Martin v. Sprint United Management Co. (273 F. Supp. 3d 404, 2017)

OPINION & ORDER

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge:

Plaintiffs Jamie Martin and Daneisha Singleton bring this action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq. (“FLSA”), and the New York Labor Law, N.Y. Lab. Law § 650, et. seq. (“NYLL”). Plaintiffs served as field agents securing low-income customers to acquire wireless telephones of defendant Sprint/United Management Company (“Sprint”) pursuant to a federal subsidy program. They claim that they were misclassified as independent contractors, as opposed to as employees. Plaintiffs claim that, as a result, they were denied statutorily required minimum wage and overtime compensation. Plaintiffs claim that Sprint and co-defendants Credico (USA), LLC (“Credico”) and Wallace Morgan, Inc. (‘Wallace Morgan”) are jointly responsible for this willful misclas-sification. Plaintiffs further claim that defendants failed to provide them with required wage notices and statements.

Pending now are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. These motions raise three issues: (1) whether plaintiffs were employees rather than independent contractors under the FLSA and NYLL; (2) if so, whether Sprint and Credico were joint employers (with Wallace Morgan) of plaintiffs, such that they can be held liable for the alleged FLSA and NYLL violations; and (3) whether, even if plaintiffs are employees, they are exempt from FLSA and NYLL requirements as outside salespeople.

For the reasons that follow, the Court holds for defendants on the latter two issues. Specifically, the Court holds that, even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs were employees rather than independent contractors, (1) Credico and Sprint cannot be held liable as plaintiffs’ joint employers, and (2) the outside sales exemptions to the FLSA and NYLL apply. These rulings preclude liability altogether for Sprint and Credico, and they preclude liability for Wallace Morgan on plaintiffs’ minimum-wage and overtime claims. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants’ motions for summary judgment and denies plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. As to the sole remaining claims—plaintiffs’ wage-notice claims under the NYLL against Wallace Morgan—the Court, as explained below, commissions letter-memo-randa from plaintiffs and Wallace Morgan as to the effect of the Court’s rulings on these claims.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

1. The Lifeline Program

The federal government’s Lifeline Program was founded in the 1980s with the goal of “ensurfmg] that low-income consumers have access to phone service.” PI. 56.1 ¶ 1. Under the program, designated telecommunications carriers may provide Lifeline Program services to eligible consumers in exchange for subsidies. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.201, 54.403(a). These subsidies are administered by the Universal Service Administrative Company (“USAC”), a not-for-profit corporation des-jgnated to perform this function by the Federal Communications - Commission (“FCC”). Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶3. Since 2005, Lifeline Program services have' included wireless service and phones in addi-. tion to traditional landline phones. PI.. 56.1 ¶ 2.

Lifeline Program services are available only to persons who meet certain qualifications, including having an income below applicable guidelines. JSF ¶¶ 35, 37. To be eligible for Lifeline Program services, applicants must also certify that they will not exceed the maximum of one Lifeline Program-enrolled mobile phone per household. Id, ¶ 35.

Telecommunications carriers are not required to charge consumers for Lifeline Program services, see PI. 56.1 ¶ 4, but they may charge qualified low-income customers for additional, services, see Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 4. For example, while Lifeline Program enrollees may receive a free wireless phone and a free preset amount of minutes and messages, PI. 56.1 ¶ 6, enroll-ees may also purchase additional minutes and messages above this preset amount, Credico Counter 56.1 ¶ 6.

2. The Parties

Sprint is a telecommunications carrier that offers Lifeline Program, products and/or services through Assurance Wireless, a brand that Sprint acquired in 2009. Id. ¶¶ 7, 35-37, 52, Sprint’s receipt of subsidies from USAC is conditioned on Sprint’s compliance with the applicable program regulations. Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 3. Sprint is also required to “[publicize the availability of Lifeline service in a manner reasonably designed to reach those likely to qualify for the service.” See 47 C.F.R. § 54.405(b).

To promote and market Lifeline services, Sprint contracts with third-party Outreach Agencies (“OAs”). PI. 56,1 ¶ 14. Sprint also uses the National Lifeline Accountability Database (“NLAD”), which detects duplicate applications' to make sure that qualified applicants do not receive more than one Lifeline Program benefit, either through the same or multiple providers. Sprint 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10.

Credico is an OA that has contracted directly with Sprint since September 2012. PL 56.1 ¶¶ 16,18. Credico outsources sales and marketing services for its clients, which include other telecommunications carriers besides. Sprint, to independént sales offices (“ISOs”). PI. 56:i ¶ 17; Credi-co Counter 56.1 ¶ 17. Sprint pays Credico on a monthly basis. PI. 56.1 ¶ 187. In September 2013, Sprint and Credico entered into an Amended and Restated Outreach Agency Agreement (the “OA Agreement”) effective September 1, 2013; amending their original agreement dated September 15, 2012, JSF ¶ 41; PL 56.1 ¶ 18. Attached to the OA Agreement was a copy of Sprint’s Standard Operating Procedures (“SOPs”). JSF ¶¶ 39, 41. Under the OA Agreement, Credico was authorized to collect applications for Sprint’s Assurance Wireless Program within delineated areas of New York (including the Bronx, Queens, and Manhattan). Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 20, 93. Credico was not permitted to subcontract or use third parties to collect applications for the Assurance Wireless Program.* without Sprint’s prior written consent. Id. ¶21.

Wallace Morgan is an ISO with whom Credico has subcontracted, with Sprint’s consent, to collect applications for Sprint’s Assurance Wireless Program. PL 56.1 ¶ 22. Credico assigned an “Account Manager” to Sprint to serve as a main point of contact between Sprint and Wallace Morgan. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Wallace Morgan and Credico signed a . subcontractor agreement, to which Sprint was not a party,- dated October. 17, 2014. JSF ¶ 44;' Sprint 56.1 ¶67. Wallace Morgan and Sprint signed a document entitled “Authorized Office Acknowledgment to Participate in Assurance Wireless Program.” First Srey Decl, Ex. 8. It stated.that Wallace Morgan would “only source Assurance Wireless products from [Credico] and ¡no other . distributors or master agents.” Id. at 1. The document further stated that Wallace Morgan was “authorized to hire and train a team (referred to herein as “field agents” or “Staff’) to promote Assurance Wireless in the field, solicit and process Assurance Wireless applications ... and aetivate/pro-gram Assurance Wireless devices via the methods approved.” Id.

Plaintiffs are field agents who were hired by Wallace Morgan to solicit and collect applications for wireless phones and services from individuals seeking to enroll in the Lifeline Program through Sprint’s Assurance Wireless brand. JSF ¶ 52. Martin held the title of “account executive” front approximately March 29, 2015, and “corporate trainer” from approximately mid-April 2015, through May 7, 2015. Id. ¶2. Singleton held the title of “account executive” from approximately April 3, 2015, through mid-April 2015, and “corporate trainer” from approximately - mid-April 2015 through May 7,- 2015, id. ¶-4.

3. The Responsibilities of Field Agents

As noted, field agents on the Assurance Wireless campaign solicited and collected applications from potentially qualifying Lifeline Program applicants. JSF ¶ 52 (“Plaintiffs understood their job duty to be collecting applications from potentially qualified individuals who wanted to enroll in the- Lifeline Assistance Program through Assurance.”). Field agents may work on only one campaign at a time. PI. 56.1 ¶176.

As set forth in Sprint’s OA Agreement, field agents were required to “inform and educate potential customers about Assurance Wireless, determine and advise on an individual’s qualification for the program and engage the eligible customers in the application process for Assurance Wireless.” PL 56.1 ¶ 59. Field agents distributed Sprint-provided materials, visiting “targeted community locations and attending public or private community events.” Id.

In initially addressing potential applicants for phones pursuant to the Lifeline Program, field agents were required, as set forth in the Sprint SOPs, to begin-by “utilizing] an approved pitch that meets [Assurance Wireless] standards and clearly indicates only qualified applicants may receive ... lifeline services.” PL 56.1 ¶ 60. One such pitch, for example, could be: “Would you like to find out if you qualify for a free lifeline service from Assurance Wireless[?]” Id. Use of a pitch that did not meet these standards could result in a field agent being “immediately removed from marketing at Assurance Wireless’ sole discretion and not allowed to return without approval from Assurance Wireless.” Id. ¶ 61.

Sprint’s SOPs address the remainder of the interaction between field agents and potential applicants. For example, the SOPs state that field agents “must ask potential applicants if they currently have a lifeline phone with [Assurance Wireless] or any other carrier” and “if they have applied with [Assurance Wireless] or any lifeline carrier recently.” Id. ¶ 62; Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 62. Plaintiffs and Sprint dispute whether Sprint’s SOPs rigidly choreographed the steps for these interactions (along the lines of “first do this, next this”) or instead offered more relaxed training guidelines without any such temporal dimension. See PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 62-66; Sprint Counter 111162-66. But the parties do not appear to dispute that the SOPs discussed ways in which field agents were to speak with potential applicants to explain the program and to assess the applicant’s eligibility before submitting applications via a tablet. PL 56.1 ¶ 65; Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 65.

Using their Credico-provided tablet, field agents uploaded completed Lifetime Program applications to a third-party vendor called Solix so that the applications could be either approved or denied. JSF. ¶ 60; see also PI. Counter to Sprint 56.1 1Í 167 (noting ambiguity about whether it was actually Solix that determined whether an applicant met the regulatory qualifications but admitting that Solix conveyed information about whether applications had been approved or denied).

If an applicant qualified for a phone, he or she would have no contract or other agreement requiring activation of that phone or participation in the Lifeline Program. PI. 56.1 ¶87. There was never an exchange of money between field agents and potentially qualified applications. PI. 56.1 ¶ 112. Field agents would inform qualified customers about add-ons permitting them to purchase additional minutes. Sprint 56.1 ¶ 169.

4. The Schedules of Field Agents

Plaintiffs reported to work at Wallace Morgan’s office. Credico 56.1 ¶ 100. Wallace Morgan operated its own office space located at 40 Exchange Place in New York City. Credico 56.1 ¶49. Plaintiffs did not report to or work in any Sprint facility, Sprint 56.1 ¶ 119, or any Credico office, Credico 56.1 ¶ 101.

Wallace Morgan required field agents to sign in upon arrival. PI. 56.1 ¶67. Field agents working on the Assurance Wireless campaign could then pick up from the Wallace Morgan office a tablet provided by Credico. Field agents used these tablets in the field to review Lifeline Assistance Program applications. JSF ¶¶ 57-58. Wallace Morgan was financially responsible for any damage or loss of the tablets. Credico 56.1 ¶ 168.

Wallace Morgan also offered “atmosphere” meetings, which could be held in the morning and/or at night, at the Wallace Morgan office. JSF ¶¶ 67-68. At these meetings, Wallace Morgan agents received guidance as to how to solicit Assurance Wireless applications. See Sprint 56.1 ¶ 138 (“ ‘Atmosphere’ meetings were meetings in which Wallace Morgan agents gathered to receive sales tips from others at Wallace Morgan.”); PI. Counter to Sprint 56.1 ¶ 138 (attendees of atmosphere meetings “would discuss ... strategies on how to collect a higher number of approved Assurance Wireless Lifeline enrollment applications”). Field agents were informed of the start time of atmosphere meetings by Wallace Morgan supervisors. Credico 56.1 ¶ 126.

When heading out into the field with their tablets, field agents were not provided transportation to a particular territory; field agents paid for their own transportation. Wallace Morgan 56.1 ¶60; Credico 56.1 ¶ 117. Plaintiffs spent the.majority of their time working in the field. Sprint 56.1 ¶ 170. Wallace Morgan informed .field agents of their daily sales locations. Credi-co 56.1 ¶ 110. As noted, these locations had to be within broader territories approved by Sprint, which included the Bronx, Queens, and Manhattan. PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 20, 93.

Upon their return to the Wallace Morgan office at the end of work, field agents would report their application numbers and return their tablet. JSF ¶¶ 70-71. Wallace Morgan tracked the number of Lifeline Assistance Program applications that field agents obtained each day. Id. ¶ 69.

The parties dispute the rigidity of field agents’ schedules. It is undisputed that Wallace Morgan provided a “suggested daily schedule” to field agents. JSF ¶ 66. In claiming that field agents’ schedules were more regimented, plaintiffs point to a Wallace Morgan' “Leadership Guide” document, which states that field agents must “[b]e in early every day,” ■ “[h]ave 100% attendance,” “be in every day (including Saturday)” and “[c]all people at night and on weekends.” PI. 56.1 ¶ 67. In claiming that field agents’ schedules were more malleable, Credico points to Singleton’s testimony that her work hours varied and that Saturday work was not required. Credico Counter 56.1 ¶ 67. Credico also points to Singleton’s testimony that some agents lacked a morning schedule, worked only certain days of the week, and “could have walked in any time and taken a tablet [computer].” Id.

Martin estimated that, as an' account executive at Wallace Morgan, she worked from 8 a.m. to 7 p.m. six days per week. Credico 56.1 ¶ 130. Martin' testified that Saturdays were optional “[b]ut according to everybody else, if you wanted to move ahead, you would make' Saturday.” Id:, PI. Counter to Credico 56.1 ¶ 130. Martin estimated that, as a corporate trainer at Wallace Morgan, she worked from 7:30 a.m. to 7 p.m. six days per week. Credico 56.1 ¶ 132.

Singleton estimated that, as an account executive at Wallace Morgan, she worked from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. or 6 p.m. six days per week. Id. ¶ 129. Singleton estimated that, as a corporate trainer at Wallace Morgan, she worked from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. six days per week, unless she had something to do and only worked five days. Id. ¶ 131. Plaintiffs confirmed in their depositions that they never communicated with anyone at Credico about their work at Wallace Morgan or their work hours." Id. ¶ 99.

Opt-in plaintiffs in this action testified as to their schedules, which varied significantly. For example, opt-in plaintiff David Gillens estimated that, as a field agent at Wallace Morgan, he worked from 6 a.m. to 9 p.m. or 10 p.m., Monday through Saturday, resulting in approximately 90-96 hours per week, id. ¶ 135(i), whereas opt-in plaintiff Sandra Mills estimated that she worked from 8:30 a.m. to 7 p.m., Monday through Friday, resulting in'approximately 52.5 hours per week, id. ¶ l35(o).

5. The Hiring of Field Agents

Wallace Morgan conducted field agents’ interviews, including of plaintiffs, and made hiring decisions. JSF ¶¶ 46^47. In arranging their job interviews, prospective Wallace Morgan field agents corresponded only with Wallace Morgan. Credico 56.1 ¶65. Part of plaintiffs’ interviews with Wallace Morgan took place at the Wallace Morgan office and part, took place in the field, where plaintiffs learned about field agent responsibilities from Wallace Morgan supervisors. Id. ¶¶ 66, 68. Wallace Morgan employees communicated with plaintiffs to extend offers of employment. Id. ¶ 70.

Some agents working for Wallace Morgan, including plaintiffs, signed “Independent Sales Representative Agreements.” Id. ¶¶ 48-50. These stated that plaintiffs could provide similar or other services to companies that, like Wallace Morgan, were engaged in direct sales and marketing, as long as this other work did not interfere with ongoing work performed for Wallace Morgan. Id. ¶ 61.

Sprint’s SOPs required that OAs like Wallace Morgan complete background checks for field agents collecting Lifeline Program applications on the Assurance Wireless campaign. PL 56.1 ¶ 32; Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 32. ■

Credico also required that field agents comply with Sprint’s SOPs by completing a background check, signing a “zero-tolerance fraud letter,” and taking Sprint’s “Cyber Scholar” test. Credico 56.1 ¶ 33.

6. The Training of Field Agents

Wallace Morgan offered training to field agents. JSF ¶ 43. The parties do not appear to dispute that field agents were also required to complete online training provided by Sprint. PI. 56.1' ¶ 34; see Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 34 (identifying plaintiffs’ factual statement as “disputed” but acknowledging that “field agents who marketed and promoted the Assurance Wireless campaign were required to complete a one-time‘‘initial' training’”). In this training, field agents received “an explanation of the terms of the Assurance Wireless service” as well as “the Application processing and collection process, eligibility verification process and related Assurance Wireless sales guidelines.” Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 92-93.

Splint’s online ‘ training also addressed what field agents are “expected to know” and discussed “how to present yourself and act” as a field agent. Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 36. In a slide entitled “How should you look,” Sprint instructed that field agents “must represent Assurance Wireless in an appropriate manner at all times,” that “uniforms must be clean and neat,” that “[n]ame badges including the agent’s name and company must be worn and clearly visible at all times,” that “Assurance Wireless provided t-shirts must be worn at all times while working events,” and that, “[i]f you are in training, you should have a Trainee name badge and wear it at all times until your official name badge is provided to you.” First Srey' Deck, Ex. 12, at SPRMAR-000128. In another Sprint slide entitled “How should the event' look,” Sprint instructed that field agents must- “[ajlways display, if required, all permits, licenses and permissions before the beginning of any Assurance Wireless. event or activity” and “[n]o locally created merchandising/collateral may be utilized at any time without prior approval from Assurance Wireless.” Id. at SPRMAR-000129. Other slides cautioned field agents not to “post, print, or publish any marketing materials or advertisements (print, radio, social media, etc.) without prior Assurance Wireless written permission” or “represent, market, or offer Assurance Wireless products or services” on any website. Id. at SPRMAR-000130.

In compliance with Sprint’s OA Agreement with Credico, Credico was responsible for ensuring that each field agent working on the Assurance Wireless. camr paign completed Sprint’s training. Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶39. Under the same agreement, Sprint was permitted to revise its training guidelines for any reason, after which Credico was responsible for ensuring that field agents completed “re-training.” Id. ¶ 40. For example, one email from a Credico employee gave the following training update:

All AW agents need to use this pitch starting immediately. Please communicate this to everyone tonight, and ensure everyone is using it in the field.... Opening Pitch: so that everyone is on the same page—You can say ‘free’ and/or ‘lifeline’ so long as it is in the same sentence as “qualify for and Assurance Wireless.”

Credico Counter 56.1 ¶ 41.

Documents prepared by Credico set forth certain policies and rules for field agents. For example, one such document listed “Agent Compliance Rules,” including rules requiring wearing ID badges visibly in the field and forbidding wearing shorts in the field. PI. 56.1 ¶ 51. There is testimony that the document was created after Sprint asked Credico to address ongoing compliance issues, and that the document was “heavily based on suggestions from Sprint.” Credico Counter 56.1 ¶51.^ different Credico document, entitled “Territory Management,” stated that, “[i]n the event that an agent sells in territory that is assigned to another office, the office forfeits all office profit for sales submitted and payable.” Id. ¶ 52. Another “Business Trip” document created by Credico addressed situations in which an ISO and its field agents collected Lifeline Program applications outside of a normal approved territory. PL 56.1 ¶ 53.

Credico also created and implemented a “Compliance Improvement Plan” to enforce compliance with Assurance Wireless program rules. PL 56.1 ¶ 151; but see Credico Counter 56.1 ¶ 151 (acknowledging creation of the Compliance Improvement Plan, but claiming to. have done so at Sprint’s request, in cooperation with Sprint, and in a manner heavily based on Sprint’s suggestions). Credico also conducted audits to ensure compliance with Sprint SOPs. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 150; Credico Counter 56.1 ¶ 150.

Notwithstanding the online training, plaintiffs did not identify any Sprint personnel as having (1) any knowledge as to, or (2) any supervision or other form of direction over, plaintiffs’ duties or training. Sprint 56.1 ¶¶ 175-76. Plaintiffs also did not identify anyone from Credico as their manager or supervisor. Credico 56.1 ¶ 104. Martin and Singleton identified Wallace Morgan supervisors Stuart Guarney, Nilda Ortega, Jose Gutierrez, and Smith as their managers. Sprint 56.1 ¶ 178. Plaintiffs identified only Wallace Morgan supervisors as having knowledge about their job duties, id. ¶ 179, they did not identify anyone from Credico as having such knowledge, Credico 56.1 ¶ 106, and they testified that they never spoke with anyone at Sprint about-their jobs, duties, or schedule, Sprint 56.1 ¶ 180.

7. The Classification and Compensation of Field Agents

Until September or October 2015, all field agents at Wallace Morgan were classified as independent contractors. PL 56.1 ¶ 78.

Sprint and Credico both assert that they were not responsible for the independent contractor classification. Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 78 (“Sprint did not instruct Wallace Morgan to classify agents on the Assurance Wireless campaign in any particular way.”); Credico Counter. 56.1 ¶ 78 (“Credi-co had no involvement with the classification of Wallace Morgan Field Agents.”).

In disputing that Sprint was not responsible for the independent contractor classification, plaintiffs cite the “Authorized Office Acknowledgment to Participate in Assurance Wireless Program” signed by Sprint and Wallace Morgan. This prohibited Wallace Morgan from using sub-dealers or subcontractors but permitted the use of 1099 independent contractors to work on the Assurance Wireless campaign. PI. Counter to Sprint 56.1 ¶ 83 (citing First Srey Decl., Ex. 8 at WM000002).

In either September or October 2015, Wallace Morgan field agents were reclassified as exempt employees pursuant to the FLSA and NYLL’s outside sales exemptions. PI. 56.1 ¶ 80. Plaintiffs assert that this change was made based in part on Credico’s recommendation, citing evidence that Credico in 2016 changed its subcontractor agreement to ensure that ISOs like Wallace Morgan classified all agents as employees. Id. ¶81. Credico asserts that this evidence is “misleading and incomplete” and that Thomas “Tommy” Smith, the head of Wallace Morgan, was the only person that decided to reclassify field agents. Credico Counter 56.1 ¶80. Sprint and Credico both assert that the reclassification decision was ultimately Wallace Morgan’s, not Sprint’s or Credico’s. Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 80 (“The record confirms that Sprint was not involved in any respect in that decision or decision-making process.”); Credico Counter 56.1 ¶80 (“Wallace Morgan made the decision to reclassify •

While working at Wallace Morgan during the periods of time in which they were classified as independent contractors and outside sales employees, plaintiffs were not guaranteed' minimum wage and overtime payments. They were instead paid on a commission basis for approved Assurance Wireless applications. PL 56.1 ¶ 82; Credi-co Counter -56.1 ¶ 82. Field agents were also paid a commission if an applicant switched over to Assurance Wireless from a competing Lifeline Program service provider. Credico 56.1 ¶ 184. Wallace Morgan paid field agents via direct deposit. Credi-co 56.1 ¶ 193.

Martin earned a total of $980 during her employment, which averages to $196 per week, and Singleton earned a total of $1,300 during her employment, which averages to $260 per week. PL 56.1 ¶ 83. Neither Martin nor Singleton were provided any benefits such as health insurance. Wallace Morgan 56.1 ¶47. Wallace Morgan provided plaintiffs with IRS Form 1099s. JSF ¶ 55.

The OA Agreement between Sprint and Credico set forth the compensation that Credico would receive per approved application. PL 56;1 ¶ 84; Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 84. Sprint “retained] the right to change ... the pay structure with over a month of written notice.” Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 84 (internal quotation marks omitted). Sprint’s online training for field agents did not provide any information as to field agents’ compensation or classification. Sprint 56.1 ¶ 93.

Commission schedules created by Credi-co and referenced in Credico’s subcontractor agreement with Wallace Morgan state that field agents “shall be paid” at certain rates per approved application. First Srey Deck, Ex. 7, 36-37. However, in testimony, Wallace Morgan and Credico representatives characterized these rates as advisory. For example, Credico employee Timothy J. Reedy characterized this as a “suggested rate,” and stated that an ISO did not have to follow the commission schedule and that “the ISO owner can pay their representative what they would like.” Williams Deck, Ex. 4 at 221-22.

8. The Termination of Field Agents

Sprint and Credico both had the authority to require that a field agent suspected of fraud or failure to abide by the Standard Operating Procedures no longer work on the Assurance Wireless campaign. Id. ¶¶ 73-74.

Plaintiffs assert that Sprint and Credico had the power to direct an ISO to have field agents pulled from the field. PI. 56.1 ¶ 170 (citing Credico emails pulling agents from field). Credico acknowledges this capability but claims that this capability was exercised only for limited reasons, such as during an investigation of fraud or compliance issues. Credico 56.1 ¶ 170. Sprint points out that the evidence cited by plaintiffs establishes only that Credico, and not Sprint, had the power to have agents pulled from the field. Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 170.

The parties dispute whether Credico had the power to terminate field agents. It is undisputed that Credico had the power to require that any field agent suspected of engaging in fraud or failure to abide by the SOPs no longer work on the Assurance Wireless campaign. JSF ¶74. But plaintiffs also contend that “Credico has the authority to fire or suspend any Field Agent.” PI. 56.1 ¶ 183. In support, plaintiffs cite an email from Credico to Wallace Morgan owner Tommy Smith, asking Smith to “suspend” certain agents from going into the field pending an investigation, and an email from a Credico Account Manager stating: “starting this week ... any rep that has not had their audit will have their code shut off come this Monday.” PI. 56.1 ¶ 183. Credico claims that only Wallace Morgan could terminate its engagement with field agents and that Credico’s authority in this area did not extend beyond, as noted, requiring that field agents not work on the Assurance Wireless campaign. Credico Counter 56.1 ¶ 183.

The parties also dispute whether Sprint had the power to terminate field agents. It is, again, undisputed that Sprint had the power to require that any field agent suspected of engaging in fraud or failure to abide by the SOPs no longer work on the Assurance Wireless campaign. JSF ¶73. But plaintiffs also claim, citing Sprint’s SOPs, that “Sprint may terminate a Field Agent if they fail to meet the performance requirements set forth in the Sprint SOPs.” PI. 56.1 ¶ 50. The SOPs state that Sprint “will periodically review each OA back office operations and sales event locations for compliance with the requirements and standards within the Master Agreement and these SOPs,” First Srey Deck, Ex. 6, at SPRMAR-000025, and that, “[biased on any negative audit results, Assurance Wireless may, in its sole discretion, take action, up to and including termination of the Master Agreement and/or requiring any OA employee or field agent is removed from performing Assurance Wireless activities.” Id. (emphasis added).

In a similar vein, the parties dispute the reasons why Sprint could require the removal of a field agent. Plaintiffs contend that Sprint “has the authority to remove a Field Agent for any reason, not simply if it determines the Field Agent engaged in fraud, or failed to comply with the SOPs,” PI. Counter to Sprint 56.1 ¶ 148 (emphasis in original), citing a provision in the. SOPs that states Sprint may “ ⅛ its sole discretion’ ” terminate a field agent “ ‘based on any negative audit results,”’ id. (citing First Srey Decl., Ex. 6, at SPRMAR-000025). However, Sprint claims that this mischaraeterizes the SOPs and that Sprint “could only seek the removal of an agent from the Assurance Wireless campaign for suspected fraud or failing to abide by the SOPS” and “could not ‘terminate a field agent’ from its engagement with Wallace Morgan.” Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 50.

As to Sprint’s process of evaluating field agents, the parties do not dispute that Sprint conducted “mystery shops,” under which a “Sprint employee will represent himself as a potentially qualifying applicant and observe whether the Field Agent is performing his/her job in compliance with Sprint’s SOPs,” enabling Sprint to evalute “what the Field Agent says, their appearance, their knowledge of Assurance Wireless products and services, and whether' they present the proper marketing materials and attestations.” PI. 56.1 ¶ 144; see Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶ 144; Credico Counter 56.1 ¶ 144,

The parties also do not dispute that both Martin and Singleton were ultimately terminated by Walláce Morgan. JSF ¶ 72. Singleton testified that “[Wallace Morgan owner] Tommy Smith told [her] [she] was fired,” and that she never received a termination letter from Credico. Williams Decl., Ex. 20 at 107. Martin testified that that Smith directed another Wallace Morgan employee to terminate her. Williams Decl., Ex. 19 at 102. Plaintiffs do not dispute that no one from Sprint was present when Singleton and Martin were fired, and neither Singleton nor Martin ever discussed their terminations with anyone from Sprint. Sprint 56.1 ¶¶ 145-47.

In 2016, after plaintiffs initiated this action, Wallace Morgan stopped performing marketing services. Williams Deck, Ex. 1, at 56, Smith testified that it did so in part “[b]ecause the class action lawsuit ’ meant that, legally, the lawyers for Martin and Singleton were able to email texts and communicate aggressively with every representative of Wallace Morgan, and that email suggested that we were paying improperly, which decimated my sales force.” Id

B. Procedural History

On July 7, 2015, plaintiffs filed the initial complaint in this action, bringing claims against “Assurance Wireless LLC” and Wallace Morgan. Dkt. 1. On September 1, 2015, and September 14, 2015, respectively, Wallace Morgan and Sprint filed answers, Dkts. 31, 35, with Sprint’s asserting that it had been incorrectly sued under the name Assurance Wireless LLC.

On October 13, 2015, plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), bringing claims against Sprint and Wallace Morgan. Dkt. 48. -

On October 23, 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion for conditional collective certification, Dkt. 52, as well as a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 53, and supporting declarations, Dkts. 54-64.

On October 27, 2015, answers to the FAC were filed by Sprint, Dkt. 66, and Wallace Morgan, Dkt. 67.

On November 13, 2015, Sprint filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for conditional certification, Dkt. 70, as well as supporting declarations, Dkts. 71-72. The same day, Wallace Morgan filed a memorandum of law opposing the same motion. Dkt. 73.

On November 19, 2015, plaintiffs filed a reply in further support of the motion for conditional certification, Dkt. 77, and a supporting declaration, Dkt. 78.

On January 4, 2016/the Court conditionally certified a collective consisting of “all Wallace Morgan employees who gathered applications for enrollment in the Lifeline Program through Assurance Wireless at any point during the three years preceding the issuance of a Court-approved- Notice.” Dkt. 86. The Court declined > to certify a broader collective defined to include either “all Agents nationwide” or “all those -employed by Credico.” Id.

On February 12, 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the -FAC to add Credico (USA) LLC as a' defendant, Dkt. 107, as well as a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 108, and a declaration. Dkt. 109. On February 25, 2016, Sprint filed a memorandum of law in opposition to this motion, Dkt, 120, and a supporting declaration, Dkt. 119. On March 4, 2016, plaintiffs filed a reply, Dkt. 127, .and another supporting declaration, Dkt. 128. On May 12, 2016, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend the FAC. Dkt. 145.

On May 16, 2016, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), bringing claims against Credico as well as Sprint and Wallace Morgan. Dkt. 146. On June 2, June 24, and July 11, 2016, respectively, Sprint, Wallace Morgan, and Credi-co filed answers to the SAC. Dkts. 149, 158,167.

On June 20, 2016, Wallace Morgan filed an answer to the SAC. Dkt. 158.

On June 24, 2016, the parties.in this case and in the related case Vasto v. Credico (USA) LLC, No. 15 Civ. 9298 (PAE), filed a letter addressing overlap between their FLSA collectives. Dkt. 163. The Vasto plaintiffs alleged that, while working as field agents at a Credico ÍSO called Cro-mex Inc. (“Cromex”), they had been misclassified as independent contractors and subjected to FLSA and NYLL violations. No. .15 Civ. 9298, Dkt. 1. The Vasto plaintiffs brought claims against Credico, Cro-mex, Credico’s president Jesse Young, and Cromex’s owner Meixi Xu. Id.

On September 8, 2016, the Court issued an order declining to consolidate this action with Vasto but directing counsel in the two cases “to communicate and coordinate their efforts so as to avoid duplicative discovery.” Dkt. 185 at 2. The Court also held that, to avoid overlap between the 'two cases, while the Martin collective would remain as previously delineated, the Vasto collective would be limited to “[a]ll individuals who performed face-to-face marketing work for any U.S. subcontractor of Credico (USA) LLC, except Wallace Morgan, from June 16, 2013 to the present and who have been classified as independent contractors.” Id.

On December 5, 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification under Rule 23, Dkt. 197, as well as a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 198, and a supporting declaration, Dkt. 199.

On March 3, 2017, all three defendants opposed the motion for class certification. See Dkts. 233, 236-37, 242-13. The same day, Credico filed a letter motion claiming that Singleton had spoliated relevant evidence and seeking relief. Dkt. 232.

On April 7, 2017, the parties filed their joint statement of undisputed facts. Dkt. 259.

On April 21, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, Dkt. 263, as well as a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 264; plaintiffs’ 56.1 statement, Dkt. 265; and the declaration of Rachhana Srey, Dkt. 266.

On May 12, 2017, Sprint filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, Dkt. 271, as well as a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 272; Sprint’s 56.1 statement, Dkt. 273; Sprint’s counter-statement to plaintiffs’ 56.1 statement, Dkt. 279 (“Sprint Counter 56.1”); and the declaration of Nicole A. Eichber-ger. Dkt. 276. The same day, Credico filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, Dkt. 274, as well as a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 278; Credico’s 56.1 statement, Dkt. 280; and Credico’s counter-statement to plaintiffs’ 56.1 statement, Dkt. 281. The same day, Wallace Morgan filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to plaintiffs’ motion. Dkt. 282. On May 18, 2017, after notification of a technical error, Wallace Morgan re-filed its cross motion and opposition, Dkt. 289, as well as a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 290, and the declaration of Joseph F. Tremiti, Dkt. 291. On May 19, 2017, Wallace Morgan re-filed its 56.1 statement. Dkt. 293.

On May 13, 2017, Credico filed the declaration of Greta B. Williams in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment and in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. Dkt. 283.

On June 3, 2017, plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to defendants’ cross motions for summary judgment and reply in support of plaintiffs’ motion, Dkt. 305; a counter-statement to Sprint’s 56.1 statement, Dkt. 301; a counter-statement to Credico’s 56.1 statement, Dkt. 302; a counter-statement to Wallace Morgan’s 56.1 statement, Dkt. 300; and an affidavit and a declaration from Rachhana Srey. Dkts. 303-04.

On June 23, 2017, Sprint filed a reply memorandum of law, Dkt. 311, as well as the supporting declaration of Elise M. Bloom, Dkt. 312, and a reply 56.1 statement, Dkt. 313. The same day, Credico, Dkt. 314, and Wallace Morgan, Dkt. 315, filed reply memoranda.

On July 6, 2017, the Court held argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment.

II, Applicable Legal Standards for a Motion for Summary Judgment

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a question of material fact. In making this determination, the Court must view all facts “in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

If the movant meets its burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). “[A] party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A);. see also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009).

“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law” will preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment raise three issues: (1) whether Sprint and Credico can be held liable as joint employers, (2)'whether the outside sales exemption to the FLSA and NYLL applies, and (3) whether plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors.

A. Joint Employer

Sprint and Credico seek summary judgment on the' ground that the evidence would not permit a finding that they were “joint employers” of' plaintiffs. In other words, they argue, even assuming plaintiffs were employees, they were employees only of Wallace Morgan, and only Wallace Morgan can be held liable for any FLSA and NYLL violations.

The FLSA defines “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The Supreme Court has emphasized that this is an expansive definition with “striking breadth.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992). An individual may simultaneously have multiple “employers” for the purposes of the FLSA, in which event, “all joint employers are responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the [FLSA].” 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a).

“[Wlhether an employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of the FLSA should be grounded in ‘economic reality rather than technical concepts.’” Barfield v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S.Ct. 933, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961)). The determination of whether defendants aré plaintiffs’ joint employers is to be based on “the circumstances of the whole activity,” Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947), viewed in light of “economic reality,” Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33, 81 S.Ct. 933; see also Barfield, 537 F.3d at 141-42 (employment is “to be determined on a case-by-case basis by review of the totality of the circumstances”). “Above and beyond the plain language, moreover, the remedial nature of the statute further warrants an expansive interpretation of its provisions so that they will have ‘the widest possible impact in the national economy.’ ” Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984)).

“When it comes to ‘employer’ status under the FLSA, control is key.” Lopez v. Acme Am. Envtl. Co., Inc., No. 12 Civ. 511 (WHP), 2012 WL 6062501, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2012); see also Herman, 172 F.3dat 135 (“[C]ontrol of employees is central ■ to deciding whether appellant should be deemed an employer;”). In assessing economic reality, the Second Circuit has articulated two tests for determining whether an employment relationship existed for the purposes of the FLSA; one relating to formal control and the other to functional control.

• The formal control test inquires “‘whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.’ ” Carter, 735 F.2d at 12 (quoting Bonnette v. Calif. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir, 1983)).

Formal control does not require continuous monitoring of employees, looking over their shoulders at all times,, or any sort of absolute control of one’s employees. Control may be restricted, or exercised only occasionally, without removing the employment' relationship from the protections of the FLSA, since such limitations on control do not 'diminish the significance of its existence.

Hart v. Rick’s Cabaret Int'l Inc., 967 F.Supp.2d 901, 939 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (citing Herman, 172 F.3d at 139) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to the functional control test, the Second Circuit has identified a number of factors pertinent to determining whether a person or entity, even if lacking formal control, exercised “functional control” over an employee. In Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. Inc., 355 F.3d 61, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2003), which involved an employer and its subcontractors, the Circuit identified the following non-exclusive factors:

(1). whether [the alleged employers’] premises and equipment were used for the plaintiffs’ work; (2) whether- the [subcontractors] had a business that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer to another;' (3) the extent to which plaintiffs performed a discrete line job that was integral to [the alleged employers’] process of production; (4) whether responsibility under the contracts could pass from one subcontractor to another without material changes; (5) the degree to which [the alleged employers] or their agents supervised plaintiffs’ work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked exclusively or predominantly for [the alleged employers].

Id.; accord Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 432 F.Supp.2d 390, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 537 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2008).

Under NYLL, the standard for employer status is nearly identical to that of the FLSA. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (“‘Employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee ....”), with NYLL § 190(3) (“ ‘Employer’ includes any person, corporation, limited liability company, or association employing any individual in any occupation, industry, trade, business or service.”). Accordingly, courts in this District regularly apply the same tests to determine whether entities were joint employers under NYLL and the FLSA. See Spicer v. Pier Sixty LLC, 269 F.R.D. 321, 335 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y.2010); see also Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 526-27 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (collecting cases); see also Hart, 967 F.Supp.2d at 940.(citing Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 117 (2d Cir. 2013)) (“To, be sure, the New York Court of Appeals has not yet. resolved - whether NYLL’s standard for employer status is coextensive with the FLSA’s, but there is no case law to the contrary.”).

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, neither Sprint nor Credico can be held liable as plaintiffs’ joint employer.

1. Sprint

On the undisputed facts, Sprint satisfies neither the formal or functional control tests for joint employer status.

a. Formal Control

i. Hiring and Firing

The Court first assesses whether plaintiffs have adduced evidence sufficient to support a determination that Sprint hired or fired field agents.

This case bears a considerable resemblance to Jean-Louis v. Metro. Cable Communications, Inc., 838 F.Supp.2d 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), in which plaintiffs were employees of Metropolitan Cable Communications, Inc. (“Metro”), who worked as technicians installing telecommunications services provided by Time Warner Cable of New York City (“Time Warner”). The technicians sued Metro, alleging FLSA violations, and claimed that Time Warner was liable for these violations as the technicians’ joint employer. In holding that Time Warner was not the technicians’ joint employer as a matter of law, the district court reasoned that the first formal control factor had not been satisfied because Time Warner played an insufficient role in the hiring process:

In terms of hiring, the undisputed evidence shows that Time Warner does not receive applications from putative Metro technicians; interviéw or review applicants; inform applicants that they have been hired; or provide new hires with employment forms. It is further undisputed that none of the Plaintiffs met or communicated with any • Time Warner employee prior to being hired as a Metro technician.... In short, Metro, not Time Warner, has the power to hire Metro technicians.

Id. at 123. The district court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact • that “Time Warner require[d] Metro to conduct criminal background checks of applicants.” Id.

Here, the record is similarly clear that Wallace Morgan, not Sprint; had the power to hire field agents. Wallace Morgan scheduled and conducted interviews, made hiring decisions, and extended offers of employment. JSF ¶¶ 46—47; Credico 56.1 ¶¶ 65-66, 68, 70. That' Sprint required agents hired by Wallace Morgan to complete background checks before being assigned to. the Assurance Wireless campaign, Sprint Counter 56.1 ¶49, does not demonstrate Sprint’s control over the hir: ing process. Cf. Inclan v. New York Hosp. Grp., Inc., 95 F.Supp.3d 490, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (defendant exercised formal control over restaurant’s - waiters under FLSA and NYLL where defendant “personally hired the Restaurant’s management team, including its executive chef’). Nor does the fact that new Wallace Morgan hires received Sprint identification codes that were necessary to work on the Assurance Wiréless campaign, see PL Opp. Br. at 28, establish such control. Cf. Lawrence v. Adderley Industries, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 2309 (SJF) (ETB), 2011 WL 666304, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)- (telecommunications company lacks power to hire technicians employed by contractor even though “[a] technician cannot work on a .. .job [for the company] without an identification badge”).

The record is similarly clear that Wallace Morgan, not Sprint, had the power to fire field agents. The parties do not dispute that Martin and Singleton were informed, of their termination by a Wallace Morgan employee, that no one from Sprint was present at the time, and that neither Martin or Singleton ever discussed the termination with anyone from Sprint. See Sprint 56.1 ¶¶ 145-147; PI. Counter to Sprint 56.1 ¶¶ 145-157.

Plaintiffs counter that Sprint had the power to fire field agents because Sprint had the power to require that field agents no longer work on Sprint’s Assurance Wireless campaign. The decisions in a series of analogous cases are to the contrary. In Jean-Louis, the district court distinguished between a power to fire and Time Warner’s “power to ‘de-authorize’ any Metro technician from installing Time Warner services at customers’ home while employed by Metro.” Jean-Louis, 838 F.Supp.2d at 124. The district court reasoned that the power to de-authorize in such a context differed from a firing decision because technicians could continue to perform other work for Metro. See id. (“[I]t is undisputed that a Metro technician whom Time Warner has prohibited from perform installation work while employed by Metro may continue working for Metro in some other capacity, say as a dispatcher or warehouse worker, or leave Metro and later perform installations while working as a technician for another company.”). Time Warner’s exercise of its de-authorization power was thus “not the same as a decision to either (a) prevent a Metro technician from working for Metro altogether; or (b) prevent a Metro technician from working for another service company that does installation work for Time Warner” and it was therefore “difficult to describe a decision by Time Warner that has neither consequence as equivalent to a decision to fire a Metro technician.” Id.

The district court drew a similar distinction in Godlewska v. HDA, in which home healthcare attendants employed by a not-for-profit contractor brought FLSA claims against the contractor as well as a city agency that engaged the contractor to administer home attendant services to city residents. 916 F.Supp.2d 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Godlewska v. Human Dev. Ass’n, Inc., 561 Fed.Appx. 108 (2d Cir. 2014). In granting the city agency’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that it was not a joint employer, the district court distinguished between the agency’s power to direct the contractor to remove a home attendant from a particular patient’s case and the power to terminate the home attendant. See id. at 258 (although the city agency could “direct [the contractor] to remove [a] home attendant from [a] particular patient’s case,” there was “no evidence,... that [the city agency] ha[d] power... to require [the contractor] to fire a home attendant entirely”).

The same distinction also carried the day in Lawrence v. Adderley Industries, Inc., 2011 WL 666304. There, the district court held that CSC Holdings LLC i/s/h Cablevision Systems Corporation (“Cablev-isidn”), a telecommunications company, had not exercised formal control over technicians employed by Adderley Industries, Inc. (“Adderley”), a contractor, such that Cablevision could be considered the technicians’ joint employer under the FLSA. Id. at *11. In Lawrence, Cablevision had “maintained] a list of approved workers, i. e., individuals authorized to install its equipment, and any individual not on that list [could not] install Cablevision equipment.” Id. at *3. Cablevision had the power to “direct Adderley not to assign an individual who was previously employed by one of its other contractors and had been disciplined or fired for bad performance to a Cablevision project” and to “remove[ ] technicians from its list of approved workers.” Id. Notwithstanding this “de-authori-zation” power, the district court held that, “[b]ased upon the evidence in the record, there [was] no genuine dispute as to a material fact that Cablevision did not... have the power to hire and fire [Adderly] technicians.” Id. at *8.

Here, tellingly, plaintiffs do not point to any evidence that Sprint had the power to terminate a field agent’s employment at Wallace Morgan or ability to work on any other Wallace Morgan campaign. And as the cases above instruct, Sprint’s power to de-authorize Wallace Morgan field agents from working on the Assurance-Wireless campaign does not equate to the power to terminate.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the first formal control factor does not support a finding that Sprint jointly employed Wallace Morgan field agents.

ii. Work Schedules and Conditions

The Court next assesses whether plaintiffs have adduced evidence sufficient to support a finding that Sprint supervised and controlled plaintiffs’ work schedules or conditions of employment.

As to plaintiffs’ work schedules, the' record is clear that Wallace Morgan dictated these. Field agents reported to work at Wallace Morgan’s office and never to any Sprint facility. Sprint 56.1 ¶¶ 115, 119. Field agents attended atmosphere meetings at Wallace Morgan’s office, JSF ¶ 67, and were informed of the start time of these meetings by their Wallace Morgan supervisors, Credico 56.1 ¶ 126. Wallace Morgan supervisors assigned field agents to territories in which to collect applications each day, albeit within the general regions of New York City that had been approved by Sprint for Assurance Wireless application collection. Sprint 56.1 ¶ 116; PL Counter to Sprint 56.1 ¶ 116. When plaintiffs were to call in sick or be absent from work, they would contact their supervisors at Wallace Morgan. Sprint 56.1 ¶ 118. When asked who managed their work and had knowledge of their duties and responsibilities, plaintiffs identified only Wallace Morgan employees. Id. ¶¶ 178-179. Both Martin and Singleton testified that they never spoke to anyone at Sprint about their jobs with Wallace Morgan, their duties, or their work hours. Id. ¶ 180; see Jean-Louis, 838 F.Supp.2d at 126 (“the undisputed facts appear to demonstrate that Metro rather than Time Warner ‘supervised and controlled employee work schedules’ where “[i]t is ... undisputed that Metro tells its technicians when to report in the morning; that technicians contact Metro if they are running late or will be absent; and that no Plaintiff ever contacted Time Warner about those issues”).

In claiming that Sprint controlled their schedules, plaintiffs stress that Sprint employees have attended meetings at Wallace Morgan, and that Sprint has the power to have agents pulled from certain areas in the event of overproduction. See PI. Opp. Br. at 32. But the formal control factor requires greater involvement on the putative joint employer’s part. For example, .in Jean-Louis, the district court found that Time Warner did not control Metro technicians’ schedules where, even though Time Warner gave Metro certain time windows during which Metro should perform certain jobs, it was “Metro, not Time Warner, [that] decide[d] which technicians -will work on which job and whether a technician will work on any jobs in that period at all.” 838 F.Supp.2d at 126. Similarly, in Hugee v. SJC Group, Inc., the district court found. that a security guard employed by SJC Group, Inc. (“SJC”), a subcontractor of NESCTC Security Agency, LLC (“NESCTC”), had failed to demonstrate that NESCTC controlled his work schedule or conditions of employment even though the guard “was required to report by telephone to NESCTC each day upon his arrival to and departure from a work-site and to fill out NESCTC, and not SJC, timesheets.” No. 13 Civ. 0423 (GBD), 2013 WL 4399226, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2013). In finding such requirements “insufficient to demonstrate supervision or control over Plaintiffs work schedules or conditions of ■ employment,” the district court emphasized the Second Circuit’s admonition that

“the degree to which defendants supervise the plaintiffs’ work ... can be misinterpreted to encompass run-of-the-mill subcontracting relationships .... Although ... a defendant’s extensive supervision of a plaintiffs work is indicative of an employment relationship ... such extensive supervision weighs in favor of joint employment only if it demonstrates effective control of the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs employment.”

Id. (quoting Zheng, 355 F.3d at 74-75). The court noted that the plaintiff had “concede[d] that he was given day-to-day instruction about assignments or scheduling by” an employee of SJC. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nor have plaintiffs adduced evidence sufficient to show that Sprint supervised or controlled Wallace Morgan' field agents’ work conditions. Plaintiffs emphasize (1) Sprint’s SOPs, which address methods for collecting applications, territories of collection, and appropriate attire, PI. Br. at 41, (2) Sprint’s requirement of “auditing” field agents, including through mystery shops, and of tracking application numbers, and (3) Sprint’s requirement of certain online training and testing, as well as Sprint’s attendance at certain Wallace Morgan, meetings and Sprint’s role in notifying field agents of changes to the SOPs. See PI. Br. at 41-42; PI. Opp. Br. at 22-23.

Sprint’s SOPs do not give rise to an employer-employee relationship. Plaintiffs cite no case demonstrating that such general conduct standards suffice to establish such a relationship. Courts have widely held that “[e]xercising quality control by having strict standards and monitoring compliance with those standards does not constitute supervising and controlling employees’ work conditions.” Godlewska, 916 F.Supp.2d at 259; see also Chen v. Street Beat Sportswear, Inc., 364 F.Supp.2d 269, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he Court will not consider evidence plaintiffs present with respect to this factor' to the extent it concerns the presence of.,. quality-¡control personnel.”); Courts instead have distinguished between the circumstances where the, putative joint employer “‘maintains specific standards to which the [putative joint employer’s contractors] and [the com tractors’ employees] must adhere;’" and regularly monitors the [contractor’s employees] to ensure that their performafice satisfies [the putative joint employer’s], expectation