Equal Opprtunity Employment Commission v. United Health Programs of America, Inc. (213 F. Supp. 3d 377, 2016)

United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 2016-09-30

Citations

Full opinion text

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge

The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (the “EEOC”) brings this action on behalf of a group of former employees (“claimants” or “plaintiffs”) of United Health Programs of America Inc. (“UHP”) and Cost Containment Group Inc. (“CCG”) (collectively, “defendants”) who claim principally that they were subjected to religious discrimination in their workplace in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Claimants have moved for partial summary judgment on the discrete issue of" whether certain practices and beliefs (referred to herein as “Onionhead” and “Harnessing Happiness”) purportedly imposed on employees by supervisors in defendants’ workplace constitute a religion. Defendants have cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims, the nature of which will be discussed in greater detail below. For the reasons stated herein, claimants’ motion is GRANTED and defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The facts provided below derive from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements, as well as from the deposition testimony and other exhibits attached by the parties in their cross-motions for summary judgment. The facts below are undisputed unless otherwise noted. The court has construed the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with respect to each motion.

I. Factual Background

A. Defendants’ Companies and Other Related Entities

Defendants operate a “small wholesale company that provides discount medical plans to groups of individuals” as well as a number of other for-profit and non-profit entities. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 1-10.) Defendants’ organizations, which at all relevant times employed fewer than 50 people, have conducted their business since 2006 out of a single office located in Long Island, New York. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 2-5.)

B. The Claimants

Claimants all worked for defendants for different periods of time;

(1) Sandra Benedict: September 2011 - March 2012. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 144.)

(2) Danielle Diaz: July 2010 - December 15, 2012. (Id. ¶ 163.)

(3) Jennifer Honohan: Approximately 1992 - February 3, 2012. (Id. ¶ 193.)

(4) Karen Josey: March 2011 - Approximately November or December 2011. (Id. ¶ 237.)

(5) Regina Maldari: October 2004 - May 2008. (Id. ¶ 333.)

(6) Elizabeth Ontaneda: 1992 - August 24, 2010. (Id. 56.1 ¶ 259.)

(7) Faith Pabon: October 2010 - March 2012. (Id. ¶ 283.)

(8) Cynthia Pegullo: 2004 - 2007 and then again from 2008 - April 2011. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 262.)

(9) Francine Pennisi: November 2004 - August 2010. (Id. ¶ 276.)

(10) Elizabeth Safara: December 2004 - August 2008. (Id. ¶ 296.)

C. Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness Programs

Beginning around 2007, CCG Chief Executive Officer Robert Hodes (“Hodes”) and Chief Operations Officer Tracy Bour-andas (“Bourandas”) determined that their previously effective corporate culture was deteriorating amid a difficult financial period for the company. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 37, 79-81.) Hodes and Bourandas hired Hodes’s aunt, Denali Jordan (“Jordan” or “Denali”), to provide assistance. (Id. ¶¶ 77-81.) Jordan considered herself a teacher and parent to Hodes, and they maintained a close relationship. She stayed at Hodes’s home when working at defendants’ office. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 73.) Before Jordan began working with defendants, she developed a program called Onionhead (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 2), the purpose and nature of which is strongly disputed by the parties. It is undisputed that defendants used the Onionhead program in the workplace after Jordan began to work with defendants. It is also undisputed that defendants provided administrative and financial support to Onionhead that was unrelated to defendants’ other business. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 7.) Beyond the undisputed fact that Onionhead was utilized in defendants’ workplace, however, the parties’ respective views of when, how, and why Onionhead was implemented are practically irreconcilable and, as explained in greater detail throughout this memorandum and order, require a trial to resolve the disputed issues.

Defendants describe Onionhead as a multi-purpose conflict resolution tool, while plaintiffs characterize it as a system of religious beliefs and practices. (Compare, e.g., Def. 56.1 ¶ 11 and Tab I, Jordan Dep. at 235, with, e.g., Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 11.) According to defendants, Jordan created Onionhead as a “tool to help children, including those with disabilities, identify, understand, and communicate emotions.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 12.) Although Onionhead was initially targeted toward children, gradually defendants contend that its purpose expanded to assist “people of all ages with addiction, abuse and domestic violence, family issues, marital problems, eldercare, death and dying, the full spectrum of autism and other cognitive disabilities or illnesses (such as Alzheimer’s), and to generally develop better problem-solving and communication skills.” (Id.) Onionhead practices include the use of “tools,” many of which describe a “total of 150 different emotions,” including cards, pins, dictionaries, workshop materials, magnets, journals, and a “Declaration of Virtues of Empowerment.” (Id. ¶¶ 13, 20(a)-(e).) Onionhead materials often include images of an anthropomorphic Onion. (E.g., Jt. Exs. A-O.)

Beginning around 2011, Jordan merged some of the concepts and principles underlying Onionhead into a program referred to as Harnessing Happiness, which was designed to make Onionhead more “suitable for adults.” (Jt. Ex. 2, ¶¶ 26-27; Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 25-27.) Harnessing Happiness is now the “umbrella name” Jordan employs to describe the programs she offers. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 25.) Today, Onionhead falls under the Harnessing Happiness “umbrella.” (Id.)

Claimants maintain a widely divergent view of Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 1-45.) Claimants contend that Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness are a “system of religious beliefs and practices” with a corresponding “comprehensive system of multiple products and programs.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 11.) Emails in the record regarding Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness, sent between Jordan and other supervisors and employees working for defendants, involve discussions about God, spirituality, demons, Satan, divine destinies, the “Source,” purity, blessings, and miracles. (Jt. Exs. 8, 78-81, 89,117.) In one email from 2011, Hodes groups Onionhead with “higher guidance teachings.” (Jt. Ex. 117.) Claimants also emphasize that many of the materials associated with Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness — some of which, however, were not used at defendants’ workplace — contain spiritual and religious imagery and iconography. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 1-41.) For example, one Onionhead document is referred to as the Declaration of Virtues for Empowerment. (Jt. Ex. K.) The document contains a list of 12 virtues, and provides: “Because the road to Heaven is paved with the power of what is good in us, we have devised The Declaration of Virtues for Empowerment .... Onionhead’s goal is to help transform negative thought forms into positive thought forms, thereby co-creating a new loving, wondrous garden for us all to thrive in.” (Id.) Another document, used in office workshops conducted by defendants while the majority of claimants were employed (Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 24), is referred to as the Onionhead Keys and, Codes to Living Good. (Jt. Ex. M.) The document contains the following examples of religious and spiritual language:

• “Keys and codes have been a part of the Divine Plan from the beginning of time. Every sacred tribe and religion have codes hidden within their scripts, books and scrolls. It was, and still is, a way to integrate our heavenly nature into our human nature.”

• “The Onionhead program is designed to transform negative thoughts and behaviors into positive thoughts and behaviors.... Choice, not chance, determines human destiny and only moral code determines the state of Heaven on Earth.”

• “Our soul is our constant reminder of our higher self. It stays with us in order to keep us on the track of what is right and righteous.”

(Id.)

D. Implementation of Onionhead at CCG

As noted above, Jordan first began working with defendants in 2007. Jordan’s first visit to defendants’ office was in October 2007, and she stayed for five days. (Pl. 56.1¶ 88.) She was introduced to and met with the employees during three separate group meetings. (Id.) When Jordan initially arrived, defendants’ upper managers referred to her as a “spiritual advisor,” though she stated that she disliked the term. (Jt. Ex. 97 (email from Jordan stating that “I was called a spiritual advisor”).) Jordan testified that when she first arrived at CCG, she viewed “a lot of disharmony.” (Tab I, Denali Dep. at 21.) She also testified that she believed a disproportionate number of the employees “had cancer” and that she “had not been exposed to that before.” (Id.) Jordan testified that she “attempted to change the atmosphere and to try to create a camaraderie and a unification in the people.” (Id. at 22; see also id. at 24 (“I felt that my role was to create more harmony, period.”).) After Jordan’s initial visit in October 2007, CCG brought her back in February 2008 and approximately every month or two afterward. (Pl. 56.1¶ 93.) Her monthly visits sometimes lasted several days, and she was paid approximately $380,000 annually for her work. (Id. ¶¶ 94-96.)

Because claimants were employed at different times, their individual experiences with Onionhead, Harnessing Happiness, and Jordan differed, sometimes significantly. Based on the record, however, certain experiences were allegedly shared by most or all of the claimants. For example, virtually all of the claimants characterize Onionhead-related workshops, prayers, and meetings implemented in the workplace as effectively mandatory (though defendants contend that they were entirely voluntary). (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 100, 109-14; Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 49, 51; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 52.) Claimants also describe being required to attend one-on-one meetings with Jordan (which defendants do not explicitly dispute or counter with admissible evidence). (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 98, Def. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 98.) During both the workshops and the one-on-one meetings with Jordan, claimants describe being requested to share personal information about themselves. (E.g., Pl. 56.1 ¶ 98.) At times, Jordan offered unsolicited advice about their personal lives. For example, two claimants testified that Jordan suggested to them that they leave their husbands. (Id, ¶¶ 181, 251.) Defendants offer no evidence to the contrary but, instead, object that the fact is no material, is based on hearsay, and is self-serving. The court notes that deposition testimony can be sufficient to create genuine disputes of material fact for purposes of summary judgment. See Hamilton v. A C & S, Inc., No. 94-CV-4397, 1998 WL 633682, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1998) (“A litigant’s deposition testimony is sufficient to raise an issue of fact precluding summary judgment.”).

Many claimants also offer evidence (and defendants again offer no contrary evidence) of a number of other workplace practices they shared in common. Some claimants describe being told to burn candles and incense to “cleanse the workplace.” (Id. ¶¶ 265, 373-74.) Some claimants also describe being told that they should not use overhead lighting “in order to prevent demons from entering the workplace through the lights.” (Id. ¶¶ 142, 206, 262.) Claimants also describe instances in which they were required to engage in chanting and prayer in the workplace. (E.g., Tab H, Honohan Dep. at 113; Tab N, Ontaneda Dep. at 213; Tab R, Safara Dep. at 60-61; Tab O, Pabon Dep. at 119, 125; Tab J, Josey Dep. at 119.)

Each claimant contends that she was ultimately terminated by defendants either because she rejected Onionhead beliefs or because of her own non-Onionhead religious beliefs. Claimants further offer un-controverted evidence that certain other employees who participated in Onionhead activities or adhered to Onionhead beliefs were given progressive discipline when they erred instead of being terminated. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 379-91.) Although defendants concede that a number of the claimants were terminated (Def. Mem. at 36 n.27), they contend that others voluntarily resigned. Defendants further contend that none of the claimants were qualified for their positions at the time of their terminations, and that any terminations (or other adverse employment actions) were imposed for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

The individual circumstances of each claimant will be discussed below as relevant to their particular claims.

II. Procedural Background

On June 7, 2011 Ontaneda and Pennisi filed charges of discrimination and retaliation against defendants with the EEOC. (Jt. Exs. 61-62.) On July 27, 2012, Pabon also filed a charge against defendants with the EEOC. (Jt. Ex. 63.) On March 13, 2014, the EEOC issued a letter of determination stating that Ontaneda, Pabon, and Pennisi — along with a “class of additional claimants,” whose names were not specified — had been discriminated against on the basis of religion, and attached a proposed conciliation agreement. (Jt. Ex. 64.) The following month, on April 22, 2014, the EEOC sent a letter to defendants indicating that conciliation efforts had been unsuccessful and that further efforts to conciliate would be futile. (Jt. Ex. 65.)

Actions for violations of Title VII can be brought either by aggrieved individuals or by the EEOC. Here, the EEOC brought this enforcement action on June 11, 2014, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). Aggrieved individuals have the “right to intervene in a civil action brought by the [EEOC].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). On July 2, 2014, the court granted, on consent, Ontaneda, Pennisi, and Pabon’s motions to intervene in the instant action. (July 2, 2014 Docket Entry; ECF Nos. 4, 7.) On October 9, 2014, the EEOC filed the operative amended complaint. (Jt. Ex. 67.) The EEOC identified Benedict, Diaz, Honohan, Josey, Maldari, and Pegullo as claimants on January 12, 2015. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 316.) The EEOC identified Safara as a claimant on February 28, 2015. (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “only where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant the entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). A dispute of material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 2010). The standard remains the same in the context of cross-motions. “[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001)

DISCUSSION

As relevant here, Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shah be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... religion .... ”). “Title VII has been interpreted to protect against requirements of religious conformity and as such protects those who refuse to hold, as well as those who hold, specific religious beliefs.” Lampros v. Banco do Brasil, S.A., No. 10-CV-9576, 2012 WL 6021091, at *6 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012) (quoting Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir. 1993)), aff'd, 538 Fed.Appx. 113 (2d Cir. 2013). Title VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for engaging in protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter .... ”).

Claimants here assert claims under a variety of Title VII theories including disparate treatment, hostile work environment, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. There are effectively two groups of claims. The first group of claims is premised on reverse religious discrimination: that defendants subjected claimants to discrimination by imposing religious practices and beliefs on claimants. The second group of claims fall within the more traditional religious discrimination and retaliation rubric: claimants assert that they were discriminated against and retaliated against on the basis of their own religious beliefs. Claims falling in the first group, the reverse religious discrimination claims, can be broken down as follows:

(1) Benedict, Diaz, Honohan, Josey, On-taneda, Pennisi, Pabon, and Pegullo contend that they were terminated because they opposed Onionhead practices and beliefs.

(2) All claimants claim that they were subjected to a hostile work environment based on coerced adherence to Onionhead practices and beliefs.

Claims falling in the second group, the more straightforward religious discrimination and retaliation claims, are as follows:

(3) Benedict, Diaz, Honohan, Josey, On-taneda, Pennisi, Pabon, and Pegullo claim that they were subjected to religious discrimination on the basis of their religious beliefs.

(4) All claimants assert that they were subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of their religious beliefs.

(5) All claimants allege that defendants failed to accommodate their religious beliefs.

(6) Benedict, Diaz, Honohan, Josey, On-taneda, Pennisi, Pabon, and Pegullo allege that they were retaliated against after engaging in protected activity.

In resolving the parties’ respective motions, the court first addresses claimants’ partial motion for summary judgment, which requires resolving the issue of whether Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness constitutes a religion for purposes of Title VII. The court subsequently addresses defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which requires an analysis of each of the six aforementioned theories of Title VII liability asserted in this action.

I. Claimants’ Motion for Partial Sum-mart/ Judgment

As noted earlier, Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Aside from protecting employees from discrimination on the basis of their religion, Title VII also protects employees from discrimination because they do not share their employer’s religious beliefs. See Mandell v. Cty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 378 (2d Cir. 2003) (“An employer discriminating against any non-Catholic violates the anti-discrimination laws no less than an employer discriminating only against one discrete group .... ”). A religious discrimination claim premised on an employer’s preference for a particular religious group is often referred to as a “reverse religious discrimination” claim. See Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1168-1169; Shapolia, 992 F.2d at 1038. Claimants here bring both conventional religious discrimination claims (contending that they were discriminated against because of their religious beliefs) as well as reverse discrimination claims (contending that they were discriminated against because CCG discriminated against employees who objected to or failed to adhere to Onionhead practices and beliefs, and treated differently employees who did share and adhere to On-ionhead practices and beliefs).

In most cases where reverse religious discrimination claims are asserted, the employer’s religious beliefs are fairly easy to ascertain. In Shapolia, for example, the plaintiff, a non-Mormon, alleged that a Mormon supervisor gave him a negative evaluation, which contributed to his eventual termination, because he did not share the supervisor’s religious beliefs. See 992 F.2d at 1035, 1037; see also Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1165 (“[Plaintiff] alleges that a supervisory employee at her former employer, Kelly Services, Inc., was a member of a small religious group, the Fellowship of Friends, and that he repeatedly favored and promoted other Fellowship members.”). Here, however, defendant contends that Onionhead is not a religion. (Def. Mem. at 3-9.) Accordingly, before evaluating plaintiffs’ claims premised on reverse religious discrimination, the court must determine whether Onionhead is a religion for purposes of Title VII.

A. Defining Religious Belief Under Title VII

“The determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Sherr v. Northport-E, Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F.Supp. 81, 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Defining ‘religion’ for legal purposes is an inherently tricky proposition.”). Because of the intrinsic difficulties associated with evaluating whether a particular practice or belief is religious in nature, there is “no consensus on how to define religion” for purposes of employment discrimination cases. Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held “Religious” Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection Without Definition, 7 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 368, 371 (2005). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has addressed how to define religion for purposes of a Title VII action.

The court begins with the text of Title VII. Title VII provides that the “term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). EEOC guidelines further define

religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.... The fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective employee.

29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. The EEOC adopted its expansive definition of religion based on two Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970), which defined religion broadly for purposes of addressing conscientious-objector provisions to the selective service law.

Delineating the meaning of “religion” for purposes of Title VII often requires resort to First Amendment cases, where nontraditional religions and religious practices are a frequent source of litigation. See Genas v. State of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 75 F.3d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Title VII was designed to protect employees from the workplace effects of many of the same forms of discrimination that are forbidden by the Constitution — discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, and national origin.”); see also EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1117 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing reliance placed on First Amendment cases in defining religion for purposes of Title VII), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015); Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., Inc., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (finding in part based on “analogy to cases under the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment” thát antipathy toward atheists is prohibited by Title VII); EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (relying on First Amendment jurisprudence in evaluating the breadth of protection afforded under Title VII for a Seventh-Day Adventist).

In Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded, 479 U.S. 60, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986), the Second Circuit explicitly considered First Amendment principles in evaluating whether the plaintiff, a member of the Worldwide Church of God, could establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination against his employer under Title VII. See id. at 481-82 (“We see no reason for not regarding the standard for sincerity under Title VII as that used in free exercise cases.”); Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F.Supp.2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A court’s limited role in determining whether a belief is ‘religious’ is the same under Title VII as it is under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”).

To determine whether a given set of beliefs constitutes a religion for purposes of either the First Amendment or Title VII, courts frequently evaluate: (1) whether the beliefs are sincerely held and (2) “ ‘whether they are, in [the believer’s] own scheme of things, religious.’ ” Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185, 85 S.Ct. 850); see also Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he inquiry is whether the beliefs professed by a [claimant] are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Eatman, 194 F.Supp.2d at 268 (same, in Title VII context).

Evaluating the first factor, sincerity - particularly when the belief system is non-traditional — is inherently fact-intensive. See Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157 (“Sincerity analysis is exceedingly amorphous, requiring the factfinder to delve into the claimant’s most veiled motivations and vigilantly separate the issue of sincerity from the factfinder’s perception of the religious nature of the claimant’s beliefs. This need to dissever is most acute where unorthodox beliefs are implicated.”); Jack son, 196 F.3d at 321 (reversing grant of summary judgment where there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a plaintiffs religious beliefs were sincerely held). Courts must be mindful to “differentiat[e] between those beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that are animated by motives of deception and fraud.” Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157.

That an individual or entity purportedly holding the beliefs rejects the characterization of the beliefs as religious is not dispositive. In Warner v. Orange Cty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1075 (2d Cir. 1996), for example, the Second Circuit found an Alcoholics Anonymous program that a convict was required to attend as a condition of his probation was religious in nature, over the objection of prison officials who characterized the program as therapeutic rather than religious. In Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 1979), the court determined that a public school’s offering of a course called the Science of Creative Intelligence Transcendental Meditation violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment over the objection of the school that the course was secular in nature.

In analyzing the second factor — whether a set of beliefs are, in the believer’s “own scheme of things, religious,” Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185, 85 S.Ct. 850 — courts look to whether the belief system involves “ultimate concern[s].” Int'l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981); Sherr, 672 F.Supp. at 92 (“The Supreme Court and Second Circuit have each declared religion to involve the ‘ultimate concerns’ of individuals .... ”). “A concern is ultimate when it is more than intellectual.” Barber, 650 F.2d at 440 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A concern is more than intellectual when a believer would categorically disregard elementary self-interest in preference to transgressing its tenets.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714, 101 S.Ct. 1425. “A religious belief can appear to every other member of the human race preposterous,” yet still be entitled to protection. Stevens v. Berger, 428 F.Supp. 896, 899 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944) (“The religious views espoused by [the criminal defendants] might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But ... those doctrines are [not] subject to trial .... ”).

Defendants, relying principally on Third Circuit caselaw, contend that a narrower definition of religion applies. In Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), on which defendants rely, the Third Circuit applied three

“useful indicia” to determine the existence of a religion.... First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by the presence of certain formal and external signs.

Id. at 1032. The Second Circuit, however, has rejected the “narrow definition of ‘religious belief promulgated by the Third Circuit.” Patrick, 745 F.2d at 156 (reversing grant of summary judgment where district court had relied on Africa, and holding that a more “expansive conception of religious belief’ applied).

As the legal principles outlined above make plain, an “expansive conception of religious belief’ is appropriate, at least in this circuit. Patrick, 745 F.2d at 158; United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 449-50 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that in “recent years, the concept of religion has certainly broadened” and explaining that courts apply an “expansive definition of religion”). In accordance with the generous parameters defining religion, courts regularly determine that non-traditional beliefs can qualify as religions. In Warner, the Second Circuit found that the twelve-step Alcoholics Anonymous program had “a substantial religious component” because: (1) participants were told to pray to God; (2) meetings opened and closed with prayer; and (3) the program placed a “heavy emphasis on spirituality and prayer, in both conception and in practice.” 115 F.3d at 1075. In Patrick, the Second Circuit reversed a grant of grant summary judgment to a prison that prohibited a prisoner from practicing his professed religion, referred to as the Five Percenter faith. See 745 F.2d at 160. The prisoner described the Five Percenter faith as devoted to “spiritual enlightenment” through study of “the Bible, Elijah Mohammed’s Body of Lessons and Plus Lessons, and the Egyptian Book of the Dead.” Id. at 155. Five Percenters also “conceiv[ed] of [their] ideals by reference to the realm of mathematics.” Id. Although Five Percenters wor-shipped Allah, the faith was “marked by informality,” without any fixed places of worship. Id. In reversing the grant of summary judgment principally because the sincerity of the plaintiffs beliefs were in dispute, the court emphasized the right of citizens “to explore diverse religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of their conscience” and that “unorthodox beliefs forbidden elsewhere have consistently found tolerance and acceptance on our shores.” Id. at 155, 157; cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961) (characterizing “Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, [and] Secular Humanism” as religions).

Lower courts in this circuit have faithfully adhered to the Second Circuit’s expansive definition of religion, including in the First Amendment context. In Berger, 428 F.Supp. at 896, a husband and wife seeking welfare benefits on behalf of their four minor children refused to comply with a state law regulation followed by the Suffolk County Department of Social Services requiring that they provide a copy of their children’s social security cards. Id. at 897. They explained that “the use of social security numbers was a device of the Antichrist, and that they feared the[ir] children, if numbered in this way, might be barred from entering Heaven.” Id. The court concluded, after a detailed analysis of the complex biblical history and literature that the plaintiffs marshalled to support their views, that the plaintiffs’ “belief must be characterized as religious for purposes of this case.” Id. at 902-905. The court’s holding was grounded in the principles of religious freedom and tolerance discussed earlier:

Delicacy in probing and sensitivity to permissible diversity is required, lest established creeds and dogmas be given an advantage over new and changing modes of religious belief. Neither the trappings of robes, nor temples of stone, nor a fixed liturgy, nor an extensive literature or history is required to meet the test of beliefs cognizable under the Constitution as religious.

Id. at 900.

In Sherr, 672 F.Supp. at 81, the plaintiffs, two couples, refused to consent to inoculation of their children, which was mandatory for the children to attend school. Id. at 83-84. According to one of the family’s complaints, their beliefs required all persons to “live in harmony with the mutual world and its order.” Id. at 92. The complaint provided that “[a]ll things are part of one intimate universe, or whole.” Id. Testifying about his beliefs, one parent explained that he viewed “God as being pervasive everywhere” and “saw [himjself as God in expression or life in expression.” Id. at 93. “Immunization in my eyes,” the plaintiff testified, “in the framework of my religious beliefs and in my wife’s, I might add, interferes with the health of the organism.” Id. Emphasizing that the plaintiffs’ beliefs were “replete with references to ‘God’” and that the plaintiffs’ very willingness to engage in a protracted legal battle reflected that their beliefs were “rooted in matters of ‘ultimate concern,’” the court held that the plaintiffs’ views could fairly be “classified as religious.” Id. at 93.

Courts outside this circuit, too, have applied a definition of religion consistent with the views adopted in the cases outlined above. See, e.g., Malnak, 592 F.2d at 198-99 (Third Circuit holding that Transcendental Meditation class involving mantras and chanting was “religious in nature”); Toronka v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 649 F.Supp.2d 608, 612 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding religious a plaintiffs “belief in the power of dreams,” which he characterized as “a moral and ethical belief’ rooted in the “traditional religious convictions of his African origin”).

On the other hand, not all non-traditional belief systems are religious. In Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 79 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit held that a school’s celebration of Earth Day — notwithstanding school-sponsored prayers worshipping the Earth — did not violate the First Amendment. Similarly, in Allen, 760 F.2d at 447, the court addressed, inter alia, an Establishment Cause defense to a group of antinuclear protesters’ convictions for damaging property at an Air Force base during a protest. Id. at 448-49. The protesters argued that “there has arisen a national religion of nuclearism ... in which the bomb is the new source of salvation” and that the new religion focused “on the acceptance of nuclear weapons as sacred objects.” Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court held that the protesters’ concerns reflected disagreements principally grounded in “political judgment, not religious belief.” Id. at 450.

B. Onionhead is a Religion for Purposes of Title VII

With the abovementioned principles in mind, the court concludes that On-ionhead qualifies as a religion for purposes of Title VII. First, as to sincerity, there is a genuine factual dispute regarding the sincerity of defendants’ beliefs that is underscored by the difficulty here of ascribing religiosity to beliefs argued by their purported adherents to be secular. Moreover, the court finds disputed factual issues regarding whether the defendants’ actions of bringing Jordan and the Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness beliefs, practices and materials into defendants’ workplace establishes that the defendants sincerely believed in Jordan’s teachings. See Patrick, 745 F.2d at 159 (“This Court has consistently held where subjective issues regarding a litigant’s state of mind, motive, sincerity or conscience are squarely implicated, summary judgment would appear to be inappropriate and a trial indispensable .... ” (collecting cases)). Second, as to whether the beliefs are religious, the court finds as a matter of law that they are. See Barber, 650 F.2d at 440 (“We think it is clear that Krishna Consciousness is a ‘religion’....”).

i. Sincerity

Defendants argue that “there is no evidence that anyone associated with this matter sincerely held beliefs” related to Onionhead. (Def. Mem. at 8.) The undisputed, documentary evidence alone, however, is at least sufficient for a trier of fact to find that Jordan and Hodes held sincere beliefs regarding Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness. For example:

• In approximately October 2007, the CEO of CCG, invited Jordan and paid her to come into his offices to work with his employees and conduct meetings and workshops. Hodes was a nephew of Jordan and they shared a close relationship. Jordan stayed in Hodes’s home- during her periods of working at defendants’ offices. Hodes was aware of his aunt’s sincerely held beliefs as reflected in emails he and other managers received from Jordan. (E.g., Jt. Ex. 79-81, 105, 117.)

• On July 23, 2009, Jordan wrote an email to management (including Hodes and Bourandas) and 27 other CCG employees (including Pegullo, Pennisi, and Honohan) explaining that she wanted to “run an Onionhead workshop,” as a “vehicle towards Onionhead reaching the world.” (Jt. Ex. 8.)

• In a December 1, 2010 email, Jordan wrote to CCG supervisors Lane Michel and Bourandas complaining about Hodes’ management. (Jt. Ex. 89.) In the email, she wrote that “Onionhead CANNOT BREATHE IN THE LAND OF DECEPTION, DECEIT, DISRUPTION, AND DESTRUCTION.” (Id. (emphasis in original)) She implored Michel and Bourandas to oust Hodes: “The demon is fighting for control and if you two do not take charge, your Divine destiny as King and Queen is destroyed and the kingdom will be lost.” (Id.)

• On November 28, 2011, Jordan wrote again to Hodes describing a plan to donate certain unspecified Onionhead cards to schools. (Jt. Ex. 79.) In the email, Jordan wrote that donating the cards was “important [ ] because On-ionhead is extremely pure .... Adults seem very far away from Source. Because these cards are for younger children, I suspect[] we may have a chance to protect them.... Purity is the most important issue for the recovery of our planet. It is all I live for.” '(Id.)

• In an undated email to Hodes, Bourandas, RickProtas, and other CCG employees, Jordan shared feedback she had received during a conference at which Onionhead had been discussed. (Jt. Ex. 80.) She described the “miracles that our little guy has performed” and wrote: “God is pleased with our perseverance. We must never give up.” (Id.)

• In an undated email to Bourandas, Hodes, and other CCG employees, Jordan described Onionhead cards, an Onionhead dictionary, and a new Onionhead website. (Jt. Ex. 81.) She explained that users of Onionhead materials “will see the world shift. Onionhead is now a school ... a school for solutions. But in fact ... we are the GRAIL SCHOOL .... we are in a race with time.” (Id.)

• A jury could find from documentary evidence that Hodes held sincere beliefs in precepts of Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness. (Jt. Ex. 117.) In a December 16, 2010 email responding to Jordan’s statement that she was growing a sixth finger (see Jt. Ex. 120), Hodes likened Jordan’s experience to a science fiction program in which a man “gains intellectual power while growing a six[th] finger, but uses it for destruction instead of light.” (Id.) Hodes wrote that the sixth finger “may represent the beginning of an evolution,” and that the man who “uses the higher intelligence for destruction instead of good may represent those who have taken [Jordan’s] technology (Onionhead and higher guidance teachings) and used or are using them for destructive or dark purposes instead of light.” (Id.)

A reasonable jury could find that by inviting Jordan into the workplace, paying her to meet and conduct workshops, authorizing her to speak to employees about matters related to their personal lives, disseminating Onionhead/Harnessing Happiness material and directing employees to attend group and individual meetings with Jordan, Hodes and his upper management held sincere beliefs in Onionhead and Harnessing Happiness. Although defendants are correct that Jordan, in an affidavit, stated that she does not believe and never has believed in Onionhead as a religion (Jt. Ex. 2, ¶¶ 17, 19, 30), undisputed documentary evidence conflicts with her statement and indicates that a reasonable jury could find otherwise. To the extent that establishing an employer’s beliefs are sincerely held is a requirement for purposes of a reverse discrimination claim under Title VII (but see supra note 13) a reasonable jury could find that Jordan, Hodes, and several of defendants’ managers or supervisors held sincere beliefs regarding On-ionhead.

ii. Religious Nature of Beliefs

Turning to the more difficult question about whether the nature of the beliefs qualifies as religious, the court concludes that the beliefs are religious within the meaning of Title VII.

Here, as an initial matter, the above-described emails reflect references — in the specific context of discussions about Onionhead — to God, spirituality, demons, Satan, divine destinies, miracles, “higher guidance teachings,” and a grail. (Jt. Exs. 8, 78-81, 89, 117.) Jordan herself stated that she had been referred to as a “spiritual advisor” for some time while working for defendants (though she disliked the term). (Tab B, Benedict Dep. at 85; Tab M, Maldari Dep. at 62-63, 103; Tab Q, Pennisi Dep. at 59-63; Tab R, Safara Dep. at 52; Jt. Ex. 97 (email from Jordan stating that “I was called a spiritual advisor”).)

Additional documentary evidence lends further support to the conclusion that Onionhead is a religion. The Onionhead Dictionary of 150 Emotions: Teen and Adult Edition (Jt. Ex. G) — which was, defendants concede, used in workshops at CCG while Honohan, Pegullo, Pabon, Josey, Diaz, and Benedict were employed (Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 20; Def. 56.1 Resp. at ¶ 20) — contains references to divinity, spirituality, souls, and heaven. The dictionary contains, inter alia, the following statements:

• “We enter and leave this world with only our souls, therefore, we must learn to live THROUGH our souls.”

• “When light and love control our lives, we are Masters. Our Divine spark is re-ignited and we re-claim our authenticity and electricity.”

• “A spiritual person often appears as a fool to the eyes of the world, because their ways and rules are very different from the world at large .... [T]he destiny of heaven on earth begins and ends with our own personal behavior.”

• “In its full sense, [love] denotes something deeply spiritual .... One single act of love bears the imprint of heaven on earth.”

(Jt. Ex. G.)

Another Onionhead document is referred to as the Declaration of Virtues for Empowerment, though it is not clear whether this document was available in the workplace. (Jt. Ex. K.) The document lists 12 virtues, and an acrostic formed from the first letters of each of the virtues spells out “Garden of Eden.” (Id.) The document provides: “Because the road to Heaven is paved with the power of what is good in us, we have devised The Declaration of Virtues for Empowerment .... Onion-head’s goal is to help transform negative thought forms into positive thought forms, thereby co-creating a new loving, wondrous garden for us all to thrive in.” (Id.) The document also contains the following statements:

• “The virtue of respect elevates us from a human presence to an angelic performance.”

• “When we ‘opt’ to view things from a place of possibilities, we are truly showing our commitment to the Universal Plan.”

• “[Faith] holds within it the pulse of the Universe and the promise of the Heavens. Faith is the constant reminder that there is a union between ourselves and the Universal Realm. Remember: The virtue of faith is a belief that needs no evidence.”

(Id.) A similar document, called The 13 Codes of Caring for Teens and Adults, describes one code, “Creative,” as follows: “To be creative is to be incredibly connected to the Creator.” (Jt. Ex. L.)

A further document, referred to as the Onionhead Keys and Codes to Living Good — which defendants appear to concede was used in workshops while Honohan, Pegullo, Pabon, Josey, Diaz, and Benedict were employed (Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 41; Def. 56.1 Resp. at ¶ 41) — contains, but is not limited to, the following religious and spiritual language:

• “Keys and codes have been a part of the Divine Plan from the beginning of time. Every sacred tribe and religion have codes hidden within their scripts, books and scrolls. It was, and still is, a way to integrate our heavenly nature into our human nature.”

• “The Onionhead program is designed to transform negative thoughts and behaviors into positive thoughts and behaviors.... Choice, not chance, determines human destiny and only moral code determines the state of Heaven on Earth.”

• “Our soul is our constant reminder of our higher self. It stays with us in order to keep us on the track of what is right and righteous.”

(Jt. Ex. M.)

Testimonial evidence from claimants further underscores the religiosity of On-ionhead and Harnessing Happiness. Claimants describe Jordan and others repeatedly referencing God and other spiritual matters in the workplace, often in a manner directly connected to Onionhead. Maldari testified that Jordan, referring to CCG employees, stated that “God loves us all” and spoke about “demons and angels.” (Tab M, Maldari Dep. at 68, 71-72, 85, 102, 160.) Maldari also testified that she and other employees “were told [by Hodes] that we were chosen.” (Id. at 73-74.) Safara testified that Jordan sent emails including spiritual texts that she felt compelled to read. (Tab R, Safara Dep. at 66.) Pennisi testified that Onionhead “makes you believe in things religiously that you may not have believed in before .... [I]t made you question maybe something that you thought all your life was how it was supposed to be when you were in religious class or things like that.” (Tab Q, Pennisi Dep. at 118.) Pennisi also testified that she believed Onionhead was “the way of [Jordan’s] life.” (Id. at 192 (“[Jordan’s] way of explaining Onionhead was always some sort of religious experience ....”); see also id. at 193 (explaining that Jordan described Onionhead as “here to help everybody, you know, connect, whether it be emotionally or within feelings or spiritually, religiously, it was set to be under one — one thing.”).) Diaz described Harnessing Happiness content as involving references to angels. (See Tab E, Diaz Dep. at 80.)

Many of the claimants also described being told to pray in the workplace. (E.g., Tab M, Maldari Dep. at 67, 79-80, 103-07; Tab B, Benedict Dep. at 157-559 (describing prayers being read from a set of cards referred to as Universal Truth Cards); Tab R, Safara Dep. at 60-61 (“[Jordan] would just sit there and we would have to sit there and hold hands and close our eyes and she’d like chant and she would just, you know, pray to these spirits, whoever they were, to keep us safe .... ”).)

The Onionhead system of beliefs and practices described above is “more than intellectual.” Barber, 650 F.2d at 440. It can fairly be characterized as involving the kinds of “ultimate concern[s]” signifying religiosity described by the Second Circuit in Barber. The chants and prayers, mentions of God, transcendence, and souls, and the strong emphasis on spirituality very closely resemble the twelve-step Alcoholics Anonymous program found by the Second Circuit to be religious in Warner. See 115 F.3d at 1075 (describing how participants were told to pray to God, meetings opened and closed with prayer, and highlighting the “heavy emphasis on spirituality and prayer, in both conception and in practice”). Onionhead’s system of beliefs also appears no more or less religious than the arguably less coherent systems of beliefs held to be religious in Sherr and Berger. See Sherr, 672 F.Supp. at 92 (parents refused to submit their children to mandatory vaccinations because they believed vaccination interfered with their beliefs that “[a]ll things are part of one intimate universe, or whole” and that all persons must “live in harmony with the mutual world and its order”); Berger, 428 F.Supp. at 897 (plaintiffs believed “the use of social security numbers was a device of the Antichrist” and “feared the[ir] children, if numbered in this way, might be barred from entering Heaven”).

As discussed earlier, defendants rely on a narrower definition of religion than the definition adopted by the Second Circuit. See Patrick, 745 F.2d at 156 & n.4, 158 (describing and disagreeing with the “narrow definition of ‘religious belief promulgated by the Third Circuit” and emphasizing the Second Circuit’s adoption of an “expansive conception of religious belief’). Their contention that Onionhead was merely a “conflict resolution tool” (Def. Reply at 3) is belied by the ample documentary and testimonial evidence detailed above. Accordingly, the court concludes that Onionhead is a religion for purposes of Title VII.

II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Having concluded that Onionhead is a religion, the court turns next to the individual claims asserted by claimants. Before analyzing the merits of the claims, however, the court must first resolve a dispute regarding whether certain claimants are entitled to participate in this action.

A. Pre-Suit Requirements

Defendants contend that the EEOC failed to fulfill certain administrative requirements with respect to Benedict, Josey, and Safara. (Def. Mem. 1-3.)

Before filing an action under Title VII, the EEOC must comply with a set of administrative obligations prescribed by statute. The EEOC must, before filing:

(1) receive a formal charge of discrimination against the employer; (2) provide notice of the charge to the employer; (3) investigate the charge; (4) make and give notice of its determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII occurred; and (5) make a good faith effort to conciliate the charges.

EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 801 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). In Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC,_U.S_, 135 S.Ct. 1645, 1656, 191 L.Ed.2d 607 (2015), the Supreme Court held that federal courts are permitted to review whether the EEOC has complied with its pre-suit administrative obligations. In Mach Mining, an employer argued that the EEOC had failed to conciliate in good faith before filing suit. Id. at 1650-53. The parties disputed whether courts were permitted to review the EEOC’s conciliation efforts at all, and, if courts could conduct a review of the conciliation efforts, what the appropriate scope of judicial review would be. Id. at 1649. First, the Court determined that judicial review of the conciliation process was appropriate. Id. at 1652-53. Second, however, the Court held that “the scope of that review is narrow, reflecting the abundant discretion the law gives the EEOC to decide the kind and extent of discussions appropriate in a given case.” Id. at 1656. “A sworn affidavit from the EEOC stating that it has [attempted to conciliate] but that its efforts have failed will usually suffice to show that it has met the conciliation requirement.” Id.

More recently, in Sterling Jewelers, 801 F.3d at 99, the Second Circuit extended the holding of Mach Mining, which addressed only conciliation, to cover the EEOC’s investigative efforts. In Sterling Jewelers, the Second Circuit addressed an employer’s argument that the EEOC’s pre-suit investigation of discrimination allegations had been insufficient. Id. at 100. The court held that the “sole question for judicial review is whether the EEOC conducted an investigation.” Id. at 101. “[C]ourts may not review the sufficiency of an investigation — only whether an investigation occurred.” Id.

Defendants argue that the EEOC failed to comply with steps three (investigation), four (reasonable cause determination), and five (conciliation) with regard to Benedict, Josey, and Safara before filing suit. (Def. Mem. at 1-3; Def. Reply at 18-20.) It is undisputed that the EEOC did not speak with Benedict, Josey, or Safara dinting the course of the investigation. (Def. 56.1 at ¶¶ 316-17.) The EEOC first sent letters to Benedict, Josey, and Safara notifying them of the lawsuit and asking whether they were interested in participating in December 2014 and January 2015, months after this action was filed in June 2014. (ECF No. 1; Jt. Exs. 70-72.)

The EEOC argues that it investigated religious discrimination and retaliation against a class of employees at CCG’s single facility in 2007, and that the class identified in the investigation encompassed all current claimants, including Benedict, Josey, and Safara. (Pl. Mem. at 39-40.) Citing Mach Mining LLC, 135 S.Ct. at 1652, 1655-56, the EEOC asserts that it complied with its “minimal” obligations that it “tell the employer about the claim - essentially, what practice has harmed which person or class - and must provide the employer with an opportunity to discuss the matter in an effort to achieve voluntary compliance.” (Id. at 39.) The EEOC further contends that its pre-suit investigation of class allegations did not require that it interview each member of that class during the investigation so long as the members of the claimant class fall within the contours of the scope of the allegations in the suit. Id.. (citing Sterling Jewelers, 801 F.3d at 102 n.2,103-04). The EEOC thus asserts it can file suit on behalf of anyone “encompassed by the scope of the claims identified in the investigation, including individuals interviewed later.” (Id. at 40 (citations omitted).) Effectively, the EEOC argues that it is permissible to identify new claimants after filing a Section 706 action so long as the new claimants’ allegations are reasonably related to the allegations of the already-identified claimants, while defendants contend that the five-step administrative process must be followed with respect to each claimant in an action under Section 706.

The court concludes that, at least under the circumstances present in the instant case, the EEOC was not precluded from identifying new claimants (whose claims were effectively identical to the claims of the pre-existing claimants) after filing this action. Courts have permitted the EEOC to add new claimants identified during discovery even when the EEOC is asserting claims under Section 706 of Title VII rather than exclusively under Section 707, which permits “pattern or practice” actions. See EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 103 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (permitting the EEOC to add additional claimants identified during discovery in a hybrid 706/707 action, but affirming magistrate judge’s decision to place a deadline on the addition of new claimants); see also EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co., Inc., 872 F.Supp.2d 1107, 1111 (E.D. Wash. 2012) (“The undersigned is not persuaded ... that the EEOC must specifically identify, investigate and conciliate each alleged victim of discrimination before filing suit.”); EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 1 F.Supp.3d 647, 664 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (“[T]he EEOC is not obligated to provide the identities of all § 706 class members.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Defendants have cited no binding authority requiring dismissal of claimants first identified after the EEOC files a Section 706 action. Defendants rely heavily on EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 674 (8th Cir. 2012). In CRST, the EEOC filed a Section 706 action on behalf of a single named individual. Id. The EEOC waited two years after filing suit to name 67 additional allegedly aggrieved persons, whose allegations the EEOC admitted it had not investigated until after the complaint was filed. Id. at 669, 673. For years after the complaint was filed, the employer-defendant did not know if the “Section 706 lawsuit involved two, twenty or two thousand allegedly aggrieved persons.” Id. at 669 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court held, inter alia, that under the circumstances, dismissal of the complaint as to the 67 individuals was appropriate. Id. at 677. Reviewing the dismissal for abuse of discretion, the Eight Circuit affirmed. Id. The court held that the EEOC failed to adequately investigate because “the EEOC did not investigate the specific allegations of any of the 67 allegedly aggrieved persons ... until after the Complaint” was filed. Id. at 675-76 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The EEOC’s attempt in CRST to add 67 claimants to an EEOC action filed two years earlier and naming a single individual is a far cry from the situation presented in this action, where the EEOC’s investigation undisputedly encompassed seven of the ten claimants and the additional three claimants’ allegations arise out of the same alleged course of conduct, in the same office, by the same individuals, and during a time period already covered by the charges in the initial complaint. Even in EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P., 967 F.Supp.2d 802, 816 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), another decision involving an action under Section 706 upon which defendants rely, the court explicitly acknowledged that the EEOC need not always “identify each and every potential claimant before filing a lawsuit.” Accordingly, and particularly in light of the narrow scope of review courts are permitted in reviewing the sufficiency of EEOC investigations, see Sterling Jewelers, 801 F.3d at 101-04, the court concludes that dismissal of Benedict, Josey, and Safara would be inappropriate, and denies defendants’ request for their dismissal on procedural grounds.

The court next considers the merits of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. First, the court addresses the reverse religious discrimination claims. Second, the court addresses the conventional religion-based discrimination and retaliation claims.

B. Reverse Religious Discrimination

Claimants Benedict, Diaz, Honohan, Josey, Ontaneda, Pennisi, Pabon, and Pegullo bring reverse religious discrimination claims based on disparate treatment and a hostile work environment. Disparate treatment claims for employment discrimination under Title VII are assessed under the burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facia case of discrimination. See St Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case is “minimal.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll, 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to establish a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742.

Should the employer meet its burden, “the inquiry then returns to the plaintiff, to demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.” United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 102 (2d Ci