CBOT. Id. ¶ 78. ' B. The Alleged “Exchange for Physical Wash Trading Scheme” In addition to the alleged long wheat futures scheme, Ploss also alleges that Kraft engaged in unlawful wash trades in violation of the CEA and caused inaccurate trading information to be published to the wheat market. The Complaint does not explicitly define a wash trade, but it suggests that they occur when the same investor simultaneously buys and sells a financial instrument in order to give the false appearance of higher trading volume. Id. ¶¶ 121-44. More specifically, Ploss alleges that from 2003 to 2014, Kraft made non bona-fide “exchange for physical” (EFP) transactions, where parties trade physical commodities for an offsetting futures contract. Id. ¶¶ 45, 131. These transactions happen off the Exchange and give the parties the option to change th¿ delivery period and location. Id. ¶ 122. Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and bBOT Rules regulate EFPs and require them to be bona-fide trades between separate accounts under independent control. Id. ¶¶ 125-26. Parties to an EFP transaction must document the trade and report certain information to the Exchange, such as the volume of the physical commodity traded. Id. ¶¶ 127-29. This volume information (but not price information) is then published daily on CME Group’s website. Id. Ploss alleges that EFP volume “is an important element in the price discovery function of the market, by reflecting supply and demand factors” and is considered by traders when deciding whether or not to transact. Id. ¶ 130. Ploss alleges that Kraft’s off-exchange EFP transactions between 2003 and 2013 were unlawful because they were between two of Kraft’s own accounts in violation of Exchange rules. Id. ¶¶ 131-33. These were allegedly not bona fide because Kraft was the counterparty to its own trades, and there was no physical exchange of wheat. Id. Yet Kraft reported the trading volumes to CBOT, which in turn reported them to the broader wheat market, allegedly because Kraft hoped to drum up trading volume. Id. ¶ 134. Thus, “by reporting these EFP transactions, Kraft duped the CBOT wheat market into believing that a bona fide ownership transfer of CBOT wheat futures had occurred” and made the market believe that there was a greater demand for wheat than there really was. Id. In turn, this “caused the prices of CBOT wheat futures contracts to be artificial by injecting artificial supply and fundamentals used to price these contracts.” Id. ¶¶ 134-36. C. Claims in This Case Plaintiff Harry Ploss (as the trustee of the Harry Ploss Trust) originally brought this action in April 2015, R. 1, but later amended his individual complaint into the Consolidated Class Action Complaint at issue in this motion, R. 71, Compl. The Consolidated Class Action Complaint includes seven other plaintiffs: Richard Dennis, Budiack Inc., Joseph Caprino, Kevin Brown, White Oak Fund LP, Henrik Christensen, and Robert Wallace. Compl. ¶¶ 15-22. All of the Plaintiffs transacted in December 2011 and March 2012 wheat futures and allege that they lost money because of the artificial prices caused by Kraft’s unlawful December 2011 wheat futures position—that is, the Plaintiffs allege that they either bought at a higher price or sold at a lower price than they would have without Kraft’s allegedly manipulative actions. Id. Ploss, on behalf of all of the Plaintiffs, brings seven counts against Kraft: (1) price manipulation under Section 9(a)(2) of the CEA for the long wheat futures scheme, 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2); (2) use of a manipulative device under Section 6(c)(1) of the CEA for the long wheat futures scheme, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1); (3) principal liability under Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the CEA for the manipulative acts of its agents in connection with the long wheat futures scheme, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B); (4) price manipulation under Section 9(a)(2) of the CEA for the EFP wash trading scheme, 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2); (5) use of a manipulative device under Section 6(c)(1) of the CEA for the EFP wash trading scheme, 7 U.S.C. § 9(1); (6) violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; and (7) state-law unjust enrichment. Id. ¶¶ 102-76. Kraft now moves to dismiss each of these claims for failure to state a claim. R. 76, Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss. Relatedly, at the same time that Ploss filed suit in April 2015, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission brought a parallel enforcement action against Defendants Kraft and Mondeléz, with substantially similar allegations about Kraft’s participation in the wheat futures market. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F.Supp.3d 996, 2015 WL 9259885 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 18, 2015). That CFTC enforcement action contained only CEA claims for the long wheat futures scheme, id., while this private action also includes CEA claims for the EFP wash trading scheme as well as antitrust and unjust enrichment claims. The district court in CFTC v. Kraft denied Kraft’s motion to dismiss late last year. Id. II. Legal Standard Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Swierkiemcz v. Sorema N.A. 534 U.S. 506, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)). “A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir.2009). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson, 551 U.S. 89 at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. And the allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. As will be discussed below, some of Ploss’s claims are subject to the heightened pleading standard for fraud. Those claims must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state ivith particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (emphasis added). Put differently, allegations of fraud “must describe the who, what, when, where, and how of the fraud.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 441-42 (7th Cir.2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). III. Analysis A. The Alleged “Long Wheat Futures Scheme” 1. Commodity Exchange Act Overview Before diving into each of the anti-manipulation counts under the Commodity Exchange Act, it will be helpful to provide an overview of the two relevant anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA: Sections 9(a)(2) and 6(c)(1), which are codified at 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) and 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), respectively. The former has been the longstanding anti-manipulation provision of the CEA, and the latter was revised as part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Amendments. Section 9(a)(2) makes it a felony to “manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, or of any swap ....” 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). The CEA also provides a private cause of action for price manipulation. 7 U.S.C. § 25(a) (“Any person ... who violates this chapter .,. shall be liable for actual damages resulting ñ’om” a prohibited transaction, including “a manipulation of the price of any such [futures] contract or swap or the price of the commodity underlying such contract or swap.”). In addition, Congress more recently amended Section 6(c)(1) as part of the Dodd-Frank Amendments, strengthening the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA. The amended provision makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, in connection with any swap, or a contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission shall promulgate .... 7 U.S.C. § 9(1); see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 1376. The revisions are meant to “augment the Commission’s existing authority to prohibit fraud and manipulation.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,398-401. Private parties can also sue to enforce Section 6(c)(1). 25 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(D)© (providing a private right of action for the use or attempted use of “any manipulative device or contrivance in contravention of such rules”). The CFTC also promulgated Regulation 180.1 under Section 6(c)(1). That regulation, in turn, explains that a person shall not “intentionally or recklessly” (1) Use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) Make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not untrue or misleading; (3) Engage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; or, (4) Deliver or cause to be delivered, or attempt to deliver or cause to be delivered, for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce ... a false or misleading or inaccurate report concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce .... 7 C.F.R. § 180.1. The regulation added that “[njothing in this section shall affect, or be construed to affect, the applicability of Commodity Exchange Act section 9(a)(2).” 7 C.F.R. § 180.1(c). One of the differences between the older and newer provisions is that Section 9(a)(2) requires the manipulation (or attempted manipulation) of prices, but Section 6(c)(1) expands liability for any manipulative or deceptive device regardless of whether the conduct intended to or did affect prices. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (it is a violation to “manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity”), with 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) (it is a violation to “directly or indirectly ... use or employ ... in connection with any ... contract of sale of any commodity ... any manipulative or deceptive device”). The CFTC provided some additional guidance for the amended version of Section 6(c)(1). In new regulations, the agency explained that the amended 6(c)(1) was based on federal securities laws: “Given the similarities between CEA section 6(c)(1) and Exchange Act section 10(b), the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to model final Rule 180.1 on SEC Rule 10b-5.10.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399. Section 6(c)(l)’s language parallels that of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, which makes it unlawful “[tjo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ....” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). And like Regulation 180.1, SEC Rule 10b-5 clarifies that it is unlawful, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”: (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of- the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person[.] 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Finally, the CFTC explained that “[t]o account for the differences between the securities markets and the derivatives markets, the Commission will be guided, but not controlled, by the substantial body of judicial precedent applying the comparable language of SEC Rule 10b-5.11.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399. 2. Section 6(c)(1) Manipulation The bulk of the parties’ dispute is over Count Two, Ploss’s manipulation claim under Section 6(c)(1), so the Court starts there. As explained above, this newer section of the CEA prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” connected to any futures contract. 7 U.S.C. § 9(1). The gist of Ploss’s claim is that Kraft violated this section “by putting on an enormous futures position in order to force wheat futures and cash prices to move in a favorable direction.” R. 87, Pis.’ Resp. at 25. In response, Kraft argues that the “(1) Plaintiffs do not identify any misrepresentation or misleading omission by Kraft; (2) Plaintiffs fail to allege facts supporting the inference that Kraft engaged in intentional or reckless misconduct;, and (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege reliance.” R. 77, Defs,’ Br. at 18-19. The parties also dispute which pleading standard—Rule 8(a) or Rule 9(b)—applies. Id. at 19; Pis.’ Resp. at 14. As explained next, the Court con-eludes that Ploss has stated a manipulation claim under Section 6(c)(1) and denies Kraft’s motion to dismiss this claim, i. Misrepresentation Requirement Kraft’s first argument is that a misleading misrepresentation or omission—which Ploss does not allege—is necessary to state a manipulation claim under Section 6(c)(1). Defs.’ Br. at 19. (This analysis is closely tied to the relevant pleading standard, which the Court will address in the next section. See infra Section III. A.2.Ü.) Because Section 6(c)(1) is similar to federal securities laws, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399, Kraft points to cases interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act to argue that an explicit misrepresentation is required in the Section 6(c)(1) context. Defs.’ Br. at 19. Kraft focuses on Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857 (7th Cir.1995), where the Seventh Circuit explained that, aggressive short selling that decreased a stock’s price did not form “the basis for a claim under Rule 10b-5, which requires proof of either deception or manipulation,” because there were no “representations, true or false, actual or implicit, concerning the number of shares that [the defendant] would sell short.” 47 F.3d at 864-65 (citations omitted). Sullivan involved the bankrupt LTV Corporation, which had announced a reorganization plan where shareholders would receive new shares worth 3 to 4 cents, compared to the previous share price of 30 cents. Id. at 859. Expecting that the price of the stock would fall after the announcement, the defendant began aggressively shorting the stock in order to make a profit. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that no deception was involved, because the defendant was simply taking advantage of the publicly-available information in LTV’s bankruptcy reorganization plan and was “bring[ing] mdrket values into closer, quicker conformity with economic reality. The profit that such trading brings at the expense of less knowledgeable traders provides the incentive for a private, for-profit firm, such as [the defendant], to provide this economic service.” Id. at 860. In other words, this was permissible price arbitrage—“identifying] and eliminating] disparities between price and value ... where the difference cannot be attributed to any prospective change in value.” Id. at 862. Because there was nothing unlawful about making trades based on a better understanding of the bankruptcy plan, there could be no liability. Id. at 865. Sullivan, however, did not hold that a market manipulation claim in the securities context always requires an explicit misrepresentation. Although it is true that “most forms of manipulation involve deception in one form or another,” Rule 10b-5 “requires proof of either deception or manipulation.” 47 F.3d at 865 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (“[Section] 10(b) ... prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). This interpretation is consistent with the text of Section 10(b), which plainly prohibits “any manipulative or deceptive device.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, the corresponding regulation makes it unlawful “(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” or “(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact ....” 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. The statute and regulations themselves thus recognize a difference between two types of unlawful actions: manipulative acts and explicit misrepresentations. In addition, several courts have explained that an explicit misrepresentation is not needed for a Section 10(b) securities action because “a transaction [that] sends a false pricing signal to the market” can form the basis of a market manipulation claim. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir.2007). This is based on the theory that investors generally assume that they are trading on “an efficient market free of manipulation” and “that prices at which they purchase and sell securities are determined by the natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by manipulators.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Like Sullivan, ATSI acknowledged that high-volume short selling, without “something more,” was insufficient to state a market manipulation claim. Id. But when trading activity is “willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market participants value a security,” a plaintiff can state a market manipulation claim. Id. at 101; see also Frey v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 931 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir.1991) (“Manipulation, broadly stated, is an intentional exaction of a price determined by forces other than supply and demand.”). The district court in the enforcement version of this case, CFTC v. Kraft, analyzed similar authorities and also concluded that like securities plaintiffs, CEA plaintiffs may plead manipulation under Section 6(c)(1) by alleging that a defendant had an improper motive in making its commodities transactions and that it “misle[d] or eheat[ed] the market through [its] actions, rather than through [its] representations.” CFTC v. Kraft, 153 F.Supp.3d at 1011, 2015 WL 9259885, at *9 (holding that a manipulation claim may be based on misrepresentations or market manipulation). Similarly, in In re Amaranth National Gas Commodities Litigation, 587 F.Supp.2d 513, 534 (S.D.N.Y.2008), the New York district court applied the principles established in Sullivan and ATSI to the commodities markets. Although In re Amaranth analyzed the term “manipulation” under Sections 9(a) and 6(c)(1) of the CEA before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Amendments, the rationale is still helpful here because the court was generally explaining the characteristics of manipulation in the commodities context. Id. It explained that “|j]ust as with securities, commodities manipulation deceives traders as to the market’s time judgment of the worth of the commodities. Similarly, for the same reasons that ATSI concluded that short selling, without more, cannot constitute securities manipulation, entering into futures contracts or swaps, without more, cannot constitute commodities manipulation.” Id. That is, “[i]f a trading pattern is supported by a legitimate economic rationale, it cannot be the basis for liability under the CEA because it does not send a false signal.” Id. Although the court required “something more,” or “some additional factor that causes the dissemination of false or misleading information,” that “additional factor need not be a misstatement or omission.” Id. For example, “[because every transaction signals that the buyer and seller have legitimate economic motives for the transaction, if either party lacks that motivation, the signal is inaccurate,” id. and using that false signal to manipulate commodity pricing can qualify as manipulation. The reasoning of these cases are persuasive and analogous to the Section 6(c)(1) context, so the Court holds that an explicit misrepresentation is not required for a Section 6(c)(1) manipulation claim, which may be based on market activity that sends a false pricing signal to the market. ii. Pleading Standard: 8(a) or 9(b)? Having concluded that a manipulation claim under Section 6(c)(1) can be based on market activity short of an explicit misrepresentation, the next question is whether market-manipulation claims are subject to the heightened pleading standards for fraud. Rule 9(b) requires that “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (emphasis added). The rule requires a complaint to “state the identity of the person making the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff.” Uni*Quality, Inc. v. Infotronx, Inc., 974 F.2d 918, 923 (7th Cir.1992) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Put differently, the plaintiff “must describe the who, what, when, where, and how of the fraud.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 441-42 (7th Cir.2011) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted). Kraft argues that Section 6(c)(1) and Rule 180.1 only apply to fraudulent conduct, and thus are governed by Rule 9(b), Defs.’ Br. at 19, while Ploss argues that manipulation based on “market activity” does not have to sound in fraud, so only Rule 8(a) applies, Pis.’ Resp. at 27. Again, the only other court to have addressed this issue is CFTC v. Kraft in the parallel enforcement action. CFTC v. Kraft, 153 F.Supp.3d at 1007-08, 2015 WL 9259885, at *6. There, the district court concluded that Section 6(c)(1) reaches only fraudulent conduct because the plain language of the statute, which prohibits “any manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” can only mean that the “[CEA] prohibits: (1) the use of manipulative devices to defraud; (2) the use of schemes to defraud; and (3) the use of artifices to defraud.” Id. The district court also relied on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act, both of which use language similar to Section 6(c)(1) and thus provide instructive precedent for Section 6(c)(1). 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399. The district court in CFTC v. Kraft explained that these securities provisions have been interpreted to require a showing of fraud. 153 F.Supp.3d at 1009-10, 2015 WL 9259885, at *7 (citing, e.g., Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 234-45, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 n. 27, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983)). Because securities manipulation involves “intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price,” id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted), or “practices that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity,” id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted), all manipulation must sound in fraud. See also 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,400 (CFTC explaining that “Rule 180.1 prohibits fraud and fraud-based manipulations”). CFTC v. Kraft then went on to hold that, although manipulation requires fraud, “the exact pleading requirements for a cause of action under Section 10(b) [still] vary depending on the type of claim alleged.” 153 F.Supp.3d at 1011, 2015 WL 9259885, at *9. For manipulation claims involving a material misrepresentation or omission, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of security; (4) reliance (transaction causation); (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Id. (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005)) (explaining the elements of a fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act). Like this Court, CFTC v. Kraft also held that manipulation may be based on market behavior that does not depend on a specific misrepresentation. Id. The court concluded that cases based on market manipulation were also fraudulent, but could be alleged with less specificity. Id. In those cases, a plaintiff must plead with particularity “what manipulative acts were performed, which defendants performed them, when the manipulative acts were performed, and what effect the scheme had on the market for the commodities at issue.” Id. (citing ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir.2007)). This holding of CFTC v. Kraft is persuasive and well-reasoned. The Court agrees that manipulation based on explicit misrepresentations sound in fraud, but declines to decide at this time whether manipulation claims based on market behavior must also always be subject to Rule 9(b) in precisely the same way as a misrepresentation case. When manipulation is based on an explicit misrepresentation or omission, it is true that the allegations must meet the heightened pleading standards ofj Rule 9(b). Thus, such a claim requires a material misrepresentation (or omission), scienter, a connection with the purchase or sale of security, reliance, economic loss and loss causation. Dura Pham., 544 U.S. at 341, 125 S.Ct. 1627; see also Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 693 (7th Cir.2008) (same). But for manipulation based on market activity rather than overt misrepresentations, there is some support for the conclusion that Rule 8(a) could apply, depending on the specific facts. In the CEA Section 9(a)(2) context, for example, which prohibits price manipulation, 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2), some courts have held that a case-by-case determination of the appropriate pleading standard is appropriate, depending on the type of claim brought. That is, Rule 9(b) would govern manipulation claims based on explicit misrepresentations, while Rule 8(a) would apply to manipulation claims based on market activity. See, e.g., Premium Plus Partners, L.P. v. Davis, 2005 WL 711591, at *15 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 28, 2005) (explaining that “[although the Court does not purport to endorse a rule that Rule 9(b) pleading requirements never could apply to a CEA manipulation claim,” Rule 8(a) applied to the instant claim, which did not.“sound in fraud” and involved no allegedly false statements (emphasis in original)); In re Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litig., 2013 WL 9815198, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) on reconsideration in part, 2014 WL 5014235 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (“[T]he case specific approach” instructs courts to “appl[y] Rule 9(b) where the allegations involve disseminating false or misleading information in the market” but Rule 8(a) “[wjhere a plaintiff has alleged a manipulative trading strategy[.]” (citing cases)); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F.Supp.2d 523, 531 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (same). It is possible that a similar analysis would apply in the Section 6(c)(1) context, even though there arguably are “material differences” between the text and contextual background of the two CEA sections. See CFTC v. Kraft, 153 F.Supp.3d at 1010, 2015 WL 9259885, at *8 (explaining that the language in the two sections is different, and that “Section 6(c)(1) is nearly identical to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.”). In any event, the Court does not need to decide the pleading standard for Section 6(c)(1) market-manipulation actions at this time, because Ploss has met, for its long wheat futures claims, both Rule 8(a) and (more importantly) the tougher pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Under Rule 9(b), the plaintiff “must describe the who, what, when, where, and how of the fraud.” Pirelli, 631 F.3d at 441-42 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). CFTC v. Kraft held that in the market-manipulation context, this requires a plaintiff to plead with particularity “what manipulative acts were performed, which defendants performed them, when the manipulative acts were performed, and what effect the scheme had on the market for the commodities at issue.” 153 F.Supp.3d at 1012, 2015 WL 9259885, at *9 (citing ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101). As explained below, regardless of whether the appropriate pleading standard is Rule 8(a) or 9(b), Ploss has met it iii. Market Manipulation Applying the standards previously discussed, the Court concludes that Ploss has successfully alleged a commodities-manipulation claim under Section 6(c)(1) by pleading that Kraft misled the market with its actions, even absent an affirmative misrepresentation. The Complaint’s detailed allegations provide more than “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and they also sufficiently “describe the who, what, when, where, and how of the fraud” as required by Rule 9(b), Pirelli, 631 F.3d at 441-42 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). (But remember, the Court does not definitely decide whether Rule 9(b) applies to all Section 6(c)(1) manipulation claims.) Specifically, Ploss alleges that Kraft schemed to obtain a large long position in December 2011 futures contracts not because of any bona-fide commercial need for wheat, but because it wished to “depress cash market wheat prices and inflate the futures price of wheat.” Compl. ¶ 82. According to Ploss, Kraft’s acquisition of 3,150 December 2011 contracts ($90 million worth) was not bona fide because Kraft never intended to take delivery of futures market wheat, which required expensive delivery, transportation, and storage solutions as compared to buying wheat from the local cash market. Id. ¶¶ 51, 81-82, 160. The Complaint sets forth factual allegations to support this: first, when Kraft attempted a test run in September 2011 of accepting delivery of futures market wheat, it concluded that this strategy was not viable because of the additional costs. Id. ¶¶ 80-81. Plus, futures market wheat was of a lower quality, and Kraft had not taken delivery of futures market wheat since 2002. Id. ¶¶ 3, 51. To use CBOT wheat, Kraft would have had to buy additional higher-quality cash wheat for mixing so that the CBOT wheat would meet baking specifications. Id. ¶ 86. Finally, Kraft allegedly did not have the capacity to store $90 million worth of wheat, or a 6-month supply of 15 million bushels. Id. ¶ 85. In November 2011, Kraft already had 4.2 million bushels of wheat at its Toledo facility, occupying 80% of its storage capacity. Id. ¶ 86. Acquiring 15 million additional bushels of wheat would have meant paying for more storage—an additional cost of five cents a bushel. Id. Ultimately, Kraft only accepted delivery of 660,000 bushels of wheat, or less than 5% of its December 2011 positioh, showing (at least as this stage of the case) that Kraft never really needed 15 million bushels of wheat for its mill operations. Id. ¶ 91. Even though the purchase of futures contracts seemed uneconomic, Ploss alleges that Kraft ultimately benefited from this purchase. First, the large long position made sellers in the Toledo market believe that Kraft would satisfy its need for wheat from the futures market, and not from the local cash mai'ket. Id. ¶ 56. This caused cash prices in the Toledo market to fall, and in turn, allowed Kraft to purchase wheat in the Toledo market at lower prices. Id. Ploss alleges that Kraft’s Senior Director of Global Procurement outlined this strategy in an email: “[Tjhere is a key market dynamic that is important to understand: Once the market sees that Kraft is ‘stopping’ December wheat, we anticipate the futures curve will begin to flatten, reducing the profitability of wheat storage, thereby reducing the commercial wheat basis to Kraft.” Id. ¶ 83. Second, it is alleged that Kraft also intended for its December 2011 acquisition to artificially increase December 2011 futures prices relative to March 2012 futures prices; thus, when Kraft shorted its March 2012 futures contracts, it also benefited from the artificial increase of December 2011 futures and the narrowed spread between the December and March contract prices. Id. ¶1¶ 1, 49, 61, 64-70, 87. Ploss alleges that this trading strategy of purchasing unneeded futures contracts ultimately yielded over $5.4 million in profits and savings to Kraft. Id. ¶ 78. In sum, Ploss alleges specific details about the scheme, suggesting that Kraft’s high-volume futures acquisition was “willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market participants value a security.” ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101 (citing Sullivan, 47 F.3d at 861-62). That “something more” was a false signal through its market behavior that Kraft intended to source its wheat from the futures market, so that the transaction was not representative of true supply and demand. Market manipulation has been adequately alleged. iv. Scienter Kraft also argues that Ploss has not alleged intentional or reckless misconduct and that the allegation that “Kraft desired to make the market believe that it would take delivery, load out, and store that wheat for use in its mill” is concluso-ry. Defs.’ Br. at 23-24 (citing Compl. ¶ 87). As just explained, however, the allegations of intent are not merely conclusory—Ploss alleges more than enough concrete facts to support his contention that Kraft intentionally and knowingly deceived the market. See supra Section III.A.2.iii. There is no need to rehash all of those facts, but the main point is that Kraft allegedly obtained a huge long position in wheat futures contracts even though it did not make financial sense to take physical delivery of futures market wheat. Id. Kraft intentionally signaled to the market that it would source its wheat from the futures market (despite knowing it did not actually intend to do so), which caused the Toledo cash market prices to fall and the December 2011 futures prices to rise, both of which financially benefited Kraft. Id. All of the allegations previously discussed sufficiently describe how Kraft intended to deceive the market, how it carried out this deception, and how it benefited. Id. Kraft also argues that the emails from its Senior Director of Global Procurement actually demonstrate that Kraft did intend to take delivery of the December 2011 wheat, and not the other way around. Defs.’ Br. at 24-25. The October 20, 2011 email notes that “[Kraft’s] proposal to ‘take physical delivery in Dec’ of 15 mm bushels at 50 cents per bushel below the commercially offered price results in the savings of $7mm +.” Compl. ¶ 83. Sure, a factfinder ultimately might believe Kraft’s interpretation of this email, after considering a full factual presentation at trial and bearing in mind that Ploss will bear the burden of proof. But at this stage of the case, the Court must accept the allegations in the Complaint as true, and give all reasonable inferences to Ploss—in other words, the Court must accept that this email reflects the intent to carry out the manipulative strategy. Nothing in this email contradicts that allegation. Even though the email does mention “the proposal to ‘take physical delivery in Dec,’” id. the part about taking physical delivery is surrounded by quote marks, and when read in context, those could be the written equivalent of air quotes. More significantly, the email goes on to explain that “[o]nce the market sees that Kraft is ‘stopping’ December wheat, we anticipate the futures curve will begin to flatten, reducing the profitability of wheat storage, thereby reducing the commercial wheat basis to Kraft.” Id. This directly supports Ploss’s allegation—that as a result of obtaining a large long December 2011 futures position, Kraft intended that the Toledo cash market would be left with a wheat surplus. Rather than storing the extra wheat, the Toledo market reduced the cash wheat prices, and Kraft took advantage. With all this, Ploss has adequately pled scienter and all of the elements of a manipulation claim under Section 6(c)(1). The Court denies Kraft’s motion to dismiss this count. 3. Section 9(a)(2) Manipulation Count One is also a claim for manipulation based on the long wheat futures scheme detailed above, but under Section 9(a)(2) of the CEA. Remember, Section 9(a)(2) makes it unlawful for any trader to “manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity ....” 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). The related regulation includes the same prohibition. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity,”). Because the new Dodd-Frank provisions were not intended to affect Section 9(a)(2), the four-part test that courts have adopted for Section 9(a)(2) still stands. 7 C.F.R. § 180.1(c) (“Nothing in this section shall affect, or be construed to affect, the applicability of Commodity Exchange Act section 9(a)(2).”). That test requires a plaintiff to allege four elements: “(1) the defendant] possessed the ability to influence prices; (2) an artificial price existed; (3) the defendant caused the artificial price; and (4) the defendant specifically intended to cause the artificial price.” In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. Cheese Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 758, 764-65 (7th Cir.2015). The Court concludes that Ploss has alleged each of these elements. These four elements overlap some, but the Court will address each one in turn. i. Ability to Influence Prices First, Ploss alleges that Kraft was able to influence prices in two markets: the Toledo cash market and the December 2011 futures market. Ploss’s allegations are not merely conclusory; he explains that by obtaining a large December 2011 long position, Kraft “induce[d] sellers to believe that Kraft would in fact take delivery, load out, and use that wheat in its mill in Toledo.” Compl. ¶ 56. As a result, cash prices in Toledo indeed decreased because sellers believed that Kraft no longer needed their wheat. Id. ¶¶ 87-89. Kraft was able to generate these false impressions because it is one of the largest food companies and commercial end-users of wheat, and because it had historically sourced its wheat from the Toledo cash market. Id. ¶¶ 23, 51. At the same time, Kraft’s long position in December 2011 wheat futures also artificially inflated the prices of those contracts, because the large position indicated increased demand. Id. ¶¶ 1, 16, 82. Ploss alleges that Kraft at one point had 87% of the open interest of December 2011 wheat contracts, putting it in a dominant position where it could control prices. Id. ¶ 166. Kraft first argues that Ploss cannot show ability to control prices because he does not allege classic forms of manipulation, such as a “corner” or a “squeeze,” which require either control of the deliverable supply or a shortage of that supply. Defs.’ Br. at 12. In a corner, a trader “gains control of the supply or the future demand of a commodity and requires the shorts to settle their obligations, either by the purchase of deliverable quantities of the supply or offsetting long contracts, at an arbitrary, abnormal and dictated price imposed by the eornerer.” Great W. Food Distributors v. Braman, 201 F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir.1953) (defendant purchased eggs in the cash and futures market and demanded high prices from shorts when an artificial shortage resulted). A squeeze is similar to a corner but does not require the trader to control the cash crop; the trader takes advantage of a shortage in the cash commodity and “force[s] shorts facing an inadequate cash supply to cover their positions at unfair prices.” Frey, 931 F.2d at 1175 (defendants took advantage of low supply conditions in the wheat market). The latter can occur when there is a natural disaster, a strike, or other problems leading to a shortage. See In re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F.Supp. 1025, 1035 (N.D.Ill.1995). In both cases, shorts in the market are forced “into settling their holdings with the dominant long at above-market prices as the delivery date approaches.” Frey, 931 F.2d at 1175. The Court, however, agrees with CFTC v. Kraft that a manipulation claim is not bound to corners and squeezes. 153 F.Supp.3d at 1017, 2015 WL 9259885, at *14. As many courts recognize, manipulation is not specifically defined in the CEA because “[t]he methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man.” Premium Plus Partners, L.P. v. Davis, 653 F.Supp.2d 855, 876 (N.D.Ill.2009) aff'd sub nom. Premium Plus Partners, L.P. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 648 F.3d 533 (7th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir.1971)); see also Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgrnt. Co. LLC, 244 F.R.D. 469, 485 (N.D.Ill.2007) aff'd, 571 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that corners and squeezes are “by no means [the] exclusive” “situations in which manipulative intent may be inferred”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “the test of manipulation must largely be a practical one if the purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act are to be accomplished,” Premium Plus, 653 F.Supp.2d at 876 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and should focus on whether there has been “an intentional exaction of a price determined by forces other than supply and demand,” Frey, 931 F.2d at 1175. So manipulation can exist whenever there is “[b]uying or selling in a manner calculated to produce the maximum effect upon prices.” U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Enron Corp., & Hunter Shively, 2004 WL 594752, at *5 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 10, 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); DH2, Inc. v. Athanassiades, 404 F.Supp.2d 1083, 1092 (N.D.Ill.2005) (“The gravamen of manipulation is deception of investors into believing that prices at which they purchase and sell securities are determined by the natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged- by manipulators.” (quoting Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, even though Ploss does not allege that Kraft controlled the physical wheat supply or that Kraft exploited a supply shortage, Ploss’s allegations of non-traditional manipulation techniques can still sustain a CEA violation. Ploss alleges that wheat prices were driven by forces other than supply and demand. In particular, Kraft allegedly obtained a large long position in December 2011 wheat futures even though it had no intention of .actually using futures market wheat for its mill operations, so it could make the market believe that it was not going to source its wheat from the Toledo market. Id. ¶¶ 1, 51, 55-56, 81-83. Ploss alleges that this ruse worked; in response to Kraft’s purchase, prices in the Toledo market fell as anticipated, and Kraft was able to take advantage of those lower prices. Id. ¶¶ 82-83, 87, 89. Meanwhile, Kraft also hoped that its long position would inflate the price of futures contracts as the number of open long positions dramatically increased. Id. ¶¶ 49, 65, 82. This holding “constituted a dominant position” that “gave Kraft great influence or control over the prices of December 2011 CBOT wheat futures contracts.” Id. ¶ 166. According to Ploss, Kraft again succeeded: the prices of December 2011 wheat contracts rose, and Kraft was able to make more money from its December-March spread position. Id. ¶¶ 35, 61, 87. So Ploss has adequately alleged the “ability to influence prices,” when the allegations are viewed on “a fact-specific, case-by-case analysis.” In re Soybean Futures, 892 F.Supp. at 1044. Finally, Kraft argues that it had no ability to influence prices when it did not disseminate any false information that would have affected market prices. Defs.’ Br. at 12. But like Section 6(c)(1), manipulation under Section 9(a)(2) can be based on a trader’s actions, not just her statements. See supra Section III.A.2.Í. As In re Amaranth put it, manipulation is based on sending false signals to the market, which need not be in the form of a misstatement or omission. 587 F.Supp.2d at 534. Rather, as noted above, “[bjecause every transaction signals that the buyer and seller have legitimate economic motives for the transaction, if either party lacks that motivation, the signal is inaccurate.” Id. So again, the lack of a false statement does not preclude a manipulation claim. ii. Existence of an Artificial Price and Causation Next, Ploss has adequately pled both the existence of an a