Twilio, Inc. v. Telesign Corp. (249 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 2017)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 31

LUCY H. KOH, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Twiilio, Inc. (“Twilio” or “Plaintiff’) filed a patent infringement suit against Defendant Telesign Corporation (“Telesign” or “Defendant”) and alleged that Defendant infringed the claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,306,021 (“the ’021 Patent”), 8,837,465 (“the ’465 Patent”), 8,755,-376 (“the ’376 Patent”), 8,738,051 (“the ’051 Patent”), 8,737,962 (“the ,’962 Patent”), 9,270,833 (“the ’833 Patent”), and 9,226,217 (“the ’217 Patent”) (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”), Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, which seeks to dismiss all seven Asserted Patents. ECF No. 31 (“Mot.”). The Court issued its decision on the ’962, ’833, ’021, ’465, and ’376 patents on March 31, 2017. ECF No. 57. The present order covers the ’051 and ’217 patents. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the. relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to the ’051 and ’217 patents.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. The Parties

Plaintiff Twilio is a Delaware corporation with its primary place of business in San Francisco, California. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶1. Plaintiffs co-founder, Jeffrey Lawson, is a co-inventor on three of the Asserted Patents. ECF No. 45 at 1. Defendant Telesign is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Marina Del Rey, California. Compl. ¶ 15.

2. The Twilio Patents

Plaintiffs complaint and the parties’ briefing divides the asserted patents into four families: (1) the ’962 and ’833 patents (the “Score Patents”), (2) the ’051 patent (the “Delivery Receipts Patent”), (3) the ’021, ’465, and ’376 patents (the “Platform Patents”), and (4) the ’217 patent (the “Path Selection Patent”). As mentioned above, this order covers the ’051 and ’217 patents, which are the Delivery Receipts Patent and the Path Selection Patent, respectively. An overview of the two patents follows.'

a. Delivery Receipt Patent (The ’051 Patent)

i. Specification

The ’051 patent is titled “Method and System for Controlling Message Routing.” Compl, Ex. D (’051 patent). It was filed on July 25, 2013 and issued on May 27, 2014. It claims priority to several provisional applications, the earliest of which was filed on July 26, 2012.

The ’051 patent generally relates to “controlling message routing in the telephony messaging field.” ’051 patent at col. 1:17-18. In . general, when a message is sent from one machine (or “node”) to another, it passes through a series of intermediate machines (or “nodes”) before it reaches its final destination. See id. at col, 1:40-42, 2:55-65. The process of determining the path that the message takes through these intermediate nodes is often referred to as “routing.” See id. at col. 1:40-60.

In modern networks, the sender or the recipient of a message does not retain control over the route that a message takes through these intermediate nodes. Id. at col. 1:47-49, 2:55-65. This is due in part to the fact that the intermediate nodes are often controlled by third-parties who are not affiliated with the sender or the recipient of the message. See id. at col. 1:29-35. As a result, the sender or the recipient of the message cannot always trust that an intermediate node will reliably pass a message along to the next intermediate node on its route. See id. at col. 1:37-39. Messages can get “altered, delayed dropped, split into multiple messages, suffer from character encoding issues, or have any number of issues due to the message handling of an encountered node on the message’s way to the destination.” Id. at col. 1:50-54. This “makes it extremely difficult for a party wishing to send and/or receive a message to ensure the integrity and reliability of communicating a message.” Id. at col. 1:55-57.

One prior art solution for ensuring that messages have been reliably delivered is using a delivery receipt, which is an indication sent by the recipient that the message was received. Id. at col. 1:46-47. However, a delivery receipt also has reliability problems. Because it also passes through the same third-party, intermediate nodes, there is also no guarantee that it will be reliably transmitted. See id. at col. 1:37-39. Thus, at the time of invention, “there remained] a need in the telephony field to create a new and useful method and system for controlling message routing.” Id. at col. 1:57-59.

The ’051 patent purports to solve this problem through one primary modification to delivery receipt usage: sending the delivery receipt through a “second channel,” which is different from the one that the original message was sent through. Id. at col. 2:53-55, 3:14-15. For example, if a message is sent as a text message over an “SMS message routing channel,” the delivery receipt could be sent through an “internet network channel.” Id. at col. 3:14— 17.

The ’051 patent integrates this “second channel” feature into a larger method for monitoring and adjusting routing options for sending a message. Id. at col. 2:53-55. Figure 1 illustrates this method:

At step S110, the message is sent through a “first channel” using a “routing option selected from a plurality of routing options.” Id. at col. 3:31-32. In the patent, “[r]outing options are preferably different initial nodes to which a message may be initially sent.” Id. at col. 3:35-37. As discussed above, a message will generally pass through a series of intermediate nodes before it reaches its destination, and the sender of the message does not retain control over the path that the message takes through these intermediate nodes. See id. at col. 1:40-42, 1:47-49, 2:55-65. Thus, the sender’s selection of an initial node “functions as the fundamental point of control to the full route a message will take to arrive at a destination.” Id. at col. 3:65-67. After the message is passed off to the initial node, it will then get passed off to a series of intermediate nodes that lie between the initial node and the message’s destination. See id. at col. 1:47-49, 2:55-65.

Eventually, the message will either reach its destination or the destination will determine, after waiting for a certain period of time, that delivery was unsuccessful. See id. at col. 4:23-38. Once either of these events occurs, at step S120, the destination will send a “message delivery report” (i.e., a delivery receipt) to the sender through a “second channel” that is different from the “first channel.” Id. at col. 4:19-20. The message delivery report provides feedback on the message’s delivery, such as whether delivery succeeded or failed and/or what condition the message arrived in (e.g., if it was “altered, censored, truncated, encoded improperly, split into multiple messages, or otherwise not conforming to the original outgoing message”). Id. at col. 4:25-31, 4:38-44.

At step S130, the information in the message delivery report is used to “adjust the criteria used in selecting routing options” for future messages. Id. at col. 6:32-33. The specification refers to this step as “updating message routing data.” Id. at col. 6:31-32. For example, “[ujpdating the message routing data can include ranking routing options based at least in part on delivery success rates.” Id. at col. 6:42-43. At step S140, this adjusted criteria is put into practice: a “second routing option” is selected for a “second outgoing message.” Id. at col. 7:1-5.

Neither the claims nor the specification provides much limitation- on how this process must be implemented, or the contexts in which it can be deployed. Instead, the specification makes a number of non-limiting statements, including that: Messages can include “SMS, multimedia messaging service (MMS), image messaging, animation messaging, video messaging, audio/music messaging, internet protocol (IP) messaging, push notifications, and/or any suitable messaging technique.” Id. at col. 3:4-9; see also id. at col. 11:3-4 (“the messages are preferably SMS or MMS, but can be any suitable type of message”). “There may ... be a plurality of types of channels available for sending a message such as SMS or MMS, push notifications, or any suitable messaging channel.” Id. at col. 4:9-12. “Generating a delivery report may include a number of various implementations,” including “providing a user feedback interface [ ], redirecting internet and app links through a monitored system [ ], providing a monitored pin code service [ ], monitoring a user-reply signal [ ], and/or using any suitable alternative technique.” Id. at col. 4:66-5:7. “The routing options may be characterized by different service providers, networks, geographic locations, physical machines, resource addresses, contractual agreements, communication protocols, time-dependent quality/performance properties, and/or any other suitable distinguishing characteristics of message routing node.” Id. at col. 3:37-42, The “message routing data” can be any collection of data from the message delivery reports or other data sources, including “[d]ata or parameters from routing option contracts, data from message routing infrastructure such as Signaling System No. 7 (SS7), or any other resource that may be used in determining an optimality assessment.” Id. at col. 6:50-55.

ii. Asserted Claims

Twilio currently asserts claims 1-8, 11-20, and 22 of the Delivery Receipt Patent. EOF No. 55, Independent claims 1 and 18 recite:

1. A method for transmitting telephony messages comprising:

transmitting a first outgoing telephony message through a first channel using a first routing option selected from a plurality of routing options; receiving a message delivery report through at least a second channel, wherein the second channel is different from the first channel; updating message routing data in response to the message delivery report; selecting a second routing option for at least a second outgoing message, the second routing option selected from the plurality of routing options prioritized by the updated message routing data; and

transmitting the second outgoing telephony message through the first channel using the selected second routing option.

IS. A method comprising:

providing a.message delivery system with at least two message delivery channel options;

sending a message through the message delivery system with a coded identifier in the content of the message, the message sent through one of the message delivery channel options, and wherein the coded identifier is mapped to' the message delivery channel option used in sending the message;

at a code identifier service, tracking use of the coded identifíér;

in response to the tracked use of the coded identifier, generating a score of the message delivery channel option based on results of the tracked message delivery.

’051 patent at col. 11:43-59,12:63-13:9.

b. The Path Selection Patent (The ’217 Patent)

i. Specification

The ’217 patent is titled “System and Method for Enabling Multi-Modal Communication,” Compl., Ex. G (’217 patent). It was filed on April 17, 2015 and issued on December 29, 2015. It claims priority to a provisional application, which was filed on April 17, 2014.

The ’217 patent generally relates to “enabling multi-modal communication in the telecommunication field.” ’051 patent at col. 1:16-17. In modern mobile devices, multiple modes of communication are possible, such as “SMS, MMS, and PSTN voice calls, as well as IP based communication such as client application messaging and VoIP.” Id. at col. 1:23-25. For example, a user can wish a friend “good morning” from his mobile device by sending a text message (SMS or MMS communication), sending an email (IP based communication), or calling the friend ■ (a PTSN voice call). See id. In addition to these options, a user can also communicate with his mobile device using “over the top (OTT) communication” services like What-sApp. See id., at col. 1:27-32,2:23-27.

However, use of OTT services has a downside: it “can fragment the communication channels so that'only those within an OTT provider can communicate.” Id. at col. 1:33-34. For example, if a user wishes to send a message through WhatsApp, the recipient must also use WhatsApp to receive this message and send a response. See id. The recipient cannot receive the message through a different OTT service, SMS, MMS, or some other mode of communication. See id.

The ’217 patent purports to address this problem through a method for enabling “transparent multi-modal communication” on a “communication platform” such that users’’ can transparently send and receive communications through different modes. Id. at col. 2:9-19. For example, the method enables a user to send a text message and have it be received by another user as a WhatsApp messáge, and vice versa. See id. at col, 2:9-19,2:38-46.

Figured illustrates this method:

A message sent through one of the modes of communication on the left (i.e., “SMS,” “MMS,” “IP App,” “PSTN,” “SIP,” “Fax,” “Email,” “OTT Comm 1,” “OTT Comm 2”) is transmitted to the communication platform (i.e., “communication service” at 110). Id. at col. 3:14-4:15, 8:5-9:34. The communication platform then chooses an appropriate mode of communication that suits the message’s intended destination (i.e., “SMS,” “MMS,” “IP App,” “PSTN,” “SIP,” “Fax,” “Email,” “OTT Comm 1,” “OTT Comm 2” at 112), and then sends the message to that destination using that mode of communication. Id. at col. 4:16-54, 9:35-12:35. For example, if a user sends a message through WhatsApp to a destination device that only accepts SMS (i.e., text) messages, the communication platform selects an SMS service as the appropriate mode of communication and sends the message using that SMS service. See id.

Figure 10 illustrates the process of selecting the appropriate mode of communication in more detail: •

When a user sends a message, this is transmitted to the communication platform as a “communication request.” See id. at col. 3:14-4:15, 17:23-30. The “communication request” identifies the “communication destination” for the message, which can be a phone number, an email address, an IP address, or “any suitable communication endpoint.” Id. at col. 3:17-21, 18:55-58. The “communication request” also includes “account information,” which can include “an account identifier of the external system and an authentication token associated with the account identifier.” Id. at col. 18:4-6. For example, the “account identifier of the external system” could be an identifier for a user’s WhatsApp account. See id. at col. 18:4-14.

After the “communication request” is received, the communication platform determines whether the “communication request” is authenticated. Id. at col. 18:4— 14. This “includes authenticating the communication request by using the authentication token, and determining that the communication request is permitted for an account identified by the account identifier.” Id. at col. 18:8-14.

Next, the communication platform determines which modes of communication are available for the “communication destination.” Id. at col. 17:60-20:50. It does this through a simple database-style lookup: the communication platform stores “routing address records” in an “endpoint information repository.” Id. at col. 19:48-50. “[Ejach routing address record ... associates a communication destination with at least one external communication provider.” Id. at col. 18:42-45. For example, a “routing address record” could associate a phone number (the “communication destination”) with an SMS service provider, a PTSN service provider, and an OTT communication service provider (the several “external communication providers]”). See id. at col. 18:32-20:50. Then, to determine which modes of communication are available for the “communication destination,” the communication platform simply locates the “routing address record” for that “communication destination.” Id. at col. 19:44-20:50.

After the communication platform locates the “routing address record” for the “communication destination,” it selects one or several “external communication providers” through which to transmit the message. Id. at col. 20:51-23:9. This can be done using a “communications profile,” which specifies a “priority” and a “weight” for various “external communication providers.” See id. at col. 20:62-22:3. However, “any suitable parameter” (instead of or in addition to “priority” and “weight”) can be “used in selecting [an external] communication provider.” Id. at col. 22:1-3.

Finally, after the “external communication provider(s)” have been selected, the communication platform “provide[s] a request to establish communication with the communication destination to each selected [external] communication provider.” Id. at col. 23:10-12. The “external communication provider(s)” then transmit the message to the “communication destination.’-’ See id. at col. 23:17-30.

Neither the claims nor the specification provide much restriction on how this process must be implemented, or the contexts in which it can be deployed. Instead, the specification makes a number of non-limiting statements, including that: “The telephony platform can be ... any suitable network accessible computing infrastructure. The system may ... be used in combination with ... any suitable communication platform.” Id. at col. 2:53-3:4. “Routing options ... can include ... any suitable communication service.” Id. at col. 4:16-27. “The communication destination can be ... any suitable communication endpoint.” Id. at col. 3:17-21. “The communication platform can ... use any suitable logic to determine a content and destination of a -communication.” Id. at col. 4:10-13. “The account information can include ... any suitable source information.” Id. at col. 13:29-31.

ii. Asserted Claims

Twilio currently asserts claims 1-12 and 15-19 of the Path Selection Patent. EOF No. 55. Independent claims 1 and 15 recite:

1. A method comprising: at a multi-tenant communication platform:

receiving a request to establish communication, the request being provided by an external system and specifying a communication destination and an account identifier of the external system;

determining whether the account identifier is a valid account identifier of an account that is permitted to establish communication by using the communication platform;

responsive to a determination that the account identifier is a valid account identifier of an account that is permitted to establish communication by using the communication platform:

determining at least one communication provider for the communication destination based on an a [sic] routing address record matching the communication destination, the matching routing address record associating the communication destination with one or more communication providers, the routing address record being stored at the communication platform, each communication provider being external to the communication platform;

selecting one or more of the determined at least one communication provider; and

providing a request to establish communication with the communication destination to each selected communication provider,

wherein the communication platform generates the matching routing address record based on registration information provided to the communication platform for the communication destination by each determined communication provider, and wherein the communication destination matches at least one of a routing address identifier and a deterministic endpoint address specified in the matching routing address record.

15. A method comprising:

at a multi-tenant communication platform, and responsive to authentication of a communication request provided by an external system, the communication request specifying a communication destination and account information:

determining a routing address record of the communication platform that matches the communication destination of the communication request, the matching routing address record associating the communication destination with a plurality of external communication providers;

selecting at least one communication provider associated with the matching routing address record; and

providing a request to establish communication with the communication destination to each selected communication provider.

’217 patent at col. 29:35-30:3, 31:21-27.

B. Procedural History

On December 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant patent infringement suit. In its complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant “has infringed and continues to infringe one or more claims of the [Asserted Patents].” Compl. ¶¶ 75, 91, 106, 135, 156, 169, 184. The products accused included “Defendant’s Smart Verify product,” “Auto Verify product,” “SMS Verify product,” “Voice Verify Product,” “Push Verify product,” and “Score and Phone ID products.” MW 40-45. • ■ -

On January 25,2017, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, EOF No. 31 (“Mot”). On February 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, EOF No. 37 (“Opp’n”), and on February 15, 2017, Defendant fil^d' a reply, ECF No. 39 (“Reply”).

On March 30, 2017, the Court ordered the parties to disclose the asserted claims and accused products identified in Plaintiffs infringement contentions. ECF No. 53. On March 31, 2017, the parties disclosed these asserted claims and accused products. ECF No. 55.

On March 31, 2017, the Court issued its first order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and found that the asserted claims of the Score Patents were invalid because they were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101, but that the asserted claims of the Platform Patents were not invalid because they were not directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility .that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving‘party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

Nonetheless, the Court is not required to “ ‘assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.’ ” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Furthermore, “ ‘a plaintiff may plead [himjself out of court’ ” if he “plead[s]. facts which establish that he cannot prevail on his ... .claim.” Weisbuch v. Cty. of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Warzon v. Drew, 60 F.3d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir. 1995)).

B. Motions to Dismiss for Patent Validity Challenges Under 35 U.S.C.§101

Defendant’s Motion asserts that the Asserted Patents fail to claim patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 189 L.Ed.2d 296 (2014). Whether a claim recites patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 is a question of law. In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Section 101 patent eligibility is a question of law[-.]”); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same). Accordingly, a district court may resolve the issue of patent eligibility under § 101 by way of a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343,1345 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming determination of ineligibility made on 12(b)(6) motion); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 112. F.3d 709, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming determination of ineligibility made on motion for judgment on the pleadings).

Although claim construction is often desirable, and may sometimes be necessary, to resolve whether a patent claim is directed to patent-eligible subject matter, the Federal Circuit has explained that “claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Where the court has a “full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter,” the question of patent eligibility may properly be resolved on the pleadings. Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1349; see also Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic Jungle, Inc., 2013 WL 245026, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013) (same), aff'd, 817 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

C. Substantive Legal Standards Applicable Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

1. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code “defines the subject matter that may be patented under the Patent Act.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010). Under § 101, the scope of patentable subject matter encompasses “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101). These categories are broad, but they are not limitless. Section 101 “contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354 (quotation marks omitted). These three exceptions are not patent-eligible because “they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work,” which are “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012) (quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court has explained that allowing patent claims for such purported inventions would “tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,” thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. Id. at 70, 132 S.Ct. 1289. However, the United States Supreme Court has also cautioned that “[a]t some level, all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Accordingly, courts must “tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.” Id.

In Alice, the leading case on patent-eligible subject matter under § 101, the United States Supreme Court refined the “framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts” originally set forth in Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77, 132 S.Ct. 1289. This analysis, generally known as the “Alice” framework, proceeds in two steps as follows:

First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an “ ‘inventive concept’ ”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”

Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355 (citations omitted and alterations in original); see also In re TLI Comme’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (describing “the now familiar two-part test described by the U.S. Supreme Court in Alice”).

2. Alice Step One—Identification of Claims Directed to an Abstract Idea

Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has set forth a bright line test separating abstract ideas from concepts that are sufficiently concrete so as to require no further inquiry under the first step of the Alice framework. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357 (noting that “[the U.S. Supreme Court] need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case”); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (observing that the U.S. Supreme Court did not “delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in Alice”) (quotation marks omitted). As a result, in evaluating whether particular claims are directed to patent-ineligible abstract ideas, courts have generally begun by “comparing] claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Two of the U.S. Supreme Court’s leading cases concerning the “abstract idea” exception involved claims held to be abstract because they were drawn to longstanding, fundamental economic practices. See Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356 (claims “drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, ie., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk” were directed to an unpat-entable abstract idea); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611-12, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (claims drawn to “the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk” were directed to an un-patentable abstract idea because “[Pledging is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance class.”) (quotation marks omitted).

Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that information itself is intangible. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12, 127 S.Ct. 1746, 167 L.Ed.2d 737 (2007). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has generally found claims abstract where they are directed to some combination of collecting information, analyzing information, and/or displaying the results of that analysis. See Fair-Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims “directed to collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected” were drawn to an unpatentable abstract idea); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d at 611 (claims were “directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner”); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to an abstract idea because “[t]he advance they purport to make is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing those functions”); see also id. (collecting cases).

However, the determination of whether other types of computer-implemented claims are abstract has proven more “elusive.” See, e.g., Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]recision has been elusive in defining an all-purpose boundary between the abstract and the concrete.”) As a result, in addition to comparing claims to prior U.S. Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedents, courts considering computer-implemented inventions have taken varied approaches to determining whether particular claims are directed to an abstract idea.

For example, courts have considered whether the claims purport to “improve the functioning of the computer itself,” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359, which may suggest that the claims are not abstract, or instead whether “computers are invoked merely as a tool” to carry out an abstract process. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335; see also id. .(noting that “some improvements in computer-related technology when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display, and the like. Nor do we think that claims directed to software, as opposed to hardware, are inherently abstract!)]”). The Federal Circuit has followed this approach to find claims patent-eligible in several cases. See id. at 1335-36 (claims directed to a specific type of self-referential table in a computer database were not abstract because they focused “on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities (i.e,, the self-referential table for a computer database)”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to automating part of a preexisting method for 3-D facial expression animation were not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules of a particular type.”).

Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a “new and useful technique” for performing a particular task were not abstract. Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not abstract); Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepato-cytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to calculate the optimal cure time for rubber were not abstract).

Another helpful tool used by courts in the abstract idea inquiry is consideration of whether the claims have an analogy to the brick-and-mortar world, such that they cover a “fundamental .,. practice long prevalent in our system....” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356; see, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding an email processing software program to be abstract through comparison to a “brick and mortar” post office); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 100 F.Supp.3d 371, 383 (D. Del. 2015) (“Another helpful way of assessing whether the claims of the patent are directed to an abstract idea is to consider if all of the steps of the claim could be performed by human beings in a non-computerized ‘brick and mortar’ context.”) (citing buySafe, 765 F.3d at 1353).

Courts will also (or alternatively, as the facts require) consider a related question óf whether the claims are, in essence, directed to a mental process or a process that could be done with pen and paper. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims for translating a functional description of a logic circuit into a hardware component description of the logic circuit were invalid because they “can be performed mentally or with pencil and paper”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claim for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over the Internet was invalid because the “steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper”); see also, e.g., Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims for computer-implemented system to enable borrowers to anonymously shop for loan packages were abstract where “[t]he series of steps covered by the asserted claims ... could all be performed by humans without a computer”).

Regardless of the particular analysis that is best suited to the specific facts at issue in a case, however, the Federal Circuit has emphasized that “the first step of the [Alice] inquiry is a meaningful one, i.e., ... a substantial class of claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335 (emphasis in original). The court’s task is thus not to determine whether claims merely involve an abstract idea at some level, see id. but rather to examine the claims “in their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1346.

3. Alice Step Two—Evaluation of Abstract Claims for a Limiting Inventive Concept

A claim drawn to an abstract idea is not necessarily invalid if the claim’s limitations—considered individually or as an ordered combination—serve to “transform the claims into a patent-eligible application,” Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348. Thus, the second step of the Alice analysis (the search for an “inventive concept”) asks whether the claim contains an element or combination of elements that ensures that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more thañ a patent upon the abstract idea itself. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355.

The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that a transformation of an abstract idea to a patent-eligible application of the idea requires more than simply reciting the idea followed by “apply it.” Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294). In that regard, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that “[fjor the role of a computer in a computer-implemented invention to be deemed meaningful in the context of this analysis, it must involve more than the performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’.” Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347-48 (quoting Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359) (alterations in original); see also Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324-25 (holding that “generic computer components such as an ‘interface,’ ‘network,’ and ‘database’ ... do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement.”); Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1278 (“To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible process, a computer must be integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations or computations could not.”). Similarly, “[i]t is well-settled that mere recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea” where those components simply perform their “well-understood, routine, conventional” functions. In re TLI Commc’ns., 823 F.3d at 613 (limitations of “telephone unit,” “server,” “image analysis unit,” and “control unit” insufficient to satisfy Alice step two where claims drawn to abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner) (quotation marks omitted).

In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Bilski that “limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components [does] not make the concept patentable.” 561 U.S. at 612, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978)); see also Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358 (same). The Federal Circuit has similarly stated that attempts “to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment” are insufficient to render an abstract idea patent eligible. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716 (quotation marks omitted); see also Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d at 1366 (“An abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or technological environment, such as the Internet.”).

In keeping with these restrictions, the Federal Circuit has found that claims “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks” can be sufficiently transformative to supply an inventive concept. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257 (claims that addressed the “Internet-centric problem” of third-party merchant advertisements that would “lure .,. visitor traffic away” from a host website amounted to an inventive concept).

In addition, a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces” can amount to an inventive concept. BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For example, in BASCOM, the Federal Circuit addressed a claim for internet content filtering performed at “a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user.” Id. Because this “specific location” was different from the location where internet content filtering was traditionally performed, the Federal Circuit concluded this was a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces” that provided an inventive concept. Id. As another example, in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., the Federal Circuit found that claims relating to solutions for managing accounting and billing data over large, disparate networks recited an inventive concept because they contained “specific enhancing limitation^] that necessarily incorporate^] the invention’s distributed architecture.” 841 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The use of a “distributed architecture,” where information about accounting and billing data was stored near the source of the information in the “disparate networks,” transformed the claims into patentable subject matter. Id.

4. Preemption

In addition to these principles, courts sometimes find it helpful to assess claims against the policy rationale for § 101. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the “concern that un-dergirds [the] § 101 jurisprudence” is preemption. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358. Thus, if a claim is so abstract so as to “pre-empt use of [the claimed] approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea,” it is not patent-eligible. Bilski 561 U.S. at 612, 130 S.Ct. 3218. However, the inverse is not true: “[w]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss contends that the asserted claims of the ’051 and ’217 patents fall within the patent-ineligible “abstract ideas” exception to § 101. The Court applies the Alice framework described above to these claims.

A. Scope of Analysis and Representative Claims

Before turning to the substance of the parties’ eligibility arguments, the Court clarifies the scope of the claims to be assessed. Currently Plaintiff is asserting the following claims in the Delivery Receipt and Path Selection Patents: claims 1-8, 11-20, and 22 of the ’051 patent; and claims 1-12 and 15-19 of the ’217 patent. ECF No. 55.

Nevertheless, the Court need not individually analyze every claim, if certain claims are representative. See generally Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359-60 (finding 208 claims to be patent-ineligible based on analysis of one representative claim). Often, parties will agree that certain claims are representative for the purposes of a § 101 analysis. See, e.g., Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1147 (parties agreed that certain claims were representative); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed.Cir. 2016) (parties agreed that certain claims were representative). However, when they do not, a district court may make this determination on its own. Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348 (“The district court ... correctly determined that addressing each claim of the asserted patents was unnecessary. After conducting its own analysis, the district court determined that [certain claims] are representative....’”) (emphasis added).

Here, the parties dispute whether representative claims can guide the Court’s analysis,. and who bears the burden of showing that certain claims are representative. Compare Mot. at 3, Reply at 2, with Opp’n at 5. The Court need not delve into these arguments because, for the reasons discussed below, the Court can address all the claims of these patents. It will do so by first assessing the patentability of the allegedly representative claim of each patent, and then using that as a basis for analyzing the remaining claims.

B. Delivery Receipt Patent (The ’051 Patent)

The Court now turns to the ’051 patent and determines whether the asserted claims of this patent are patent-ineligible under § 101. The Court begins with claim 1 of the ’051 patent, the only claim for which either party has provided substantial briefing, and then turns to the remaining claims.

1. Alice Step One for Claim 1 of the ’051 Patent—Whether the Claim is Directed to an Abstract Idea

Step one of the Alice framework directs the Court to assess “whether the claims at issue are directed to [an abstract idea].” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. On this point, Defendant contends that claim 1 is directed to “finding the best routing option for transmitting messages based on a delivery receipt (... the message delivery report of claim 1 ,..).” Mot. at 10. Defendant argues that this concept is similar to other abstract ideas identified in other district court cases. Id. at 10-11. Defendant also emphasizes that claim 1 recites this idea at a high level of generality and does not recite concrete structures or implementation details. Id. at 11.

Plaintiff responds that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea because it is instead directed to a specific improvement in computer capabilities. Opp’n at 8. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that claim 1 is directed to an improved method for ensuring that messages are transmitted through the best (e.g., most reliable) routing option which “use[es] different channels for outgoing message and message delivery reports.” Id.

The step one inquiry “applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335. Thus, the Court conducts its step one inquiry by first identifying what the “character as a whole” of claim 1 of the ’051 patent is “directed to,” and then discussing whether this is an abstract idea.

a. Claim 1 of the ’051 Patent— “Directed to” Inquiry

The Court begins by examining claim 1 of the ’051 patent in its entirety to understand what its “character as a whole” is “directed to.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353 (“[W]e have described the first-stage inquiry as looking at the ‘focus’ of the claims, their ‘character as a whole.... ’ ”); Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he court must first identify and define whatever fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the claim.”) (quotation marks omitted). In distilling the purpose of a claim, the Court is careful not to express the claim’s fundamental concept at an unduly “high level of abstraction .,. untethered from the language of the claims,” but rather at a level consonant with the level of generality or abstraction expressed in the claims themselves. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337; see also Thales Visionix, 850 F.3d at 1347 (“We must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful,”).

Claim 1 recites two types of transmissions: (1) sending a message through a “first channel” using one of several “routing options;” and (2) receiving a message delivery report through a “second channel” which is different from the “first channel.” ’051 patent at col. 11:45-50, 11:57-59. The majority of the claim then describes how the system uses the separately-transmitted message delivery report as feedback to help it select the best “routing option” for future messages: “routing data” is updated based on the message delivery report, the updated “routing data” is used to create a prioritized list of “routing options,” and the “routing' option” for the next message is selected from this prioritized list. Id. at col. 11:51-59.

Reading the entirety of claim 1 of the ’051 patent for its character as á whole, the Court finds that claim 1 is “directed to” selecting the best message routing option based on separately-transmitted feedback. Apart from background descriptions about the two types of transmissions in the system, the majority of the limitátions of claim 1 describe this process. See id. at col. 11:51-59; compare Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (identifying the “concept embodied by the majority of the limitations” ‘ in its step one analysis) (emphasis added). This “directed to” statement is also consistent with the specification because the statement provides that the patented method “functions to enable real-time adjustments to message routing according to feedback through a secondary channel.” Id. at col. 2:53-55. Thus, “selecting the best message routing option based on separately-transmitted feedback” meaningfully captures the “character as a whole” of claim 1.

b. Claim 1 of the ’051 Patent— Abstract Idea Analysis

‘ Having determined the “character -as a whole” of claim 1, the Court turns to whether it is directed to an abstract idea. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335. As discussed above, courts will generally compare the claims at issue to prior § 101 cases, as well as consult several guideposts, including: (1) whether the claims are directed to an “improvement to computer functionality;” (2) whether the claims are directed to a “new and useful technique;” (3) . whether the claims have an analogy to the brick- and-mortar world; and (4) whether the claims are directed to a mental process or a process that can be performed with a pen and paper. See Section II.C, supra.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the brick-and-mortar ánalogy, applied in the same way other Federal Circuit and district court cases have applied it, confirms that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Thus, the Court will discuss this guidepost and then turn to Plaintiffs remaining arguments, which all relate to the “improvement to computer functionality” guidepost.

i. Brick and Mortar Analogy

The United States Supreme Court has held that “fundamental .., practice^] long prevalent in our system” and “method[s] of organizing human activity” are abstract ideas. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Several Federal Circuit and district court cases applying these principles are instructive here. The Court reviews each in turn, and then applies this same reasoning to claim 1 of the ’051 patent.

In Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, the Federal Circuit concluded that claims directed to “providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content” were directed to an abstract idea because this was a “broad and familiar concept concerning information distribution that is' untethered to any specific or concrete way of implementing it.” 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In so reasoning, the Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he practice of conveying regional content to out-of-region recipients” had been employed “by nearly every form of media” for decades, and was “not tied to any particular technology.” Id. Instead, it “can be implemented in myriad ways ranging from the low-tech, such'as by mailing copies of a local ■ newspaper to an out-of-state subscriber, to the high-tech, such as by using satellites to disseminate broadcasts of sporting events.” Id. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reasoned, it was an abstract idea. See id. The court then concluded that because the claims were drawn to this same abstract idea (not any particular way of implementing it), they too were abstract. Id. It noted that the claims “confined the abstract idea to a particular technological environment—in this case, cellular telephones,” but this did not make the claims not abstract. Id. at 1258-59. To the contrary, “[t]he Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly made clear that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract.” Id. at 1259 (citations omitted).

In Intellectual Ventures, the Federal Circuit concluded that claims relating to “receiving, screening, and distributing email” were directed to an abstract idea. 838 F.3d at 1316. The claims at issue there recited steps of receiving email messages and applying business rules to control the delivery of the email messages. Id. at 1316-17. The Federal Circuit found these steps analogous to those performed by corporate mailrooms, which “receive correspondence, keep business rules defining actions to be taken regarding correspondence based on attributes of the correspondence, apply those business rules to correspondence, and take certain actions based on the application of business rules.” Id. at 1317. Thus, the claims were directed to “fundamental ... practiced] long prevalent in our system” and “method[s] of organizing human activity,” and hence, were directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1318.

In Mobile Telecoms. Techs., LLC v. Blackberry Corp., the Northern District of Texas found that claims relating to “utilizing a two-way communication network to process data messages that cannot be successfully transmitted from a network operations center (‘NOC’) to a mobile unit” were abstract. No. 3:12-cv-1652, 2016 WL 2757371, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63067, at *6 (E.D.T.X. May 12, 2016). The court found that the claims were “directed to the basic idea of sending and storing messages, which is not rooted in computer technology.” Id. at *3, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63067, at *8. Instead, this is a “routine task that could be performed by a human,” such as “a courier attempting to deliver a package.” Id. As such, the court concluded, the claims were directed to an abstract idea. Id.

Although the substance of claim 1 of the ’051 patent is different from the claims at issue in the above cases, the Court finds that it presents an analogous situation. As discussed above, claim 1 of the ’051 patent is directed to selecting the best message routing option based on separately-transmitted feedback. Selecting the best option based on separately-received feedback is a fundamental activity that has long been performed by humans. For example, a person choosing among dinner restaurants may select a restaurant based on diner reviews from a third-party service instead of soliciting information from the restaurants themselves. As another example, a person wishing to send a package may select between FedEx, UPS, and USPS based on feedback in online forums from other customers who have used those services instead of getting information from FedEx, UPS, and USPS themselves. Thus, selecting the best option based on separately-received feedback constitutes a “fundamental ... practice long prevalent in our system.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As such, it is an abstract idea. Id.

The only difference between claim 1 of the ’051 patent and these real-world examples is that claim 1 applies this fundamental practice to message routing. Instead of selecting a restaurant or a package delivery service, claim 1 selects a “routing option,” e.g., the first node to which a message should be passed. ’051 patent at col. 11:45-47,11:53-56. This is a classic case of limiting an abstract idea’s field of use to a certain technological environment. Compare, e.g., DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1258-59 (claims relating to “wireless delivery of regional broadcast content to cellphones” were instances of “confining] the abstract idea [of providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content] to a particular technological environment—in this case, cellular telephones”). As was the case in DIRECTV, claim 1 does not recite any specific implementation of the fundamental practice of selecting the best option based on separately-received feedback. Compare id. at 1258. Instead, it recites this fundamental practice genetically and at a high-level, and simply deploys it in the context of message routing. See ’051 patent at col. 11:43-59.

“The Supreme Court and [the Federal Circuit] have repeatedly made clear that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract.” DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1259 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures, 838 F.3d at 1317-18 (claims abstract where fundamental practice of processing mail with business rules applied to email); Mobile Telecoms. Techs., 2016 WL 2757371, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63067, at *6 (claims abstract where fundamental practice of sending and storing messages applied to data messages). Thus, because it simply takes an abstract idea and limits its use to a technological environment, claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.

ii. Improvement to Computer Functionality

Plaintiff nevertheless contends that claim 1 of the ’051 patent is not directed to an abstract idea because it is instead directed to an “improvement in computer functionality” under Enfish. Opp’n at 8-9. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that claim 1 “takes advantage of the availability of multiple communications channels to provide more reliable feedback about message routing.” Id. at 8. This is unpersuasive.

As discussed above, in Enfish, the Federal Circuit held that it is “relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea.” 822 F.3d at 1335. When considering claims purportedly directed to “an improvement of computer functionality,” the Court must “ask whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1335-36. For example, in Enfish, the Federal Circuit found that claims directed to a specific type of self-referential table in a computer database were not abstract because they focused “on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table for a computer database).” Id.

Claim 1 of the ’051 patent is distinguishable from Enfish. As discussed above, claim 1 of the ’051 patent is directed to selecting the best message routing option based on separately-transmitted feedback. Nothing about this improves the functioning of a computer itself. Rather, at most, it contemplates using a computer as a tool for implementing this idea. Compare, e.g., DIRECTV, 838 F.3d at 1262 (claims for “providing out-of-region access to regional broadcast content” were “directed not to an improvement in cellular telephones but simply to the use of cellular telephones as tools in the aid of a process focused on an abstract idea”). It is also no answer that, as Plaintiff contends, claim 1 provides an improvement to technology by “providing] more- reliable feedback about message routing.” Opp’n at 8. In Enfish, a specific technology—the computer database—was itself improved. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335-36 (claims- directed to a specific type of self-referential table in a computer data-, base were not abstract because they focused “on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities (i.e„ the self-referential table for a computer database)”). Claim 1, by contrast, does not' improve message routing technology itself. Thus, for th