Craig v. Mnuchin (278 F. Supp. 3d 42, 2017)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting in Part and Denying in Part ■ Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff B.B. Craig, an official at the United States Mint (the “Mint”), brings this suit against Steven Mnuchin, in ‘his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Treasury, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Now before the Court is the Secretary’s Motion for Summary Judgment. See generally Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 33. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant in part and deny in Defendant’s motion.

II. BACKGROUND ,

The Mint, which is a bureau of the United States Department of Treasury (“Treasury”), is responsible for not only manufacturing and distributing coins used by the public in commerce, but also for manufacturing, marketing and selling collectible (“numismatic”) coins and investment grade bullion. See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 1. Within the Mint, marketing and selling of such products is the responsibility of the Sales and Marketing Division (“SAM Division”), which is overseen by the Mint’s Associate Director for ‘Sales and Marketing (“A/D SAM”). See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶¶7, 13-14.

On November 17, 2008, the Mint, .hired B.B. Craig, an African-American man, to be its A/D SAM. See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 13. In that role, Mr. Craig reported directly to the Deputy Director of the Mint and was charged with leading an organization responsible for generating sales of approximately $500 million annually. See Dep. B.B. Craig (“Craig Dep.”) at 25:12-26:5, 32:24-33:9, ECF No. 51-3. Mr. Craig had “authority to speak and act on behalf of the Mint in public meétings and private conferences with senior officials of the [] Treasury, top-level Mint management, and representatives of other agencies' of the federal government and international governments.” Decl. B.B. Craig (“Craig Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 40-2. Mr. Craig also had significant supervisory authority, with approximately ninety-four full-time equivalent employees allotted to the SAM. Division. See Craig Deck ¶ 4.

Upon assuming the A/D SAM position, Mr. Craig also became a member of the Senior Executive Service (“SES”), the Federal government’s executive management core. Ph’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 6-7, 13. Members of the SES are “charged with executive management of key governmental programs, divisions, offices, and functions within Federal executive branch agencies, such as the Mint.” Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 8. However, .they,are governed differently than other federal employees and can, at the discretion of .the agency, be reassigned to any SES position within an agency for which.they ape qualified or be “detailed” to a position with unclassified duties within the agency or to another agency for up to 240 days. See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 10-12; PL’s :0⅛⅛, Ex. 16 at 9, 11-12, ECF No 41-14.

This case primarily concerns Mr. Craig’s removal from his position as A/D SAM, his placement into other inferior roles at the Mint, ancl Defendant’s refusal to reassign him to a position that was commensurate with the A/D SAM position. Of central importance to all of these claims is Mr. Craig’s performance on two critical projects during the 2012 fiscal year rating period (“FY 2012”)—the Order Management System Project and the Comprehensive Numismatic Marketing Plan and Advertising Spend Request. The Secretary claims that.Mr. Craig’s inadequate performance on these.two projects set into motion a series of employment actions that Mr. Craig is now alleging were discriminatory and retaliatory. Indeed, Defendant argues that Mr. Craig’s performance justified Mr. Craig’s FY 2012 . performance evaluation, his removal from the A/D SAM position, and prompted Defendant to find another position at the Mint that was a “better fit” for Mr. Craig. Ultimately, the “better fit” that Defendant identified was a detail to a position called “Executive Lead,” which, unlike Mr. Craig’s previous position, had unclassified duties and no supervisory authority. Although Mr. Craig remained in the Executive Lead position beyond the 240-day limit, he was eventually reassigned to a permanent SES position as Associate Director of Environment, Safety, and Health (“A/D ES & H”), which Mr. Craig argues is only marginally better than the “Executive Lead” position and was far from commensurate with his former A/D SAM position.

A. The OMS Project

One of the projects that Mr. Craig worked on during the FY 2012 rating period was the Order Management System Project (“OMS Project” or “the Project”). See Pi’s Resp. SMF ¶ 22-23. This Project' was undértaken by the SAM Division and the Mint’s Information Technology Division (“IT”). See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 22; PL’s Statement Genuine Issues ¶ 16, ECF No. 40-1. The Mint’s goal was to overhaul, upgrade, and revise the Mint’s existing online ordering system that the public used to purchase Mint products. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶22. Between SAM and IT, SAM was responsible for specifying its needs and how the system should function, while IT was responsible for delivering the system. See Dep. Beverly Babers (“Babers Dep.”) at 120:5-121:13, ECF No. 51-1 (SAM is responsible for identifying “what we need and this is how we need it to work and this is why it important to our customers,” while IT is responsible for presenting “here is how you do it and here are your options for doing it.”); Craig Dep. at 84:1-5 (“So the way it was designed, IT was the lead of the [Pjrpject. I was the customer, but I had say-so and I was supposed to give up resources to make the [Pjroject an accomplishment.”). However, this was to be- a highly collaborative process between the two departments. See Babers Dep. at 121:13-15 (“So it’s got to be really, really collaborative. And they are both [SAM and IT] both very critical to the situation.”). Overseeing the Project was an Executive Steering Committee (“ESC”), which was to provide support, guidance, and-resources to ensure that the OMS Project was a success. See Dep. Richard Peterson (“Peterson Dep.”) at 76:10-20, ECF No. 50-2. Both Mr. Craig and the Mint’s Chief Information Officer (“CIO”) served on this committee. See Peterson Dep. at 75:14-17; accord PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 51.

The Project was initiated at the beginning of FY 2012, but by Spring of 2012, problems had emerged. Richard Peterson, the Deputy Director of the Mint, recalled that by early April, he felt that the “[Project- was' not on track” and knew “the [P]roject was late and behind budget.” Peterson Dep. at 79:17-20. Thus, in May 2012, Mr. Peterson made the decision to temporarily halt the OMS Project and retain the Mitre Corporation (“Mitre”) to conduct an analysis of the OMS Project’s continued viability. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 31.

Around this same time, Mr. Peterson hired Beverly Babers. Earlier that year Mr. Peterson had decided to seek additional executive management resources for the Mint. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 32. Thus, in April and May of 2012, Mr. Peterson interviewed and ultimately hired Ms. Babers to be the Mint’s Chief Administrative Officer. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 33. Before she began working at the Mint, however, Mr. Peterson asked Ms. Babers to attend a meeting with Mitre and other Mint executives to discuss the OMS Project. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 34. At that meeting, Mitre described its findings and recommended that the OMS Project be temporarily suspended. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 35; Babers Dep. at 106:1-11. Ms. Babers testified that her understanding of Mitre’s findings from that meeting was that “there was lack of ... governance and oversight that contributed to the failure of the [P]roject and, specifically, [that] the IT and Sales and Marketing Departments had failed to effectively collaborate.” Babers Dep. at 107:14-19.

Indeed, Mitre found systemic and programmatic deficiencies in the OMS Project, one of which was “governance.” See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶36. One problem that Mitre identified was the Project’s “shifting program accountability and decision making.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 15 at Bates No. 002548, ECF No. 35-3. According to Mi-tre, while the documented governance processes indicated that the CIO was “responsible and accountable for program delivery,” it observed that the ESC “[did] not operate in accordance with its documented roles and responsibilities and [was] acting in a de facto decision-making capacity.” Defi’s Mot., Ex. 16 at 7, ECF No. 35-4. So while, “program accountability [resided] with the [CIO], [] decision-' making [was] diffused via the ESC.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 16 at 7. In addition, Mitre identified “weak communications,” “conflicting assumptions about program scope and intent,” and “internal discord.” PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 36, 38; see also Defi’s Mot., Ex. 15 at Bates No. 002548. It concluded that this “infighting [was] endangering pursuit of [the Mint’s] goal.” PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 36, 38; see also Defi’s Mot, Ex. 15 at Bates No. 002548. Thus, Mitre- recommended that the Mint make improvements to its “program governance and management structures, methods, and disciplines,” PL’s Resp. SMF ¶37, but also that it “slow down” the Project until “certain systemic improvements in governance and-management of the [P]roject were incorporated.” PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 39.

Mr. Craig does not dispute that Mitre made such findings or that they were discussed during the meeting with Ms. Ba-bers. However, according to Mr. Craig, the failure of the Project had nothing to do with him or the SAM Division, but was, instead, attributable- to the CIO who was responsible for both the budget and the timeline for the OMS Project. See Craig Dep. at 84:13-15. He also claims that it was the CIO that'was hostile towards other members of the OMS Project team and who refused to share information about the budget, status, or progress of the Project with Mr. Craig. See Craig Dep. at 50:2-52:7. And even though Mr. Craig brought these issues to Mr. Peterson’s attention, he claims that Mr. Peterson did nothing to address them. See Craig Dep. at 153:14-154:18.

Ms. Babers officially reported for duty at the Mint in July 2012. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 44. Once she arrived, Mr. Peterson shifted the reporting lines of Mr. Craig and other executives as part of an organizational realignment. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 45, From that point forward, Mr, Craig and others, including the CIO, were to report directly to Ms. Babers who, in turn, reported to Mr. Peterson. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 45; Defi’s Mot., Ex. 2, ECF No. 34-2. After joining, Ms. Babers took several steps to improve the project governance of the OMS Project. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 48-51. For example, an Executive Lead was assigned to the Project and an official from the Treasury’s Office of the Chief Information Officer was added to assist on technical aspects of the Project. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 48-49. The Project was ultimately reconstituted as “OMS II” and, later, both Mr. Craig and the CIO were removed from the ESC. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 50-51. ..

B. The Marketing Plan

In addition to the OMS Project, Mr. Craig was responsible for developing the “mission-critical” Comprehensive Numismatic Marketing Plan and Advertising Spend Request (“Marketing Plan” or “the Plan”). PL’s Reap. SMF ¶ 52. At that time, the Mint was looking for ways to halt or reverse the years-long decline in the numismatic customer base and revenue for numismatic product sales. See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 53. To do this, it wanted to engage in advertising, but it first needed approval from Treasury to obtain the funds. See Dep. Sherry Suggs (“Suggs Dep.”) at 54:7— 55:5, EOF , No. 51-8. Thus, Mr. Craig and his team were responsible for developing a marketing plan to support their request for funds. See Suggs Dep. at 54:7-55:5. This Marketing Plan would explain how the funds were to be spent, the kinds of marketing and advertising the Mint wanted to pursue, what those efforts were expected to produce in terms of revenue and customers, and would include supporting evidence for the various recommendations. See id. Although Mr. Craig was responsible for the Plan, Ms. Babers felt that he left much of the oversight for the Plan to his Deputy. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 14 at Bates No. 00178 (Mr. Craig “left primary oversight of the plan to his deputy”), ECF No. 34—12; see also Babers Dep. at 174:16-21 (“it was my understanding from [Mr. Craig] that [his deputy] had the more technical [marketing] experience and in fact that she was the one who was within Sales and Marketing leading this ... marketing plan effort.”).

Work on the Marketing Plan first began in FY 2011 and continued through FY 2012. During that time, the Plan received both praise and criticism. For example, in June 2012, the Mint’s Chief Counsel reviewed a draft of the Marketing’ Plan and said it was “the best piece of work in terms of a marketing plan that [he] [had] seen in some time” and told Mr. Craig “Nice Job!” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 19, ECF No. 41-16. Others; however, noted issues. For example, the Mint’s Director , of Public Affairs wrote Mr. Peterson and Ms. Babers a lengthy email in July 2012 in which he raised several substantive questions concerning the Plan and stated his belief that the Plan outlined or identified many problems, but failed to provide many good solutions or recommendations. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 58; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 22, ECF No. 34-17.

On August 23,2012, there was a meeting among various Treasury and Mint officials to discuss the Marketing Plan. See Defi’s Mot., Ex. 23, ECF No.' 34-18. Following that meeting, Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for Management sent an email to Mr. Craig and others, including the Treasurer of the United States, Mr. Peterson, and Ms. Babers, in which she raised questions about the Plan’s recommended new customer base, the Plan’s ability to capture new customers, the requested spend amount, and the Plan’s return on investment calculation. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 58; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 23 Indeed, she noted that some of the Plan’s arguments were not sufficiently “convincing” or “compelling” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 23.

At this same time, however, there was a draft action memorandum that was going through the Mint clearance review process. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 24, ECF No. 34-19; PL’s Resp.. SMF ¶ 59. The memorandum was a draft of the formal funding request from the Mint to the Treasury and summarized the Marketing Plan. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 24. According to Mr. Craig, Ms. Babers put this memorandum together using excerpts of the SAM Division’s Marketing Plan. See Craig Deck ¶ 24. Although the Mint’s Executive Secretary and its Chief Counsel each-approved the memorandum on August 22 and 23 respectively) Ms. Babers and Mr. Peterson did not sign off on it, See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 24. Thus, the memorandum was never presented to Treasury. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 59.

At her deposition, Ms. Babers recalled that, at some point in August or September, Mr. Craig, Ms. Babers, and Mr. Peterson had a meeting with the Treasurer where they attempted to “instill ■ confidence” that they “had a plan of action that was credible and baked for moving forward with marketing and advertising” in the event Treasury approved their spend request. Babers Dep. at 164:2-165:1. According to Ms. Babers, that meeting “went poorly” and it became clear from- the Treasurer that the Marketing Plan was not “going well.” Babers Dep. at 164:18, 165:12-15.

Ultimately, neither the Treasurer nor the Treasury Deputy Secretary ever approved a Marketing Plan in FY 2012, see PL’s Resp. SMF ¶60, and Ms. Babers came to believe that Mr. Craig had been unsuccessful in his efforts to deliver an acceptable Marketing Plan, see Def.’s Mot., Ex. 10 at Bates No, 00204, ECF No. 34-10; Def.’s Mot., Ex 14 at Bates No. 00178.

C. FY 2012 Performance Appraisal

The performance objectives, delivera-bles, and, standards that SES members are expected to meet over the course of a particular rating year are memorialized in a document called an Executive Performance Agreement (“EPA”), which is issued to each SES member annually. See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶23. Mr. Craig’s FY 2012 EPA listed the OMS Project as a critical performance deliverable and therefore it became “Commitment Element 4” of Mr. Craig’s evaluations. See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 23.

Over the course of the 2012 fiscal year, Mr. Craig received both a mid-yéar review from Mr. Peterson and an end-of-year review from Ms. Babers. The available rating options for a Treasury SES member, such as Mr. Craig, in ascending order, are: Unsatisfactory, Minimally Successful, Fully Successful, Exceeded, and Outstanding. See PL’s Resp.-SMF ¶72; PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 11, ECF No. 41-41. Mr. Peterson conducted a mid-year review of Mr. Craig in June 2012. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶43;- PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 10, ECF No. 41-10. He rated Mr. Craig as “Fully Successful” on “Commitment Element 4,” which related to Mr. Craig’s work on the OMS Project, and “Exceeded” in all other categories. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 43; PL’s Opp’n, 'Ex. 10. This resulted in an overall rating-for Mr. Craig of “Exceeded.” See PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 10.

On November 8, 2012, Ms. Babers mét with Mr. Craig to issue his FY2012 performance rating. PL’s Resp. See SMF ¶ 71. Like Mr. Peterson, Ms. Babers gave Mr, Craig a “fully successful” rating on the OMS Project, but unlike Mr, Peterson, she also evaluated Mr. Craig as “fully successful” in the areas of “Program Management” and “Customer Service & Collaboration.” See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 73; PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 11. In all other areas Ms. Ba-bers rated Mr. Craig as “Exceeded.” See PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 11. Once combined, these grades resulted in Mr. Craig’s overall rating of “Fully Successful,” See PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 11. In the narrative assessment of Mr. Craig’s performance, Ms. Babers specifically cited the unsuccessful OMS Project and Marketing Plan as bases for the rating. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 74 When Plaintiff sought a higher-level. .review of his rating from an official outside of Ms. Ba-bers’s chain of command, that official sustained Ms. Babers’s rating, noting that she “did not find any documentation to change the ratings for • Program Management, Customér Service and- Collaboration, or Commitment Element 4.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 27, ECF No. 34-22; see .also Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 75.

Mr. Craig argues that Ms. Babers’s failure to rate him at the “Exceeded” level resulted in him hot receiving an' SES per-formanee bonus for FY 2012. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 15-16. Although Mr. Craig had previously received SES performance bonuses every other year for which he had been at the Mint, see Pl.’s Opp’n, Exs. 2-3, EOF Nos. 41-4 & 41-5, Ms. Babers did not recommend, and Mr. Craig did not receive, an SES performance bonus for the FY2012 rating period. See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶80. According to Office of Personnel Management and Treasury-wide guidance, SES members are not guaranteed a bonus regardless of their performance level. See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 81. Furthermore, Treasury-wide guidance advises agencies to make “meaningful distinctions” among SES members’ performance and notes that “[a]ll bonuses are. discretionary, they are not required or guaranteed, regardless of rating level.” PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 83.

D. Removal from A/D SAM, Detail to Executive Lead, and Reassignment to A/D ES & H

On September 25, 2012, a few days before the end of the FY 2012 rating year and shortly after the last Marketing Plan briefing with the Treasurer, Ms. Babers and Mr. Craig had a meeting. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 62-63; Babers Dep. at 164:2-165:1. At that meeting, Ms. Babers addressed concerns relating to the Marketing Plan and raised criticism of Mr. Craig’s performance as A/D SAM. See Ba-bers Dep. at 164:2-165:1; Craig Decl. ¶ 9. Ms. Babers observed that the Marketing Plan was not “going well” and told Mr.' Craig she believed marketing did not appear to be his strong suit. See Babers Dep. at 165:7-18. Mr. Craig explained that, in fact, he was “a manufacturing guy” and the two had a discussion regarding his experience in that area .See Babers Dep. at 166:18-19; 169:4-11; 173:13. Thus, the two began discussing the possibility of finding another position at the Mint that would be a “better fit” for Mr. Craig. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶66; Babers Dep. at 166:22-67:2, 172:10-73:1; Craig Decl. ¶ 9.

Ms. Babers and Mr. Craig had further discussions between September and December 2012. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 14 at Bates No. 00181; Babers Dep. at 198:2-202:1. According to Ms. Babers, she and Mr. Craig worked together, seeking to identify an alternative role based on Mr. Craig’s stated interests and strengths. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 14 at Bates No. 00181. Those discussions eventually came to center on the concept that would later be described as the “Executive Lead” role. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 14 at Bates No. 00187; Babers Dep. at 198:2-202:1. That position would entail “long-range process planning,” the goal of which was to identify ways of the Mint could be more efficient in manufacturing and bringing its numismatic products to market. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 100-01; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 14 at Bates No. 00181 Babers Dep. at 198:2-202:1. But, according to Mr. Craig, during the few conversations between the two, they did not discuss “specifics about what [he] would be doing in the Executive Lead position” nor did Ms. Babers ever tell him how much staff he would have, where his position would fall within the organization, or what budget he would be working with. Craig Decl. ¶ 15.

On October 26, 2012, before being detailed to the Executive Lead position, Mr. Craig filed an informal EEO complaint. See EEO Counseling—Intake Information (“EEO Compl.”) at Bates No. 00098, ECF No. 12-18; Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶86. In it, he made various allegations of reprisal and discrimination based on his race and sex. See generally EEO Compl. He also described the September 25 meeting with Ms. Babers and stated that Ms. Babers had informed him that they.“needed to discuss what he wanted to do in the future, as it was ‘time for them to find a better fit for him’. than his current position.” EEO Compl. at Bates No. 00109. It also states that she “suggested that she would find a position within the Mint that would last about one year, and which would allow him to transition out of SAM and work on ‘operational issues.’ ” EEO Compl. at Bates No. 00109. Mr. Craig claims that he “did not know what would come of the September 25, 2012 meeting,” but that he initiated the EEO process “as a precautionary measure to ensure that the Mint could not come back later and claim- that [he] had missed a filing deadline.” Craig Decl. ¶ 10. Ms. Babers learned of Mr. Craig’s EEO activity on December 5, 2012 and expressed to Mr. Craig that she understood Mr. Craig had filed an EEO complaint and indicated that she was amenable to mediation. .See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 87-88.

Six days later, on December 11, 2012, Mr. Peterson issued a Mint-wide email announcing several leadership changes at the Mint. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 90-91. First, it announced that Mr. Craig would leave his role -as A/D SAM and would become the “Executive Lead” for the Comprehensive Production Schedule and Plan Project. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 90; Def.’s Mot., Ex 31, ECF No. 34-25. The email also announced that Jon Marc Landry, a white SES member with no prior EEO activity, would discontinue his role as, Acting Associate Director of Manufacturing (“Acting A/D Manufacturing”) and would take over, on an acting basis, the A/D SAM position that Mr. Craig was vacating. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 20, 92, 94; Def.’s Mot., Ex 31. Dave Croft, another white SES member with no prior EEO activity who had been overseeing the Denver manufacturing facility, would assume Mr. Landry’s former position as Acting A/D of Manufacturing. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶21, 94. Although the Mint’s Human Resources (“HR”) department would ordinarily have been consulted about an SES member’s detail, neither the head of HR nor the HR representative responsible for SES executives at the Mint learned about Mr. Craig’s detail until the December 11, 2012 announcement was made. See Dep. Lisa Nicholson (“Nicholson Dep.”) at 63:12-70:4, ECF No. 51-6; Dep. Anita Fogan (“Fogan Dep.”) at 30:22-32:6, ECF No. 51-5.

Mr. Craig’s detail to the Executive Lead position began effective January 3, 2013. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 91. This position had no occupational code, classified grade level, or position description and was therefore subject to the 240-day detail restriction for SES executives. See Nicholson Dep. at 60:1-62:9, 68:13-70:4, 80:4-83:21, 94:18-95:4. In that role, unlike his former A/D SAM position, Mr. Craig had no staff or administrative support and he spent a significant amount of time entering data and performing tasks that would typically' be performed by a GS-5 or GS-7 employee. Craig Deck ¶ 14. This position did not exist either before or after Mr. Craig occupied the role and the projects-that he worked on were not transferred to anyone or any department after he left. Craig Decl. U14. However, Mr. Craig’s detail in the role was extended several times through the 2013 fiscal year and into the beginning of the 2014 fiscal year, which caused Mr. - Craig’s detail to extend beyond the 240-day limit. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 103; Nicholson Dep. at 95:5-7. ' '

In February 2014, a serious, near-fatal accident occurred at the Mint’s Denver manufacturing plant, where one employee was injured while operating a fork-lift. Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 111. Thereafter,' Mr. Peterson and Ms. Babers decided to appoint Mr, Craig to oversee the administrative investigation of the accident, conduct an analysis and review of the circumstances and cause, and generate a final report with recommendations for Mint-wide safety improvements. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 112. Mr. Craig performed this work for several months and ultimately generated a report recommending changes in safety protocols, which was well-received by Mint leadership. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 113— 14. As a result of the incident and Mr. Craig’s work, Mr. Peterson and Ms. Ba-bers decided to create an SES-level position to oversee safety throughout the Mint. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 114.

On July 31, 2014, it was announced that Mr. Craig would assume a position entitled Associate Director of Environment, Safety, and Health (“A/D ES & H”). See Def.’s Ex. 41, ECF No. 34-35. Before Mr. Craig took on this role, that same work was being performed by a GS-14 employee who had the same resources and reporting structure that Mr. Craig now has. Craig Dep. at 183:1-24. Indeed, Mr. Craig himself reports to another Associate Director at the Mint and is the only Associate Director to do so; Craig Dep. at 227:6-8. He is also not invited to any of the high-level meetings that he used to attend when he was A/D SAM. Craig Dep. at 229:1-21. Furthermore, he is the only Associate Director who does not have a GS-15 in his organization. Craig Dep. at 227:4-228:23.

Through the EEO process, Mr. Craig requested that he be returned to the A/D SAM position or to be placed in a comparable position,- which included the Associate Director of Manufacturing (“A/D Manufacturing”). See PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 14, ECF No. 41-13. Craig was never returned to his former position nor was he ever selected for the A/D Manufacturing position.

E. A/D Manufacturing and Acting A/D SAM Positions

As explained above, on December 11, 2012, the same day that it was announced that Mr. Craig would become the “Executive Lead,” it was also announced that Mr. Landry, who was serving as Acting A/D Manufacturing at the' time, would leave that position and become the Acting A/D SAM. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶20, 92, 94. Ms. Babers purportedly selected Mr. Landry due to his effectiveness running the manufacturing-side of the Mint and his understanding of the SAM Division and the numismatic business. See Babers Dep. at 217:1-10; Peterson Dep. at 170:9-17. This meant, however; that someone else would need to fill -Mr. Landry’s former position as Acting A/D Manufacturing.

The A/D Manufacturing position was responsible for overseeing all four of the Mint’s manufacturing facilities in the United States. Def.’s Mot. at 3-4; see also Def. Ex. 2. Mr. Peterson announced that Mr. Croft, who was in charge of the Denver plant, would take over as Acting A/D Manufacturing. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 21, 92, 94. The record is unclear, however, as to how or why Mr. Peterson .selected Mr. Croft for that position. Mr. Croft testified that he had never expressed any interest in the position, but Mr. Peterson had recruited him for it nonetheless. Dep. David Croft (“Croft Dep.”)-at 34:2-9, ECF No. 51-4. And even though it was inconsistent with agency policy and practice, Mr. Peterson allowed Mr. Croft to remain at his duty station in Denver throughout the course of his 18-month acting assignment while performing two-week rotations to the headquarters office in Washington, D.C. Croft Dep. at 34:11-35:18; Nicholson Dep. at 152:21-153:9.

By August 2014, Mr. Peterson began considering assigning someone to the A/D Manufacturing role on a permanent basis. Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 119. To fill the position, Mr. Peterson did not undertake any competitive hiring process, but instead considered only two possible candidates—Mr. Landry and Mr. Croft. See Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶ 119. Mr.' Landry and Mr. Croft both had extensive experience in manufacturing, both at the Mint and elsewhere. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶120. Indeed, Mr, Landry and Mr. Croft had, for several years, managed the Mint’s Philadelphia and Denver manufacturing facilities, respectively, and each had previously served as Acting A/D Manufacturing for a period of approximately eighteen months. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 120. Furthermore, they both had significant manufacturing experience in the automotive industry prior to joining the Mint. See Peterson Dep. at 189:13-15; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 44, ECF No. 35-7. Mr. Croft at that time was still serving as the Acting A/D Manufacturing and Mr. Peterson considered him to be doing an “outstanding job” in that role. Peterson Dep. at 189:19. Thus, based on his qualifications and performance in the position, Mr.. Peterson selected Mr. Croft for the permanent A/D Manufacturing role. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 121. Mr. Peterson announced Mr. Croft’s permanent appointment on August 19, 2014. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 122.

In making his selection, however, Mr. Peterson admittedly did not consider Mr. Craig. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 124. Although Mr. Craig had never occupied a manufacturing position at the Mint, he did have prior manufacturing experience. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 125-26. Indeed, in 2008, Mr. Craig applied for the A/D Manufacturing position and was considered to be among the “best qualified” candidates for the position at that time. Def.’s Mem. P & A. in Supp. Mot. Partial Dismissal or Partial Summ. J, at 2-3, ECF 10. The resume that Mr. Craig submitted to the Mint at that time indicated that Mr. Craig had spent more than three years in manufacturing positions with Dell Computers, including standing up a manufacturing facility in Malaysia and managing manufacturing operations at a large facility in Tennessee. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 126; PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 4, ECF No. 41-6.

In December 2014, a few months after selecting Mr. Croft to be the permanent A/D Manufacturing, the Mint learned that the Deputy Director of the Philadelphia plant was to retire. PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 127. Thus, Mr. Peterson determined that Mr. Landry would need to return full-time to his position as plant manager in Philadelphia and would terminate his role as Acting A/D SAM. Peterson Dep. at 188:1-4, 199:16-200:5. Mary Lhotsky, who had been serving as Mr. Landry’s Deputy in the SAM Division and was -considered to be a “very solid performer” was temporarily slotted into the Acting A/D SAM position. Peterson Dep. at 200:10-17.

Meanwhile, in the Spring of 2015; the Mint sought to competitively fill the permanent A/D SAM position. See Dep. Jon Cameron (“Cameron ■ Dep.”) at 44:5-6, 46:16-19, EOF No. 51-2. The Mint received somewhere between thirty and forty-five applications and ultimately interviewed five candidates. Cameron Dep. at 46:13-16. These interviews were carried out by a panel that included Ms. Babers and Jon Cameron, who was the Director for the Office of Coin Studies at the Mint. Cameron Dep. at 44:7-8, 46:13-14. However, after the interview process, the panel felt that there were no viable candidates for the position. Cameron Dep. at 45:14-15.

According to Mr. Peterson, Ms. Lhotsky felt she had been “overtaxed” in the Acting A/D SAM position and approached Ms. Babers to ask for help. Peterson Dep at 200:18-21. Ms. Babers suggested that Mr. Cameron be selected for the position. Peterson Dep. at 200:21-201:8. Mr. Peterson approached Mr. Cameron and asked if he would consider temporarily stepping in as Acting A/D SAM, which Mr. Cameron agreed to do. Cameron Dep. at 43:14-22. In May 2015, the newly appointed Principal Deputy Director of the Mint announced in an email several personnel moves, including Mr. Cameron’s selection to serve as Acting A/D SAM. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 48, ECF No. 34-41; PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 130. It also noted, however, that the Mint would continue its search for a new A/D SAM. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 48.

F. Procedural Background

On August 6, 2014, Mr. Craig initiated the present action, asserting five claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a pre-dis-covery motion for partial dismissal, or in the alternative, for partial summary judgment on two Counts. See Mot. Partial Dismissal or Summ. J., ECF No. 10. In an Order dated June 19, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion, granting summary judgment on one of Mr. Craig’s claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 16.

On September 30, 2015, Mr. Craig filed an amended complaint. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 22. In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Craig alleges that the Mint discriminated against him on the basis of his race by giving him a “Fully Successful” rating in his FY 2012 appraisal, which he claims resulted in him not receiving a performance-based bonus for that year. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 107-13. He also alleges that Defendant removed him from the A/D SAM position and detailed him to the Executive Lead position and later reassigned him to the A/D ES & H position based on racially discriminatory and retaliatory reasons. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 61-71, 87-93. In addition, Mr. Craig claims that the Mint retaliated and racially discriminated against him by refusing to restore him to his former A/D SAM position or to an equivalent position, such as A/D Manufacturing, despite his requests. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 72-86, 94-106. Finally, Mr. Craig alleges that the Mint retaliated and racially discriminated against him when it failed to select him for the A/D Manufacturing position in 2014. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 114-26. On September 21, 2016, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Craig’s claims. See generally Def.’s Mot.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and pie movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

The principal purpose of summary judgment is to streamline litigation by disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses and determining whether there is a genuine need for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In response, the non-movant must point to specific facts in the record that reveal a genuine issue that is suitable for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must “eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence!;,]” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and all underlying facts and inferences must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nevertheless, conclusory assertions offered without any evidentiary support do not establish a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Title "VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and forbids retaliation against an employee because he “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by” Title VIII, or because he “made a charge” under Title VII, id. § 2000e-3(a). To establish employment discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008). On the other hand, to prove unlawful retaliation, a' plaintiff must establish that he made -a charge or opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII, that the employer took a materially adverse action against him, and that the employer took the- action because of his- protected conduct. See Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 901-02 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Title VII). The D.C. Circuit, however, has explained that, at the motion the summary judgment stage, “the question of whether plaintiff made out a prima facie case is almost always irrelevant.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Indeed, once an employer asserts a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reason for its actions, inquiry into a plaintiffs prima facie case typically becomes “an unnecessary and improper ‘sideshow.’” Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 494).

Instead, district courts should consider only whether “‘the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated or retaliated against the employee.” Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 493) (brackets omitted). To answer this question, the Court considers whether a reasonable jury could infer discrimination or retaliation “from ‘all the evidence, which includes not only the prima facie case but also the evidence the plaintiff offers to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions and [any] other evidence.’” Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alteration in Morris)). “Whether the available evidence suffices to support a jury finding of [discrimination or] retaliation will, necessarily; be a contextual judgment.” Allen, 795 F.3d at 40. “Typically, successful rebuttal of an employer’s stated reason counts as evidence of the invidious motive that is a required element of a disparate treatment or retaliation claim.” Id. (citing George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 413. (D.C. Cir. 2005). Furthermore, “though evidence of pretext is not per se sufficient to permit an inference of discrimination [or retaliation], it usually will be enough to get a plaintiffs claim to a jury.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 679 (internal quotations, citations, ellipses, and brackets omitted); see also Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (courts “do not routinely require plaintiffs to submit evidence ' over and above rebutting the employer’s stated explanation in order to avoid summary judgment.”) (internal quotations omitted).

There are multiple ways in which a plaintiff may support an inference that an employer’s stated reason for a challenged employment action was not the actual reason, and that the real reason was prohibited discrimination or retaliation. For example, the D.C. Circuit has held that “temporal proximity of an adverse action close on the heels of protected activity is a common and highly probative type of circumstantial evidence of retaliation.” Allen, 795 F.3d at 40 (citing Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1357-59). “Other common ways of proving invidious motive—whether retaliation or discrimination—include pointing to evidence that the employer treated other; similarly situated employees better; that the employer is ‘lying about the underlying facts’ of-its decision; that there were ‘changes and inconsistencies’ in the employer’s given reasons for the decision; that the employer .failed to ‘follow established procedures or criteria’; or that the employer’s ‘general treatment, of minority employees’ (or, in the retaliation context, employees who asserted their Title VII rights) was worse -than its treatment of non-minorities (or employees who did not assert their Title VII rights).’ ” Id. (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 495 & n.3) (parentheses in original).

IV. ANALYSIS

The thrust of Mr. Craig’s claims is that the Mint discriminated and retaliated against him by giving him a sub-par performance review for FY 2012, removing him from the A/D SAM position, placing him in other inferior roles at the Mint, and refusing to reassign him to a position that was commensurate with his former A/D SAM position. Defendant argues that Mr. Craig’s inadequate performance on the OMS Project and the Marketing Plan formed the basis of Mr. Craig’s downgraded performance review and precipitated his removal from A/D SAM. The Court finds that Mr. Craig has not presented evidence sufficient to rebut that legitimate, nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reason. Thus, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on those issues. Likewise, Defendant asserts that it refused to reinstate Mr. Craig to the A/D SAM position for the same reason that it removed'him, which Mr. Craig also fails to rebut. Consequently, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this issue as well.

However, there remain genuine disputes as to whether the Mint retaliated against Mr, Craig when it detailed him to the Executive Lead position and failed to select him for the A/D Manufacturing position in 2014. With respect to the Executive Lead detail, there is a genuine dispute about whether the Mint retaliated against him for his-EEO activity based on the fact that it placed him in an indisputably inferi- or role only six days after it.learned that he had initiated the EEO counseling process. Moreover, there were procedural irregularities attendant with his detail, including failures to consult with HR and the detail extending well beyond the 240-day limit for an SES executive. When viewed together, a reasonable jury could conclude that his detail to that position was retaliatory and, thus, summary judgment is not warranted on this issue. On the issue of non-selection for the A/D Manufacturing position, Mr. Craig has raised genuine issues as to whether the Mint “preselected” Mr. Croft for the acting position in 2012, which ultimately led to Mr. Croft obtaining the permanent position in 2014, and whether there was retaliatory intent associated with those selections. He has not, however, demonstrated that racial animus played any part of any supposed selection decisions in 2012 or 2014. Accordingly, summary judgment on the issue of his non-selection for the A/D Manufacturing position is " appropriate with respect to the discrimination claim, but not on the retaliation claim.

A. FY 2012 Performance Appraisal

Mr. Craig alleges that the Mint engaged in racial discrimination when it failed to give him an overall performance rating at the “Exceeded” level for fiscal year 20Í2, which he claims would have entitled him to a'bonus of at least $8,497. PL’s Opp’n at 9-10. Mr. Craig’s performance review period began in October 2011 and concluded September 30, 2012. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 11. In her review of Mr. Craig, Ms. Babers rated Mr. Craig as “Fully Successful,” in the areas of “Program Management,” “Customer Service & Collaboration,” and “Commitment Element 4” (relating to the OMS Project) and “Ex-eeeded” in all other areas. See PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 11. OiiCe combined, these grades resulted in Mr. Craig’s overall rating of “Fully Successful.” See PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 11. In the narrative assessment of Mr. Craig’s performance, Ms. Babers specifically cited the unsuccessful OMS Project and Marketing Plan as bases for the rating. See PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 74. Def.’s Mot. at 35, When -Plaintiff sought'a higher-level review of his annual performance rating from an official outside of Ms. Babers’s chain of command, that official, sustained Ms, Babers’s rating, noting that she “did not find any documentation to change the ratings for Program Management, Customer Service and Collaboration, or Commitment Element 4.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 27; see also PL’s Resp. SMF ¶ 75. -

Defendant’s dissatisfaction with Mr. Craig’s performance establishes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Mr. Craig’s performance ratings. See Paquin v. Fed. Nat’l. Mortg. Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that an employer proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for negative performance evaluation by offering an evaluation that criticized the employee’s work performance and identifying specific examples of the employee’s inadequate performance); see also Dews-Miller , v. Clinton, 707 F.Supp.2d 28, 52 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that the supervisors’ dissatisfaction with employee’s work was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for employee’s two “minimally successful” performance evaluations). Accordingly, the Court considers, whether, in light of the total circumstances of the case, Mr. Cráig has “produced evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s stated reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated” against him on the basis of his race. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 495.

The D.C. Circuit has explained that, in cases such as this, involving “[d]is-agreement[s] between a middle manager and [his] immediate supervisor over the validity of discretionary judgments,” courts must be “vigilant in smoking out unlawful motives while remaining ‘relue-tan[t] to become involved in the micromanagement of everyday employment decisions.’ ” Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 291 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (fourth alteration in original); see also Manuel v. Potter, 685 F.Supp.2d 46, 63 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that the court does not sit as a “super-personnel department” that “independently evaluated] the quality of the plaintiffs work product” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, courts do not concern themselves with whether an employer’s action was “wise, fair, or correct.” Kelly v. Mills, 677 F.Supp.2d 206, 228-29 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alteration in original); see Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that a reason given for a job action is not just, or fair, or sensible,” for “the issue is not the correctness or desirability of the reasons offered ... but whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Instead, courts assessing whether an employer’s purported reasons for its actions were pretext for discrimination consider only whether a plaintiff has provided any evidence from which to infer that the employer’s explanation was a lie. See Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[I]t will not do for the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason was false if the employer believed it in good faith; the plaintiff must establish a basis to conclude that the employer has lied about the reason or, more directly, that the reason was discriminatory” (citing Brady, 520 F.3d at 495)). Thus, “ ‘[i]f the employer’s stated belief about the underlying facts is reasonable in light of the evidence,’ and is honestly held, there ordinarily is no basis to put the case to a jury, even if the employee disagrees with the discretionary decision the employer made.” Allen, 795 F.3d at 40-41 (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 495); see also George, 407 F.3d at 415. With those principles in mind, the Court turns to the Plaintiffs various arguments concerning his FY 2012 performance evaluation and his performance on the OMS Project and Marketing Plan.

Much of Mr. Craig’s argument appears to rest on the fact that Mr. Peterson, Mr. Craig’s former supervisor, gave Mr. Craig a higher performance rating in his midyear review than Ms. Babers ultimately gave him at his end-of-year review. According to Mr. Craig, although Ms. .Babers claimed that her downgraded performance rating of Mr. Craig was based on the unsuccessful OMS Project and Marketing Plan, she “had not been at the Mint long enough to make.that assessment, and certainly not long enough to reach a different conclusion from Mr. Peterson.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 32. But this argument appeals only to whether Ms. Babers’s decision was “wise, fair, or correct,” for which the Court is not concerned, and it does not speak to the pertinent question of whether Ms. Babers honestly and reasonably believed her criticisms. Kelly, 677 F.Supp.2d at 229. Indeed, Mr. Craig does not point to any evidence that Ms. Babers was required to adhere to Mr. Peterson’s mid-year ratings and courts in this Circuit have routinely refused to infer discriminatory pretext merely because a subsequent supervisor departs from a prior supervisor’s appraisal. See, e.g., Robertson v. Dodaro, 767 F.Supp.2d 185, 193 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[E]vi-dence of the plaintiffs higher performance ratings by evaluators other than [plaintiffs current supervisors] is insufficient.to give rise to an inference of race .or gender discrimination”); Nurriddin v. Goldin, 382 F.Supp.2d 79, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (concluding that evidence of previous positive performance reviews and numerous letters of commendation did not give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent because that “evidence has nothing to do with any possible discrimination by defendant”); Hussain v. Principi, 344 F.Supp.2d 86, 102 n.19 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that “the fact that a previous manager found that plaintiff had met or exceeded expectations does not, by itself, establish that a subsequent manager’s evaluation of employee’s performance was discriminatory” (internal citation omitted)). As explained in greater detail below, even though Ms. Babers had been at the Mint for only three months at the time she gave her assessment, she had a factual basis for her beliefs, which Mr. Craig does not dispute; and Mr. Craig does not present any evidence demonstrating that Ms. Babers’s beliefs were not honestly or reasonably held. Because Mr. Craig gives no reason why the Court should question Ms. Babers’s stated criticisms of his performance on the OMS Project or the Marketing Plan, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Count V.

1. The OMS Project

Ms. Babers faulted Mr. Craig’s performance on the OMS Project because he demonstrated a lack of leadership and failed to achieve a “constructive resolution” of the Project. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex 24. According to Ms. Babers, Mr. Craig, along “with the [CIO], was responsible for ensuring' the successful implementation of a new order management system (OMS). This [P]roject was established to replace the aging legacy system [through] ' which customers place [online] orders for Mint products. It suffered from' significant interpersonal conflict between Sales and Marketing and Information Technology team members, including the respective leadership. Unfortunately, the [P]roject was ultimately halted at a cost of several million dollars to the United States Mint.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. 24.

Plaintiff does not dispute that the OMS Project failed, instead, he essentially argues that Ms. Babers’s assessment of his performance was flawed because the Project’s failures should have been attributed to the Mint’s CIO—not Mr. Craig. .First, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Babers misconstrued the- scope of Mr. Craig’s authority on the OMS Project. See. PL’s Opp’n at 32. Specifically, he challenges Ms. Babers’s claims that SAM was the “owner” of the OMS Project when, in reality, the CIO had been in control of the budget and the schedule. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 32. Plaintiff also argues that Ms. Babers unfairly attributes some of the “interpersonal conflicts” between SAM and the IT Department to him or his leadership. See PL’s Opp’n at 32. According to Mr. Craig, he and SAM were the recipients of hostility from the CIO, who was supposedly known to have a volatile personality and to discriminate against people who were different from him. Pl.’s Opp’n at 32. Thus, according to Mr. Craig, Ms. Babers was wrong to credit the failure of the Project to him and the CIO equally, when the failures should have been more properly attributed to the CIO alone.

. But even if Ms. Babers was factually wrong in her appraisal of Mr. Craig, those flaws do not create a genuine issue of material fact unless Mr. Craig can demonstrate that Ms. Babers’s “putative error on [his assessment] was either dishonest or unreasonable.” Allen, 795 F.3d at 42; see also George, 407 F.3d at 415 (“[A]n employer’s action may be justified by a reasonable belief in the validity of the reason given even though that reason may turn out to be false.”); Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183 (“Once the employer has articulated a non-diseriminatory explanation for its action, ... the issue is not ‘the correctness' or desirability of [the] reasons offered ... [but] whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.’ ” (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992)). In this case, the arguments that Mr. Craig advances and the evidence that he has proffered do not suggest either that Ms. Babers did not honestly believe her criticisms or that her beliefs were unreasonable.

With'respect to Ms. Babers’s purported misunderstanding of Mr. Craig’s authority, Mr. Craig seizes upon Ms. Babers’s description of the SAM Division as an “owner” of the OMS Project without putting it into the context in which Ms. Babers used the term. According to Ms. Babers, she understood that SAM was responsible for identifying “what we need and ... how we need it to work and ... why it’s important to our customers,” while IT was responsible for presenting “how you do it and ... your options for doing it.” Babers Dep. at 120:5, 121:13. Thus, according to Ms. Ba-bers, to the extent that the SAM Division has the “knowledge and vision, [] they own the [P]roject in that respect[,] [b]ut they are supported by IT.” Babers Dep. at 121:1-4. As a result, Ms. Babers understood that the Project had to be “really, really collaborative” because SAM and IT “are both very critical to the situation.” Babers Dep. at ,121:13-15. This description is not terribly different from Mr. Craig’s own description in which he describes IT as “the lead” and SAM as the “customer” when he also admits that he “had say-so ánd [ ] was supposed to give up resources to make the [P]rojeet an accomplishment.” Craig Dep. at 84:1-4. He further agrees that it “was [his] job” to get the “OMS [P]roject up and running.” Craig Dep. at 84:6-9. Indeed, Mr. Craig does not deny that he served on the OMS Project’s ESC, see Peterson Dep. at 75:14-17; accord Pl.’s Resp. SMF ¶51, or that his evaluation expressly -palled for an, assessment of his performance in “[i]mplement[ing] [a] .Customer Order Management System in collaboration "with IT and Procurement” and his “Service] on the. Executive Steering Committee providing support guidance and resources to support the overall success of the Order Management System.” PL’s-Opp’n, Ex. 11. Thus, it is undisputed that he had an active role, in the Project, that it was a collaborative effort between the SAM Division and IT, and that Mr. Craig actually had leadership authority on the Project by virtue of his position on .the ESC. Thus, Mr. Craig has not shown that Ms. Babers was either dishonest or unreasonable in her .assessment of Mr. Craig based on any error concerning his authority over the OMS Project.

Mr. Craig points out, however, that the CIO was in control of the “budget and schedule” for the Project. PL’s Opp’n at 32. But Ms. Babers has never intimated that Mr. Craig was responsible for those matters nor did she fault him for problems stemming from either the budget or schedule.'Rather, she faulted him for his part in the “significant interpersonal conflict” between the SAM Division and IT and his failure to provide “more effective leadership” that “could have made a difference to the outcome” of the Project. Defl’s Mot., Ex. 14 at Bates'No. 00179; see also PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 11 at Bates No. 00204.

Critically, the record demonstrates that Ms. Babers had a reasonable basis for those criticisms. Specifically, Ms. Babers’s critique was supported by the reports from Mitre, the third-party consultant that was hired to assess the continued viability of the Project.Tndeed, Ms. Babers testified that she knew, based on Mitre’s briefing, “that there was some failure of leadership when it came to those two areas [IT and SAM] in leading their teams, in a way that could have led to a more successful outcome.” Babers Dep. at 124:2-6. She also understood from that briefing that “leadership or governance of the. OMS [P]roject was ineffective, and that .... ineffectiveness was in, the way that .Sales and Marketing and IT collaborated or failed to collaborate, and that was in part due to the leadership of those organizations.” Babers Dep. at 124:16-125:3. This account is also supported by Mitre’s written reports, which observed that there were governance issues, including “weak communications,” “conflicting assumptions about program scope and, intent,” and “internal discord,” concluding that this “infighting [was]..endangering [the] pursuit of [the Mint’s] goal.” PL’s Resp. SMF ¶¶ 36, 38; Defi’s.Mot, Ex. 15 at-Bates 002548; see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. 16. Mr. Craig does not dispute that Mitre made these findings or- that they were presented to Ms. Babers. Nor does Mr. Craig offer any evidence that Ms. Babers did not honestly believe in Mitre’s findings or that she had any reason- to disregard them. Thus, even though Mr. Craig disagrees with Ms. Ba-bers’s assessment, he does not identify any reason to question the genuineness of her stated criticisms with respect to the OMS Project.

2. Marketing Plan

Ms. Babers also faulted Plaintiffs performance on the Mint’s Marketing Plan. According to her, Mr, Craig had been directed. “to deliver a high quality Comprehensive Marketing Plan and Advertising Spend Request” which was “critical to reverse the steady decline of the Mint’s numismatic customer, base,”- but he “left primary oversight of the plan to his deputy and, ultimately, the plan was not acceptable.” PL’s Opp’n, Ex. 24 at Bates No. 00178, ECF No. 41-19; see also Babers Dep. at 174:16-17 (“it was my understanding from [Mr. Craig] that [his deputy] had the more technical [marketing] experience and in fact that she was the one who was within Sales and Marketing leading this ... marketing plan effort.”); Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 11 (“the Comprehensive Numismatic Marketing Plan and the advertising spend