Citations
- 275 F. Supp. 3d 32
Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge
Table of Contents
I. Factual Findings.. .38
A. Attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound in Benghazi, Libya.... 38
B. Abu Khatallah’s Personal Background ... 39
C. Preparation for Abu Khatallah’s Arrest ... 40
D. The Capture Operation... .41
E. Intelligence Interrogations;.. .45 ■
F. FBI interrogations... .45
G. Foreign Transfer of Custody Request .. .49
H. Engine Problems on the USS New York... 50
I. Procedural Background.... 51
II. Discussion ... 52
A. Whether the Government Violated Abu Khatallah’s Right to Prompt Presentment ... 52
B. Whether Abu Khatallah’s Miranda Waivers Were Undermined by a Two-Step Interrogation.... 60
C. Whether Abu Khatallah’s Miranda Waivers Were Otherwise Knowing and Voluntary.... 66
D. Whether Abu Khatallah Invoked His Right to Counsel.... 68
E. Whether Abu Khatallah’s Custodial Statements Were Voluntary.... 69
III. Conclusion..., 70
The United States has charged Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah with the murder of the former United States Ambassador to Libya,,J. Christopher Stevens, and three other U.S. government employees, along with related crimes stemming from the 2012 attack on a U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya. Nearly two years after the attack, U.S. special forces launched an operation to capture Abu Kha-tallah on the outskirts of Benghazi. The operation was a. success. Abu Khatallah was brought on board a U.S. naval warship positioned off the Libyan coast, which then transported him to the United States approximately 5,000 miles away.
Abu Khatallah was repeatedly interrogated over the course of this thirteen-day journey. First, U.S. intelligence agents questioned him for several days mainly to gather information concerning his knowledge of potential terrorist activity in Libya and the surrounding region. FBI agents later boarded the ship, obtained verbal and written waivers of Abu Khatallah’s Miranda rights, and conducted a series of interrogations focused on the attack.
Abu Khatallah now moves to suppress the Mirandized statements he gave to the FBI. The grounds for the motion are: (1) that his nearly two-week journey across the Atlantic Ocean by boat violated his right to prompt presentment before a magistrate under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a); (2) that the Government’s two-step interrogation process undermined the voluntariness of his Miranda ■ waiver; (3) that his Miranda rights were otherwise not voluntarily and knowingly waived; (4) that he invoked his right to counsel; and (5) that his statements were not voluntarily given.
The Court held an eight-day evidentiary hearing at which it received testimony from Justice Department and State Department officials involved in the planning of the capture operation; several members of the capture team; intelligence and FBI agents who conducted the interrogations and their Arabic-language interpreters; the captain of the Navy ship that brought Abu Khatallah -to the United States,- the USS New York, and two of its crew members; and a defense expert who opined on the psychological effects of torture. Based on that testimony and the entire evidentia-ry record, and for the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Abu Khatallah’s motion.
I. Factual Findings
A. Attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound in Benghazi, Libya
During the civil war that erupted in Libya in early 2011, the rebel group seek-mg to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi, the Transitional National Council (“TNC”), established its, base of operations in the city of Benghazi. On February 25, 2011, the U.S. Department of State evacuated American personnel from Libya and suspended its operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Less than two months later, the State Department reestablished its presence in the country with the arrival in Benghazi of U.S. Special Envoy J. Christopher Stevens. According .to the State Department’s official report on the Benghazi attack, on June 21, 2011, Stevens moved into what would become a U.S, Special Mission compound. See Accountability Review Bd., U.S. Dep’t of State, Benghazi Attack Report 14 (Unclassified) (2012), http://www. state.gov/documents/organization/202446. pdf [hereinafter “State Dep’t Report”]. The compound was eventually comprised of “a diplomatic outpost, known as the U.S. Special Mission,” where a contingent of State Department personnel worked, and a second facility, known as the “Annex,” where a group of U.S. intelligence personnel was based. Indictment ¶¶ 5-6.
The United States officially recognized the TNC as Libya’s governing authority the following .month, on July 15, 2011, and Gaddafi was ousted from power only a few weeks later. The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli reopened with a temporary-duty staff in September 2011. Stevens continued as Special Envoy to the TNC in Benghazi until he left the country on November 17, 2011. The Special Envoy position was not filled after Stevens’s departure, but he returned to Libya as Ambassador in May 2012, operating out of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. According to the State Department Report, “2012 saw an overall deterioration of the security environment in Benghazi, as highlighted by a series of security incidents involving the Special Mission, international organizations, .non-governmental organizations ..., and third-country nationals and- diplomats.” Id. at 15; see also id. at 15-16.
' Ambassador Stevens traveled to Benghazi to visit-the Mission compound on September 10, 2012. Among others stationed at the compound and present during- the Ambassador’s visit were Information Management Officer Sean Patrick Smith, and Security Officers Tyrone Snow-den Woods and Glen Anthony Doherty. See Indictment ¶ 16; State Dep’t Report 18.
The Mission and Annex were attacked on September 11 and 12, 2012. In two phases beginning on the evening of September 11 and lasting into the morning of September 12, armed intruders deployed small-arms and machine-gun fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars at both facilities. See State Dep’t Report 4. Buildings on the compound burned, and the fire spread to the Mission building housing Ambassador Stevens during his stay. Ambassador Stevens, Smith, Woods, and Do-herty were killed in the attacks.
B. Abu Khatallah’s Personal Background
U.S. authorities came to suspect that Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah played a key role in the attack. On July 15, 2013, a criminal complaint and arrest warrant were issued for him, and, as noted above, he was captured in Benghazi the following summer. According to statements made by Abu Khatallah to law enforcement agents following his capture, he was born on May 7, 1971, so was 43 years old at the time of his arrest and interrogation. Hr’g Tr. 604:1-2 (May 12, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Agent Clarke). He received nine years of formal schooling, ultimately earning a certification as a car mechanic. Id. at 604:3-7. He worked briefly as a mechanic for the Libyan government, before moving to construction and later opening his own automobile repair shop in Benghazi. Id. at 604:9-13. Between 1995 and 2010, Abu Khatallah was arrested, released, and rearrested multiple times, largely due to his association with political opponents of the Gaddafi regime, and he spent most of this period in various Libyan prisons. Id. at 604-07. Abu Khatallah described the conditions in Tripoli’s Abu Salim prison as being particularly harsh. The prison was “very crowded” with “no air circulation,” and the temperatures were often extremely hot or cold due to a lack of heat and air conditioning. Id. at 605:15-19. Abu Khatal-lah told agents that he “was beaten for the first few days” of his imprisonment there, but “after that he was never tortured or interrogated.” Id. at 605:20-22. After his 2010 release from prison, Abu Khatallah returned to Benghazi, where he joined and ultimately led a revolutionary militia group aimed at overthrowing the Gaddafi regime. Id. at 607:4-12.
C. Preparation for Abu Khatallah’s Arrest
The operation to capture Abu Khatallah followed nearly a year of planning across multiple U.S. government agencies. U.S. officials seriously considered two options in bringing Abu Khatallah to the United States after his capture: transport by aircraft, and transport by boat. The former option involved what is known as a foreign transfer-of-custody (“FTOC”) request: Abu Khatallah would be taken to a third country and then flown across the Atlantic Ocean. See Hr’g Tr. 1187:4-11 (May 17, 2017 a.m.). The latter required transporting Abu Khatallah aboard the USS New York, a San Antonio-class amphibious warship. See Hr’g Tr. 948:5-17 (May 15, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of USS New York Captain Christopher Brunette).
U.S. officials harbored serious doubts about the viability of the FTOC alternative for two reasons. First, the United States needed permission from a third country in order to conduct an FTOC, as it necessarily involved an intrusion upon the territorial sovereignty of another country. See Hr’g Tr. 1103:23-1104:9 (May 16, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Justin Sibe-rell, Acting Coordinator for Counterter-rorism, U.S. Department of State). Given the site of the arrest, the State Department could have requested permission from countries in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. See Gov’t Ex. 402. Officials were skeptical, however, that European countries would agree to such a request given the potential application of the death penalty to Abu Khatallah. See Hr’g Tr. 1105:17-25 (May 16, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Justin Siberell). Countries in North Africa and the Middle East were also doubtful participants given the potential domestic backlash they could face from cooperating with the United States on an anti-terrorism operation. See id. at 1106:18-22. And State Department officials were averse to making a request that was likely to be denied given the possible diplomatic ramifications. As Mr. Siberell put it, “When we make a request of a government, we do not want to put that government in the position of saying no to us on a very difficult issue. That may have some costs more broadly in the relationship.” Id. at 1116:11-22; see also, e.g., Gov’t Ex. 335 (E-mail from Redacted Sender to Justin Siberell on June 17, 2014) (“As you and I discussed, there are costs to making requests and I’d prefer not to throw a bunch of spaghetti against the wall.”). Given these concerns, the State Department believed that making an FTOC request would be “difficult” and “a hard one for [foreign] governments to accept.” Hr’g Tr. 1111:10-16 (May 16, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Justin Siberell).
The second reason that U.S. officials doubted the viability of flying Abu Khatal-lah through a third country concerned the timing of the request. The relevant officials concluded they would not be able to make an FTOC request of another country until after Abu Khatallah had been captured. As one Justice Department official involved in the deliberations testified, contacting a third country with this request prior to the operation would have entailed “a high security risk.” Hr’g Tr. 851:21 (May 15, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz). An FBI official explained that a belated request was necessary because there was no guarantee that the third country would have kept the request confidential. Hr’g Tr. 1194:3-9 (May 17, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of C. Bryan Paarmann, FBI Deputy Assistant Director for International Operations). The FBI was concerned that either the Libyan Government or various rebel groups inside Libya would learn of the operation beforehand, which “would significantly increase the risk to the mission and the possibility of failure of the operation.” Id. With any FTOC request on hold until after the operation began, the FBI focused much of its planning on transporting Kha-tallah across the Atlantic by ship. See Gov’t Ex. 304 (E-mail from Redacted FBI Official to Redacted Recipient on Oct. 1, 2013) (“[The Department of Defense] has tasked [us] with developing [a plan] for transportation back to U.S. via opportune naval vessels. While everyone understands this is not the preferred [plan], it is the only one which the planners can start working on.”). .
The FBI nonetheless believed that “an FTOC out of a third country would have been the preferred and most likely course of action if [it] could [have beeii brought] to bear.” Hr’g Tr. 1202:4-7 (May 17, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Bryan Paarmann). It began laying the groundwork for this option in the fall of 2013, in conjunction with the planned apprehension of another terror suspect in Libya, Abu Anas al-Libi. See Gov’t Ex. 303; Hr’g Tr. 1188:9-1189:7 (May 17, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Bryan Paarmann). The FBI developed an informal-list of about a dozen countries that might help facilitate the FTOC, although even this informal list betrayed skepticism about the viability of this option. See Gov’t Ex. 303 (E-mail from C. Bryan Paarmann to Justin Siberell on Oct. 7, 2013) (“Truly believe though that given the media surrounding [the Benghazi attack] that the list of countries being willing to help- on this would be very small .... [I]f all say no ... we are stuck with the Trans Atlantic boat movement option.”).
The FBI ultimately planned for an operation that would allow for both transport options across the Atlantic. About five weeks prior to the operation, the FBI described the plan in internal e-mails as follows: The FBI would arrest Abu Khatal-lah in Libya and transfer him to a naval vessel in international waters. The vessel would then travel westward across the Mediterranean Sea for two to four days. During this time, intelligence agents would conduct non-Mirandized interrogations of Abu Khatallah as the State Department simultaneously contacted countries regarding the possibility of an FTOC request. FBI agents would then board the ship following the conclusion of the intelligence interrogations. If a third country agreed to an FTOC request, the ship would proceed to that country.' If no country agreed, it would continue through the Mediterranean and across the Atlantic. See Gov’t Ex. 302 (E-mail from Redacted FBI Employee to Redacted Recipient on May 7, 2014); Gov’t Ex. 306 (E-mail from Redacted Sender to Redacted Recipient on June 13, 2014).
D. The Capture Operation
FBI Agent “Johnson” described the planning and execution of Abu Khatallah’s capture at the evidentiary hearing, An eight-member team began training for the operation in April 2014. Hr’g Tr. 21:11-20 (May 10, 2017 a.m.). The team, which included an FBI agent and a military translator trained as an Arabic linguist, departed the United, States in early June. Id. at 34:13-16. On June 9, 2014, they flew by helicopter from a base in Southern Europe to. the USS New York, as it was travelling eastward in the Mediterranean toward the Libyan coast. Id. at 22:3-7. After landing in Libya early in the morning on June 15, 2014, the team headed to a community of villas located on the coastline, just south of Benghazi. Id. at 26:4-20. There, the team rehearsed the plan and made final preparations for the capture mission, which was scheduled to take place that night. Id. at 26:22-27:5. The mission was officially underway at 10:00 p.m. on June 15, 2016. Id. at 22:7-8. All team members were armed with pistols and dressed in civilian clothing that was intended to blend in with the environment. Id. at 28:2-29:5. In addition to their side arms, half the-team carried backpacks containing assault-style weapons. Id. at 29:3-5. The team divided itself among the villa’s four rooms and waited for Abu Khatallah to arrive. Id. at 29:11-15.
The team planned for one of Abu Kha-tallah’s acquaintances to lead him to the villa. When Abu Khatallah and his acquaintance entered the villa, they were immediately swarmed, Three members of the team, two from the bathroom and one from the kitchen of the villa, grabbed Abu Kha-tallah and threw him to the ground. Id. at 30:9-16; 69:15-18. Agent Johnson was in the bedroom and did not see Abu Khatal-lah enter, but entered the main area of the villa upon hearing the initial commotion-id. at 30:23-31:15, Agent Johnson saw his colleagues on the floor with Abu Khatallah: two were trying to secure his arms and the third was attempting to control his head. Id. Seeing Abu Khatallah punching, biting, and kicking his captors, Agent Johnson grabbed both of Abu Khatallah’s legs and held them to the ground. Id. at 31:17-22. At that point, Agent Johnson noticed a holstered pistol strapped to Abu Khatal-lah’s left hip, which another team member promptly removed. Id. at 32:20-33:1. After struggling for three to four minutes, Abu Khatallah eventually tired and a team member was able to handcuff his hands behind his back. Id. at 33:14-17.
The capturé team then led a handcuffed—but mobile—Abu Khatallah into the bathroom, where Agent Johnson, through the Arabic linguist, identified himself as a member of the U.S. government. He told Abu Khatallah that he was in government custody and would be taken to the United States. Id. at 35:15-22. He also asked Abu Khatallah to identify himself, whether he was armed, and if anybody knew his current whereabouts. Id at 37:4-14. Abu Khatallah responded by stating his name and confirming that he was not armed and that no one knew where he was. Id. The capture team had decided not to identify themselves to Abu Khatallah earlier because they felt this'was the safest way to apprehend him. Id. at 34:18-35:14. In the bathroom with the lights on, Johnson observed a gash on Abu Khatal-lah’s head and signs of bruising and swelling around his eyes, but he was unable to say precisely how Abu Khatallah had sustained those injuries. Id. at 89:2-5. No one on the capture team was injured. Id. at 66:12-13. A member of the capture team with medical training gave Abu Khatallah a cursory medical examination to make sure he was able to travel and not suffering from any significant injuries. Id. at 39:16-21. The entire apprehension—from Abu Khatallah’s entrance into the villa until the conversation in the bathroom—lasted approximately eleven minutes. Id. at 40:11-15.
Ten minutes later, after the team had cleaned the villa, it escorted Abu Khatallah about 500 meters to the shore, where a boat with another FBI agent on board was waiting. Id. at 44:3-21. Abu Khatallah was in handcuffs, the front of his face was obscured by' a blindfold, his ears were covered, and he was gagged. Id. at 41:2-5. Two team members guided him by the arms. Before boarding the vessel, the agents switched Abu Khatallah’s handcuffs to the front and outfitted him with a life preserver so that he would be able to tread water in case he fell overboard. Id. at 45:7-17. At roughly 10:30 p.m., the boat departed the Libyan coast, and after ten minutes at sea, it pulled alongside a larger boat. Id. at 46:14-22. Abu Khatallah was lifted into the second vessel, which then proceeded toward the USS New York. Id. During the two-hour journey to the USS New York, Agent Johnson removed Abu Khatallah’s gag because he was no longer within shouting distance of the shore, and a medic examined him. Id. at 46:23-47:7. The medic checked Abu Khatallah’s vital signs and informed Agent Johnson that he was fit to continue. Id. at 49:11-24. Abu Khatallah reportedly repeated the phrase “God, why me” during the journey. Id. at 50:2-5. Upon arriving at the USS New York, the boat pulled alongside the ship’s rear cargo door, and the medic placed a harness around himself and Abu Khatal-lah, and they were hoisted approximately ten to twelve feet to the ship’s berth. Id. at 50:13-18; 51:5-14, 52:9. Agent Johnson entered the boat by .jumping from : the smaller vessel to a ladder attached to the ship. Id. He did not have any further contact with Abu Khatallah and left the USS New York five days later.
The capture team’s efforts were supported by a team on board the USS New York, who helped ready the ship for Abu Khatallah’s arrival. Special Agent Robert Story, a supervisor in the FBI’s counter-terrorism division and a member of the support team, testified concerning Abu Khatallah’s treatment and living conditions on the ship. Agent Story was tapped for the team in May 2014 and boarded the USS New York on June 9, 2014. Id. at 92:7-9; 94:18-19. While awaiting Abu Kha-tallah’s capture, the team erected a detention facility in an open area within the ship’s rear interior that consisted of four mobile pods in a row. Id. at 98:10-99:6; 101:13-19. The pods measured roughly 8 feet in length by 7 feet in width by 8 feet in height and were designated as either living quarters (pods “DI” and “D2”) or interrogation rooms (pods “II” or “12”). A larger, adjacent pod served as the latrine (“L”). Id. The pods were ventilated and screened off from the rest of the ship so that they could not be viewed from the sides or above. Id.; Gov’t Ex. 405A-E. Abu Khatallah would live in pod D1 for the duration of the ship’s journey. Id. at 106:17-22. An arrow on the wall of the pod pointed west towards Mecca and for the initial phase of his transit he was provided a blanket, a Quran, and a prayer rug. Id. at 106:11—14.
Agent Story was responsible for processing Abu Khatallah as soon as he boarded the USS New York Id. at 111:8-10. Story, along with two Department of Defense (“DOD”) guards and with the assistance of an Arabic linguist, verbally instructed Abu Khatallah and physically guided him to the detention facility. Id. 113:8-13. Abu Khatallah’s hearing restraint was removed but his handcuffs and blindfold remained in place, which would be the general protocol whenever he was moved between pods. Id. at 113:15-16. Abu Khatallah followed all instructions, and Agent Story described him as “compliant” .and “very calm” Id. at 114:22-24. Upon reaching the detention facility, Abu Kha-tallah was searched and taken to pod D2 for initial processing. Id. at 115-116.
Once inside the processing pod, Abu Khatallah’s blindfold, ear coverings, and handcuffs were removed. Hr’g Tr. 538:8-15 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). Staff Sergeant Dylan Lee Peterson—a member of the DOD guard force that provided security on board the ship—testified that he read Abu Khatallah the provisions of Article III of the Geneva Conventions, pausing throughout so that the interpreter could repeat the provisions in Arabic. Id. at 540:10-544:25. Abu Khatallah was told, for example, that he would be “treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria,” and that U.S. personnel would not engage in “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.” Id.; see also Gov’t Ex. 206. Written versions of those guarantees in both English and Arabic were also posted on the wall of the pod, where they remained for the duration of the trip. Hr’g Tr. 540:24-542:3, 551:5-7 (May 12, 2017 a.m.); see also Gov’t Ex. 143B.
Further processing included photographing Abu Khatallah in the clothes he arrived in and conducting a medical screening. Id. at 118; Gov’t Exs. 106-08. The ship’s physician, Dr. Brad Smith, performed an initial medical exam and treated Abu Khatallah throughout his journey on the USS New York Hr’g Tr. 177:13-21 (May 10, 2017 p.m.) (Testimony of Dr. Smith); see Gov’t Ex. 203 (Abu Khatal-lah’s medical records). Dr. Smith characterized Abu Khatallah’s head injury as a “subcutaneous laceration,” and he closed the wound with three staples after applying local anaesthetic. Iff at 183:11, 188:4-21, 195:24, 197:16-20; see also Gov’t Exs. 135-138 (photos of Abu Khatallah during the screening). He also examined Abu Khatallah’s left hand, which showed signs of swelling and bruising around the fourth finger. Iff at 194:8-10. Dr. Smith took x-rays of Abu Khatallah’s hand and jaw, which were negative. Iff at 195:9. At the end of the exam, Dr. Smith informed Abu Khatallah that he would be “seeing him again on a daily basis” and would remove the staples later. Iff at 199:15-20.
The DOD guards were present throughout the initial processing and medical examination, and they attended to Abu Kha-tallah’s general care and handling while on the ship. They gave him a set of rules, which included instructions to use one-word requests such as “water” and “bathroom,” and directed him to “notify the staff’ if he felt “abused.” Hr’g Tr. 553:19-554:12, 567:23-24 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). The guards kept a written log of all of Abu Khatallah’s movements, including his visits to the latrine,' the medical unit, and the interrogation pod. Hr’g Tr. 546:22-547:19 (May 12,2017 a.m.); see also Gov’t Ex. 204 (Def. Ex. 6). Each time Abu Khatallah was transported from one place on the ship to another, he was handcuffed, and his ears and eyes were covered. Hr’g Tr. 559-61 (May 12, 2017 aim.). The logs also reflect brief checks on' Abu Khatallah that occurred every two hours: The guards would peer through a window in the door of his cell “to make sure he was moving, awake, [and] alive.” Id. 557:13-17.
E. Intelligence Interrogations
[See Classified Insert 1.]'
F. FBI Interrogations
The FBI interview team arrived on the USS New York on June 19, 2014, by helicopter. Hr’g Tr. 573:9-15 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). The team consisted of FBI case agents Michael Clarke and Justin O’Donnell, plus an interpreter or “language analyst,” Mousa El-Chaer. Id. 574:22-575:3; Hr’g Tr. 756-57 (May 12, 2017 p.m.). Agent Clarke had conducted “dozens and dozens of interviews in Libya” with the assistance of El-Chaer, who by that time had over five years of experience as an FBI interpreter. Hr’g Tr. 575:10-18 (May 12, 2017 a.m.); see Hr’g Tr. 756 (May 12, 2017 p.m.). O’Donnell also participated in those Libya interviews, and was proficient in Arabic. Hr’g Tr. 576:9-20 (May 12, 2017 a.m.); Hr’g Tr. 759:15-17 (May 12,. 2017 p.m.). The FBI team, by design, had no contact with the intelligence team before, during, or after Abu Khatallah’s capture and interrogation—and has had no contact to this day. Hr’g Tr. 573:20-574:11 (May 12, 2017 a.m.); see also Hr’g Tr. 682:4-15; 747-48 (May 12, 2017 p.m.).
For the FBI phase of the interrogation, Abu Khatallah was moved to new living quarters (the room marked “D2”), see Gov’t Exs. 150A-J, and was questioned in a different intérview room (“II”), see Gov’t Exs. 149A-J. There were no video or audio recording devices in the rooms. Hr’g Tr. 582:19-24 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). The rooms had identical dimensions to the intelligence-phase rooms, but were arranged differently. For example, in the interview room, the FBI team pasted green wallpaper and hung “decorative pictures” on the wall, and placed a green tablecloth and placemats on the table. Id. 579:18-25, 581:22-582:1; Hr’g Tr. 696:7-14, 702:24-25 (May 12, 2017 p.m.). And to the living quarters, they added wallpaper, a prayer' rug, a notepad, and a pencil. Id. at 701:14— 17. Abu Khatallah was also given a change of clothing, and his routine was slightly altered: He was able to shower once daily, and he started receiving three meals per day. Hr’g Tr. 583:5-12 (May Í2,2017 a.m.). He was not told, however, why any of these changes were made. Hr’g Tr. 700, 703 (May 12, 2017 p.m.).
The FBI team first met with Abu Kha-tallah on June 21, 2014, beginning at 7:30 a.m. Hr’g Tr. 587 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). After the guards escorted Abu Khatallah to the interview room, he sat down at the table and the guards removed his blindfold, ear coverings, and hand restraints before leaving. Id. at 588-589. No members of the interview team were armed, and they were all dressed in casual, civilian clothes. Id. at 587:9-12, 588:8-10. Special Agent Clarke testified that when he first saw Abu Khatallah, he “appeared alert ... well-rested and engaged with what was going on around him.” Id. at 588:21-22. Clarke also testified that Abu Khatallah was in better condition than he appeared in the photograph taken immediately after his capture, see Gov’t Ex. 106. By the time of the FBI interview on June 21, Clarke observed, Abu Khatallah’s “hair was washed, his eyes were more focused, and the discoloration, the bruising, on his face was consistent with five or so days of healing.” Hr’g Tr. 589:4-7 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). The agents began the interview with a health and welfare check, during which Abu Khatallah reported that he had a slight headache. Id. at 589:9-24. After introducing themsélves, the agents informed Abu Khatallah that we was “under arrest, and that he was aboard a U.S, Navy ship.” Id. at 590:10-11.
The agents then set about advising Abu Khatallah of his Miranda rights. Special Agent Clarke read from an English copy of an Advice of Rights form, see Gov’t Ex. 220B, and El-Chaer translated, pausing after each phrase to confirm that Abu Khatallah understood its content. Hr’g Tr. 591:20-592:5, 592:20-25 (May 12, 2017 а.m.). Each time, Abu Khatallah responded that he understood. Id. In addition to informing Abu Khatallah of his core Miranda rights—including his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney—the agents also read the following language aimed at distinguishing their interview from the prior, intelligence-team interrogation:
We know that you met with other members of the U.S. Government in the past. We do not know whether you told them or they told you anything. Anything you stated in the past to other officials from the U.S. Government was not the subject of the criminal procedures levied against you in the United States, and probably will not be used against you in U.S. courts. We are now starting anew. You are not compelled to speak with us today just because you have already spoken with others in the past.. If you decide to talk to us today, it is essential for you to know that anything you say could be used against you in U.S. courts.
Gov’t Ex. 220B; see also Hr’g Tr. 594:2-14 (May 12, -2017 aim.). Abu Khatallah' was also advised that he would “be arraigned before a court in the United States Without any undue delay,” and that once in court, a judge would explain the charges against him, permit 'him to hire an attorney or assign him an attorney, and determine whether to release him on bond. Id. at 595:4-19. Abu Khatallah was then asked, “Are you -willing to waive your rights? Do you want to’ waive these rights?” Id. at 595:20-22. He-replied in the' affirmative. Id. at 595:22-23. He also asked, “Is there an attorney here?” Id. at 595:24. When the agents explained that' no attorney was present, Abu Khatallah responded that “he wanted to continue to talk to [the agents], waive his rights, but he wanted to reserve his right to have an attorney in the future.” Id. at 596:1-4.
The above process was then repeated in writing. El-Chaer 'gave Abu Khatallah an Arabic version of the same Advice of Rights form, see Gov’t Ex. 220A. Hr’g Tr. 596:10-17 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). After the agents confirmed that Abu Khatallah could read and write Arabic, El-Chaer read the entire Arabic version of the Advice of Rights form to Abu Khatallah, and Special Agent Clarke testified that Abu Khatal-lah’s eyes appeared to follow the text as it was read. Id. at 696:17-24. Finally, Abu Khatallah was read a series of waiver statements—with Clarke reading in English and El-Chaer in Arabic—and was instructed to initial each statement “if you agree with the statement, and you want to waive the right.” Id. at 597:24-598:3. Abu Khatallah initialed next to all the1 statements on the 'form. Id. at 598—99; see also Gov’t Exs. 220A-B. Next to some of them, he added additional comments in his own hand. For example, next to the Arabic statement, “I am prepared to give statements and answer questions,” he wrote (in Arabic),' “To the best of my ability,” and then initialed. Hr’g Tr. 598:9-13 (May 12, 2017 a.m.); see also Gov’t Exs. 220A-B. Abu Khatallah then wrote and signed his name at the bottom of the written waiver form. Hr’g Tr. 599:6-9 (May 12,2017 a.m.); see also Gov’t Exs. 220A-B.
Finally, after Abu' Khatallah had initialed the waiver of rights form, the agents asked him if he would “like it noted on th[e] form your acceptance to talk to us today without an attorney present, waiving your right to attorney, but wanting to reserve the right in the future to have one?” Hr’g Tr. 599:19-22 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). Abu Khatallah responded yes, and wrote the following statement in Arabic at the bottom of the form: “I understood from the conversation that I have the right to have an attorney present at any time; but today, 6/21/2014 A.D., I have consented to talk without the.attorney being present.” Id. at 600:1-4; see also Gov’t Exs. 220A-B. He then signed and dated after the statement. Hr’g Tr. 600:7-8 (May 12, 2017 a.m.); see also Gov’t Exs. 220A-B. This occurred at 8:20 a.m. Hr’g Tr. 600:18 (May 12,2017 a.m.).
From 8:30 to 9:30 a.m., Abu Khatallah and the FBI team took a break. Id. at 601-02. After resuming, the agents asked Abu Khatallah how he was feeling, and Special Agent Clarke said, “Mr. Khatallah, you realize this is voluntary. This is a voluntary statement, and ... you can stop talking to us at any time.” Id. at 603:9-11. Agent Clarke’s statement was translated, and Abu Khatallah responded, “Yes, I know this is voluntary, and I agree to talk to you at this time.” Id. at 603:14-15. The agents proceeded to interview Abu Khatal-iah from 9:30 to 11:30 a.m. Id. at 609:5-11. During that time, Abu Khatallah was offered (but declined) bathroom and food breaks, and he was also offered (and accepted) tea and a sweatshirt. Id. at 603:18-22. At 11:30, Abu Khatallah was given another break, and the interviewing resumed at 1 p.m. Id. at 609:12-16. Because this second break was longer—one-and-a-half hours—the agents reviewed Abu Kha-tallah’s Miranda rights again, using the Advice of Rights form as a guide. Id. at 610:19-25. Special Agent Clarke testified that the core Miranda rights were read verbatim, while the additional language about Abu Khatallah’s prior interrogation and right to presentment were paraphrased. Id. at 611:20-613:17. Abu Khatal-lah again indicated his agreement to continue, and the questioning resumed for roughly an hour. Id. at 613:22-23. Agent Clarke described the tone of the interview as “[c]onversational” and “calm”; he characterized Abu Khatallah as “engaged” and “coherent”; and he explained that Abu Khatallah was addressed as “Mr. Khatal-lah” or “Sheikh” to convey respect. Id. at 613-14.
In all main respects, this first interview day on June 21 was typical of the five interview days that followed—on June 22, June 23, June 24, June 26, and June 27. During the interviews, Abu Khatallah’s blindfold, ear coverings, and handcuffs were removed. See id. at 587, 602, 616, 627, 632, 641, 643. The interviews were punctuated every hour or two by breaks, see id. at 621, 623, 626, and they all began with health and welfare checks, see id. at 589, 610, 616, 622, 625, 633, 641, 643, 647-48. Each day, the FBI team issued the same set of warnings—written and verbal Miranda waivers at the start of the day; a brief reminder that interviews were voluntary after each break of one hour or less; and a verbal Miranda waiver after each longer break—and each time Abu Khatal-lah indicated his agreement to speak. Id. at 610-13, 617, 622, 627-30, 648^9. At the end of each written waiver, at the suggestion of the agents, Abu Khatallah made the same notation indicating his desire to waive his right to counsel for the present, but to reserve that right for the future. See id. at 620, 630. Throughout, the tone of the interviews remained conversational and respectful, see 624, 632, 646, 655, and the team addressed Abu Khatallah either as “Mr. Khatallah” or “Sheikh.” Id. at 614:6-8. No promises, threats, or other inducements were employed, according to the agents. Id. at 619, 624; 632, 647, 656. Sometimes, Abu Khatallah refused to answer a question, without penalty. See id. at 631, 639-40. Abu Khatallah was offered snacks and refreshments, see id. at 620:16-20, 622-23, 636, and at one point, El-Chaer offered Abu Khatallah his watch, so that he could keep his prayer schedule. Id. at 616; Hr’g Tr. 773-74 (May 12, 2017 p.m.).
The case agents took notes during each interview, and immediately following each interview, they completed an FBI 302 based on those notes. Hr’g Tr. 583:18-25 (May 12, 2017 a.m.); see also Gov’t Exs. 207-18 (interview notes and FBI 302s for each of the six FBI interviews). The main topics covered in the interviews were: Abu Khatallah’s personal history and background; participants in the Benghazi attacks; and Abu Khatallah’s whereabouts and activities during the attacks. Hr’g Tr. 727-33 (May 12, 2017 p.m.).
On the morning of June 27, the last interview day, after the agents advised Abu Khatallah of his Miranda rights, they also informed him that a single-count indictment had been filed against him the day before, charging him with conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist group, resulting in death. Hr’g Tr. 649:18-650:2 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). The day then proceeded in the same fashion as had the others, with interviews and breaks. Id. at 650-51. In the afternoon, during the last interview portion, the agents told Abu Khatallah that he would be transferred from the ship to the U.S. mainland by helicopter the following day. Id. at 651:17-22. They further explained that he would be handcuffed and blindfolded, but that El-Chaer would be present throughout the process to answer any of his questions. . Id. at 651:22-652:2. Finally, the agents read to Abu Khatallah—in English, pausing for Arabic translation by El-Chaer—a form setting out his rights to presentment without unnecessary delay. Id. at 652:15-653:1. The form included the following language:
You have a right to be taken without unnecessary delay before the court, where a judge will advise you of- the charges against you and of your rights. Among those rights are your right to counsel. The judge also will determine whether you will be detained or allowed pretrial release. If you waive your right, you still will be presented to the judge so that you can be informed of and exercise your rights, but providing a statement at this time may cause your initial appearance in court to be delayed.
Gov’t Éx. 227. Abu Khatallah declined to waive his prompt presentment right, and indicated that he wanted to appear before a judge. Hr’g Tr. 654:4-8 (May 12, 2017 a.m.). The agents then concluded the interview. Id. at 654:9-10. Abu Khatallah was brought before a Magistrate Judge of this Court the following day, Saturday, June 28, 2014. Id. at 656:5-13.
G. Foreign Transfer of Custody Request
As the intelligence interviews of Abu Khatallah got underway on June 15, 2014, State Department and DOJ officials considered their options for making an FTOC request. Consistent with their planning discussions in the months leading up to the capture operation, they determined that the State Department should not make an FTOC request of any country affiliated with the European Union. The reasoning remained the same: there are diplomatic costs to making FTOC requests, and EU countries would not have agreed given the potential application of the death penalty. See Gov’t Ex. 309 (E-mail from Bryan Paarmann to Redacted Recipient on June 17, 2014) (“[TJheir policy on [the death penalty] would prohibit an FTOC option from any EU affiliated country.”).
Thus, although more than a dozen countries were initially considered, the State Department ultimately made an FTOC request to only a single country, G-24. See id. U.S. officials had determined that G-24 was the “[l]ast country in possible play.” Gov’t Ex. 335 (E-mail on June 17, 2014) (“Okay DOJ and FBI agreement that no EU countries (and no G-l too). Last country in possible play (but not given realities) is G-24.”.). On a conference call prior to making the request, State Department and DOJ officials agreed that if G-24 declined their request, they would proceed to transport Abu Khatallah across the Atlantic on board the USS New York. See Hr’g Tr. 891:5-13 (May 15, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Bruce Swartz).
G-24, a country in North Africa, was chosen for its geographic location and its history of cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism investigations. See Hr’g Tr. 1209:14-21 (May 17, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Bryan Paarmann). U.S. officials also believed that G-24 was politically stablp, and could thus better withstand any domestic backlash from cooperating with the United States on a terrorism-related operation. See Hr’g Tr. 892:23-893:7 (May 15, 2017 a.m.). G-24, however, declined the request on or about June 19, 2014. See Gov’t Ex. 334 (June 19, 2014 e-mail from Bruce Swartz to C. Bryan Paarmann).
U.S. officials also seriously considered making an FTOC request of G-21, a country in Europe, About a month prior to the operation, an FBI legal attache stationed in that country had asked his counterpart in G-21 about assisting with an FTOC, in general terms. See Gov’t Ex. 329 (E-mail from C. Bryan Paarmann on May 14, 2014). According to Bryan Paarmann, G-21 was apparently “extremely receptive to the FTOC idea.” Id. As he later testified, however, G-21 was not aware of the specifics of the operation—particularly the identity of the arrestee being transferred. See Hr’g Tr. 1276:19-1277:3 (May 17, 2017 a.m.) (Testimony of Bryan Paarmann). Because G-21 had previously refused an FTOC request for Abu Anas al-Libi, “it was decided that G-21 would be unlikely to say yes given the specifics of Abu Khatal-lah.” Id. The United States therefore did not make an official FTOC request of G-21.
H. Engine Problems on the USS New York
The Captain of the USS New York, Christopher Brunette, testified at the suppression hearing that the ship encountered engine problems that reduced its speed throughout its voyage to Libya and back. Captain Brunette explained that the ship is a San Antonio-class amphibious warship that is powered by four- diesel engines. Hr’g Tr. 948:16-949:2; 953:9-13 (May 15, 2017 p.m.) (Testimony ‘of USS New-'For/cCaptain Christopher Brunette). As the USS New York proceeded toward the Mediterranean, its crew 'noticed a fuel dilution problem in one of the engines. Id. at 964:10-20. The crew began running a series of tests on the engine on June 5, 2014. Id. at 964:22-965:6. On or about June 9, the crew realized that they were unable to solve the problem on their own, and decided to shut the engine down until a diesel engine inspector could travel to the ship to assist them. Id. at 965:6-9. The engine inspector arrived on the ship via helicopter on June 19, after Abu Khatallah had boarded, as it neared the Strait of Gibraltar headed toward the Atlantic. Id. at 967:5-6. At the direction of the inspector, the crew ran additional tests for several days and resolved the issue on June 25. Id. at 983:24r-984:2.
The USS New York experienced additional difficulties in another engine on June 23, as it ventured toward, the- United States. Id. at 984:20-23. As .tests were being run- on the first problem engine, the diesel engine inspector noticed that one of the ship’s other engines was operating with high vacuum pressure. Id. at 985:7-8. Captain Brunette described this as a “very serious condition” that could “render that entire engine completely useless.” Id. at 985:8-13, The ship’s crew deliberated and determined that there was no way to conduct the necessary repairs at sea. Id. at 986:3-4. The, engine therefore had to be shut down until the ship reached the mainland United States. Id. at 986:6-19,
The upshot of these mechanical issues was that two of the USS New York’s four engines were shut down at the same time for a period of about 50 hours. Id. at 986:21-987:4. As a result, the ship had to slow considerably during that time. Id. The ship is “governed by directives that define how fast [it] should or should not transit” at any giveri time. Id. at 954:18-22. These directives take into account fuel efficiency, “wear and tear” on the engines, and the body óf water in which the ship is traveling. Id.' at 955:4-25. They provide that the USS New York should travel at about sixteen knots in the Atlantic, and at about fourteen knots in the Mediterranean. Id. The ship’s maximum speed depends on how many of the ship’s four engines are fully functional. Id. at 956:5-16. During the time that two of the ship’s engines were inoperable—from about June 23 to June 25—the ship was limited to thirteen knots. Id. at 986:21-23. ■ After the first troublesome engine was restored on June 25, Captain Burnette ordered the USS New York to travel at eighteen knots for the remainder of its voyage to the United States—above the recommended, speed provided for in the ship’s directives. Id at 987:19-25. The reduction in the ship’s speed to thirteen knots ultimately resulted in an added delay of “about a day and a half.” Id. at 1054:22-25. The captain credibly testified that he was not involved in planning the capture operation, and was not instructed by anyone at the FBI to slow the pace of the ship in order to prolong Abu Khatallah’s questioning. Id. at 989:24-990:1.
As noted above, for the final stage of his journey, Abu Khatallah was transferred by helicopter from the USS New York to the United States.
I. Procedural Background ■
Abu Khatallah was arraigned before a Magistrate Judge of this Court on June 28, 2014. A grand jury sitting in this district issued an initial indictment against him on June 26, 2014, and a superseding indictment approximately four months later. The Superseding Indictment (“Indictment”) identifies the Defendant as Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah, also known as Ahmed Abu Khatallah, Ahmed Mukatallah, Ahmed Bukatallah, and “Sheik,” and describes him as having been “the commander of Ubaydah Bin Jarrah ..., an Islamist extremist militia in Benghazi, which had the goal of establishing Sharia law in Libya,” until that group merged in 2011 with Ansar al-Sharia, “another Islamist extremist group in Libya with the same goal.” Indictment II9. Abu Khatallah allegedly became the new group’s “Benghazi-based leader,” Id.
The eighteen-count Indictment charges Abu Khatallah with providing and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists, resulting in death, under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Counts One and Two); murder of an internationally protected person under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1116 and 1111 (Count Three); three counts of murder of an officer and employee of the United States under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1111 (Counts Four through Six); three counts of attempted murder of an officer and employee of the United States under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1113 (Counts Seven through Nine); four counts of killing a person in the course of an attack on a federal facility involving use of a firearm and a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 930(c) and 1111 (Counts Ten through Thirteen); two counts of maliciously damaging and destroying U.S.' property by means of fire and an explosive, causing death under 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) and (3) (Counts Fourteen and Fifteen); two counts of maliciously destroying and injuring dwellings and property and placing lives in jeopardy within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1363 and 7 (Counts Sixteen and Seventeen); and using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Eighteen).
Abu Khatallah,moved to dismiss all but one of the counts, arguing that most of the charged statutes could not be applied to conduct undertaken outside the United States. The Court largely denied Abu Kha-tallah’s motion in a December 2015 Memorandum Opinion, reserving judgment on two counts until it could receive additional briefing. See 151 F.Supp.3d 116 (D.D.C. 2015). The Court denied his motion with respect to those remaining two counts in a separate Memorandum Opinion on March 2, 2016. See 168 F.Supp.3d 210 (D.D.C. 2016). Abu Khatallah moved to suppress the statements he made to government officials on board the USS New York on November 15, 2016. The Court held an evidentiary hearing from May 10 to May 18, 2017, at which 15 witnesses testified, and heard oral argument on the motion on June 6, 2017.
II. Discussion
A. Whether the Government Violated Abu Khatallah’s Right to Prompt Presentment
Abu Khatallah first moves to suppress the statements he gave to FBI agents on board the USS New York on the ground that the Government violated his right to prompt presentment before a neutral magistrate. Given the extraordinary facts of this case, which present numerous concerns that were not present in the Supreme Court’s leading prompt-presentment cases, the Court will begin by reviewing the history and general principles of the presentment requirement.
1. The Right to Prompt Presentment: Background and General Principles
An arrestee’s right to prompt presentment before a neutral magistrate dates back to the common law. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 307, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009).. The right was “one of the most important” protections against unlawful arrest and secret detention. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 61-62, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has explained that “this procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as the ‘third degree’ which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way into use.” McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943). Nearly every state has adopted some form of the presentment rule. Corley, 556 U.S. at 306-07, 129 S.Ct. 1558.
At the federal level, the right to prompt presentment was codified across several statutes by the mid-twentieth century— none of which provided an exclusionary rule or any other sort of enforcement mechanism. Id. The Supreme Court first confronted this issue in McNabb. In that case, federal agents arrested a small clan of Tennessee mountaineers on murder charges and interrogated them for several days. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 333-36, 63 S.Ct. 608. No lawyer was present, nor were the suspects advised of any of their rights. Id. The agents brought the suspects before a magistrate only after securing confessions that were essential to their subsequent convictions. Id. at 338, 63 S.Ct. 608. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, explaining that “a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand.” Id. at 345, 63 S.Ct. 608. The Court also noted that the purpose of the present ment requirement was to “avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.” Id. at 344, 63 S.Ct. 608.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5, promulgated several years after McNabb, provides that “[a] person making an arrest outside the United States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge, unless a statute provides otherwise.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(B). This rule “pulled the several statutory presentment provisions together in one place.” Corley, 556 U.S. at 307, 129 S.Ct. 1558. But like its predecessors, Rule 5 failed to specify a remedy for violations of the presentment requirement. The Supreme Court nonetheless reaffirmed the McNabh exclusionary rule with two important clarifications. First, in Upshaw v. United States, it held that McNabb required the exclusion of incriminating statements even if those statements were voluntarily made by the defendant. 335 U.S. 410, 413, 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100 (1948). Second, in Mallory v. United- States, the Supreme Court held, that even short delays in presentment—i.e., delays of several hours—can violate an arrestee’s presentment rights if the arresting officers caused the delay in order to interrogate the arres-tee. 354 U.S. 449, 455-56, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). The principle that emerged from these cases is referred to as the McNabb-Mallory rule, which “generally renders inadmissible -confessions made during periods of detention that violate the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a).” Corley, 556 U.S. at 309, 129 S.Ct. 1558 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Congress narrowed the scope of the McNabb-Mallory rule in 1968 by ^enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). See id. Section 3501(c) creates a six-hour grace period immediately following an arrest, and provides that any incriminating statements made in that period “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in [presentment].” 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). Under § 3501(c), statements made during a presentment delay of more than six hours are inadmissible unless “[the delay] beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available ... magistrate judge.” Id. The Supreme .Court has thus restated the McN abb-Mallory rule in light of § 3501(c) as a two-part test:
Under the rule as revised by § 3501(c), a district court with a suppression claim must find whether the defendant confessed within six hours of arrest (unless a longer delay was ‘reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available magistrate”). [1] If the confession came within that period, it is admissible, subject to other Rules of Evidence, so long as it was made voluntarily and the weight to be given it is left to the jury. [2] If the confession occurred before .presentment .and beyond six hours, however, the court must decide whether delaying that long was unreasonable 'or unnecessary under the McN abb-Mallory cases, and if it was, the confession is to be suppressed.
Corley, 556 U.S. at 323, 129 S.Ct. 1558 (internal citations and alterations omitted).
As for what constitutes an ‘ “unreasonable or unnecessary [delay] under the McNabb-Mallory cases,” a court does not assess reasonableness simply by “watching the clock.” Muschette v. United States, 322 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 378 U.S. 569, 84 S.Ct. 1927, 12 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1964). It must look instead to the cause of any delay. See id. “[D]elay for the purpose of interrogation is the epitome of ‘unnecessary delay' ” and is inherently unreasonable. Corley, 556 U.S. at 309, 129 S.Ct. 1558 (citing Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455-56, 77 S.Ct. 1356). After all, the McNabb-Mallory rule arose from the Supreme Court’s desire to deter police from engaging in extensive prear-raignment detentions in order to further interrogate a defendant. United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 569 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009).
Beyond this, however, courts “have been careful not to overextend McNabb-Mallo-ry’s prophylactic rule in cases where there was a reasonable delay unrelated to any prolonged interrogation of the arrestee.” Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Thompson, 772 F.3d 752, 760-61 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804, 814 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Boche-Perez, 755 F.3d 327, 337 (5th Cir. 2014). The. McNabb-Mallory framework thus tolerates delays stemming from legitimate administrative or-logistical issues. For example, in United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1993), a Spanish-speaking defendant was not brought before a magistrate until about 24 hours after his arrest because no interpreter was available. During the delay, the defendant waived his Miranda rights and made 'incriminating statements to FBI agents. Id. at 633. The district court denied his subsequent suppression motion. Id. In affirming the denial, the D.C. Circuit noted that the FBI “followed established procedure” in securing an interpreter, and that there was “no[ ] evidence” of purposeful delay. Id. at 633-34.
2. Applying the McN abb-Mallory Rule to Overseas Arrests
The principle that reasonableness turns on the cause of any delay, rather than the length of the delay alone, applies with equal force to arrests made outside the United States. Crucially, “[t]he prompt presentment requirement does not require a magistrate to be available twenty-four hours a day, and the government is not required to take the fastest possible route to the courthouse—just a reasonable one.” Boche-Perez, 755 F.3d at 338; see also Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 797 (9th Cir. 1959) (“The law appears to be clear that the arresting officers do not have to make a bee line to the [nearest magistrate].”). This is particularly relevant for overseas arrests, as the distance between the site of arrest and the nearest magistrate often leads to unavoidable delays in presentment.
Consistent with this principle, a number of federal courts have found extensive presentment delays to be reasonable under the circumstances presented. For example, in United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976), the U.S. Coast Guard stopped a small boat in international waters between Cuba and Mexico during a routine patrol. After determining that the vessel was registered in the United States, Coast Guard officials conducted a safety and documentation inspection, which led to the discovery of a large amount of marijuana. Id. at 341. The defendants were arrested and placed on board the Coast Guard ship. During, the vessel’s five-day return journey to Florida, DEA agents arrived on the boat via helicopter. Id. The arrestees waived their Miranda rights and were interrogated on the boat for several days before being presented before a magistrate in Florida. Id. Citing the “unique circumstances in [the] case,” the Fifth Circuit declined to suppress the statements made on board the vessel under the McNabb-Mallory rule.-See id. at 343.
Other federal courts háve upheld even longer delays in presentment. See, e.g., United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (16-day presentment delay found reasonable where defendants were brought by boat 1,620 nautical miles from international waters near southern Mexico to San Diego); United States v. Cheme-Ibarra, No. 14-cr-3305, slip op. at 12 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2016) (16-day presentment delay found reasonáble where defendants were brought by boat 2,500 nautical miles from international waters near Panama to San Diego); United States v. Gonzales-Corredor, No. 12-cr-2550 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012) (19-day delay in presentment found reasonable where defendants were brought by boat several thousand miles from the eastern Pacific Ocean to San Diego); United States v. Greyshock, 719 F.Supp. 927, 932-33 (D. Haw. 1989) (9-day presentment delay found reasonable where defendants were brought by boat 900 miles from international waters in the Pacific to Honolulu, Hawaii).
As Abu Khatallah rightly points out, the above cases 'are distinguishable insofar as the arrests were not planned in advance. However, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988), illustrates the application of McNabb-Mallory to overseas arrests that occurred following extensive planning. In Yunis, the FBI arrested the defendant, a Lebanese citizen, for his alleged involvement in the 1985 hijacking of a commercial airplane. Id. at 954-55. The FBI planned the capture and arrest in concert with other federal agencies. Id, at 955. Agents lured the defendant to a yacht in the eastern Mediterranean, where they arrested him and brought him onboard a nearby U.S. Navy ship. Id The ship then traveled westward across the Mediterranean until it rendezvoused with an aircraft carrier, where Yunis was put on a plane and flown to the United States to be arraigned. Id. The journey across the Mediterranean took four days, during which time FBI agents repeatedly interrogated Yunis and procured incriminating statements from him. Id at 955-57.
■ In Yunis, alternative modes of transportation ■ “were never seriously considered [by the