Dyer v. McCormick & Schmick's Seafood Restaurants, Inc. (264 F. Supp. 3d 208, 2017)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge

This employment discrimination and retaliation ease is before the Court on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 37 & 38). Plaintiff is Brett F. Dyer—a Sous Chef who aspired to be an Executive Chef. Defendants are three national restaurant chains. Defendant McCormick and Schmick’s Seafood Restaurants, Inc. (“M & S”) operates a variety of restaurants across the United States. Defendant'Landry’s, Inc. (“Landry’s”) acquired M & S in January 2012. And Defendant Gordon Biersch Brewery Restaurant Group, Inc. (“Gordon Biersch”) owns and operates another chain of restaurants.

Between December 2005 and May 2013, Dyer worked as a Sous Chef for M & S and then M & S/Landry’s. Although Dyer repeatedly expressed interest in becoming an Executive Chef, he never received a promotion. Dyer says he was not promoted because of his race. M & S/Landry’s responds that (1) he was not officially considered for promotion because he never submitted an application and (2) he was not otherwise considered because he was not qualified. Because Dyer has failed to adduce any material evidence casting doubt on the second of these rationales, the Court will GRANT M & S/Landry’s motion for summary judgment as to Dyer’s non-promotion claims.

Dyer’s employment ended in May 2013 when M & S/Landry’s shuttered the restaurant to which he was assigned. Although M & S/Landry’s transferred the remaining managers to other M & S/Landry’s restaurants in the region, it failed to do the same for Dyer. Instead, M & S/Landry’s terminated Dyer’s employment for what he alleges were unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory reasons. Because a reasonable jury could find that M & S/Landry’s proffered justifications for terminating Dyer’s employment were not only false but evasive, and because Dyer was let go shortly after filing an EEO complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights, the Court will DENY M & S/Landry’s motion for summary judgment as to Dyer’s termination claims.

Finally, in May and June of 2013, Dyer sought a position at a restaurant owned by Gordon Biersch. Gordon Biersch extended him an offer but withdrew it soon thereafter. Gordon Biersch says it withdrew the offer because it learned that Dyer had misrepresented his employment history. Dyer says that Gordon Biersch withdrew the offer because someone from M <& S/Landry’s sent an email to Gordon Biersch calling him a “troublemaker,” purportedly in reference to his recent complaints of racial discrimination and unlawful retaliation. Dyer thus accuses M & S/Landry’s of engaging in “post-termination retaliatory behavior,” and accuses Gordon Biersch of withdrawing its offer because of unlawful retaliatory animus. Dyer has failed to identify any admissible evidence, however, establishing the existence, much less the specific substance, of the alleged email. Nor has he identified any evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that Gordon Biersch personnel were aware of Dyer’s earlier discrimination and retaliation complaints. The Court, accordingly, will GRANT all three defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to Dyer’s post-termination claims.

I. BACKGROUND

At restaurants run by M & S (and, later, by Landry’s), Sous Chefs must demonstrate not only culinary skills, but managerial skills. Dkt. 37-2 at 11 (M & S/Landry’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”) ¶¶ 15, 16). They are responsible for food preparation, inventory management, and supervision of the kitchen’s hourly staff, including line cooks. Id. They also “assist with kitchen staff scheduling, personnel actions, and employee paperwork.” Id. (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 15). And they have other responsibilities like ordering supplies and managing costs. See, e.g., Dkt. 37-7 at 4; Dkt. 37-22 at 2. Sous Chefs are evaluated annually based on “culinary skills, quantitative metrics such as sales and budget, .and qualitative managerial] behaviors such as business acumen,leadership, and employee relations.” Dkt. 37-2 at 11 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 16).

A given M & S/Landry’s restaurant will typically have multiple Sous Chefs, as well as one Executive Chef. The Executive Chef oversees the Sous Chefs and “is responsible for overall management of kitchen functions.” Id. at 8-9 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 6); accord id. at 11 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 16). In addition, M & S/Landry’s employs Regional Managers and Regional Chefs who oversee all M & S/Landry’s restaurants in a given regional market. Id. at 9-10 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶¶ 8-9). At the relevant times, the District.of Columbia market included as many as nine M & S/Landry’s restaurants. See, e.g., Dkt. 40-11 at 4.

A. Dyer’s Employment at the D.C. Grill

On December 7, 2005] Dyer began as a Sous Chef at the M & S Grill located at 600 13th Street NW, Washington, D.C. Dkt. 37-2 at 7-8 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 3). (For clarity, this opinion will refer to the restaurant as “the D.C. Grill.”) According to Dyer, he also filled in as the D.C. Grill’s de facto Executive Chef for an extended period of time “around 2006,” while Lisa Thompson, ■ an African-American women who served as the actual Executive Chef, recovered from a car accident. Dkt. 40-1 at 6-7 (Dyer Dep. 73:4-77:2, 80:14-20); Dkt. 40-2 at 3 (Dyer Dep. 100:11-12). He asserts that, during his informal tenure in that position, the D.C. Grill rocketed up M & S’s internal rankings “in the region for the whole United States,” moving from sixty-eighth place to first. See Dkt. 40-2 at 3 (Dyer Dep. 97:4-98:16). Although Dyer testified that he had “paperwork to attest to [the D.C. Grill’s rise in the rankings]” during his informal tenure as the, de facto Executive Chef, see id. (Dyer Dep. 97:8), no such documents are before the Court. Around the same time (i.e., in 2006), Dyer recalls asking Regional Chef Anthony Marcello why he had not yet been promoted. Id. (Dyer Dep. 98:21-99:4, 100:11-12). According to Dyer, Marcello responded: “[W]hen I see an executive chef, I know it when I’m looking at him.” Id. (Dyer Dep. 99:16-17). In Dyer’s view, that answer “d[id]n’t make any sense,” given how successful he had been in his role as the D.C, Grill’s de facto Executive Chef- ⅞. (Dyer Dep. 99:17-100:15).

.Dyer’s performance reviews from 20,06 to 2008, however, paint a less flattering picture of his abilities. His first—and, ultimately, best—review took place in August 2006, about eight months after he started. See Dkt. 37-7. His average rating across all categories was 3.3 out of 5, putting him slightly above the “[m]eets [expectations” benchmark of 3.0. See id. But that was the only review in which Dyer “met expectations.” In his 2006-2007 annual review, his average rating dropped to 2.8, see Dkt. 37-8, where it remained for his 2007-2008 review, see Dkt. 37-9. Dyer’s various reviewers expressed concerns about his “tendency] to forward problems to [his supervisor],” see Dkt. 37-8 at 2; Dkt. 37-7 at 3; his difficulties training subordinates and delegating them tasks, see Dkt. 37-7 at 2; Dkt. 37-8 at 4; Dkt. 37-9 at 2, 3; and his untimely and inconsistent enforcement of company policies, see Dkt. 37-7 at 2; Dkt. 37-8 at 2, 6; Dkt. 37-9 at 2. The 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 reviewers further emphasized Dyer’s need to hew more closely to M & S recipes and food preparation techniques, and his need to keep the kitchen in cleaner condition. See Dkt. 37-8 at 4, 6; Dkt. 37-9 at 3, 5. They also rated many of his financial management skills as “tb]elow [expectations.” See Dkt. 37-8 at 4; Dkt. 37-9 at 3.

All the while, Dyer continued to express frustration that he had not been promoted. Between April and November 2007, he had several conversations with M & S employees, including two conversations with the supervisor who completed his 2006 performance evaluation, in which he “complained ... that ... [he was] being passed over” because of his race and lamented that he “should have been well oh [his] way to being promoted.” Dkt. 40-4 at 4 (Dyer Dep. 276:2-5); see also id. at 4-5 (Dyer Dep. 274:12-280:22). Dyer repeated his concern that he “was having some struggles with trying to be promoted” to his new supervisor, Adán Maya, in March 2009, and did so again to three other M & 5 employees, including a Human Resources representative, in July and August 2009. See id. at 5-6 (Dyer Dep. 279:19-282:18). It is undisputed, however, 'that Dyer never submitted a formal “exprfession of interest” in promotion through M & S’s internal website and that he never filed a written or electronic application for any particular position. See Dkt. 40-3 at 2 (Dyer Dep. 189:22-191:1); Dkt. 37-4 at 27 (Dyer Dep. 244:3-5); Dkt. 37-2 at 11 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 14).

Around June 2010, Dyer broached the subject of his non-promotion with the restaurant’s senior management. He reached out separately to Connie Collins, who was then a Regional Manager for D.C.-area M & S restaurants; to Stephen Briggs, who was then the General Manager of the D.C. Grill; and to Adán Maya, who was then his direct supervisor. See Dkt. 40-4 at 6 (Dyer Dep. 282:19-286:14); accord Dkt. 37-2 at 9, 12 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶¶7, 17). Dyer asked them generally “what [he was] doing wrong” and “what [he] c[ould] ... do to ■... break through and get promoted.” Dkt. 40-4 at 6 (Dyer Dep. 284:2-3); see also Dkt. 37-29 at 3 (2011 email from Collins) (“[Dyer] asked to speak to me about his goals and desire to move his career forward.”).

In response, Collins spoke with Briggs and Maya. Dkt. 37-2 at 12 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 17). “Both felt that [Dyer] was not performing tasks at the level needed as a Sous Chef and would need to accomplish th[o]se tasks before he could even be considered qualified for potential promotion.” Id.) see also Dkt. 40-16 at 2 (Dyer SDMF) (not disputing this assertion of fact). Collins thus responded to Dyer’s inquiry by directing that Briggs and Maya prepare a “Development Plan” for him to help him achieve his goal. See Dkt. 37-2 at 12 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 19); Dkt. 37-29 at 4. According to an email Collins wrote a year later, Collins, Briggs, and Maya met with Dyer to “outline[]” the Development Plan, and Dyer “agreed to work on [it].” Dkt. 37-29 at 4. The Development Plan was not produced in discovery, however, and the parties dispute whether it was ever actually put to paper. See Dkt. 40-16 at 2-3 (Dyer SDMF ¶20). Compare Dkt. 37-4 at 15 (Dyer Dep. 167:7-11) (“They were supposed to work on a plan ... for me ... [but] they never followed through with it. It was never completed.”), with Dkt. 37-29 at 3 (April 2011 internal, email from Hunter) (“[Dyer] lost the document [memorializing the Development Plan] and brushed it off as ‘stuck in a box somewhere in his house.’ ”’).

In December 2010, Dyer received his worst performance evaluation yet. See Dkt. 37-10. Maya rated him below the “meets expectations” level in eight out of nine categories, with an average rating of 2.8. See id. The comments highlighted particular deficits in Dyer’s performance. Among other things, Maya admonished Dyer that “[i]t [wa]s essential that [he] elevate [his] professional [interactions with employees;” that he must “execute ... the financial education [he] received in [his] 2010 Development Plan;” that “[t]here [wa]s no excuse” for failing to hold specific types of mandatory safety and food trainings; that he “ha[d] not partnered enough with [front of the house] managers to build business;” and that, because “[his] administrative skills [were] lacking,” it was “essential that [he] reach out for training and become more effective.” Id. at 2-4. The review concluded that Dyer “appealed] to be a key turner and not the leader that we expect.” Id: at 4.

In April 2011, Dyer filed his first charge of discrimination against M & S with the D.C. Office of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that Maya assigned him a poor performance rating “because [Maya] has a bias against [b]lack employees,” arid further alleging that the .poor rating “[wa]s still affecting [his] chances for future promotions.” Dkt. 37-18 at 3. 'Maya had since been transferred to another location and was no longer Dyer’s supervisor. Id.

In September 2011, Dyer received his annual performance review from his new supervisor, Jason Boone. See Dkt. 37-12. Like his predecessors, Boone notes a number of deficiencies in Dyer’s performance. Id. Assigning Dyer an average rating of 2.20—a significant drop from previous years—Boone flagged a variety of concerns. Id. Boone’s comments included that Dyer “leavefs] without notifying fellow management;” “let[s] things ‘fester’ until action is necessary;” “[d]oes not listen very well;” “[d]oes not follow through with direction[s];” pays “[n]o attention to detail;” “[h]as a negative attitude;” “[struggles with deadlines;” “[d]oes not plan and organize well;” “[hjas trouble achieving strategic and tactical goals;” “[d]oes not follow given recipe direction[s];” and “leave[s] hazardous foods ... out of refrigeration and then leave[s] for the day.” Id. at 2-4. In the optional “Summary Comments” field, Boone added:

[Dyer] has worked for McCormick & Schmick’s for many years now. [He] should fully comprehend all aspects of daily operations, [but] he commonly does not. In [his] position, he should be able to execute at a high level[ ] all areas/aspects of daily operations, without complaint or resistance to senior management. [He] should be able to follow directions better, and be more aware of what is being asked of him. A review of this caliber is below McCormick & Schmick’s standards. [Dyer] needs to work in all areas of his review, and take it upon himself to learn and progress in the areas, not just wait around to be told/shown what to do. .

Id. at 5.

Adding to these concerns, Dyer received three written disciplinary warnings in 2012 after M & S had been acquired by Landry’s. Dkt. 37-2 at 14 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶¶ 25, 26). The first warning, issued in March, charged Dyer with “insubordination” for failing to complete the task of baking cinnamon rolls before leaving for the day, as Boone had specifically requested. See Dkt. 37-13 at 2. The second warning, also issued in March, charged Dyer with “unprofessional behavior” and “falsifying company records” because Dyer had created a job verification letter that misstated his subordinate’s hourly wage. Id. at 3-4. And the third warning, issued in August, faulted Dyer for uncritically accepting a delivery of products intended for an entirely different M & S restaurant. See Dkt. 37-14 at 3; Dkt. 37-20 at 28 (Marcel-lo Dep. 177:4-21). Although Dyer argues in his brief that his supervisors “disciplined [him] without bothering to obtain his version of events,” Dkt. 40 at 13-15, he does not argue that the warnings were fabricated or suggest that the events did not occur.

Dyer’s final performance evaluation in August 2012 assigned him an average rating of just 2.0. See Dkt. 37-15. Boone rated Dyer “[unsatisfactory” or “[n]eeds improvement” in 30 of the 38 performance categories. See id. The comments largely restated those from Dyer’s 2011 review, and Boone expressed frustration that Dyer “ha[d] fallen behind in all areas” since then. Id. at 6. Dyer’s poor overall rating on his 2012 performance evaluation triggered the creation of a “Performance Improvement Plan” (“PIP”) under company policy. Dkt. 37-2 at 15 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 28). Briggs and Boone prepared the PIP and presented it to Dyer. Dkt. 37-38 at 3 (Jasso Decl. ¶ 6). The PIP explained that it was intended “[t]o serve as notification that [Dyer’s] performance [did] not meet[ ] professional standards by Landry’s” and to “clarify” the company’s “performance expectations.” Dkt. 37-38 at 13. It then repeated many of the concerns reflected in Dyer’s performance evaluations, including concerns that Dyer “d[id] not maintain a high level of performance from his staff;” “d[id] not follow recipes;” “d[id] not finish on time;” “d[id] not plan ahead efficiently;” “ha[d] a negative attitude;” “d[id] not motivate his hourly employees well;” and “lack[ed] overall motivation himself.” Id. at 13-14. Finally, the PIP identified various areas of “[e]xpected [^Improvement” and set a future meeting “to discuss [Dyer’] progress concerning [his] performance.” Id. at 14-15. Once again, Dyer does not dispute that his 2012 performance evaluation and PIP reported these deficiencies, but he does disagree with his managers’ assessment of “the quality of [his] job performance.” Dkt. 40-16 at 3 (Dyer SDMF ¶¶ 27-28).

Despite these increasingly critical performance evaluations, between 2010 and 2012 Dyer continued to express interest in receiving a promotion. At deposition, Dyer recounted at least four such incidents. First, near “the end of 2010 or the beginning of 2011,” Dyer expressly told Marcel-lo that he wanted to “put in [his] bid to be the next [Executive [C]hef” at the D.C. Grill. Dkt. 40-3 at 8-9 (Dyer Dep. 239:19— 241:19). There is no evidence that Dyer submitted a formal application. See id. Second, in late March or early April 2011, Dyer asked Marcello about a specific “[E]xecutive [S]ous or [Executive [C]hef’ job opening, but Marcello told him the position had been filled. Dkt. 40-4 at 7 (Dyer Dep. 287:10-288:8). Third, sometime after Maya left the D.C. Grill in mid-2012, Dyer says that he asked Marcello “what ... [he] ha[d] to do in order to be promoted,” and Marcello responded, “Don’t worry about it, Brett. I’ll take care of you.” Dkt. 40-1 at 10 (Dyer Dep. 91:22-92:6). And, fourth, in December 2012, Dyer recalls “expressing an interest in being promoted” during a conversation with Brendan Lof-ton, the Regional Director of Operations. Dkt. 40-4 at 9 (Dyer Dep. 306:11-12, 307:10-21). Again, there is no record evidence that Dyer ever submitted a formal “expression of interest” online or submitted written or electronic applications for any particular job openings.

On April 25, 2013, Dyer filed a second EEO complaint against M & S/Landry’s with the D.C. Office of Human Rights and the EEOC in which he alleged that his poor performance reviews and his occasionally late pay checks were the result of racial discrimination. See Dkt. 37-18 at 4. This complaint did not mention a discriminatory failure to promote. See id.

B. Dyer’s Discharge from the D.C. Grill

Around the same time that Dyer filed his second EEO complaint, Lofton learned that the D.C. Grill would be closing its doors permanently, effective May 27, 2013. Dkt. 37-2 at 15'(M & S/Landry’s SUMF IT 29); Dkt. 37-24 at 7 (Lofton Dep. 17:8-22). M & S/Landry’s had elected not to renew the building’s lease, Dkt. 37-2 at 15 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 29), and Dyer does not challenge that decision here, Dkt. 40 at 5.

As was standard operating procedure, it fell to Lofton as the Regional Manager to decide which D.C. Grill employees would be transferred to other D.C.-area Landry’s restaurants, and which employees would be let go. Dkt. 37-2 at 15 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 30); Dkt. 40-8 at 12 (Lofton Dep. 135:13-137:10); Dkt. 40-16 at 3 (Dyer SDMF ¶ 30). Although Dyer disputes this testimony, Lofton testified he made these determinations in early May 2013 based on the other restaurants’ “current [staffing] needs.” Dkt. 40-8 at 12 (Lofton Dep. 136:8-137:18). Lofton also testified, with some equivocation, that he does not remember if he was able to find a place for Dyer. Id. at 13 (Lofton Dep: 138:1-8); id. at 14 (Lofton Dep. 148:2-10) (“[M]y recollection is there was nothing open within my restaurant authority ... in order to transfer him or we would have, more than likely—or not. I don’t remember.”). It is undisputed, however, that when Dyer arrived at work on May 27, 2013, Lofton informecl him that M <& S/Landry’s “d[id]n’t have any place for [him]” and that they were “going to let [him] go.” Dkt. 40-4 at 3 (Dyer Dep. 263:4-264:18); accord Dkt. 37-2 at 17 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶34). Lofton then terminated Dyer’s employment. M & S/Landry’s maintains that Lofton made this decision “[b]ecause there was no open Sous Chef position in his territory,” Dkt. 37-2 at 17 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶ 34); see also Dkt. 37-26 at 16 (Jasso Dep, 81:14-22) (“I don’t believe that we offered [Dyer] a specific position because we didn’t have one in his region.”).

Dyer was the only manager still working at the D.C..Grill who was terminated rather than transferred. Lofton transferred the other three managers to equivalent positions at nearby M & S/Landry’s restaurants., See 37-2 at 16—17 (M & S/Landry’s SUMF ¶¶ 31—33). Those three mangers were General Manager Jeff White (Caucasian); Assistant General Manager Sophia Kiflu (African American);, and Sous Chef Dario Guzman (Hispanic). Id. Although Dyer and Guzman were both Sous Chefs, only Guzman—the more junior of the two—was transferred.

Guzman was “promoted] to the position of Sous Chef at the Reston, Virginia location” in August 2012, Dkt. 37-37 at 2 (Guzman offer letter), but he had since been “transferred to the D.C. Grill,” Dkt. 37-20 at 16 (Marcello Dep. 96:9-12). Dyer characterizes Guzman as a “[S]ous [C]hef in training,” Dkt. 37-4 at 37 (Dyer Dep. 257:8), and, indeed, Guzman’s offer letter reflects that he was originally hired into the “Manager in Training” program, Dkt. 37-37 at 2. .The parties, however, have presented no evidence as to what this program entailed or whether Guzman remained a part of it in May 2013. When the D.C. Grill closed, Guzman was transferred “[a]s a [S]ous [C]hef’ back to his prior location in Reston. Dkt. 40-7 at 10 (Jasso Dep. 79:8-21).

C. Dyer’s Application to Gordon Biersch

1. Dyer Applies to Gordon Biersch

Even before the D.C. Grill closed, Dyer had been looking for a new job. He contacted a third-party recruiter, Julie Spencer, and on May 2, 2013, Spencer forwarded Dyer’s candidate profile to employees at Gordon Biersch. Dkt. 38-2 at 2 (GB SUMF ¶ 6); see also Dkt. 41-1 at 1 (Dyer SDMF). On May 16, 2013, Chris Brett, one of Gordon Biersch’s internal recruiters, interviewed Dyer for a Sous Chef position. Dkt. 38-2 at 2 (GB SUMF ¶ 7); see also Dkt. 41-1 at 1 (Dyer SDMF). During the interview, Dyer stated that he was still working at M & S/Landry’s—which was true at the time. Dkt. 38-2 at 2 (GB SUMF ¶ 7); see also Dkt. 41-1 at 1 (Dyer SDMF). But, as noted above, his employment with M & S/Landry’s terminated eleven days later on May 27, 2013. Dkt. 38-2 (GB SUMF ¶ 8). Dyer then filed additional EEO complaints against M & S/Landry’s on May 31, 2013, and June 8, 2013. See Dkt. 37-18 at 2,6.

After his termination from. the D.C. Grill, Dyer continued to represent to Gordon Biersch that he was still employed there, even though that assertion was no longer true. During an interview on June 8, 2013, Dyer made statements to Gordon Biersch’s Regional Manager, Arthur For-gette, that at minimum left Forgette with the false impression that Dyer was still working at the D.C. Grill. See Dkt. 38-2 at 2 (GB SUMF ¶ 9); Dkt. 38-7 at 2-3 (For-gette Dep. 35:22-36:1). Forgette testified that Dyer told him that “he was currently working at [the. D.C.] Grill,” although he also testified that he did not have a specific recollection of the conversation and that he was replying, instead, on his “general practice” in conducting interviews. Dkt. 38-7 (Forgette Dep. 35:22-36:22). Dyer, in turn, testified that Forgette asked him if he “was ... still working,” and that he responded, “Yes, I’m still working.” Dkt. 41-6 at 7-8 (Dyer Dep. 355:9-356:11).

On June 24, 2013, Dyer completed his online job application. Dkt. 38-2 at 2 (GB SUMF ¶ 10). In response to a question asking for his “[rjeason for leaving” M & S/Landiy’s, Dyer wrote: “Still employed there.” Dkt. 37-34 at 4. As a Gordon Biersch witness explained, however, the date reflected on the online application represents “the last time that the candidate accessed the application,” Dkt. 38-5 at 5-6 (Brett Dep. 60:22-61:14), raising the possibility that Dyer’s response was correct at the time him input his answer but became incorrect by the time he finalized his application. And on June 28, 2013, Dyer began to complete a background check form for Gordon Biersch, on which he falsely indicated that he was still employed at the D.C. Grill. Dkt. 38-2 at 2 (GB SUMF ¶ 11). According to Spencer, Dyer confided in her that he had intentionally misrepresented' his employment history “because [he] didn’t think théy would give [him] the job” otherwise. Dkt. 37-31 at 13-14 (Spencer Dep. 38:5-39:17). ■

2. Gordon Biersch Extends an Offer

On July 8, 2013, Gordon Biersch offered Dyer a job as a Sous Chef. Dkt. 37-35. Dyer immediately accepted. Dkt. 38-2 at 3 (GB SUMF ¶ 14). Within days, however, Gordon Biersch, reconsidered that decision. The following events are recounted in the record.

On or about July 9, 2013, Forgette received a phone call from Kirk Spare, one of Gordon Biersch’s General Managers with whom Dyer had interviewed. Dkt. 38-2 at 2-3 (GB SUMF ¶¶ 12, 15); Dkt. 41-8 at 7-8 (Forgette Dep. 49:20-50:21). Spare described how he had mentioned to an unidentified M & S/Landry’s employee from the D.C. Grill that Gordon Biersch had hired Dyer. Dkt. 41-8 at 7-8 (Forgette Dep. 49:20-50:21). According to Spare, the M & S/Landry’s employee “raised [his] eyebrows” and informed Spare that Dyer no longer worked for M & S/Landry’s. Id. Based on this conversation, Spare recommended that Forgette “look deeper” into Dyer’s employment history and “maybe do some reference checks.” Id. at 9 (Forgette Dep. 52:1-15). Spare was concerned, in particular, that Dyer may have misrepresented “the times that he told [Gordon Biersch that] he was working at M & S Grill.” Id.

On July 10, 2013, Brett sent Spencer an email with the subject line “RE: Brett Dyer,” stating: “It is getting weirder and more strange by the minute.” Dkt. 41-3 at 2. The following day, Forgette sent Brett an email describing a conversation For-gette had with one of Gordon Biersch’s chefs, Mamadou Diallo. See Dkt. 41—4 at 4; Dkt. 41-9 at 3 (Forgette Dep. 10:18-22). According to Forgette’s email, Diallo had previously worked for M & S as a regional chef. Dkt. 41-4 at 4. The email further explained that Diallo had “called the guy ... he worked with,” and that guy had “said that they closed [the D.C. Grill] and had open positions in the region but would not offer jobs to the [two] chefs (including [Dyer]) when they closed it.” Id. Finally, the email reported that Diallo “said he would not hire [Dyer].” Id. Diallo never identified “the guy with whom he worked” at M & S. Dkt. 41-9 at 5 (Forgette Dep. 14:11-Í8).

3. Gordon Biersch Withdraws the Offer

On July 12, 2013, one or more representatives from Gordon Biersch contacted Dyer to rescind the company’s offer. Dkt. 38-2 at 3 (GB SUMF ¶ 16); see also Dkt. 41-1 at 1 (Dyer SDMF). Brett and For-gette state that they and Spare jointly made the decision to withdraw the offer, and that they did so because they had been unable to verify Dyer’s employment history and because they believed Dyer had been untruthful with them. Dkt. 37-36 at 7 (Forgette Dep. 70:7-18); Dkt. 38-5 at 17 (Brett Dep. 118:7-20). Spencer attests that it was also her understanding that Dyer’s perceived untruthfulness was the reason the offer had been withdrawn. Dkt. 37-31 at 15 (Spencer Dep. 46:6-9). Dyer, however, “hotly contests]” those accounts. Dkt. 41 at 6.

According to Dyer, he received two phone calls in quick succession on July 11, 2013. Dkt. 41-6 at 9,13 (Dyer Dep. 359:13-19, 363:1-11). He was driving at the time, so he put both calls on speakerphone. Id. at 11 (Dyer Dep. 361:4-8). His fiancée was also in the car, id. at 9-10 (Dyer Dep. 359:21, 360:18), and she has submitted a declaration stating1 that she “could hear both sides of the conversation[s]” and corroborating Dyer’s account, see Dkt. 41-5 (Gonzalez-Dyer Deck).

The first phone call was from Spencer, the third-party recruiter. Dkt. 41-6 at 9 (Dyer Dep. 359:13-16); Dkt. 41-5 at 2-3 (Gonzalez-Dyer Decl. ¶¶ 3-7). Dyer attests that Spencer was “very excited” about a call she had received from Forgette. Dkt. 41-6 at 9-10 (Dyer Dep. 359:19-360:5). According to Dyer, Spencer told Dyer that Forgette had told Spencer that Forgette received “an anonymous email” saying that Dyer “was a problem-employee” and “was trouble.” Id. Forgette had also told Spencer that this email was the reason Gordon Biersch was withdrawing the offer. Id.-, see also Dkt. 41-5 at 2 (Gonzalez-Dyer Deck ¶ 4) (“Spencer stated that ... For-gette told her that ... Dyer’s offer was going to be rescinded because an anonymous email indicated that he was a ‘trouble-maker.’”). Spencer did not mention anything about Dyer’s job application being untruthful. Dkt. 41-5 at 2-3 .(Gonzalez-Dyer Deck ¶¶ 5, 6). Spencer also told Dyer to “expect a call” from Arthur Forgette. Dkt. 41-6 at,; 12 (Dyer Deck 362:11-12).

The second phone call occurred shortly thereafter. The phone number on caller ID had the same first three digits as did the phone number Spencer had used. Dkt. 41-6 at 13 (Dyer Dep. 363:4-8). Dyer assumed the caller was Forgette and answered the phone by saying “Arthur.” Id. (Dyer Dep. 363:9-11). The man on the line immediately started talking, without acknowledging Dyer’s greeting or’ stating who he was. Id. The caller then confirmed that Gordon Biersch had received the anonymous email asserting that Dyer was “trouble,” that he was “a bad employee,” and that Gordon Biersch should not hire him. Id. at 15 (Dyer Dep. 367:6-19). According to Dyer, the caller concluded by saying that he had “to protect the business and,” therefore, was “going to have to withdraw the [company’s] offer” of employment. Id. The caller did not mention the truthfulness of Dyer’s application. Dkt; 41-5 at 3 (Gonzalez-Dyer Deck ¶¶ 8-12). • ■

Spencer, fqr her part, testified that she was unaware of the anonymous email and that Dyer’s contention that she called to tell him about the email was untrue. Dkt. 37-31 at 15 (Spencer Dep. 46:1-22). Brett denies having received or learned of an anonymous email, and further denies that he was aware of Dyer’s disciplinary history at M <% S/Landry’s. Dkt. 37-33 at 8-9 (Brett Dep. 159:21-160:7). Brett was also unaware of Dyer’s previous EEO complaints against M & S and M & S/Landry’s. Id., at 9 (Brett Dep. 160:16-19). As to Forgette, he testified that he did not receive any communications, including any email, about Dyer from anyone at M & S/Landry’s. Dkt. 37-36 at 8 (Forgette Dep. 104:15-21). And, although the parties have not directed the Court to any portion of Forgette’s deposition in which he confirmed or denied knowledge of. Dyer’s earner EEO complaints, Forgette attests that those EEO complaints played no role in the decision to withdraw Dyer’s offer. Id. at 10 (Forgette Dep. 106:4-8). Spare’s deposition was not taken. See Dkt. 46 at 1. Dyer agrees that he never told Brett, For-gette, or Spare about his prior EEO activity. Dkt. 38-6 at 5-7 (Dyer Dep. 39:6-41:2). The “anonymous email” was not produced in discovery.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The moving party is entitled to summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 if it can “show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When, as here, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof, but the defendant has moved for summary judgment, the defendant “bears the initial responsibility” of “identifying those portions” of the record that “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is “material” if it could affect the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 Ú.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). And a dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The Coürt, moreover, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

“Although summary judgment is not the occasion for the court to weigh credibility or evidence ... summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. (internal citations and quotatión ' marks omitted). The nonmoving party’s opposition, accordingly, must consist of more than unsupported allegations or denials and must be suppo'rted by affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. That is, once the moving party carries its initial burden on summary judgment, the nonmoving party must provide evidence- that would permit a reasonable jury to find in its favor. See Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987). If the nonmoving party’s evidence is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” the Court may grant summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. ANALYSIS

Dyer brings Claims for racial discrimination in employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”). Both statutes “prohibit[ ] private employers from intentionally discriminating on the basis of race with respect to the ‘benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions’- of employment.” Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting § 1981(b)); accord D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1). He also.asserts claims for retaliation under .the DCHRA, which further .prohibits “retaliating] against,” “suggesting]” retaliation, against,.or “aiding]” and “abet[ting]” retaliation against any person “on account of [that person] having exercised” his DCHRA rights. See D.C. Code §§ 2-1402.61,2-1402.62.

Under both statutes, when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove a defendant’s intent, courts apply the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See, e.g., McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 611 F.3d 1, 3, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Title VII analytic framework applies to discrimination and retaliation claims under § 1981 and the DCHRA). “Under this formula, an employee must first make out a prima facie case of retaliation or discrimination. The. employer must then come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason, for the challenged action.” Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). But once, the defendant proffers one or more legitimate, non-discriminatory, and non-retaliatory reasons, the Court “need not—and should wot—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Instead, the Court should decide only the ultimate question: “Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non[-]discriminatory [and non-retaliatory] reason[s] w[ere] not the actual reason[s] and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race [or retaliated against the employee for engaging in protected activity]?” M; see also Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (retaliation claim). On this question, “the ultimate burden of persuafeion] ... remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 630 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted).

Within this’general framework, Dyer asserts five claims. In Counts I and II, he alleges the M & S discriminated against him on the basis of his race, in violation of § 1981, by failing to promote him to Executive Chef. Dkt. 12-1 at 6-8 (Am, Compl. ¶¶ 29-38). In Count III, he alleges the M & S/Landry’s discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the DCHRA' when it terminated his employment In May 2013. Id. at 8-9 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-47). In Count IV, he alleges- that M & S/Landry’s retaliated against him in violation of the DCHRA by telling Gordon Biersch that he was a “problem” employee and thereby inducing Gordon Biersch to retract its job offer. Id. at 9-10 (Am. Compl.-¶¶ 48-53). And, in Count V, Dyer alleges that Gordon Biersch joined in this unlawful conduct when it retracted the job offer. Id. at 10-11 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54-58).

The Court will first address Dyer’s non-promotion claims, will then turn to his termination claim, and will, finally, consider his post-termination claims.

A. Non-promotion Claims

Dyer asserts Counts I and II against only M <& S. These counts allege that M & S’s failure to promote Dyer between May 21, 2010, and. his discharge on May 27, 2013, constituted unlawful racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Dkt. 12-1 at 6-8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29-38). The May 2010 start date stems from the parties’ agreement that Dyer’s § 1981 claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations, see Dkt. 37-2 at 24 n.12; Dkt. 40 at 23 n.32, and from the fact that Dyer filed this lawsuit on May 21, 2014, see Dkt. 1-1 at 8, Dyer does not contend that he formally applied for an Executive Chef position by, for example, submitting an online application. Rather, he maintains that his repeated oral, informal, and generalized “expressions of interest” in promotion created what amounts to a standing application for promotion, such that he “was a victim of actionable race discrimination every time after May 21, 2010, that M & ‘S selected a non-African-American [as Executive Chef] over him at any of [its D.C.-area] restaurants.” Dkt. 40 at 23 n.32; accord id. at 11-12; Dkt. 40-16 at 5 (Dyer SDMF ¶ 41). On this theory, Dyer says, approximately twenty such “nonse-lections” occurred. Dkt. 40 at 11-12 (citing Dkt. 40-11 at 3-4).

In response, M & S/Landry’s proffers two legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons why Dyer was never promoted: First, it says, Dyer “never applied or submitted a formal expression of interest for an Executive Chef position via the M & S job posting system,” which company policy required him to do before he could be considered for any particular opening. Dkt. 37-2 at 23-24. Second, M & S/Landry’s says, to the extent that Dyer’s general expressions of interest was sufficient to create a kind of “perpetu[al]” application for all new openings that arose, Dyer “cannot possibly demonstrate that he was qualified for the Executive Chef positions at issue given his well-documented history of deficient performance.” Id. at 23, 26. The question thus becomes whether Dyer has adduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that these reasons are a mere pretext for racial discrimination. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494.

As explained below, the Court agrees with Dyer with respect to the first proffered reason: there is a genuine factual dispute whether, during the relevant time period, M & S/Landry’s consistently required internal candidates to submit formal applications and expressions of interest in order to be promoted. The second proffered reason, on the other hand, indisputably favors M & S/Landry’s: Dyer identifies no evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that the assessment of his various managers that he lacked the skills to be promoted was in any way pretextual. Finally, although neither party raises the issue, the Court concludes that the two non-discriminatory rationales proffered by M & S/Landry’s are sufficiently independent of each other that Dyer’s successful rebuttal of the first does not defeat the second. See Thomas v. District of Columbia, 227 F.Supp.3d 88, 104-05 (D.D.C. 2016). The Court, accordingly, will grant summary judgment in favor of M & S/Landry’s as to Counts I and II.

1. Proffered Reason One: Failure to Apply

As a first legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, M & S/Landry’s asserts that it never promoted Dyer because Dyer “never applied or submitted a formal expression of interest for an[y particular] open Executive Chef position.” Dkt. 37-2 at 24. According to M & S/Landry’s, Dyer’s non-promotion claims depend on the faulty premise that his informal, generalized expressions of interest were “enough [for him] to be ‘considered’ for any Executive Chef position ... in perpetuity.” Dkt. 37-2 at 26. In support of its contention that it “was simply not the case” that a “general expression of interest” was sufficient, id., M & S/Landry’s points to the testimony of Sam Hunter, who previously served as the company’s Director of Human Resources, id. at 10, 30 n.14. And, M & S/Landry’s is correct that Hunter testified that existing M & S employees were required to initiate the process by “formally express[ing] an interest” through an internal online portal. Dkt. 37-28 at 3 (Hunter Dep. 48:13-49:10).

The difficulty for M & S/Landry’s, however, is that this • evidence is' disputed. Take, for instance, the testimony of Ralph Harrison, who served as M & S’s Regional Chef for D.C. until no later than August 2006. Dkt. 43-4 at 3 (Harrison Dep. 132:1-18). Harrison testified at deposition that he at times filled Executive Chef vacancies'by simply approaching lower-ranked ■ chefs and offering them the job. Dkt. 40-5 at 6 (Harrison Dep. 56:16-57:11). Far from demanding “formal expressions of interest” of the kind Hunter described, Harrison testified that he knew which lower-level chefs to promote because most of them “were already expressing [their] interest in being .an [Executive [C]hef,” and, “[f]or the most part, they all wanted to move up to the next level.” Id. at 6-7 (Harrison Dep. 57:21-58:14). Harrison further attested that Dyer himself expressed this kind of informal interest in promotion to Harrison during - the early months of Dyer’s career. Id. at 7 (Harrison Dep. 58:15-19).

Anthony Marcello, who succeeded Harrison as Regional Chef, also described a relatively informal process for distributing Executive Chef promotions. In fact, Mar-cello himself was promoted to Executive Chef at another M & S restaurant in 2002 or 2003 without submitting an application or a formal expression of interest—Harrison simply “approached” him and offered him the job. See Dkt. 40-9 at 4 (Marcello Dep. 14:7-15:18). And, once Marcello took over from Harrison as Regional Chef in mid-2006 (a position he kept through August 2013), he offered similar opportunities to Sous Chefs “whom [he] approached about the prospect of betcoming] an [Executive [C]hef.” Id. at 10 (Marcello Dep. 91:4-8); see id. at 7, 9-10 (Marcello Dep. 27:3-9, 87:21-91:8).

Finally, Landry’s corporate representative Laura Jasso testified that, although it was her understanding that M & S had a formal application requirement on the books before its acquisition by Landry’s in January 2012 (whether the policy was consistently enforced is another matter), after January 2012, the Landry’s-managed D.C. Grill “didn’t have any application process for internal candidates or anywhere for them to go to express interest such as [M & S] had pre-acquisition.” Dkt. 40-7 at 5-6 (Jasso Dep. 41:19-42:5, 54:17-22).

This testimony from Harrison, Marcello, and Jasso is more than sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute as to whether, at all times between May 21, 2010, and May 27, 2013, the D.C. Grill’s management consistently enforced a requirement that Sous Chefs submit written applications or formal “expressions of interest” in order to be considered for promotion. Cf. Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“If Margaret Dodd could get the position by expressing her interest to Elizabeth James, Cones can certainly establish [that he ‘applied for’ the position for purposes of making out a prima facie ease] by demonstrating that he did precisely the same thing.”). As a result, a reasonable jury could find that M & S’s first proffered nondiscriminatory rationale—Dyer’s failure formally to apply—was not the true reason that M & S failed to promote Dyer,

2. Proffered Reason Two: Lack of Qualifications

M & S’s second, proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason—ie., that management considered Dyer unqualified for "promotion—fares better. As recounted at length above, M & S has adduced undisputed evidence that senior managers like Marcello, Hunter, and Briggs considered Dyer unfit to serve as an Executive Chef, and, in fact, had concerns about his ability to perform his existing role as Sous Chef. See supra Part I.A. M & S/Landry’s has-also adduced undisputed evidence that Dyer received increasingly critical reviews from his direct supervisors, accompanied by increasingly exasperated comments. See id. And M & S has shown by undisputed evidence that management’s concern about Dyer’s poor performance culminated in a formal PIP, alerting Dyer “that [his] performance d[id] not meet[ ] [the company’s] professional standards.” See Dkt. 37-16 at 2.

None of Dyer’s attempts to cast this evidence as “mere pretext” for discrimination are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

a. Dyer’s “Countervailing Evidence ■ of his Qualifications”

Dyer’s principal response—and, indeed, the only one he makes in the argument section of his brief—contends that M & S’s unfavorable assessment of his qualifications cannot justify the entry of summary judgment because, in his view, a reasonable jury could conclude that Dyer was, in fact, qualified for promotion during the relevant time period. See Dkt. 40 at 2, 22-24 (“Of course, a" jury could. accept- the judgment of M & S management that Dyer was not qualified to be an [Executive [C]hef. But[ ] a jury could also accept Dyer’s countervailing evidence of his qualifications .... ”). This , argument, however, misunderstands the relevant standard. The question is not whether a reasonable jury could disagree with M & S’s assessment of his qualifications. Rather, to avoid summary judgment,. Dyer must adduce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find- that M & S’s proffered reason “is a lie,” in the sense that it is not an honestly held belief. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); see also, e.g., Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Once the employer has articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action ..., the issue is not the correctness or desirability of the reasons offered but whether the employer honestly believes [them].”) (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Thus, even if Dyer were correct that reasonable minds could differ as to whether his track record at the D.C.- Grill demonstrated his readiness to serve as Executive Chef, that showing would not by itself suffice.

That said, in some circumstances, “the fact that a proffered reason is objectively false may undermine an employer’s professed honest belief in that reason.” George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (“In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.”)- This is so because “honesty and reasonableness are linked: a belief may be so unreasonable that a factfinder could suspect it was not honestly held.” DeJesus v. WP Co. LLC, 841 F.3d 527, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2016). As applied here, evidence, that some of Dyer’s supervisors held him in high regard might support a claim that those professing to disagree did not honestly hold, that belief. Thus, it may be the case that Dyer intends to argue that the assessments of Dyer’s abilities set forth in his performance evaluations, disciplinary warnings, and PIP were so inconsistent with reality or the views of others that a reasonable jury could find that M & S’s management did not honestly believe that Dyer’s performance as a Sous Chef was subpar. See, e.g., Aka, 156 F.3d at 1295.

Even if Dyer had made this argument, however, the Court would conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Dyer’s own assessment of his qualifications or the handful of neutral or positive comments made by others are sufficient to show that the repeated negative assessments of his performance, made by a variety of supervisors over an extended period of time, were knowingly false and a pretext for discrimination. Most significantly, Dyer relies on the views of two supervisors, neither of whom ever considered Dyer for a promotion, regarding Dyer’s performance from December 2006 to August 2006. Dkt. 40 at 23. First, he points to the deposition testimony of Regional Chef Harrison, who overlapped with Dyer for less than nine months before leaving the company no later than August 2006, ‘ and who recalls thinking that Dyer was “a good guy” and “a long-term player [who] wanted to progress in the company.” Dkt. 40-6 at 7 (Harrison Dep. 59:4-7, 60:19). When asked whether Dyer was “qualified to be an [Executive [C]hef,” Harrison initially responded, “Yeah, I thought Brett was pretty good,” but he then tempered his response by noting that he overlapped with Dyer for less than a year and that, even if a vacancy had existed, he “most likely” would not have promoted Dyer without a year’s experience and an annual evaluation demonstrating a “great” performance “throughout that year.” Id. (Harrison Dep. 69:21— 61:14). Second, Dyer points to his August 2006 performance review from Executive Chef Jalloh, which assigned him an average overall rating of 3.3—or just above the “[m]eets. [expectations” level—on a scale of 1 to 5. See Dkt. 37-7. That evaluation included some praise, and some criticism.

Drawing all inferences in Dyer’s favor, these pieces of evidence would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Dyer got off to either a good or acceptable start during his first nine months on the job. But such a finding,, without more, would not permit a reasonable jury to go on to find that Dyer’s later evaluations were not only unfair, but knowingly false and, indeed, fabricated as a pretext for the company’s decision to deny Dyer promotion in May 2010 and later because of his race. By that time, M <& S had almost another four years to observe Dyer’s performance, and nothing in Harrison’s testimony or Jalloh’s evaluation regarding Dyer’s performance between December 2005 and August 2006 would permit a reasonable jury to find that each of the many supervisors who evaluated Dyer’s performance between August 2006 and August 2012 was lying and that, in truth, they believed he.was an outstanding employee.

To the contrary, many of the same deficiencies noted in Dyer’s later evaluations are foreshadowed in the Jalloh evaluation. Thus, for example: (1) where Jalloh observed that Dyer “needs to take charge, and try to res[ol]ve problems instead of waiting” for his manager, Dkt. 37-7 at 3, Hagstad later observed that Dyer “tends to forward problems to” his manager, Dkt. 37-8 at 2, (2) where Jalloh observed that Dyer “needs to ... [ejnforce gro[o]ming, and hygien[e] rules regardless” of who was violating them, Dkt. 37-7 at 2, Maya later observed that Dyer needs to “reinforce uniform, grooming and hygiene” rules, Dkt. 37-9 at 2, and (3) where Jalloh observed that Dyer “should demonstrate leadership and ownership in running the rest[a]urant[ ],” Dkt. 37-7 at 5, Maya later observed that Dyer “appear[s] to be a key turner and not the leader that we expect,” Dkt. 37-10 at 5. In addition, although Harrison testified that Dyer was a “good guy” with potential, Dyer has offered no evidence that Harrison ever shared this perspective with any of the relevant decision-makers, see Giles v. Transit Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that positive performance assessment was of “exceptionally limited relevance” because it was not communicated to decisionmakers), or any other evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to infer from Harrison’s early impressions of Dyer’s work that the criticisms offered by Dyer’s supervisors in later years were fabricated.

Accordingly, although “[i]n some cases, a positive evaluation is inconsistent with an employer’s assertion of poor performánee and therefore suggests pretext,” id. at 7, nothing that Dyer has identified in Harrison’s testimony or Jalloh’s evaluation of Dyer’s performance rises to this level. Rather, those comments were dated; in the case of Harrison, there is no evidence that his views were conveyed to any relevant decisionmaker; and, in case of Jalloh, his comments were “consistent with” the criticisms offered by his successors, id. At this point, the Court’s role comes to end; absent some evidence of pretext, it is not the role of the Court to act as a “super-personnel department that reexamines” the merits of an entity’s personnel decisions. Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same); Giles, 794 F.3d at 7 (same).

Read liberally, Dyer’s brief also attempts to show that a reasonable jury could find that M & S’s assessment of his qualifications was knowingly false by citing his own deposition testimony. See Dkt. 40 at 23. Specifically, he points to his own testimony that he served as the D.C. Grill’s de facto Executive Chef for an extended period of time “around 2006,” that he performed well in that role, and that the D.C. Grill moved from “number 68 in the region for the whole United States as [M & S] properties” to number one during his “tenure.” Dkt. 40-2 at 3 (Dyer Dep. 97:4-100:15). Dyer also points to his own testimony that Marcello asked him at various points to train newly hired chefs (some of whom were or soon became Executive Chefs), and that he saw himself as “instrumental” to the process. See id. at 4, 6-7 (Dyer Dep. 102:14-104:7, 125:17-129:12).

These portions of Dyer’s deposition, however, are nothing more than Dyer’s “own ‘subjective assessments of [his] own credentials,’ which are ‘largely irrelevant’ for purposes of establishing discriminatory motive.” Bell v. Donley, 928 F.Supp.2d 174, 180 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Washington v. Chao, 577 F.Supp.2d 27, 44 (D.D.C. 2008)); see also, e.g., Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[Plaintiffs] own personal opinion is inadequate by itself to create an issue for the jury.”). After all, “it is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” Vatel v. Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000)). And Dyer’s own subjective judgment of his value to the restaurant says little about whether the managers’ belief that he was ■ not qualified for promotion was objectively unreasonable. Where Dyer might have come forward with objective evidence, moreover, he has failed to do so. Notably, although Dyer testified at his deposition that he had “paperwork to attest to [the D.C. Grill’s rise in the rankings]” during his informal tenure as the de facto Executive Chef, Dkt. 40-2 at 3 (Dyer Dep. 97:8), he has failed to produce any such documents to the Court. In addition, and most importantly for present purposes, Dyer has failed to offer any evidence that the relevant decisionmakers shared his view, that this purported rise in the restaurant’s ranking was attributable to his excellent performance. As Dyer concedes, “Jalloh’s management at” the D.C. Grill “absolutely” played a role in achieving the improved ranking. Dkt. 40-2 at 4 (Dyer Dep. 101:11-14). To this, he adds the unsupported, subjective judgment that the success was a “team” effort and that he was responsible for providing the necessary “direction” in the kitchen. Id. (Dyer Dep. 101:15-21). He may or may not be right about that. The relevant question, however, is whether there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the less flattering views of his supervisors were pretext for discrimination, and his subjective assessment of his own contribution does not suffice to meet that burden.

Dyer’s last piece of “countervailing evidence of his qualifications” consists of “the assurances he received from M & S management that he was next in line for promotion.” Dkt. 40 at 23 (citing Dyer Dep. 235:9-15). But Dyer fails to attach the cited material to his summary judgment brief. See Dkt. 37-4. at 26-27; Dkt. 40-3 at 7-8. The Court therefore .considers neither the cited evidence nor the argument it is intended to support. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring parties to support factual assertions by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record”) (emphasis added). Dyer.concedes, moreover, that he. has not challenged his non-promotion to the position he was purportedly promised, Dkt. 45-1 at 62 (Dyer Dep. 238:18-239:7), and he has failed to explain how his non-promotion in 2006 has any .bearing on whether his subsequent performance evaluations were honest; whether those who declined to promote him between May 2010 and May 2013 acted with discriminatory intent; or, indeed, whether they even knew about any promise his prior supervisor—who left the company in August 2006—may have made. ,

Dyer’s attempt to demonstrate pretext through “countervailing evidence of his qualifications” is, accordingly, unavailing.

b. Dyer’s Remaining Arguments for Pretext

Dyer makes four additional arguments regarding pretext in the introduction of his brief, see Dkt. 40 at 2-4, but he fails meaningfully to develop them in ihe argument section, see id, at 21-24. Dyer has therefore failed-to raise these arguments. See Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“A litigant does not properly raise an issue by addressing it in' a ‘cursory fashion’ with only ‘bare-bones arguments.’ ”) (quoting Wash. Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). And, in any event, the Court finds them unpersuasive.

First, Dyer argues that “the lack of standards and the subjectivity of M & S’s ‘tap on the shoulder’ promotion system ... by itself raises a genuine question of material fact.” Dkt. 40 at 2-3. In support, he cites Adorno v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 258 F.R.D. 217, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he lack of criteria in promotions is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”), and Watson v. National Linen Service, 686 F.2d 877, 881 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he failure to establish fixed or reasonably objective standards and procedures for hiring is a discriminatory practice.”). Id. at 2-3, 22. He also asserts that Marcello and Hunter’s testimony that Dyer “struggled with ‘leadership’ and ‘accountability’” and “was not ‘effective,’ ” see supra n.5, constituted improperly “vague[]” and “subjective judgments,” Dkt. 40 at 22. •

Even accepting Dyer’s view of the law, however, the' cited statements come nowhere near showing that M & S employed a subjective or standardless system for promotions. To the contrary, the judgments that Dyer lacked leadership skills and accountability, and that Dyer was not “effective” as a Sous Chef, are given substantial content by. Dyer’s various performance reviews. Those evaluations explain—in concrete and specific ways—how Dyer was- unable to manage his subordinates, routinely passed his responsibilities onto other employees, and generally failed to, execute many, of the duties required of. Sous Chefs at M & S, including preparing recipes and managing part of the restaurant’s finances. See infra Part I.A. The “judgment” that such a person is not qualified to recei