Citations
- 278 F. Supp. 3d 562
Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
SPATT, District Judge:
This action was brought by the Plaintiff Michael Babino (the “Plaintiff’) against the Defendants Thomas Gesualdi, Joseph Ferrara, Sr., Louis Bisignano, Frank Fink-el, Anthony D’Aquila, Marc Herbst, Michael O’Toole, Denise Richardson, Michael Bourgal, and Thomas Corbett (collectively, the “Trustees”), as trustees and fiduciaries of the Local 282 Pension Trust Fund (the “Pension Fund”), the Local 282 Welfare Trust Fund (the “Welfare Fund”), the Local 282 Annuity Trust Fund (the “Annuity Fund”) and the Local 282 Vacation & Sick Leave Trust Fund (the “Vacation Fund,” collectively with the Pension Fund, ■ the Welfare Fund, and the Auiriuity Fund, the “Funds”), and Thomas J. Ryan, Administrator (collectively, with the Funds and the Trustees, the “Defendants”), seeking recovery of pension, welfare, annuity, and vacation benefits allegedly due pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (“ERISAÍ”).
Presently before the Court are cross-motions from the Plaintiff and the Defendants for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure .(“Fed. R. Civ. P.” or “Rule”) 56, as well as a motion by the Plaintiff to' amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15. For the following reasons, the Plaintiffs motions are denied in their entirety,’ and the Defendants’ motion is granted in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Relevant Facts
The majority of the facts in this case are undisputed. The following facts are drawn from the Plaintiffs response to the Defendants’ 56.1 Statement (the “SMF”), as well as the Plaintiffs supplemental 56.1 Statement.
1. The Funds
The. Funds are “employee benefits plans” and “multiemployer plans” as defined by ERISA. The Funds provide various benefits to covered employees of employers who sign collective bargaining agreements with Building Material Teamsters Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Local 282”). Covered employees receive pension benefits, welfare plans, vacation benefits, and medical benefits from the Funds. The Funds .are jointly administered by the Trustees.
The Funds are maintained pursuant to a Restated Agreement and Declaration of Trust (the “Trust Agreement”), for the purposes of collecting and receiving contributions from employers bound by collective bargaining agreements with Local 282. The Funds incorporate by reference the Trust Agreement, which require employ-: ers to contribute monies to the Funds on behalf of those employees who perform work covered by collective bargaining agreements. :
Only those employees who perform covered work qualify for benefits. As demonstrated below, the Funds’ documents do not clearly identify “covered work,” but instead refer to the collective bargaining agreements for what work is covered.
The Trust Agreement requires employers to submit reports (“remittance reports”) to the Funds that set forth the number of hours worked by covered employees. In order to verify the accuracy of these remittance reports, the Funds corn duct regular audits of employers, and may conduct an audit at any time pursuant to the Trust Agreement.
In addition to the remittance reports, the Funds also analyze “Hired Truck Reports,” which are referred to as “shop steward reports,” or “steward reports” in the industry. These steward reports are filled out each week by two different types of stewards: barn stewards, and on-site stewards. Barn stewards work for the truck driver’s employer, and work out of the “barn” where the truck drivers typically start their day. On-site stewards work for the company for the company for whom the truck driver is performing a service. Both stewards are appointed by the Union, and all steward reports are sent to the Fund’s office.
2. Oakfield Leasing, Inc.
Oakfield Leasing, Inc. (“Oakfield”) provided trucking services to customers. The Plaintiffs mother owned Oakfield until 2010, after which time Babino’s father owned it.
Oakfield was a party to two collective bargaining agreements with Local 282 during the relevant period—the New York City Heavy Construction & Excavating Contract (the “Heavy CBA”), in effect from July 1, 1993 through June 30, 2006; and the Metropolitan Trucker’s Association and Independent Trucker’s Contract, in effect from July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2012 (the “MTA CBAs”) (collectively, the “CBAs”).
The Heavy CBAs list the following employees as covered by the agreement: automobile chauffeurs; Euclid and turnpull operators; and drivers of six wheeler tractors and trailers, heavy equipment trailers, and boom trucks. (SMF ¶¶ 34-36). The MTA CBAs each state that “[t]he terms and conditions of this Agreement shall apply to the Employees of the Employer on any day they drive a dump truck, flatbed trailer, or flo-boy.” (SMF ¶ 38). The. Plaintiff claims that “covered work” .encompasses more than just driving, and cites .to affidavits from , two individuals, discussed below.
Between July 1995 and July 2012, Oak-field submitted remittance reports to the Funds that indicated that the ■ Plaintiff worked for Oakfield. The remittance reports did not specify the type of work in which the Plaintiff engaged.
3;. Coral Industries, Inc. and the Initial Lawsuit
The Plaintiff was the owner, sole officer, and only shareholder of Coral Industries, Inc. (“Coral”). Coral also provided trucking services to customers.
At some point in the late 200s, the Funds sought to audit both Oakfield and Coral (the “Companies”) because of multiple perceived connections between the Companies. Namely, the Funds sought to determine whether Oakfield had reported all hours of covered employees and paid the required corresponding contributions. The Companies failed to submit to the audit, and so in 2011, the Funds sued the Companies and the Plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The case, Ferrara et al. v. Oakfield Leasing Inc. et al., 11-cv-408 (ADS)(WDW) (the “Oakfield Lawsuit”), was assigned to this Court.
On November 9, 2012, the Court granted summary judgment to the Funds, Ferrara v. Oakfield Leasing Inc., 904 F.Supp.2d 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (the “2012 Decision”). The Court found that Coral and Oakfield were a single employer; ordered the Companies to submit-to an audit; and found that the Plaintiff was jointly and severally liable with the Companies for the Companies’ obligations to the Funds.- Relevant here, the- Court found that Coral was bound by the CBAs, and that Coral therefore owed monies to the funds for covered work done by Coral’s employees. ' .
The Trustees audited Coral and found that Coral owed $875, 729.20 in unpaid contributions for Coral drivers covered by the CBAs. The Court awarded the Funds those unpaid contributions. Ferrara v. Oakfield Leasing Inc., No. 11-CV-408 ADS WDW, 2013 WL 1207066, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2013) (the “2013 Decision”).
4. The Funds’ Evidence Purportedly Supporting Their Decision To Terminate His Benefits
On January 28,2013,,the Funds received a letter allegedly sent by Anthony Bassoli-no (“Bassolino”) and purportedly signed by five other employees of the Companies (the “Employees’ Letter”). Bassolino stated that he drove for Oakfielcl beginning in October 2005, and worked as a barn steward for Oakfield from August 2009' until July 2012. As a barn steward, Bassolino was given the task of entering time sheets for drivers to track when Oakfield employees engaged in covered work. The Funds used these time sheets to verify covered work. '
Bassolino claimed that the. Plaintiff ¡san the daily operations at Oakfield while. Bas-solino worked there, and the Plaintiff told him to list the Plaintiff on three 8-hour tours per week. Yet Bassolino- said that he never saw the Plaintiff drive a truck after 2007, and said that he could “confirm with certainty [that] he did not drive.a regular tour while [Bassolino] was [s]tewar[d].” (Def.’s Ex Bulding BB). Bassolino had believed that the Plaintiff was one- of the owners of Oakfield, but once he discovered that he was not, he sought to bring the matter to the Funds’ attention. The other five signatures purportedly belong to John Minutillo, Joseph Mollin, Michael Zizzo, Jean Policard, and Anthony Zaffuto, each of whom worked for either Oakfield or Coral. Joseph Mollin worked for bothcom-panies.
While the Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of this letter, he disputes the veracity of the statements made in the letter.
In a letter -dated January 24, 2014, the attorneys for the Defendants informed the Trustees that during discovery in the Oak-field Lawsuit, they had spoken to, Anthony Zaffuto (“Zaffuto”), one of the signatories to the Employees’ Letter. Zaffuto had allegedly told the Defendants’ attorneys in a telephone interview that the Plaintiff would take Zaffuto’s driving tickets and write his name over Zaffuto’s, so that the Plaintiff could maintain coverage under the Funds. ■
The Plaintiff' alleges that Zaffuto and Babino were biased because they were both plaintiffs in an action brought against the Plaintiff and the Companies for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Plaintiff also points out that Bassolino received cash wages when he worked for Coral.
Also during the Oakfield Lawsuit, the Plaintiff testified in a deposition that Coral paid some of its drivers in cash, because “[tjhat’s what they wanted.” (Defs.’- Ex. Mackson C at 164). The Funds state that this cash policy is what caused Coral to owe over $875,000 to the Funds.
5. The Termination of Babino’s Coverage
On January 28, 2014, the Trustees terminated Babino’s coverage under the Welfare Fund because of the allegations in the Employees Letter and from Zaffuto, as well as Coral’s cash payments to its employees. The Trustees also disregarded all hours Babino reportedly worked for Oak-field. On April 14, 2014, the Trustees informed Babino via letter (the “April 2014 Letter”) that they were terminating his Welfare Fund benefits, and that they would subtract his Oakfield hours from his credits he had earned in the Pension and Annuity Funds, unless he could prove that he engaged in covered work during those hours. At the time, the Plaintiff was fully vested in the Pension Plan. The letter further informed Babino that because his Welfare Fund coverage was retroactively rescinded, he owed $106,719.65 for medical claims that had been “wrongfully paid” on his behalf. (Defs.’ Ex. Bulding DD). The letter from the Trustees stated:
It has come to the attention of the Trustees of the Local 282 Pension, Annuity, and Welfare Trust Funds (the “Funds”) that in your capacity as principal of Coral Industries, Inc., (“Coral”), you caused Oakfield Leasing Inc. (“Oakfield”) to report hours worked by you to the Funds in order to allow you to claim benefits from the Funds, despite your never having worked for Oakfield or Coral in covered employment. As you know, Oak-field was held to be a single employer with Coral in Ferrara, et al., v. Oakfield Leasing, et al.
Accordingly, the Trustees have determined to disregard all hours of work reported by Oakfield on your behalf to the Local 282 Pension and Annuity Trust Funds, unless you are able to prove to the Trustees’ satisfaction that you did work in covered employment for Oakfield or Coral by providing documentation of such work, including, but not limited to, delivery tickets, driving tickets or customer invoices from the period in question. If the hours of work reported on your behalf to the Funds are disregarded, Pension Credits reflected in your records for the Pension Fund attributable to hours reported by Oak-field will be eliminated, and any amounts in your Annuity Fund Individual Account attributable to Oakfield’s contributions will be taken away.
The Trustees have also determined to terminate your coverage under the Local 282 Welfare Trust Fund (the “Welfare Fund”) permanently pursuant [to] the section entitled “Fraud” on page 46 of the Welfare Fund’s January 1, 2013 Summary Plan Description (“SPD”). Specifically, in addition to fraudulently causing hours to be reported on your behalf to the Welfare Fund despite your not having performed covered work, you also caused drivers for Coral Industries Inc., who were Welfare Fund Participants, to be paid in cash for their covered work, and you were aware that Oakfield would therefore not report such hours of covered work to the Welfare Fund. Due to these fraudulent activities, as of the date of this letter, you and your Dependents (as that term is defined in the SPD) are permanently banned from receiving benefits from the Fund, even if, in the future, an employer makes contributions to the Fund based on your hours of covered work.
Moreover, because you engaged in the fraud as described above against the Welfare Fund, your coverage under the Welfare Fund is retroactively rescinded. According to our records, medical claims in the amount of [$106,719,65] were wrongfully paid on behalf of you [and your covered Dependents] during this period when you were not, in fact, eligible for the coverage. You must reimburse the Welfare Fund for these amounts by May 14, 2014, which is 30 days from the date of this notice.
You have the right to appeal this decision to the Board of Trustees. Your appeal must be in writing and must be made within 180 days of your receipt of this letter. You have the right to review documents relevant to this decision. You will be notified of the Trustees’ decision within 30 days of receipt of your appeal. If your appeal is denied, you have the right to bring a civil action under Section 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”).
(SMF ¶ 102)
Mario Bulding (Bulding), who was the Funds Administrator as of April 28, 2016, testified in his deposition that, after reviewing the Trust Fund Summary Plan Description (the “SPD”), that there was nothing in the document that “provides for the revocation of pension hours based upon the happening of a particular event or circumstance[.]” (Defs.’ Ex. Mackson J at 56)
On May 27, 2014, counsel for Babino sent a letter to the Funds (the “May 2014 Letter”) which stated that the Funds’ allegations were false; and unless the Funds’ decision were reversed, Babino would commence legal action. The May 2014 Letter stated in relevant part:
[Y]our allegations that Mr. Babino had hours fraudulently reported for him by Oakfield Industries, Inc., a signatory to the Local Union 282 collective bargaining agreement is false. This allegation is belied by your very own documents in the nature of Steward Reports that were filed by your designated shop steward for Oakfield Industries, Inc.
Your allegations that Mr. Babino defrauded the Funds by paying Local 282 members for work performed by them when driving for Coral Industries, Inc. and not reporting the same to the Funds also cannot legally stand scrutiny predicated upon fraud allegations. In the event that the Funds’ decision is not immediately reversed, we will commence all necessary legal action to recover damages and restitution. In accordance with your, communication, please advise me when I may review all of the documentation the Funds’ utilized in making this determination, including all shop steward reports and remittance, reports.
(SMF ¶ 104).
On September 8, 2014, counsel for the Funds responded to counsel for Babino’s May 2014 letter, via letter (“The September 2014 Letter”). The letter stated that the Trustees would consider. Babino’s request at their next meeting on September 23, 2014. The Employees’ Letter, Babino’s deposition, excerpt, and the Funds’ counsel’s report from the Oakfield Lawsuit, along with shop steward reports and remittance reports requested by Babino, were included with the letter. The Funds’ Counsel informed Babino that if he wished to provide any documents for the Trustees to consider, he should provide those documents to them before the meeting. The September 2014 Letter stated in relevant part:'
With regard to your request that the Funds’ decision be reversed, we assume that this request refers to the Funds’ decision to terminate Mr. Babino’s coverage under the Welfare Fund. We also assume that this refers to the Funds’ decision [to] disregard all hours of work reported by Oakfield on Mr. Babino’s behalf to the Local 282 Pension and Annuity Trust Funds based on his fraudulent activities unless he is able to provide documentation of such work including, but not limited to, delivery tiek-ets, driving tickets or customer invoices from the period in question. The Trustees will consider your request at their next scheduled meeting, which will be held on September 23, 2014. If you wish to provide any documents for the Trustees to consider with respect to their determination, please provide them in advance of the meeting.
With respect to your request for “all documentation the Funds utilized in making this determination,” we assume that you are referring to the same decisions that you are asking the Funds to reverse. In response to your request, we have enclosed the following:'
(a) ' A letter from Anthony G. Bassolino, former shop steward for Oakfield, signed by Mr. Bassolino and other employees of Oakfield;
(b) An extract from the transcript of a deposition of Mr. Babino conducted on November 4, 2011 in the matter of Fer-rara, et. al, v, Oakfield Leasing Inc., et al., Case No.: ll-cv-0408 (AJS)(WDW) (E.D.N.Y); and
(c) An extract from this firm’s report to the Funds’ Trastees, dated January 24, 2014, reporting, in addition to the above, statements by Anthony Zaffuto, a former employee of Oakfield.
In addition, you requested copies of shop steward reports and-remittance reports. We have enclosed, in response, the Funds’ records of such reports relating [to] Mr, Babino. ’
(SMF ¶ 106) ‘
On September 20, 2014, the Plaintiffs counsel emailed the Funds’ counsel to inform that he was still obtaining supporting documentation for his client. The Funds’ counsel responded by letter on September 24, 2014, stating that the Trastees would delay decision on the Plaintiffs request until October 28, 2014 in light of the special circumstances.
, Babino did not submit any documentation on or before October 28, 2014. As of. March 2015, the Plaintiff had not sent any-supporting documentation. In-March 2015, the Trustees denied his appeal. On March 25, 2015, the Funds’ counsel sent a letter to the Plaintiff, informing him that they had not received any documents from him, and that they had denied his appeal.
6. Babino Supplies Documentation to the Trustees
In June 2015, three months after his appeal was denied, the Plaintiff sent sevenr ty daily driving tickets from Oakfield that covered seventy days from 2006 to 2009, The daily driving tickets purportedly proved that he engaged in covered work during those seventy days. The tickets only indicate the first name of the driver— either “Mike” or “Michael” in each instance; they do not state the driver’s last name.
Those seventy tickets- are the-only .Oak-field driving, tickets that the Plaintiff possesses. Before her death, the Plaintiffs mother stored .Oakfield’s driving tickets. After her death, the Plaintiff stored the driving tickets for Oakfield as well as for Coral. The Plaintiff admits that he did. not store the driving tickets in alphabetical order; and he is unaware' whether his mother stored them in alphabetical order.
7. The Trustees Restore Babino’s Work Hours and Vacation Benefits
Although the Trustees never decided to withhold the Plaintiffs vacation-and sick leave benefits, those benefits were withheld after the Trustees rescinded the Plaintiffs Welfare Fund benefits. The De-, fendants assert that the Trustees never decided to withhold his vacation and sick leave benefits, and that any withholding was an error. In support, the Defendants cite to Bulding’s deposition, Bulding attributed the error to his predecessor, who was deceased at the time'of .Bidding's deposition, and said that the reason the Funds did not pay the Plaintiffs vacation benefits was a “mistake.”" (Defs.’- Ex. Bulding J at 63). The Plaintiff -asserts - that it was pot-error, but a conscious decision by the Funds. He cites to page 82 of Bulding’s deposition, but that page refers, .to. the Welfare Fund. -However, Bulding,did respond yes, when asked whether “[t]he initial decision to,not pay [the Plaintiff] his vacation money was made at the. same time that the [T]rustees decided to revoke his pension and annuity,credits.” (Id,).
The Plaintiff also cites to his complaint generally, as well-as his counsel’s declaration which states that “[tjhey refused to give him his, vacation earning for work performed for his new employer,' CCC Leasing, Inc., and only-did. so after this action had been initiated .... ” (PL’s Ex. 3, Decí. of. Dandenau (“Pl.’s Ex, 3”) ¶ 18 (citing complaint)).,
As to the complaint, because it is not a verified complaint, it ip not admissible evidence for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment. See Sloane v. Getz, 2002 WL 31132968, at *1 (S.B.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2002) (“Because [plaintiffs] original, amended, and second amended complaints were unverified, they may not serve as affidavits for purposes pf summary judgment.”) (citing Monahan v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 292 (2d Cir. 2000)); Yearwood v. LoPiccolo, 1998 WL 474073, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1998) (stating that “no effect need be given at summary judgment” to, an unverified complaint) (footnote omitted). ■. .
As to Dandenau’s declaration, a declar-ant can only affirm facts of which he has personal -knowledge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (“An affidavit or declaration.used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set. out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”) Therefore,' as' the Plaintiffs counsel cannot swear or affirm to the Trustees’ state of mind—that they “refused” to give the Plaintiff his money—the only admissible evidence to which the Plaintiff cites is the fact that the Funds did not pay the Plaintiff until after he initiated this lawsuit.
On August 3, -2015, the Funds sent a check for $3,697.50 to Babino, payable to him for his past due Vacation Fund benefits. Babino deposited the check, and admits that the check represented 'all of the Vacation Fund benefits that had been withheld and that were due to him.
During the course of the litigation, on-site steward reports were produced in discovery. The on-site steward' reports were originally in the Trustees’ possession, but they had been provided to the Plaintiff by the Trustees with their September 2014 Letter. The on-site steward reports showed that the Plaintiff drove approximately four thousand hours for Oakfield from 1995 to 2012. On May 24, 2016, the Trustees restored 3,928 hours to the Plaintiffs Annuity and Pension Funds. The Plaintiff denies that he worked as few hours as the Trustees claim. The Plaintiff points to the shop steward reports and his Work History compiled by the Defendants as evidence that he engaged in covered work from June 1995 until June 2012.
8. Further Evidence
The Plaintiff also submitted two affidavits from individuals. These affidavits were not considered by the Trustees and are not part of the administrative record.
Michael Bird, a Local 282 Business Agent and Union Trasteé, testified that truck drivers in Local 282 would be “paid the 282 wage and benefit” when they “would load up the trucks ... [and] clean the yard up.” (Defs.’ Ex. Mackson Supp. A at 14). The Plaintiff cites to this testimony in support of his claim that “covered work” under the CBAs includes more than just driving tracks.'
Michael Pellegrino (“Pellegrino”), who worked for Oakfield for more than ten years, including as the shop steward for Oakfield from September 2009 through May 2010, also submitted an affidavit. Pel-legrino stated in an affidavit that he saw the Plaintiff drive tracks “regularly” for Oakfield. He said that the Plaintiff would drive a truck three to four times a week on average. Pellegrino claimed that maintenance and repair work was covered under Local 282’s contracts, and said that when the Plaintiff did not drive he dispatched other drivers and did maintenance work. Finally, Pellegrino averred that the Plaintiff had never asked him to credit the Plaintiff with hours that he did not earn; nor had Pellegrino ever heard the Plaintiff ask that of anyone else.
9. Relevant Terms of the Funds’ Plans
a. The Annuity Fund’s Plan
The terms of the Annuity Fund’s plan of benefits are set out in its Rules and Regulations (the “Annuity Plan”).
The Annuity Plan defines an employee as “a person who is an Employee of an Employer and who is covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement, Participation Agreement, or any other written agreement requiring Employer contributions on his or her behalf.” (Defs.’ Ex. Bulding I at Funds 001951).
The Annuity Plan vests the Trustees with the discretion to administer and interpret the Annuity Plan. It states that:
The Trustees shall be responsible for the general administration of the Plan. The Board of Trustees shall have the exclusive right, power, and authority, in its sole and absolute discretion, to administer, apply and interpret the Plan and any other Plan documents and to decide all matters arising in connection ■with the operation or administration of the Plan, including, but not limited to, determining the standard of proof required in any case based upon objective standards.
(Defs.’ Ex. Bulding 0 at Funds 0150). Furthermore, the Annuity Plan provides that “[a]ll interpretations, determinations and decisions of the Plan Administrator and the Trustees with respect to any claim or any other matter relating to the Plan shall be made in their sole discretion based on the Plan documents, and shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties affected thereby.” (Id. at Funds 0157).
As to applications for benefits, the Annuity Plan states that:
Every Employee, Annuitant or beneficiary shall furnish, at the request of the Trustees, any information or proof required for the administration, of the Plan, or for the determination of any matter that the Trustees may have before them. Failure to furnish such information or proof promptly and in good faith shall be sufficient reason for (i) the denial of benefits to such Employee or beneficiary ...The falsity of any statement, material to an application, or the furnishing of fraudulent information or proof shall be sufficient reason for the denial, suspension or discontinuance of benefits under this Plan and, in any such case, the Trustees shall have the right to recover any benefit payments made in -reliance thereon. An Employee’s acceptance of payment in cash or otherwise from an employer (as defined in Article I, Section' 1 of the Trust Agreement) for hours of work in employment covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement or Participation Agreement with Local 282 that have not been reported to the Funds, where the Employee knew or .should have known that the hours would not be reported, shall constitute sufficient reason for the Trustees, in their discretion, to deny, discontinue, suspend, reduce, or otherwise impair the Employee’s- nonvested benefits and those provided to his or her beneficiaries.
(Id. at Funds 150).
Finally, as to vesting, the Annuity Plan states that employees:
are 100% vested in [their] Individual Account balance under the Plan at all times. This means that [beneficiaries] have a nonforfeitable right to all Employer Contributions obligated to be made on [their] behalf and any earnings on these Contributions. (The fact that [they] are 100% vested in your Individual Account balance does not mean, however, that [they] are eligible to receive a distribution prior to your retirement or severance from employment. Eligibility rules are set forth below.) The vested benefits to which [employees] are entitled are nonforfeitable, except that they may be subject to forfeiture resulting from criminal acts committed against the Plan, in accordance with applicable law.
(Id. at Funds 0111). It similarly states later in the plan that “The benefits to which an Employee is entitled under this Plan are nonforfeitable, subject only to conditions as to application, and willful misrepresentation .... ” (Id. at Funds 0157). •
b. The Pension Fund’s Plan
The terms of the Pension Fund’s plan of benefits are contained in the Pension Fund’s Rules and Regulations (the “Pension Plan”). The Pension Fund Summary Plan Description (the “Pension Fund SPD”) summarizes the terms of the Pension Plan,
The Pension Fund SPD states that “[y]ou may participate in the Plan if you work for a Contributing Employer in a position covered by- a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Union ,,,. Such employment is referred to as “Covered Employment.” (Defs.’ Ex. Bulding X at Funds 0178). Furthermore, it states that “[y]ou earn Pension Credit for periods of work in Covered Employment ..,{Id. at Funds 0190). Pension benefits available from the Pension Fund are based, in part, on the number of Pension Credits an' eligible participant accrues.
The Pension Plan vests the Trustees with the discretion to administer and interpret the Pension Plan. It states that:
The Trustees shall, subject to the requirements of the law, be the sole judges of the standard of proof required in any case and the application and interpretation of this Plan, and décisions of the Trustees shall be final and binding on all parties. Wherever in the Plan the Trustees are given discretionary powers, the Trustees shall exercise such powers in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner. The Trustees shall have discretionary authority to interpret and construe the terms of the Plan and any other Plan documents and to decide all matters arising in -connection with the operation or administration of the Plan-, including specifically, but not by way of limitation, the right to determine questions regarding Pension Credits, eligibility, amount, type and effective date of benefits, survivor rights, Beneficiary designations, marital status, disability claims. All-such determinations and interpretations made by the Trustees shall be made in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner, shall be final and binding upon all Participants, Beneficiaries and all other individuals claiming benefits under the Plan, and shall be given deference in all courts of law to the greatest extent allowed under applicable law and shall not be overturned or set aside unless found to be arbitrary and capricious or made in bad faith.
(Defs.’.Ex. Bulding V at Funds 0280).
With regard to applications for benefit payments and retirement the Pension Plan states that:
Every Participant or Pensioner shall furnish, at the. request of the Trustees, any information or proof reasonably required to determine his benefit rights. If the claimant makes a willfully false statement material to his application or furnishes fraudulent information or proof, material to his .claim, benefits not Vested under this Plan (as defined in Section 6.9) may be denied, suspended, or discontinued. The Trustees shall have the right to- recover any benefit payments made in reliance on any willfully false or fraudulent statement, information, or proof submitted by a Participant or Pensioner.
{Id. at Funds 0279).'
c. The Welfare Fund’s Plan
The terms of the Welfare Fund’s plan of benefits appear only in the Welfare Fund’s Summary Plan Description (the “Welfare Fund SPD”).
The Welfare Fund SPD provides, in a section entitled “Fraud,” that:
Subject to the terms of the Affordable Care Act, the Fund reserves the right to terminate coverage for you and/or your Dependent(s) if you and/or your Dependents) are otherwise determined to be ineligible for coverage. Pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, the coverage will not be rescinded retroactively, except in certain instances, such as if you or your Dependent(s) commits fraud or. makes an- intentional misrepresentation (for example, in enrollment materials, a claim, or appeal for benefits or in response to a question from the Fund administrator or its delegates). In such cases of fraud or intentional misrepresentation, your coverage may be rescinded retroactively upon 30 days’ notice. Failure to inform the Fund Office that you or your Dependent is covered under another group health plan, and knowingly providing false information to obtain coverage for an ineligible Dependent are examples of actions that constitute fraud or intentional misrepresentations. Coverage may also be eliminated retroactively (without notice) in cases in which it would not be considered rescission under the Affordable Care Act, such as failure to pay a required premium or contribution toward the cost of coverage. Examples of fraud against the Fund may also include your failure to notify the Fund Office of your divorce; your acceptance of payment from an Employer for hours of work that should have been reported to the Fund but were not, where the Employee knew or should have known that the Employer would not report the .hours. Where a Participant is found to have engaged in fraud, the Fund may suspend or permanently discontinue coverage for the Participant and his Dependents.
(Defs.’ Ex. Bulding Y at Funds 0383). It further states in a section entitled “Required Information that:
The falsity of any statement or the furnishing of fraudulent information or proof shall be sufficient, reason for the denial, suspension or discontinuance of benefits under the Plan and, in any such case, the Trustees shall have the right to recover any benefit payments made in reliance thereon.
(Id.).
The Welfare Fund SPD provides that “the Board of Trustees has the sole authority and discretion to interpret or amend the terms of this SPD.” (Defs.’ Ex. Bulding Y, (Welfare Fund SPD), at Funds 0339). ;
B. Relevant Procedural History
The Plaintiff filed his .-complaint on June 18, 2015. He. sought declaratory relief, damages, and- the return of the benefits that he alleged were wrongfully terminated. He styled his complaint in three causes of action, all brought under ERISA: his first two were both for “recovery of pension benefits,”- (Complaint at 7, 8); and his third , “for recovery of welfare benefits, annuity fund benefits!!,] and vacation fund benefits, (id. at 9).
On September 26, 2016, the Plaintiff filed his motion, which asked for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 as well as the right to amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15. The Plaintiff moves to add a fourth cause of action for “conflict of interests, restitution, and breach, of fiduciary duty” under sections 502(a) and 502(a)(3) of ERISA.
■ On September 29, 2016, the Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Rule 56.
II. DISCUSSION
As the Plaintiff has asked, the Court to rule that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of his claims, including the cause of action which he seeks to add, the Court will first analyze whether he should be permitted to amend his complaint. ’
A. As to the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend
1. The Legal Standard
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) applies to motions to amend the pleadings once the time for amending a pleading as a matter of right has expired. It states, in pertinent part, that “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Courts have construed the rule liberally and have said that “the purpose of Rule 15 is to allow a party to correct an error that might otherwise prevent the court from hearing the merits of the claim.” Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Silogram Lubricants Corp., No. 12-CV-4849, 2013 WL 6795963, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2013) (quoting Chapman v. YMCA of Greater Buffalo, 161 F.R.D. 21, 24 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)); see also Williams v. Citigroup Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding a “strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits”).
A court should deny leave to amend only “in instances of futility, undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or undue prejudice to the nonmoving party.” Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
“The party opposing the motion for leave to amend has the burden of establishing that an amendment would be prejudicial.” Fariello v. Campbell, 860 F.Supp. 54, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F.Supp.2d 456, 502-03 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Saxholm AS v. Dynal, Inc., 938 F.Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The opposing party likewise bears the burden of establishing that an amendment would be futile. See Blaskiewicz v. County of Suffolk, 29 F.Supp.2d 134, 137-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Harrison v. NBD Inc., 990 F.Supp. 179, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
Proposed amendments are futile when they “would fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” IBEW Local Union No. 58 Pension Trust Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC, 783 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2012)).
Under the Bell Atlantic v. Twombly standard, a complaint should be dismissed only if it does not -contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1973, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Second Circuit has explained that, after Twombly, the Court’s inquiry-under Rule 12(b)(6) is guided by two principles:
First, although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss and determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
2. Application to the Facts
a. As to Whether the Plaintiff Engaged In Undue Delay in Moving To Amend
The Plaintiff contends that the Court should permit him to amend his complaint because the Defendants would not be prejudiced. In opposition, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff unduly delayed filing the amended complaint. The Court finds that the Plaintiff did not engage in undue delay.
The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not engaged in undue delay because “[m]ere delay ... absent a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, does not provide a basis for a district court to deny the right to amend.” State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981); Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 333 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming grant of motion to amend after seven-year delay, where defendant did not show prejudice). “The concepts of delay and undue prejudice are interrelated—the longer the period of unexplained delay, the less will be required of the non-moving party in terms of showing prejudice.” Evans v. Syracuse City Sch. Dist., 704 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1983). As the Defendants do not argue that the Plaintiff has engaged in bad faith or that they would be unduly prejudiced by such an amendment, the Court will determine whether the Plaintiff’s proposed additional claim is futile.
b. As to Whether the Plaintiffs Proposed Additional Claim is Futile
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs proposed additional is futile because it fails to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA and it is duplica-tive. Although the Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on this claim, he does not respond to the Defendants’ arguments in any way. In support of his motion for summary judgment on the claim, the Plaintiff only contends that the Defendants unjustly enriched themselves and that a breach of fiduciary duty under Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA can give rise to a claim for equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. The Court agrees with the Defendants that the Plaintiffs claim under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA is duplicative of his other claims, and is therefore futile.
The Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint states that his fourth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, and restitution is brought pursuant to Sections 502(a) and 502(a)(3)' of ERISA. However, Section 502(a) of ERISA does not provide a vehicle for a cause of action. Section 502(a) of ERISA, entitled “Persons empowered to bring a civil action” only has a dependent clause: “A civil action may be brought—,” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), and does not give any rights to anyone.
However, Section 502(a)(3) does provide such a vehicle. In his memoranda in support of his motion, the Plaintiff states that “[a] breach of fiduciary duty found under ERISA Section 502(a)(2) may give rise to a claim for equitable relief under- ERISA 502(a)(3).” (Pl.’s Mem of Law at 23 (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, as this offers some clarification, the Court will analyze whether, the Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.
Section-502(a)(3) of ERISA states that
A civil action may be brought by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan[.]
• As to Section 502(a), the Supreme Court has said
The language of the ... third and the fifth [subsections] creates two “catchalls,” providing “appropriate equitable relief’ for “any” statutory violation. This structure suggests that these “catchall” provisions act as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy.
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 1077-78, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996).
The Second Circuit has interpreted this to-mean that “29 U.S.O. § 1132(a)(3) [] [] may not be relied on by a claimant to pursue relief—-in this case, pension benefits—available under a separate ERISA provision.” Whelehan v. Bank of Am. Pension Plan for Legacy Companies-Fleet-Traditional Ben., 621 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Varity, 516 U.S. at 515, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (“[W]here Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a bene*-ficiary’s' injury ... relief [under § 502(a)(3) ] normally would not be ‘appropriate.’ ”)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2463, 195 L.Ed.2d 801 (2016); see also Miller v. Int’l Paper Co., No. COTT12 CIV. 7071 LAK, 2013 WL 3833038, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013) (“While ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides a vehicle for seeking equitable relief, in order to bring a claim pursuant to this Section, a plaintiff must also allege an underlying violation of some substantive provision of ERISA.” (citing Gates v. United Health Grp., No. 11 Civ. 3487(KBF), 2012 WL 2953050, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2012) (plaintiffs ability to seek equitable relief pursuant to Section 502(a)(3) “does not relieve her. from having to establish an underlying, violation of the statute”)).
“Since Varity, courts have found [Section 502(a)(3)] applicable when ERISA does not elsewhere provide a remedy for a wrong suffered by plaintiff, or when plaintiff seeks additional equitable relief that differs from monetary relief sought according to the specific remedies provided in ERISA’s other sections.” Klecher v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 331 F.Supp.2d 279, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (collecting cases).
The equitable relief sought by the Plaintiff encompasses:
declaring that all rights and benefits due Babino under the Pension and Annuity Plans are vested and non-forfeitable or, in the alternative, to award Babino a money judgment for all sums.due and owing; that Defendant F[unds] be restrained- from taking any action against Babino which has the effect of limiting and/or precluding Babino’s right to secure benefits from Defendant F[unds]; Declaring that Babino is entitled to welfare insurance coverage for himself and his dependents^] retroactively to April 14, 2014, that he is entitled to be reimbursed from the.Funds all medical expenses and medical bills that he incurred but for the Defendants’ failure to cover himself and his dependents; restraining the Defendants and the Funds from taking any similar action against Babino in the future without just cause
(Pl.’s Ex. 1 (PL’s Proposed Amended Complaint) at 13-14). .
The “equitable relief’ sought by the Plaintiff is available under another section of ERISA. Section 502(a)(1)(B) states in pertinent part: “A civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary .... (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B).
Therefore, the Plaintiff does not seek “appropriate equitable relief’ under Section 502(a)(3) because the relief he seeks is available elsewhere, and his claim is dupli-cative of his claims under Section 502(a)(1)(B). See Varity, 516 U.S. at 515, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (“[W]here Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary’s injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief, in which case such relief normally would not be ‘appropriate’ [under Section 502(a)(3) ].”); id. at 512, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 1077-78' (“These ‘catchall’ provisions act as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that [ERISA] does not elsewhere adequately remedy.”); id. (observing that § 502(a)(1)(B) “specifically provides a remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty with respect to the interpretation of plan documents and the payment of claims ... one that runs directly to the injured beneficiary”); Giordano v. Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., No. CV-08-0391WDW, 2011 WL 839507, at *8-9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011) (dismissing the plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty because it was duplicative of his claim for benefits, and stating that.“Plaintiff seeks to recover the pension benefits he believes are due unto him .... This relief can be adequately achieved through his Section 1132(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits and is thus not also entitled to seek the identical relief, even in the- alternative, under Section 1132(a)(3).”); Mead v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 309 F.Supp.2d 596, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[I]t is ‘appropriate’ to allow plaintiffs to include a § -502(a)(3) claim which may provide distinct relief from a § 502(a)(1) claim; it is inappropriate to include a § 502(a)(3) claim which, as here, merely duplicates the § 502(a)(1) claim.”); Klecher, 331 F.Supp.2d at 287-88 (finding that plaintiffs proposed additional claim for breach of fiduciary duty would be futile because whereas Varity holds that the “catchall” provision applies when ERISA elsewhere does not provide a remedy for a wrong, plaintiff here brings an “ordinary” denial of benefits claim • for which § 1132(a)(1)(B) provides a remedy. Plaintiff merely disputes the détermination that she is not entitled to long-term benefits. [ ] ERISA provides a remedy for this wrong in § 1132(a)(1)(B) ....”); Mead, 309 F.Supp.2d at 598 (“[I]t is ‘appropriate’ to allow, plaintiffs to include a § 502(a)(3) claim which may provide distinct relief from a § 502(a)(1) claim; it is inappropriate tp include a § 502(a)(3) claim which, as here, merelyduplicates -the, § 502(a)(1) claim.”); Rubio v. Chock Full O’Nuts Corp., 254 F.Supp.2d 413, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (dismissing .claim brought under § 1132(a)(3) because, plaintiffs’ “suit is a ‘normal’ case of denial of benefits under -an ERISA plan,” that “can be fully satisfied under § 502(a)(1)(B)”); .”);. see also Kendall v. Employees Ret. Plan of Avon Prod., 561 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (“claims [that] are effectively claims for money damages [are] outside the scope of § 1132(a)(3)”); Gates, 2012 WL 2953050, at *10 n.10 , (“[Plaintiffs prayer for so-called ‘equitable restitution’ is .properly characterized as a legal remedy unavailable under 502(a)(3)” (internal citations' omitted)).
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs- -motion to amend his .complaint pursuant to Rule 15 to add a claim for. breach-of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest and restitution under Section 502(a)(3) is denied as. futile.
B. As to the Parties’ Crqss Motions for Summary Judgment
1. The Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
Under Fed. R.. Civ. P. 56(a),- “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment .if,the mov-ant shows.that-there is no genuine dispute as .to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter -of law.” When deciding a motion-, for summary judgment, “[t]he Court ‘must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all ambiguities in favor of the non-moving party.’” Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Garza v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988)).
“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not [] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, “[credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., 512 Fed.Appx. 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Redd, 678 F.3d at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court should not attempt to resolve issues of fact, but rather “assess whether there áre any factual issues to be tried.” Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir. 2012).
The movant has the burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If a nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of their case where they will have the burden of proof, then summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552. If the nonmoving party submits evidence which is “merely colorable,” legally sufficient opposition to the motion for summary judgment is not met. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for that party. See Dawson v. Cty. of Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2004).
2. The Applicable Law
ERISA creates a private right of action to enforce the provisions of retirement plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
A denial of benefits under ERISA “is to be reviewed under a de novo standard, unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989).
If the relevant plan (or plans) vest the administrator(s) with discretionary authority over decisions regarding benefits, “the administrator’s decisions may be overturned only if they are arbitrary and capricious.” Roganti v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 786 F.3d 201, 210 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Here, arbitrary and capricious means “without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence[,] or erroneous as a matter of law.” Pagan, 52 F.3d at 442 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The standard is “highly deferential,” and “the scope of judicial review is narrow.” Celardo v. GNY Auto. Dealers Health & Welfare Trust, 318 F.3d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 2003). “Substantial evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the decisionmaker and requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Tansey v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 619 Fed.Appx. 24, 25 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1072 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal alterations omitted)).
Of importance here, “a district court’s review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is limited to the administrative record.” Roganti, 786 F.3d at 217 n.11 (quoting Miller, 72 F.3d at 1071). “This rule is consistent with the fact that nothing ‘in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended that federal district courts would function as substitute plan administrators’ and with the ERISA ‘goal of prompt resolution of claims by the fiduciary.’ ” Miller, 72 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Perry v. Simplicity Eng’g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990)). The same holds true even when a district court reviews a claim denial under the de novo standard. See Halo v. Yale Health Plan, Dir. of Benefits & Records Yale Univ., 819 F.3d 42, 60 (2d Cir. 2016). (“[W]hen reviewing claim denials, whether under the arbitrary and capricious or de novo standards of review, district courts typically limit their review to the administrative record before the plan at the time it denied the claim.”)
While the Plaintiff apparently concedes that the Court should review the Trustees’ decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard, he does argue throughout his memoranda that the Trustees failed to comply with the Department of Labor’s claims procedure regulation, codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. The claims procedure provides as follows:
(a) Scope and purpose. In accordance with the authority of sections 503 and 505 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or the Act), 29 U.S.C. 1133, 1135, this section sets forth minimum requirements for employee benefit plan procedures pertaining to claims for benefits by participants and beneficiaries (hereinafter referred to as claimants).
(g) Manner and content of notification of benefit determination
(1)' Except as provided in paragraph (g)(2) of this section, the plan administrator shall provide a claimant with written or electronic notification of any adverse benefit determination. Any electronic notification shall comply with the standards imposed by 29 CFR 2520.104b-l(c)(l)(i), (iii), and (iv). The notification shall set forth, in a manner calculated to be understood bythe claimant—
(i) The specific reason or reasons for the adverse determination;
(ii) Reference to the specific plan provisions on which the determination is based;
(iii) A description of any additional material or information necessary for the claimant to perfect the claim and an explanation of why such material or information is necessary;
(iv) A description of the plan’s review procedures and the time limits applicable to such procedures, including a statement of the claimant’s right to bring a civil action under section 502(a) of the Act following an adverse benefit determination on review ....
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. The Second Circuit has recently held that a plan’s failure to comply with these regulations “result in that claim being reviewed de novo in federal court, unless the plan has otherwise established procedures in full conformity with the regulation and can show that its failure to comply with the regulation in the processing of a particular claim was inadvertent and harmless.” Halo, 819 F.3d at 45.
While the Plaintiff argues throughout his memoranda that the Trustees violated these regulations, he does not acknowledge the full effect of this violation until the last full page of his .memorandum in opposition to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (See PL’s Mem. in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. at 26). Nevertheless, the Court finds that it must conduct a de novo review because the Trustees failed to fulfill the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(g).
Specifically, in their January 2014 Letter, the Trustees failed to reference the specific plan provisions.on which they relied in subtracting the hours that the Plaintiff worked for Oakfield from his Pension and Annuity Funds. The Defendants claim that the Trustees met ERISA’s standards because “the Trustees’ notices to [the Plaintiff] provided adequate notice of the reasons for the claim denial (Defs.’ Reply Mem, of Law at 8). Specifically, they claim that “[t]he notices did not mention Pension or Annuity Fund plan provisions because no such plan provisions applied, in light of [the Plaintiffs] failure to substantiate his claim that he engaged in Covered Work.” (Id.) The Court disagrees. Both the Pension and Annuity Funds have clauses similar to the one contained in.' the Welfare Fund,, which was cited by.the Trustees in their January 2014 Letter. Specifically, the Annuity Plan states: ■
The falsity of any statement, material to an application, or the furnishing of fraudulent information or proof shall be sufficient reason for the denial, suspension or discontinuance of benefits under this Plan and, in any such case, the Trustees shall have the right to recover any benefit payments made in reliance ‘thereon. An Employee’s acceptance of payment in cash or otherwise from an employer (as defined in Article I, Séction 1 of the Trust Agreement) for hours of work in employment covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement or Participation Agreement with Local 282 that have not been reported to the Funds, where the Employee knew or should have known that the hours would not be reported, shall constitute sufficient. reason for the Trustees, in. their discretion, to deny, discontinue, suspend, reduce, or otherwise impair the Employee’s nonvested benefits and those provided to his or her beneficiaries.
(Defs.’ Ex Bulding 0 (2013 Annuity Plan), at Funds 0160). The Annuity Plan further states that:
An Employee who believes that he is entitled to Employer Contributions for Covered Employment that is not reflected in the Fund Office’s records of his employment history, must provide documentation of the claimed periods of Covered Employment, including but not limited to, Social Security records, pay stubs, W-2 forms, or any other proof that supports his claim. If the Employee does not produce documentation to support his claim for additional periods of work in Covered Employment, his Accumulated Share will only be calculated based on Covered Employment reflected in the Fund Office recordsf.] The mere submission of documentation in support of a claim of additional work in Covered Employment does not entitle an Employee to any additional Accumulated Share. The Trustees have the sole discretion and authority to determine whether the documents submitted sufficiently evidence work in Covered Employment.
(Id. at Funds 0138).
Similarly, the Pension Plan states that:
If the claimant makes a willfully false statement material to his application or furnishes fraudulent information or proof, material to his claim, benefits not Vested under this Plan ... may be denied, suspended, or discontinued. The Trustees shall have the right to recover any benefit payments made in reliance on any -willfully false or fraudulent statement, information, or proof submitted by a Participant or Pensioner.
(Defs.’ Ex. Bulding V (2009 Pension Plan), at Funds 0279).
While these cl