Doe v. Western New England University (228 F. Supp. 3d 154, 2017)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (Dkt. Nos. 30 & 54)

PONSOR, United States District Judge

Plaintiff, a former student at Defendant Western New England University (“WNEU”)—proceeding under the pseudonym John Doe—has filed a twelve-count complaint against WNEU and eight university employees, seeking damages and equitable relief in connection with his two-year suspension for sexual misconduct.

In response, Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint in its entirety. (Dkt. No. 30). The motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Katherine A. Robertson for a Report and Recommendation.

Judge Robertson’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 54) advises that Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be allowed, except as to three elements of the complaint: a portion of Count I, which generally alleges breach of' contract; a portion of Count II, which generally alleges a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and misnumbered Count XIII, which seeks declaratory relief. In all other respects, including the bulk of the claims offered under Count I and Count II, the Report suggests that the motion to dismiss should be allowed.

Both Plaintiff and Defendants have filed objections to the Report and Recommendation in accordance with the timetable set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s memorandum. For the reasons set forth below, these objections are unpersuasive. As a result, on de novo review, the court will adopt the Report and Recommendation and allow the motion to dismiss the complaint, in part.

It is not necessary to repeat the essential facts; they are scrupulously recited in the Report and Recommendation and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, largely undisputed. The Report and Recommendation is attached for reference.

Plaintiff does not protest the Report’s recommendation that most of his claims be dismissed. He objects only to dismissal of two counts: Count VII, which seeks damages for common law intentional infliction of emotional distress; and Count XI, which seeks damages for violation of Title IX. Though vigorously asserted, neither’ of these objections has traction.

With regard to Count VII, the Report correctly concludes that, even accepting all the allegations of the complaint, Defendants’ behavior would not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This conclusion is well supported, both by general authorities detailing the standards for a claim of this sort, and by specific cases involving precisely the disciplinary context the parties confront here. (Dkt. No. 54 at 43-44.)

Plaintiffs arguments in support of his objection to the dismissal of Count XI are similarly unavailing. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88, is a federal statute barring gender-based discrimination in federally supported educational institutions. As the Report points out, a claim may be offered pursuant to Title IX only where non-speculative evidence exists of discrimination based on sex. See, e.g., Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, the complaint offers no sufficient evidence—indeed, no evidence of any kind beyond conjecture—supporting a claim that discrimination on the basis of gender was a motivating factor in Defendants’ decision to suspend Plaintiff. As the Report and Recommendation notes, numerous courts have dismissed claims for violation of Title IX in the face of allegations substantially identical to those offered here. (Dkt. No. 54 at 44-52.) Analogous cases denying motions to dismiss Title IX claims cite far more compelling facts.

Defendants’ objections to the Report and Recommendation similarly fall short, but require more discussion. A summary of the facts that are undisputed at this stage is necessary to make the basis for the court’s ruling clear.

The triggering incident, a sexual encounter between Plaintiff Doe, a male, and a female fellow student—referred to in this litigation as Loe—occurred on the night, and during the early morning hours, of September 26-27, 2014. At that time, the only applicable standards governing claims of sexual misconduct by a student were set forth in the Student Code of Conduct contained in WNEU’s 2014-2015 Handbook. Sexual misconduct was defined in the Handbook as “any form of physical contact or exploitation of another person of a sexual nature that is made without effective consent.” (Dkt. No. 54 at 18.) Consent is effective when “a person is able to make free, informed, and reasonable choices and decisions—and is not impaired by intoxication or other drug consumption ... by disability, or by fear.” (Id. at 19.) The Handbook states, in bold type, that consent is effective “when it has been clearly communicated. Consent may never occur if a person is unconscious, unaware, or otherwise physically helpless.” Id.

The undeveloped facts that led—nine months after the incident—to the charges of misconduct against Plaintiff may be summarized crudely as follows. The word “crudely” is used in both senses. It is distasteful to have to get into these details but unfortunately necessary.

Doe and Loe met at a party. They consumed some alcohol, but not enough to be impaired. They went to Doe’s room, ostensibly to watch a movie. They began kissing. By mutual consent, they both removed all their clothing. Loe said she did not want to have penile-vaginal intercourse, and Doe respected this. By mutual consent, they began performing oral sex on each other. At some point, Loe said she did not want to continue this, and Doe stopped. At this point, Doe’s and Loe’s versions of what happened appear to diverge slightly. According to Doe, he asked Loe to “finish him off’ so that he would not be left with “blue balls.” She then masturbated him to ejaculation. (Id. at 5.) According to Loe, Doe said, “Now you have to finish me off,” placed her hand on his penis, and held it there until he ejaculated. (Id.) It is undisputed that Loe never explicitly voiced any disinclination to masturbate Doe or tried to pull her hand away.

Based on this incident, Defendants eventually informed Plaintiff that he was being charged with two violations of Article III— A of the 2014-2015 Handbook’s Student Code of Conduct. Plaintiff prepared his defense to the charges based on this disclosure.

Eventually, WNEU’s Conduct Review Board (CRB), the quasi-judicial entity responsible for weighing the charges and determining the sanction, found Plaintiff had committed the violations and suspended him for two years. The crucial factual tipping point was that the CRB found Loe’s version of the facts—that Doe said, “now you have to finish me off,” before placing her hand on his penis—more credible than Doe’s version, which was that he first said, “Could you at least finish me off?” (Id. at 11.)

Now the analysis reaches its key moment. In issuing its November 2015 sanction letter, the CRB relied not on the provisions of the applicable 2014-2015 Handbook, but on language contained in its Title IX policy. It is undisputed that this policy was not in effect in September 2014 when Doe and Loe had their fateful encounter.

Defendants argue vehemently that the CRB’s reference to the Title IX policy has no bearing on the motion to dismiss, since both the 2014-2015 Handbook and the Title IX policy prohibit coerced sexual conduct of any kind and both define coerced sex as sex without consent.

The problem with this argument is that the Title IX policy defines what constitutes coerced sex significantly more broadly than the Handbook. The Title IX policy, but not the Handbook, states that “[ajny-thing but a clear, knowing and voluntary consent to any sexual activity is equivalent to a ‘no.’ ” (Id. at 11.) The CRB concluded that, in the absence of clear and voluntary consent, the masturbation was non-consensual and therefore coerced. Id.

The emphasis in the Handbook is very largely on the condition of the participants, their state of impairment, and their ability to make reasonable judgments. The demand in the Title IX policy of clear, knowing and voluntary consent, it might well be argued, takes the standard a step beyond that. It appears to require a higher degree of explicitness for consent to be effective than may often be found even in wholly voluntary encounters.

Reasonable people may debate which standard is preferable. It cannot fairly be denied, however, that the Title IX standard demanded more than the Handbook required.

Defendants concede that the Title IX policy was not in effect at the time of Plaintiffs alleged misconduct and was therefore inapplicable. Meticulous adherence to definitional boundaries and notification requirements regarding what constituted consent and coercion was especially critical in determining whether discipline was appropriate on this record’s factual landscape. Certainly, Judge Robertson was correct in concluding that, at a minimum, Plaintiff is entitled to discovery before losing his day in court on this issue.

For the foregoing reasons, upon de novo review, the court hereby -ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 54) in its entirety. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 80) is hereby ALLOWED, except as to the portions of Counts I and II identified in the Report and Recommendation and as to Count XIII.

This case is hereby referred to Magistrate Judge Robertson for a scheduling conference pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.

It is So Ordered.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT (Dkt. No. 30)

ROBERTSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiff John Doe (“Plaintiff’) has sued Western New England University (“WNEU” or “University”) and eight university employees (collectively “Defendants”) regarding WNEU’s two-year suspension of Plaintiff in November 2015 for alleged sexual misconduct. In his first amended verified complaint (“Complaint”) (Dkt. No. 22), Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action against the University: breach of contract (Count I); breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II); estoppel and reliance (Count III); breach of the common law duty of basic fairness (Count V); and a violation of Title IX (Count XI). Plaintiff brings a claim against all Defendants for the intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (Count VII). Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment against the University under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Count XIII).

Now before the court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss all contested counts (Dkt. No. 30), which was referred to the undersigned for report and recommendation (Dkt. No. 43). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(b). The court heard argument from the parties on May 19, 2016. For the reasons stated below, the court recommends that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss be allowed as to Counts III (estoppel and reliance), IV (unjust enrichment), V (breach of the common law duty of basic fairness), VI (negligence), VII (IIED), VIII (tortious interference with advantageous business relations), IX (violations of the Clery Act and regulations), X (violation of FERPA), and XI (violation of Title IX), and denied, in part, as to Counts I (breach of contract), II (breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing), and XIII (declaratory judgment).

II. Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 30). “Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) .,. test the sufficiency of the pleadings.” Hagenah v. Cmty. Enter., Inc., Case No. 15-CV-30036-KAR, 2016 WL 1170963, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 23, 2016). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “Plausibility does not demand a showing that the claim is likely to succeed. It does, however, demand a showing of ‘more than a sheer possibility’ of success.” Butler v. Balolia, 736 F.3d 609, 616 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). In order to meet the plausibility standard, “[t]he plaintiff must proffer more than mere ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Garrity, Levin & Muir, L.L.P. v. United States, No. CV 15-11405-RGS, 2015 WL 6126816, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 16, 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

The First Circuit has instructed that “[t]he plausibility inquiry necessitates a two-step pavane.” The court must first differentiate between “the complaint’s factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).” Next, “the court must determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ” Moreover, the First Circuit has “emphasize[d] that the complaint must be read as a whole” and thus “[t]here need not be a one-to-one relationship between any single allegation and a necessary element of the cause of action.”

Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F.Supp.3d 177, 183 (D.R.I. 2016) (quoting Garcia-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013)).

III. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

In deciding Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court must determine whether the facts that are alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint and in documents that were submitted as exhibits to his original complaint, which are incorporated by reference into the Complaint, clear the plausibility hurdle (Dkt. Nos. 1, 22). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court also considers facts drawn from documents whose authenticity is “not disputed by the parties” and documents that are “sufficiently referred to” in Plaintiffs Complaint. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). “Because this is a motion to dismiss and the [c]ourt must ‘assume the truth of the well-pleaded facts and indulge all reasonable inferences therefrom/ ” the facts are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Brown Univ., 166 F.Supp.3d at 181 n.3 (quoting Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2002)).

A. September 26-27, 2014: The Sexual Encounter between Plaintiff and Loe

Plaintiff, who is a Maine resident, was a full-time student at the University in September 2014 (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 41). According to Plaintiff, after he and a female student, Linda Loe (“Loe”), attended a party on the University’s campus on the evening of September 26, 2014, they eventually went to Plaintiffs dormitory room where they kissed, removed their clothes, and engaged in sexual touching and “consensual mutual and simultaneous oral sex” (id. at ¶¶ 20, 52). Plaintiff sought Loe’s consent to engage in sexual intercourse (id. at ¶ 20). Plaintiff honored Loe’s stated “no” (id. at ¶¶ 20, 53). They continued to engage in mutual oral sex until Loe indicated that she wanted to stop (id.). Plaintiff complied with her request (id.). According to Plaintiff, he asked Loe to “finish him off” so that he would not be left with “blue balls” (id. at ¶ 21). She masturbated him to ejaculation (id.). Loe, however, indicated that Plaintiff said, “Now you have to finish me off,” placed her hand on his penis, and held it there until he ejaculated (id).

After Loe dressed and left Plaintiffs room, she sent text messages to at least two friends conveying details of her experience through words and positive “emo-jis” (id. at ¶¶ 56, 58-60). Other students, including Plaintiffs roommate, indicated that Loe did not display any unease when she was in Plaintiffs presence after September 27, 2014 (id. at ¶ 61).

B. Loe’s Complaint against Plaintiff to the University’s Title IX Officer and the University’s Investigation

On June 16, 2015, Loe reported the September 26-27, 2014 incident to Defendant Joanne Ollson, the University’s Title IX officer (id. at ¶¶ 46, 95). Loe told Ollson that her attendance at a sexual assault prevention workshop in January 2015 precipitated her report (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 112; Dkt. No. 31-5 at 3; Dkt. No. 31-14 at 5). In her first report about the encounter, Loe alleged that after Plaintiff asked her questions that made her “‘uncomfortable,’ ” he got on top of her, ripped off her clothes, digitally penetrated her vagina, and forced her to fellate him and to submit to oral sex, despite her repeated protests of “no” (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 102-109; Dkt. No. 31-1 at 2-4). Loe told Ollson that, the following day, she sent text messages to her best friend about the incident (Dkt. No. 31-1 at 3). She requested no contact with Plaintiff (id.).

On June 26, 2015, after Loe’s report to Ollson, Defendants Donna Rae Kenneally and Beth A. Hill, the University’s Title IX investigators, informed Plaintiff by letter that the University was investigating “an allegation that [he] may have engaged in acts of serious misconduct,” including sexual misconduct (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 64; Dkt. No. 31-2 at 2, 3). Plaintiff was notified that he “need[ed]” to meet with the University’s investigators for an interview (Dkt. No. 31-2 at 2). In addition, the letter supplied details of the process “to ensure that [it was] ... transparent,” and enclosed and referred Plaintiff to the University’s “Title IX Discrimination Policy” (“Title IX Policy” or “Policy”), which was updated and implemented in November 2014, for the “applicable procedures,” including his entitlement to an advisor in a limited role (Dkt. No. 1-6 at 2, 13; Dkt. No. 31-2 at 2-3). Plaintiff was directed to consult the Student Code of Conduct in the 2014-2015 Student Handbook (“Handbook”) for details of his “specific rights,” and was advised to have no contact with Loe (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 67; Dkt. No. 31-2 at 2-3).

Kenneally and Hill interviewed Plaintiff on July 10, 2015 in the presence of his counsel and the University’s general counsel (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 122). At the outset of the meeting, Hill told Plaintiff that she was the University’s Title IX investigator and that the investigation would be ‘“totally neutral’ ” (id. at ¶ 123). When the investigators asked Plaintiff for his “ ‘side of the story,’ ” his counsel intervened and asked that Plaintiff be advised of the allegation prior to speaking to the investigators (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 124-127; Dkt. No. 31—4 at 2). Plaintiff and his counsel reviewed Ollson’s summary of her June 16, 2015 interview of Loe (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 127; Dkt. No. 31-4 at 2). Plaintiffs counsel copied “the relevant portions of the document by hand” because the University did not provide Plaintiff with a copy of the interview summary (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 130-131; Dkt. No. 31-4 at 2).

As Plaintiffs counsel copied the summary, Hill “began yelling at [Plaintiff], aggressively insisting that [Plaintiff] could not take any more time to review ... Ollson’s interview summary of Loe, and insisting that [Plaintiff] had to immediately start answering her questions” (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 132). Plaintiffs counsel informed Hill that he would not permit her to “bully” Plaintiff and that her behavior indicated that she was not a “ ‘neutral’ investigator” (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 133; Dkt. No. 31-4 at 2). After counsel conferred with Plaintiff, counsel informed the investigators that Plaintiff declined to be interviewed (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 136; Dkt. No. 31-4 at 2). Counsel requested copies of relevant documents (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 137; Dkt. No. 31-4 at 2).

Loe was interviewed twice by Kenneally and Hill. During the first interview on July 14, .2015, Loe indicated that she did not object when Plaintiff kissed her (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 138; Dkt. No. 31-5 at 2). She said she refused Plaintiffs request to remove her clothing, but she could not recall how or when her clothing was removed (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 142, 143, 149; Dkt. No. 31-5 at 2-3). Her clothing was not torn (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 148; Dkt. No. 31-5 at 3). When Plaintiff asked Loe to have sexual intercourse, she said, “no,” and he honored her communication; that is, they did not have penile/vaginal intercourse (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 144, 145; Dkt. No. 31-5 at 2-3). According to Loe, Plaintiff performed cunnilingus while his penis was in her mouth (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 155; Dkt. No. 31-5 at 3). When Loe told Plaintiff to “stop,” he complied with her request, and told her that she had “ ‘to finish [him] off ” (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 157, 158; Dkt. No. 31-5 at 3). He “put [Loe’s] hand on his penis and ejaculated” (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 158; Dkt. No. 31-5 at 3).

Kenneally and Hill’s • second interview with Loe was on September 1, 2015, after their interviews of “multiple witnesses” (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 163, 165; Dkt. No. 31-6 at 2). Loe indicated that although she had consumed about three drinks at the party, she was not incapacitated (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 166; Dkt. No. 31-6 at 2). This time, Loe said that after she and Plaintiff performed mutual oral sex for less than a minute, Loe said, “no” (Dkt. No. 31-6 at 2). Plaintiff said, “ ‘[F]ine, you have to finish me off ” (Dkt. No. 31-6 at 2). Loe was not sure whether Plaintiff ejaculated in her hand or on the bed (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 167; Dkt. No. 31-6 at 2). Loe told the investigators that her pants were torn at the seam (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 168; Dkt. No. 31-6 at 2).

C. The Pre-hearing Informational Meeting

With counsel, Plaintiff attended a pre-hearing informational meeting on October 14, 2015 in the office of Defendant Kym-berly Hendricks, the University’s Assistant Director of Residence Life for Programming and Graduate Housing (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 51,189). The University’s general counsel also attended the meeting (id. at ¶ 189). Hendricks told Plaintiff, “ ‘It’s the University versus the student’” (id. at ¶¶ 198, 199). The University’s general counsel repeatedly informed Plaintiff that he “was in the predicament he was in because [he] had ‘failed to come forward’ to provide his own statement about what had happened” (id. at ¶ 194).

Hendricks presented Plaintiff with a document entitled “Pre-hearing Informational Meeting, Cases involving Consideration of Suspension or Dismissal from [WNEU] ” (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 190; Dkt. No. 31-8 at 2-3). This document described the Alleged Misconduct that would be the subject of the hearing as violations of the 2014-2015 Handbook’s “Student Code of Conduct, Article III-A: Offenses Against Another Person(s),” and “Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct Policy” (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 37, 54; Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 191; Dkt. No. 31-8 at 2). The form also explained the possible sanctions for the alleged misconduct, including dismissal and suspension, the format of the “judicial hearing,” as well as the procedures that would be employed at the hearing (Dkt. No. 31-8 at 2-3).

The form notified Plaintiff of his obligations to provide a list of witnesses to Hill by a certain date and to present a written statement to the hearing board, and stated that it was Plaintiffs responsibility to ensure that his witnesses attended the hearing on time (Dkt. No. 31-8 at 3). Plaintiff was referred to specific articles within Sections III and IV of the Student Conduct Code in the Handbook for additional details (id,). By his signature, Plaintiff confirmed that he received a copy of the form as well as copies of the witness list and advisor forms that he was required to return (id.). Plaintiff and his counsel were provided access to the University’s investigative file, which they were not given time to review in its entirety (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 195, 203-204, 216-217).

D. The Conduct Review Hearing and Plaintiffs Suspension

On October 26, 2015, Hill notified Plaintiff that Defendants Sean Burke and Adina Elfant, Ph.D., the Conduct Review Board (“CRB”), would hold the hearing on November 3, 2015 (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 218; Dkt. No. 31-9 at 2). The letter repeated the two alleged violations of the Student Code of Conduct with which Plaintiff was charged: the Student Code of Conduct, Article III-A: Offenses Against Another Person(s); and the Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct Policy (Dkt. No. 31-9 at 2). A list of witnesses and advisors for the University, Loe, and Plaintiff was attached to the letter (id.). Hill advised Plaintiff that it was his responsibility to contact his advisor and witnesses and to ensure their timély appearance (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 218; Dkt. No. 31-9 at 2).

Plaintiff submitted a written statement at the conduct review hearing and orally presented his version of events (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 22; Dkt. No. 31-13 at 2). The CRB “repeatedly refused” to pose Plaintiffs proposed questions to witnesses, while they asked most of Loe’s proposed questions (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 249, 250, 251). In addition, the hearing officers permitted Loe to “make lengthy self-laudatory statements” (id. at ¶ 253).

On November 6, 2015, the CRB issued a sanction letter notifying Plaintiff of . a two year suspension from the University (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 255; Dkt. No. 31-13). The letter referenced the two standards within the Student Code of Conduct that Plaintiff was alleged to have violated; that is, “Article III-A: Offenses Against Another Person(s)” and the “Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct Policy,” and continued by finding that, more likely than not, Plaintiff violated “both of the standards of the Student Code of Conduct under which [he] was charged” (Dkt. No. 31-13 at 2). This conclusion was “[b]ased on written statements provided ... as well as the verbal statements of those who participated in the hearing” (id.). The hearing officers made the following factual findings: that Plaintiff and Loe consented to kissing; that Plaintiff and Loe “engaged in other physical activity of a sexual nature;” that Loe did not want to have sexual intercourse and that they did not engage in penile/vaginal intercourse; and that both Plaintiff and Loe acknowledged that Loe’s hand was on Plaintiffs penis and she “ ‘finished [him] off ” (id.).

The CRB relied on two portions of the University’s Title IX Policy, as follows, as a basis for their decision that Plaintiff had violated the Student Code of Conduct:

The masturbation occurred after it was determined that there would not be penile/vaginal intercourse. According to statements from both [Plaintiff] and Loe, Loe said “no” to intercourse and [Plaintiff was] aware that she said no to intercourse. Loe’s statement indicates that [Plaintiff] said, “now you have to finish me off’ while [Plaintiff] claimfs] [he] asked her “Could you at least finish me off? Don’t leave me with blue balls.” According to University Title IX Policy (p.3) Prohibited Conduct: Sexual Misconduct http://wwwl .wne.edu/assets/45/ TitleIXDiscrimination7.15.pdf “Coercing someone into sexual activity violates this policy in the same way as physically forcing someone into sex. Coercion occurs ivhen someone is pressured for sex. ” According to the statements provided, we found Loe’s statement to be more plausible and therefore determined that it is more likely than not that Loe’s masturbation of [Plaintiff] was a coerced act.

According to University Title IX Policy (p.3)—Prohibited Conduct: Sexual Misconduct http://wwwl.wne.edu/assets/45/ TitleIXDiscrimination7.15.pdf “Anything but a clear, knowing and voluntary consent to any sexual activity is equivalent to a “no.” Loe stated, and [Plaintiff] acknowledged, that she said “no” to sexual intercourse. Loe further stated that she said “no” to other sexual activity. Loe stated that “[Plaintiff] held my hand with his hand on his penis until he ejaculated. He made me feel I had no choice by forcing me to finish.” At the hearing [Plaintiff] claimed that this sexual encounter was consensual. Based on these statements, we believe that it is more likely than not that Loe did not clearly and voluntarily consent to the masturbation and that it was a non-consensual and coerced act.

(Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 258, 260; Dkt. No. 31-13 at 2-3) (italics original).

The CRB indicated that the .two year suspension was “effective immediately” and that Plaintiff could return to the University for the Pall 2017 semester as long as hé completed “an educational training on sexual misconduct” and provided proof of the training to the University (Dkt. No. 31-13 at 3). Plaintiff was notified that Article VII-B of the Student Code of Conduct provided that “[suspension is noted in the student’s file and on the student’s transcript during the term of suspension” and “[i]f suspension occurs during a semester in progress, University practice mandates that all courses become administrative withdrawals” (id.). Plaintiff was advised of his right to appeal to Defendant Jeanne Hart-Steffes, the Vice President for Student Affairs and Dean of Students, which he did (Dkt. No. 31-13 at 3; Dkt. No. 22 at ¶ 272).

Harb-Steffes denied Plaintiffs appeal (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 274; Dkt. No. 31-14 at 2). In response to Plaintiffs argument that he was found in violation of “ ‘a policy that did not even exist,’” Harb-Steffes stated.that the policy existed and cited:

[p]age 182 of the 2014-2015 [WNEU] Student Handbook^ which] states, “Sexual misconduct refers to ANY (emphasis added) form of physical conduct or exploitation of another person of a sexual nature that is made without effective consent.” Additionally the 2014-2015 Student Code of Conduct prohibits any act of coercion even if not spelled out explicitly ... The University also has the obligation to revise its policies to be in compliance with local state and federal mandates. As such, the University distributed its sexual misconduct policy to the University community in late 2014. The word “coercion” served as a clarification to the act of un-consented to sexual conduct pursuant to the University’s obligation under Title IX.

(Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 277; Dkt. No. 31-14 at 2, 3). She further advised that Plaintiff received “procedural protections” under the Title IX Policy, which were “more expansive” than the rights articulated in the 2014-2015 Student Code of Conduct (Dkt. No. 31-14 at 2). For example, the Title IX Policy permitted an attorney to act as an advisor, but the Student Code of Conduct did not (id.).

Hari^Steffes rejected Plaintiffs twelve other claimed errors in the hearing process, which included alleged denials of access to information prior to the hearing, complaints about Plaintiffs witnesses’ absence, and imposition of an unfair sanction (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 273; Dkt. No. 31-14 at 3-5). She found that the hearing officers “followed [the University’s] process and procedures exactly as they should” and that the two-year suspension was fair and reasonable (Dkt. No. 31-14 at 5). Harb-Steffes, however, put Plaintiffs Fall 2015 suspension in abeyance, permitted Plaintiff to complete his courses as an “on-line student” where possible, and allowed him to take his final examinations on campus “[w]ith special permission” (Dkt. No. 31-14 at 5-6).

E. Procedural History in this Court

Plaintiff filed his original complaint against Defendants on November 2, 2015 (Dkt. No. 1). After a hearing, the district court denied Plaintiffs motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on November 3, 2015 (Dkt. Nos. 5, 7, 20). Plaintiff filed the Complaint on November 23, 2015 (Dkt. Nos. 22, 23). Defendants moved to dismiss (Dkt. No. 30). Defendants’ motion was referred to this court on March 9, 2016 (Dkt. No. 43).

IV. Discussion

A. Breach of Contract (Count I)

The parties agree that Massachusetts law applies in this case, and that under state law, the relationship between a student and a university is based on contract (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 70; Dkt. No. 33 at 2 n.3; Dkt. No. 36 at 7). See Cloud v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 724 (1st Cir. 1983). “The terms of this contract were the terms contained in the Student Handbook and other college materials.” Bleiler v. Coll. of the Holy Cross, Civil Action No. 11-11541-DJC, 2013 WL 4714340, at *14 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2013), appeal dismissed, No. 13-2245 (1st Cir. Apr. 30, 2015). See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 724.

Count I of the Complaint asserts that the University breached its contract with Plaintiff by (1) applying the Title IX Policy retroactively to the incident between Plaintiff and Loe; (2) failing to investigate; (3) violating Plaintiffs right to an effective advisor throughout the investigation and at the hearing; (4) failing to provide Plaintiff with copies of the records to which he was entitled; (5) failing to secure the presence of witnesses favorable to Plaintiff at the hearing; and (6) violating its obligations to presume Plaintiff innocent, to bear the burden of proof and the burden of production of evidence at the hearing, and to apply the correct standard of proof (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 286).

Due to the time that elapsed between the alleged sexual contact and WNEU’s investigation and formal disciplinary proceedings, the contract terms are contained in three documents: the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 Handbooks, which included the Student Code of Conduct, and descriptions of the student judicial system and the judicial process (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3-4 [2015-2016 Handbook]; Dkt. No. 1-3 [2014-2015 Handbook] at 4-5); and the Title IX Policy, which contained standards of conduct and the complaint resolution procedure (Dkt. No. 1-6). The parties agree that the 2014-2015 Handbook’s provisions applied to Plaintiffs alleged sexual misconduct in September 2014, and to the investigation in June and July 2015 (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 263, 264, 270; Dkt. No. 33 at 2 n.3, 23-24). See Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F.Supp.3d 561, 581, 596 (D. Mass. 2016) (hereinafter Brandéis) (university “applied the substantive policies (but not the procedures) for the academic year in which the conduct occurred”); Coveney v. President & Trs. of the Coll. of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16, 445 N.E.2d 136, 140 (1983) (applying the terms of the student handbook in effect at the time of the incident and student’s expulsion). Defendants do not dispute that the Title IX Policy was “updated and implemented in November 2014” and amended in July 2015 (Dkt. No. 33 at 23-24), which made it applicable to the investigation in June and July 2015 and to the formal disciplinary process, which commenced in October 2015 (Dkt. No. 1-6 at 2, 13; Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 261). See Brandeis, 177 F.Supp.3d at 578 (university properly applied the procedures in affect at the time of the investigation and disciplinary decision). In addition, the 2015-2016 Handbook’s procedures also applied to the formal disciplinary process. See id.

“When interpreting contracts between students and their academic institutions, under Massachusetts law courts ‘employ “the standard of reasonable expectation—what meaning the party making the manifestation, the university, should reasonably expect the [student] to give it.” ’ ” Bleiler, 2013 WL 4714340, at *15. See also Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2007); Cloud, 720 F.2d at 724; Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 735 N.E.2d 373, 378 (2000). “Contract interpretation, including whether any ambiguities exist in the disputed contractual terms, is generally a question of law for the [c]ourt.” Bleiler, 2013 WL 4714340, at *15 (citing Driscoll v. Bd. of Trs. of Milton Acad., 70 Mass.App.Ct. 285, 873 N.E.2d 1177, 1185-86 (2007)). “Where, as here, the university specifically provides for. a disciplinary hearing ... [the court] review[s] the procedures followed to ensure that.they fall within the range of reasonable expectations of one reading the relevant rules.” Cloud, 720 F.2d at 724-25. As is the case with interpretation of the Handbook provisions, “an objective reasonableness standard” applies. Walker v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 82 F.Supp.3d 524, 530 (D. Mass. 2014) (quoting Cloud, 720 F.2d at 724-25).

Plaintiff recites a litany of complaints about the process, each of which is addressed below. In the court’s view, only two of these state actionable breach of contract claims.

1. The University Breached the Contract by Retroactively Applying the Title IX Policy to Plaintiffs Conduct.

The sexual encounter between Plaintiff and Loe occurred on September 26-27, 2014, more than six weeks before the University implemented the Title IX Policy that it relied on to conclude that Plaintiff had engaged in sexual misconduct (Dkt. No. 1-6 at 13; Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 3). After Loe’s complaint to the Title IX officer in June 2015, the University notified Plaintiff that he allegedly violated two Student Code of Conduct provisions contained in the 2014-2015 Handbook (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 37, 54; Dkt. No. 31-8 at 2-3). In determining that Plaintiff was responsible for violating the University’s sexual misconduct policy, however, the CRB applied the University’s Title IX Policy’s descriptions of sexual misconduct implemented after the sexual contact at issue (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 258, 260; Dkt. No. 31-13 at 2-3). Plaintiffs assertion that the University violated its agreement with him encompasses two related claims: (1) he did not receive notice of the prohibited conduct for which he was ultimately found responsible; and (2) prior to the hearing, he did not have notice of the policy that he was alleged to have violated (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 286). Because the court is not persuaded by the University’s argument that the Title IX Policy merely filled a “definitional hole” in its prior sexual misconduct policy (Dkt. No. 33 at 24), the court finds that Plaintiff states a plausible claims for relief.

The pertinent segments of the 2014-2015 Handbook and the Title IX Policy are as follows.

a. Section III of the 2014-2015 Student Handbook, including description of Title IX

Section One articulates the following “Guiding Philosophy”:

The goals of this Student Code of Conduct and the corresponding, review processes are to help students understand and accept their obligations as members of the community and to advance the University’s educational mission by defining and establishing certain norms of behavior. The rules and policy statements that follow serve to clarify commonly accepted standards of conduct by members and prospective members of this University community.

(Dkt. No. 1-3 at 35).

Section Two contains the Student Code of Conduct (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 35). Article III of the Student Code of Conduct describes “Specific Standards of Behavior” as. follows:

Certain behaviors by any student, students, or student organizations can violate the Student Code of Conduct. Prohibited behaviors include, but are not limited to:

A. Offenses Against Another Person(s), such as:

• Intentionally or recklessly threatening or causing another person emotional distress;

• Any actual or threatened non-consensual sexual act or misconduct. Non-consensual presumes that the other person is able to make a reasonable judgment under the circumstances and is not impaired by intoxication, unconsciousness, or other incapacity. If the other person is impaired, a student may not guess, assume, or infer consent ....

(Dkt. No. 1-3 at 37).

F. Responsibility for Standards of Behavior

Students are also responsible for all policies in Section III of this [Hjandbook entitled “Standards of Behavior' and Student Accountability,” specifically:

• Student Code of Conduct

• Sexual Harassment' and Sexual Misconduct Policy

• Additional Standards and Policies (... Title IX).

(Dkt. No. 1-3 at 38).

The relevant portions of the Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct Policy, which is contained in Section III of the 2014-2015 Handbook, states;

In Massachusetts, sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and/or physical conduct of an unwelcome sexual nature, when:

: • Such advances, requests or con- „ duct have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive work environment or, in the educational living/learning setting, the creation of [a] similarly hostile, humiliating, or sexually offensive academic or student residential environment.

Other sexually-oriented conduct that is unwelcome and has the effect of creating a workplace and/or learning environment that is hostile, offensive, intimidating, or humiliating to male or female members of the University community may also constitute sexual harassment. While it is not possible to list all circumstances that may constitute sexual harassment, the following are some examples of conduct which, depending on each circumstance, may constitute sexual harassment:

• Unwelcome sexual advances, whether they involve physical contact or not;

Sexual misconduct refers to any form of physical contact or exploitation of another person of a sexual nature that is made without effective consent. Effective consent means that a person is able to make free, informed, and reasonable choices and decisions—and is not impaired by intoxication or other drug consumption (be it voluntary or otherwise), by disability, or by fear. Sexual behavior without effective consent can lead to sexual misconduct, sexual assault, and/or sexual harassment. Consent is effective when it has been clearly communicated. Consent may never occur if a person is unconscious, unaware, or otherwise physically helpless.

(Dkt. No. 1-3 at 53-54) (emphasis original).

The last page of the 2014-2015 Handbook contains a single paragraph describing Title IX (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 61). This section indicates that WNEU “does not discriminate on the basis of sex in its education programs; sexual harassment and sexual violence are types of sex discrimination that will not be tolerated at the University” (id.). It also lists the Title IX officer, Ollson, and the two deputies, Burke and another (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 62).

b. The Title IX Policy

The Title IX Policy, implemented on November 17, 2014, describes “Prohibited Conduct,” including “Sexual Misconduct” and “Sexual Assault” (Dkt. No. 1-6 at 4-6, 13), as follows:

Sexual Misconduct!:] A violation of this policy may occur if one party engages in sexual activity with another party without consent. In order for individuals to engage in sexual activity of any kind with each other, there must be clear knowing [sic] and voluntary consent pri- or to and during sexual activity. Effective consent means that a person is able to make free, informed, and reasonable choices and decisions, and is not impaired by intoxication or other drug consumption (be it voluntarily or otherwise), by disability, or by fear. Consent is effective when it has been clearly communicated. Consent may never occur if a person is unconscious, unaware, or otherwise physically helpless.

Anything but a clear, knowing and voluntary consent to any sexual activity is equivalent to a “no.”

Coercing someone into sexual activity violates this policy in the same way as physically forcing someone into sex. Coercion occurs when someone is pressured for sex.

In short, consent may include explicit communication and mutual approval of the sexual activities in which the parties are involved. For consent, individuals involved in the sexual activity must willingly and knowingly engage in the activity. As a result, consent cannot be given due to physical force, intimidating behavior, threats, or coercion. Engaging in sexual activity with someone through force, intimidation, threats, or coercion is a violation of this policy. Further consent cannot be given by an individual who is incapacitated.... Sexual misconduct offenses include but are not limited to, sexual harassment, sexual assault, and sexual violence as defined below.

(Dkt. No. 1-6 at 4) (emphasis added).

Sexual Assault: The term “sexual assault” means any nonconsensual sexual act proscribed by Federal, tribal, or State law, including when the victim lacks capacity to consent.

Sexual assault includes, but is not limited to:

• Coercing, forcing, or attempting to coerce or force a person to touch another person’s intimate parts without that person’s consent.

(Dkt. No. 1-6 at 5-6). The Title IX Policy continues by describing the University’s reporting requirements, including the requirements for claims of sexual misconduct and the resulting investigation (Dkt. No. 1-6 at 7-8). The Policy states that the procedures. for the resolution of claims that are outlined in the Handbook’s Student Code of Conduct in the Student Handbook apply to cases in which the respondent is a student, and provides a link to the 2014-2015 Handbook for a description of these procedures (Dkt. No. 1-6 at 8).

c. Notice of prohibited conduct.

The purpose of the Handbook’s Student Code of Conduct in September 2014 was to “help students understand and accept their obligations as members of the community” (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 35). The rules and policy statements were aimed at “clarify[ing] commonly accepted standards of conduct” (id.). In other words, the Student Code of Conduct was the contract between the University and Plaintiff, which gave Plaintiff notice that the failure to comply with defined standards of conduct could lead to sanctions.

The question, therefore, is whether, under an objective standard, the University reasonably could expect a student in Plaintiffs position to understand that the 2014-2015 Handbook prohibited the conduct in which he engaged with Loe. See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 724; Bleiler, 2013 WL 4714340, at *15 (citing Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 378). In defining sexual misconduct and consent, the 2014-2015 Handbook and the Title IX Policy draw nuanced distinctions that may be difficult for a college student, not trained in the law, to understand and apply. Nonetheless, as a student at WNEU, Plaintiff agreed to abide by Defendant’s student Standards of Behavior, including the sexual harassment and sexual misconduct policy and the Title IX Policy. The Title IX policy in effect when Plaintiff and Loe had their sexual encounter in September 2014 provided only that sexual harassment and sexual violence were forms of sexual discrimination that would not be tolerated (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 61). Thus, under the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiffs obligation, at the time of his sexual encounter with Loe, was to comply with Defendant’s sexual harassment and sexual misconduct policy (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 37, 54). That policy provided, insofar as relevant, that “sexual misconduct” referred to any form of “physical conduct or exploitation of another person of a sexual nature ... made without effective consent” (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 54). Consent had to be clearly communicated (id.).

A finder of fact could conclude in this case that: (1) the CRB found, explicitly or implicitly, that Loe consented to certain forms of sexual intimacy with Plaintiff and that he complied when she said “no” to penile/vaginal intercourse and further oral sex; (2) the CRB did not conclude that Loe said “no” when Plaintiff either asked or instructed her to “finish him off;” and (3) the CRB found that Loe was not impaired and was in a condition to make free and informed choices and that she clearly communicated consent to some forms of sexual intimacy with Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 31-13 at 2-3). The policy was ambiguous as to whether consent had to be communicated orally or could be communicated by acts. A factfinder could conclude that Plaintiff could reasonably expect, under the terms of the sexual harassment and sexual misconduct policy in effect in September 2014, that Loe’s consent remained operative and extended to further sexual activity when she did not say “no” or physically rebuff him.

Even if the CRB could reasonably .conclude that Plaintiffs demand that Loe “finish him off’ constituted pressuring her for sex in violation of Defendant’s Title IX Policy, that policy was not in effect and was not part of the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant as of September 26-27, 2014. A jury could conclude that the University could not reasonably expect a student who read the 2014-2015 Handbook’s sexual misconduct policy to intuit that it included the Title IX Policy’s more finely tuned definition of sexual misconduct. See Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 378. At a minimum, the Handbook’s standards regarding coercion are ambiguous, which results in its terms being construed against the University. See Brandeis, 177 F.Supp.3d at 594 (citing cases); Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Lanco Scaffolding Co., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 726, 716 N.E.2d 130, 133 (1999) (“Contract language is ambiguous where ‘an agreement’s terms are inconsistent on their face or where the phraseology can support reasonable difference of opinion as to the meaning of the words employed and the obligations undertaken’ ”) (quoting Fashion House, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1083 (1st Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that the University breached the contract by finding him responsible for behavior that was not included in the 2014-2015 Handbook’s description of prohibited conduct. For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiffs breach of contract claim should not be dismissed insofar as he alleges that he was disciplined for conduct that was not prohibited under existing policies.

d. Notice of the allegations of misconduct before the CRB.

Plaintiff further claims that he received insufficient notice of the allegations that he would have to prepare to meet at the hearing because he was not informed that the CRB would apply the Title IX Policy to him. (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 286). The court agrees.

Section Four of Section III of the 2015-2016 Handbook, which applies to the disciplinary process here, outlined the “Judicial Process” (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 42-45). Article III of Section Four describes the process to which a “respondent”—a student allegedly in violation of the University’s applicable policy or procedure—was entitled in cases, such as this, which involved consideration of suspension or dismissal (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 38, 43-45). Plaintiff was entitled to receive “a written statement identifying the section of the Student Code of Conduct that was allegedly violated and the possible sanction(s) that might apply” at the pre-hearing informational meeting (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 43). The Handbook also required the University to provide “the specific charge(s) relating to the alleged misconduct” in the written notice of the conduct review hearing (id.).

The Pre-hearing Informational Meeting form notified Plaintiff that he was alleged to have violated the following two standards within the Student Code of Conduct:

• Student Code of Conduct, Article III-A: Offenses Against Another Person(s), specifically intentionally or recklessly threatening or causing another person emotional distress; any actual or threatened non-consensual sexual act or misconduct; non-consensual presumes that the other person is able to make a reasonable judgment under the circumstances and causing physical and/or emotional harm to another person.

• Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct Policy

(Dkt. No. 1-3 at 37, 54; Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 191; Dkt. No. 31-8 at 2). The letter that notified him of the conduct review hearing and the CRB’s post-hearing decision reiterated these descriptions of the two' standards that he allegedly violated (Dkt. No. 31-9 at 2; Dkt. No. 31-13 at 2).

The CRB found that “it was more likely than not” that Plaintiff violated “both of the standards of the Student Code of Conduct under which [he was] charged”, (Dkt. No. 31-13 at 2). The CRB’s decision, however, was based on its findings that Plaintiff violated two sections of the Title IX Policy on Sexual Misconduct, which were not included in either the 2014-2015 Handbook or the notices' provided to Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 37, 54; Dkt. No. 31-8 at 2; Dkt. No. 31-13 at 2). The University could not reasonably' expect Plaintiff to understand that the descriptions of his alleged misconduct, which it provided to him prior to the hearing, included the Title IX Policy on sexual misconduct. See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 724. The -lack of adequate notice of the charges suffices to state a claim for a breach of contract. See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F.Supp. 238, 246-47 (D. Vt. 1994) (holding that the college breached the contract contained in the student handbook because “[t]he undisputed facts show that [plaintiff] was never told what conduct, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing, would violate the ... portion of the [h]andbook” for which he was sanctioned).

In addition, the Complaint states adequate grounds for the claim that Plaintiffs hearing was unfair due to the lack of adequate notice. See id. Although a student’s due process rights do not equate to those afforded to a criminal defendant, see Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 381, adequate warning of the misconduct that could result in a student’s discipline is a fundamental element of fairness in the proceeding. See Brandeis, 177 F.Supp.3d at 602-03 (denying motion to dismiss for breach of contract and holding that university’s failure to provide plaintiff with notice of the specific charges “may have substantially impaired the fairness of the proceeding”). Sufficient notice of the alleged misconduct is necessary to the preparation of a defense. See Fellheimer, 869 F.Supp. at 246-47. Here, Plaintiff presented his version of events to the CRB with the understanding that he was alleged to have violated standards of conduct in the 2014-2015 Handbook (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 22; Dkt. No. 31-13 at 2). The CRB unfairly applied the Title IX Policy’s definition of misconduct. See Cloud, 720 F.2d at 725; Coveney, 445 N.E.2d at 138-39. Accepting the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint as true, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a finding that the University breached the contract by failing to notify Plaintiff of the misconduct for which he was disciplined. Plaintiffs remaining claims of breach of contract, discussed below, are not legally sufficient to state breach of contract claims.

2. The University conducted an investigation.

Despite Plaintiffs statement that “Defendants undertook an investigation,” Plaintiff alleges that the University was in breach of the contract by failing to adequately investigate Loe’s complaint (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 11, 286). The Handbooks and the Title IX Policy required the University to investigate a complaint of sexual misconduct (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 42; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 44; Dkt. No. 1-6 at 8). According to the Title IX Policy, “[p]rior to any hearings, the investigator will interview all parties and witnesses, compile statements, verify statements, gather documentation, review evidence, conduct research and draft a report to submit to the [CRB] ... if one has been convened” (Dkt. No. 1-6 at 8). Details of Defendants’ investigation, which included these items, are alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 13, 59-61, 121, 138-155, 163, 165-171, 214, 215). As a result, the Complaint fails to state a claim for breach of contract for failure to investigate. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

3. The University did not deny Plaintiff effective access to his attorney who acted as his advisor.

Plaintiff further alleges that the University deprived him of his right to “an effective advisor” in breach of the Handbooks’ provision (Dkt. No. 22 ¶ 286). The 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 Handbooks permitted a student, such as Plaintiff, to “seek assistance from an advisor of the student’s choice, provided that the advisor is a member of the University community (current student, faculty member, or staff member) and is not legal counsel acting in this capacity’ (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 44; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 45). “Parents, legal guardians, and/or legal counsel, regardless of their affiliation with complainants, respondents, and/or witnesses, are not permitted to attend any part of the process, pre-hearing or hearing” (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 44; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 46). Under the Title IX Policy, in cases other than those in which a student was the respondent, an attorney was allowed to act as the respondent’s advisor (Dkt. No. 1-6 at 8, 9). The attorney was not permitted to act “as legal counsel or advocate,” but could “observe and consult freely” with the respondent (Dkt. No. 1-6 at 9). Although Plaintiff, a student-respondent, was not entitled to an attorney as an advisor under the terms of the Handbooks and Title IX Policy, Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that his legal counsel was present in the capacity of advisor at every stage of the process (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 116-120, 122, 189, 204, 234, 248). By permitting Plaintiffs counsel to act as his advisor, Defendants allowed Plaintiff assistance during the disciplinary process to which he was not entitled. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief on this ground.

4. Plaintiff was not denied access to investigative materials.

Plaintiff contends that provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) incorporated in the Handbooks, along with separate provisions of the Handbooks, entitled him to receive copies of all of the records that were compiled during the investigation (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 12, 208, 340, 341, 349).

The section of the 2014-2015 Handbook that discusses “Student Records and Confidentiality,” states that the University “adheres to a policy of compliance with.... FERPA” (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 29). See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. FERPA “permits students to inspect their educational records” within 45 days of the student’s written request (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 29, 30). See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A), (d) (right to “inspect and review” education records”). “Educational records include those records that contain information directly related to a student and are maintained as official files by the University” (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 29). See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).

In addition to the inspection and review of records that FERPA provided, the University permitted students to obtain copies of their records by paying reproduction costs (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 30). However, “[t]he University reserve[d] the right to deny copies of transcripts or educational records ... where there is an unresolved disciplinary action against the student” (id.).

By letter of July 6, 2015, Plaintiffs attorney, on behalf of Plaintiff, requested copies of any records that were related to the investigation and disciplinary proceedings (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3). Plaintiff was not provided copies due to the “unresolved disciplinary action” (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 30; Dkt. No. 33 at 34). He had access, however, to the investigatory materials in the University’s possession, including Loe’s statement to Ollson and the substance of witnesses’ statements (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 59-61, 94-115, 121, 138-161, 210, 229-233). His counsel took notes (id.). Contrast Brandeis, 177 F.Supp.3d at 598-99 (finding that the student’s complaint stated a breach of contract claim upon which relief could be granted where the pleadings were unclear regarding whether the university provided the student access to a special examiner’s report about his alleged sexual misconduct, as FERPA required); Brown Univ., 166 F.Supp.3d at 193 (finding plaintiffs allegation sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract where the handbook provided that “ ‘the case administrator will respond’ to the respondent’s requests for information,” and the university failed to comply); Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-1679, 2012 WL 1569826, at *18-19 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2012) (holding that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support a finding that the university breached the provision of the student handbook that promised “that Bucknell will provide the accused with a copy of the charges against him, along with supporting information, including the public safety department’s report and witness statements”).

Although Plaintiff had the opportunity to view certain photographs and text messages and to hear audio messages between Loe and other students, FERPA did not require the University to grant Plaintiff access (Dkt. No. 22 ¶¶ 209-210). These were not Pl