Perez v. Abbott (267 F. Supp. 3d 750, 2017)

ORDER ON PLAN H358

XAVIER RODRIGUEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This Order addresses Plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional claims against Plan H358, enacted by the 83rd Texas Legislature in 2013.

The following Plaintiffs assert claims against Plan H358: The Texas Latino Redistricting Task Force (limited to HD90), MALC, the Perez Plaintiffs, and the NAACP Plaintiffs. At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs’ remaining claims involve statutory claims under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

I. Background and Summary of Claims

Although the Governor called the special session to adopt the Court’s interim map H309, some changes'were made to the map in Dallas, Tarrant, Harris, and Webb Counties, and the Legislature incorporated those changes into Plan H358. At second reading, Chairman Darby outlined criteria that he would apply in evaluating any proposed amendment:

that it does not create a harm or a risk to further litigation by violating the constitution’s “one person, one vote” principle regarding population deviation; that it does not dilute nor dismantle a Section 2 protected district under the Voting Rights Act or violates the Texas Constitution regarding contiguous districts or the county line rule. If those measures can be satisfied, I want to see that it addresses a concern, for example, the splitting of a community of interest. And finally, I’d like to see an agreement amongst the members affected.

JX-17.3 at Sl-2. After three amendments were adopted, Darby stated that they were “small tweaks to districts between members that unite communities of interest and don’t have any implications with regard to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the constitution.” Id. at S5.

The Task Force Plaintiffs bring Shaw-type and intentional discrimination/vojte dilution claims based on the changes inade to HD90 in Tarrant County.

MALC and the NAACP Plaintiffs assert § 2 results claims based on the Legislature’s continued failure to draw additional minority coalition opportunity districts in Harris, Fort Bend, Dallas, and Bell Counties, as shown in their proposed demonstration Plans H391 (MALC) and H392 (NAACP). Defendants maintain their position that § 2 cannot require the creation of coalition districts, but that argument has already been rejected by this Court as inconsistent with binding Fifth Circuit authority. Defendants further contend that these districts are not required by § 2 because Plaintiffs have failed to prove the necessary cohesion among the minority groups included.

MALC also contends that the Legislature was required to draw additional Latino opportunity districts .in Nueces County and Midland/Ector Counties. Defendants argue that these districts cannot be required by § 2 because their creation would violate Texas’s County Line Rule. This Court has already held that § 2 of the VRA may require the State to break the County Line Rule if § 2 requires'the district under the totality of circumstances.

.Plaintiffs contend that the intentional discrimination found by this Court in Plan H283 remains in Plan H358, and that Plan H358 was operated or maintained as a device to further intentional vote dilution. This Court’s analysis in the Order on Plan C235 concerning the intent of the 2013 Legislature applied to both Plan C235 and Plan H358. Thus, the Court finds that the 2013 Legislature purposefully maintained the intentional discrimination contained in Plan H283 where the district lines remain unchanged or substantially unchanged. The Court will discuss the implications of its prior intent findings in the analyses of the various areas affected.

Last, Plaintiffs assert that the Legislature again acted with intent to discriminate in adopting Plan H358 in 2013 by the Legislature’s continued hostility toward minority districts, pretextual use of the County Line Rule to avoid creating new Latino opportunity districts, and refusal to consider minority coalition opportunity districts,. despite the minority population growth. While the Court agrees that the circumstantial evidence remains unchanged in terms of the Legislature’s refusal to recognize minority growth due to its continued hostility toward, minority districts as perceived Democrat districts, the Court finds that the intentional discrimination, in 2013 was limited to the Legislature’s intent to maintain and perpetuate (without remedy) any infirmities in the plan that already existed.

II. Analysis by County

The Court thus turns to its analysis of the various claims in each of the specific challenged areas.

A. Harris County

With regard to Plan H283, Plaintiffs asserted a § 2 results claim and intentional discrimination/intentional vote dilution claims. They challenged mapdrawers’ failure to draw a new Latino or coalition opportunity district, despite the minority population growth, while protecting slower-growing Anglo districts. They also challenged the elimination of HD149, which they contended was a multi-ethnic .coalition minority opportunity district as part of the Legislature’s decision to reduce the number of districts in Harris County from 25 to 24.

In fashioning the interim plan H309, this Court found that Plaintiffs had demonstrated' a likelihood of Success on the merits of the § 2 claim, in eastern Harris County. Specifically,-the Court found that Plaintiffs had presented numerous demonstration plans illustrating that an additional compact majority-HCVAP district could be drawn there, and made a preliminary finding that creation of a new Latino opportunity district was justified by the totality of . circumstances. Docket no. 690 at 8-9. The Court’s interim plan thus reconfigured HD144 in the manner requested by Plaintiffs to have a majority HCVAP. Id. The Court also maintained HD149, finding that the § 5 claims were not insubstantial. Id.

In its Order on Plan H283, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to prove intentional racial discrimination with regard to the decision to reduce the number of districts to 24 or the elimination of HD149. Docket no. 1365 at 52-54. However, the Court found .that the failure to draw an additional Latino opportunity district in Harris County violated § 2 and was .intentionally racially discriminatory. The Court noted that: the member-driven process failed to consider § 2 compliance insofar as minority members were essentially shut out of the process; Hanna’s recommendation to consider drawing an additional Latino opportunity district (as he was able to do) was ignored; and when faced with a map that failed to create any new Latino opportunity districts, mapdrawers decided to shuffle minority population within the minority districts to artificially (and without legal basis) inflate the SSVR and HCVAP of existing Latino ability district HD148 to claim VRA compliance, knowing that this was already a, performing Latino district and that no new opportunity district was being created. Docket no. 1365 at 53-57.

During the 2013 legislative session, some changes were made to HD133, HD137, and HD149 and incorporated into Plan H358. These changes were the result of Amendment 3 (Plan H318); offered by Reps. Wu, Vo, and Murphy. On the House floor, Rep. Wu stated .that the amendment was agreed to by the three affected members and “swaps out sections of our districts.” JX-17.3 at S4. He stated, “One of the main things it does is it helps reintegrate part of a very large Vietnamese population that has very strong language and cultural issues that neither Representative Murphy nor I can really address and áre better placed in Representative Vo’s district so he can better represent them. This helps make this area more constitutionally sound ....” Id,; see also Tr1525-26. No party complains of these changes.

With regard to Plan H358, MALC asserts § 2 results claims and intentional vote dilution claims based on the intentional failure to create additional coalition opportunity districts. MALC’s demonstration Plan H391 creates two additional coalition districts — HD132 is a Black + Hispanic CVAP coalition district and HD135 is a Black + Hispanic + Asian coalition district. JX-107; Tr32; MALC-24. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Gingles because minority groups do not vote cohesively in Harris County, citing the lack of evidence of cohesion in primary elections.

As noted in the Order on Plan C235, the evidence is undisputed that African Americans and Latinos choose primarily to participate in. the Democratic .primaries. in Harris County. The undisputed evidence further shows that Latinos and African Americans are strongly cohesive in support of Democrat candidates in general elections. See MALC-22 Table 7 (2014 and 2016 elections). Brischetto characterized African American and Latino cohesion as “extremely high” in general elections. MALC-19 ¶ 64. Dr. Chervenak also found high levels of cohesion between African Americans and Latinos in general elections, with each group cohesively supporting candidates of each race. NAACP-2 Table 5.

As discussed in the Order on Plan C235, however, the evidence indicates a lack of cohesion between African Americans and Latinos in the primaries, Dr. Engstrom’s countywide analysis of statewide elections involving Latino and non-Latino candidates indicates lack of Democratic primary cohesion between African-American and Latino voters. African Americans and Latinos shared support for only two of six Latino candidates in Harris County between- 2006 and 2010 (both- groups also shared a lack of support for candidate Alvarado). Docket no. 307-1 at 16. Howevr ér, in one case where both groups supported the Latino candidate (Yanez for Supreme Court Place 8), African-American support was only 52.7% and in the other case (Uribe for Land Commissioner), Latino support was only 59%. Id. Table 6. For three Latino candidates, African-American support for the Latino candidate was lower than “others.” Docket no. 307-1 at 17-18

Dr. Brischetto did not study any primary elections. Dr. Chervenak did examine the 2016 Democratic primary in HD149 in southwest Harris County, where Asian-American candidate Hubert Vo ran against an African American. He found that a majority of African-American (56.4%) and Latino (60.6%) voters supported Vo. NAACP-2 Table 5A. But Vo also received majority support from Asian (62%) and white (55.4%) voters, meaning that all racial groups supported Vo in the primary, though none at very high levels. Id. Further, while HD149 is located within Harris County and is somewhat near (though not adjacent to) proposed tri-ethnic coalition district HD135, it is unclear how voting patterns in HD149 would translate to proposed HD135.

As discussed in the Court’s prior orders, there was lay testimony about Hispanic and African-American coalitions in Harris County. And there was lay testimony, such as from Rogene Calvert, Sarah Winkler, Rep. Hubert Vo, and Rep. Sylvester Turner, that Asians, Latinos, and African Americans in Harris County had formed coalitions, though this testimony referred to southwest Houston, farther south than where proposed HD135 would be. Docket no. 1364 ¶¶ 410, 424-27, 451, 460, 503. Rep. Senfronia Thompson provided general testimony that African Americans, Latinos, and Asians work in cooperation together politically in Harris County.

But as it concluded with regard to the proposed congressional districts, the Court finds that there is simply insufficient evidence of cohesion to show that, when combined, Black and Hispanic voters in proposed HD132 or Black, Hispanic, and Asian voters in proposed HD135 would cohesively support their candidates of choice. Thus, the § 2 results claims in Harris County fail.

To the extent MALC, Perez Plaintiffs, or the NAACP Plaintiffs contend that discrimination found by the Court in Plan H283 remains in Plan H358, the Court rejects such a claim.

No further changes are required in Harris County.

B. Fort Bend County

The NAACP and MALC argued that the Fort Bend County configuration in Plan H283 violated § 2 because it resulted in minority vote dilution, and that an additional minority coalition district was required. Population growth (primarily minority) in Fort Bend County resulted in the addition of a new district there, but no additional minority district was drawn.

The Court considered the NAACP’s proposed tri-ethnic coalition district HD26 in Plan H202, but found that the NAACP had failed to establish the Gingles preconditions. Specifically, the districts appeared compact, but Plaintiffs had not offered evidence that the minority communities contained within the district were compact, taking into account traditional districting principles. Docket no. 1365 at 59.

And even if the districts were compact, the Court found that the NAACP offered-only lay testimony concerning minority cohesion in Fort Bend County, and the Court would not infer cohesion- from other evidence in Harris County. Id. at 60. MALC’s expert Dr. Brischetto provided the only expert testimony on racially polarized voting in Fort Bend County, and found cohesion among African Americans, Latinos, and Asians and polarized Anglo bloc voting. MALC-161 Table 22. But he only looked at elections in 2012, and he did not conduct a multivariate analysis of the primary elections. Docket no. 1364 ¶533.

To support its § 2 results claims in Fort Bend County in this phase of the litigation, MALC offers demonstration Plan H391, which creates a new majority-minority Black+Hispanic+Asian district HD26. Tr30; MALC-24. Plan H391. redraws HD26, HD27, HD28, and HD85 in the “Fort Bend Mix” of Fort Bend, Jackson, and Wharton Counties, and is set up to be plugged into Plan H358. MALC-17 (Kor-bel 2017 Report) ¶26. MALC’s expert George Korbel drew the plan, and he states that HD26, HD27, and HD28 are essentially located in suburban Houston areas, the districts are simplified, the split of the City of Richmond is eliminated, and the adjacent cities of Rosenberg and Richmond are combined in HD85. Id.

NAACP offers demonstration Plan H392, which creates tri-ethnic coalition district HD26, and Dr. Fairfax’s testimony regarding compactness. County Commissioner Grady Prestage also testified to the' compactness of proposed HD26, Tr567-68. The Court agrees that NAACP’s proposed HD26 is compact and' satisfies the first Gvngles precondition of numerosity when all the groups are combined.

NAACP Plaintiffs offer the expert testimony of Dr. Chervenak to show racially polarized voting. NAACP-2 Table 4. He examined 2012, 2014, and 2016 general elections in HD26, finding in each case that African Americans, Latinos, and Asians were cohesive in support of the minority candidate, while non-Hispanic whites were strongly polarized against those candidates (with support never exceeding 13%). Id. Dr. Chervenak testified that there had not been a contested Democratic primary in HD26 for many years. Tr422. The NAACP Plaintiffs argue that this demonstrates that voters of color are not acting in -opposition to each other, and each group supports the minority candidates in the general election. They further contend that lay witness testimony supports a finding of cohesion, citing Commissioner Prestage’s testimony about K.P. George (Fort Bend ISD Trustee), Neeta Sane (HCC Board of Trustees), and Q Imam (Sugarland City Council). Tr557-58.

The State contends that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Gingles because there is no evidence of cohesion among Asian-American, Black, and Hispanic voters in Fort Bend County. Docket no. 1526 at 63. They note that Plaintiffs’ experts did not analyze primary elections, that Dr. Murray testified that Asian-American voters in Fort Bend County tended to split their vote almost evenly between Democrats and Republicans, and that lay witness testimony failed to show cohesion within the Asian population.. Defendants also cite the testimony of Jacey Jetton, who testified that Asian Americans are not cohesive among themselves, with South Asian voters and Chinese voters differing in preference, Tr699, and the testimony of Commissioner Grady Prestage, who also confirmed that the Asian-American community is not “monolithic.” Tr581-82.

NAACP Plaintiffs argue that the Latino community is also not monolithic, but “that does not negate their ability to obtain fair representation under the Voting Rights Act.” Docket no. 1529 at 56. However, the lay witness and expert witness evidence indicates that national origin subgroups within the- Fort Bend Asian community may have distinct political, preferences such that they cannot all be considered together in determining cohesion. Jetton testified that the Asian community did not necessarily vote cohesively, citing instances where the South. Asian and Chinese communities had differed, Tr699-701. Though Jetton’s testimony was not particularly compelling for several reasons, Dr. Murray also stated that “you really need to look at national origin groups in Fort Bend County, because the South Asians are much more Democratic-and have been since — a lot of them since 2001, too. So it’s complicated communities, and to lump them all together is somewhat problematic in terms of analysis.” Trl290. He contrasted this with Latinos in Texas, which he said are mostly of Mexican origin, which “simplifies things a lot.” Id.

Further, there -is evidence that Latinos are not cohesive with other minorities in their choice of primaries. In his 2014 report, Dr. Brischetto found that more Latino voters in Fort Bend County chose to participate in the Republican primary (2.758) in. 2012 than in the Democratic primary (576). MALC-161 Table 21. This was also true in 2010, where 2,176 Hispanics chose to participate in the Republican primary, while only 1,305 participated in the Democratic primary. Joint Expert Ex. E-3 (Lichtman Report) at 5 (Table 1). In 2008, however, 9,252 Hispanics chose the Democratic primary, while only 2,715 chose the Republican primary. Id.

Based on his general election analysis, Dr. Brischetto noted “severe” racial bloc' voting between Anglos and African Americans, between Anglos and Hispanics, and between Anglos and Asians in Fort Bend County, and .concluded that “[t]here is clearly a tri-ethnic coalition in support of Democrats in the general election” in Fort Bend County. MALC-161 ¶¶89, 91. However, he noted that “[v]oter cohesion among Asian American voters for. Democrats in general elections is ... considerably lower (60%) in. Ft. Bend. In some of the contests, however, the Asian point estimates are not reliable.” Id. ¶ 89. The mean vote for Latinos was 72.2% and for African Americans it was 97.8%, compared to Anglo support of 5.9%. Id. at Table 25. Dr. Brischetto did not analyze any Fort Bend County elections in his 2017 report.

Considering all the evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prove minority group cohesion sufficient for their § 2 results claims, based on triethnic minority coalition districts in Fort Bend County,

The Court previously rejected the NAACP’s intentional vote dilution claifn concerning Fort Bend County for insufficient evidence. The .NAACP continues to pursue its intentional vote dilution claim in Fort Bend .County, arguing that the county is reportedly the most diverse .in the country, and thus the minimization of minority voting strength, with only one of four districts having a representative of color, is circumstantial evidence of an intent to discriminate against voters of color. Docket no. 1529 at 52. In addition, the NAACP offers racial density shading maps to show that minority communities are cracked in the districts’ configuration, with HD26 fragmenting a high-density Asian-American population in Sugarland and a substantial Asian-American population in the Four Corners and New Territory region. Id. The NAACP notes that County Commissioner Gary Prestage confirmed how Plan H358 fractures Asian-American communities, and the oddly shaped appendages reach out to grab predominantly white pockets of voters, in complete disregard for city boundaries and compactness.

The NAACP does offer circumstantial evidence of intentional vote dilution — minority communities are split, and the result is a lack of proportionality of representation (in 2010 Fort Bend County was 36.2% Anglo, yet only one district has a representative of color). And the HD26 configuration is bizarre, but some explanations were given for the districts’ shapes, and Plaintiffs have failed to prove discriminatory intent as opposed to discriminatory effects. Plaintiffs’ shading exhibit shows an Asian community in Meadows Place is cracked, but there was evidence that Rep. Reynolds wanted population to the north, which could account for that cracking (the specifics of this possibility were not explored). In addition, mapdrawers offered race-neutral explanations for some of the bizarre shape of HD26. The Court maintains its finding that Plaintiffs have not shown intentional vote dilution in the Fort Bend County configuration.

No changes are required in Fort Bend County.

C. Bell County

In the prior phase of litigation, MALC, the Perez Plaintiffs, and the NAACP Plaintiffs asserted § 2 results and intentional vote dilution claims in Bell and Lam-pasas Counties. The Court found no § 2 results violation in Plan H283, noting that Plaintiffs’ proposed districts combined three or four different minority groups but Plaintiffs lacked the necessary evidence of such multi-ethnic cohesion. Docket no. 1365 at 75. The Court also found that, considering all the evidence, the Legislature’s intentional failure to create the proposed districts was not intentional vote dilution. Id.

However, the Court found evidence that mapdrawers (specifically Anglo Republican HD64 incumbent Aycock) intentionally racially gerrymandered the district by cracking minority population, thus diluting the minority -vote to ensure Anglo control over both remaining districts. Rather than respecting the boundaries of the City of Kil-leen, which included significant minority population and had been mostly within HD54 in the benchmark, he and mapdraw-ers split the City 'to divide its minority population. Plans were introduced by minority members that would have kept the City more whole, but they were rejected. Rep. Aycock, who drew the configuration, offered unconvincing and pretextual explanations for the split (such as. that portions of the Killeen community were more of a community of interest with Lampasas than with the remainder of Killeen), leading the Court to find that the decision to split Killeen and the minority community within it (removing minorities from HD54 and moving in Anglos) was tp ensure that HD54 and HD55 remained Anglo-majority and to make HD54 less likely to perform for minority voters.

The Plan H283 configuration of Bell and Lampasas Counties remains unchanged in Plan H358. The NAACP Plaintiffs, MALC, and the Perez Plaintiffs continue to assert § 2 results and intentional vote dilution claims. E.g., Docket no. 897 (MALC) ¶ 54 (Plan H358 “unnecessarily fragments the minority community of Killeen to minimize its political impact on Texas House elections”). They contend that the violations found by this Court concerning Plan H283 remain in Plan H358.

The NAACP Plaintiffs offer Plan H392, which draws HD54 as a 30.3% Black Alone CVAP and 20.9% HCVAP coalition district, and the expert testimony of Dr. Fair-fax to show compactness. JX-108.3; Tr972 (Fairfax). MALC and Perez Plaintiffs offer Plan H391, which draws HD54 as a 30.1% Black Alone CVAP and 20.4% HCVAP coalition district. JX-107.3. Plan H391 reunites the City of Killeen in proposed minority opportunity district HD54, respecting municipal boundaries and creating a compact district, while also equalizing population variances this Court previously found to violate one person, one vote principles. Tr20 (Korbel). These districts satisfy Gingles’ numerosity requirement as a coalition. Both are also compact, especially MALC’s district in Plan H391.

However, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Gingles 2 because Plaintiffs did not establish that Black and Hispanic votes in Bell County are cohesive. Although Dr. Brischetto found racially polarized voting in Bell County in the 2012 general elections he analyzed, he did not analyze any Bell County elections from 2014 or 2016. Dr. Chervenak analyzed general elections in 2012, 2014, and 2016 and found racially polarized voting, but did not analyze primaries. And Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ lay witness testimony does not provide a basis for 'finding cohesion.

The Court found that the lines in Bell County were drawn with a racially discriminatory purpose, and that the minority population was intentionally split to ensure Anglo Republican voting strength in both districts in the area. That intent and harm remain in Plan H358 and must be remedied. Although, Defendants argue that any intentional discrimination claim fails due to the lack of evidence that any legislator acted with a racially discriminatory purpose in voting for Plan H358 in 2013, the Court has found that the 2013 Legislature intended to continue the intentional discrimination found in Plan H283.

The Court need not decide whether Plaintiffs have proven that a coalition minority district is required under the § 2 results test. Defendants conceded during the interim map phase, with respect , to DFW and CD33, that an appropriate remedy for cracking a minority population would be to reunite that population. As noted, Killeen was mostly whole in Plan H100 but its minority population was then intentionally split to minimize minority voting strength. As a possible remedy, MALC’s Plan H391 reunites the City of Killeen and its minority population.

Plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination/vote dilution claims have merit, and a remedy is required in Bell County.

D. Dallas County

In Dallas County, the Court rejected the NAACP Plaintiffs’ § 2 results claims with regard to Plan H283 because they failed to meet their burden under Johnson v. De Grandy to show that Plan H202 contained more compact opportunity districts than Plan H283, and found that the remaining § 2 results claims were best addressed in the 2013 plan case, Docket no. 1365 at 62 n.49. And while the Court did not find racial gerrymandering or intentional vote dilution in eastern Dallas County, it did find an improper use of race to dilute Latino voting strength in western Dallas County. Specifically,- the Court found that mapdrawers improperly used race to make HD103 and HD104 more Hispanic and HD105 more Anglo to protect an Anglo Republican.

The Court’s interim Plan H309 did not alter the Dallas County configuration from Plan H283. However, during the 2013 legislative session, some changes were made to HD103 and HD115 through an agreed amendment (Amendment 2, Plan H324) proposed by Rep. Anchia (HD103) and Rep. Ratliff (HD115). Anchia testified that the change was requested by Rep. Ratliff, and Anchia wanted to accommodate him to maintain good relationships. Trl31-133. The amendment swapped some population between the two districts. On the House floor, Rep. Villalba explained that Rep. Anchia would receive the entire community of Farmers Branch in exchange for keeping together the Carrollton Community in HD115. JX-17.3 at 4. Chairman Darby testified (as he also stated on the House floor) that the amendment also “helped the [population] deviations.” Trl525; JX-17.3 at 6 (“Anchia was way over the deviation, and Bennett Ratliffs district was way under. What that did — what this amendment did was help bring those deviations back into line”). No .party complains about these changes.

The NAACP Plaintiffs, MALC, and.'the Perez Plaintiffs assert-results and intentional, vote dilution claims under § 2. Plaintiffs contend that certain violations found by this Court concerning Plan H283 remain in Plan H358, specifically this Court’s findings concerning HD103, HD104, and HD105 in western Dallas County. NAACP Plaintiffs continue to assert “that minority voters across the county, not just in the western part of the county, were intentionally cracked and packed” beyond those identified areas. Docket no. 1529 at 58.

For the § 2 results claim, MALC’s Plan H391 proposes four new minority-majority CVAP coalition districts in Dallas County. TrSl; JX-107; MALC-24. HD102 and HDl‘07 would be Black + Hispanic coalition districts, and HD105 and HD113 would be tri-ethnic coalition districts including Asians.

NAACP Plaintiffs assert that Plan H392 “presents a configuration, that corrects [the] intentional discrimination [found by the Court in Plan H283], and when the districts are drawn fairly, three additional majority-minority districts naturally occur, reflecting the population present in those areas.” Docket no. 1529 at 58. Those districts are HD105 in western Dallas County, and HD102 and HD107 in eastern Dallas County. All three districts are Black + Hispanic coalition districts, though HD105 and HD102 are Hispanic-plurality districts and HD107 is a black-plurality district. NAACP Plaintiffs contend that lay expert testimony demonstrates that the proposed districts are compact. They assert that these districts are required by § 2 and to remedy the intentional discrimination across Dallas County.

Whether § 2 requires these districts again boils down to whether minority voters in the proposed districts are politically cohesive. Plaintiffs assert that they'have éstablishéd racially polarized voting through expert and lay witness testimony. The evidence discussed in the Opinion on Plan C235 is equally relevant here. Dr. Chervenak examined six elections in Dallas County. NAACP-2 Table 2. His multivariate analysis revealed racially polarized voting — African Americans and Latinos are eohesive in support of African-American and Latino candidates, while other voters did not share the candidate preferences of African-American and Latino voters. In the 2016 general election for HD107 in Dallas County, Dr. Chervenak found Latinos (83.8%) and African Americans (87.5%) were cohesive in their support of Neave, while Anglos gave only 41.1% support. Id.

Dr. Brischetto found racially polarized voting in the five general election contests in 2014 and 2016 that he analyzed — African Americans and Latinos voted cohesively in support of three Latino Democratic candidates and Anglos were cohesive in their lack of support; Anglos gave 64 and 69.4% support to the Latino Republican candidate, while African Americans and Latinos did not support those candidates. MALC-19 Table 6. Thus, “[i]n all five of these contests, African American and Latino voters were supporting the same candidates and opposing the candidates preferred. by Anglo voters. The degree of cohesiveness in voting between African Americans and Latinos was extremely high in Dallas County.” Id, ¶ 50. Plaintiffs also cite to the testimony of Rep. Eric Johnson from Dallas, who stated that African-American voters were strongly supportive of Latino House representatives currently serving in the areas .encompassed in HDs 103, 104, and 105. Tr520-21.

Dr. Engstrom’s analysis of general elections also found strong cohesion between African Americans and Latinos in support of the Democratic candidate,' with Anglo voter support in the 20-30% range. Docket no, 307-1 Table 5. But Dr. Engstrom’s analysis of primaries found that African Americans were “the least likely group to support Latino candidates in Democratic primaries.” Id. at 15 (African American support was lower than “Other” support in six of eight primaries); see also id. Table 5.

Defendants note that Korbel did not consider primary cohesion when he drew the districts and did not offer any opinion on cohesion, and that MALC’s expert Dr. Brischetto did not look beyond general elections. They further note that NAACP expert Dr. Chervenak did not examine primary elections in Dallas County and could not make any statements about the characteristics of,Latino, African American, or Asian American candidates of choiqe. Tr443-45.. Further, Defendants assert, to the extent the record contains any evidence regarding cohesion, it shows that Black and Hispanic voters are not cohesive.

Considering all of the evidence, the Court finds, as it did in the Order on Plan C235, that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the necessary cohesion for their § 2 results claims in Dallas County.

However, the Court finds that the intentional discrimination it found in western Dallas County in Plan H283 still exits in Plan H358. H309 made no changes to Dallas County. Although some changes were made in H358, these did not remove or remedy the intentional discrimination.

Accordingly, changes are necessary in Dallas County .to remedy the intentional discrimination previously found by the Court in HD103, HD104, and HD105.

E. Nueces County

MALC challenges the configuration of districts in, Nueces County under § 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment. As discussed m the Court’s opinion on Plan H283, it is undisputed that Nueces County had two benchmark Latino opportunity districts (HD33 and HD34, though both failed to elect Latino-preferred candidates in 2010) and part of a third district (HD32) represented by Anglo Republican Todd Hunter. Because Nueces County grew at a slightly slower rate than the statewide average, all three districts were underpopulated compared to the 2010 county population ideal. The 2010 . census population entitled Nueces County to almost exactly two (2.02) districts under the County Line Rule. During, the 2011 redistricting process, map-drawers chose to eliminate one of the Latino opportunity, districts (HD33) and draw two districts wholly within Nueces County — one strongly Latino (HD34) and one a safe Anglo Republican seat (HD32) to protect incumbent Hunter.

Although the HCVAP of Nueces County was above 50%, mapdrawers did not look into whether two maj ority-HCVÁP Latino opportunity districts could be maintained in Nueces County, either wholly within the County or by breaking the County Line Rule, despite advice from David Hanna of the Texas Legislative Council to consider those options. Instead, they relied on countywide SSVR (which was below 50%) to assert that it was mathematically impossible to draw two Hispanic districts wholly within the County, and they categorically refused to consider breaking the County Line Rule to comply with the VRA.

They then tried to offset the § 5 retrogression caused by the loss of HD33 by increasing the SSVR of two districts that were electing Democrats, HD90 and HD148, even though, as the D.C. Court held, these were already ability districts. They did not consider whether § 2 required two Latino opportunity districts in Nueces County because, they believed, increasing the number of majority-SSVR (in Interiano’s view) or majority-HCVAP (in Downton’s view) districts statewide also precluded that claim. Thus, as this Court previously concluded, the motive for increasing the SSVR in HD90 and HD148 was not to increase Latino electoral opportunity in the spirit of the VRA, but to undermine Latino voting strength statewide by attempting to mask the loss of HD33 and preclude § 2 results claims.

Although Plaintiffs challenged the Nueces County configuration in Plan H283, this Court did not alter the districts in Plan H309. The Court lacked the benefit of the full record in making its preliminary determinations. Thus, at the time, the Court also focused on SSVR rather than HCVAP. Further, the Court concluded that the loss of HD33 for § 5 purposes was offset by the new Latino opportunity district HD144 in the interim map. The Court could not conclude, at that time, that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their § 2 claim because it appeared that the only way to maintain two Latino districts in Nueces County was to cut a county line, which seemed inappropriate absent a § 5 violation (which existed in Plan H283 but not H309). But the Court did not rule out a conclusion that the VRA could require a county line cut:

This is not to say that Section 2 of the VRA could never require a county line cut. This Court can envision a situation in which the refusal to cut a county line could, even in the absence of discriminatory purpose, result in vote dilution. However, in the particular circumstances of this case, traditional redistricting principles counsel in favor of maintaining two districts in Nueces County.

Docket no. 690 at 8.

During the 2014 trial, the Task Force Plaintiffs argued for the first time that two HCVAP-majority districts could be drawn wholly within Nueces County, but did not offer a demonstration map with such districts. The Court found that consideration of the § 2 results claim concerning Plan H283 was premature because, while mathematically two HCVAP-majority districts could be drawn in the area, no Plaintiff demonstrated whether or not two Gingles-compliant districts could have been drawn wholly within the County, and it was improper to consider whether § 2 required a County Line Rule violation in Nueces County until that issue was decided.

However, this Court did find evidence of intentional vote dilution in the' Legislature’s refusal to consider whether the VRA required HD33 to be preserved and its attempted offset for the elimination of HD33 (described above) and also in the configuration of remaining- HD32 and HD34. Docket no. 1365 at 37-40. The Court found that HD32 and HD34 were racially gerrymandered to dilute • Latino voting strength and protect Anglo incumbent Hunter. HD34 was intentionally packed with Hispanic voters, Hunter intentionally drew out potential Hispanic rivals (both Republican and Democrat), and Hunter intentionally overpopulated HD34 and underpopulated HD32 without legitimate justification in violation of one-person, one-vote principles. The Nueces County configuration remains unchanged' in Plan H35S, and MALC asserts § 2 results and intentional vote dilution claims.

Standing

Although Defendants have not raised the issue, these claims require us to determine whether MALC has standing. MALC’s standing argument in Nueces County centers on Raul Torres, a registered voter in current HD34 and a former Texas House representative and MALC member from HD33,. the eliminated Nueces County Latino opportunity district. MALC argues that it has organizational standing “to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). In this respect, MALC argues that its organizational strength and membership depend on growth, but that Plan H358 impedes this purpose by eliminating MALC member Torres and preventing potential MALC members from being elected. Docket no. 1462 at 5.

Separately from its argument on organizational standing, MALC asserts that it has associational standing, which requires that an individual MALC member have standing to sue in his or her own right. Docket no. 1462 at 2. To support this requirement, MALC points again to 'Torres, who “at the time of the filing of this action and the initial redistricting, had his district completely eliminated and was then paired with Anglo Republican Representative Connie Scott.” Id. at 3.

The general elements of standing are well established:

[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum pf standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion .of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.]’ ” Second, there must.be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be “fairly ••.. trace[able] to the- challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will.be “redressed by a favorable decision.”

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal citations omitted) (most alterations original).

There are two main types of standing for entities such as MALC. First, through organizational, standing, “an association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Organizational standing is to be distinguished from associational standing (more descriptively, termed representational standing) through which “[a]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when [1] its members would have standing to sue in their own right, [2] the’ interests at stake are germane to the- organization’s purpose, and [3] neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (emphasis added).

The Court agrees that MALC has organizational standing, and alternatively, that MALO has associational/representational standing.

organizational standing

The Supreme Court in Warth, by simply recognizing that an organization may seek judicial relief from an injury to the organization itself, articulated what is often cited as the origin of organizational standing. 422 U.S. at 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Several years later, the Supreme Court refined this concept by deciding the seminal case on this topic, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). The relevant portion of Havens dealt with the standing- of an organization — Housing Opportunities Made Equal' (“HOME”) — to bring racial steering-claims against a realty company under the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 378-79, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Relying partly on Warth to conduct “the same inquiry as in the case of an individual,” the Supreme Court looked to the following allegations from HOME’S complaint regarding its expenditures of resources to determine whether HOME alleged a sufficient injury:

“Plaintiff HOME has been frustrated by defendants’ racial steering practices in its efforts to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other referral services. Plaintiff HOME has had to devote significant resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s [sic] racially discriminatory steering practices.”

Id. at 379 (internal citations to HOME’S Complaint omitted). The Supreme Court held that the district, court improperly dismissed for lack of standing:

If, as broadly alleged, petitioners’ steering practices have perceptibly impaired HOME’S ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and mod? erate-income. homeseekers, there can be no question that the organization has suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities — with the consequent drain- on the organization’s resources— constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.

Id.

Beyond this main holding, the Supreme Court made two noteworthy comments. First, the Court contrasted its finding that these allegations exceeded a simple setback to HOME’S abstract interests with prior case law holding that a mere interest in a problem could not support organizational standing. Id. at 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)). Second, the Supreme Court noted that HOME was not deprived of standing simply because its injury was noneconomic. Id. at 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114 n.20.

The Fifth, Circuit has applied this concept of organizational standing on' many occasions, helping define its boundaries by focusing on whether a plaintiffs alleged injury’ is sufficiently concrete and traceable to the defendant’s conduct. In Louisiana ACORN Fair Housing v. LeBlanc, the Fifth Circuit recognized that an organization’s redirection of “some of its resources to litigation and legal counseling in response to actions or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart standing upon the organization.” 211 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2000). But outside of costs expended pursuing litigation, an organization will have organizational standing if it “prove[s] a drain on its resources resulting from counteracting the effects of the defendant’s actions.” Id.; ACORN v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 356-62 (5th Cir. 1999).

In Fowler, the court addressed the standing of a voter advocacy organization to force state compliance with the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”). 178 F.3d at 356-62. The court concluded that neither litigation costs nor expenditures made to monitor state compliance with the NVRA supported organizational standing because these injuries were not fairly traceable to the state. Id. at 358-59. But for some claims, the . court found that-the organization had standing based on its voter registration activities, the cost of which increased out of a need to “counteract!] the effects of [the state’s] alleged failure to implement [the. NVRA].” Id. at 360-61; see also Scott v. Schedler, 771 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming a district court’s finding of standing for the Louisiana NAACP because the head of its voter registration efforts personally conducted registration drives to counteract a state’s alleged noncompliance with the NVRA, even though the NAACP itself may not have spent any money to conduct these drives).

Still, not all diversions of resources counteracting a defendant’s conduct establish an injury in fact. NAACP v. City of Kyle, Tex., 626 F.3d 233, 238-39 (5th Cir. 2010). In City of Kyle, the court concluded that organizations had not suffered an injury in fact arising from a city’s new hous-: ing ordinances where they failed to explain how their activities, “which basically boil[ed] down to examining and communicating about developments in local zoning and subdivision ordinances, differed] from [their] routine lobbying activities.” Id. at 238. Further, the court considered the plaintiffs’ failure to identify specific projects that were delayed or curtailed as a result of resources being diverted to the challenged ordinances. Id. The court characterized the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries as simple setbacks to the organizations’ abstract interests rather than perceptible impairments to their abilities to carry out their purposes, despite the fact that the plaintiffs commissioned a $15,000 study on the impact of the challenged ordinance. Id. at 238-39.

The Fifth Circuit has also indicated that a conflict between the defendant’s conduct and the organization’s mission is necessary but not- sufficient to establish organizational standing. Fowler, 178 F.3d at 361-62 (“[U]nless it [is] clear that an organization’s stated goals [are] ‘at loggerheads’ with a defendant’s conduct, ‘it.is entirely speculative whether the defendant’s conduct is impeding the organization’s activities.’ ” (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). This requirement was' satisfied in Fowler where the voter advocacy organization’s purpose of increasing the political power of low and moderate income people was at odds with the state’s alleged failure to facilitate voter registration. Id.

This Court is aware of no redistricting case in which an organizational plaintiff has based' its standing on an injury to itself, as described in Havens. Nor is this Court aware of any redistricting decisions rejecting such a theory. But while Havens and many other decisions on organizational standing deal with the Fair Housing Act; nothing in Havens limits organizational standing to such challenges. Indeed, as noted above, the Fifth Circuit and other "courts have extended this concept of organizational standing beyond the housing context. E.g., Fowler, 178 F.3d at 356-62 (the NVRA); Schedler, 771 F.3d at 836-37 (same); Georgia State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Kemp, 841 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1336-37 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (same). Most importantly for present purposes, despite not dealing specifically with redistricting claims of the type asserted in this case, courts have consistently found standing under Havens for organizations to challenge alleged violations of § 2 of the VRA and the Fourteenth Amendment.

A majority of the Supreme Court has accepted this approach in the § 2 context. In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Seventh Circuit found that the Indiana Democratic Party had organizational standing to assert § 2 and Fourteenth Amendment claims against an Indiana voter ID law because it “injure[d] the Democratic Party by compelling the party to devote resources to getting to the polls those of its supporters who would otherwise be discouraged by the new law from bothering to vote. See Havens[, 455 U.S. at 378, 102 S.Ct. 1114].” 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007). Subsequently, a splintered Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s grant’ of summary judgment against the plaintiffs claims on the merits. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 188-89, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008). In doing so, five justices across two opinions explicitly approved of the Seventh Circuit’s standing analysis. Id. at 189, 128 S.Ct. 1610 n.7 (Stevens, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); id. at 209, 128 S.Ct. 1610 n.2 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

Other circuit and district courts have unanimously reached similar conclusions on organizational standing for § 2 and Fourteenth Amendment claims. See, e.g., Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 624 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2265, 198 L.Ed.2d 699 (2017) (finding organizational standing to bring § 2 and Fourteenth Amendment claims against a state law restricting absentee ballots and in-person voting assistance because the organization planned to expend resources to counteract the law’s effect on the African-American community). In one case, for example, the Democratic Party of Virginia alleged § 2 and Fourteenth Amendment claims against a Virginia voter ID law. Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 155 F.Supp.3d 572, 575-76 (E.D. Va. 2015), on reconsideration, 3:15CV357-HEH, 2016 WL 6921611 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2016). At the pleadings stage, the district court found that the Party sufficiently alleged its organizational standing based on expected expenditures of additional resources and longer lines at polling places. Id. at 579. The court added that the Party also “claim[ed] direct injury to its raison d’étre — electing candidates who support the democratic platform, as opposed to the individualized interests of its members.” Id. at 578.

Following a trial, the court found that the Party proved its standing and its injury, “primarily in the form of diversion of time, talent, and resources to educate their voters and implement the requirements of the Virginia voter identification law.” Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 188 F.Supp.3d 577, 584 (E.D. Va. 2016). Without mentioning standing, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016).

The only case indicating a contrary result is Lopez v. Merced County, California, in which the court granted summary judgment for lack of organizational standing against the Mexican American Political Association’s §' 5 claims because the Association failed to proffer evidence “that [it] ha[d] suffered organizational harm, including any evidence that [it] áctually diverted significant organizational resources in an effort to assure Hispanic voter rights.” 1:06-CV-1526OWWDLB, 2008 WL 170696, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008). But Lopez was a summary judgment decision where the Association’s claim to organizational standing foundered not because it was invalid as a matter of law but because the Association failed to meet its evidentiary burden. And as noted, other courts have unanimously recognized this-application of organizational standing in the § 2 context.

Plan H358, like Plan H283, eliminates the district of former MALC member Raul Torres. At trial, MALC presented the testimony of Representative Rafael Anchia, the present chairman of MÁLC. Anchia testified that MALC has “dual purposes.” Trll7. One purpose is to represent Latinos in Texas, and one is to grow MALC’s membership. Id. Defendants presented no contrary evidence on MALC’s purposes. On the basis of this evidence, MALC has organizational standing to challenge Plan H358’s configuration of Nueces County, which perpetuates the elimination of HD33. MALC’s injury due to this configuration is hardly speculative — MALC’s loss of a member was caused directly by the elimination of Torres’s district. .

This is not a case where the Court must assess the expenditure of resources to counteract a certain enactment’s effect to determine whether there is a sufficient injury; nor is this a case where MALC’s nonmonetary efforts in counteracting the Plan are at issue. Instead, the injury here is as direct as can be — MALC’s very existence, its raison d’étre, depends on its membership. and growing that membership, and Plan H358’s treatment of Nueces County reduced that membership by eliminating Torres’s district and deliberately placing Torres in a district he could not win. See Lee, 155 F.Supp.3d at 578. As a result, MALC has organizational standing to challenge Plan H358 in Nueces County.

associational/representational standing

The Court also finds alternatively that MALC has representational standing for its Nueces County claims. As mentioned, “[a]n association r has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when [1] its members would have standing to sue in their own right, [2] the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and [3] néither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181, 120 S.Ct. 693. MALC easily satisfies the second and third prongs because the district lines are important to MALC’s purposes of growing its membership and representing Latinos in Texas, and this litigation, like other similar redistricting cases, has proceeded without the participation of individual members. Accordingly, the only issue for associational standing is whether MALO has a member who would have standing to sue in his or her own right.

The only current MALO member in Nueces County is Abel Herrero, the representative for HD34 in Plan H358. MALC-1 at 3. Herrero is also a voter in HD34. As discussed above, Nueces County in Plan H358 includes two districts, HD32 and HD34. HD34, Herrero’s district, is a Latino opportunity district. Thus, Herrero’s standing (and therefore MALC’s representational, standing through Herrero) must exist even though Herrero lives in a Latino opportunity district in Plan H358.

“No circuit has developed a framework specifically for a Section 2 standing inquiry.” Pope v. Cty. of Albany, No. 1:11-CV-0736 LEK/CFH, 2014 WL 316703, at *5 n.13 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014). As a result, this Court will look to the alleged injury and determine whether it is sufficiently concréte, causally connected to the Defendants’ conduct, and redressable. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Pope, in which a district court found that minority plaintiffs residing in existing majority-minority districts had standing to bring vote dilution claims based on the possibility of drawing an additional majority-minority district, is the most analogous authority in conducting this analysis. 2014 WL 316703 at **5-6.

“Nothing in [§ 2] establishes :.a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”' 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). a This concept of proportional representation, which refers to “the success of minority candidates, as distinct from the political or electoral power of minority voters” is expressly not the right guaranteed by § 2. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n.11, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). Therefore, lack of proportional representation alone cannot be the alleged injury in a § 2 vote dilution plaintiffs claim to standing. See Pope, 2014 WL 316703 at *5.

The Court in Pope contrasted “proportional representation” as that term was used by the Court in Be Grandy with “substantial proportionality of political opportunity,” which it defined as “per capita voting power on par with the majority.” Id. A denial of this proportional opportunity .under the existing voting system, said the court in Pope, was the “putative injury” suffered by a minority bringing a § 2 claim, Id. The Pope court concluded that “supported allegations that Plaintiffs reside in a reasonably compact area that could support additional MMDs [majority-minority districts] sufficiently proves standing for a Section 2 claim for vote dilution” because the personalized injury is “that the apportionment of 4 MMDs to the sufficiently numerous and geographically compact minority population, as opposed to the 5 MMDs that. Plaintiffs, contend are required by the VRA, dilutes Plaintiffs’ individual voting power — including those in existing MMDs.” Id. .

Supporting this conclusion is other Supreme Court language, not cited by the Pope court, indicating that the injury suffered by a § 2 plaintiff asserting a claim that additional minority opportunity districts are required goes beyond the boundaries of a single district and includes a geographic area. In Shaw v. Hunt, the Court stated that “[i]f a' § 2 violation is proved for a particular area, it flows from the fact that individuals in this area ‘have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect, representatives of their choice.’ 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).” 517 U.S. 899, 917, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996). In De Grandy, the Court recited “how manipulation of district lines can dilute the voting strength .of politically cohesive minority group members, whether by fragmenting, the minority voters among several districts , where a bloc-voting majority can routinely outvote them, or by packing them into one or a small number of districts to minimize their influence in the districts next door.” 512 U.S. at 1007, 114 S.Ct. 2647 (citing Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153-54, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993)).

Thus, while the Court has said that § 2 rights are individual rights and not the right of the minority group as a whole, a claim that an additional minority opportunity district is required concerns individuals in a particular geographic area. As described in De Grandy, the basis of such a § 2 results claim in the single-member district- context is typically cracking or packing (or a combination of them). The claim will generally thus involve two or more districts within the geographic area where minority population is cracked or one or more districts in which the minority population is packed (and from which additional districts could be drawn), or some combination. A voter such as MALC member Abel Herrero, who lives in HD34, essentially lives in an allegedly packed district because MALC’s claim is that the Latino population in the area is sufficient for two Latino opportunity districts, but the plan contains only one. See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago, No. 92 C 1683, 1996 WL 34432, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1996) (finding 'Standing where - “[plaintiffs allege that many of their class members live in packed wards which could be redrawn into non-excessive majority African American wards”). Thus, the claim focuses on Herrero’s district in the context of the broader geographic area.

For these reasons, this Court agrees with the conclus