Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey (271 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 2017)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN R. TUNHEIM, Chief Judge

Plaintiffs Carl and Angel Larsen and Telescope Media Group (“TMG”) bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the ban on sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations and contracting in the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). The Larsens operate a videography business, and they plan to expand into the wedding video business as a public accommodation. They argue that the MHRA’s requirement that they serve same-sex couples seeking wedding video services violates the Larsens’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, free exercise, equal protection, and due process. The Larsens move for a preliminary injunction, seeking an order from the Court preventing enforcement of the MHRA against them in their future wedding video business. Defendants Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights Kevin Lindsey (“Commissioner Lindsey”), and Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson (“Attorney General' Swanson”) (collectively “Defendants”) move for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

The Court finds that contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Attorney General Swanson is not currently entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. However, the Court also finds that to the extent the Larsens claim that the MHRA would require them to publicize videos of same-sex weddings online, the Larsens have no standing because the alleged injury-in-fact is too abstract and hypothetical to present a genuine Article III case or controversy. As to the Larsens’ claims regarding the MHRA’s requirement that they serve same-sex couples in their wedding video business, the Larsens have standing and their claims are ripe. But the Court will dismiss the Larsens’ challenges to this application of the MHRA because all of the Larsens’' claims fail as a matter of law. Thus, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss and will deny the Lar-sens’ motion'for preliminary injunction as moot. '

BACKGROUND

I. THE MINNESOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (MHRA)

Minnesota has outlawed invidious discrimination in public accommodations since 1885. While the early antidiscrimination law was aimed- at protecting African-Americans from denials of equal opportunity in public accommodations and the “stigmatizing injury” that resulted from such discrimination, the MHRA’s scope has “progressively broadened” to outlaw discrimination against a number of historically disadvantaged groups. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624-25, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). The Minnesota Legislature added “sexual orientation” to the .list of protected characteristics more than two decades ago. Act of Apr. 2, 1993, ch. 22, 1993 Minn.. Laws 121 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-363A.44).

Two types of “unfair discriminatory practice” defined in the MHRA are relevant to this case. First, the Public* Accommodations Provision: “It is an unfair discriminatory practice ... to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation[] because of ... sexual orientation .... ” § 363A.11, subd. 1(a)(1). Second, the Business Discrimination Provision:

It is an unfair discriminatory practice for a person engaged in a trade or business or in the provision of a service -... to intentionally refuse to do business with, to refuse to contract with, or to discriminate in the basic terms, conditions, or performance of the contract because of a person’s ... sexual orientation .,,, unless the alleged refusal or discrimination is because of a legitimate business purpose.

§ 363A.17(3).

Commissioner Lindsey leads the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (“MDHR”) and is charged with interpreting and enforcing the MHRA’s substantive provisions. See § 363A.06. MDHR investigates allegations of MHRA violations and may pursue administrative enforcement actions to ensure 'compliance with the MHRA. See § 363A.28. MDHR and private parties may also bring civil actions “seeking redress for an unfair discriminatory practice,” § 363A.33, subds. 1, 6, and may pursue declaratory, and. injunctive relief, monetary damages, and costs and fees, id., subd. 6 (citing § 363A.29, subds. 3-6). In addition to civil enforcément mechanisms, an unfair discriminatory practice in violation of the MHRA is a misdemeanor. §' 363A.30, subd. 4.

II. LEGALIZATION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

In 2013 Minnesota enacted legislation to legalize same-sex marriage. Act of May 14, 2013, ch. 74, 2013 Minn. Laws (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.26, 517.01-23, 518.07). Subsequently, MDHR publicly announced interpretive guidance for businesses providing wedding-related services, stating:

[State law] does not exempt individuals, businesses, nonprofits; or the secular business activities of religious entities from- non-discrimination laws based on religious beliefs regarding same-sex marriage.

Therefore, a business that provides wedding services such as cake decorating, wedding planning or catering services may not deny services to a same-sex couple based on their sexual orientation. To do so would violate, the protections for sexual orientation laid out in the [MHRA]. The .individuals denied services could file a claim with [MDHR] against the entity -that discriminated against them.

(First Am. Verified Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 61, Jan. 13, 2017, Docket No. 13 (quoting Minn. Dep’t of Human Rights, Minnesota’s Same-Sex Marriage Law, https://mn. gov/mdhr/yourrights/who-is-protected/ sexual-orientation/ same-sex-marriage/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2017))); see also id. ¶¶ 62-64 (citing similar publicly available MDHR guidance).)

III. THE LARSENS’BUSINESS

The Larsens are Minnesota residents; they operate TMG, a for-profit Minnesota company incorporated in 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 22-25, 79.) The Larsens create films and other media for clients. (Id. ¶¶ 80-82, 89.) The parties do not dispute that because TMG offers videography services to the general public, it is a “place of public accommodation” as defined in § 363A.03, subd. 34.

The Larsens are Christian. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 72-78.) In their work at TMG, the Lar-sens generally exert a large amount of editorial and creative control over the media they produce for clients. (Id. ¶¶ 88, 90-91, 100-07.) The Larsens seek to create products that both satisfy their clients’ needs and also are consistent with' their religious beliefs. (Id. ¶¶ 84-85, 89, 93, 109.) The Larsens allege that they will “gladly work with all people” regardless of sexual orientation or religious belief, but they decline requests for their creative services unless “they can use their story-telling talents and editorial control to convey only messages they are comfortable conveying given their religious beliefs.” (Id. ¶¶ 92, 95.) This means that the Larsens decline requests to work on projects that “promote any conception of marriage other than as a lifelong institution between one man and one woman.” (Id. ¶ 96.) The Lar-sens also decline some client requests because they receive more requests than they have capacity to complete. (Id. ¶ 98.)

The Larsens allege that they are planning to expand their videography services to include wedding video services with the purpose of “counteract[ing] the current powerful' cultural narrative undermining the historic; biblically-orthodox definition of marriage as between one man and one woman” and expressing their opposition to same-sex marriage. (Id. ¶ 122; see also id. ¶¶ 3-5, 113-21, 123-30, 154-56, 159, 174.) They plan to publicly promote their wedding videos to a broad audience on then-website and on “other internet mediums, like Twitter and Facebook,” in order “to achieve maximum cultural impact” and to “affect the cultural narrative regarding marriage.” (Id. ¶¶ 135-36.) The Larsens allege that “[p]ublic promotion of the wedding videos ... will be mandatory in every wedding videography contract into which the Larsens enter.” (Id. ¶ 138.)

The Larsens maintain that the only way that they will be able to achieve their desired expressive goal — to create videos promoting their view of marriage — is if they operate as a provider of wedding video services for paying clients. They argue that (1) “[i]t is not financially feasible ... to tell stories about marriage with the frequency and quality they desire if they cannot charge for their work”; and (2) “[g]iven the nature of the wedding industry and the fact that weddings are typically not open to the general public, the Lar-sens would not have access to and be able tó capture weddings if couples did not hire them for their weddings.” (Id. ¶¶ 144, 147.)

The Larsens allege that they are unable to start offering their services “until they know whether they can operate in the wédding industry in accordance with their religious beliefs.” (Id. ¶ 156.) They claim that if they operate a wedding video service, they will be forced to choose between violáting the MHRA — and facing the associated civil and/or criminal consequences— or offering wedding video services to same-sex couples in violation of their religious beliefs. (See id. ¶¶ 160-65.) They allege that if they carry out their plan to expand into the wedding video business, they will decline requests to make wedding videos for same-sex couples and will post a statement publicizing this position on their website — acts that the Larsens acknowledge would violate the MHRA’s Public Accommodations and/or Business Discrimination Provisions as interpreted by MDHR. (Id. ¶¶ 158, 160, 165-66, 168, 170.) Thus; the Larsens argue the MHRA’s prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination is the reason why the Larsens have not expanded into the business of wedding videos. (Id. ¶ 173.)

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 6, 2016, the Larsens initiated this action against Defendants in their official capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28-30; see also Verified Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 26, 28-30, Dec. 6, 2016, Docket No. 1.) The Larsens assert seven as-applied pre-enforcement constitutional challenges to MHRA’s Public Accommodations and Business Discrimination Provisions. They argue the law impermissibly infringes their First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association and free exercise; creates an unconstitutional condition on entry into the wedding video market; and violates their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and to substantive and procedural due process. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 194-328.) The Larsens seek injunctive and declaratory relief excepting them from the MHRA’s ban on sexual orientation discrimination, as well as costs and fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Id. at 45-46.)

On January 13, 2017, the Larsens filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On February 15, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Court now considers both motions.

ANALYSIS

I. LACK OF JURISDICTION

The Court first addresses the threshold jurisdictional questions. Defendants make three arguments for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1): (1) pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims against Attorney General Swanson; (2) the Larsens lack standing; and (3) the Larsens’ claims are not ripe for review.

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts lack- jurisdiction .over claims against defendants entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. E.g., Roe v. Nebraska, 861 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding a complaint against state officials entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity was properly dismissed, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)). Similarly, if a plaintiff cannot satisfy Article Ill’s case- or-controversy requirements there is no federal subject-matter jurisdiction. KCCP Tr. v. City of N. Kan. City, 432 F.3d 897, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2005) (treating a motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion); Faibisch v. Univ. of Minn., 304 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[A] standing argument implicates Rule 12(b)(1).”).

In a facial attack on jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) such as this, “the court merely [needs] to look and see if plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction.” Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)). “Accordingly, ‘the court restricts itself to the face of the pleadings and the non-moving party receives the same protections as-it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).’” Id. (quoting Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)). “In other words, in a facial challenge, the court ‘determine^] whether the asserted jurisdictional basis is patently meritless by looking to the face of the complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.’ ” Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC, 98 F.Supp.3d 1012, 1017 (D. Minn. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005)).

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

“The. Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits by private citizens against a state in federal court.” Balogh v. Lombardi, 816 F.3d 536, 544 (8th Cir. 2016). In Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court articulated an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for state officers who “are clothed with some duty in regard -to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature,” holding that such officers may be enjoined from taking unconstitutional enforcement action. 209 U.S. 123, 156, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). “[T]o be amenable for suit challenging a particular statute the attorney general must have ‘some connection with the enforcement of the act.’ ” 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson (281 Care I), 638 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reprod. Health Servs. v. Nixon, 428 F.3d 1139, 1145-46 (8th Cir. 2005)). In 281 Care I, the Eighth Circuit found that the Ex Parte Young exception applied in a lawsuit challenging a state statute because of the following three connections between the Attorney General and the statute’s enforcement:

(1) the attorney general “may, upon request of the county attorney assigned to a case, become involved in a criminal prosecution of [the challenged statute],” (2) “the attorney general is responsible for defending the decisions of the [state agency ' to whom enforcement of the challenged statute is delegated] — including decisions pursuant to [the challenged statute] — if they are challenged in civil court,” and (3) “the attorney general appears to have the ability to file a.civil complaint under [the challenged statute].”

281 Care Comm. v. Arneson (281 Care II), 766 F.3d 774, 796 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 633).

Here, Attorney General Swanson has the same connections to enforcement of the'MHRA as the Attorney General in 281 Care I. First, she “may; upon request of the county attorney assigned to -a case, become involved in a criminal prosecution of’ the-MHRA. 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 632; see also Minn. Stat. § 8.01 (“Upon request of the county attorney, the attorney general shall appear in court in such criminal cases as the attorney general deems proper.”). Second, Attorney General Swanson “is responsible for defending” MDHR’s decisions pursuant to the MHRA if they are challenged in civil court; 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 632; see also Minn. Stat. § 8.06- (“The attorney general shall act as the attorney for all state officers and all boards or commissions created by law in. all matters pertaining to their official duties.”); Minn. Stat. § 363A.32, subd. 1 (“The attorney general shall be the attorney for [MDHR].”). Third, Attorney General Swanson “appears to have the ability to file a civil complaint [for violation of the MHRA], as Minnesota law gives the attorney general broad discretion to commence civil actions, see Minn. Stat. § 8.01, and [§ 363A.33] allows any person ;.. to file a civil complaint.” 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 632.

The Court is bound by the Eighth Circuit’s holding in 281 Care I. Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction over the claims for injunctive‘relief against Attorney ■ General Swanson under Ex Parte Young.

C. Justiciability

Defendants argue the 'Court' should grant the motion to dismiss on two justici-ability grounds, specifically the Larsens lack standing and their claims are not ripe. To evaluate justiciability, the Court distinguishes between two separate alleged injuries. First, the Larsens allege that if they sell wedding video services to the public, the MHRA’s requirement that they serve same-sex couples, effectively requiring them to create videos of same-sex weddings, would violate the Larsens’ constitutional rights. Second; the Larsens allege that “public promotion of the wedding videos {created by TMG] will’be mandatory in every wedding videography contract into which the Larsens enter.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 138). Based on this allegation, the Lar-sens claim the following:

The Larsens want to create films that will be played at weddings, published on their website, and shared via social media’ to tell a story of love, commitment, and vision for the future that encourages viewers to see biblical marriage as the sacred covenant God designed it to be. But if they do so, Defendants require that they also tell stories promoting other types of marriage, including same-sex marriage, in the same way and through the same channels.

(Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Pis.’ Opp.”) at 28, Mar. 8, 2017, Docket No. 40 (citations omitted).) The Larsens argue that if they structure their wedding video contracts, as planned — -in a manner that contractually obligates them to post all TMG wedding- videos online — the Larsens would- be unconstitutionally compelled to post videos of same-sex weddings online by operation of the Business Discrimination Provision.

•1. Standing

“Whether a plaintiff has standing to sue ‘is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.’ ” McClain v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 424 F.3d 728, 731 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000)). “The ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing1 is that a plaintiff show (1) an ‘injury-in-fact’ that (2) is ‘fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant’ and (3) is ‘likely .. ’. [to] be redressed by a favorable decision’ in court.” ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). The alleged injury-in-fact must be “(a) concrete and particularized” and “(b) ‘actual or imminent,’ ” as opposed to “ ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)). “A party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing standing ‘for each type of relief sought.’ ” Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr, 830 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009)).

In the First Amendment. context, “two types of injuries may confer Article III standing to seek prospective relief.” Id. at 794 (quoting Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2003)). First, the Larsens could establish an imminent threat of harm sufficient to confer standing by alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Id. (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)). A plaintiff in such a situation is “not ... required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.” Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973).

Second, “when there is a danger of chilling free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever possible may be outweighed by society’s interest in having the statute challenged.” Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph E. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). Thus, self-censorship in the face of a credible threat of future prosecution or civil enforcement constitutes an ongoing injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. Klahr, 830 F.3d at 794 (discussing a “chilling effect” due to' “a, credible threat of future [criminal] prosecution” (quoting Ward, 321 F.3d at 1267)); see also 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 630 (“[N]on-criminal consequences contemplated by a challenged statute can also contribute to the objective reasonableness of alleged chill,”). But self-censorship founded on alleged subjective chill caused by a statute is not enough to support standing, and “persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs.” 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 627 (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301).

Defendants argue that the Larsens have not alleged an injury-in-fact.

a; Making Wedding Videos for Same-Sex Couples

First, the Court examines the Larsens’ desire to sell wedding video services to the public, yet refuse to serve same-sex couples. Here, the Larsens allege both types of injuries courts have found sufficient to establish standing in pre-en-forcement First Amendment challenges, as articulated in Klahr. First, the Larsens allege plans to operate TMG as a pufylic accommodation in a manner that would clearly violate the Public Accommodations and Business Discrimination Provisions because they would decline to serve same-sex couples. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 158,167-68.) The Larsens allege that at least one same-sex couple already requested that TMG produce their wedding video, (id. ¶ 169), only increasing' the likelihood that, if they did expand into the wedding video business, they would end up turning away same-sex couples in violation of the MHRA. The Larsens also colorably argue that the operation of the statute would violate their constitutional rights; for purposes of evaluating standing, the Larsens “need[ ] only to establish that [they] would like to engage in arguably protected speech.” 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 627 (emphasis added).

The Larsens also allege a credible threat of enforcement, contrary to Defendants’ argument that the Larsens have asserted only a hypothetical injury-in-fact based on “[sjubjective concern about how [the MHRA] might apply.” (Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 6, Feb. 15, 2017, Docket No. 34.) MDHR’s interpretation of the statute’s application to wedding vendors is clear. See Minn. Dep’t of Human Rights, Minnesota’s Same-Sex Marriage Law, https://mn. gov/mdhr/yourrights/who-is-protected/sex-ual-orientation/same-sex-marriage/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). And the Larsens allege MDHR took enforcement actions againsira wedding vendor very recently— in 2014 — after sending testers to investí-, gate business’s practices. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-47, 66-71, 164-65.) To the extent Defendants argue there is no; credible threat of enforcement simply because there is no telling at this time whether they would ever decide to exercise their enforcement discretion against the Lar-sens, courts have found that speculation as to whether an entity charged with enforcement will actually choose to enforce a law against a plaintiff does not defeat standing. See, e.g., 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 627-31. “We assume [MDHR] would prosecute violators of [the MHRA], given the opportunity, because it has vigorously defended the [statute] and has never suggested that it would refrain from enforcement.’^ Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1998). Thus, the Larsens have alleged an imminent, non-hypothetieal injury-in-fact based on their plan to engage in conduct proscribed by statute — refusing to serve same-sex couples when operating as a public accommodation providing wedding video services — coupled with a credible threat of prosecution.

Second, the Larsens allege First Amendment chilling based on the notion that their wedding video business would arguably involve exercise of their First Amendment rights, but they have refrained from offering their expressive business services in the wedding field because, if they did,so, they would operate in a way that violates the MHRA. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 154-74.) The Court finds that because there is a .credible threat of enforcement, the Larsens’ “decision to chill [their activities] in light of the [MHRA is] ‘objectively reasonable.’ ” 281 Care II, 766 F.3d at 780-81 (quoting 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 627). Therefore, the Larsens have alleged self-censorship sufficient to establish standing regarding their claim that the MHRA would unconstitutionally force them to create videos of same-sex weddings if they operated as a Wedding video services public accommodation.

b. Publicizing Videos of Same-Sex Weddings

Next the Court considers whether the Larsens have standing to challenge the validity of the Business Discrimination Provision’s ban on “discrimination] in the basic terms, conditions, or performance of the contract because of a person’s ... sexual orientation,” § 363A.17(3), as applied to the Larsens’ allegation that they will write contracts that mandate, them to publicize all TMG wedding videos online. The Court concludes that, as for this aspect of the Larsens’ pre-enforcement challenge, the Larsens have failed to satisfy Article Ill’s injury-in-fact requirement because: (1) they failed to allege an intention to engage in a course of conduct proscribed by statute; (2) they failed to demonstrate a credible threat of enforcement; and (3) any First Amendment chilling is unreasonable. '

First, it is not clear that the Larsens have alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct that is proscribed by statute. See Klahr, 830 F.3d at 794. The Business Discrimination Provision bars sexual orientation discrimination in “the basic terms, conditions, or performance of [a] contract” by a person engaged in a trade, business, or’ the provision of services, § 363A.17(3). The most plausible reading of the phrase “basic terms” is that it refers to the elements of a contract that make up the core of the deal, or in other words,.,terms that are necessary in order to make the contract enforceable. For example, price and services offered are “basic terms” of a contract for the sale of services, so the Larsens would be barred from charging a higher price or declining to provide certain services because of a customer’s sexual orientation.

Additionally, the purpose 'of the Business Discrimination Provision is to shield people in protected classes from invidious discrimination that prevents them from benefiting from contracts on equal terms as- everyone else. But a mandatory requirement that the Larsens post all wedding videos online and adopt them as the Larsens’ own speech is not a provision that benefits customers. The allegations in the Amended Complaint demonstrate that the Larsens’ plan to post, wedding videos-online -is meant to fulfill their own personal goal of communicating with the public about their religious beliefs. (E.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 135-38 (stating that the Larsens plan to promote wedding videos “proclaiming God’s design for marriage ... to a broader audience to achieve maximum cultural impact,” including, for example, publishing the videos online, and stating that such public promotion “will be mandatory in every wedding videography contract”).) Thus, a contractual provision obligating the Larsens to post wedding videos online — a term wholly unrelated to any consideration exchanged in the contract or any benefit provided to the customer — is not a- “basic term” as contemplated by the Business Discrimination Provision.

Second, there is no credible threat of prosecution or civil ■ enforcement. This is due, in part, to the low likelihood that MDHR would interpret the MHRA in line with the Larsens’ minimally colorable reading of the statute. Furthermore, Defendants’ counsel made clear at the hearing that Defendants — 'Charged with interpreting and enforcing the statute — do not believe the MHRA would require the Lar-sens to post videos of same-sex weddings online. (Tr. of Mots. Hr’g at 25:21-24, June 16, 2017, Docket No. 52 (explaining that what videos the Larsens post online “would be utterly and completely within [the Larsens’] control and discretion”).) Additionally, the Larsens have not alleged a history of enforcement or any allegations showing MDHR agrees with their reading of the Business Discrimination Provision.

The fear that MDHR would ever take enforcement action against the Larsens for refusing to post videos of same-sex weddings online is “imaginary or speculative.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).. Thus, because the Larsens “do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution [or civil enforcement], that a prosecution [or civil enforcement action] is likely, or even that a prosecution [or civil enforcement action] is remotely possible,’' id., in relation to their plan not to post videos of same-sex weddings online, “they do not allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a federal court.” Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 299, 99 S.Ct. 2301.

2. Ripeness

Defendants also argue the Larsens’ claims are not ripe. “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’ ” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985)). The doctrine’s “basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). “It requires that before a federal court may address itself to a question, there must exist ‘a real, substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal.interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.’ ” Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAm. Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1037-38 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301).

To show that a case is ripe, a plaintiff must satisfy both of the following two prongs “to at least a minimal degree”: (1) the issues presented are “fit[ ] for judicial resolution,” and (2) “significant harm” to the parties would result if the court withholds consideration. Id. at 1038-39. The first prong “depends on whether [a case] would benefit from further factual development,” with ripeness “more likely ... if [the case] poses a purely legal question and is not contingent on future possibilities.” Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 10 of Cass Cty. v. City of Peculiar, 345 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2003). With respect to the second prong,, “[a]bstract injury is not enough. It must be alleged that the plaintiff has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)).

Under the first prong, Defendants assert that the Larsens’ claims are not ripe because “there is uncertainty regarding how [MDHR] would apply [the MHRA] -in particular circumstances.” (Defs.’ Mem. at 6.) To support this argument, Defendants cite Texas, in which the Supreme Court dismissed a case as unripe in dramatically different circumstances. There, Texas sought a declaration that potential sanctions for failing school districts under a comprehensive state statutory scheme to improve public schools categorically did not violate the Voting Rights Act. 523 U.S. at 297-99, 118 S.Ct. 1257. The Supreme Court held that the inquiry into how Texas might interpret and apply the legislation was “too remote and abstract” in the absence of a concrete case. Id. at 301, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (quoting Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224, 74 S.Ct. 447, 98 L.Ed. 650 (1954)). Whether such a case might ever arise was “contingent on a number of factors,” and Texas’s manner of implementing the legislation was not yet clear. Id. at 300-01, 118 S.Ct. 1257.

Considering the Larsens’ allegation that the MHRA would require that they serve same-sex couples in their future wedding video business, the issues presented are fit for judicial decision. Unlike the unimplemented legislation at issue in Texas, here the Court considers a long-standing, already-implemented antidiscrimination statute. State agencies regularly apply statutes of this type and courts regularly review them. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (reviewing Minnesota’s application of a previous version of the MHRA); State by McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985) (same). There is a record of past state enforcement actions, as well as explicit interpretive guidance from MDHR indicating that the Larsens’ planned conduct would violate the MHRA. And unlike the abstract future injury in Texas, the Larsens allege both imminent and ongoing injuries that do not rest on any hypothetical contingencies, as discussed above. Defendants do not explain how the Court’s deliberations would “benefit from further factual development.” City of Peculiar, 345 F.3d at 573. Legal questions regarding undisputed facts are at the core of this dispute, and thus, the issues presented are fit for judicial decision.

Moving to the second prong, Defendants argue that the Larsens’ alleged future injuries are so speculative that no hardship would result if the Court withheld consideration. But as discussed above, the Lar-sens allege both ongoing injury (chilling) and imminent injury (enforcement if they engage in their intended, course of conduct). Courts have rejected ripeness arguments -in similar pre-enforcement contexts when there is an allegation of ongoing chilling. See, e.g., 281 Care I, 638 F.3d at 631. Therefore, the Larsens have satisfied the second prong as to their plan to decline providing wedding video services to same-sex couples if they operate a wedding video business as a public accommodation.

To summarize, the Court finds that Attorney General Swanson is not currently entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. However, the Larsens’ claim that the MHRA would force them to post same-sex wedding videos online is not justiciable because there is no injury-in-fact. The Court will reject Defendants’ standing and ripeness challenges to the Larsens’ claim that they will be unconstitutionally required to serve same-sex couples by creating videos of same-sex weddings if they operate a wedding video business as a public accommodation; the following discussion of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion addresses this alleged injury only.

II. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court considers all facts alleged in the complaint as true to determine if the complaint “state[sj a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than “ ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Although the Court accepts a complaint’s factual allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). “A-claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent, with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility,’ ” and therefore must be dismissed. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “In addressing a motion to dismiss, ‘[t]he 'court may consider the pleadings themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings; and matters- of public record.’ ” Illig v. Union Elec. Co., 652 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010)).

B. Count I: Free Speech

The First Amendment, as applied to states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits states from making laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). The Larsens allege that the Public Accommodations and Business Discrimination Provisions, as applied to the Larsens’ wedding video business, violate the Free Speech Clause in three ways, including that the law: (1) is a direct regulation of “pure speech” that is not content- or viewpoint-neutral and fails strict scrutiny; (2) unconstitutionally compels speech and fails strict scrutiny; and (3) imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech because officials have unbridled enforcement discretion, Defendants move to dismiss the free speech claims, arguing that the Lar-sens’ claims fail as a matter of law because the MHRA is a content-neutral regulation of conduct, it does not compel speech, and it is not a prior restraint. Defendants also argue that even if the MHRA is content-based or compels speech, it survives strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.

L Whether the MHRA Unconstitutionally Burdens Free Speech as a Content-Based Regulation

The Court first addresses the Larsens’ argument that the MHRA, as applied, violates their First Amendment rights because it is not content- or viewpoint-neutral and fails strict scrutiny. When a law regulating speech is content-based, it is “presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if’ it survives strict scrutiny — that is, the law is “narrowly tailored to’serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015). A law regulating speech- is content-based if (1) “ ‘on its face’ [it] draws distinctions- based on the message a speaker conveys,” id. at 2227 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566, 131 S.Ct. 2653, 180 L.Ed.2d 544 (2011)); (2) it is facially content-neutral but “cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech’ ” id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989)); or (3) it was “adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys,’” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746).

Content-neutral laws affecting Speech and expression are generally subject only to intermediate scrutiny. Por example, “‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations [of speech] are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avepues of communication.” City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). A similar form of intermediate scrutiny applies when a content-neutral law incidentally affects speech or inherently ¿xpressive conduct. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (noting the analysis “is little, if any, different”).

In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court held that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968); see also Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (“[T]he First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.”). Such , a regulation will be upheld “if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental .restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673); cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 578, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995) (holding a. law regulating-the content of a parade was unconstitutional'when'it “simply ... require[d] speakers to modify the content -of- their expression . in ' the absence of some further, legitimate end” (emphasis added)). “[A]n incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore' is permissible under O’Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985).

But laws that regulate conduct that is, in part, effectuated through language (or some other medium of exercising expression) are generally considered regulations of conduct that do not pose a First Amendment issue at all. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (“[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct.'....”). “[I]t has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949); see also, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 62, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) (“The fact that [a law barring racial discrimination in hiring] wil] require, an employer to take down a sign reading ‘White Applicants Only’ hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the employer’s speech rather than conduct.”).

' a. The Proper Level of Scrutiny in This Case

'As an initial matter, the Larsens plan to post langúage on their website stating that they will not create wedding videos for same-sex couples. To. the extent the Larsens argue such a statement is protected by the First Amendment, and thus the operation of the MHRA would unconstitutionally curtail such speech,, the Court finds there is no constitutional problem. While carried out through language, the statement is conduct akin to a “White Applicants Only” sign that may be prohibited without implicating the First Amendment. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62, 126 S.Ct. 1297. Posting language on a website telling potential customers that a business will discriminate based on sexual orientation is part of the act of sexual orientation discrimination itself; as conduct carried out through language, this act is not protected by the First Amendment. Id.; see also Giboney, 336 U.S. at 690-91, 69 S.Ct. 684.

The Court next considers the Lar-sens’ argument that the MHRA would unconstitutionally burden their free-speech rights because, as applied, the law affects the content of the Larsens’ wedding videos. It is an unremarkable proposition that films are First Amendment-protected speech, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 499-502, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952), and that creating films involves exercise of First Amendment rights, see Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (“[T]he creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”). The Court assumes for purposes of this motion that the creation and contents of the Lar-sens’ speech-for-hire implicate the Lar-sens’ First Amendment rights. But the Larsens are not immune from generally-applicable or commerce-oriented business regulations simply because they are engaged in First Amendment-protected expression. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (“[Restrictions on protected expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on nonexpressive conduct.”); cf. Turner, 512 U.S. at 626, 668, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (applying intermediate scrutiny to a law requiring cable operators to save a certain number of channels for local broadcasters even though cable operators engage in First Amendment speech, and remanding to determine whether the law was napowly tailored as required by the O’Brien test); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (finding that while lawyers “make a ‘distinctive contribution ... to the ideas and beliefs of our society,’ ” Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination in hiring and promotions did not unconstitutionally infringe upon a law firm’s exercise of First Amendment free expression (alteration in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963))). Nonetheless, the Court recognizes that the application of the MHRA to expressive businesses may at certain limited times burden the business’s exercise of free expression, and the case at hand is one such situation. Therefore, the proper level of scrutiny depends on whether the MHRA is content-based or content-neutral. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641-43, 114 S.Ct. 2445.

The Court concludes that the MHRA is content-neutral. First, the law dpes not facially “target speech based on its communicative content.” See Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2226. The MHRA is a generally-applicable business .regulation; the statute applies to all public accommodations and all businesses engaged in the provision pf a service, outlawing discrimination against customers or prospective customers on the basis of a protected status. §§ 363A.11, 363A.17. Furthermore, on its. face, the MHRA regulates, non-expressive conduct — the act of selecting and serving customers — and does not target speech or expression at all. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-24, 104 S.Ct. 3244; see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993) (noting that Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment, is “a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct”).

.Second, the law'is not the type of statute that, though' facially content-neutral, “cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2227 (quoting Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746). The law applies to all public- accommodations and businesses selling services regardless of the type of product or service sold. This includes all public accommodations selling expressive services to the public, regardless of the message expressed.

Third, the MHRA bans discrimination against customers as a way to combat invidious discrimination, not because the government “disagree^] with the message” any expressive service might convéy. Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2227 (quoting Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746); see § 363A.02, subd. 1 (“It is the public policy of this state to secure for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination ... in public accommodations because of ... sexual orientation .,..”). “[A]cts of invidious discrimination in .the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent — wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244.

The Larsens argue that the MHRA would not compel a wedding videographer supportive of same-sex marriage to create a video critical of same-sex marriage, and thus, the law is viewpoint-based. But this comparison is inapt, as Court cannot imagine any situation in which the MHRA would compel a wedding videographer to make a wedding video critical of any marriage. It would, however, compel a wedding videographer hostile to opposite-sex marriage to serve opposite-sex couples, which would incidentally require them to create videos depicting opposite-sex weddings. Thus, as applied to wedding videog-raphers, the law incidentally requires creation of wedding videos for all customers regardless of the customers’ protected status or the message depicted in the resulting videos. The law also does not prohibit the creation of any videos, and thus does not “raise[ ] the specter that [Minnesota] may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991). Contrary tq the Larsens’ assertions, the MHRA does not amount to a state effort to stamp out expression opposing same-sex marriage or to privilege only pro-same-sex marriage views.

It is a “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment ... that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable,” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); the MHRA, both facially and as applied to the Larsens, simply does not implicate this fundamental First Amendment concern.' As a content-neutral law regulating conduct, strict scrutiny is not the proper standard for evaluating the MHRA as applied to the Larsens’ wedding video business.

Instead, recognizing that application of the MHRA to expressive businesses in limited circumstances incidentally affects the content of the expressive product created for the customer, the Court applies the test set out in O’Brien to evaluate “content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 662, 114 S.Ct. 2445.

b. Whether the MHRA Survives. Intermediate Scrutiny

Applying O’Brien, the MHRA as applied to the Larsens easily passes constitutional muster. First, the MHRA furthers a state interest in preventing acts, of invidious discrimination in the provision of goods and services provided to the public. The Supreme Court has characterized this interest as not merely “important or substantial,” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, but “compelling,” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (upholding the constitutionality of the MHRA).

Though the Roberts court upheld an earlier version of the MHRA, the subsequent addition of sexual orientation t'o the list of protected statuses does not lessen the compelling nature of the state’s interest in preventing' discrimination. Indeed, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the MHRA only after Minnesota’s Governor convened a Task Force on Lesbian and Gay Minnesotans (“Task Force”) which “heard 25 hours of public testimony, 15 hours of private testimony and amassed over four inches of written materials.” Geraldine Sell et al., Report of the Governor’s Task Force on Lesbian and Gay Minnesotans 3 (1991), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/ other/910436.pdf. The Task Force recommended enactment' of a law banning discrimination based on sexual orientation after receiving “overwhelming” testimony demonstrating “that, as a group, gays and lesbians are the targets of considerable discrimination in the State of Minnesota,” Id. at 5. The améndment'to the MHRA adding sexual orientation as a protected characteristic was predicated on the conclusions of the Task Force. Thus, the Court has no doubt that Minnesota has a compelling, and not just a substantial, interest in preventing invidious discrimination in public accommodations and contracting because of sexual orientation, and that interest is present in the context of businesses providing wedding-related services. Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) (recognizing “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person”).

The Larsens argue that because there are many other wedding video vendors in Minnesota who will gladly serve same-sex couples, same-sex couples will not be deprived of access to wedding video services if the Larsens do not provide them, and thus the state’s interest in preventing invidious discrimination is not implicated in this as-applied challenge. (See Am. Gompl. ¶¶ 175-82.) But “[t]he promise of equality is not real or robust if it means you can be turned away.” Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No, 38 Harv. J. L. & Gender 177, 190 (2015). The Larsens’ argument ignores the fact that an act of discrimination is harmful not merely because it might result in unequal access to goods or services, but also because the act itself “generates a feeling of inferiority as to [one’s] status in the community.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). “That stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their [sexual orientation] as by those treated differently because of them race [or sex].” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625, 104 S.Ct. 3244. This legally-cognizable harm — “deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments,” Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964) — means that an anti-discrimination law fulfills its purpose when it reaches all, not simply most, public accommodations. Thus, the MHRA serves the compelling state interest'of preventing invidious sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations and contracting both in general and as applied to the Lar-sens’ future wedding video business.

Second, the Court considers whether the state’s interest in preventing discrimination in contracting and public accommodations is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. The Supreme Court has explained that the MHRA “reflects [Minnesota’s] strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services. That goal ... is unrelated to the suppression of expression .... ” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (citation omitted); see also id. at 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (explaining that Minnesota’s interest in preventing invidious discrimination is “wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit”). Furthermore, when the Minnesota Legislature added sexual orientation to the list of protected statuses under the MHRA, it took pains to clarify that the amendment did not signify an official state policy “condon[ing]” various sexual orientations. See § 363A.27(1). The fact that the MHRA’s application to expressive businesses may incidentally affect their speech does not change the fact that restricting free expression is neither the goal nor the primary function of the MHRA. Thus, the purpose of the challenged provisions — to provide Minnesota citizens equal access to contracting and public accommodations free from discrimination — is indeed “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673; see also § 363A.02 (describing Minnesota’s public policy “to secure for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination”).

Third, “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of’ Minnesota’s interest in preventing invidious discrimination. Turner, 512 U.S. at 662, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673). It is clear that the state’s purpose “would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897. The challenged provisions only ban acts of discrimination that produce the harm the MHRA seeks to prevent, and “[t]he state’s overriding compelling interest of eliminating discrimination ... could be substantially frustrated if [a business selling services to the public], professing as deep and sincere religious beliefs as those held by [the Larsens], could discriminate against the protected classes.” McClure, 370 N.W.2d at 853. Thus, any incidental burden on the Larsens’ speech caused by the Public Accommodations Provision is no greater than is essential to further the state’s compelling interest.

The MHRA’s application to the Larsens’ wedding video business, as a content-neutral regulation of conduct with an incidental effect on speech, survives intermediate scrutiny.

2. Whether the MHRA Implicates the Compelled Speech Doctrine

Next the Court considers Defendants’ argument that the Larsens have failed to plead a plausible claim under the compelled speech doctrine. “[F]reedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.” Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 61, 126 S.Ct. 1297. The compelled speech doctrine limits the government’s ability to force an individual to personally “speak the government’s message.” Id. at 63, 126 S.Ct. 1297. Thus, the government may not forbid a driver from covering up the “Live Free or Die” message on a license plate, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713, 717, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), or force students to recite the pledge of allegiance, W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). The doctrine also íimits the government’s ability to force a speaker to “host or accommodate another speaker’s message.” Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 63, 126 S.Ct. 1297. For example, unless strict scrutiny is satisfied, the government may not compel private parade. organizers to allow specific banners to be carried in a parade, Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566, 115 S.Ct. 2338, force a newspaper to provide space to a political candidate in the opinion section, Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), or require a utility company to send to customers printed information.prepared by the company’s critics, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 5-6, 9-18, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).

Where a business provides a “conduit” that allows others to pay for speech, strict scrutiny is usually unnecessary because thére is “little risk” of compelled speech or that the public will attribute the messagé to that of the speaker. Id. at 575-76, 115 S.Ct. 2338. Further, courts generally do not find compelled speech where the speaker may easily disclaim the message of its customers.

The Court finds the MHRA, as applied to the Larsens’ wedding video business, does not implicate the compelled speech doctrine. The law does not compel the Larsens to speak a specific government message, unlike the message on the license plate in Wooley or the words of the pledge of allegi