McKinney/Pearl Restaurant Partners, L.P. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (241 F. Supp. 3d 737, 2017)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JANE J. BOYLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

' Before the Court are Defendants Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), OBRE, Inc., f/k/a CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (CBRE), and MCPP 2100 McKinney, LLC’s (MCPP) Motions for Summary Judgment. Docs. 194,195, and-196. For the reasons explained below, MetLife’s and MCPP’s motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and CBRE’s motion is DENIED.

Also before the Court are (1) Defendants’ motions to strike or exclude the testimony of fourteen experts designated by Plaintiff and (2) Plaintiffs motions to exclude or limit the testimony of ten experts designated by Defendants. As explained in Part III.A below, all motions to strike, exclude, or limit expert testimony filed by either side are DENIED without prejudice at tips time.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

This landlord-tenant dispute arises from the alleged breach of a lease agreement by the property owner. In short, Plaintiff contends MetLife, the property owner, failed to maintain and repair the structural system of the leased premises as required under the lease and — in conspiracy with CBRE, the property manager — made various misrepresentations regarding the cause of and efforts to remedy the structural issues.

Plaintiff McKinney/Pearl Restaurant Partners, L.P., d/b/a Sambuca (Plaintiff or Sambuca), operates a restaurant in the Uptown neighborhood of Dallas, Texas. Doc. 120, Pl.’s 4th Am. Compl. ¶ 8. Sambu-ca began as an upscale jazz restaurant in the Deep Ellum neighborhood of Dallas in 1991. Id. On October 6, 2003, Sambuca entered into a commercial- lease agreement (Lease Agreement or Lease) with non-party 2100 Partners, L.P. for approximately 9,000 square feet of space to move its restaurant to Uptown. Id. The Lease was for an initial ten-year term with two five-year renewal options. Id. The Lease provided, among- other things, that the landlord “shall keep and maintain- in good condition and repair: (A) the roof and structural system of the Restaurant Building....” Defs.’ App. 1855, Lease Agreement § 7(b)(ii).

After signing the Lease, Plaintiff worked with 2100 Partners, L.P. to commence “the necessary work to finish-out and ready the building.” Doc. 280, Pl.’s Consolidated Statement of Facts ¶ 9 [hereinafter PL’s CSF], Aware that the previous tenant had experienced plumbing issues, Plaintiff engaged consultants to investigate and remedy these issues, which Plaintiff contends were resolved at that time. Id.

. Less than a year into the Lease, on July 12, 2004, 2100 Partners, L.P. sold the property to MetLife. Doc. 202, Defs.’ Consolidated Statement of Facts 10 [hereinafter Defs.’ CSF]. Upon purchasing the property, MetLife contracted with the previous property manager — Trammell Crow Company, which merged with CB Richard Ellis, Inc. in. December 2006 and later became CBRE — to continue managing the property. Doc, 202, Defs.’ CSF 11; Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶ 11. .

On June 2, 2009, Plaintiff notified CBRE that it was “seeing a TON of movement-in the building lately,” specifically complaining of drywall damage, an inoperable door, and an expanding crack in the concrete floor of the kitchen area. Defs.’ App. 100. CBRE sent an employee to observe the damage, engaged a contractor to rule out the possibility that a leak under the building was causing the movement, and notified MetLife of the issue. Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 12-13; Defs.’ App. 1698. Having determined that the plumbing lines beneath the building were intact, CBRE hired a structural engineer to investigate the cause of the cracking. Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 13. CBRE’s structural engineer believed that soil expansion, or heave, under the east side of the building was the most likely cause. Id. Thus, in the summer of 2009, CBRE and MetLife began a “phased investigation” to determine the cause of the heave. Id. This so-called “phased investigation” is at the center of the dispute between the parties. Defendants contend that the “phased investigation” was necessary to systematically eliminate possible causes of the heave, starting with the most likely and moving to the least likely. Id. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues the “phased investigation” was merely a ruse to delay necessary repairs and ultimately drive Sambuca out of the leased property in favor of a more profitable tenant. Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶¶ 17-18.

The investigation started with the excavation of two test pits to observe the voids underneath the grade beam in July 2009. Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 13; Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶ 18. The following month, CBRE’s structural engineer also ordered the excavation and examination of the flume trench drain. Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 14. Neither revealed the cause of the heave, and in August 2009, CBRE’s structural engineer recommended additional geotechnical testing. Id. In September 2009, Sambuca experienced a partial drain-line collapse, which it attributed to the “movement” issues previously reported to CBRE. Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶¶ 19-21; Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 18-19. Sambuca hired a plumber to replace the collapsed portion of the drain line, and upon CBRE’s recommendation, MetLife reimbursed Sambuca for the repair. Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶¶ 19-21; Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 18-19. Sambuca’s plumber recommended replacing additional portions of the drain lines, as did Defendants’ own contractor, but “CBRE decided to continue the ongoing investigation that [Defendants] had started in June” instead. Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 16-17.

Sambuca “continued to experience significant structural movement and related distress” throughout the fall of 2009 and, on November 3, 2009, sent a letter to CBRE detailing the ongoing issues. Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶ 21; PL’s App. 2445. Plaintiff sent an additional letter noting “increasing foundation issues and expenses incurred ... in relation to such” on December 8, 2009. Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶ 21; PL’s App. 2471. In February 2010, CBRE ordered the geotechnical tests previously recommended by its structural engineer. However, the additional testing did not reveal the cause of the structural movement. Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶ 23; Doc 202, Defs.’ CSF 19-20. CBRE also retested the plumbing lines for leaks in March 2010— and found none — and sent cameras down the grease-drain lines. Doc 202, Defs.’ CSF 19-20. CBRE’s structural engineer also recommended a zip elevation survey, which MetLife paid for in June 2010. Id. Although both Plaintiffs and Defendants’ consultants recommended replacing additional sections of the drain lines, MetLife “decided to hold off on replacing the main drain lines” because these “geotechnical tests did not indicate that drain lines were leaking and causing the heave.” Id.

In July 2010, Sambuca again notified CBRE that it was experiencing building distress. Id. at 21. CBRE’s structural engineer inspected the building again in August 2010 but was still unable to locate the cause of the movement. Id. at 22. He recommended waiting another six months to conduct a second elevation survey. Id. In the meantime, CBRE hired a contractor to apply epoxy to fill the cracks in the floor. Id. In March and April 2011, MetLife paid for the second floor elevation survey and hired a contractor to re-camera the drain lines, which revealed broken and missing sections of pipe in the lines. Id.

During the summer of 2011, Plaintiff sent several additional notices to MetLife and CBRE documenting the issues it continued to experience and complaining about the length of the investigation. Id. On August 22, 2011, CBRE responded by letter that the drainage and foundation issues at the property were “one-in-the-same” and that CBRE planned to completely replace the two primary drain lines at Sambuca beginning in January 2012 to “correct defects caused by movements in foundation.” Defs.’ App. 744. Later, on November 8, 2011, Defendants’ counsel also informed Plaintiff that after the drain line replacement project was completed, it would take 12 to 18 months for the ground to “fully settle,” after which “the remaining repairs to the structural system of the building [would] then be completed.” Doc. 280, Pl.’s CSF ¶ 30. Plaintiffs contend such representations were made to them repeatedly by various representatives of both CBRE and MetLife. Id. Although Plaintiff expressed doubt — both before and after the drain line replacement project— that the drainage and plumbing issues were causing the foundation movement, Plaintiff contends it went along with the repair plan with the understanding that all of the structural issues would eventually be addressed after the ground “settled.” Id. ¶¶ 27-85.

The drain-line replacement project began in January 2012 and was completed in March 2012. Id. ¶ 37. MetLife paid for the project, which was completed after hours so Sambuca did not have to shut down the restaurant. Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 25-26. On April 19, 2012, Sambuca reiterated to CBRE by email that it did not believe the drainage issues were causing the foundation movement. Defs.’ App. 304-08. In response, MetLife sent a letter on May 3, 2012, stating it was “confident, although unable to guaranty, that the primary source of moisture under the foundation [had] been remedied” and that Defendants were “past the stage of expending additional time and money on further research and work unless and until it is determined that the work performed to date does not solve the problem.” Pl.’s App. 2376-78.

Plaintiff contends that movement-related issues continued during the summer of 2012, and Plaintiff sent another letter expressing its position to MetLife on August 31, 2012. PL’s App. 77. MetLife agreed to pay for a soil analysis, which was conducted in February 2013. Doc. 202, Defs.’ App. 29-30. The results of that study indicated that all “observation wells were observed to be dry on each of the three consecutive weekly readings,” meaning that “either the source of water under the floor slab has been corrected or the available water under the slab has temporarily been distributed to the dryer surrounding area.” Defs.’ App. 1539. Thus, the results of soil testing were, yet again, inconclusive as to the cause of the movement.

Despite these ongoing issues, Plaintiff notified MetLife on March 22, 2013, of its intention to exercise the first five-year renewal option in the Lease. Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶¶ 39-40. The Lease provided that renewal rent would be determined by the “Market Rate” at the time of renewal, and it outlined a method for determining the Market Rate in the event that the parties disagreed on the rate. Lease Agreement, Ex. E ¶2. The parties were not able to agree on a Market Rate using the procedures provided in the Lease, so Plaintiff filed the current suit in state court in October 2013. Notwithstanding the pending lawsuit, the parties executed the Third Amendment to the Lease on March 31, 2014, which left the rental rate unchanged “until such time as the Market Rate is finally determined in accordance with Exhibit E to the Lease.” Lease Agreement, 3d Am. ¶ 3.

On October 23, 2015, MetLife transferred the leased premises to .MCPP as part of a larger transaction by which it transferred several real-estate assets to MCPP-affiliated entities across the country. Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 35. Defendants admit, however, that MetLife “continues to oversee the Premises on behalf óf MCPP,” and “CBRE continues to manage the Premises.” Id.

B. Procedural History

■ Plaintiff initially filed suit against only MetLife in Texas state court on October 7, 2013. Doc. 2, Notice of Removal, App. 4-17. The original state-court petition included only claims for breach of contract and repudiation/anticipatory breach of contract, as well as requests for specific performance and declaratory judgment. Id, at 12-15. Based on information received in discovery in the breach-of-contract suit, Plaintiff later amended the state-court petition on June 13, 2014, adding CBRE as a defendant and asserting the following tort causes of action against both CBRE and MetLife: (1) fraud; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) civil conspiracy; and (4) aiding and abetting. Doc. 3, Notice of Removal, App. 249-69. The amended state-court petition also added an additional contract-based claim for breach of the warranty of quiet enjoyment against MetLife. Id. at 262-63.'

CBRE timely removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1, Notice of Removal. Plaintiff filed its Second Amended Complaint on August 11, 2014 (doc. 13), and its Third Amended Complaint on August 22, 2014 (doc, 17). The Third Amended Complaint added a request for rescission of the Lease renewal. Doc. 17, 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 82.

Because MetLife subsequently sold the leased premises to MCPP, Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint added MCPP as a defendant on and asserted the following claims against it as the current property owner: (1) breach of contract; (2) repudiation/anticipatory breach of contract; and (3) breach of the warranty of quiet enjoyment. Doc. 120, 4th Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-53. Plaintiff also requested specific performance and declaratory judgment regarding MCPP. Id. ¶¶ 79-84.

Defendants each filed motions for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them on June 17, 2016. Defendants filed a single consolidated statement of facts (doc. 202) and individual motions for summary judgment (docs. 194, 195, 196) with briefs in support (docs, 197, 198, 199). Plaintiff responded with a single consolidated statement of facts (doc. 280) and individual responses (docs. 277, 278, 279), and Defendants replied (docs. 294, 295). Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are ripe for review.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is .appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute “is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdicf for the non-moving party.” Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007). And a fact “is ‘material’ if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Id.

The burden is on the movant to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). Usually, this requires the movant to identify “those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the non-movant ultimately bears the burden of proof at trial, however, the movant may satisfy its burden just by pointing to the absence of evidence supporting the non-movant’s case. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If the movant meets, its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to “show with significant probative evidence that there exists a genuine issue of material fact.” Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994)). “[M]etaphysical doubt as to material facts,” “conclusory allegations,” “unsubstantiated assertions,” or a mere “scintilla of evidence” will not do. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Rather, “the non-mov-ant must go beyond the pleadings and present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial.” Bluebonnet Hotel Ventures, L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 754 F.3d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

In determining whether a genuine issue exists, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000). But .the Court need not “sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary-judgment.” Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)). Rather, the non-movant must “identify specific evidence in the record” and “articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports [its] claim.” Id. If it cannot do so, then the Court must grant summary judgment. Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.

III.

ANALYSIS

Before getting to the summary judgment motions themselves, there are two preliminary matters the Court must address: (1) the motions to strike, exclude or limit the testimony of experts; and (2) each side’s evidentiary objections to the other’s summary-judgment evidence. •

A. Motions to Strike, Exclude, or Limit Expert Testimony

Defendants filed their motions for summary judgment on June 17, 2016. Docs. 194, 195, 196. Before Plaintiff could respond to the motions for summary judgment, Defendants filed motions to strike or exclude the testimony of fourteen of Plaintiffs designated experts. See supra note 1. Plaintiff responded to each motion, and Defendants replied in turn. After reviewing the vast summary judgment and expert-challenge record, the Court notes that Defendants’ summary-judgment motions are intertwined with, and in large part predicated upon, their challenges to Plaintiffs experts. For example, Defendants attack the causation and damages aspects of each cause of action, arguing that Plaintiff has no evidence of legally recoverable damages attributable to each cause of action, as well as that the economic-loss doctrine bars recovery on Plaintiffs tort claims. The Court finds these issues would be better addressed at or shortly before trial. Therefore, rather than decide the expert issues on the papers at this time, the Court DENIES without prejudice all of Defendants’ challenges to Plaintiffs experts, subject to those motions being re-raised at trial. To the extent Defendants’ summary-judgment motions rely on the expert challenges (ie., Defendants’ arguments regarding damages, causation, and the economic-loss doctrine), those portions of the motions for summary judgment are also DENIED at this time.

In apparent response to Defendants’ barrage of expert challenges, Plaintiff launched its own attack on ten of Defendants’ experts. See supra note 2. Defendants responded to each motion, and Plaintiff replied in turn. In the interest of fairness, and because the Court determines these issues can be best handled at or shortly before the time of trial as noted above, Plaintiffs challenges to Defendants’ experts are likewise DENIED without prejudice at this time, subject to their being re-raised at trial.

B. Objections to Summary Judgment Evidence

Next, the Court turns to the parties’ evidentiary objections, beginning with Defendants’ objection to Plaintiffs summary-judgment evidence.

L Defendants’ Objection to Plaintiffs Summary-Judgment Evidence

Defendants’ sole objection to Plaintiffs summary-judgment evidence regards a single statement in the affidavit of Kim Forsythe, Sambuca’s founder and co-owner. Doc. 287, Defs.’ Obj. to Pl.’s Summ. J. Evid [hereinafter Defs.’ Obj.]. Defendants object to Forsythe’s statement that “[t]he economic damages suffered by Sambuca as a result of Defendants’ breach of contract and fraud through May 19, 2016, are set forth by year in Exhibit H hereto, which is incorporated herein by reference.” Doc. 287, Defs.’ Obj. 1. Defendants apparently find objectionable the insinuation that Sambuca’s damages were “a result of’ Defendants alleged conduct. They argue this causation opinion linking Sambuca’s economic damages to Defendants’ conduct is conelusory and unreliable and was not properly disclosed. See generally doc. 287. The Court, however, finds this objection redundant of Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Designation and Exclude Expert Testimony of Non-retained Experts Kim Forsythe, Debbie Barber, Laura Dalager, and Jamie Spurgeon (doc. 228), which the Court has already denied without prejudice above. Therefore, Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED at this time.

2. Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Evidence

Plaintiff raised numerous objections to Defendants’ summary-judgment evidence (doc. 263), to which Defendants responded (doc. 289). In reply, Plaintiff withdrew several objections but stood on a handful of others. Doc. 336, Pl.’s Reply. As to those remaining objections identified in Plaintiffs Reply (doc. 336), the Court agrees with the reasoning provided by Plaintiff for each objection and SUSTAINS the objection and STRIKES the evidence from the summary-judgment record with the following exceptions:

i Emails from Kari Delamore (CBRE) to Jill Boyd (Sambuca)

Plaintiff objected to three emails offered by Defendants. Doc. 263, PL’s Obj. 3. The emails were from Kari Delamore of CBRE to Jill Boyd of Sambuca and were sent in August 2011 and January 2012. Doc. 263, Pl.’s Obj. 3. The first email was from August 30, 2011, in which Delamore explained that Defendants were waiting on a response from their engineering team regarding whether they would be able to repair the “cosmetic” issues immediately after the drain-line replacement, or whether they would need to wait “to allow for settling.” Defs.’ App. 1118-19. Presumably having received a response, Delamore notified Boyd the following day that Defendants would need to wait until the ground dried out. Id. at 1118. The third email, dated January 21, 2012, confirms that the drain-line replacement project was scheduled to begin on January 29, 2012, and notes that Defendants would reassess what steps should be taken once the replacement was completed. Id. at 1120. Plaintiff argues these “emails contain hearsay statements which are not admissible without a hearsay exception.” Doc. 263, PL’s Obj. 3. However, Plaintiff submitted the exact same three emails in its own summary-judgment evidence. PL’s App. 3078 (Aug. 30, 2011 email), 3076 (Aug. 31, 2011 email), 2928 (Jan. 21, 2012 email). Therefore, Plaintiff’s objections to these emails are OVERRULED. See Dark. v. Hous. Methodist San Jacinto Hosp., No. H-14-3640, 2016 WL 2770545, at *2 n.13 & 14 (S.D. Tex. May 12, 2016).

ii. Daniel Cantu deposition excerpt

Next, Plaintiff objected to a portion of the deposition testimony of Daniel Cantu, former chief engineer at CBRE, in which Cantu answered a question posed by Plaintiffs counsel regarding why Defendants would have hired their own plumbing contractor to investigate the drain line if Plaintiffs plumber had already repaired the issue. Doc. 263, PL’s Obj. 4. At the deposition, Plaintiffs counsel asked Cantu the following question:

Q: Okay. Now, if — if EPS corrected and repaired the issues, then why would it be necessary for you to hire TDI to do additional investigation of the main drain line?

Defs.’ App. 361, Dep. of Daniel Cantu 87:3-6. And Cantu answered as follows:

A: It was because maybe the building was still moving. I — I don’t recall. I mean, it was — there was a reason why, but I just don’t recall right now. But if— if — if we have TD — TDI come back after those folks, it’s either I was inspecting EPS’ work to make sure everything was done right or maybe because the building was still moving and we need to do some more in-depth investigation on it.

Defs.’ App. 361, Dep. of Daniel Cantu 87:7-14.

Plaintiff objected that “[tjhese statements are impermissible speculations and are not based on personal knowledge.” Doc. 263, PL’s Obj. 5. Defendants responded that it was Plaintiffs own counsel who asked the question, and “[t]he fact that Sambuca did not like the answers it elicited is not a basis to exclude the testimony.” Doc. 289, Defs.’ Resp. to PL’s Obj. 11.

As Plaintiff notes, every witness must have personal knowledge of the matter about which they testify, regardless of who asks the question. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. However, the Court finds that, as chief engineer at CBRE, Cantu did have the requisite personal knowledge and was not speculating. Plaintiff asked why it would be necessary for CBRE to hire its own contractor; Cantu gave two reasons why it might be necessary: (1) to make sure the work was done right; or (2) because more investigation was needed. Therefore, Plaintiffs objection is OVERRULED.

Hi. Corporate representative deposition

Finally, Plaintiff objects to several excerpts from the deposition of its corporate representative, Debbie J, Barber, as being outside the scope of the Rule 30(b)(6) notice. Doc. 263, Pl.’s Obj. 6. For each objection, Plaintiff contends that, “[a]s objected to in the deposition, this line of questions seeks inquiry into topics outside those designated for the deposition. Consequently, the statements are made without sufficient personal knowledge and are speculative.” Id. Defendants responded that Barber was designated as Sambuca’s corporate representative on all topics related to damages and that all of the testimony to which Sambuca objects was within the scope of the noticed Rule 30(b)(6) topics. Doc. 289, Defs.’ Resp. to PL’s Obj. 12. In reply, Plaintiff argues that because the questions reference topics outside the 30(b)(6) notice “[n]one of those questions or corresponding answers from Ms. Barber’s corporate representative deposition can bind Sambu-ca,” and therefore “they all should be excluded from the summary judgment record.” Doe. 336, PL’s Reply to Defs.’ Resp. to PL’s Obj. 10-11. -

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not directed the Court to the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice for the Court to determine whether the line of questioning was or was not within the scope of the notice. However, assuming that Barber was designated as Sambuca’s corporate representa-^ tive “on all topics related to damages” as Defendants allege (and Plaintiff did not dispute), it would appear to the Court that the questions and answers objected to fall within that general scope. Finally, even if the questioning was outside the scope of the 30(b)(6) notice, the Court is not convinced that excluding the evidence would be necessary. Plaintiff is correct that “questions and answers exceeding the scope of the 30(b)(6) notice will not bind the corporation.” United States ex rel. Fisher v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 4:12-CV-543, 4:12-CV-461, 2016 WL 2997120, at *9 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2016) (citing Falchenberg v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 642 F.Supp.2d 156, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Detoy v. City and Cty. of S.F., 196 F.R.D. 362, 367 (N.D. Cal. 2000); King v. Pratt & Whitney, a Div. of United Techs., Corp., 161 F.R.D. 475, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff'd sub nom, King v. Pratt & Whitney, 213 F.3d 646 (11th Cir. 2000)). Such questions and answers “are merely treated as the answers of the individual deponent.” Falchenberg, 642 F.Supp.2d at 164. Therefore, even if the questions and answers were outside the scope of the notice, they would merely be the answers of Debbie J. Barber. Thus, Plaintiffs objections to the questions and answers of its designated corporate representative are OVERRULED.

C. Summary Judgment Motions

The Court now turns to the substance of Defendants’ summary-judgment motions. As noted above, Plaintiff asserts both tort and contract-based claims against MetLife, only contract claims against MCPP, and only tort claims against CBRE. Doc. 120, PL’s 4th Am. Compl. Each defendant has moved for summary judgment on every claim asserted against it. The Court would normally proceed by addressing each defendant’s motion for summary judgment one by one, however, in this case it makes sense to organize the discussion based on cause of action rather than by' motion. Thus, the Court begins with a discussion of MetLife’s motion for summary judgment with regard to the contract-based claims asserted against it as the property owner at the time the alleged breach began. Then it will move to MCPP’s motion for summary judgment regarding the contract claims asserted against MCPP as the current property owner. Next, it will address MetLife’s and CBRE’s motions for summary judgment with regard to Plaintiffs tort causes of action against them. And finally, the Court will discuss the motions for summary judgment as they relate to Plaintiffs requests for declaratory judgment and equitable relief.

L MetLife’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Contract-based Claims

Plaintiff asserted three causes of action against MetLife stemming from the Lease Agreement: (1) breach of the agreement; (2) repudiation/anticipatory breach of the agreement; and (3) breach of the express warranty of quiet enjoyment in the Lease. Doc. 120, Pl.’s 4th Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-53. .Though different causes of action with different elements, the allegations and evidence supporting all three claims are the same: that MetLife failed to “keep and maintain the structural system of the building in good condition and repair” as required under § 7(b)(ii) of the Lease. Id. ¶42. Under Texas law, “[t]he essential elements of a breach of contract action are: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach.” Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Egle Grp., LLC, 490 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Kalama Int’l, L.L.C., 51 S.W.3d 345, 351 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.)).

In support of its claim for repudiation/anticipatory breach of contract, Plaintiff contends that, following the renewal of the Lease, MetLife has taken the position that “certain language in the renewal option ... obviated ... any obligation to repair areas affected by the structural movement.” Doc. 120, Pl.’s 4th Am. Compl. ¶29. According to Plaintiff, MetLife has “made clear that [it] has no intention of complying with its Lease obligations.” Id. To prevail on a claim for anticipatory breach in Texas, a plaintiff must establish: (1) an absolute repudiation of the obligations; (2) a lack of just excuse for the repudiation; and (3) damage to the nonre-pudiating party. Narvaez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 757 F.Supp.2d 621, 630 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Gonzalez v. Denning, 394 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 2004)).

As to Plaintiffs third contract-based claim, Plaintiff contends MetLife’s failure to maintain the structural system of the premises violated the express warranty of quiet enjoyment in the Lease, which provides as follows:

Provided Tenant has performed all of the terms and conditions of this Lease to be performed by Tenant, Tenant shall peaceably and quietly hold and enjoy the Premises for the Term, without hindrance from Landlord or any party claiming by, through, or under Landlord, subject to the terms and conditions of this Lease.

Doc. 120, PL’s 4th Am. Compl. ¶ 50 (citing Lease Agreement § 23(h)). The elements of a traditional claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment are:

“(1) an intention on the part of the landlord that the tenant shall no longer enjoy the premises;, (2) a material.act by the landlord that substantially interferes with the tenant’s intended use and enjoyment of the premises; (3) an act that permanently deprives the' tenant of the use and enjoyment of the premises; and (4) abandonment of the premises by the tenant within a reasonable time after the commission of the act.” Lazell v. Stone, 123 S.W.3d 6, 11-12

(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (holding that the elements of a breach of the warranty of quiet enjoyment are the same as the elements in constructive eviction claim); see also Goldman v. Alkek, 850 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).

MetLife acknowledges that the “essence of all of Sambuca’s contract claims (whether styled as a breach of contract, repudiation, anticipatory breach, or breach of the express covenant of quiet enjoyment) is the same — that MetLife failed to make repairs to the Premises.” Doc. 197, Met-Life’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 23 [hereinafter MetLife’s Br.]. Instead of attacking specific elements of each contractual claim, however, MetLife asserts the affirmative defenses of waiver and ratification. First, MetLife contends that § 17 of the Lease waives all damages other than actual, direct damages for any breach of the Lease Agreement. Doc. 197, MetLife’s Br. 11-13. Second, MetLife argues that Sambuca waived any breach it now complains of when Plaintiff signed the Second Amendment to the Lease in 2004, prior to the sale of the leased premises from 2100 Partners, L.P. to MetLife. Id. at 24-25. And third, MetLife argues that Sambuca ratified any alleged breach of contract when it renewed the Lease and signed the Third Amendment in 2014. Id. at 23. The Court will address each of MetLife’s defenses.

i. Consequential damages waiver

First, MetLife argues that § 17 of the Lease Agreement waives all damages other than actual, direct damages for any alleged breach of the Lease Agreement. Id. at 11-13. Plaintiff responds that § 17 is unenforceable as a damages waiver because it was not “conspicuous.” Doc. 278, PL’s Br. in Supp. of Resp. to MetLife’s Mot. for Summ. J. 16 [hereinafter Pl.’s Br.]. As Plaintiff notes, “[w]aiver is an affirmative defense and the party alleging waiver has the burden of proof.” Walkup v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 7:13-CV-0150-O, 2014 WL 4798443, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2014) (citing JM Walker LLC v. Acadia Ins. Co., 356 Fed.Appx. 744, 748 (5th Cir. 2009)). Therefore, MetLife has the burden to prove as a matter of law that Plaintiff waived all damages other than actual, direct damages for breach of the Lease Agreement.

Section 17 of the Lease, titled “Landlord’s Default/Tenant’s Remedies,” provides in pertinent part as follows:

.Tenant’s remedies for default hereunder ■and for breach by Landlord of any of its obligations hereunder will be limited to a suit for actual and direct damages and/or injunction.... The liability of Landlord to Tenant for any default by Landlord under the terms of this Lease shall be limited to only Tenant’s actual direct damages therefor.... In no event shall Landlord be liable to Tenant for consequential, punitive or special damages (or any similar types of damages) by reason of a failure to perform (or a default) by Landlord hereunder or otherwise.

Lease Agreement § 17, Plaintiff argues this provision is unenforceable because the “damages waiver is buried at the end of a page-long, uniform paragraph, generically entitled ‘Landlord’s Default/Tenant’s Remedies,’ with no (1) contrasting type, font or color; (2) capitalization; (3) no symbols or other marks to call attention to it; (4) and no heading that would attract the attention of a reasonable person.” Doc. 278, Pl.’s Br. 16.

“A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.” Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 179 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Tex. 1993)). “Whether a term is ‘conspicuous’ or not is a decision for the court.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.201(b)(10). Conspicuous terms include “a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding test of the same or lesser size” or “language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language.” Id.

The Court agrees that the waiver language in § 17 is not in contrasting type, color, or font compared to the surrounding text; it has no special symbols or marks; and it uses no special capitalization. It also comes on pages 24 and 25 of a 38-page Lease with almost 100 additional pages of exhibits and amendments. The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiff that' the waiver is not conspicuous. Cf. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, No. 3:13-CV-4841-L, 2015 WL 1856729, at *8-10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2015), aff'd, 819 F.3d 170, 179 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding a damages waiver was conspicuous as a matter of law where the heading was in bold, all capitals, and underlined and where the waiver provision itself was in bold and all capitals).

“[0]nce a court determines that a disclaimer is not conspicuous ..., it may still give effect to. the disclaimer if it is shown that the [plaintiff] had actual knowledge of the disclaimer.” Am. Eagle Ins. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 48 F.3d 142, 146 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex. 1990)). “In other words, actual knowledge of the disclaimer overrides the. question of conspicuousness.” Id. MetLife argues that even if the waiver was not conspicuous, Plaintiff was represented by competent counsel and had actual knowledge of the waiver, evidenced by the fact that Plaintiffs previous counsel who negotiated the Lease, in a November 2011 email to Plaintiffs present counsel, acknowledged that “[t]he lease calls for limited remedies to the Tenant, specifically excluding consequential damages.” Doc. 294, MetLife’s Reply 11-12; Defs.’ App. 2013-14. Additionally, MetLife argues, Plaintiff twice acknowledged the consequential-damages waiver: once when it signed the First Amendment to the Lease in 2003, and again when it signed the Second Amendment in 2004. Doc. 294, MetLife’s Reply 12.

The First Amendment, executed on December 31, 2003, between Plaintiff and non-party 2100 Partners, L.P., is four pages long and ■ includes 11 numbered paragraphs. Lease Agreement, First Amendment. The last numbered paragraph before the signature lines is titled “EXCULPATION.” Lease Agreement, First Amendment ¶ 11. The title is in bold, all capitals, and is underlined. Id. The paragraph states: “This Amendment'and the obligations of Landlord hereunder are and shall be and remain subject to and limited by the exculpation and limitations of Landlord’s liability as are set forth in the Lease (including, without limitation, pursuant to Section 17 thereof).” Id.

The Second Amendment, executed on July 8, 2004, again between Plaintiff and non-party 2100 Partners, L.P., is 11 pages long. Lease' Agreement, Second Amendment. The final numbered paragraph— again the last before the signature lines— repeats: “This Second Amendment and the obligations of Landlord hereunder are and shall be and remain subject to and limited by the exculpation and limitations of Landlord’s liability as are set forth in the Lease (including, without limitation, pursuant to Section 17 thereof).” Lease Agreement, Second Amendment ¶ 16.

A “history of signing lease agreements containing the same ... waiver language evidences an understanding of the provision and a willingness to be bound by it.” In re Key Equip. Fin. Inc., 371 S.W.3d 296, 302-03 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see also Glidden Co. v. CDNE, Inc., No. 12-09-00283-CV, 2011 WL 686286, at *7-8 (Tex. App.-Tyler Feb. 28, 2011, no pet.) (holding it was “unnecessary for the language in [the] disclaimer of the consequential damages to be conspicuous” where there was “evidence that the disclaimer of these consequential damages remained the same throughout the course of dealing between the two parties” over the course of nine years).

Plaintiff does not contend that the waiver was ambiguous' or that. Plaintiff lacked knowledge of the provision; it merely argues the waiver language was not conspicuous. However, after review of the summary judgment evidence and briefing, the Court concludes as matter of law that the unambiguous consequential damages waiver in § 17 of the Lease limits any damages for an alleged breach of the Lease Agreement to “actual direct damages.” Thus, MetLife’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs breach of contract claims is GRANTED in part such that damages for any alleged breach of the Lease Agreement are limited to actual, direct damages.

ii. Second Amendment

MetLife next argues that Plaintiff “waived the plumbing and foundation-related construction defects and deficiencies” it now complains of when it signed the Second Amendment to the Lease in 2004. Doc. 197, MetLife’s Br. 23. MetLife contends the structural issues Plaintiff has experienced since 2009 are the same ones it was aware of in early 2004, and thus, MetLife reasons, were waived with the signing of the Second Amendment on July 8,2004. Id, at 24. As noted above, waiver is an affirmative defense for which. MetLife bears the burden of proof. Tyson Foods, 2014 WL 4798443, at *3. Therefore, to be entitled to summary judgment on its waiver defense, MetLife must establish as a matter of- law that Plaintiff waived the currently alleged breach of the Lease Agreement by signing the Second Amendment in 2004.

According to MetLife, disputes had already arisen between Plaintiff and 2100 Partners, L.P. over issues “related to the foundation and plumbing” before the previous property owner sold the leased premises to MetLife in July 2004. Doc. 197, MetLife’s Br. 24. MetLife points to the fact that Plaintiff hired a plumber and a structural engineer to evaluate plumbing and foundation issues in early 2004, before opening the restaurant at the Uptown location. Doc. 202, Defs.’ OSF 6-9. For example, MetLife notes that in February-2004, Plaintiff’s plumber indicated that the “plumbing system [was] not proper” and that “most assuredly, [Sambuca] will have trouble.” Defs.’ App, 1334. After recommending a series of repairs in March 2004, the plumber noted Plaintiff had “a poorly designed, installed and possibly shifting system that has and -will still have problems” even with the recommended repairs. Id. at 1339. Also in March 2004, Plaintiffs structural engineer stated that “[t]he foundation of the building has experienced a combination of heave at the West end and a minor settlement at the East end.” Defs.’ App. 1011. Plaintiffs structural engineer also noted that “differential movement is the probable cause of cracks in the foundation at the North Central side of the building” and recommended that Plaintiff “consult with a foundation repair company.” Id. MetLife contends these .issues are the same ones Plaintiff now complains of in the present suit and thus were waived when Plaintiff signed the Second Amendment. Doc. 197, MetLife’s Br. 24.

For its part, Plaintiff argues the Second Amendment “unequivocally did not address the issues in this lawsuit” because those issues “did not exist at the time of that amendment.” Doc. 278, PL’s Br. 25. Plaintiff contends that any issues in early 2004 were repaired to its satisfaction before the transfer of ownership and that “[t]he structural movement and related distress and problems that would later develop at the Leased Premises beginning in 2009 as a result of the structural movement are distinctly different than any problem of which Sambuca was aware in 2003 or 2004.” Doc. 280, PL’s CSF ¶9.

Plaintiff and non-party 2100 Partners, L,P, signed the Second Amendment on July 8, 2004, four days before the sale of the leased premises from 2100 Partners, L.P. to MetLife. Lease Agreement, Second Amendment; Doc. 202, Defs,’ CSF 10. The full title of the amendment is “SECOND AMENDMENT TO LEASE AGREEMENT (INCLUDING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND MUTUAL RELEASE).” Lease Agreement, Second Amendment 1. It stated that “certain disputes have arisen between [2100 Partners, L.P,] and [Sambuca] as to, among other things,” the following issues:

(i) the allocation of responsibilities between the parties for payment of certain construction costs;

(ii) the effect or cost of certain delays alleged to have occurred in connec- ' tion with' the construction and complete of the Landlord Work (as defined in the Lease) and the Finish Work (as defined in the Lease);

(iii) the entitlement and/or effecting of payment and disbursement of the Finish Allowance (as defined in the Lease); and

(iv) in connection with certain alleged construction defects and/or deficiencies as set forth in that certain Tenant Estoppel Certificate submitted by Tenant to Landlord pursuant to correspondence from Tenant’s counsel dated July 2, 2004 (“Estoppel Certificate”).

Lease Agreement, Second Amendment 1. '

In the Second Amendment, however, Sambuca acknowledged that all “construction work and improvements” required under the Landlord Work and finish-out provisions of the original Lease had beep satisfied “except .for those certain matters described in Paragraph 2 below and further excepting ongoing items of repair and maintenance that are to be addressed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease.” Lease Agreement, Second Amendment ¶ 1. In Paragraph 2, 2100 Partners, L.P. agreed to undertake the following:

(i) pay up to $15,000 for the installation of a new awning on the side of the building;

(ii) pay one-half of the cost of the survey required in connection with obtaining the permit for the awning;

(iii) fix certain leaks in the kitchen floor that were identified and disclosed to 2100 PartnerSj L.P. prior to the date of the Second Amendment;

(iv) reinstall the monkey grass on the parking lot side of the building;

(v) repair and/or install gutters on the parking lot side of the building; and

(vi) any and all other maintenance and repair obligations of Landlord under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Lease.

Lease Agreement, Second Amendment ¶ 2. Other than these issues, Sambuca agreed to “waive and release any and all further claims, obligations, liabilities and responsibilities ' of Landlord” with regard to the landlord’s obligations under the Finish Allowance, Additional Allowance and Loan, Landlord Work, Additional Work, or Finish Work provisions of the Lease. Id. ¶ 1.

First, the Court finds that fact issues exist with regard to whether the current building issues, of which Sambuca began complaining in 2009, are in fact the same issues Sambuca’s plumber and structural engineer noted in early 2004. And even assuming they are the same, the real question is whether the waiver language in the Second Amendment covers those issues. MetLife repeatedly argues that all issues other than those specifically mentioned in paragraph two of the Second Amendment were waived. Doc. 202, Defs.’ CSF 10; Doc. 197, MetLife’s Br. 24. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the waiver was limited to the landlord’s obligations regarding those specific provisions of the Lease dealing with the initial “tenant finish-out, landlord’s work and tenant’s work.” Pl.’s App. 2631, Dep. of Addison Wilson 94:8-10. Aside from these specific provision, Plaintiff contends the landlord’s obligations — including the- obligation to maintain and repair the structural system of the leased premises — otherwise remained the same. Doc. 280, Pl.’s CSF ¶ 10.

The principal aim in construing a written contract is to discern the true intent of the parties as expressed through the contract’s terms. See Frost Nat'l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310, 311-12. (Tex. 2005). In determining the parties’ intent, the Court looks to the objective intentions expressed in the contract itself and construes the contract’s terms according to their plain meaning unless the contract itself provides an intended, different meaning. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003); Heritage Res. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996). “Where the contract can be given a definite legal meaning or interpretation ... the court will construe it as a matter of law.” Orthoflex, Inc. v. ThermoTek, Inc., Nos. 3:11-CV-0870-D, 3:10-CV 2618-D, 2013 WL 4045206, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2013).

Here, the Court cannot agree with Met-Life that the language of the Second Amendment, as a matter of law, waived the issues Plaintiff now complains of in this lawsuit. The Second Amendment repeatedly references the specific provisions of the Lease, to which the waiver applies. The first paragraph references “Exhibits C and D to the Lease,” which are the Landlord Work and finish-out provisions. Lease Agreement, Second Amendment ¶1. Also within the first paragraph, Sambuca agreed to “waive and release any and all further claims, obligations, liabilities and responsibilities of Landlord with regard to the funding and disbursement of the Finish Allowance, Additional Allowance and Loan, and further hereby acknowledges and agrees that Landlord shall have no further responsibilities vnth regard to the Landlord Work, any Additional Work or the Finish Work, under the Lease or otherwise, of any kind or nature except as set forth in Paragraph 2.” Id. (emphasis added).

Paragraph two, which lists the items excepted from the waiver, specifically notes that “Landlord shall otherwise undertake any and all other maintenance and repair obligations of Landlord under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Lease.” Id. ¶2. Paragraph four, after again specifically referencing the “Landlord Work,” “Finish Work,” and “Finish Allowance and/or Additional Allowance” provisions, provides the following:

[T]he foregoing release does not and shall not be construed to release Landlord ... with respect to any of [its] obligations under or pursuant to Paragraphs 1, 2 and 8 of this Agreement nor any other obligations under or pursuant to the Lease that do not pertain to the Landlord Work, Finish Work, Finish Allowance or Additional Allowance.

Id. ¶4 (emphasis added). MetLife would have the Court hold that the Second Agreement waived any and all issues not specifically excluded in paragraph two; however, the waiver language appears more limited than that. The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Sambuca’s 2004 waiver of 2100 Partners, L.P.’s performance under the specific provisions of the Lease mentioned above encompassed the issues Plaintiff now complains of in the present lawsuit. Thus, summary judgment on the affirmative defense that Plaintiff waived its current breach-of-contract claims by signing the Second Amendment in 2004 is DENIED.

Hi. Third Amendment

Finally, with respect to the breach-of-contract claims against MetLife, MetLife argues that Plaintiff ratified any alleged breach when it signed the Third Amendment to the Lease in 2014. Doc. 197, MetLife’s Br. 23. To prove ratification, MetLife must establish that Sambuca “(1) had full knowledge of the breach of duty or wrongdoing at the time of ratification; and (2) intentionally chose to ratify the conduct in spite of this knowledge.” Satis Vacuum Indus. Vertriebs, AG v. Optovision Techs., Inc., No. CIV. A. 399CV2147-M, 2001 WL 1142803, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2001) (citing Arroyo Shrimp Farm, Inc. v. Hung Shrimp Farm, Inc., 927 S.W.2d 146, 153 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ); LSR Joint Venture No. 2 v. Callewart, 837 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied)). The party relying on the ratification has the burden “to prove knowledge of the fraud or breach and to prove a voluntary, intentional choice to ratify the contract in light of that knowledge.” Spangler v. Jones, 797 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied). If the acts of ratification are controverted, however, the question becomes one for the trier of fact. Id. Here, the question is not whether Plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged breach at the time it signed the Third Amendment — indeed, Plaintiff had already filed a lawsuit for breach of contract by that point — but rather whether Plaintiff intended to ratify any such breach by signing it.

As noted above, Sambuca notified Met-Life of its intention to renew the Lease in March 2013. Doc. 280, Pi’s CSF ¶¶ 39-40. In addition to outlining a method for determining the renewal rate of rent, the Lease also required the parties to execute an amendment on or before the commencement date of the renewal period containing certain renewal terms. See Lease Agreement, Exhibit E ¶ 1. One such term was the following:

Landlord shall lease to Tenant during each such extended Term the Premises in their then-current condition, and Landlord shall not provide to Tenant any allowances (e.g., moving allowance, construction allowance, and the like) or other tenant inducements in connection with any such renewal period or Renewal Option.

Id. ¶ 1(d). Although the parties could not agree on the renewal rate of rent — leading Plaintiff to file suit in October 2013 in state court — consistent with Exhibit E, they executed a two-page Third Amendment to the Lease on March 31, 2014, which contained the above quoted language following the heading “Tenant Inducements.” Lease Agreement, Third Amendment ¶ 4.

Apparently in reliance on the “then-current condition” language of the “Tenant Inducements” provision, MetLife now argues that any alleged breach of the Lease Agreement existing at that time was ratified by Sarabuca’s signing the Third Amendment. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends the “then-current condition” language merely acknowledged that MetLife was “not obligated to provide additional money for tenant improvements.” Doc. 120, PL’s 4th Am, Compl. ¶31 n.4. In essence, MetLife interprets the “then-current condition” language in the “Tenant Inducements” paragraph of the Third Amendment as a sort of “as-is” clause. The Court, however, is not persuaded. The summary-judgment record clearly demonstrates that the parties were already embroiled in a lawsuit over MetLife’s repair obligations and the renewal’s effect on those obligations at the time the Third Amendment was signed. After reviewing the entirety of the Lease, the summary-judgment evidence, and the parties’ briefing, the Court cannot as a matter of law find that Sambuca’s signing the Third Amendment ratifies any alleged breach of the Lease that may have existed at the time. Thus, because MetLife has failed to carry its burden to establish this affirmative defense, summary judgment on Plaintiffs contract claims is DENIED.

2, MCPP’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Contract Claims

More than two years into this litigation, MetLife transferred the leased premises to MCPP. Therefore, in the Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) anticipatory breach/repudiation, and (3) breach of the express warranty of quiet enjoyment against- MCPP. Doc. 120, PL’s 4th Am. Compl.. ¶¶ 41-53. The breach-of-contract claims against MCPP are based on the same alleged breach Plaintiff asserts against MetLife, namely that after assuming the role of Landlord, MCPP has failed to maintain and repair the structural system as required under § 7(b)(ii) of the Lease. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that “[s]ince the sale and transfer, MCPP has taken no steps to comply with its repair obligations under the Lease” and has “indicated, through their statements, actions, and omissions that despite the continuing obligations under the Lease, [MCPP] will not provided structurally sound building during the renewal term.” Id. ¶¶40, 47. According to Plaintiff, this failure to maintain and repair the structural system also “breached the express warranty of quiet enjoyment by hindering Sambuca’s occupation and enjoyment of the Leased Premises.”/⅛¶ 53,

MCPP moved for summary judgment on all three contractual claims for essentially the same reasons as MetLife did on the contract-based claims against it. First, MCPP argues that the consequential damages waiver in § 17 of the Lease limits any damages based on a breach of the Lease to actual, direct damages. Doc. 196, MCPP’s MSJ ¶ l. Second, MCPP contends that Plaintiff ratified any alleged breach of the Lease when it signed the Third Amendment. Id. Because Plaintiff ratified any alleged breach, MCPP also argues it cannot as a matter of law have breáched or repudiated its contractual obligations as Plaintiff alleges. Id. Lastly, regarding the claim for breach of the warranty of quiet enjoyment, MCPP adds that Plaintiff cannot recover as a matter of law because it has not abandoned or been permanently deprived of the use and enjoyment of the premises. Id. ¶ 2.

As to MCPP’s first argument, the Court has already analyzed the consequential damages waiver language in § 17 of the Lease in relation to the contract claims against MetLife above. The parties do not dispute that upon assuming the Lease, MCPP assumed all rights and obligations under the Lease, whatever those may have been. Therefore, for the same reasons as explained above in relation to MetLife, the Court finds that Plaintiffs damages for any alleged breach of the Lease Agreement by MCPP would likewise be limited to actual, direct damages, whatever those may be determined to be. And therefore, MCPP’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part such that damages for any alleged breach of the Lease Agreement are limited to actual, direct damages.

' MCPP’s ratification argument has also already been addressed but includes an additional wrinkle here as MCPP bases its challenge to the breach element of Plaintiffs contract claims on the ratification defense. Thus,, the Court turns now to MCPP’s argument that “Sambuca’s breach of contract claim against MCPP fails as a matter of law because MCPP did not breach the lease,” Doc. 199, MCPP’s Br. 1.

i. Breach and ratification

First, MCPP argues it cannot be held liable for any alleged breach that occurred before the transfer of ownership from MetLife to MCPP, citing a Texas Supreme Court case for the proposition that “[tjh'e transferee [of an interest in leased property] will not be liable for any breach of the promise which occurred before the transfer to him.” Id. at 2 (citing Regency Advantage Ltd. P’ship v. Bingo Idea-Watauga, Inc., 936 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. 1996)). Plaintiff responds that this general rule does not apply to a “continuing breach, which passes with the lease transfer between landlords.” Doc. 277, Pl.’s Resp. 5. For its continuing breach argument, Plaintiff cites the same case, Regency Advantage. Id. The Court agrees that Regency Advantage ⅛ instructive.

In Regency Advantage, a commercial lease required the landlord to complete “build-out” of the premises within 46 days of tenanfs notification that tenant had obtained a license from the state to operate a bingo facility. Regency Advantage Ltd. P’Ship v. Bingo Idea-Watauga, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 936 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. 1996). The tenant obtained the license and notified the landlord, but the landlord neglected to build-out the space. Id. Several months later, the landlord sold the property and assigned the lease to the new landlord. Id. The new landlord informed the tenant it also had no intention of building out the- space. Id. Therefore, the tenant sued the new landlord for breach of contract. Id. The Texas appellate court acknowledged that “[generally, a transferee of a [lease] is not liable for a breach of the landlord’s covenant that occurred before the transfer.” Id. at 59. However, it noted that this general rule “refers to where a breach occurs at one particular point during the ownership of the original owner, not where a breach continues to occur after the original owner’s grantee acquires title to the property.” Id. at 59 (citing 3 Milton R. Friedman, Friedman on Leases § 36.2 (3d ed. 1990)). Finding the breach to be of the continuing variety, the appellate court held that both the original landlord and the subsequent landlord breached the build-out provision. Id.

The Texas Supreme Court later reversed the appellate court, holding that the obligation to complete the buildout was a “one-time obligation, accruing forty-five days from the receipt of the approvals necessary for the lessee to operate a bingo facility.” Regency Advantage, 936 S.W.2d at 277. The Supreme Court did not, however, disavow the idea of a continuing breach; it merely determined that the appellate court had incorrectly categorized the breach in that case