Hewett v. City of King (29 F. Supp. 3d 584, 2014)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BEATY, District Judge.

On November 2, 2012, Plaintiff Steven Hewett (“Plaintiff’) filed his Complaint in this case against Defendant City of King (“Defendant City of King” or “the City”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, §§ 13 and 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. This matter is before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 68, # 70, # 72] filed by (1) Defendant City of King, (2) the American Legion and American Legion Post 290 of King, North Carolina (“Defendant-In-tervenors”), and (3) Plaintiff. The Motions for Summary Judgment are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication by this Court. Also before the Court is a Motion in Li-mine to Exclude Expert Testimony [Doc. # 88] filed by Plaintiff requesting that the Court exclude the expert testimony of Professor Joseph T. Glatthaar, the expert witness retained by DefendanUIntervenors. Furthermore, Defendant City of King has filed a Motion to File Supplemental Brief [Doc. # 113]. Plaintiff has filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant City of King’s Motion for Supplemental Briefing [Doc. # 117] and Defendant City of King has filed its Reply Brief [Doe. # 118]. For the reasons set forth below this Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #72], the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant City of King’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 68], and deny Defendanh-Intervenors’ Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 70]. Though Plaintiff requests that this Court grant its Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony [Doc. # 88] of Dr. Joseph T. Glatthaar, the Court will defer disposition of that Motion to the trial court, as this Court finds that based on the evidence of Plaintiffs expert witness alone, Dr. Kurt Piehler, and other evidence in the record, that there is a genuine issue of material fact relating to the issue that is subject to such evidence. Thus, the Court will defer all outstanding evidentiary motions in this case to the trial court. Finally, the Court will deny Defendant City of King’s Motion to File Supplemental Brief [Doc..# 113].

1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following is a presentation of the undisputed facts in this case. However, to the extent any disputed facts must be resolved in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court will address those additional facts in the relevant and appropriate context below.

Plaintiff, a resident of King, North Carolina initiated the instant action by filing a Complaint [Doc. # 1] with the Court on November 2, 2012. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City of King violated his First Amendment rights by promoting religion, specifically Christianity, by (1) allowing the Christian flag to fly in the City’s Central Park at the Veterans Memorial; (2) placing a statue depicting a soldier kneeling in front of a cross in the City’s Central Park at the Veterans Memorial; and (3) hosting invocations, benedictions, and other alleged Christian practices at memorial events held at the Veterans Memorial. The Court will discuss the factual background of each alleged violation in turn.

A. Flag Display

In 2003, Defendant City of King initiated plans to build a Veterans Memorial in the City’s Central Park and designated five members to head the Veterans Memorial committee to create the Memorial. (,See August 4, 2003 Committee Minutes [Doc. # 75-5], Ex. R6 at 2; August 14, 2003 Committee Minutes [Doc. # 74-1], Ex. II at 5.) The Memorial was completed in 2004 and consists of three platforms “(1) a large stone pentagonal platform, (2) a smaller black granite pentagonal platform atop the stone platform, and (3) an even smaller black granite platform atop the other two platforms.” (Compl. at ¶ 14.) The two larger platforms supports flagpoles on each of the pentagonal corners and the smallest platform support one flagpole at its center. The members of the Veterans Memorial committee recommended that the Memorial display eleven flags: (1) five flags from the five branches of the armed forces, (2) the American flag, (3) the State flag, (4) the City flag, (5) the American Legion flag, (6) the Prisoner of War flag, and (7) the Christian flag. (American Legion Post 290 Resps. to Pl.’s First Set of Interrogs. [Doc. # 74-4], at 4.) Veterans Memorial committee member Eligah Epperson (“Epperson”) recommended that the Christian flag be flown, which some of the other committee members supported, and Epperson felt that the Christian flag “represented the morals and beliefs of their community.” (American Legion Post 290 Resps. to Pl.’s Second Set of Interrogs. [Doc. # 74-5], at 2.) However, committee member Colonel James Ingram had reservations about flying the Christian flag on the eleventh flagpole, recommending that the committee choose a flag with a “closer connection to the military or veterans” and did not vote for the recommendation that the Christian flag be flown, due to his reservations. (Id. at 3.) The City adopted the recommendation that the Christian flag be flown on the eleventh flagpole. (Id.)

From 2004 until 2010, the Christian flag was consistently flown at the Veterans Memorial, without complaint, until the City took it down in the fall of 2010. The decision to remove the Christian flag from the Veterans Memorial was prompted by „ Plaintiffs anonymous call to City Manager John Cater (“Cater”) to voice his concern about the Christian flag being flown at the Veterans Memorial. (Video Recording KK5, available at http://tinyurl.com/ ExhibitKK5). In discussing his concern with Cater, Plaintiffs essential complaint was that he believed the display of the Christian flag at the Veterans Memorial was a misrepresentation of veterans and that the City was likely “in violation of separation of church and state.” (Id. at 4:55-5:03). Cater noted that Plaintiff was the only person to complain of the Christian flag aspect of the Memorial and Cater told Plaintiff that he, Plaintiff, was ashamed of his complaint because he would not give Cater his full name. However, Cater also acknowledged that he heard arguments similar to Plaintiffs and that “legally speaking [Plaintiff is] probably correct.” (Id. at 12:00-12:32). Subsequent to the phone call between Cater and Plaintiff, Cater informed the City Council about Plaintiffs phone call and the city attorney recommended that the City remove the flag. On August 2, 2010, the City Council held a council meeting and discussed, among other things, Plaintiffs phone call to Cater and the city attorney’s recommendation. (Aug. 2, 2010 City Council Minutes [Doc. # 74-11], at 5.) The City Council voted 3 to 0 to keep the Christian flag at the Veterans Memorial. (Id.) Mayor Pro Tempore Dillard Burnette (“Burnette”), in referring to the anonymity of Plaintiffs phone call, stated that “[t]his shows how cowardly these people are” and Mayor Jack Warren (“the Mayor” or “Mayor Warren”) stated that Plaintiff “definitely needs us to pray for him.” (Aug. 4, 2010 News Article [Doc. # 75-7]; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s First Reqs. for Admissions [Doc. # 74-10], at 1, 2 (admitting that Mayor Warren and Burnette made statements discussed in news article).) However, after receiving letters from the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and upon advice of the City Attorney, the City Council voted the next month, 3 to 1, to remove the Christian flag from the Memorial. (Sept. 15, 2010 City Council Minutes [Doc. # 74-13].) Councilman Wesley Carter, the only council member to vote against the removal of the Christian flag at the September 15, 2010 meeting, stated that he felt that it was his and others’ “religious right and the religious freedom that we are granted by the Constitution to fly that flag” and that the nation “was founded on Christian principles, and [the] flag represents those principles.” (The Stokes News Article [Doc. # 81-4], at 1; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s First Reqs. for Admissions [Doc. # 74-10], at 2 (admitting statement).)

After the City voted to remove the Christian flag, it received phone calls (approximately fifty to one hundred), letters, emails, and a petition with hundreds of signatures, the bulk of which expressed grievances with removal of the Christian flag from the Veterans Memorial. (Petition [Doc. # 76]; Letters and Emails [Doc. # 76-1]; Cater Email [Doc. 76-2], at 43 (stating that the City received fifty to one hundred phone calls regarding the removal of the Christian flag).) Plaintiff also alleged that he faced repercussions after it was determined that he lodged the complaint regarding the Christian flag. In Plaintiffs deposition testimony, he states that such repercussions included (1) being assaulted by a neighbor; (2) having an abnormal amount of traffic in front of his home; and (3) internet blogs threatening his life. (PL’s Dep. [Doc. # 81-6], at 14-15.) To some, it appeared that the community was angry with the City Council for taking down the Christian flag. (Hat-ley Dep. [Doc. # 73-3], at 344.) Additionally, protest vigils were held outside of the Veterans Memorial. (Cater Dep. [Doc. # 73^4], at 239.) Cater gave the protesters permission to hold the vigil because the protest had gained so much public support that Cater was concerned that if he made them leave, that the City would risk negative media exposure and fights. (Id. at 240.) However, at least one King resident expressed that she was upset about the “protest taking over of [sic] a public memorial by Christians” via email to the City Clerk, Tammy Hatley (“City Clerk Hatley” or “Hatley”) (October 26, 2010 Email [Doc. # 76-5].) On October 23, 2010, a rally was held regarding the removal of the Christian flag from the Veterans Memorial, which drew a crowd of thousands of people, where many who spoke at the rally expressed their opposition to the removal of the Christian flag. On October 11, 2010, the City Council held a meeting to discuss the issue regarding the Christian flag, which was open to members of the community for public comment. At the meeting, three options were presented to the public regarding the Christian flag: (1) “Permanently remove the Christian flag from the memorial”; (2) “Create a limited public forum and policy which would designate the single flag pole to display flags of religions, religious symbols or emblems recognized by the U.S. military for placement on government markers”; or (3) “Transfer the memorial to a private entity such as a veteran’s group.” (October 11, 2010 City Council Minutes [Doc. # 74-15], at 1.) At that meeting, 400 to 500 members of the community and people outside of the City of King community attended the meeting and many voiced their support of the Christian flag. For example, Raymond Martinica resident of Winston-Salem, stated that “[w]hen he heard they were going to take the cross off the fallen soldier monument and had already taken down the Christian flag ... he was upset and got a permit from the City to stand guard over the monument.” (Id. at 5.) Other citizens thanked Mayor Warren for previously stating that the City of King was a Christian community, however the City only admits that Mayor Warren stated that “in [his] opinion King is a Christian community.” (Id. at 2, 4; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s First Requests for Admissions [Doc. # 74-10], ¶ 15 (admitting statement).)

At a November 1, 2010 City Council meeting, members of the City Council voted unanimously 4 to 0 to approve Resolution 2010-21, “a resolution to approve a ‘Limited Public Forum Approach for the City of King’s Veteran’s Memorial at Central Park’ ” subject to the review of the City’s attorneys and the approval of the Council. (November 1, 2010 City Council Minutes [Doc. # 96-5], at 3.) Thus, the City Council opted to move forward with the purported limited public forum option to address the ongoing issues with the Christian flag at the Memorial. At that meeting, Mayor Warren stated that he wanted to move forward with the limited public forum approach because it “would give citizens of King access to the Veterans’ Memorial for the express and limited purpose of honoring their veterans and the faith traditions that inspired and sustained the service and sacrifice made by their veteran, that they have represented at the Memorial.” (Id. at 2.) Councilmen Fowler and Carter stated that the public forum option would be the best way to “honor our veterans.” (Id.) Mayor Pro Tempore Bur-nette agreed with the statements of Councilmen Fowler and Carter and stated that “[w]e have to remember that this memorial is to honor veterans. Some other issues have gotten in the way and we’re going to work through those the best we can.” (Id.) The Limited Public Forum Flag Policy (“Flag Policy”) was formally adopted on December 6, 2010. (December 6, 2010 City Council Minutes [Doc. # 74-19], at 4.) Relevantly, the Flag Policy states that “the eleventh flag pole [of the Veterans Memorial] shall be designated as a limited public forum for the purpose of flying, on a rotating basis ..., flags which represent the faith traditions of men and women who have served in the U.S. military.” (Flag Policy [Doc. # 1-2], at ¶ 2.) An “eligible person” may enter into a lottery to fly the flag of their choice for one week at a time. (Id. at ¶¶ 2.b, 8.) The flag displayed on the eleventh flagpole “[s]hall be limited to a flag that displays the emblems of belief recognized by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, as may be amended from time to time, as an available emblem of belief for placement on government headstones or markers.” (Id. at ¶ lO.b.) The Flag Policy requires that the individuals flying a flag provide their own flag at their own expense. (Id. at ¶ lO.e.) When the flag is displayed on-the eleventh flagpole, relevantly, the following requirements must be followed:

A temporary sign or placard will be placed on or near the flagpole which will identify the name, rank, area served, service dates, and status applicable to the veteran in whose honor the flag is being flown. The marker shall also state that the flag is temporarily displayed to honor the role that faith traditions play for men and women who have served and sacrificed to secure the freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of King and the United States of America.... A placard or sign, as described in paragraph 4 above, shall be posted on or near the flagpole and contain a legend that reads “This flag is being flown at the request of a private citizen and is the private expression of such individual and is not an official view or expression of the City,” or words substantially to that effect.

(Id. at ¶¶4, lO.h.) Finally, the policy states that neither the City Council nor its city representatives or employee “shall participate in their official capacity in the selection of flags chosen by requesters.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) However, the policy does allow such representatives or employees to participate in the forum in their “private or individual capacity.” (Id.) Members of the King community have been participating in the Flag Policy since January 2011. In 2011, 2012, and 2013 the Christian flag has flown on the eleventh flagpole for 47 weeks out of 52 weeks of the year. (See 2011-2013 Limited Public Forum Schedules [Docs. # 76-7, # 76-8, # 76-9].) In 2011, Plaintiff was selected, pursuant to the lottery, to participate in the limited forum four times and decided not to fly a flag each time. One other person decided not to fly a flag in 2011. (2011 Limited Public Forum Schedule [Docs. #76-7].) In 2012, Plaintiff was again selected to participate in the forum four times and his wife was selected to participate once. (2012 Limited Public Forum Schedule [Docs. # 76-8].) Plaintiff decided not to fly a flag three times in 2012 and the Buddhist flag one time in 2012. (Id.) Plaintiffs wife decided not to fly a flag when she was selected to participate in the forum in 2012. (Id.) In 2013, Plaintiff was selected to participate in the forum five times and decided not to fly a flag each time. (2013 Limited Public Forum Schedule [Docs. # 76-9].) In 2014, the Christian flag is slated to fly 46 weeks out of 52 weeks of the year, with Plaintiff being selected to participate in the forum four times and his wife being selected to participate twice. (2014 Limited Public Forum Schedule [Docs. # 83-12].) Each time, Plaintiff and his wife are scheduled to fly a flag in 2014, they have chosen to fly no flag.

B. Cross Statute

In March 2010, the City’s Community Appearance Advisory Commission (CAAC) recommended that “a yard shadow figure of a praying soldier made out of metal be commissioned and placed at the King Veteran’s Memorial.” (March 18, 2010 Commission Minutes [Doc. # 74-2], at 5.) On April 5, 2010, the City Council unanimously “approve[d] the construction and placement of a metal Yard Shadow Figure at the Veteran’s Memorial.” (April 5, 2010 City Council Minutes [Doc. # 75], at 3-4.) The CAAC provided American Legion (Local Legion) Trustee, Carl F. Calloway (“Calloway”) with the pattern for the cross statue figure. (American Legion Post 290 Interrog. Resps. [Doc. # 74-4], at 6.) Defendant City of King paid Calloway for the materials to create the statue. ([Doc. # 84-4], at 1; American Legion Post 290 Interrog. Resps. [Doc. #74-4], at 5-6.) The Kneeling Cross Statue (“Cross Statue”) is within the vicinity of the main display of flags at the Veterans Memorial. (Cross Statue Photographs [Doc. # 77-5, - 6]; see April 5, 2010 Minutes [Doc. # 75], at 3.) The Cross Statue depicts a soldier kneeling in front of a Latin cross.

C. Annual Commemorative Events

Plaintiff also complains about the annual ceremonies held in the King Central Park to commemorate Memorial Day, Veterans Day, and September 11. From 2004 until 2012, the City co-sponsored the Veterans Day and Memorial Day annual events with the American Legion, and the Stokes County Arts Council (“Arts Council”). (Def.’s Supplemental Answers to PL’s First Interrogs. [Doc. # 74-8], at 4.) It appears from the record, that the City also hosted the September 11 annual event until 2010. (Compl. at ¶ 54; Def.’s Answer [Doc. # 13], ¶ 54; Hatley Dep. [Doc. # 73-3], at 253-55.) Three days after Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, the City Council voted “to designate all Arts Council events be held at City of King facilities as City sponsored.” (November 5, 2012 Council Meeting Minutes [Doc. # 75-3], at 6.) A few months after Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, the City prepared a memorandum, which transferred the “sponsorship, planning, and organization” of the Veterans Day and Memorial Day ceremonies to the American Legion Post 290 and the Arts Council. (April 2013 Mem. [Doc. # 79].) Prior to 2013, the event programs have included the City of King as a host of the Veterans Day and Memorial Day events, but the City of King’s name is no longer included as a host or sponsor for the programs. (See Event Programs [Doc. # 78-7].)

The Veterans Day and Memorial Day ceremonies in the past, specifically, ceremonies that were hosted by the City, have contained prayers by chaplains and speakers that invoke the name of Christ, have asked the audience to bow their heads in prayer and discussed “the selfless sacrifice of Your Son, Jesus Christ”, have stated that fallen soldiers have “followed in the footstep of your Son”, and have stated that the fallen soldiers are an “image, reflection, and extension of [God’s] love and grace.” (Video Recording MM2, available at http://tinyurl.com/ExhibitMM2.) At the more recent 2013 Memorial Day event, after the City purported to transfer sponsorship of the events to third parties, May- or Warren and the guest speaker acknowledged that the event was put on by the Arts Council and the American Legion; Mayor Warren also thanked both organizations for inviting him to speak at the event and for inviting him “to help the commander lay the wreath.” (Video Recording 003, available at http://tinyurl.com/ Exhibit003 (5:20-5:48, 30:30-31:15).) The speaker at the 2013 Veterans Memorial ceremony also told the audience that “there are two that died for you: the U.S. soldier [and] the Son of God, Jesus Christ” (Video Recording, available at http:// tinyurl.com/ExhibitPP4 (00:59-1:07) and he asked the audience “to teach your children to respect God, older folks, and the military”, (Video Recording, available at http://tinyurl.com/ExhibitPP4 (18:10-18:54).)

Despite the City’s purported transfer of sponsorship of the annual commemorative events to third-party organizations, the City is still involved, to some degree, with these events. For the 2013 Memorial Day ceremony, the Arts Council requested that several news outlets, organizations, and local municipalities — including the City of King — advertise the event flyer on their websites and electronic bulletin boards. (May 13, 2013 Email [Doc. # 79-4], at 1.) The 2013 Memorial Day ceremony flyer only included the names of the Arts Council and the American Legion Post # 290 as the hosts of the event. For the 2013 Veterans Day ceremony, the advertisement the City posted on its website stated “[c]ome join us as we honor and pay our respect to the brave men and women of our armed forces and dedicate the new tiles for the Veterans Memorial.” (King Website Advertisement [Doc. # 79-8].) However, that flyer also stated that the event was sponsored by the American Legion Post # 290 and the Arts Council.

The City has a Special Events Application packet that it requires those requesting to hold special events to fill out and submit for final approval. (See Special Events Packet [Doc. # 83-6].) However, Defendant has not presented evidence that the Arts Council has previously submitted applications for its interest in using Defendant City of King’s property or facilities for these commemorative events. Given that the Arts Council provides many community and public programs at the King Central Park, the City of King does not require the Arts Council to submit'an application for these events. (Doc. Requests [Doc. 79-6], ¶4.) The Arts Council is only, required to call to reserve the Central Park to hold events. (Id.) Additionally, the Arts Council is also not required to request permits for these events. (Id. at ¶ 5.) From the perspective of Mayor Warren, the City’s transfer of the ceremonial events to the Arts Council and American Legion serves as a perpetual reservation for all future Memorial Day and Veterans Day services at the park. (Warren Dep. [Doc. # 73-7], at 124-125.) Plaintiff asserts that the City’s involvement is further evidenced by the fact that the members of the Fire Department displayed a large American flag from one of its fire trucks during the 2013 Memorial Day ceremony. However, the City did not charge the American Legion or the Arts Council for that service and the fire truck was provided without a prior request from the American Legion or the Arts Council. (Holland Dep. [Doc. # 73-7], at 121-22; American Legion Post 290 Interrog. Resps. [Doc! # 74-5], at 4.) However, the City’s Special Events Application Packet includes a request to the have the City of King Fire Department available, but this request also requires an associated fee. (Special Events Application [Doc. #83-6], at 10.) Furthermore, City Clerk Hatley has also assisted the Arts Council by providing its members with contact lists, a planning checklist, and program templates from past ceremonies for the 2013 Memorial Day ceremony. (See Email [Doc. # 79-4]; Hatley Dep. [Doc. #73-3], at 455-56; Warren Dep. [Doc. # 73-5], at 84-85.)

Mayor Warren has participated in the annual commemorative events in the past, (see Event Programs [Doc. # 78-7] (listing Mayor as a participant in the ceremonies for various events)), and he has participated in the events in 2013, even after the City transferred sponsorship of these events to third parties, (see id. at 9, 24). Mayor Warren’s participation has included giving remarks and the welcome, laying of the wreath, and introducing the guest speakers. The speaker at the 2013 Veterans Memorial ceremony also thanked May- or Warren for introducing him. (Video Recording PP3, available at http://tinyurl. com/ExhibitPP3 (0:00-0:09).) Mayor Warren has acknowledged his participation by stating that he accepted an invitation to attend the 2013 Memorial Day ceremony because it was “part of [his] duties as the mayor to be represented [at the ceremony].” (Warren Dep. [Doc. # 73-5], at 79.) The 2013 Veterans Day ceremony also continued the City’s past practice of dedicating pavers to veterans, which are installed at the Veterans Memorial and are purchased from the City. (Event Programs [Doc. # 78-7]; Hatley Dep. [Doc. # 73-3], at 287-289.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In light of the above factual events, Plaintiff filed his Complaint [Doc. # 1] with this Court on November 2, 2012. In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks the following relief: (1) a “declaratory judgment that the City’s practices of displaying the Christian flag and the Cross Statue, and sponsoring prayers and religious activities at official City events are unconstitutional” under the United States and North Carolina Constitutions; (2) a permanent injunction “barring the City from displaying or allowing the display of the Christian flag at the Veterans’ Memorial, from displaying the Cross Statue at the Veterans’ Memorial, and from sponsoring, directing, or otherwise facilitating prayers and other religious activities at City memorial events”; (3) nominal damages of one dollar; (4) attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and (5) “any other relief that the Court deems just and proper.” (Compl. at ¶¶ 72-77.) On January 3, 2013, the City filed its Answer [Doc. # 13]. On February 20, 2013, Defendant-Intervenors filed a Motion to Intervene [Doc. # 20] and their Answer [Doc. #22], Ultimately, on September 23, 2013, the Court entered an Order [Doc. # 56] allowing Defendant-In-tervenors to intervene in this case, which allowed Defendant-Intervenors to join the City in defending the Cross Statue at issue in this case. After the discovery period, the City, Defendant-Intervenors, and Plaintiff submitted Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 68, # 70, # 72]. The Motions are now fully briefed and ready for adjudication.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

When the district court is presented with cross-motions- for summary judgment “[t]he court must rule on each party’s motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720, at 335 (3d ed.1998). “When considering each individual motion, the court must take care to ‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable’ to the party opposing that motion.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir.1996)). As such, the Court will consider the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment separately. However, as Defendant-Intervenors have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment only to assist the City in defending the Cross Statue, the Court will consider the City and Defendant-Interve-nors’ Motions for Summary Judgment together.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) states that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). Once a party moves for summary judgment and the movant properly supports its motion, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine dispute exists for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Specifically, the non-movant must convince the Court that evidence exists creating a genuine dispute for the fact finder. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If no rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant, based on the available evidence, there is no genuine dispute for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. Thus, “[i]n order to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is required to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial.” English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F.Supp.2d 833, 840 (E.D.Va.2002) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Moreover, the Court should not grant a motion for summary judgment “ ‘unless the entire record shows a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and establishes affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances.’ ” Campbell v. Hewitt, Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 21 F.3d 52, 55 (4th Cir.1994) (quoting Phoenix Sav. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 245, 249 (4th Cir.1967)).

IV. DEFENDANT CITY OF KING’S AND DEFENDANT INTERVE-NORS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In Defendant City of King’s Motion for Summary Judgment, it raises three primary issues: (1) that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action; (2) that, to the extent Plaintiff challenges invocations at the annual commemorative events, that Plaintiffs claims are moot because Defendant City of King no longer hosts those events; and (3) that the Veterans Memorial complies with the Establishment, Clause. Furthermore, in Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant-Intervenors request that the Court find that the Cross Statue does not violate the Establishment Clause and the North Carolina Constitution as a matter of law. The Court will address each issue in turn, starting with the City’s assertion that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claims.

A. Standing

Defendant City of King primarily contends that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the present action by primarily asserting that Plaintiff has not suffered the requisite injury to bring the instant action. “To meet the constitutional minimum for [Article III] standing, ‘[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’ ” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir.2000) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). In this case, Defendant City of King primarily contends that Plaintiff has not suffered an injury-in-fact and thus does not have standing. “It has been repeatedly noted that ‘the concept of injury for standing purposes is particularly elusive in Establishment Clause cases.’ ” Suhre v. Haywood Cnty. (Suhre II), 131 F.3d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir.1997) (quoting Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir.1991)). Indeed, because “the Establishment Clause plaintiff is not likely to suffer physical injury or pecuniary loss .... [the] rules of standing recognize that noneconomic or intangible injury may suffice to make an Establishment Clause claim justiciable.” Id. at 1086. Additionally, in Moss v. Spartanburg County School District Seven, the Fourth Circuit stated:

Feelings of marginalization and exclusion are cognizable forms of injury, particularly in the Establishment Clause context, because one of the core objectives of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been to prevent the State from sending a message to non-adherents of a particular religion ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.’

683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir.2012) (quoting McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005) (emphasis added in Moss)). With this foundation in mind, the Court will address the standing issue.

i. Whether Plaintiff is injured by the text of the Flag Policy or the Flag Policy as applied

Defendant City of King first asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the City’s Flag Policy because it alleges that Plaintiff has not sustained an injury-in-fact. Specifically, the City argues that Plaintiff has not provided evidence that he was injured by the text of the Flag Policy and that the Flag Policy creates a limited public forum for private speech. In addressing Defendant City of King’s argument that Plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the Flag Policy by its terms because the City claims that the Flag Policy is a “neutral policy [that] creates a limited public forum for private speech honoring veterans”, (Def. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. # 69], at 8 (emphasis removed)), the Court notes that such an argument is essentially an argument on the merits of Plaintiffs claim, which should be properly reserved for the Court’s analysis only after it determines that Plaintiff has standing. See Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir.2006) (“It is well established that before a federal court can decide the merits of a claim, the claim must invoke the jurisdiction of the court.”). Indeed, the Court must be careful in confusing the merits of Plaintiffs challenge with the threshold standing inquiry. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (“Our threshold inquiry into standing ‘in no way depends on the merits of the [petitioner’s] contention that particular conduct is illegal.’ ” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975))). This is particularly true as Plaintiff argues that Defendant City of King’s Flag Policy has the purpose and effect of endorsing Christianity within the City of King, and essentially argues that the speech involved in this case is government speech. Furthermore, as it relates to his alleged injury, Plaintiff asserts that he is unwillingly exposed to the Christian flag when he visits the Veterans Memorial and that he is “offended by a perceived government expression of religion....” (PL’s Br. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. # 80], at 24 (quoting Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty. (Lambeth I), 321 F.Supp.2d 688, 693 (M.D.N.C.2004), aff'd, 407 F.3d 266 (4th Cir.2005)); see Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1086 (stating that a plaintiff may satisfy the injury element for standing when the plaintiff comes into “unwelcome direct contact with a religious display that appears to be endorsed by the state”)). Thus, in adhering to the Fourth Circuit’s acknowledgment that courts should not adopt “a restrictive rule of standing [that] shuts the door on the meritorious and nonmeritorious [claims] alike”, id., the Court does not find that the City’s assertion that it has created a neutral policy, allowing private speech, defeats Plaintiffs ability to challenge the display of the Flag Policy, at least on the basis that Plaintiff has not alleged an injury.

However, Defendant City of King also asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the policy as applied to him, because he was never denied an opportunity to fly a flag, or to choose to fly no flag at all. In making such an argument, Defendant City of King cites to ACLU Student Chapter-Univ. of Md. College Park v. Mote, 321 F.Supp.2d 670, 675 (D.Md.2004), aff'd on other grounds, 423 F.3d 438 (4th Cir.2005). In Mote, the district court declined to extend standing to a plaintiff who challenged a university policy to set limits on university outsiders’ abilities to engage in public speech on the university campus. In concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the district court determined

The Plaintiffs ... do not allege that they were unable to hear a particular viewpoint on the ... campus that they wished to hear.... Nowhere in [the] record [was] there a suggestion that [the plaintiffs] attempted to sponsor an outsider and was rejected, nor does the record suggest that [the plaintiffs have] not been able to hear a specific viewpoint when he or she wished to do so.

Id. at 675. Indeed, the facts of the instant case bear some resemblance to the facts in Mote, to the extent that the complaining parties in both cases challenged policies, which, as applied, do not appear to injure them. Specifically, in this case, Plaintiff has been able to participate in the lottery under the Flag Policy multiple times, in fact, every year since the Flag Policy was put into effect Plaintiff was able to fly a flag of his own choosing, or he could choose to fly no flag at all, without interference from Defendant City of King. Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff states, in his Reply Brief regarding his Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 94], that he “challenges the City’s unlawful promotion of Christianity, not the denial of access to a public forum.” (Id. at 4 (citing to Compl. at ¶¶ 61-70)); see Doe v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 713 F.3d 745, 762 (4th Cir.2013) (“An as-applied challenge attacks the constitutionality of a statute ‘based on a developed factual record and the application of a statute to a specific person.’ ” (quoting Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 172 (4th Cir.2009) (en banc))). Therefore, because Plaintiff does not challenge the Flag Policy as applied to him, and because in the alternative, the Court finds that Plaintiff would not have standing to assert an as-applied challenge to the Flag Policy based on the facts and cases cited above, the Court will not address any issues relating to the application of the Flag Policy to Plaintiff.

ii. Whether Plaintiff has suffered an injury because he once displayed a Christian flag in his yard and opted to fly a Buddhist flag under the Flag Policy

Defendant City of King also implies that because Plaintiff once displayed a Christian flag in his own yard and opted to fly a flag with a Buddhist emblem on the flag pole at issue in this case, it makes Plaintiffs “alleged distaste for religious symbols ... specious at best.” (Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. # 69], at 10.) Plaintiff attempts to combat the City’s argument by pointing to one of his declarations, in which Plaintiff stated that he placed the Christian flag in his own yard for a few days to demonstrate that he objects to the City’s advancement of religion but that he does “not object to religion in general or to individuals displaying religious symbols on their own private property.” (Hewett Second Decl. [Doc. # 80-2], ¶ 3). Plaintiff has also stated that he displayed the Buddhist flag once “to demonstrate that not everyone in the City of King is a Christian.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) The Court finds that Defendant City of King’s implication requires discussion, as it raises a meritorious argument regarding whether Plaintiff has actually suffered an injury as he has previously opted to display religious symbols voluntarily. Although it appears that Plaintiff may object to the City’s endorsement of religion in general, as can be gleaned from the Complaint and record, it appears that Plaintiffs primary contention is that he takes issue with the City’s alleged endorsement of Christianity, which he believes makes non-Christians feel like outsiders. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs decision to fly the Buddhist flag pursuant to the Flag Policy is not inconsistent with his challenge that the City unlawfully promotes Christianity.

In addressing the City’s argument that Plaintiff has not suffered an injury because Plaintiff briefly displayed the Christian flag on his yard, Plaintiff attempts to rebut the City’s argument by citing to three cases in which religious leaders were allowed to bring Establishment Clause claims against a government entity or public official for advancing religious beliefs. See, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 477-78 (6th Cir.2002) (standing satisfied for Rabbi and reverends, among others, to challenge Ten Commandment monument on state capitol grounds); Smith v. Cnty. of Albemarle, Va., 895 F.2d 953, 954-55 (4th Cir.1990) (allowing Christian ministers, among other religious officials, to challenge a county display of a nativity scene); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989) (allowing the Rabbi, among others, to bring an Establishment Clause claim for displaying a menorah on public property). However, the Court notes that in two cases cited by Plaintiff, Adland and Smith, the circuit courts, in their discussion of standing, did not address the specific question of whether a person of a certain religious belief can bring a claim alleging that the government has violated the Establishment Clause by endorsing or establishing the religion that the claimant also adheres to. Furthermore, Kaplan does not even address the standing inquiry. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiffs personal display of the Christian flag on his private property does not prevent a finding that Plaintiff has standing. First, Plaintiff has maintained, on the record, that he is not Christian, (Hewett Dep. [Doc. # 81-6], at 19), and Defendant City of King does not argue that Plaintiff is Christian. The Court finds Plaintiffs lack of belief in Christianity important, as Plaintiff argues that the City’s endorsement of Christianity has the effect of treating others, that are not Christian, as “second-class citizens.” (Compl. [Doc. # 1], at 26.) Second, the Court finds instructive the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir.2004), in which the court noted that standing could be maintained by plaintiffs who “are members of religious sects but nonetheless are offended by religious displays on government property.” Id. (citing Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1523 (9th Cir.1993) where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in finding that members of Catholic and Episcopalian faiths had standing to challenge the government’s alleged endorsement of a cross symbol). Thus, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs decision to fly a Christian flag in his own yard, precludes him from challenging the display of the Christian flag at the Veterans Memorial.

iii. Whether Plaintiff has prudential standing concerning the Flag Policy

Additionally, Defendant City of King argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the Flag Policy because of prudential concerns. Specifically, Defendant City of King asserts that Plaintiff, in objecting to the Flag Policy, is raising the legal rights of others because Plaintiff was given several opportunities to display a flag of his choice through the Flag Policy lottery system. As a general proposition, a person may lack standing if he or she seeks to raise the rights of others. See Moss, 683 F.3d at 606 (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97. L.Ed. 1586 (1953)). However, as the Court noted above that Plaintiff argues that the City’s perceived endorsement of Christianity, specifically through a display of the Christian flag, has injured him, the Court does not find that the City’s prudential argument affects the Court’s determination that Plaintiff has standing regarding the flying of the Christian flag.

iv. Whether Plaintiff has suffered an injury because he attended annual commemorative events and Plaintiff previously participated in the City’s Day of Prayer Ceremony

Defendant City of King also asserts that Plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the invocations at City events. Specifically, in its Reply Brief, Defendant City of King points to an audio recording of Plaintiff at the City’s former National Day of Prayer Ceremony, where Plaintiff himself addressed the crowd and offered a Buddhist prayer and also invoked the name of Jesus. (Audio Recording of National Day of Prayer Service, App. 11, 1:13:00-1:17:02 (on file with Court).) Thus, it appears that Defendant City of King argues that because Plaintiff participated in past ceremonial events by offering an invocation, Plaintiff cannot show that he has been injured by Christian invocations and other Christian content involved at ceremonial events. However, in reviewing the audio recording offered by Defendant City of King, the Court notes that the recording undercuts the City’s argument. Specifically, the recording includes statements by Plaintiff calling on members of the City of King community to respect those with other, non-Christian beliefs and cultural backgrounds and to refrain from putting one religion above another. Although, Plaintiff invokes the name of Christ, Plaintiff refers to Christ in the context of acknowledging that the teachings of Christ show that “he who is without sin cast the first stone.” (Video Recording of National Day of Prayer Service, 1:16:10-1:16:33.) As such, it appears that Plaintiffs invocation was a message of religious-tolerance of all faiths and religions, which does not appear to be inconsistent with Plaintiffs claim that the commemorative events at issue in this case are overtly Christian, advance Christianity, and are in violation of the Establishment Clause. Furthermore, to the extent Defendant City of King argues that Plaintiffs participation in or attendance of the City memorial events precludes him from asserting standing, the Court notes that “Plaintiff! ] need not allege that [he] changed [his] conduct to avoid contact with an offensive display [or religious activity].” Lambeth I, 321 F.Supp.2d at 691 (quoting Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1088 for the proposition that “[i]n evaluating standing, the Supreme Court has never required that Establishment Clause plaintiffs take affirmative steps to avoid contact with challenged displays or religious exercises.”).

Defendant City of King also points to Plaintiffs deposition testimony where he acknowledged that he liked “f* *king with these people”, which based upon the related video recording was referencing his recitation of a Buddhist prayer at the National Day of Prayer Ceremony. (Hewett Dep. [Doc. # 86-13]; Audio Recording of National Day of Prayer Service, 1:32:30-1:35:00.) Thus, Defendant City of King challenges the sincerity of Plaintiffs injury. Although the Court acknowledges Plaintiffs off-color remark, the Court does not find that such a remark diminishes Plaintiffs asserted injury, that is, that he was unwillingly exposed to what he perceives as a government endorsement of religion.

v. Whether Plaintiff has sufficient contact with the Christian flag, Cross Statue, and the Veterans Memorial to show injury-in-fact

Defendant vCity of King also argues that Plaintiff lacks standing because he does not have “frequent, unwelcome contact” with the Cross Statue, the Christian flag display, and the Veterans Memorial in general. (Def.’s Reply Br. [Doc. # 86], at 15.) Specifically, Defendant City of Bang appears to argue that because Plaintiff “must make a special trip to the Central Park to view the Memorial, especially the statue, which he cannot see from the road”, Plaintiff lacks the requisite “unwelcome direct contact” required to show standing. (Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. # 69], at 10.) However, the Fourth Circuit has pointed out that “where there is a personal connection between the plaintiff and the challenged display in his or her home community, standing is more likely to lie.” Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1087. Additionally, in Suhre II, the Fourth Circuit noted that “personal contact with state-sponsored religious symbolism is precisely the injury that was sufficient to confer standing in School District of Abington v. Schempp.” Id. at 1086. In this case, Plaintiff argues that he “challenges the promotion of Christianity by the City in which he lives, through displays and ceremonies to which he is repeatedly directly exposed.” (Pl.’s Br, in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. # 80], at 24.) Additionally, Defendant City of King cites to Suhre II for its proposition that Plaintiff must be repetitively required to be present at the Memorial to have standing. However, in Suhre II, the Fourth Circuit determined that Plaintiff had a cognizable injury as a “user of the court’s” and as a “participant in local politics and government.” Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1090. Distinguishably, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), the plaintiffs in that case were denied standing because they had “absolutely no personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion.” Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1086. Thus, the Court finds the facts of this case to stand somewhere in between the facts of Suhre II (where the plaintiff sustained sufficient frequent contacts with the challenged religious displays in the courthouse because of his rights to seek judicial remedies in that courthouse and his participation in local politics) and Valley Forge (where the plaintiffs had no personal contact with the challenged activity and the plaintiffs resided in Maryland and Virginia, were headquartered in Washington D.C., and learned of the challenged activity through a news release). However, the Court finds that the facts of this case are closer to the facts of Suhre II, because here, Plaintiff has repeatedly faced the alleged religious displays within the past few years while attending the annual memorial events hosted by the City. Additionally, although the Court makes no finding as to whether Plaintiff has a legally recognized right to visit the Veterans Memorial to pay homage to fallen soldiers, finding that Plaintiff does not have standing because he is not required to visit the Memorial, which is in a city park open to all, particular those that wish to honor veterans, would likely be inconsistent with Suhre II. (See King Website page [Doc. # 74-3], at 2 (“The memorial is dedicated to all veterans who have served in any of the 5 branches of the armed services from World War I to the present.”)); cf. School District of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (stating that standing to challenge required Bible readings was not “mitigated by the fact that individual students may be absent themselves upon parental request, for the fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause.”); Newdow v. Bush, 391 F.Supp.2d 95, 103 (D.D.C.2005) (“In the religious-display cases, a personal connection exists if a plaintiff is a member of the community in which the challenged religious exhibit is displayed, or if the plaintiff frequently visited the site of the display.” (citing cases)). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has had sufficient contacts to support his standing to pursue his claims.

vi. Whether Plaintiff has too much contact with the Veterans Memorial, the Christian flag, and the Cross Statue to confer an injury

Next, Defendant City of King argues that Plaintiff has too much contact with the Christian flag and the Cross Statue to confer standing. Specifically, the City argues that because Plaintiff voluntarily visits the Memorial, he cannot show that the contact with the Christian flag and Cross Statue is unwelcomed. However, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Suhre II, Plaintiff is not required to “take affirmative steps to avoid contact with challenged displays or religious exercises.” Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1088. Also noted by the Fourth Circuit, “[a]bsent Supreme Court direction, we are unwilling to craft a rule of standing for religious display cases that would effectively add ‘insult’ to the existing ‘injury’ requirement.... Rules of standing that require plaintiffs to avoid public places would make religious minorities into outcasts.” Id. As Plaintiff has declared, he has visited the Veterans Memorial when he attends the City’s annual commemorative events and will attend them in the future. (Pl.’s Decl. [Doc. # 73-2], ¶ 10.) He also declared that he visits the Veterans Memorial to reflect on the memory of deceased friends. (Id. at ¶ 11.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs decision to continue visiting the Veterans Memorial to reflect on deceased friends despite his alleged unwelcome contact with aspects of the Memorial falls squarely within the Fourth Circuit’s determination that “[florcing an Establishment Clause plaintiff to avoid the display of which he complains im order to gain standing to challenge it only imposes an extra penalty on individuals already alleged to be suffering a violation of their constitutional rights.” Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1088. As such, the Court finds no merit in the City’s argument that Plaintiff has too much contact with the Memorial to confer standing.

Additionally, the Court notes the inherent conflict with the arguments asserted by the City. The City first asserts that Plaintiff does not have enough contacts with the Memorial to confer standing because he visits the Memorial for commemorative events only and Plaintiff is not required to visit the Memorial. However, the City subsequently argues that because Plaintiff voluntarily visits the Memorial during these ceremonies, that his contacts with the displays at the Veterans Memorial are not unwelcomed. However, the Fourth Circuit in Suhre II gives guidance on such a position. Specifically, the Suhre II court stated that “[a] stringent requirement that plaintiffs take steps to cure their own injury would create mootness problems in many an Establishment clause case.” Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1089. Thus, the Fourth Circuit in Suhre II stated that it was “unwilling to put potential Establishment Clause plaintiffs to the task of precisely calibrating their reactions to offensive state-sponsored religious symbolism at the peril of either reacting too little to have standing or reacting so much that their constitutional claims are deemed moot.” Id. Thus, the Court is unwilling to credit the City’s argument that Plaintiff visits the Memorial too much to show that his contact is unwelcome for the purposes of standing, but that Plaintiff has visited the Memorial too little to show that his contacts were frequent for the purposes of standing.

vii. Whether Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of future harm

Defendant City of King also asserts that Plaintiff fails to prove that he will experience future harm from the Memorial. Specifically, Defendant City of King argues that because Plaintiff “has [not] proved any facts showing regular and repetitive requirements for him to be present in Central Park and near the Memorial” and because he “cannot see the soldier statue from the road” when he drives past Central Park every day, he cannot show any threat of a future injury. (Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. # 69], at 10.) Indeed, “the Supreme Court [has] held that standing to seek injunctive relief does not exist unless the plaintiff can show a substantial likelihood of future harm.” Payne v. TR Assocs., LLC, 880 F.Supp.2d 702, 705 (E.D.N.C.2012) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). However, as noted above, the Fourth Circuit has determined that standing is more likely for a plaintiff when there is “a personal connection between the plaintiff and the challenged display in his or her home community.” Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1087. Plaintiff is a veteran of the United States Army and has served his country in Afghanistan. (Compl. at ¶ 1; Def.’s Answer at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff has stated that he intends to continue attending the events at the Veterans Memorial that commemorate veterans in the future, even though he believes that the “prayers and other Christian content at these ceremonies serve to honor only veterans who are Christian” and that “[ejxcept to attend the memorial ceremonies ... [Plaintiff] no longer visit[s] the Veterans Memorial to reflect on deceased friends because [he] do[es] not wish to encounter the Christian flag and Cross Statue.” (PL’s Decl. [Doc. # 73-2], ¶¶ 10, 11.) Thus, as Plaintiff acknowledges that he will continue to participate in the ceremonies that honor veterans and he has declared that he has attended almost all of the City’s [commemorative] events in the past since returning from Afghanistan in 2004, see Stihre II, 131 F.3d at 1091 (citing cases for the proposition that although “past injury [is] probative of likely future injury”), the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated a substantial likelihood of future harm.

Furthermore, Defendant City of King asserts that because it no longer hosts the commemorative events that include invocations, as they are currently hosted by third-party organizations, that Plaintiff will never suffer any future harm because of the City’s asserted practice of engaging in prayer at public events. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff has stated that he intends to continue attending the events at the Veterans Memorial that commemorate veterans, even though the he believes that the “prayers and other Christian content at these ceremonies serve to honor only veterans who are Christian.” (PL’s Decl. [Doc. # 73-2], ¶ 10); see Suhre II, 131 F.3d at 1091. Additionally, to the extent Defendant City of King also asserts that it no longer hosts these events and thus Plaintiff will no longer suffer harm as caused by Defendant City of King, the Court notes that Plaintiff asserts, and has provided evidence of what appears to be Defendant City of King’s continued involvement in the most recent commemorative events, such that Plaintiff argues that the City’s involvement still has the effect of endorsing these events. Cf. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 292 F.Supp.2d 766, 770 (D.Md.2003) (finding that the plaintiff had standing, in part, when the plaintiff argued that the city’s sale of property to a third party was a sham “intended to remove [the city’s] legal responsibility for the [Ten Commandments] monument”). Furthermore, to the extent Defendant City of King’s argument is an attempt to assert that Plaintiffs claim regarding the commemorative events is moot, as it argues that those events are now hosted by third parties, the Court will address such an argument in its discussion of the mootness doctrine.

Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has suffered a sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing to him to challenge the City’s asserted display of the Christian flag, the City’s erecting of the cross statue, and the City’s alleged practice of engaging in Christian prayer and other Christian content at the annual commemorative events that are at issue in this case. Additionally, the Court finds that the injuries Plaintiff has asserted are fairly traceable to the actions of the City and because Plaintiff will likely suffer future harm, these injuries can be redressed by Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has Article III standing.

B. Mootness

Defendant City of King also contends, to the extent Plaintiff brings claims against it for violating the Establishment Clause and the North Carolina Constitution for hosting commemorative events that involve Christian content, that such an issue is moot because Defendant City of King no longer hosts such commemorative events. Specifically, the City of King has stated that those events, particularly, the Memorial Day, Veterans Day, and September 11th events, are hosted by third parties, the Arts Council and the American Legion. Indeed, Defendant City of King has even provided evidence, by way of a memorandum memorializing the City’s agreement with the American Legion and the Arts Council, confirming that third parties would “take over sponsorship, planning, and organization of the Veterans Day and Memorial Day cele