Stillwagon v. City of Delaware (274 F. Supp. 3d 714, 2017)

OPINION AND ORDER

EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants The City of Delaware (the “City”), Detective Benjamin Segaard, Former Detective Patrick' Gerke, Officer Adam Willauer, Detective Sergeant Jonathan Radabaugh, Officer James Ailes, and Officer Jason Flynn (collectively, the “Municipal Defendants”) have moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff James R. Stillwagon’s (“Stillwagon”) claims against them. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 1[ECF No. 203].) Stillwagon, in turn, seeks summary judgment against several of the Municipal Defendants on his § 1983 false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force claims,' his Ohio law malicious prosecution claim, and his' municipal liability claim relating to excessive force. (Pl.’s Mots, for Summ. J. [ECF Nos. 205, 206, 207].) ' ■' b-

Also before the Court are two additional motions: the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Strike [ECF No. 231] and the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Certain Expert Testimony [ECF No. 232],

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS ÍN PART and DENIES IN PART, the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 203; ’1606 ECF No. 189] and Motion to Strike [ECF No. 231; ’1606 ECF No. 217], DENIES Stillwagon’s motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 205, 206, 207; ’1606 ECF Nos. 191, 192, 193], and GRANTS the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Exclude [ECF No. 232;. ’1606 ECF No. 218], '

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case stems from a series of widely publicized events that occurred in Delaware, Ohio, and the surrounding highways on September 30, 2012. The Court provides the following description of that day’s events based primarily on Stillwag-on’s deposition testimony. Several witnesses observed portions of these events. And Defendant Mattingly has provided his own account of some of the events. The Court reviews the witness statements and Mattingly’s account later.

. 1. Events on Route 42

On September 30, Stillwagon was riding his. motorcycle northeast on Route 42 toward Delaware, Ohio. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 60-62 [ECF No. 200-1].) Stillwagr on had a handgun in the tank bag of the motorcycle. (Id. at 95.) He carried the weapon legally, as he had obtained a concealed carry permit several years earlier. (See id. at 35.)

Defendant Richard 0. Mattingly was also driving on Route 42 on September 30. (See Mattingly Interview Tr. 1 at 5 [ECF No. 155-5].) Mattingly had consumed some beer at home. (Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 48 [ECF No. 184-4].) He then continued drinking as he drove his pickup truck. (See id. at 49.)

Stillwagon and Mattingly first came into contact at a Marathon station located at the intersection of Routes 42 and 33. (See Marathon Video at 15:07:52.) Stillwagon had stopped to buy 'gas; Mattingly had stopped for beer and cigarettes. (See id. at 15:07:38 to 15:13:17.) Both Stillwagon and Mattingly were parked at gas pumps. (Id. at 15:07:53 to 15:13:09.) Mattingly was parked behind Stillwagon. (Id.), Stillwagon pulled out of the station, and Mattingly left immediately behind him. (Id. at 15:13:02 to 15:13:20.)

Just northeast of the Marathon station, Route 42 narrows from four lanes to two lanes. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 68-69.) As Stillwagon approached this merger, Stillwagon has testified that Mattingly sped past him on the left, cutting Stillwag-on off and nearly hitting him. (See id. at 68 70.) The truck came within several inches of Stillwagon’s motorcycle. (See id. at 69.) As he made the pass, Mattingly was looking at Stillwagon and laughing. (See id, at 68—69.) Mattingly then sped off out of Still-wagon’s sight, “skip[ing] his tires” along the way (i.e., tapping his brakes to “lay rubber down”). (Id. at 70, 72.)

Less than two miles up the road, Still-wagon testified that Mattingly stopped his truck half on the road and half on the berm. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 70-72.) Mattingly was waving a blue metal baseball bat out of the driver’s side window, and signaling for Stillwagon to go around him. (See id.) Stillwagon did not drive around the truck; instead, he stopped and waited around 50 yards behind the truck. (See id. at 73.) Eventually Mattingly started moving again. (Id.) He sped off out of Stillwagon’s sight, “skipping] his tires a few times.” (Id. at 73.)

Farther up the road, Stillwagon testified that Mattingly again stopped half on the road and halt on the berm. (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 74.) He waved for Stillwagon to-pass him using the baseball bat. (Id.) When Stillwagon did not pass him, Mat-tingly took off. peeling put and skipping his tires-in thé process. (See id. at 74-75.) Mattingly soon fell in behind a slower moving car though. (See id. at 75.) Stillwagon testified that he then passed Mattingly and the slower moving car. (Id.)

By riding north in the southbound .lane, and forcing at least one car off the road in the process, according to Stillwagon, Mat-tingly caught up with him. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 75-76; Oct. 1, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5110 [ECF No. 162-6].) Mattingly purportedly made three cut-in moves from Stillwagon’s left, almost knocking Stillwagon off his bike. (Stillwag-on Dep. Vol. I at 76-77.) On the third cut-in, Stillwagon braked. (Id. at 76.) Mattingly responded by making a sharp right turn immediately in front of Stillwagon and •braking hard. (See id. at 76-78.) Stillwagon testified that he was able to stop just soon enough to avoid colliding with the back of Mattingly’s truck. (See id)

Mattingly and Stillwagon' were approaching- the traffic light at Watkins/Moore Road by this point. (See Still-wagon Dep. Vol. I at 78.) The light was red. (id) Stillwagon testified that Mattingly drove through the red light and continued at a high rate of speed toward Delaware. (See id.) Stillwagon stopped, at-the light and then, after the light turned green, pulled into a gravel parking area. (See id at 78-79.) Stillwagon wanted to distance himself from Mattingly. (Id. at 79.) While Stillwagon waited in the parking area, two motorists who had witnessed Mattingly’s maneuvers (a woman named Lois Reninger and a man) stopped to ask if Stillwagon was alright. (See id. at 79-80.) The male motorist called the police at Still-wagon’s request. (See id. at 80.) The police indicated that Stillwagon could wait by the side of the road for an officer to come and take a report. (See id.) Because the police had not given any indication of when an officer might come, Stillwagon decided that he would not make a report. (See id.) Stillwagon waited on .the side of the road for several minutes. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 37, 41, 43 [ECF No. 160-11].) Stillwagon thought that Mattingly would be far up the road ■ by that point. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 83.) As a precaution, though, in case Mattingly tried “to come back down the road [to] try to run [him] over,” Stillwagon removed his firearm from the tank bag and secured it in his jacket before leaving the parking area. (See id. at 96.)

Stillwagon drove several miles northeast on Route 42; as he passed Section Line Road, Mattingly pulled back onto the road behind him. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 17 [ECF No. 160-10]; Stillwagon interview Tr. 2 -at 43-44; Oct. 2, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5111 [ECF No. 162-6].) There were five or six ears between them-.' (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 89-90.) Mattingly entered the southbound lane and passed them all. (See id.) Several cars in that lane had to pull off the road to avoid a head-on collision with Mattingly’s truck, (See id. at 90.) Mattingly then pulled back into the right lane and accelerated. (See id.) Stillwagon testified that the truck came within inches of his motorcycle. (See id.) To avoid being rammed by the truck, Stillwagon sped up to almost 85 miles per hour. (See id. at 90-91.)

Mattingly slowed down and backed away from the bike. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 91.) However, according to StiHwago'n’s account, Mattingly soon accelerated into the southbound lane and started his cut-in moves again. (See id at 91-92.) Stillwagon braked. (See id. at 92.) Mattingly then cut in front of Stillwagon and braked hard, causing Stillwagon to nearly crash into the back of Mattingly’s truck for- the second time. (See id. at 92-94.) Stillwagon narrowly avoided a collision by swerving and slamming on his brakes. (See id) Both vehicles came to a stop. (See id. at 94.) Mattingly then drove up the road , and out of Stillwagon’s sight. (See id. at 94, 101-02.)

2. Events on the Exit Ramp and in the AutoZone Parking Lot

Route 42 merges with Route 23 and turns into a four-lane divided highway as it approaches Delaware. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 103-13 [ECF No. 200-1].) As Stillwagon. approached Delaware, he saw Mattingly stopped at the traffic light at the merger; the light was green. (See id at 103.) Stillwagon stayed back 200 to 300 meters and watched Mattingly. (See id. at 103-04.) When the light turned red, .Still-wagon testified that Mattingly drove through the intersection, narrowly avoiding a collision with a tanker truck, and onto the divided highway. (See id. at 1060 Stillwagon waited at two different traffic lights before entering the divided highway. (See id. at 106-07.)

An exit ramp on the right (east) side of the highway leads to William Street. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 112-13.) The ramp forms its own lane. (See id.) As Stillwagon came to this portion of Route 42, he .kept to the right to take the William Street exit. (Id.) Mattingly was ahead of Stillwagon at this point and driving north in the far left lane. (See id. .at 113.) By Stillwagon’s account, Mattingly was traveling slowly, around 10 miles per hour, and had roughly 20 cars backed up behind him. (Id.) Mattingly had almost passed the William Street exit, but instead of continuing on the highway, he made a sudden right turn, crossing two lanes of traffic and barely missing a concrete divider, to merge onto the ramp. (See id. at 114.) Stillwagon continued down the ramp a considerable distance behind Mattingly. (See id. at 115-16.)

Stillwagon approached the end of the ramp and saw Mattingly sitting under a green light at the William Street intersection. (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 117.) The ramp is narrow and enclosed to the left by a concrete wall and to the right by a heavily wooded hill and a guardrail. (See id. at 123; William St. Ramp Photo at 1 [EOF No. 199-5].) Rather than drive past Mattingly, Stillwagon decided to wait on the right side of the exit ramp, 40 to 50 yards back , from the truck. (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 121.)

A few seconds after Stillwagon stopped, Stillwagon testified that the back-up lights on the truck lit up and the truck started backing up directly toward him. (See Still-wagon Dep. Vol. I at 126, Í31-32.) Knowing that he had no room to maneuver on the ramp, Stillwagon retrieved his pistol and fired at the.latch on the truck’s tailgate. (See id. at 126-27.) Stillwagon fired three -rounds. (Id. at 128.) He hit the center of tailgate, slightly above the latch, with two rounds. (Id.; Tailgate Photo at PagelD 7901 [EOF No. 200-3].) The third round likely went into the ground; Still-wagon had pulled his pistol down when he saw Mattingly exiting the ramp. (See Still-wagon Dep. Vol. I at 128, 137-39) According to Stillwagon, Mattingly then quickly shifted out of reverse and turned right onto William Street through the red light. (See id. at 128,133,150.)

Stillwagon drove to the end of the ramp, and after waiting at the light, Stillwagon turned right onto William Street. (Still-wagon Dep. Vol. I at 151.) Until he turned, Stillwagon could not see to the right, down William Street. (Id. at 152.) After turning, however, Stillwagon testified that he saw Mattingly stopped on the Olentangy River bridge, straddling both eastbound lanes. (See id. at 153-54.)

To avoid Mattingly, Stillwagon testified that “made a radical left turn into the oncoming lane.” (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 154.) He claimed that he was attempting to reach the concrete base of a light pole stand (the “concrete pillar”) that he could see in a parking lot just east of the bridge. (See id. at 154-55.) Immediately after Still-wagon started his left turn into the oncoming lane, Stillwagon testified that Mattingly accelerated, turned sharply to the left across William Street, cut in front of the motorcycle, and drove into the parking lot. (See id. at 155.) Mattingly turned to the left after entering the parking lot. (Eagles Video at 15:31:00 to 15:31:04.) He looped around the concrete pillar and stopped facing the road. (Id.) Stillwagon entered the parking lot seconds later; he drove directly to the concrete pillar to the left of the parking lot entrance. (Id. at 15:31:04 to 15:31:12.)

After reaching the concrete pillar, Still-wagon testified that he looked up and saw the truck several feet in front of him. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 168-69.) The driver’s side of the truck was facing Still-wagon. (Eagles Video at 15:31:13.) According to Stillwagon, Mattingly looked at him, revved the truck’s engine, and started to leave the parking lot. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 172-74, 177.) Speculating that Mattingly might try to bring, the truck around the pillar, to the side where Still-wagon was unshielded, Stillwagon fired two rounds at the truck’s rear driver-side tire. (See id. at 174.) One. of the rounds hit the tire; the other round hit the back quarter panel behind the rear tire. (Wilgus Aff. ¶¶ 33, 35 [EOF No. 232-1].)

Mattingly exited the parking lot,' turned left, and started heading east on William Street. (Eagles Video at 15:31:17 to 15:31:21.) But rather than driving away, Mattingly re-entered the parking lot farther to the east, maneuvered around a large planter, and drove directly toward Stillwagon. (Id. at 15:31:23 to 15:31:29.) Stillwagon had put down the kickstand and jumped off his motorcycle by this point. (Id.) There was nothing between him and the truck, as Mattingly had maneuvered the truck to the other side of the concrete pillar. (Id.) As the truck drove toward him, Stillwagon aimed for the truck’s bumper and fired one shot. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 187.) The bullet struck the wind deflector, below and to the left of the truck’s front license plate. (Wilgus Aff. ¶ 37.) The truck then swerved to the left and came to a stop, facing William Street, about ten feet in front of Stillwagon. (Eagles Video at 15:31:28 to 15:31:31.)

The truck stopped and Stillwagon then walked to the truck’s passenger-side door. (Eagles Video at 15:31:31.) He tried to open the door, hut it was locked; he thought that he might be able to grab Mattingly and pull him out of the truck. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 189.) Mat-tingly, appearing agitated to Stillwagon, then purportedly kicked open the driver-side door and jumped out of the truck. (Id. at 194.) In an effort to close the proximity between him and Mattingly, Stillwagon quickly walked around the back of. the truck, “using [it] as a barrier if [Mattingly] had a gun,” (Id. at 189.)

As Stillwagon came around the back of the truck and approached Mattingly, Mat-tingly was facing east, with his back to the truck. (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 195.) Still-wagon testified that Mattingly was yelling at him. (Id. at 199.) Stillwagon yelled back, indicating that he would shoot Mattingly if he had a gun in his right hand—the hand that was concealed from Stillwagon’s view. (See id. at 200-01.) Stillwagon testified that Mattingly then quickly turned toward him; Stillwagon, in turn, grabbed Mattingly by the shoulder, kicked him in the knee, and hit him in the back of the head with his pistol, at which point the pistol discharged into the air. (See id. at 200-02.) Stillwagon then pushed Mattingly to the ground. (See id. at 210.) Mattingly attempted to stand up again, but Stillwagon ordered him to stay on the ground. (See id. at 248.) Stillwagon asked a bystander to call the police, and he set his pistol down on a nearby planter. (Id. at 251.)

3. Stillwagon’s Detention and Arrest

Rashad Pitts, a Delaware County Sheriff’s Deputy arrived first. Stillwagon waved Pitts over and acknowledged that he had fired the weapon. Stillwagon. stated: “I shot the fucker. I don’t think he’s shot.” (Pitts Cruiser Video at 15:36:48.) Stillwag-on then indicated that Mattingly had just tried to kill him six times. (Id. at 15:36:51.) He informed Pitts that his pistol was sitting on the planter by the entrance to the parking lot, and he complied with Pitts’s instructions to lie on the ground and to roll onto his stomach. (Id. at 15:37:00 to 15:38:17.) Stillwagon did not resist as Pitts doublé cuffed him behind the back. (Id. at 15:38:17 to 15:38:43.)

When Pitts walked toward William Street to secure the pistol sitting-on the planter, Defendant Mes took charge -of Stillwagon. (See Cruiser 62 Video at 15:39:56; Pitts Cruiser Video at 15:39:13.) Mes decided that he would move Stillwag-on and place him in the back of a police cruiser. (See Cruiser 62 Video at 15:39:56.) Mes assisted Stillwagon to his feet, guided Stillwagon to a police cruiser, and then placed Stillwagon (by verbally directing him and physically pushing him) into the back seat of the cruiser while Stillwagon’s hands were double cuffed behind his back. (See Cruiser 62 Video at 15:39:56 to 15:41:31; Pitts Cruiser Video at 15:39:56 to 15:40:21.)

Mter placing Stillwagon in the back of the cruiser, Mes asked Stillwagon to explain what happened. (Cruiser 62 Video at 15:41:42.) Stillwagon responded by describing the incident, from beginning to end, roughly as recounted above. (See id. at 15:41:61 to 15:49:00.) Several minutes later, and while Stillwagon was still in the back of the cruiser, Stillwagon explained to a different officer some of the events that took place in the parking lot. (See Cruiser 63 Video at 15:55:08 to 15:56:10.)

About four minutes later, Stillwagon was transported to the Delaware police station. (See Cruiser 63 Video at 16:00:00.) At the station, Defendant Flynn placed plastic evidence bags over Stillwagon’s hands. (Flynn Dep. at 170 [ECF No. 53-1].) Flynn secured the bags with tape. (Id.; see Stillwagon Dep. Vol. II at 444 [ECF No. 200-2].) The bags were to preserve any gunshot residue on Stillwagon’s hands. (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 2 [ECF No. 160-10]-.)

Defendants Segaard and Gerke interviewed Stillwagon at the station. Stillwag-on described the incident from his first encounter with Mattingly on Route 42 to the final confrontation in the AutoZone parking lot.’ (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9-2Í.) Stillwagon’s description was, again, roughly as recounted above, and it was consistent with the statement he had given Mes in the parking lot. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9-21; see also Cruiser 62 Video at 15:41:51 to 15:49:00.) The officers found Stillwagon’s description to be credible. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 130 [ECF No. 16Ó-1]; Still-wagon Interview Tr.. 2 at 37 [ECF No. 160-11].)

Gerke and Segaard also learned during the interview, through text messages from officers at the scene, the location of four .of the five bullet holes in the truck. (Stillwag-on Interview Tr. 2 at 44-45.) The locations corresponded with where Stillwagon said he shot the truck. (See id. at 35, 44-45; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 21.)

Aside from the information they. obtained during the interview, Defendants Segaard, Gerke, Willauer, and Radabaugh were potentially aware of several other pieces of evidence: the final location of the truck and the motorcycle in the parking lot; the location of the Shell casings in the AutoZone parking lot (i.e., next to the concrete pillar) and on the exit ramp (i.e., on the east side of the ramp and south of the painted turn arrow farthest from Wil-liara Street); that there' was an empty shell casing in the chamber of Stillwagon’s pistol; that no blood spatter consistent with a gunshot wound was found at the scene; that Mattingly had a blue metal baseball bat in his truck; that Mattingly had beer cans (at least one opened) in his truck; and that Mattingly smelled strongly of, alcohol in the parking lot. (See, e.g., Radabaugh Dep. Vol. I at 76-78 [ECF No. 193-1]; Radabaugh Dep, Vol. II at 205-Q9, 227, 240-41, 292-93 [ECF No. 196-1]; Se-gaard Dep. Vol. I at 33-34, 266; Wilgus Aff. ¶¶ 13-17 [ECF No. 232-1]; Willauer Dep. Vol. I at 91-94, 99-100, 103-04 [ECF No. 52-1].)

Regarding the source of Mattingly’s injury, the officers had acquired differing information. Segaard and Willauer heard, either from paramedics or other personnel on the scene, that Mattingly had been grazed in the head. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 236-37; Willauer Dep. Vol. I at 98-99; Willauer Dep. Vol. II at 129-31 [ECF No. 157-1].) Stillwagon, by contrast, told Se-gaard and Gerke that he had kicked Mat-tingly in the leg and then hit Mattingly on the head with his hand and pistol. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 51.) Mattingly was reportedly alert and talking at the scene. (Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 75-76; Wil-lauer Dep. Vol. II at 129.)

A surveillance camera at the Eagles Lodge recorded the events in the Auto-Zone parking lot. Segaard and Radabaugh may have watched the surveillance video before Stillwagon’s arrest. (See Radabaugh Dep. Vol. I at 91-93.) The video shows, among other things, Mattingly leave and then re-enter the parking lot, maneuver around a large planter, and drive directly toward Stillwagon. (Eagles Video at 15:31:23 to 15:31:29.) The video also shows Stillwagon walk to the passenger-side door of the truck, pause, and then, without stopping or taking a shooting stance, walk around the back of the .truck and toward the driver-side door, where Stillwagon makes what appears to be a downward motion with his arm. (Id. at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.)

Near the time of Stillwagon’s interview, Segaard has testified that he conversed with several people—including, potentially, Radabaugh, Gerke, and Delaware Police Chief Bruce Pijanowski—outside the interview room. (See Segaard Dep. Vol.I at 29-30,149-50; Segaard Dep. Vol. II at 526-27 [ECF No. 162-1].) Following this, group conversation, and after, concluding Still-wagon’s interview, Segaard instructed Wil-lauer to prepare and file a felonious assault charge against Stillwagon. (See Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4578 [ECF No. 160-4].) Stillwagon, who had been in police custody since his detention in the parking lot, was formally arrested that evening at 8:48 p.m. (See Release Report at 1 [ECF' No. 205-1].) Stillwagon considers this to be the point at which he was falsely arrested. (PL’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 2 [ECF No. 205].)

Segaard and Gerke attempted to speak with Mattingly that evening. (Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4578.) However, they learned while in route to the hospital that Mattingly had left without being discharged. (Id.) The officers continued to the hospital anyway; they hoped to learn more about Mattingly’s condition. (Id.) They were unable, though, to obtain Mattingly’s medical records. (Id.)

Segaard later spoke with Mattingly on the phone. (Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4578.) Mattingly did not seem particularly intérested in participating in the investigation. (Id.)

4. Stillwagon’s Prosecution

At 8:04 a.m. the next day, October 1, 2012, Willauer filed a criminal complaint against Stillwagon alleging that he committed felonious assault when he “knowingly attempted] to cause serious physical harm to [Mattingly] by discharging a firearm at him at least six times, ultimately striking [him] in the head.” (Crim. Compl. at 1 [ECF No. 205s-2].)

In the days following Stillwagon’s arrest and the filing of the criminal complaint, Segaard, Gerke, Willauer, and Radabaugh obtained additional information about the incident.

a. Witness Statements

The officers received statements from several witnesses to the events on Route 42 and the confrontation in the AutoZone parking lot.

Lois Reninger—one of the two people who stopped to talk with Stillwagon near Watkins/Moore Road—corresponded with Segaard by phone and email. (See Oct. 2, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5111 [ECF No. 162-6].) She watched Mattingly pass and then brake check Stillwagon. (Oct. 1, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5110 [ECF No. 162-6].) She then stopped, along with another motorist, to check on Stillwagon; they were by the side of the road for three to five minutes. (Id.) Still-wagon appeared to be shaken and “was almost in his own world.” (Id.) She confirmed that the other motorist called the police and that Stillwagon did not want to wait to file a report. (Id.) She heard Still-wagon quietly say to himself that he would “[g]et the son of a bitch.” (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).) And when Still-wagon re-entered the road. Reninger observed that he made “a normal entry.” (Id.) Reninger re-entered the road after Stillwagon. Farther up Route 42, near Section Line Road, she observed a silver pickup truck (like Mattingly’s) pull onto Route 42 and head north. (Oct. 2, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5111.)

Tina Bickham and Kevin Cogan also communicated with Segaard. They witnessed Mattingly driving north in Route 42’s southbound lane. (See Bickham Call at 3-5 [ECF No. 162-3]; Cogan Call at 4-8 [ECF No. 162-10].) And they were each forced to drive off the road to avoid a collision with Mattingly’s truck. (See Bick-ham Call at 3-5; Cogan Call at 4-8.)

Ruth Sayre contacted Segaard too. She witnessed Mattingly chase and cut in on Stillwagon on Route 42. (See Sayre Call at 4-5 [ECF No. 205-5].) Based on this observation, she suggested that Mattingly’s story (disseminated on the news) of his truck suffering mechanical problems was likely untrue. (See id. at 5,11.)

Daniel Powell, Chris Linkous, William Brown, and Susan Orcena each observed the events in the AutoZone parking lot and provided statements to the police. Powell’s account was consistent with the events recorded on the Eagles Lodge video. (See Eagles Video at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.) The other witnesses’ statements, by contrast, are each contradicted in critical ways by the Eagles Lodge video. (See id.)

Powell described Mattingly leaving and re-entering the parking lot. (Cruiser 66 Video at 15:40:53 to 15:41:04.) And he described Stillwagon approaching and then hitting Mattingly on the head with a gun, at which point the gun fired. (Id. 15:41:04 to 15:41:12.)

Observing the events through the rear-view mirror of his car, which was parked in front of AutoZone, Linkous claimed to see Mattingly rim from the driver side to the passenger side of the truck. (Linkous Call at 3 [ECF No. 162-8].) And according to-Linkous, Stillwagon then shot at Mat-tingly, Mattingly went down, and Stillwag-on shot again. (Id.) The Eagles Lodge video, however, does not show Mattingly run to and fall to the ground by the passenger side of the truck (See Eagles Video at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.)

Brown was at AutoZone’s front window. (Brown- Call at 2 [ECF No. 159-13].) He claimed to see Stillwagon ride his motorcycle to the passenger side of the truck, fire a shot at the truck, park the motorcycle, take aim (through the passenger side of the truck), and fire at Mattingly, take a couple of steps forward, take aim, and again shoot through the passenger side of the truck, walk a bit closer and again fire at the passenger side of the truck, walk around the back of the truck and halfway up the driver side of the truck, and then fire two more shots-at Mattingly. (Id. at 3-4.) In contrast to this account, the Eagles Lodge video simply shows Stillwagon walk to the truck’s passenger-side door, pause, and then walk around the rear of the truck to the driver-side door. (See Eagles Video at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.)

Orcena was riding in a car with her husband, traveling east on William Street. (Orcena Second Statement at PagelD 4598 [ECF No. 160-5].) As their vehicle approached the off ramp from Route 23, they heard gunfire-. (Id.) Her husband stopped the car. (Id.) Orcena claimed to see Mat-tingly exit and “walk[ ] around to the side of the truck.” (Id.) In an initial statement, Orcena claimed that she:then heard a shot and saw Mattingly fall to the ■ ground. (Orcena First Statement at PagelD 5205 [ECF No. 162-12].) In a later statement, however, Orcena claimed to see Stillwagon approach Mattingly, take direct aim from eight to ten feet away, and shoot him. (Orcena Second Statement at PagelD 4598.) Orcena stated that her' husband then pulled into a parking lot on the south side of William Street and dialed 911. (Id.) The Eagles Lodge video does not depict Mattingly walk around the side of the truck, nor does it depict Stillwagon taking direct aim at Mattingly from eight to ten feet away, (Eagles Video at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.) The Eagles Lodge video- also does not show a car stopped in the eastbound lane across from the AutoZone parking lot. (Id. at 15:30:55 to 15:32:00.) An eastbound car does, however, eventually turn into a parking lot on the south side of William Street. (Id. at 15:31:51 to 15:31:57.)

b. Mattingly

In the days after the incident, the officers also spoke with Mattingly. He was interviewed twice: first by Segaard and then by Segaard and Gerke. Mattingly began the first interview by providing a brief, generalized description of the incident. He stated that he was traveling to visit his dad when Stillwagon passed him and started braking. (Mattingly Interview Tr. 1 at 4, 6 [ECF No. 155-5].) Stillwagon was annoyed, Mattingly surmised, about how slow Mattingly was driving. Mattingly averred that his truck was experiencing various mechanical problems' (“drawing power, shorting and pulling”), which caused him to drive slowly and, later, erratically. (See id. at 6.) Mattingly stated that he tried to communicate his mechanical problems to Stillwagon using hand gestures. (Id. at 8-9.) The effort was unsuccessful though, as farther up the road, at the exit ramp to William Street, Stillwagon shot at his truck. (See id. at 7-9.) Mattingly attempted to take refuge in the Auto-Zone parking lot. (Id. at 7.) But Stillwagon allegedly pulled in beside him and started shooting into the passenger side of the truck. (Id.) Mattingly got out of the truck, and Stillwagon purportedly came around the back of the vehicle firing his weapon and saying “you’re dead, you’re dead, you’re dead.”;(/A) Mattingly could not remember any more of the encounter. (Id. at 7t8.)

Later in the interview, and in response to Segaard’s various follow-up questions, Mattingly again discussed the events in the AutoZone parking lot; (Mattingly Interview Tr. 1 at 38.) Segaard asked Mat-tingly why, after seemingly fleeing, he reentered the parking lot. (Id. at 39.) Mat-tingly stated that he did not remember reentering the parking lot; he suggested though that he was probably just scared. (Id. at 39-40.) Regarding the injuries he sustained, Mattingly again stated that he exited the truck and heard Stillwagon yelling; he could not remember anything else though. (See id. at 41-43.) Mattingly speculated that he must have ducked and cringed for a, bullet to have hit him in th¿ back of the head. (See id. at 42.)

Segaard and Gerke began the second interview by insisting that Mattingly stop feigning memory loss and tell the truth; throughout the process, they repeatedly referenced the purported, fact that Mat-tingly had been shot in the head. (See, e.g., Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 10,13-14,16-17, 19, 32, 41-43, 77 [ECF Nos. 184-3, 184-4].) Following this discussion, Mat-tingly offered additional details.

Mattingly reiterated that Stillwagon came around the back of the truck and shot.at him from eight to ten feet away. (See Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 73-75, 77.) Mattingly remembered “the shots,” the “sound of it,” the “look of the barrel,” the “look of [Stillwagon’s] face,” the “whole image.” (Id. at 77-78.) Mattingly stated that he then went unconscious. (Id. at 75, 77.) Mattingly opined.that the only physical contact between him and Stillwagon would have been when he was already on the ground. (Id. at 76.)

Segaard and Gerke tried to obtain a further explanation from Mattingly about his departure and re-entry to the Auto-Zone parking lot. (See Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 5-7, 79-80.) Mattingly initially implied that he still did not remember the event and that he must have, been acting out of fear. (See id. at 5-7.) After the officers’ admonition that he should stop feigning memory loss and tell the truth, Mattingly indicated that he was confused at the time about where Stillwagon was. (See id. at 79-80.)

Mattingly admitted during the second interview to drinking beer before and during the events on Route 42. (See Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 19-20, 48-49.) He acknowledged that his truck’s back-up lights might have come on when he was stopped at the end of the .William Street exit ramp, but he insisted that his truck did not move backwards. (Id. at 68-69.) And he told the officers that he and Stillwagon both engaged in aggressive behavior on Route 42. (See, e.g., id. at 14,20, 50-58.)

Mattingly continued to insist that his truck was experiencing mechanical problems. (Mattingly Interview Tr. at 17, 35, 51.) He also continued to insist that he could not remember certain events, or their sequence. (See, e.g., id. at 52, 61, 63-65, 67—68, 73, 78.) And in various instances, when Segaard or Gerke, asked Mattingly about a specific event, Mattingly simply speculated about his actions. (See, e.g., id. at 53, 61, 64-65, 67-68.)

.The officers did, not find Mattingly’s account to be especially trustworthy—particularly the part addressing the events on Route 42. (See Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4579 [ECF No. 160-4]; see also Segaard Dep. Vol. II at 471-72 [ECF No. 162-1].)

The officers also obtained additional information about Mattingly’s injuries. During his first interview, Mattingly stated that his knee hurt and was swollen; (Mat-tingly Interview Tr. 1 at 4.) Although he did not remember injuring his knee, Mat-tingly speculated that he must have fallen oh it after losing consciousness. (See id.) Segaard viewed Mattingly’s head injury: it was at the base of Mattingly’s skull, and “there did not appear to be any swelling or scorching that would have indicated ... that he was either hit on the head or that his head had been exposed to a discharging firearm at point blank range.” (Se-gaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4579-80.) And a police evidence technician also viewed Mattingly’s head wound: there was “no stippling, scorch marks or anything else [indicative of] a point blank bullet wound,” nor was there swelling consistent with a blunt for impact. (Id. at Pa-gelD 4580.)

c. Investigation Reports, Indictment, and Trial

By October 5, 2012, Segaard, Gerke, Willauer, Flynn, and Ailes had filed their investigation reports. about the incident. (See Investigation Reports at PagelD 4566-91 [ECF No. 160-4].) And Segaard, in addition to .drafting his report,,compiled a Grand Jury Packet and developed a Grand Jury Synopsis PowerPoint. (See Grand Jury Packet at PagelD 4559 [ECF No. 160-4]; Grand Jury Synopsis at 1 [ECF No. 165-1].)

Nearly four months after the incident, on January 29, 2013, Segaard testified before the Delaware County grand jury. (Se-gaard Dep. Vol. IV at 911 [ECF No. 199-1].) Stillwagon was indicted on four counts of felonious- assault. (Indictment at 1-4 [ECF No, .203-2].) A. Bill of Particulars later clarified that three of the indicted counts alleged that Stillwagon had attempted to shoot Mattingly; the fourth count alleged that Stillwagon had used his pistol to cause serious physical harm to Mattingly. (Bill of Particulars at 1-2 [ECF No. 205-8].)

Stillwagon’s criminal case went to trial on October 1, 2013. (See J. Entry at 1 [ECF No. 205-9].) Finding no evidence in •the record that could support a conviction, the trial court dismissed each of the counts brought against Stillwagon and entered a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Ohio Criminal Rule 29. (See id.)

B. Procedural Background

Stillwagon filed his complaint in the ’807 case on July 10, 2014, and he filed his complaint in the ’1606 case on September 18, 2014. Following the Court’s March 31, 2016 Opinion and Order on the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Stillwagon filed, on May 16, 2016, an amended complaint in the ’807 case. The Court has since consolidated the ’807 and ’1606 cases for all purposes, including trial.

As relevant here, Stillwagon asserts nine claims: claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) false arrest (against- Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, and Radabaugh); (2). malicious prosecution (against Segaard, Willauer. Gerke, and Radabaugh); (3) civil conspiracy (against Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, and Radabaugh); (4) supervisory liability (against Radabaugh); (5) excessive force (against Mes and Flynn); and (6) municipal liability (against the City); as well as claims under Ohio law (against Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, and Radabaugh) for (7) malicious prosecution; (8) civil conspiracy; and (9) spoliation of evidence. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 169-192 [ECF No. 78].) Stillwagon is suing Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, Rada-baugh, Ailes, and Flynn in their individual capacities. (Id. ¶ 18; ’1606 Compl. ¶ 5 [’1606 ECF No. 1].)

Following extensive discovery, the parties filed the cross-motions for summary judgment that are currently before the Court. The Municipal Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all the claims asserted against them. Stillwagon, in turn, has filed three motions for summary judgment. In his first motion, Still-wagon requests summary judgment against Segaard and Willauer on his false arrest claim and malicious prosecution claims (under § 1983 and Ohio law). (PL’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 [ECF No. 205].) In his second motion, Stillwagon requests summary judgment against Mes and Flynn on his excessive force claim. (PL’s Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 [ECF No. 206].) Md in his third motion, Still-wagon requests summary judgment against the City on his municipal liability claim relating to excessive force. (PL’s Third Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 [ECF No. 207].)

Two additional motions relating to the parties’ summary judgment filings are also before the Court. The Municipal Defendants have moved to strike a catalog of evidence submitted as an exhibit by Still-wagon. (Defs.’ Mot. to Strike at 1 [ECF No. 231].) Md the Municipal Defendants have moved to exclude two paragraphs from an affidavit submitted by one of Still-wagon’s experts. (Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude at 1 [ECF No. 232].)

The Court first considers the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Strike.

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

The Municipal Defendants request that the Court strike, and decline to consider for purposes of the pending motions for summary judgment, a catalog of evidence submitted by Stillwagon as an exhibit to his Memorandum in Opposition [ECF No. 220] to the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mot. to Strike at 1 [ECF No. 231].) The catalog is a list of the alleged “false statements, falsified or fabricated evidence and misleading omissions by Defendant police officers.” (Catalog at 1 [ECF No. 220-2].) The Municipal Defendants contend that the catalog fails to comply with Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, which provides, in relevant part, that a “proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) “governs the procedure by which courts must review objections to the admissibility of evidence presented in connection with a motion for summary judgment.” Smith v. Interim Healthcare of Cincinnati, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-582, 2011 WL 6012971, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2011). Under that rule, a party may object if it believes that materials cited in support of a motion for summary judgment “cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). A party’s objection- under Rule 56(c)(2) “functions much as an objection at trial, adjusted for the pretrial setting. The burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated.” Id. (2010 Advisory Committee notes). A party need not file a separate motion to strike when challenging evidence submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment. Id. If a party does file a separate motion to strike, the motion should be construed as an objection under Rule 56(c)(2). Smith, 2011 WL 6012971, at *4

The Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Strike, which the Court construes as an objection under Rule 56(c)(2), consists of two request: (1) that the Court decline to consider the catalog as it decides the parties’ motions for summary judgment and (2) that the Court strike the catalog from the docket. The Municipal Defendants’ first request has merit. Stillwagon acknowledges in his response to the Motion to Strike that the catalog “is not evidence under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 1006” and “was never intended to be considered as such.” (Opp’n to Mot. to Strike at 3 [ECF No. 243].) Based on this acknowledgment, the Court grants the Municipal Defendants’ Motion in part and will not consider the catalog as it decides the parties’ motions for summary judgment.

The Municipal Defendants’ second request is less successful. Defendants point to no legal authority authorizing the Court to strike an exhibit from the docket under Rule 56. Indeed, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s notes, coupled with case law interpreting the Rule, appear to contradict the argument that the Court can strike an exhibit under Rule 56. The Advisory Committee explicitly stated that “[t]here is no need to make a separate motion to strike” when objecting to materials cited in support of a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (2010 Advisory Committee notes). And courts have clarified that a motion to strike such materials should be construed as an objection ■ under Rule 56(c)(2). The Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Strike is therefore denied to the extent that it asks the Court to strike Stillwagon’s catalog from the docket.

III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE

The Municipal Defendants have moved to exclude' paragraphs 39 and 40 of an affidavit submitted by Gary Wilgus, a crime scene investigator and expert witness for Stillwagon. (Mot. to Exclude at 1 [ECF No. 232].) In the challenged paragraphs, Wilgus states:

39. Based upon the information listed above concerning the bullet holes, their locations, patterns and directionality, the physical evidence all supports that Mr, Stillwagon made no attempt to shoot at the driver of the truck. As to every shot fired, Mr. Stillwagon was intentionally aiming at the truck, not the driver. Assuming that the shots in the tailgate came first, the shots to the rear driver’s side second, and the shot to the front of the truck was last, each time Mr. Stillwagon fired the weapon, the bullets struck lower on the truck and thus further from the driver. Assuming that Mr. Stillwagon is competent with the firearm, the physical evidence renders the theory that he was attempting to shoot the driver entirely implausible'.

.40. If the Delaware Police Depart; ment had requested-my conclusions at the' time of the investigation, regarding the analysis of the shooting-related evidence, I would have told them that it was my opinion that Mr. Stillwagon was aiming at the truck, not the driver. It was clear to me from day one there was no attempt to actually shoot at the driver himself. However, I was not asked to provide[ ] my analysis or conclusions on this issue.

(Wilgus Aft. ¶¶ 39, 40 [EOF No. 232-1].) The Municipal Defendants challenge these paragraphs, arguing that (i) Wilgus is not qualified to offer opinions regarding Still-wagon’s state of mind at the time he fired the shots, (ii) any methodology employed by Wilgus in forming these opinions is unreliable, and (iii) Wilgus’s opinions will not assist the factfinder. (Mot. to. Exclude at 1.)

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the use of expert testimony. Under the Rule, “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:”

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence' or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. “The trial judge is the ‘gatekeeper’ of expert evidence and determines its admissibility under Rule 702.” Palatka v, Savage Arms, Inc., 535 Fed.Appx. 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S, 136, 142, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)). And as the gatekeeper, a trial judge has discretion to determine the admissibility of a proposed expert’s testimony “ ‘based on whether the testimony is both relevant and reliable.’ ” Id. (quoting Rose v. Truck Ctrs., Inc., 388 Fed.Appx. 528, 533 (6th Cir. 2010)). When considering the admissibility of particular- expert testimony, the trial judge “must assess ‘whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). The proponent of expert testimony must establish its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 2001).

The Court agrees with the Municipal Defendants that paragraphs 39 and 40 of Wilgus’s affidavit should be excluded. The testimony Wilgus provides in those paragraphs on Stillwagon’s intentions in firing his pistol represents an exercise in drawing inferences from the facts of the case. And as this Court has explained previously, “‘[t]he jury is sufficiently capable of drawing its own inferences regarding intent, motive or state of mind from the evidence, and permitting expert testimony on this subject would be merely substituting the expert’s judgment for the jury’s and would not be helpful for the.jury.’” Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley, L.P.A. v. Davis, 253 F.Supp.3d 997, 2015 WL 3505793, at *14 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (quoting Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 927 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1077 (D. Or. 2013)); see also CMI-Trading v. Quantum Air, 98 F.3d 887, 890 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The intent of the parties is an issue within the competence of the jury and expert opinion testimony will not assist the jury, within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, in determining the factual issue of intent.”).

Stillwagon suggests that Wilgus was not opining about intent. (See Opp’n to Mot., to Exclude at 6 ,[ECF No. 242].) According to Stillwagon, Wilgus’s “opinions are that the physical evidence strongly contradicts the theory that [Stillwagon] was attempting to shoot [Mattingly].” (Id.)

Stillwagon’s argument offers an incomplete picture of Wilgus’s testimony. Wilgus opines that “the physical evidence renders the theory that [Stillwagon] was attempting to shoot the driver entirely implausible.” (Wilgus Aff. ¶39.) But. Wilgus also avers that “as to every shot fired, Mr. Stillwagon was intentionally aiming at the truck, not the driver.” (Id.) With this second statement, Wilgus clearly offers an opinion about intent.

Ultimately though, Stillwagon points to a distinction without a difference. Regardless of how Wilgus’s testimony is cast, Wilgus is still drawing inferences from the facts of the case-inferences that the jury needs no assistance in drawing. Accordingly, the Court grants the Municipal Defendants’ Motion and will exclude paragraphs 39 and 40 of Wilgus’s affidavit from its consideration in ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

IV. CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388-89 (6th Cir. 1993). When the moving party has carried this burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth specific facts'showing that there is a.genuine issue for trial, Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009).

“After the parties have presented their evidence, ‘the judge’s function is not himself tó weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). However, .the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonthoving party’s position will not be sufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury reasonably could find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (finding reliance upon mere allegations, conjecture, or implausible inferences to be insufficient to survive summary judgment).

Here, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary ' judgment. Each party, as a movant for summary judgment, bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The fact that one party fails to satisfy that burden on its own Rule 56 motion does not automatically indicate that the opposing party has satisfied the burden and should be granted summary judgment on the other motion. In reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, courts should “evaluate each motion on its own merits and view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994). The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when a motion is filed by one party to the litigation. Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991).

Stillwagon asserts several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy for “the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” with respect to actions taken by persons acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a claim brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law. Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015).

A. Request to Strike Stillwagon’s Memorandum in Opposition

The Municipal Defendants have, as a preliminary matter, requested that the Court strike Stillwagon’s Memorandum in Opposition [ECF No. 220] to their Motion for Summary Judgment. (Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 [ECF No. 233].) The Memorandum was due on Friday, May 5, 2017, but was not filed until Saturday, May 6. (Id.) When, as here, a request to strike falls outside the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which provides for striking matters from “a pleading,” the Court relies on its inherent power to control the docket when deciding whether to strike the document. Hill v. Ohio State Univ. T & L, No. 2:12-cv-984, 2013 WL 2354069, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2013); see Anthony v. BTR Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2003).

The Court denies the request to strike. Stillwagon filed his Memorandum just one day late. The Municipal Defendants do not claim to have suffered any prejudice from the late filing. (See Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 1.) And, in fact, the Municipal Defendants have not identified any reason, aside from the mere fact that the filing was late, why the Court should strike the Memorandum. (See id.) Striking Stillwagon’s Memorandum under these circumstances would constitute a disproportionately harsh sanction. And striking the Memorandum would neither benefit the Court’s docket management nor help to resolve the case more expeditiously.

The Court moves now to the substance of the motions for summary judgment.

B. False Arrest

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary on Stillwagon’s § 1983 false arrest claim. A false arrest claim implicates “the Fourth Amendment right to be arrested only upon probable cause.” Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2003). Prevailing on the claim thus “ ‘requires a plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.’” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005)).

Probable cause exists when the police have “‘reasonably trustworthy information ... sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.’ ” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). “No overly burdensome duty to investigate applies to officers faced with the prospect of a warrantless arrest.” Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, “ ‘[pjroba-ble cause determinations involve an examination of all [the] facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge at the time of an arrest.’ ” Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 315 (quoting Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999)). That is, “the initial probable cause determination must be founded on. ’both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence’ known to the arresting officer.” Logsdon, 492 F.3d at 341 (quoting Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318). An officer “cannot simply turn a blind eye toward potentially exculpatory evidence.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 1999). With respect to [affirmative defenses, “where a reasonable police officer would conclusively know that [a suspect’s] behavior is protected by a legally cognizable affirmative-defense, that officer lacks a legal foundation to arrest that person for that behavior.” Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 571 & n.21 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] peace officer, in assessing probable cause to effect an arrest, may not ignore information known to him which proves that the suspect is protected by an affirmative legal justification for his suspected criminal actions.”). “[T]he existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible.” Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995).

1. The Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The Municipal Defendants contend that Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, and Radabaugh are entitled to qualified immunity and, thus, summary judgment. (See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 11-18 [ECF No. 203].) Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “ ‘government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability from civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly , established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Determining whether qualified immunity shields a defendant from liability is a question of law involving a two-step inquiry. “First, the court must determine whether, based upon the applicable law, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation has occurred.” Id. If a violation could be established, the next step is to determine whether the statutory or constitutional right was clearly established. Id. When a defendant raises qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the officer is not entitled, to the defense. Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 375.

a. Constitutional Violation

The officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the Municipal Defendants argue, because the Sixth Circuit routinely grants qualified immunity in cases where, despite the suspect’s assertion of an affirmative defense, the facts known to the arresting officer track the elements of an offense. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 17.) The Municipal Defendants’ statement of the law is accurate. But it is not controlling in this case. The cases decided by the Sixth Circuit, 'and cited by the Municipal Defendants, involved situations where the evidence did not present a genuine issue of material fact on whether a reasonable police officer would have conclusively known that the affirmative defense applied. See Harvey v. Carr, 616 Fed.Appx. 826, 829 (6th Cir. 2015). This case, by contrast (and as discussed below), involves evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact on whether a reasonable officer would have conclusively known that Stillwagon acted in self-defense and, more • broadly, on whether probable cause existed to arrest Stillwagon;

To determine whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Stillwagon, the Court considers whether the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the moment, of arrest was sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that Stillwagon had committed an offense. See Sykes, 625 F.3d at 306; see also United States v. Duval, 742 F.3d 246, 253 (6th Cir. 2014) (“ ‘[T]he collective knowledge of agents working as a team is to be considered together in determining probable cause.’ ” (quoting United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 269-60 (6th Cir. 1976))).

i. Information Known at the Time of Arrest

When Stillwagon was arrested on the evening of September 30, 2012, Segaard, Gerke, Willauer, and Radabaugh were operating on a limited amount of information. The officers knew: the final location of the truck and the motorcycle in the parking lot; the location of the shell casings in the AutoZone' parking lot (i.e., next to the concrete pillar) and on the exit ramp (i.e., on the east side of the ramp and south of the painted turn arrow farthest from William Street); the location of at least four of the five bullet holes in Mattingly’s truck (i.e., two in the tailgate, one in the rear driver-side tire, and one in the quarter panel behind that tire); that there was an empty shell casing in the chamber of Still-wagon’s pistol (potentially suggesting that the pistol was in contact with something when it was last fired); that no blood spatter consistent with a gunshot wound was found at the scene; that Mattingly had a blue metal baseball bat in his truck; that Mattingly had beer cans (at least one opened) in his truck, and that Mattingly was alert, talking, and smelled strongly of al