Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM — DECISION and ORDER DAVID N. HURD, United States District Judge TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.. „. 564 II. BACKGROUND.... 565 A. The Justice Center... .566 B. The School District.... 566 C. Discipline at the Jail.566 D. Education in Solitary Confinement....567 E. Use of Solitary Confinement on Juveniles .... 567 F. Plaintiffs’Experts. 568 1. Dr. Krisberg.., .568 2. Warden Parker.... 569 3. Dr. Kraus.... 570 G. Government’s Statement of Interest..,.571 H. NAACP’s Amici Brief.... 571 III. DISCUSSION....572 A. Class Certification... .572.- I. Numerosity... .573 2. Commonality... .574 3. Typicality... .576 4. Adequacy of Representation... .576 5. Rule 23(b).... 577 6. Ascertainability... .577 B. Summary Judgment... .577 C. Preliminary Injunction.... 581 1. Substantial Likelihood of Success .... 581 1 Eighth Amendment,... .582 ii. Fourteenth Amendment... .585 iii. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.... 586 2. Strong ' Showing of Irreparable Harm.... 588 3. Public Interest... .589 4. Balance of Hardships.... 589 IV. CONCLUSION... .589 I. INTRODUCTION The named plaintiffs seek relief on behalf of themselves and a putative class of fellow 16- and 17-year-olds (“juveniles”) being detained at the Onondaga County Justice Center; (the “Justice Center” or “Jail”). by defendants Onondaga County Sheriff Eugene Conway (“Sheriff Conway”), Chief Custody Deputy Esteban Gonzalez (“Deputy. Gonzalez”), and Assistant Chief Custody Deputy Kevin Brisson (“Deputy Brisson”) (collectively the “Onondaga County defendants”), each of whom is being sued here in their respective official capacities. First, plaintiffs’ class action complaint alleges declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is necessary to put an end to the Onondaga County defendants’ routine imposition of solitary confinement on juveniles at the Justice Center, a practice which allegedly violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, plaintiffs seek class relief against the Onondaga County defendants and defendant Syracuse City School District (the “School District”), which has contracted with the Justice Center to provide educational services, for allegedly denying juveniles in solitary confinement the minimum educational instruction guaranteed by state law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, plaintiffs seek relief against both the Onondaga County defendants and the School District (collectively “defendants”) on behalf of a subclass of juvenile inmates with disabilities who are allegedly being systematically deprived of the procedural protections and special education services guaranteed to them by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 140 et seq. The parties have filed three motions: (1) plaintiffs have moved for. class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and (2) a preliminary. injunction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, while the School District has moved for (3) summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 on the basis that it is the Onondaga County defendants, not the School District, .who bear, sole responsibility for any of the constitutional or statutory violations alleged by plaintiffs. In addition, the United States of America (the “Government”) has submitted a statement of interest in this litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 517, and the Central New York Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (the “NAACP”) has moved for leave to appear as amici curiae in support of plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. The parties exchanged limited discovery and the three motions were fully briefed, although the Onondaga County defendants did not submit an opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Oral argument was heard on Wednesday, February 15, 2017 in Utica, New York, where plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and the NAACP’s motion for leave to appear as amici were granted. Decision was reserved on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and on the School District’s motion for summary judgment. II. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs have submitted a mountain of evidence in support of their request for the entry of a preliminary injunction. See Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 46-33, 7-8 & nn.1-7 (detailing evidentiary submissions). In response, the Onondaga County defendants have submitted an affidavit from Deputy Gonzalez, ECF No. 62, and the School District has submitted declarations from David Tantillti, ECF No. 28-2, John A. Dittmann, Jr., ECF No. 28-3, and Signe Nelson, ECF No. 28-5. All of these materials have been considered and the particularly relevant portions will be summarized below. Notably, the parties did not press the- need f or an evidentiary hearing at oral argument, and an independent review of the submissions did not reveal any genuine disputes over the essential facts. Matter of Defend H2O v. Town Bd. of the Town of E. Hampton, 147 F.Supp.3d 80, 96-97. (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing circumstances where an evidentiary hearing on a preliminary injunction is unnecessary). Accordingly, while a few disputes over factual matters have been noted, their resolution is unnecessary in order to decide the present issues. A. The Justice Center Opened in 1995, the Justice Center is a 671-bed correctional facility located in downtown Syracuse, New York and operated by the Onondaga County defendants. It houses pre-trial detainees, convicted individuals serving prison sentences, and technical parole violators. Although its primary function is to hold an adult inmate population, the Jail is also used to house approximately 30 juveniles at any one time. Approximately 90% of these juveniles are pre-trial detainees, though some are already serving sentences. The Justice Center operates under a “direct supervision” method, which places a single deputy in charge of a “housing pod” of 32 to 60 inmates. Juvenile inmates are typically housed in Pod 2A or 5A and, as a general matter, have access to “television, commissary, law library, a quest room or mini library, telephones, recreation, religious services, various programs including education, and visitation, which may include two one-hour contact visits per week.” Gonzalez Aff. ¶¶ 9-12. B. The School District The School District bears primary responsibility for educating eligible inmates housed at the Justice Center in accordance with New York State law as well as for ensuring that juveniles with qualifying disabilities receive the special education services and other procedural protections to which they are entitled under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). To effect these responsibilities, the School District operates an “ Incarcerated Education Program” at the Justice Center, which is staffed by 16 certified general education teachers, 4 certified special education teachers, and 1 school psychologist. According to School District personnel, new juvenile inmates who arrive at the Jail are screened with a basic educational assessment test and a disability questionnaire. Beginning in 2013, the School District and the Onondag a County defendants entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) intended to lay out the mechanics of how the School District’s education program would operate inside the Justice Center. Under the MOU, the School District agreed to administer and supervise the required educational programming and, in turn, the Onondaga County defendants agreed to assume responsibility for security matters and to provide School District personnel with access to appropriate space for classroom instruction. The parties recently extended the MOU through June 2017. C.Discipline at the Jail The Justice Center’s disciplinary policies draw no distinction between adult and juvenile inmates. An inmate who does not behave in accordance with the rules and regulations published in the Jail’s Inmate Handbook is subject to disciplinary action that includes several forms of “solitary confinement,” a blanket term used here to include: (1) “lock-in,” where an inmate is confined to either their own cell or to a cell in the. Jail’s Segregated Housing Unit (“SHU”); (2) “administrative segregation,” where an inmate is placed in “lock-in” or the SHU in response to alleged misbehavior pending a disciplinary hearing, which can take up to 15 days to occur; or (3) “punitive segregation,” an additional period of lock-in or SHU time imposed after a disciplinary hearing finally takes place. Regardless of the label applied, solitary confinement at the Justice Center amounts to being locked in a minimally furnished cell measuring about 8 by 10 feet for approximately 23 hours a day. Juveniles in solitary confinement at the Jail are denied human contact — they must eat alone in their cells, are not permitted to talk to each other through the doors or in passing, and recreation, if any, is limited to 1 hour per day. They are also denied mental stimulus — they have no access to the radio or television and only limited access to reading materials. And they are deprived of meaningful mental health treatment — typically, “treatment” is limited to Jail staff occasionally asking juveniles whether they are feeling homicidal or suicidal, and a juvenile who admits to such thoughts is simply placed under a suicide watch. D. Education in Solitary Confinement Juveniles in solitary confinement are not permitted to attend even the limited educational instruction provided by on-site School District personnel as part of the Incarcerated Education Program. Instead, teachers prepare and distribute “ cell packets” to juveniles in solitary confinement. These cell packets typically include newspaper clippings, crossword puzzles, and problem worksheets. According to the School District, the contents of these packets are sometimes modified for juveniles who need special education services. However, the School District admits that the Onondaga County defendants often block teachers from directly accessing juveniles being held in solitary confinement. Consequently, no direct instruction is provided, cell packets are distributed only sporadically, and students in solitary confinement “rarely return completed cell packets” for grading, follow-up, or other meaningful evaluation. E. Use of Solitary Confinement on Juveniles According to plaintiffs, the Justice Center routinely imposes solitary confinement regardless of a juvenile’s mental health history and even for minor misbehavior expected of juveniles, such as yelling or refusing to stop talking. In fact, the Jail appears to rely primarily on isolation as the preferred method of discipline, with lesser sanctions being imposed in addition to, rather than in lieu of, solitary confinement. Between October 19, 2015 and October 19, 2016, the Onondag a County defendants sanctioned 79 of the 131 juveniles held at the Justice Center with solitary confinement on at least one occasion. Nearly half (44%) of the juveniles who received this sanction (including all six named plaintiffs) served 20 or more days. And of the 48 juveniles who were held at the Jail for longer than the 59-day average, nearly all (96%) were punished with solitary confinement at least once. Notably, Deputy Gonzalez asserts “minor inmates” are “never subject to any form of solitary confinement.” But this appears to be a semantic distinction of his own creation, since the remainder of his affidavit details safety- and security-based justifications for imposing on the named plaintiffs and other juvenile inmates the various forms of disciplinary isolation contemplated by the Justice Center’s Inmate Handbook and challenged by plaintiffs tere. See, e.g., Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 38 (explaining that his review of disciplinary records confirmed punishment was necessary “in all instances ... for the safety of the inmates and staff and to retain institutional control”). For its part, School District personnel acknowledge in their declarations that disciplinary isolation of juveniles is a regular occurrence at the Jail. F. Plaintiffs’ Experts Plaintiffs have submitted detailed declarations from three experts: Barry Alan Krisberg, Ph.D., Louis J. Kraus, M.D., and Leander Parker, a Warden at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility. Each expert has visited the Justice Center, interviewed juveniles detained there, and reviewed relevant disciplinary policies and other documentation. Neither the Onondá-ga County defendants nor the School District have submitted evidence to rebut any of these experts’ findings. .1, Dr. Krisberg Dr. Krisberg has extensive experience as an authority on juvenile .justice . and adult corrections. A four-time published author in those-fields, he holds a Ph.D. in Sociology as well as a Master’s degree in Criminology from the University-of Pennsylvania. In- terms of relevant academic experience, Dr. Krisberg is currently employed as a Visiting Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, He has also taught and researched corrections-related topics at Berkeley’s law school, the University of Hawaii, and the University of Minnesota. Beyond these academic settings, Dr. Krisberg has served in an expert capacity or as a court .monitor in cases seeking to reform the conditions applied to youth in correctional settings in California and Illinois. Hehas also consulted on Government investigations into the use of disciplinary isolation in the states of Indiana, Washington, and California. Notably, Dr. Krisberg has also consulted for .various New York state and local entities, including conducting a review of the disciplinary isolation practices at the Rikers Island Correctional Facility at the behest of the New York City Department of Corrections. According to Dr. Krisberg, there is an emerging consensus among professional organizations in the corrections field that disciplinary isolation of juveniles should be eliminated because research shows that isolation is an ineffective disciplinary technique for restoring facility- security and is in fact counterproductive to facility discipline and security. As Dr. Krisberg explains, the prevailing professional opinion is that disciplinary isolation programs for juveniles should be replaced with a behavior management system that includes meaningful rewards for good behavior as well as a graduated system of sanctions for misbehavior. He points out that facilities around the, country have eliminated disciplinary isolation of juveniles without compromising facility discipline and security. Dr. Krisberg visited the Justice Center in October of 2016, where he observed the male juvenile pod, other general. population pods, the SHU, the mental health unit, the infirmary, and the school. He also interviewed named plaintiffs R.C., C.I., and V.W. Among other things, Dr. Krisberg notes that the Jail frequently imposes disciplinary isolation- on juveniles in many instances. that. have nothing to do with “physically assaultive behavior.” Dr. Krisberg further notes that even in instances where Justice Center staff appeared to be responding to a risk > of imminent danger, the current disciplinary policies permit staff to detain juveniles in isolation for long after the threat has dissipated. According to Dr. Krisberg, this is not reasonably calculated to restore facility discipline or security. Dr. Krisberg opines that' the conditions on the SHU are " .deplorable” and considers them among the worst he has seen in his decades of touring facilities around the country. According to him, the SHU cells are “dark, filled with graffiti, and unhygienic” and emit an “odor of human waste.” He also observed a “barren, cage-like structure”- that passes for the SHU’s recreation area. Dr. Krisberg notes that juveniles in the SHU reported that they were not receiving any form of schooling or instruction. These juveniles also reported verbal and physical abuse by adult inmates who share the SHU space. And while Dr. Krisberg concedes that the cells on the juvenile pod were better lit-and provided better recreational space, he confirmed these cells were similar in size to the cells in the SHU. 2. Warden Parker Warden Parker oversees the Youthful Offender Unit at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility in Rankin County; Mississippi, a facility which houses juveniles convicted of violent crimes. He has over 30 years of experience in juvenile and adult corrections settings: all told, he has worked in, or managed, eight different youth facilities in Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, and Mississippi. Like Dr. Krisberg, Warden Parker has consulted on Government. investigations into the treatment of juveniles in correctional facilities in Alabama and Ohio. Warden Parker visited the Justice Center in November of 2016, where he toured the school, the computer lab, the male juvenile pod, the SHU, the mental health unit, and the infirmary. He also spoke with juvenile inmates being held in the SHU as well as a juvenile who had been sanctioned with a “lock-in.” The Warden also conducted interviews with named plaintiffs C.I. and V.K. According to Warden Parker, the conditions in the SHU are “shockingly bad” and “some of the most horrible” he.has ever seen: the cells were filthy, dark, and covered in graffiti. The Warden, states that these conditions would never be tolerated in any of the various correctional facilities in which he has worked. Warden Parker also noted that one juvenile he spoke to had been sent to the SHU f or cursing, and another seemed to have had “no meaningful contact with any adult” since he had arrival at the Jail several weeks before. The Warden opines that Justice Center staff impose lengthy disciplinary isolation sanctions for minor behavior and “far too frequently overall.” He asserts that conditions in the SHU and the juvenile pod are “very harsh and troubling.” And although the Warden notes that he uses a “short-term version of room confinement” fqr juveniles in his own facility, he states that his review of disciplinary records from the Jail did not reveal even a single incident of misbehavior that, in his opinion, warranted the 28-hour disciplinary isolation frequently imposed by-Jail officials. Warden Parker further -opines that, even for fighting or violence, the “Justice Center is sending kids to solitary confinement in a manner that will surely create less safety and security in the jail, and not more.” In sum, Warden Parker concludes that “the frequency and length of time that youths at the Justice Center were sent to 23-hour isolation was not reasonably calculated to restore facility discipline and security.” 3. Dr. Kraus Dr. Kraus is Professor and Chief of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at Rush University Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois. He is also the Psychiatric Director at the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School, a residential treatment program for children and’ adolescents with serious emotional issues. In addition to these institutional responsibilities, he also assesses'and treats children and adolescents in a private practice setting. Dr. Kraus has worked with juveniles in various correctional settings for over 26 years, including 9 years as the treating psychiatrist at the, Illinois Maximum Security Youth Center in Joliet, Illinois. And like Dr. Krisberg and Warden Parker, Dr. Kraus has consulted on Government investigations into the discipline of youth in corrections settings and has served as a court-appointed monitor responsible for supervising the reform of juvenile mental health services in correctional facilities in Illinois and Arizona. Dr. Kraus also possesses extensive experience in the field of special education: for the past 22 years, he has participated in the development and implementation of individualized education programs for students with IDEA-qualifying disabilities and has testified in various settings on IDEA issues. Dr. Kraus visited the Justice Center in September of 2016, where he evaluated ten juveniles being held there, a number which includes all six named plaintiffs. At that time, four were in SHU, one was in “lock-in,” three were on the juvenile pod, and two were in behavioral health units. Each 40- to 60-minute evaluation consisted of a clinical interview, a mental health status exam, and a depression screening. Dr. Kraus also toured the juvenile wing, the behavioral health units, the SHU, and reviewed the School District’s education policies and practices as they pertain to the Justice Center. Importantly, he also reviewed the individualized education programs in place for named plaintiffs V.W. and R.C. as well as the cell packets they had in their possession. According to Dr., Kraus, nine of the ten juveniles he interviewed have spent time in the SHU and most have also spent time in “lock-in” in their cells in the juvenile wing. Dr. Kraus notes that juveniles in lock-in and the SHU may be housed “within sight and sound” of adults at the Justice Center and, consequéntly, some juveniles have reported being verbally abused or sexually harassed by the adults. Dr. Kraus further notes that although Justice Center policy states that “no form of solitary confinement is used anywhere,” the reality of the Jail’s practices is “synonymous” with the definition of “solitary confinement” both as he understands the term and as that term has been adopted by professional organizations in the corrections field. According to Dr. Kraus, solitary confinement puts juveniles at a substantial risk of serious harm to their social, psychological, and emotional development. As he explains, solitary confinement perpetuates, worsens, or even in some cases precipitates mental health concerns that can lead to long-term and often permanent changes in adolescent brain development. Further, solitary confinement also poses serious risks of suicidal ideation — almost all suicides in the juvenile correctional settings occur in some type of isolation. According to Dr. Kraus, the level of isolation and consistently inadequate degree of attention being paid to juveniles’ mental health needs being experienced by juvenile inmates at the Justice Center poses serious risks of precisely this sort of lasting psychological harm. In fact, records show that juveniles at the Jail who reported suicidal ideation or intent were brought to barren “strip cells” and did not receive any meaningful therapeutic services. In Dr. Kraus’s opinion, juveniles will recant these reports simply so they can get out of isolation and have a chance to return to the general population. Dr. Kraus also concluded that the School District provides inadequate special education instruction and services for juveniles with disabilities that qualify under the IDEA. Dr. Kraus reviewed “cell packets” provided to V.W. and R.C. and compared them to the IEPs in place for these juveniles. In his opinion, the cell packets were not tailored to these juveniles’ IEPs; “in fact, the cell packets were not even tailored to their grade levels.” G. Government’s Statement of Interest Although the Government takes no official position on the pending litigation, its submission is strongly supportive of plaintiffs’ position on the solitary confinement issue. First, the Government points out that the Supreme Court has recently emphasized the particular developmental vulnerabilities of youthful offenders. Second, the Government draws attention to instances in which it has exercised its own statutory authorization to institute civil actions to address issues related to the use of solitary confinement of juveniles in detention centers in New York, Alabama, Mississippi, Maryland, and Ohio. Third, the Government offers data that backs up Dr. Kraus’s opinions — the still-developing brains of juveniles ’ face increased susceptibility to lasting damage from the imposition of solitary confinement. Fourth, the Government states that in the last year the Federal Bureau of Prisons has ended the practice of allowing solitary confinement for juveniles^ Finally, the Government explains that it has since promulgated non-binding “Guiding Principles” intended as best practices for state and local correctional facilities. As relevant here, these guiding principles indicate juveniles., should not be placed in restrictive housing at all and should only be separated from others on a temporary basis in emergency circumstances. H. NAACP’s Amici Brief The NAACP’s brief draws attention to the same emerging scientific consensus stressed by plaintiffs’ experts as well as the same body of relevant case law set forth by the Government in its statement of interest. In addition, the NAACP’s brief identifies additional data tending to show that disciplinary isolation is disproportionately meted out to juveniles of color. As the NAACP’s brief explains, “[rjacial disparities have long persisted where authorities have greater discretion in punishment.” III. DISCUSSION A. Class Certification A district court enjoys broad discretion when it comes to resolving questions of class certification because it “is often in the best position to assess the propriety of the class and has the ability, ..., to alter or modify the class, create subclasses, and decertify the class whenever warranted.” Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). However, because the class action device is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and ori behalf of the individual named parties only,” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01, 99 S.Ct. 2646, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979), “[a] party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate [its] compliance with the Rule.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 361, 131 S.Ct. 2641, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (emphasis added) (“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.”). Accordingly, “the district court is required to make a ‘definitive assessment of Rule 23 requirements, notwithstanding their overlap with merits issues,’ and must resolve material factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement.” Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 476 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In re IPO”). First, Rule 23 requires a party seeking certification to demonstrate that: (1) the class is so numerous that join-der of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Second, the' Rule requires a party to satisfy at least, one of three additional requirements: (1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dis-positive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). (4) Finally, courts have written a third, “implied requirement” into the Rule: a party seeking certification must demonstrate that the proposed class is “ascertainable.” Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., LLC, 285 F.R.D. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Under this additional element, “[a]n identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria.” Stinson v. City of N.Y., 282 F.R.D. 360, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). In sum, “[cjlass certification is appropriate where the proposed class meets, by a preponderance of the evidence following a court’s ‘rigorous analysis,’ the requirements of Rule 23(a) and the proposed class constitutes one of the types of classes enumerated in Rule 23(b).” Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 367 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs seek to certify (1) a class composed of “[a]ll 16- and 17-year-olds who are now or will be incarcerated at -the Onondaga County Justice Center” as well as (2) a subclass of “[a]ll 16- and 17-year-olds with disabilities, as defined by the [IDEA], who are now- or will be incarcerated at the Onondaga County Justice Center, who are in need- of special education and related services'.” Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Class Cert., ECF No. 5-1, 18. This motion was granted during the February 15, 2017 hearing. As explained there, neither the Onondaga County defendants nor the School District have meaningfully opposed plaintiffs’ request for class certification. For its part, the Onondaga County defendants have not submitted any opposition* And as for the School District, its summary, judgment- filing simply invites the Court to grant summary judgment in its favor before issuing a ruling on the class certification question. The School District’s invitation is declined for reasons that will be made clear later in this decision. Nevertheless, because a party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate -compliance with Rule 23’s requirements, the relevant findings are based on plaintiffs’ submissions in support of this motion arid are set forth below. 1. Numerosity The first element requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). This inquiry is “not " strictly mathematical” but rather requires a court to “take into account the context of the particular case, in particular whether a class is superior to joinder based on other relevant factors including: (i) judicial economy, (ii) geographic dispersion, (iii) the financial resources of class members, (iv) their ability to sue separately, and (v) request for injunctive relief that would involve future class members.” Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993)). In other words, “[t]he nu-merosity requirement in Rule 23(a)(1) does not mandate that joinder of all parties be impossible — only that the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class make use of the class action appropriate.” Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 604 F.3d 229, 244-46 (2d Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs have clearly carried their burden on this element. As an initial matter, both the class and the subclass, even considered individually, exceed forty members. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 772 F.3d at 120 (“Numerosity is presumed for classes larger than forty members.”). With respect to the class, plaintiffs’ uncontested submissions, based primarily on data produced by the Onondaga County defendants, indicates that at least 86 different juveniles were placed in solitary confinement between October 1, 2016 and August 31, 2016. With respect to the subclass, plaintiffs’ uncontested submissions, based on a review of New York State Education Department records, indicate that the Jail held 58 juveniles with an IDEA-qualifying disability during the 2014-16 school year. In addition, the contextual factors also weigh heavily in favor of certification. For instance, plaintiffs’ class and subclass include all future juvenile pre-trial detainees at the Justice Center, the sort of revolving population that makes joinder of individual members a difficult proposition. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Coughlin, 783 F.Supp. 789, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The class action device is particularly well-suited in actions brought by prisoners due to the ‘fluid composition’ of the prison population ... [and] generally tend[s] to be the norm in actions such as this.”). And while the class members will obviously share the same geographic area, the ability of any one individual member of the class or the subclass to maintain an individual suit will necessarily be limited by the simple reality that they are being detained as part of the criminal justice process. Cf. Redmond v. Bigelow, 2014 WL 2765469, at *3 (D. Utah June 18, 2014) (acknowledging that individual members of a putative class of prisoners would face myriad practical difficulties in maintaining individual suits because they “enjoy very little freedom in their daily lives” such as the fact they “are not at liberty to meet and confer with counsel without .permission” from prison authorities). Finally, litigating this suit as a class action promotes judicial economy, since it avoids multiple individual suits that raise the same issues and seek the same relief— an end to solitary confinement for juve.niles being held at the Justice Center, and an end to the deprivation of education and special education services attendant to that treatment. Cf. Williams v. Conway, 312 F.R.D. 248, 251 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (McAvoy, J.) (certifying class of present and future deaf and hearing-impaired prisoners at the Justice Center). Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the class and the subclass are sufficiently numerous such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 2. Commonality This element requires plaintiffs to demonstrate there “are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Importantly, this “does not require all questions of law or fact to be common,” and “even a single common question will suffice.” Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 286; see also Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The commonality requirement is met if plaintiffs’ grievances share a common question of law or of fact.”); Trief v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 144 F.R.D. 193, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Commonality does not mandate that all class members make identical claims and arguments, only that common issues of fact or law affect all class members.”). “The common question must lend itself to ‘classwide resolution’ such that ‘determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’ ” Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 286 (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541). Importantly, “factual differences in the claims of the class do not preclude a finding of commonality.” Id. at 287 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, what matters is “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. at 286 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs- have met their burden on this element as well. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that the Onondaga County defendants and the School District have applied a common course Of unlawful conduct to the members of the class and subclass, that the Onondaga County defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm posed by certain aspects of that common course of conduct, and that the School District and the Onondaga County defendants have collectively deprived plaintiffs of the education, special services, and related procedural protections to which they are entitled. The common answers to these questions will drive the resolution of the litigation— whether defendants’ conduct violates the Constitution or federal law, and whether defendants should therefore be enjoined from engaging in that course of conduct. See, e.g., Williams, 312 F.R.D. at 253 (finding commonality requirement satisfied based on “jail’s alleged failure to provide class members with services for the deaf and hearing-impaired” because these grievances share a common question of law or fact and arise from the same course of events); Butler v. Suffolk Cty., 289 F.R.D. 80, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Whether the County was aware of and deliberately indifferent to the conditions at the [jail] is a common question subject to class-wide resolution.”); McGee v. Pallito, 2015 WL 5177770, at *4 (D. Vt. Sept. 4, 2015) (finding “common issue” of whether prison officials’ policy amounted to deliberate indifference and observing that “common questions” pertinent to the individual class members “frame the ultimate question of whether the Defendants’ policy violates the Constitution, such that they should be enjoined from implementing it”); see also Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 681 (9th Cir. 2014) (observing that “numerous courts have concluded that the commonality requirement can be satisfied by proof of the existence of systemic polices and practices that allegedly expose inmates to a substantial risk of harm”). Plaintiffs’ subclass meets the commonality requirement for substantially the same reasons. In particular, plaintiffs allege the School District’s policy of only sporadically delivering “cell packets” in lieu of direct instruction and, relatedly, defendants’ alleged failure to conduct manifestation determinations prior to imposing discipline of a certain duration, amounts to the systemic deprivation of individualized special education services in violation of the IDEA. See, e.g., R. A-G ex rel. R.B. v. Buffalo City. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2013 WL 3354424, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (“Buffalo City Sch. Dist.”) (permitting district-wide class certification of IDEA-qualifying students because alleged violations are “systemic, not individuar), aff'd sub nom. R.A.G. ex rel. R.B. v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 569 Fed.Appx. 41 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (noting the IDEA’S exhaustion requirement “was no barrier to class certification” where “Plaintiffs allege systemic failures ... [occurring] as a matter of District policy”). In sum, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that there are questions of law or fact common to the class and the subclass. 3. Typicality This requirement is satisfied if “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied when each class member’s claim arises from" the same course of events, and each class member makes similar arguments "to prove the defendant’s liability.” Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 370-71 (citation omitted). “When the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiffs and the prospective class, typicality Is usually met.” Id. at 371. Generally speaking, minor variations in the fact patterns underlying the individual claims will not preclude a finding of typicality unless there are “unique defenses” that threaten to become the focus of the - litigation. See Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 59, (2d Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs have carried their burden on-this elemént for substantially the same reasons as set forth above — the .members of the class and subclass share the same legal arguments because their claims are based on the common application of certain challenged policies. Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 287 (“The commonality and typicality, requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge such that similar considerations inform the analysis for both prerequisites.”); see also e.g., Butler, 289 F.R.D. at 99 (finding typicality satisfied where, for example, “whether exhaustion .should be excused because administrative remedies were unavailable ... is a question common to all members of the class”). Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class and the subclass. 4. Adequacy of Representation This requirement is satisfied if “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “[T]he adequacy requirement is twofold: the proposed class representative must have an interest in vigorously pursing the claims of the class, and must have no interests antagonistic to the interests of other class members.” Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 268 (2d. Cir. 2006). In addition, class counsel must be “qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation.” Baffa, 222 F.3d at 60. This inquiry. “serves, to uncover conflicts of interest between the parties and the class they seek to- represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). “Not every conflict, however, precludes a. finding-of adequacy.” Sykes, 285 F.R.D. at 287. “The conflict that will prevent a plaintiff from meeting the Rule 23(a)(4) prerequisite must be fundamental, and speculative conflict should be disregarded at-the. class certification stage.” Id. (citation omitted). “In order to defeat class certification, there must be a showing of a genuine conflict between the proposed class representative’s interests and those of the other members of the class, and only a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party’s claim of representative status.” Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 371 (quoting in part Hirschfeld v. Stone, 193 F.R.D. 175, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs have carried their burden on this element, As discussed above, the representatives of the class and the subclass have been subjected to the same common course of treatment by the same officials on the" basis of the same policies. Each named plaintiff has expressed a clear desire to seek prospective injunctive relief from these policies, a benefit that will inure .to juveniles detained at the Justice Center in the future. , Further, class counsel have extensive litigation experience in the class action context and in effectively seeking class-wide injunctive relief in federal forums. See, e.g., Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F.Supp.3d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Scheindlin, J.) (approving class settlement in litigation brought by New York Civil Liberties Unions and observing that “[t]his litigation, and the:way it has been handled by all of the attorneys, is the best example of the power of impact litigation to redress conditions that affect the most vulnerable members of Our society”); Williams, 312 F.R.D. at 254 (finding this element met and certifying class of pre-trial detainees at Jail in litigation brought by Legal Services of Central New York). Accordingly, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and the subclass. 5. Rule 23(b) Plaintiffs also satisfy this requirement. They rely on Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted — the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360, 131 S.Ct. 2541. Here, the members of the class and the subclass would benefit from the same remedy — an order enjoining defendants from application of the policies and practices resulting in the deprivations at issue. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (“ Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.”). Accordingly, plaintiffs have met their burden on this element. 6. Ascertainability Plaintiffs have also satisfied this requirement. The members of both the class and the subclass are readily identifiable pursuant to objective criteria, including but not limited to the records maintained by the Onondaga County defendants and the School District. In sum, plaintiffs have affirmatively demonstrated their compliance with the requirements for class certification. B. Summary Judgment Next, the School District has moved for summary judgment in an attempt to avoid any further direct involvem.ent in this litigation. According to the School District, it does not, and cannot, bear responsibility for any of conditions at the Justice Center. First, the School District contends that the only reason juveniles in solitary confinement receive “cell packets” in lieu of direct instruction is because the Onondaga County defendants refuse to permit School District personnel any direct access to juveniles in solitary. Second, the School District claims that its intake processes at the Jail include appropriate screening mechanisms to identify juveniles entitled to special education services. Third, the School District claims plaintiffs have failed to administratively exhaust their IDEA claims. Generally speaking, the entry of summary judgment is warranted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is “material” for purposes of this inquiry if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Jeffreys v. City of N.Y., 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005). A material fact is genuinely in dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided with respect to any essential element of the claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 2505. T he failure to meet this burden warrants denial of the motion. Id. However, in the event this initial burden is met, the opposing party must then show, through affidavits or otherwise, that there is a material issue of fact for trial. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must resolve any ambiguities and draw all inferences from the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 553. In sum, summary judgment is inappropriate where “review of the record reveals sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find in the [non-movant’s] favor.” Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (summary judgment is appropriate only when “there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict”). Plaintiffs oppose the School District’s early bid for a ruling on the merits by pointing out that formal discovery has not even begun and asserting they should be given an opportunity to test the accuracy of the School District’s claim of blamelessness before it should be excused from this matter. Plaintiffs contend there is a genuine need for discovery into the question of causation: “the issue of which policies and practices — the School District’s or the Sheriffs [Office defendants] or both— caused the [ ] violations” at issue. According to plaintiffs, there is also a need for discovery into what efforts, if any, the School District took to overcome the Onondaga County defendants’ stonewalling, since sustained inaction by policymakers in the face of known violations can give rise to liability as well. In fact, plaintiffs assert that even taking the School District at its word should not give rise to summary judgment in its favor at- this juncture, since the School District has failed to demonstrate that the Onondaga County defendants’ alleged interference, even if it should prove to be the sole cause of the violations, somehow operates to absolve the School District from its shared legal responsibility under the relevant governing laws. And as for exhaustion, plaintiffs assert that it may be excused where, as here, a party challenges “systemic” violations of the IDEA. When a party seeks to take advantage of the safety valve found in Rule 56(d) to resist summary judgment on the ground that it needs to conduct discovery in order to defeat the motion, “the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations-or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “In our Circuit, a nonmovant seeking additional discovery in the face of a pending summary judgment motion must submit an affidavit including ‘the nature of the uncompleted discovery; how the facts sought are reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact; what efforts the affiant has made to obtain those facts; and why those efforts were unsuccessful.’” DePaola v. City of N.Y., 586 Fed.Appx. 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (quoting Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1138 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Lunts v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 515 Fed.Appx. 11, 13 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order). In light of these considerations, the School District’s motion for summary judgment must be denied. As the above recitation makes clear, summary judgment is a procedural mechanism typically employed after the completion of discovery. Indeed, “[o]nly in the rarest of cases may summary judgment be granted against a plaintiff who has not been afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery.” Hellstrom v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 201 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Trebor Sportswear Co., Inc. v. The Limited Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The nonmoving party should not be ‘railroaded’ into his offer of proof in opposition to summary judgment.”). Of course, “you cannot use discovery to find out whether you have a claim.” Gene Codes Forensics, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 812 F.Supp.2d 295, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also DePaola, 586 Fed.Appx. at 71 (“[A] party may not use Rule 56(d) as a means of finding out whether it has a case.”). Therefore, even when a Rule 56(d) motion satisfies the necessary requirements, “a district court may refuse to allow additional discovery ‘if it deems the request to be based on speculation as to what potentially could be discovered’ — that is, a mere fishing expedition.” Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Marshall Granger & Co., LLP, 921 F.Supp.2d 111, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Seneca Beverage Corp. v. Healthnow N.Y., Inc., 200 Fed.Appx. 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order)); see also Legends Are Forever, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 58 F.Supp.3d 197 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (Kahn, J.) (“[A] district' court may refuse a party’s request for additional discovery if the party has had ampié time in which to pursue the discovery that it now claims is essential.”). But those ' concerns are inapplicable here; “ There is a' critical distinction ,.. between cases where a litigant opposing a motion for summary judgment requests a stay of that motion to conduct additional discovery and cases where that same litigant opposes a motion for summary judgment oh the ground that it is entitled'to an opportunity to commence discovery” with respect to their claims. Crystalline H20, Inc. v. Orminski, 105 F.Supp.2d 3, 7 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (McAvoy, J.). First, plaintiffs have submitted an affidavit in compliance with our Circuit’s mandate explaining that discovery in this case has thus far been limited to their request for a preliminary injunction. See Cotter Decl., ECF No. 42-1. Among other things, it attests that plaintiffs will seek to depose various, high-ranking School District personnel to test the assertion that there is no causal relationship between any action or inaction attributable to the School District and any of the alleged violations. Plaintiffs also attest that they will seek information concerning what efforts, if any, the School District has taken to educate juveniles in solitary confinement and how those efforts have allegedly been stymied by the Onondaga County defendants. According to plaintiffs, information gained during this process will bear on plaintiffs’ IDEA claims as well as their Fourteenth Amendment claims. As the , affidavit also explains, plaintiffs have not yet had an opportunity to obtain any of this information because it is not within the scope of discovery initially authorized for the limited purpose of briefing the preliminary injunction. Despite its continued protestations to the contrary, these outstanding discovery issues and the other material identified by plaintiffs in their Rule 56(d) affidavit do in fact bear on claims of allegedly systemic violations that are viable, and may even ultimately prove successful, against the School District for reasons that will be explained in greater detail below. See, e.g., Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.E., 321 F.3d 292, 303 (2d Cir. 2003) .(“The nonmov-ing party must have had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition to the motion for summary judgment.”). . Considerations of basic fairness also counsel against granting the School District’s motion ,at this juncture. The Statement of Undisputed Material Facts on which the School District relies to establish its initial burden of demonstrating its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law relies almost entirely on three declarations. These three declarations come from David Tantillo, one of the full-time special education teachers employed by the School District as part of its Incarcerated Education Program, John A. Dittman, Jr., the Principal of the School District’s alternative education program center, and Signe Nelson, the School District’s “Incarcerated Education. Coordinator.” The sum and substance of each of these declarations support the School District’s contention that the blame for these alleged violations lies at the feet of the Onondaga County defendants. But plaintiffs have not yet been given an opportunity to test the veracity of the “undisputed” facts set forth in these declarations — among other things, they have not yet had an opportunity to depose any of these individuals. That is not how the truth-testing feature of our adversary system of litigation is generally thought to work best. See, e.g., Am. Home Assur. Co v. ZIM JAMAICA, 418 F.Supp.2d 537, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). (“A deposition is, perhaps, the- best method of assessing [declarant’s] credibility and discovering additional facts [relevant to the litigation].”); G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, 2002 WL 31251702, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2002) (deferring consideration of a summary judgment motion where the version of facts set forth by defendants had not yet been subject to cross-examination through a deposition and collecting cases). In sum, “Rule 56(d) is intended as a safeguard .against premature grants of summary judgment and should generally be applied with a spirit of liberality.” Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., 319 F.R.D. 440, 2017 WL 194284, at *14 (D. Conn. Jan. 18, 2017). With that liberal spirit firmly in mind, the School District’s motion for summary judgment is denied. C. Preliminary Injunction “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Chobani, LLC, 158 F.Supp.3d 106, 114 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)). “The party seeking the injunction carries the burden of persuasion to demonstrate, ‘by a clear showing,’ that the necessary elements are satisfied.” Reckitt Benckiser Inc. v. Motomco Ltd., 760 F.Supp.2d 446, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997)). As a general matter, the party seeking preliminary relief must show: “(1) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions as- to the merits plus a balance of hardships that tips decidedly in their favor; (3) that the balance of hardships tips in their favor regardless of the likelihood of success; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.” Gen. Mills, Inc., 158 F.Supp.3d at 115; see also Chobani, LLC v. Dannon Co., Inc., 157 F.Supp.3d 190, 199 (N.D.N.Y. 2016). However, in cases like this one, where the movant is not seeking to restore the status quo ante but rather requesting an order that commands an affirmative act or mandates a specific course of conduct, a heightened standard applies: this type of preliminary injunction should issue only “upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief.” Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also N.Y. ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d Cir. 2015). (requiring a “clear” or “substantial” likelihood of success as well as a “strong showing” of irreparable harm); N.J. v. New York, 872 F.Supp.2d 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“This higher standard is particularly appropriate when a plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction against a government body such as a school district.”). “In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution so as not to immerse the federal judiciary in the management of [ ] prisons.” Fisher v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 167 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846-47, 114 S.Ct. 1970). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), preliminary injunctive relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct' that harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)). In considering a request for injunctive relief, a court must give “substantial weight” to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system the relief might have. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 1. Substantial Likelihood of Success Plaintiffs assert three claims: first, they allege the .Onondaga County defendants’ routine use of solitary confinement on juveniles violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; second, they allege the Onondaga County defendants and the School District deny juveniles in solitary confinement the minimum educational.instruction guaranteed by state law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; - and third, they allege the Onondaga County defendants and the School District .deprive juveniles with IDEA-qualifying disabilities of the special education services and other procedural protections to which they are entitled. i. Eighth Amendment As a general matter, a convicted prisoner is obligated to pursue relief for allegedly unconstitutional conditions under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment while a pre-trial detainee’s claim is properly brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This distinction makes sense, because “the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilty in acco