Citations
- 29 F. Supp. 3d 808
Full opinion text
ORDER AND REASONS
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN, District Judge.
In this litigation, Plaintiff Board of Commissioners of the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority — East (“Plaintiff’) seeks damages and injunctive relief against ninety-two oil and gas companies whose actions have allegedly caused erosion of coastal lands, leaving south Louisiana increasingly exposed to tropical storms and hurricanes. Plaintiff originally filed suit in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, but Defendants removed the matter to this federal Court. Now pending before the Court is Plaintiffs “Motion to Remand.” Having considered the motion, the memoranda in support, the mem-oranda in opposition, the statements at oral argument, Plaintiffs petition, the notice of removal, and the applicable law, the Court will deny the motion.
Because the Court’s specific basis for jurisdiction has the potential to reverberate throughout a number of other considerations in this litigation — particularly, Plaintiffs entitlement, if any, to a jury trial, and choice of law questions — the Court has examined all five bases of jurisdiction raised in Defendants’ Notice of Removal.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff in this matter is the Board of Commissioners of the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority' — East, individually and as the board governing the. Orleans Levee District, the Lake Borgne Basin Levee District, and the East Jefferson Levee District. The Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority (the “Authority”) was created by statute' in 2006 to further “regional coordination of flood protection.” According to Plaintiff, the Authority’s “mission is to ensure the physical and operational integrity of the regional flood risk management system, and to work with local, regional, state and federal partners to plan, design and construct projects that will reduce the probability and risk of flooding of the residents within the Authority’s jurisdiction.”
Defendants are ninety-two oil and gas companies operating in what Plaintiff refers to as the “Buffer Zone.” The Buffer Zone “extends from East of the Mississippi River through the Breton Sound Basin, the Biloxi Marsh, and the coastal wetlands of eastern New Orleans and up to Lake St. Catherine.”
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ oil and gas operations have led to coastal erosion in the Buffer Zone, making 'south Louisiana more vulnerable to severe weather and flooding. According to Plaintiff, “[cjoastal lands have for centuries provided a crucial buffer zone between south Louisiana’s communities and the violent wave action and storm surge that tropical storms and hurricanes transmit from the Gulf of Mexico.” However, “[hjundreds of thousands of acres of coastal lands that once protected south Louisiana are now gone as a result of oil and gas activities.” Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have, “dredged a network of canals to access oil and gas wells and to transport the many products and by-products of oil and gas production.” This canal network, in conjunction with “the altered hydrology associated with oil and gas activities,” has caused vegetation die-off, sedimentation inhibition, erosion, and submergence — all leading to coastal land loss.. In addition to the initial dredging, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants “exacerbate direct land loss by failing to maintain the canal network and banks of the canals that Defendants have dredged, used, or otherwise overseen.” This failure has “caused both the erosion of the canal banks and expansion beyond their originally permitted widths and depths of the canals comprising that network.” Looking beyond the alleged effects of the canal network, Plaintiffs identify ten other oil and gas activities that allegedly “drastically inhibit the natural hydrological patterns and processes of the coastal lands” — road dumps, ring levees, drilling activities, fluid withdrawal, seismic surveys, marsh buggies, spoil disposal/dispersal, watercraft navigation, impoundments, and propwashing/ maintenance dredging.
B. Procedural Background
On July 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed suit in Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. In its petition, Plaintiff asserts six causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) strict liability, (3) natural servitude of drain, (4) public nuisance, (5) private nuisance, and (6) breach of contract — third party beneficiary. Plaintiff requests both damages and injunctive relief
... in the form of abatement and restoration of the coastal land loss at issue, including, but not limited to, the backfill-ing and revegetating of each and every canal Defendants dredged, used, and/or for which they bear responsibility, as well as all manner of abatement and restoration activities determined to be appropriate, including, but not limited to, wetlands creation, reef creation, land bridge construction, hydrologic restoration, shoreline protection, structural protection, bank stabilization, and ridge restoration.
While Plaintiffs six causes of action are all ostensibly' state-law claims, Plaintiff contends that “Defendants’ dredging and maintenance activities at issue in this action are governed by a longstanding and extensive regulatory framework under both federal and state law specifically aimed at protecting against the deleterious effects of dredging activities.” According to Plaintiff, “the relevant components of this regulatory framework ... buttress the Authority’s claims.” Specifically, Plaintiff points to the River and Harbors Act of 1899, which “grants to the [Army Corps of Engineers] exclusive authority to permit modification of navigable waters of the United States and prohibits the unauthorized alteration of or injury to levee systems and other flood control measures built by the United States.” Plaintiff also cites the Clean Water Act of 1972 and accompanying regulations, which require Defendants to “[mjaintain canals and other physical alterations as originally proposed; [r]estore dredged or otherwise modified areas to their natural state upon completion of their use or their abandonment; and [m]ake all reasonable efforts to minimize the environmental impact of the Defendants’ activities.” Further, Plaintiff references the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 and related Louisiana coastal zone regulations that “impose ... a litany of duties and obligations expressly designed to minimize the adverse ecological, hydrological, topographical, and other environmental effects” associated with oil and gas activities. Finally, Plaintiff cites “[Regulations and rights-of-way granted across state-owned lands and water bottoms administered by the Louisiana Office of State Lands.” According to Plaintiff, “[t]his regulatory framework establishes a standard of care under Louisiana law that Defendants owed and knowingly undertook when they engaged in oil and gas activities.” Additionally, Plaintiff avers that these “permitting schemes created numerous individual obligations under Louisiana law between Defendants and governmental bodies of which Plaintiff is the third-party beneficiary.”
On August 13, 2013, Defendant Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (“Chevron”) removed the case to federal court. In its Notice of Removal, Chevron asserts five grounds for federal jurisdiction: (1) Plaintiffs right to relief depends upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal law; (2) Plaintiff asserts a general maritime claim; (3).the lawsuit is subject to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”); (4) the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) applies; and (5) federal enclave jurisdiction applies.
On September 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed the pending “Motion to Remand.” On October 28, 2013, all Defendants filed a “Joint Response in Opposition to the Motion to Remand,” and Defendant Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC, Gulf South Pipeline Co. LP, Southern Natural Gas Company, and. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP (collectively, the “Natural Gas Act Defendants”) filed an additional “Response in Opposition to Motion to Remand” addressing jurisdictional issues specific to certain natural gas producers. The Court also received supplemental briefs from HKN, Inc., White Oak Operating, LLC, Liberty Oil and Gas Corporation, Manti Operating Company, Mosbacher Energy Company, Coastal Exploration & Production, LLC, and Flash Gas & Oil Northeast, Inc. On November 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed an “Omnibus Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Remand.”
The Court heard oral argument on December 18, 2018. Following oral argument, both Plaintiff and Defendants brought supplemental authorities to the Court’s attention. In particular, on February 20, 2014, Defendants Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Union Oil Company of California, Chevron Pipeline Co., and Kewanee Industries, Inc. filed a “Notice of Issuance of Supreme Court Judgment,” representing that in light of a recent Supreme Court opinion, they were withdrawing their argument that CAFA supplies a basis for federal jurisdiction in this case.
II. Standard on a Motion to Remand
“ ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and by statute.’ ” Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may generally remove a civil action filed in state court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the action. The removing party bears the burden of demonstrating that federal jurisdiction exists. In assessing whether removal was appropriate, the Court “consid-eres] the claims in the state court petition as they existed at the time of removal.” The Court is guided by the principle, grounded in notions of comity and the recognition that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, that “the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand.”
As noted above, in their Notice of Remand, Defendants assert that federal jurisdiction exists based on five grounds: (1) Plaintiff asserts a general maritime claim; (2) federal enclave jurisdiction applies; (3) the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) applies; (4) the lawsuit is subject to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”); and (5) Plaintiffs right to relief depends upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. These five grounds are addressed in turn.
III. Whether Admiralty Jurisdiction Exists
A. Parties’ Arguments
1. Plaintiffs Arguments in Support of Remand
Plaintiff argues the Court does not have admiralty jurisdiction because “[t]he Authority’s claims do not constitute general maritime claims, and even if they did, general maritime claims are not removable without a separate basis for federal court jurisdiction.” According to Plaintiff, “the Petition does not allege that Defendants caused any impediments to navigability or maritime activities.”
First, Plaintiff cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. as establishing a two-part test for whether “a maritime nexus sufficient to establish admiralty jurisdiction exists.” “[Fjirst, a court must assess the general features of the type of incident, involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.” “[SJecond, the court must examine the general conduct from which the incident arose to determine whether there is a substantial relationship between the activity giving rise to the incident and traditional maritime activity.”
Applying this test, Plaintiff avers that its claims “do not involve ‘a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce’ because neither the impairment of navigability nor impact upon maritime commerce forms any part of the Authority’s allegations.” Rather, Plaintiff focuses on the “degradation of coast lands, not coastal waterways, through Defendants’ oil and gas activities.” Citing Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered Products Co., Inc., Plaintiff contends that “claims for damages related to oil and gas production activities, even though they might occur on navigable waters, have been held to be insufficiently connected to traditional maritime activity. ...” Alleging that “Defendants’ act and omissions have caused land to convert to open water,” Plaintiff- contends that “quite apart from disrupting navigability, Defendants’ conduct may have actually enhanced navigability, though at the devastating cost of the natural land buffer.”
In further support of its position, Plaintiff discusses Louisiana Crawfish Producers Association — West v. Amerada Hess Corp., where, according to Plaintiff, a magistrate judge in the Western District of Louisiana determined that failure to maintain oil pipelines and dredged canals did not sufficiently connect to traditional maritime activity.
Second, Plaintiff argues that even if the Petition asserts general maritime claims, “that alone would not suffice to support this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.” According to Plaintiff, a plaintiff may bring maritime claims in state court under the “saving-to-suitors” clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1338, and “[t]he traditional rule regarding maritime claims brought in state court is that such claims cannot be removed unless ‘there exists some basis for jurisdiction other than admiralty.’ ”
Plaintiff acknowledges that two decisions from the Southern District of Texas have held that a recent amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 “has undermined the longstanding prohibition on removal.” However, Plaintiff maintains that these cases “offer a faulty analysis because they fail to recognize that the saving-to-suitors clause has long provided the basis for the non-removability of maritime claims and they fail to address how the amendment of § 1441 alters the traditional rule.” ■ According to Plaintiff, two courts in this District “have continued to adhere to the longstanding rule regarding non-removability of maritime claims, even in the wake of the amendment of § 1441.” Further, Plaintiff asserts that “[a]t least two post-amendment decisions of the Fifth Circuit dealing with' cases filed pre-amendment support the continued viability of the traditional rule as based upon § , 1333.”
2. Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition to Remand
Defendants argue that “[t]he Court should deny the motion to remand because maritime jurisdiction provides' an independent basis for exercising federal jurisdiction.” According to Defendants, “to determine whether jurisdiction exists, a court must evaluate, first, whether the alleged ‘tort occurred on navigable water’ or the alleged ‘injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water’ (the ‘location’ test), and, second, whether the alleged tort has a connection to maritime activity (the ‘connection’ test).”
With respect to the location test, Defendants contend that “[t]he ‘location’ test is satisfied because the Petition alleges injuries suffered on land purportedly caused by vessels on navigable waters.” Specifically, Defendants assert that “[t]he Petition rests principally on allegations that Defendants’ oil and gas dredging activities created a network of access and pipeline canals that have resulted in a loss of coastal lands.”
Looking at the connection test, Defendants represent that “[cjourts have held that the ‘connection’ test is met when there is ‘a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce’ and ‘the general character of the activity’ giving rise to the litigation ‘shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.’ ” According to Defendants, “[t]he Petition’s alleged activities impact maritime commerce.” Defendants cite In re Ingram Barge Co. for the proposition that dredging activities “by their ‘very nature ... seem[ ] to affect maritime commerce!.]’ ” Further, Defendants argue that the Petition alleges that Defendants “have contributed to an ‘increased storm surge risk,’ ” which would necessarily affect the Port of New Orleans and traffic on the Mississippi River. Addressing the second part of the connection test, Defendants contend that “[b]oth dredging and oil and gas drilling from barges or other vessels have been deemed by the courts (including the Supreme Court) to constitute traditional maritime activities.”
Following this analysis of whether Plaintiffs claims are properly characterized as maritime claims, Defendants argue that “maritime claims supply an independent basis for removing this action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.” Defendants acknowledge that § 1441(b) had previously “prevented removal of maritime claims absent an independent basis for jurisdiction,” such as diversity, but maintain that post-amendment “there is no impediment to this Court’s removal jurisdiction.” Defendants counter Plaintiffs argument that the prohibition on removal is grounded in § 1331’s saving-to-suitors clause, asserting that “the ‘saving to suitors clause does no more than preserve the right of maritime Suitors to pursue nonmaritime remedies. It does not guarantee them a nonfederal forum, or limit the right of defendants to remove such actions to federal court where there exists some basis for federal jurisdiction other than admiralty.’ ” Defendants point to three district court cases recognizing that the effect of the amendment to § 1441 “is to render maritime and admiralty cases removable under § 1441(b)”— Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., Wells v. Abe’s Boat Rentals Inc., and Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co. Further, Defendants distinguish the cases cited by Plaintiffs, contending that they either do not address whether the amendment changed the traditional rule or involve claims filed prior to the amendment.
3. Plaintiffs Reply in Further Support of Remand
In its reply, Plaintiff reiterates “[m]ari-time commerce is not at issue in this case. The Authority’s case is based upon the increased costs that the Authority will be forced to bear in building and maintaining flood protection assets.” According to Plaintiff, “[o]nly in the highly attenuated sequence of events proposed by Defendants are those flood protection assets linked to maritime commerce.” Further, Plaintiff maintains that “even if there were a sufficient connection with maritime commerce in this case to establish jurisdiction, the Defendants mistakenly rely on Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc. as providing the rule that this Court must follow for remov-ability' of maritime cases.” According to Plaintiff, Ryan was wrongly decided, and “the amendment to § 1441 was not meant to effect such a profound change.”
4. Supplemental Authority
Following oral argument on the pending motion, both Plaintiff and Defendants submitted supplemental authority regarding the removability of admiralty claims. On January 31, 2014, Defendant brought to the Gourt’s attention a district court order in Tiley v. American Tugs, wherein the court adopted the reasoning set forth in Ryan and denied a motion to remand. On June 3, 2014, however, Defendants informed the Court that the district court had vacated its earlier Tiley order. On March 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a notice of supplemental authority regarding Coronel v. AK Victory, a case from the Western District of Washington in which a court determined that it lacked removal jurisdiction over general maritime claims.
B. Applicable Law
Article III of the U.S. Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” In 28 U.S.C. § 1333, Congress implemented this power, giving federal district courts “original jurisdiction ... of ... [a] civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction....”
In determining whether admiralty jurisdiction, exists over a tort claim, courts apply the two-part analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, The first part, known as the location test, asks “whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether the injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water.” In .this context, “navigable water” refers to a body of water that is “navigable in fact.” Bodies of water are navigable in fact where “they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordi-' nary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”
The second part, known as the connection test, raises two issues. First, a court must “assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.” This inquiry “turns ... on a description of the incident at an intermediate level of possible generality.” “whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” At this step, the court “ask[s] whether a tortfeasor’s activity, commercial or noncommercial, on navigable waters is so closely related to activity traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons fop applying special admiralty rules would apply in the suit at hand.”
C. Analysis
Looking first at the location test, to evaluate whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether the injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water, the Court must determine what the alleged injury is. In this case, the injury at issue is “ecological degradation and extensive land loss” within the-Buffer Zone, which “in turn has created markedly increased storm surge risk, attendant flood protection costs, and, thus, damages to Plaintiff.” Land degradation and land loss by their very nature occur on land. Thus, the question becomes whether this injury was caused by a vessel on navigable water. According to the allegations in the Petition, this injury was caused by various activities of Defendants, including dredging. The parties do not dispute that dredges are vessels, and as the Supreme Court observed in Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company courts have consistently “group[ed] dredges alongside more traditional seafaring vessels under the. maritime statutes.” Further, the parties do not dispute that the coastal waterways that were dredged are navigable waters. Accordingly, the Court finds that the location test is met.
Turning to the connection test, to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, the Court must first describe the incident at an intermediate level of possible generality. The description should be “neither too general to distinguish different cases nor too specific to the unique facts of the particular case” &emdash; that is, it “should be general enough to capture the possible effects of similar incidents on maritime commerce, but specific enough to exclude irrelevant cases.” Grubart instructs that the purpose of this exercise is to determine “whether the incident could be seen within a class of incidents that pose[ ] more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping.” For example, in Grubart, the defendant had used a crane, sitting on a barge in the Chicago River to drive piles into the riverbed above a tunnel in order to reinforce a bridge. Months later, the walls and ceiling of the tunnel collapsed, causing the tunnel as well as nearby buildings to flood. The Court characterized the incident as “damage by a vessel in navigable water to an underwater structure.” In Sisson v. Ruby, a case on which Grubart relied, a fire erupted on a pleasure yacht docked at a marina on Lake Michigan. The fire destroyed the yacht and damaged several neighboring vessels and the marina. There, the Supreme Court described the incident as “a fire on a vessel docked at a marina on navigable waters.” Grubart elaborated on Sisson’s characterization, explaining “[t]o speak of the incident as ‘fire’ would have been too general to differentiate cases; at the other extreme, to have described the fire as damaging nothing but pleasure boats and their tie-up facilities would have ignored, among other things, the capacity of pleasure boats to endanger commercial shipping that happened to be nearby.”
In its Motion to Remand, Plaintiff suggests that this incident focuses on “the degradation of coastal lands ... through Defendants’ oil and gas production activities.” This description ignores that the particular “oil and gas production activity” at issue is dredging by vessels in navigable waters. Although Defendants do not propose a precise description to apply to this analysis, in discussing the connection test, they aver that the Petition “focuses on Defendants’ dredging activities” and “alleges that Defendants have contributed to an increased storm surge risk.” This characterization is misleading as it fails to address the many intermediate steps between the initial dredging and the presence of an increased storm surge risk.' The Court finds that at an intermediate level of generality, the incident here is properly described as coastal erosion caused by dredging in navigable waters.
Having characterized the incident, the Court must evaluate whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce&emdash;that is, whether the incident could be seen within a class of incidents that pose more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping. Coastal erosion, by itself, does not interfere with maritime commerce or commercial shipping. It does not impede vessel traffic, threaten the physical integrity of vessels, or result in injury to any person on a vessel. Although coastal erosion has allegedly led to increased flood vulnerability, which in turn will allegedly require more spending on flood protection assets, this result is not disruptive to maritime commerce. Plaintiff is not an entity involved in maritime commerce, and its increased financial burden does not negatively impact maritime commerce. The Court is cognizant that a hurricane and the accompanying flooding could certainly impact the Port of New Orleans and commercial shipping in - the region, but the Court cannot rely on such an attenuated series of events to find that the dredging at issue here disrupts maritime commerce.
While the Court concludes that the incident at issue does not have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, for completeness, the Court addresses the second prong of the connection test— whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. In Grubart, the Court explained that “[t]he substantial relationship test is satisfied where at least one alleged tortfeasor was engaging in activity substantially related to traditional maritime activity and such activity is claimed to have been a proximate cause of the incident.” - Further, Grubart recognized that “ordinarily” a “tort involving a vessel on navigable waters” will have a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. As noted above, the primary activity at issue here involved dredges, which courts recognize as vessels, operating on navigable waters.
The Court finds that coastal erosion caused by dredges in navigable waters does not have a potentially disruptive effect on maritime commerce, and thus the Court does not have admiralty jurisdiction over this matter. Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether general maritime law claims are removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 absent separate and independent ground of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. Whether Federal Enclave Jurisdiction Exists
A. Parties’ Arguments
1. Plaintiffs Arguments in Support of Remand
Plaintiff contends that “[fjederal enclave jurisdiction does not attach in this case because [Defendants have] failed to factually demonstrate that there is any federal enclave at issue.” Further, Plaintiff maintains that it, “as the master of its own complaint, has not alleged a federal cause of action or made any claim that any federal enclave is relevant to its case.” Finally, Plaintiff argues that it “has not alleged that any acts occurred, or injuries were sustained, on a federal enclave.”
According to Plaintiff, courts apply a three-prong test to evaluate the existence
of a federal enclave sufficient to confer jurisdiction:
(1) the United States must purchase land from a state for the purpose of erecting forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, or other needful buildings; (2) the state legislature must consent to the jurisdiction of the federal government; and (3) the federal government must accept jurisdiction by “filing a notice' of acceptance with the Governor of the State or in another manner prescribed by the laws of the State where the land is situated.”
With respect to prong one, Plaintiff contends that Defendants have “failed to show how any fort, magazine, arsenal, dock-yard or other needful building erected by the United States was the location of any of the Defendants’ acts or omissions, or the injuries suffered by the Authority, as alleged in the Petition.” With respect to prong three, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “offer[] no support for the third prong of the test for federal jurisdiction and without such support, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction.”
Additionally, Plaintiff urges that “this Court should reject [Defendants’] novel interpretation of federal jurisdiction,” under which “the mere tangential relation of a federal enclave to a plaintiffs cause of action suffices to confer jurisdiction.” According to Plaintiff, “courts have required. a close relationship between the federal enclave at issue, the conduct that occurred, and the injury sustained,” and have limited federal enclave jurisdiction to cases involving “personal injury and other tort claims that occur on federal enclaves.”
2. Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition to Remand
In their opposition, Defendants cite a four-prong test for federal enclave jurisdiction:
(1) the United States must have acquired land from a State; (2) the state legislature must have consented to federal jurisdiction; (3) the United States must have formally accepted jurisdiction, but only if the property was acquired by the United States after 1940; and (4) the claims at issue must arise in part on the enclave.
With respect to prong three, Defendants argue that courts have presumed acceptance of jurisdiction for property acquired prior to 1940, and thus that formal acceptance is only required for acquisitions after this time. Although Defendants acknowledge that 40 U.S.C. § 3112, as amended in 2002, mow provides that “i[t] is conclusively presumed that jurisdiction has not been accepted until the Government accepts jurisdiction over land,” Defendants contend that if formal acceptance were required, “dozens of properties would lose their federal enclave status where the federal government has relied on the pre-1940 presumption that it accepted jurisdiction.”
Examining the fourth prong, Defendants aver that Plaintiffs “contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the Board has not alleged an injury that occurred on a federal enclave is equally flawed.” They contend that “[ajrtful pleading does not defeat a federal court’s jurisdiction over disputes involving federal enclaves.” According to Defendants, “there are at least two federal enclaves within the area of alleged wetland loss — (1) Breton Island and Chandeleur Island in the Breton National Wildlife Refuge (‘Breton NWR’) and (2) the Delta National Wildlife Refuge (‘Delta NWR’).” Defendants argue:
There can be no doubt that the alleged tortious activity and resulting land loss has occurred on these federal enclaves and that the relief sought by the Board, if granted, will require marsh creation, restoration, and related work on the enclaves. Although there is currently a moratorium against drilling in the Breton NWR, oil and gas exploration and. development historically occurred there. Dredging also occurred in the Delta NWR.
Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs “Petition does not distinguish between the alleged injuries caused to federal enclaves from other alleged injuries.”
3. Plaintiffs Reply in Further Support of Remand
In its reply, Plaintiff avers that “[e]ven assuming that Defendants have satisfied their burden of proving any specific area fulfills the prerequisites for enclave status, they have failed to bear their burden of proving that the federal law applicable within those enclaves creates any of the Authority’s causes of action.” In support of this position, Plaintiff maintains that “federal enclave jurisdiction is part of a court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Thus, according to Plaintiff, “[wjhether a claim arises under federal jurisdiction must be determined by referring to the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ ” and “a federal question must appear on the face, of the complaint.”
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that neither the Breton National Wildlife Refuge nor the Delta National Wildlife Refuge “bears any significant relationship to the Authority’s claims.” Plaintiff asserts that “[i]n fact, neither one even falls within the Buffer Zone.”
4. Statements at Oral Argument
At oral argument, Defense counsel stated to the Court that Defendants would withdraw their federal-enclave ground for removal if Plaintiff agreed that neither the Breton National Wildlife Refuge nor the Delta National Wildlife Refuge is in the Buffer Zone. The Court inquired whether Plaintiff would stipulate that the Breton National Wildlife Refuge and the Delta National Wildlife Refuge are not in the Buffer Zone. Counsel for Plaintiff indicated that he was not prepared to make that stipulation without conferring with co-counsel because he had not handled the federal enclave portion of Plaintiffs argument. Accordingly, the Court stated that it would determine the matter.
B. Applicable Law
Federal enclave jurisdiction is a form of federal question jurisdiction derived from Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution. That clause gives Congress exclusive legislative jurisdiction over federal enclaves, or “all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.” Courts have reasoned that if Congress has legislative jurisdiction over federal enclaves, then federal courts must also have subject matter jurisdiction over controversies “which arise from incidents occurring in federal enclaves.” In order for a place to be a federal enclave, three conditions must be present:
(1) the United States must purchase land from a state for the purpose of erecting forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, or other needful buildings, (2) the state legislature must consent to the jurisdiction of the federal government, and (3) if the property was acquired after 1940, the federal government must accept jurisdiction by filing a notice of acceptance with the Governor of the State or in another manner prescribed by the laws of the State where the land is situated.
C. Analysis
Defendants initially maintained that federal enclave jurisdiction exists in this case because “there are at least two federal enclaves within the area of alleged wetland loss&emdash;(1) Breton Island and Chandeleur Island in the Breton National Wildlife Refuge (‘Breton NWR’) and (2) the Delta National Wildlife Refuge (‘Delta NWR’).” At oral argument, however, Defense counsel indicated that Defendants would withdraw their federal enclave argument if Plaintiff stipulated that the Breton National Wildlife Refuge and the Delta National Wildlife Refuge were not in the Buffer Zone. Although counsel for Plaintiff, noting that he had not worked on the portion of the motion addressing federal enclave jurisdiction, was unwilling to make that stipulation at oral argument, a review of the record indicates that in its reply-brief, Plaintiff states that “neither one even falls within the Buffer Zone.” Accordingly, the Court finds that Breton National Wildlife Refuge and the Delta National Wildlife Refuge are not in the Buffer Zone.
Aside from the Breton National Wildlife Refuge and the Delta National Wildlife Refuge, Defendants do not point to any other possible federal enclaves within the Buffer Zone, the area identified in the Petition as experiencing coastal erosion. Further, Defendants do not direct the Court to any possible federal enclaves where Defendants conducted the dredging or other activities that allegedly caused the coastal erosion. Although Defendants mention that there are “numerous [ ] federal enclaves in the New Orleans area,” they do not demonstrate how this controversy arises from an incident at any of those alleged enclaves. Unless Defendants’ conduct took place on a federal enclave or the damage complained of — coastal erosion — occurred on a federal enclave, the Court cannot say that the controversy arises from an enclave. While certain federal structures in the New Orleans area might face increased flood risks due to Defendants’ alleged conduct, this relationship is too attenuated to support the conclusion that federal enclave jurisdiction is proper.
Considering that the parties agree that Breton National Wildlife Refuge and the Delta National Wildlife Refuge are outside the Buffer Zone, and that Defendants have not identified any other possible federal enclaves in the area where Defendants’ conduct took place or in the area experiencing erosion, it is unnecessary to apply the three-part test for whether a federal enclave truly exists.
V. Whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) Provides Jurisdiction
A. Parties’ Arguments
1. Plaintiffs Arguments in Support of Remand
Plaintiff asserts that “[bjecause none of the acts and omissions that form the basis for the Authority’s claims involves [sic] an operation on the outer continental shelf, OCSLA cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction in this matter.” Citing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Amoco Production Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., Plaintiff explains that “OCSLA ‘confers upon the federal district courts jurisdiction to hear and determine certain disputes which Congress anticipated that oil and gas leases on the OCS [outer continental shelf] and operations thereunder might generate.’ ” According to Plaintiff, OCSLA’s jurisdictional grant “is limited to ‘activity occurring beyond the territorial waters of the states.’ ” Plaintiff points to Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co. as establishing a three-part test for “whether a cause arises under OCSLA.” That test examines whether: “(1) the facts underlying the complaint occurred on the outer continental shelf; (2) the acts were in furtherance of mineral development on the outer continental shelf; and (3) the injury would have occurred but for the actions on the outer continental shelf.”
Averring that “the acts and omissions at issue center on Louisiana’s coastal lands, rather than waters,” Plaintiff argues that OCSLA cannot serve as grounds for removal where:
(1) none of the acts or omissions at issue occurred on the outer continental shelf; (2) no injury was sustained away [sic] on the outer continental shelf; (3) and the only connection to the outer continental shelf is that there is an attenuated commercial relationship between the acts and omissions complained of and activity that occurs on the outer continental shelf.
2. Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition to Remand
In opposition to Plaintiffs “Motion to Remand,” Defendants argue that “[because this case involves pipelines that transport hydrocarbons from the outer continental shelf, the Court has federal question jurisdiction under OCSLA.” Citing Sea Robin Pipeline Co., Defendants contend that “OCSLA jurisdiction exists with respect to any dispute that threatens to disrupt mineral production on the outer continental shelf.” Further, Defendants maintain that “the Fifth Circuit has held that OCSLA’s grant of federal jurisdiction should be interpreted and applied very broadly.”
According to Defendants, this case comes within OCSLA’s broad grant of jurisdiction as Plaintiffs “claims present a direct threat to the efficient exploitation of minerals in the outer continental shelf.” Defendants aver that Plaintiffs requested relief — backfilling and revegetating every canal dredged by Defendants — “would dramatically alter oil and gas production-related operations in the region, including exploration, development, and production operations on the outer continental shelf.” Further, Defendants assert that the dredged canals at issue in this case “are used not only .to transport hydrocarbons produced through operations occurring within three miles of the Louisiana coast, but have also been used to transport hydrocarbons from the outer continental shelf to onshore terminals and other locations since the late 1940s.”
Addressing Plaintiffs argument that OCSLA jurisdiction cannot exist because the “acts and omissions at issue center on Louisiana’s coastal lands, rather than water,” Defendants counter that “the law is well-settled that OCSLA jurisdiction exists ‘even where’ the acts or omissions giving rise to the suit ‘occur on land.’ ” According to Defendants, “[t]o give effect to § 1349’s broad grant of jurisdiction, courts thus do not look solely to whether the operation occurred in the water, but instead find OCSLA applicable whenever the liberal ‘but for’ test for federal-question jurisdiction is met.” Defendants point to three reasons why this case meets the but-for test. First, Defendants contend that “the alleged facts implicate the ‘proper situs’ because Defendants include producers that transport resources from the outer continental shelf to on-shore terminals by way of pipelines located in the canals that are the subject of the Board’s claims.” Next, Defendants assert that the challenged conduct — dredging canals in wetlands — “was performed in furtherance of mineral development on the outer continental shelf.” Finally, Defendants argue that but-for Defendants’ mineral operations on the OCS, “there would have been no need to build (nor ongoing use for) some or all of the pipelines that traverse the canals and wetlands at issue.”
3. Plaintiffs Reply in Further Support of Remand
In its Reply, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he test for OCSLA jurisdiction ‘is whether the case: (1) involves an operation on the Outer Continental Shelf that involves doing some physical act in search of minerals on the OCS, preparing to extract them by drilling wells and constructing platforms, and removing minerals and transferring them to shore; and, (2) involves a dispute that arises out of or in connection with the defendant’s operation on the OCS, that is, ‘but for’ the operation on the OCS would the case or controversy have arisen.’ ” According to Plaintiff, neither prong of this test is met. First, Plaintiff avers that the claims “concernf ] activity iii the coastal Buffer Zone” and “[t]hat geographic description conclusively precludes outer continental shelf operations.” Further, Plaintiff maintains that the but-for test is not met: “The Authority would have a case regardless of whether certain pipelines that run through the Buffer Zone connect to the outer continental shelf operations, because the Authority’s case is factually dependent upon the exploration and production activities that Defendants undertook within the Buffer Zone.”
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants misinterpret Plaintiffs requested relief, stating that “[njowhere does the Authority suggest that it seeks to have operational pipelines shut off and removed.” Thus, relief in this case would not disrupt operations on the OCS.
4. Supplemental Authority
On March 5, 2014&emdash;after the Court heard oral argument on the pending motion&emdash;Defendants filed a “Notice of Supplemental Authority,” bringing the Fifth Circuit’s February 24, 2014 decision in In re DEEPWATER HORIZON to the Court’s attention. According to Defendants, DEEPWATER HORIZON “rejected the [ ] contention that OCSLA contains a ‘situs requirement,’ which would limit its reach to injuries occurring on the outer continental shelf itself.” Defendants aver that “Deepwater Horizon confirms that OCSLA jurisdiction is proper,” noting “[although it is true that neither the dredging nor the erosion took place on the OCS, Deepwater Horizon holds that OCS-LA contains no ‘situs’ requirement.”
B. Applicable Law
Pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), as codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1), the district courts of the United States have jurisdiction over claims “arising out of, or in connection with (A) any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, development, or production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf....” This jurisdictional grant is broad, and “[a] plaintiff does not need to expressly invoke OCSLA in order for it to apply.”
As the Fifth Circuit recently explained in DEEPWATER HORIZON, “[c]ourts typically assess jurisdiction under this provision in terms of whether (1) the activities that caused the injury constituted an ‘operation’ ‘conducted on the outer Continental Shelf that involved the exploration and production of minerals, and (2) the case ‘arises out of, or in connection with’ the operation.” With respect to the first prong of this analysis, although OCS-LA itself does not define “operation,” the Fifth Circuit has stated that operation is “the doing of some physical act.” “Exploration, development, or production” respectively refer to “the processes involved in searching for minerals on the OCS; preparing to extract them by, inter alia, drilling wells and constructing platforms; and removing the minerals and transferring them to shore.” The second prong of the jurisdictional test “require[s] only a ‘but for’ connection”&emdash;that is, a court must evaluate whether but for the operation would the case have arisen. DEEPWA-TER HORIZON clarified that there is no situs requirement for jurisdiction under OCSLA, explaining “[b]ecause federal ju-risdietion exists for cases ‘arising out of, or in connection with’ OCS operations, 43 U.S.C. § 1349, the statute precludes an artificial limit based on situs.” Indeed, the Fifth Circuit noted in DEEPWATER HORIZON that a situs requirement “conflicts with this court’s but-for test.”
In its “Motion to Remand,” Plaintiff cites the test set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co. for whether a cause of action arises under OCSLA. According to Plaintiff, the Demette test asks whether “(1) the facts underlying the complaint occurred on the outer continental shelf; (2) the acts were in furtherance of mineral development on the outer continental shelf; and (3) the injury would have occurred but for the actions on the outer continental shelf.” Plaintiff argues that because “none of these elements are met ... the Authority’s claims do not arise under OCSLA and OCSLA cannot provide a basis for removal.” However, the Demette test cited by Plaintiff is not a test for whether the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1349, as claimed by Plaintiff. Rather, Demette addresses choice of law issues under 43 U.S.C. § 1333, another provision of OCSLA. In DEEPWATER HORIZON, the Fifth Circuit explicitly cautioned against “intertwining] the Section 1349 jurisdictional inquiry with OCSLA’s choice of law provision, 43 U.S.C. § 1333, ... because the provisions and issues they raise are distinct.” Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt the Plaintiffs articulation of the test for whether jurisdiction exists under OCSLA.
C. Analysis
1. Whether the Activities that Caused the Injury Constituted an Operation Conducted on the Outer Continental Shelf that Involved the Exploration and Production of Minerals
Applying the two-prong test described in DEEPWATER HORIZON, the Court first examines whether “the activities that caused the injury constituted an ‘operation’ ‘conducted on the outer Continental Shelf that involved the exploration and production of minerals.” Thus, a threshold question is what are the activities that caused the injury. In its petition, Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n the Buffer Zone, Defendants identified in Exhibit A have dredged, used, and/or bear responsibility for the network of access canals and pipelines throughout 20-plus inland oil and gas fields.” Plaintiff also claims that Defendants have “fail[ed] to maintain the canal network.” Further, Plaintiff identifies ten other “ongoing oil and gas activities contributing to land loss”: road dumps, ring levees, drilling activities, fluid withdrawal, seismic surveys, marsh buggies, spoil disposal/dispersal, watercraft navigation, impoundments, and propwash-ing/maintenance dredging.
The next question the Court must address is whether these activities constitute an operation conducted on the OCS. As noted above, an operation is defined as “some physical act.” All of the acts alleged in Plaintiffs Petition take place within the Buffer Zone. Indeed, in their Notice of Supplemental Authority, Defendants specifically acknowledge “neither the dredging nor the erosion took place on the OCS.” Considering that all of the activities causing Plaintiffs’ injuries occurred on Louisiana’s coastal lands or within Louisiana’s territorial waters, they cannot be characterized as “an ‘operation’ ‘conducted on the outer Continental Shelf that involved the exploration and production of minerals.”
Nevertheless, the Defendants argue “the law is wfell-settled that OCSLA jurisdiction exists ‘even where’ the acts of omissions giving rise to the suit ‘occur "on land.’ ” This contention inappropriately relies on a district court’s order in BP Exploration & Production, Inc. v. Callidus Technologies, L.L.C. BP Exploration & Production did not address jurisdiction under 43 U.S.C. § 1349; rather, it dealt with choice of law under § 1333. As noted above, the Fifth Circuit has directed courts not to intertwine the § 1333 and § 1349 analy-ses.
Defendants also assert that “[t]o give effect to § 1349’s broad grant of jurisdiction, courts thus do not look solely to whether the operation occurred in the water, but instead find OCSLA applicable whenever the liberal ‘but for’ test for federal-question jurisdiction is met.” This argument, however, conflates the two prongs of the test for jurisdiction under OCSLA. Although the second prong involves a but-for analysis, the first prong presents a distinct inquiry — whether “the activities that caused the injury constituted dn ‘operation’ ‘conducted on the outer Continental Shelf that involved the exploration and production of minerals.” Here, the first prong — correctly stated — is not met as all of the activities allegedly causing Plaintiffs injuries occurred on Louisiana’s coastal lands or within Louisiana’s territorial waters.
Finally, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs claims “present a direct threat to the efficient exploitation of minerals in the outer continental shelf’ is unavailing. In this case, Defendants’ acts occurred on Louisiana’s coastal lands or in Louisiana’s coastal waters, and Plaintiffs injuries occurred on Louisiana’s coastal lands or in Louisiana’s coastal ' waters. Although some of the dredging and pipelines may have facilitated oil and gas activities on the OCS, Defendants have not identified — nor has the Court located — any case where a court based jurisdiction on such an attenuated relationship between operations on the OCS and the conduct and injuries at issue in the litigation. Defendants cite Amoco Production Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., for the proposition that “Congress intended that ‘any dispute that alters the progress of production activities on the [outer continental shelf]’ would fall ‘within the grant of federal jurisdiction contained in § 1349.’ ” Sea Robin, however, involved take-or-pay contracts for natural gas produced from wells that were located on the OCS, leading the Fifth Circuit to conclude that “[ejxercise of take-or-pay rights ... necessarily and physically has an immediate bearing on the production of the particular well, certainly in the sense of the volume of gas actually produced.” Additionally, Defendants characterize EP Operating Limited Partnership v. Placid Oil Co. as “finding OCSLA-based jurisdiction where resolution ‘would affect the efficient exploitation of resources from the’ outer continental shelf.” EP Operating is also readily distinguishable from this matter as it concerned the partition of offshore equipment attached to the OCS.
2. Whether the Case Arises Out Of, or In Connection With the Operation
Although this matter fails to satisfy prong one of the test for jurisdiction under OCSLA — the activities that caused the injury do not constitute an ‘operation’ ‘conducted on the outer Continental Shelf that involved the exploration and production of minerals — the Court turns to prong two for completeness. Prong two requires the Court to ask whether “the case ‘arises out of, or in connection with’ the operation” on the OCS. In addressing prong two, the Court examines whether the injury would have ’occurred but for operations on the OCS.
In this case, some of the dredging and pipelines at issue facilitate oil and gas production on the OCS. However, as Plaintiff notes, “the Authority’s case is factually dependent upon the exploration and production activities that Defendants undertook within the Buffer Zone,” and Exhibit D of Plaintiffs petition identifies hundreds of wells on Louisiana’s coastal lands and within Louisiana’s coastal waters Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs injury would have occurred regardless of operations on the OCS, and the but-for test is not satisfied.
VI. Whether the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) Provides Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that on February 20, 2014, Defendants Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Union Oil Company of California, Chevron Pipeline Co., and Kewanee Industries, Inc. filed a “Notice of Issuance of Supreme Court Judgment.” In their Notice, these four defendants represented that they were withdrawing their argument that CAFA supplies a basis for jurisdiction in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. Considering that only four of the ninety-two remaining defendants indicated that they were withdrawing their CAFA argument, the Court addresses this issue on the merits.
A. Parties’ Arguments
1. Plaintiffs Arguments in Support of Remand
Plaintiff asserts that this case is not removable under CAFA because it does not meet the definition of a “mass action.” According to Plaintiff, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(ll)(B)(i) defines a “mass action” as “a civil action ‘in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.’ ” Looking to subsection 1332(d)(ll)(B)(ii)(III), Plaintiff further argues that the term “mass action” does not include a civil action in which “all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claims or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such action.” Plaintiff points out that “[t]he Authority is the only Plaintiff in this case” and asserts that “[t]his is a case in which all of the claims are asserted by a single public body pursuant to a state statute that specifically authorizes that body to sue.”
2. Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition to Remand
In opposition to Plaintiff, Defendants argue that although the Authority is the only Plaintiff in this case, “ ‘numerosity’ is not determined by counting names in a case caption.” Instead a court must examine the substance of an action “so as to determine who are the real parties in interest.” Citing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., Defendants contend that “[i]n the context of CAFA, the Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to ‘pierce the pleadings and look at the real nature’ of the claims ‘so as to prevent jurisdictional gamesmanship.’ ” Defendants look to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., which defined real parties in interest as those “directly and personally concerned in the outcome of the litigation,” and reason that the real party in interest is not the Authority, but the residents, business, and properties within the flood protection system.
3. Plaintiffs Reply in Further Support of Remand
In its Reply, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he specific claims at issue in the lawsuit are for harms visited upon the Authority.” According to Plaintiff, “the Authority’s flood protection system, while protecting the public, is an asset under the Authority’s care, and for the protection of which the Authority is the real party in interest.”
4. Defendants’ Notice of Supreme Court Judgment
As previously indicated, on February 20, 2014, Defendants Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Union Oil Company of California, Chevron Pipeline Co., and Kewanee Industries, Inc. filed a “Notice of Issuance of Supreme Court Judgment.” In their Notice, these four defendants represent that they are withdrawing their argument that CAFA supplies a basis for jurisdiction in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.
B. Applicable Law
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) “creates original jurisdiction over cases that previously were beyond federal diversity subject-matter jurisdiction” by enabling defendants in civil suits to remove “mass actions” from state to federal court. CAFA defines a “mass action” as a civil action “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.”
In its 2008 decision in Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., the Fifth Circuit held that “persons” in the mass action context are “the real parties in interest as to the respective claims.” The Fifth Circuit reiterated this position in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., a 2012 decision. In Hood, the state of Mississippi brought a consumer protection suit against liquid-crystal display (“LCD”) manufacturers, alleging that the manufacturers had formed a cartel to restrict competition and raise prices. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that “the real parties in interest in this suit include both the State and the individual consumers of LCD products” and noted that “it is undisputed that there are more than 100 consumers.” Accordingly, the court held that “there are more than 100 claims at issue in this case,” and that “[t]he suit therefore meets the CAFA definition of a ‘mass action.’ ”
Mississippi appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, and on January 14, 2014 — after oral argument had been held on the pending “Motion to Remand” — the Supreme Court reversed. In its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that CAFA’s. numerosity requirement could be satisfied by looking at the real parties in interest:
The question presented is whether a suit. filed by a State as the sole plaintiff constitutes a “mass action” under CAFA where it includes a claim for restitution based on injuries suffered by the State’s citizens. We hold that it does not. According to CAFA’s plain text, a “mass action” must involve monetary claims brought by 100 or more persons who propose to try those claims jointly as named plaintiffs.
Observing that “the State of Mississippi is the only named plaintiff in the instant action,” the Court determined that “the case must be remanded to state court.”
C. Analysis
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hood, the Court must conclude that the above-captioned matter is not removable pursuant to CAFA. The Authority is the only named plaintiff on the complaint, and Hood now forecloses the “real party in interest” analysis previously ado