Cirocco v. McMahon (294 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 2018)

Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang

This matter comes before the court on Defendant Linda McMahon's Motion to Dismiss. [# 7, filed October 10, 2017]. The Motion to Dismiss is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the Order of Reference dated November 21, 2017 [# 19]. The court has carefully considered the Motion and related briefing, the entire case file, and the applicable case law, and, for the reasons stated below, GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Sue Cirocco ("Plaintiff" or "Ms. Cirocco") initiated this lawsuit through counsel on June 29, 2017, by filing a Complaint asserting unlawful sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and for retaliation. [# 1]. The court draws the following facts from Ms. Cirocco's Complaint, and accepts them as true for the purposes of considering the Motion to Dismiss. Ms. Cirocco began working at the United States Small Business Administration ("SBA") in August 2009 as a Finance Division Manager. [# 1 at ¶ 9]. In December 2012, she was promoted to Finance Director over two male colleagues, Mr. Bates and Mr. Berges, who "vocally expressed" their displeasure, suggested the promotion was on account of gender, and "went as far to file an EEO complaint regarding Mr. Cirocco's selection." [Id. at ¶¶ 10-13]. In October 2013, Mr. Gribben was hired as the Deputy Chief Financial Officer and he became Ms. Cirocco's manager. [Id. at ¶¶ 15-16]. Ms. Cirocco alleges that Mr. Gribben and Mr. Bates began working together to her exclusion and "outside the normal chain of command." [Id. at ¶ 17]. At one point, Mr. Gribbon reversed Ms. Cirocco's performance review of Mr. Bates, [id. at ¶¶ 20-22]; he also instructed Ms. Cirocco not to issue written discipline to Mr. Bates after Mr. Bates had been insubordinate to her and verbally abusive toward one of his female co-workers. [Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27-28, 31-32]. Mr. Gribben also instructed Ms. Cirocco against further communicating with Mr. Bates, an employee whom she managed. [Id. at ¶¶ 33-34].

Ms. Cirocco alleges that not only was Mr. Gribben "complicit in supporting Mr. Bates' discriminatory behavior," he reprimanded her for retaliating against Mr. Berges for his filing of an EEO complaint, when in fact Mr. Berges "routinely confided in Ms. Cirocco about the stress he experienced in filing his complaint." [# 1 at ¶¶ 35, 37-38, 40]. Ms. Cirocco asserts that Mr. Gribben gave her a poor annual review ("FY14") that was lower than any review she had ever received at the SBA, and in stark contrast to her mid-year performance review that she was "doing a fabulous job." [Id. at ¶¶ 42-43, 49]. When Plaintiff asked Mr. Gribben about the FY14, he said he "based his decision on 'complaints about [her] professional conduct,' " which Plaintiff alleges referred to her "efforts to discipline Mr. Bates for verbally berating a female employee." [Id. at ¶¶ 45, 47]. Ms. Cirocco lost the opportunity for a raise as a result of the FY14. [Id. at ¶ 52].

Plaintiff filed her own EEO complaint in February 2015, and alleges the retaliation continued thereafter. She was moved to a less desirable office away from her team; she received a written reprimand for failing to treat Mr. Bates "with respect"; and she was placed under investigation in February and March 2015. [Id. at ¶¶ 60-62]. In March, the chief financial officer of the SBA visited the Denver office and announced that Ms. Cirocco's staff would be reduced by approximately 50 percent so as to comply with "best practices." [Id. at ¶ 65]. Ms. Cirocco alleges that, without adequate staffing and no change in the description of her position, it was impossible to perform her job. [Id. at ¶ 72]. Ms. Cirocco thereafter took a medical leave of absence and ultimately sought employment elsewhere.

Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on October 10, 2017, [# 7], and, three days later, counsel for Plaintiff moved to withdraw his representation. See [# 8, # 9]. Plaintiff has proceeded pro se since that time. The Parties then consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), [# 18]. On November 28, 2017, the court held a telephonic Status Conference at which the undersigned discussed with the Parties the Motion to Dismiss, and Ms. Cirocco represented that she had intended for certain email correspondence, which she had sent to counsel for Defendant, to serve as her response to the Motion. See [# 22]. Accordingly, the court docketed the correspondence as Plaintiff's Response, see [# 23], and Defendant thereafter filed a Reply, [# 25]. The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe, and the court has determined that oral argument would not materially assist in its disposition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Rule 12(b)(1)

Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she failed to participate in the SBA's investigation of her claims and the underlying administrative proceeding. See [# 7]. Federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, must have a statutory basis for their jurisdiction. See Morris v. City of Hobart , 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Castaneda v. INS , 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) ). "A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking." Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co ., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). As the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, Plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts that support jurisdiction. See Dutcher v. Matheson , 733 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, we presume no jurisdiction exists absent an adequate showing by the party invoking federal jurisdiction").

When a party's Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the facts upon which subject matter is based, "a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations." Sizova v. Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Tech. , 282 F.3d 1320, 1324 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotations omitted). Instead, the court has "wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1)." Holt v. U.S. , 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). The court's reliance on evidence outside the pleadings in addressing such a motion does not, as a general rule, require conversion of the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. (citation omitted).

II. Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendant also moves to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which authorizes a court to dismiss a pleading for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations ... and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Casanova v. Ulibarri , 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States , 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) ). However, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, "and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Plausibility refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs 'have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.' " Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "The burden is on the plaintiff to frame 'a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief." Id. The ultimate duty of the court is to "determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed." Forest Guardians v. Forsgren , 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).

III. Pro se Litigants

Ms. Cirocco is currently proceeding pro se and filed her Response as a pro se litigant. Accordingly, the court engages in a liberal review of the Response and holds it to a less stringent standard than if it were drafted by an attorney. See, e.g., Trackwell v. United States Gov't , 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, the court does not afford the Complaint the same level of review, because an attorney drafted and filed that pleading. Ultimately, regardless of the standard of review applied, the court will not act as an advocate for a pro se litigant, and will not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that she has not alleged or that a defendant has violated laws in ways that a plaintiff has not alleged. See Gallagher v. Shelton , 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[Court's] role is not to act as [pro se litigant's] advocate"); Drake v. City of Fort Collins , 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) ("the court will not construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues") (internal citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Title VII prohibits discrimination against any individual "with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Harris v. Forklift Sys, Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ); Khalik v. United Air Lines , 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012) ; James v. James , 129 F.Supp.3d 1212, 1221 (D. Colo. 2015). Title VII also makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee for opposing practices made unlawful by that statute. See Hansen v. SkyWest Airlines , 844 F.3d 914, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a)). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is vested with the authority to enforce § 2000e-16(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).

The governing regulations require that an employee first attempt to resolve the matter by filing an informal complaint that triggers counseling with an EEOC Counselor, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a), and, if an informal resolution is not reached, the employee must then file a formal complaint for a decision by an ALJ. See id. §§ 1614.105(d), 1614.106. Thereafter, the employee may file a civil action in federal district court within 90 days of receiving notice of final agency action on the employee's formal complaint by the ALJ, or after 180 days from the filing of the complaint if no final action has been taken by that time. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(a)-(b) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (stating more specifically that after 180 days from the filing of the formal complaint, the complainant may file a civil action if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint or by the failure to take final action on his complaint). "Although § 2000e-16(c) permits an employee to file suit in federal court alleging a violation of § 2000e-16(a)," federal employees must exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit under Title VII. Id. at § 2000e-16(c). Requiring a Title VII claimant to exhaust administrative remedies serves the purpose of "giv[ing] the agency the information it needs to investigate and resolve the dispute between the employee and the employer." Khader v. Aspin , 1 F.3d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Historically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ("Tenth Circuit") has held that a plaintiff's exhaustion of his or her administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under Title VII, not merely a condition precedent to suit. See, e.g., Jones v. Runyon, 91 F.3d 1398, 1399 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1996).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims for sex discrimination and retaliation fail because she did not exhaust her administrative remedies. Specifically, after filing the EEO Complaint in February 2015, Plaintiff "failed to participate in its adjudication and ultimately abandoned her administrative claims"; and Plaintiff "never pursued any administrative remedies," with respect to the retaliation claim. [# 7 at 1]. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because she alleges only in conclusory terms that she exhausted her administrative remedies. [Id. at 2]. In support of these arguments, Defendant attaches to her Motion the declaration of William L. Gery, an attorney in the SBA's Office of General Counsel, [# 7-1], to which the following exhibits are attached: Ms. Cirocco's EEO Complaint, [# 7-2]; a letter from the SBA Office of Diversity, Inclusion and Civil Rights, [# 7-3]; a copy of the EEO investigator's Memorandum to File regarding the EEO Complaint, [# 7-4]; and an order of dismissal issued by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") assigned to the matter, [# 7-5].

I. State of the Law

As an initial matter, the court considers whether Plaintiff's failure to participate in the EEOC investigation and proceeding before the ALJ implicates its jurisdiction. The court has an independent obligation to consider its own subject matter jurisdiction, and, conversely, whether an issue is actually one of jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp ., 546 U.S. 500, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1240, 1244, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) ; 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. , 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006). In arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as a result of Plaintiff's failure to participate in the EEOC process, Defendant relies heavily on an unpublished case from the Tenth Circuit, Douglas v. Norton , 167 Fed.Appx. 698 (10th Cir. 2006), which in turn relies upon Khader v. Aspin , 1 F.3d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1993). See [# 7 at 5]. Curiously, Defendant omits any mention or discussion of the ambiguity in the law as reflected in more recent, published decisions.

In Khader , the court stated that exhaustion is satisfied by a "[g]ood faith effort by the employee to cooperate with the agency and the EEOC and to provide all relevant, available information"; and advised that, conversely, "when a complainant refuses or fails to provide the agency information sufficient to evaluate the merits of the claim, he or she cannot be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies." Khader , 1 F.3d at 971 (finding plaintiff's "angry refusal to resubmit the requested materials," which the agency received but ultimately lost, contradicted any argument of good faith effort to comply with administrative procedures) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts within the Tenth Circuit have routinely cited to Khader to find that a claimant who begins an administrative procedure but abandons it to file suit in federal court fails to exhaust her administrative remedies, and accordingly, is jurisdictionally barred from suit. See, e.g., Laughter v. Gallup Indian Medical Center , 425 Fed.Appx. 683, 686 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Abandoning a complaint of discrimination filed with an employing agency prior to the agency's final action on the complaint constitutes a failure to exhaust") (citing Khader , 1 F.3d at 971 ).

In 2005, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its position, within the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., that a complainant's failure to cooperate in the EEO's investigation of his charge constituted a failure to exhaust administrative remedies that deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Shikles v. Sprint/United Management Co. , 426 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 2005). The court stated that "when a plaintiff's non-cooperation effectively prevents the EEOC's investigation and conclusion efforts such that the EEOC proceeding essentially becomes a sham or meaningless proceeding[,] [ ] a charging party's non-cooperation will amount to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies." Id. at 1311. In turn, the Shikles court concluded that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies was a jurisdictional bar to suit. In so holding, the court relied on precedent from two other Circuits and several federal district courts. Id. at 1312 (citing Rann v. Chao , 346 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that plaintiff was not only uncooperative, the agency had dismissed the administrative complaint due to the lack of cooperation) (further citations omitted). In its discussion, the court acknowledged both the EEOC's amicus curie brief that an employee's failure to cooperate with the EEOC during the administrative process does not preclude him from later proceeding against his employer in court, id. at 1315-16, and the Supreme Court's guidance that courts not read into Title VII and the ADEA "procedural prerequisites to suit that are not expressly provided in the text of the statute." See id. at 1314.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed with Shikles the following year, and observed that the statutory language contained no requirements to filing suit other than timely filing an EEOC charge and timely filing suit following the right to sue letter:

There is...no basis in the language of Title VII for that position. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court's "admonition that no requirements beyond those in the statute should be imposed" ... but it imposed them anyway. So the Tenth Circuit's gloss on Title VII is confessedly adventurous, and this will distress originalists. It is also in severe tension with the Supreme Court's recent observation, concerning the "exhaustion" provisions in both Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, that "neither of these provisions makes reference to the concept of exhaustion, and neither is in any sense an exhaustion provision." Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2390, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). Title VII imposes procedural requirements as a precondition to bringing a suit in federal court that is an original proceeding rather than one to review agency action. Doe satisfied all those requirements. Title VII does not incorporate anything like the full apparatus of exhaustion, an apparatus designed as we have noted for cases in which judicial review of an adjudication or a rule is sought.

Doe v. Oberweis Dairy , 456 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2006). See also Mohamed v. 1st Class Staffing, LLC , 286 F.Supp.3d 884, 897-99, 2017 WL 6383611, at *10-11 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2017) (discussing Shikles and Oberweis and applying the rationale articulated in Oberweis ).

Almost ten years later, in 2015, the Tenth Circuit determined that Title VII's verification requirement that a claimant verify the charges against an employer is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather a non-jurisdictional condition precedent to suit that can be waived. Gad v. Kansas State University , 787 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 2015). In so holding, the court relied on a series of Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), in which the Court determined that the statutory time limit for filing EEOC charges was subject to waiver and estoppel, and culminating with United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 1632, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015), in which the Supreme Court advised that "procedural rules ... cabin a court's power only if Congress has 'clearly state[d]' as much." Id. at 1037-40. From these cases the Gad court distilled a key principle that "a Title VII statutory requirement's classification as jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional turns in large part on whether it is located in Title VII's jurisdictional subsection- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)." Id. at 1038.

The Gad court cast doubt on the Khader and Shikles holdings that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional issue. However, Gad addressed only Title VII's verification requirement; and while the court observed that "the subsequent development of the law underscores the limited force our earlier cases retain today," it did not expressly overturn Shikles . Id. at 1040. See Wickware v. Manville , 676 Fed.Appx. 753, 767 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2017) (acknowledging on review of an order of summary judgment that " Gad raises the question of whether the district court's jurisdictional rationale here remains legally viable," but stating that "even if exhaustion is not jurisdictional, it is a condition precedent to suit"); Hung Thai Pham v. James , 630 Fed.Appx. 735, 738 (10th Cir. 2015) (reviewing Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of Title VII complaint and declining to address whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional on basis that defendant had "not waived or forfeited the issue," noting that the court may affirm dismissal "on a rationale different from the district court's"); Arabalo v. City of Denver , 625 Fed.Appx. 851, 859-60 (10th Cir. 2015) (declining to decide the impact of Gad on the Circuit's "earlier decisions concluding we lacked subject-matter jurisdiction for other failures to meet Title VII's requirements," agreeing that plaintiff was required to first assert certain allegations to the EEOC as a condition precedent to suit, if not a jurisdictional prerequisite).

Since Gad , at least two of our sister courts have recognized the tension within the applicable Circuit law. See Moreno v. Kansas City Steak Company, LLC , No. 17-cv-02029-DDC-KGS, 2017 WL 2985748, at *3 (D. Kan. July 13, 2017) ; Dolin v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corporation , 2:16-cv-00529-MCA-GBW, 2017 WL 1551990, at *3-4 (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2017) (putting aside the jurisdictional question and dismissing claim for plaintiff's failure to assert it in the EEOC charge). Like the Moreno court, while mindful of the questionable status of Shikles as good law, "[t]his court is bound by the published Tenth Circuit decisions unless they have been overruled by the Tenth Circuit sitting en banc or superseded by a contrary Supreme Court decision." Moreno , 2017 WL 2985748, at *3 (citations omitted). See, e.g., In re Smith , 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Spedalieri , 910 F.2d 707, 710 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (a three-judge panel cannot overrule circuit precedent)) (further citation omitted). Accordingly, despite its hesitation given the subsequent development of Supreme Court case law, the court applies here the rule of law as stated in Shikles and Khader , and finds under a Rule 12(b)(1) standard of review that Plaintiff's failure to cooperate in the EEOC investigation and subsequent proceedings divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Application

A. Title VII Claim

The record before the court demonstrates that Ms. Cirocco filed the EEO Complaint on February 3, 2015. [# 7-2]. In the EEO Complaint, Ms. Cirocco alleged that in December 2014 Mr. Gribben discriminated against her in the FY14 performance on account of her sex, and retaliated against her for "her efforts to comply with the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA) and the 'Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.' " [Id. at 5, 6]. On February 26, 2015, the SBA issued to Plaintiff a Notice of Partial Acceptance/Dismissal (the "Notice"). [# 7-3]. The Notice explained that the SBA had accepted for investigation a single issue: "Whether Complainant was discriminated against on the basis of sex (Female), when on December 10, 2014, she learned that her FY2014 performance rating of three (3) was submitted as a final rating to OHRS." [Id. at 2]. The Notice also explained that Plaintiff's claim for retaliation was dismissed because Plaintiff had "failed to identify a specific harm to a term, condition, or privilege of your employment where you suffered a direct, personal deprivation at the hands of the employer on a basis covered by EEO statutes." [Id. at 5].

The EEO assigned investigation of Ms. Cirocco's claim to Ralph Gay, who contacted Ms. Cirocco on May 28, 2015. [# 7-4 at 2]. Mr. Gay wrote in a memorandum to file that Ms. Cirocco advised she had taken leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act and was not physically well enough to participate in an interview. [Id. ] Mr. Gay subsequently corresponded with Ms. Cirocco on several occasions in an effort to schedule an interview, and wrote that Ms. Cirocco ultimately informed him on August 24, 2015, that "it would be too stressful to be deposed and that her doctor had not cleared her to be deposed." [Id. ] Mr. Gay thereafter "conclude[d] the investigation without [Plaintiff's] input," [id. at 3], and, after the Report of Investigation was issued, the parties sought a hearing before the ALJ. [# 7-1 at ¶ 11].

On February 6, 2017, the ALJ held a telephonic conference in which Plaintiff and her counsel participated, as did Mr. Gery. [# 7-1 at ¶ 12]. The ALJ issued an order identifying the single claim, stated above, and directing the parties to initiate discovery within twenty days and complete discovery by May 12, 2017. [Id. at ¶¶ 13-14]. Mr. Gery thereafter sent initial discovery requests to Plaintiff's counsel; the SBA did not receive Plaintiff's responses and Plaintiff never served discovery on the SBA. [Id. at ¶¶ 15, 17-18]. On June 16, 2017, Mr. Gery filed a Motion for Decision Without a Hearing, to which Plaintiff failed to respond. [Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20]. On June 29, 2017, Plaintiff initiated this action, and filed with the EEOC a Notice of Commencement of Civil Suit. [Id. at ¶ 22]. On July 7, 2017, the ALJ issued an order dismissing Plaintiff's case before the EEOC on the grounds that Plaintiff had filed this lawsuit. [Id. at ¶ 23; # 7-5]. Based on this record, the court finds that Ms. Cirocco failed to cooperate with the EEOC investigation, and thus failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

The court notes that Ms. Cirocco filed a pro se Response, in which she references her former counsel's efforts to negotiate with opposing counsel and asserts a number of allegations that relate to the merits of her claims. See [# 23]. In relevant part, Ms. Cirocco states that her "former attorney advised me to file my case in federal court after discussions with SBA attorneys," and that her attorney "did not believe the SBA attorney's acted in good faith with him [sic]." [Id. at 2]. Ms. Cirocco also details the retaliation she allegedly endured after she filed her EEO Complaint. Finally, she represents that she is "out resourced at this point," that her "attorney has said it could cost up to $100k to pursue this case," and "[s]ince I am only looking to be made whole with the time I was forced to take in medical leave and I would like to retire soon, I simply cannot proceed with this expense." [Id. at 3]. Notably, however, Ms. Cirocco does not address Defendant's contention that she failed to participate both in Mr. Gay's investigation and the proceedings before the ALJ. As a pro se litigant, Ms. Cirocco is entitled to a liberal construction of her Response; however, the court is not tasked with articulating the pertinent arguments on her behalf. Neither legal training nor expertise is required for Plaintiff to describe her version of events with respect to what transpired during the EEOC investigation and before the ALJ. For these reasons, I find Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the court has subject matter jurisdiction over her Title VII claim.

B. Retaliation Claim

Ms. Cirocco's claim for retaliation claim similarly fails for lack of jurisdiction because it was not included in the underlying EEOC proceedings. Administrative remedies generally must be exhausted as to each discrete instance of discrimination or retaliation. Foster v. Ruhrpumpen, Inc., 365 F.3d 1191, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2004). It is undisputed that the SBA accepted only the Title VII claim for investigation: "Whether Complainant was discriminated against on the basis of sex (Female), when on December 10, 2014, she learned that her FY2014 performance rating of three (3) was submitted as a final rating to OHRS." [# 7-3 at 2]. The SBA explained in the Notice that Plaintiff's claim for retaliation was dismissed because Plaintiff had "failed to identify a specific harm to a term, condition, or privilege of your employment where you suffered a direct, personal deprivation at the hands of the employer on a basis covered by EEO statutes." [Id. at 5]. The governing regulations permit the agency to dismiss some but not all of the claims in a complaint, and advise that such a determination "is reviewable by an administrative judge if a hearing is requested on the remainder of the complaint, but is not appealable until final action is taken on the remainder of the complaint." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(b). See id. at §§ 1614.401(a), 1614.402 ("a complainant may appeal an agency's final action or dismissal of a complaint," and any such appeal must be filed "within 30 days of receipt of the dismissal, final action or decision"). See also id. at § 1614.407(c)(d) (providing that a complainant may file an action in federal court within 90 days of receipt of Commission's final decision on appeal, or after 180 days from the date of filing an appeal with the Commission if there has been no final decision by the Commission). Plaintiff does not allege that she sought review of the SBA's decision from the ALJ or further appealed the ALJ's dismissal of the action; accordingly, Plaintiff cannot pursue that retaliation claim in federal court.

Additionally, in her Response, Plaintiff discusses the particulars of the retaliation she experienced after she filed her EEO Complaint. See [# 23 at 2-3]. However, federal courts lack jurisdiction over Title VII claims that were not previously covered in a claim presented to the EEOC, and Plaintiff does not allege that she filed either a supplement to her EEO Complaint or a new EEO Complaint raising the allegations of retaliation that occurred subsequent to the filing of her initial Complaint. See Eisenhour v. Weber Cty. , 744 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 2014) ("federal courts lack jurisdiction over incidents occurring after the filing of an EEOC claim unless the plaintiff files a new EEOC claim or otherwise amends her original EEOC claim to add the new incidents") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) ). Each act of retaliation must be separately exhausted, even when acts that post-date the EEO complaint reasonably relate to others presented to the EEOC. Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting this policy was particularly important where plaintiff claimed an ongoing pattern of retaliation, as Ms. Cirocco claims here). Additionally, to the extent the retaliation claim is ancillary to the Title VII claim, the court has jurisdiction to hear it only when the main administrative charge is properly before the court. Jones v. Runyon , 91 F.3d at 1402 (citing Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 932 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1991) ("because one of plaintiff's ADEA claims was untimely and the other had not been presented first to the EEOC, claims were not properly before the court and retaliation charge had 'no charge on which to attach itself,' therefore, court had no jurisdiction over retaliation claim"). For these reasons, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's retaliation claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Defendant Linda McMahon's Motion to Dismiss [# 7] is GRANTED ; and

(2) This action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Attachment

2017 WL 2985748

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,

D. Kansas.

Paula MORENO, Plaintiff,

v.

KANSAS CITY STEAK COMPANY, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-02029-DDC-KGS

Signed 07/13/2017

Attorneys and Law Firms

Mark E. Meyer, The Law Offices of Mark E. Meyer, Lee's Summit, MO, for Plaintiff.

Kyle B. Russell, Jackson Lewis PC, Overland Park, KS, for Defendant.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Daniel D. Crabtree, United States District Judge *1 On January 17, 2017, plaintiff Paula Moreno filed a Complaint alleging four claims against defendant Kansas City Steak Company, LLC. Doc. 1. In Counts One through Three, plaintiff asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. In Count Four, plaintiff asserts a claim under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-501 et seq.

On April 7, 2017, defendant filed a Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint. Doc. 6. In it, defendant contends that the court must dismiss Counts One through Three because plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court agrees. For the reasons explained below, the court denies defendant's Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint and also grants plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. The amended pleading must address the jurisdictional issues addressed in this Order.

Background

Plaintiff worked for defendant from March 2009 to March 2015. In April 2012, plaintiff's work gloves caught in a conveyor belt, injuring the smallest finger on her right hand to the point that one of the joints was immovable. Plaintiff received medical attention for her injury through workers compensation benefits, and began using a splint at work per her doctor's orders.

Over time, plaintiff's injury worsened. She began experiencing intermittent muscle and tendon pain in her right hand, wrist, and forearm. Eventually, the pain spread to her shoulder. Worker's compensation again allowed plaintiff to seek medical attention. But, when plaintiff's treating physician advised her to see a hand specialist, defendant refused and would not allow her to seek further treatment. Plaintiff told defendant about her continuing pain and discomfort several times between 2012 and 2014.

Plaintiff's supervisor questioned whether plaintiff truly was injured and the supervisor got angry with her. Plaintiff's supervisor physically pushed plaintiff twice, "yelling at [her] for using her left hand instead of her injured right hand." Doc. 1 at 5. Some time later, plaintiff went to human resources to inform them of the pushing incident and to complain, again, about her continuing injury. Plaintiff alleges that human resources told her "that if she made a report she would not be able to work for" defendant. Id.

On March 26, 2015, following another unpleasant interaction between plaintiff and her supervisor, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. Believing she was terminated for discriminatory reasons, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC") and the Kansas Human Rights Commission ("the KHRC"). Where her KHRC Charge ("the Charge") asks what "unlawful employment practice" she alleged defendant employed in violation of the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1001 et seq. , plaintiff checked the boxes for race, color, national origin, disability, and retaliation. Doc. 2 at 4.

*2 Plaintiff's Charge alleged only the following facts: she worked for defendant from March 16, 2009, to March 27, 2015, and her last position was in packaging; she is from Mexico; her son has a disability; defendant knew about her son's disability starting in March 2009; her supervisor physically harassed her on December 23, 2014, by pushing her twice; and that defendant terminated her employment on March 27, 2015, because of her national origin and her "association with [her] son, who has a disability." Id. at 4-5.

The EEOC issued plaintiff a Right to Sue Letter on October 20, 2016. She then filed this lawsuit. Her Complaint alleges that defendant violated the ADA by failing to accommodate her disability (i.e. , her injured finger), by retaliating against her for seeking accommodations, and by physically harassing her and disciplining her because of her disability. The Complaint also alleges a retaliation claim under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act.

Defendant has filed a Motion for Partial Dismissal. In its Motion, defendant contends that plaintiff's ADA claims exceed the scope of her Charge, and so plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as the ADA requires. The court considers the parties' arguments below.

Analysis

Defendant's Memorandum in Support its Motion (Doc. 7) and Reply (Doc. 10) present a threshold procedural question that the court must decide before it can begin to analyze the parties' arguments. While defendant labels its motion to dismiss as one under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the legal standards section of its Memorandum in Support begins with the following propositions: "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Under the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. 'In the Tenth Circuit, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.' Thus, a district court must dismiss unexhausted claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Doc. 7 at 4 (citations omitted). This language invokes Rule 12(b)(1). Defendant then continues, mentioning-albeit briefly-the legal standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Defendant's Reply does not clarify its intentions. See Doc. 10 at 8 ("KCSC argues that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies at all -whether her Charge was verified or not-with respect to any claims based on her own disability, which clearly is a jurisdictional requirement." (citation omitted)). So, defendant's papers alone do not permit the court to discern whether defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

But the court must determine which subdivision of the Rule applies because "[d]ifferent standards apply to a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)." Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt , 669 F.3d 1159, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012). If the question presented by defendant's motion truly is a jurisdictional one, then the court may not reach any aspect of the merits of plaintiff's Complaint under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. As the Supreme Court explained in Bell v. Hood :

*3 [I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.

327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ; accord Oppenheim v. Sterling , 368 F.2d 516, 520 n.16 (10th Cir. 1966). So, typically, the court may dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim for relief only after it has found that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id. The court thus must determine whether defendant's motion presents a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(b)(1) before it properly can consider any aspect of the parties' merit arguments. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation , 669 F.3d at 1167 (holding that a district court erred by equating the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(b)(1) standards when it applied the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard to the determination whether it had subject matter jurisdiction).

Despite the Rule 12(b)(6) label defendant places on its Motion to Dismiss, the court must construe it as a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) if the question it presents is jurisdictional. In other words, if the question whether the court should dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies is jurisdictional, then the court must consider defendant's motion as one under Rule 12(b)(1). To decide this question, the court relies on ADA and Title VII cases because, as the Tenth Circuit has noted, "Title I of the ADA, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability, explicitly incorporates the powers, remedies, and procedures of Title VII, making [it] clear that the procedural requirements of those two provisions must be construed identically." Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. , 426 F.3d 1304, 1309 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) ).

In Shikles v. Sprint/United Management Co. , the Tenth Circuit held that "a plaintiff's exhaustion of his or her administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under Title VII-not merely a condition precedent to suit." Id. at 1317 (citing Jones v. Runyon , 91 F.3d 1398, 1399 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996) ). In the years after Shikles , the Circuit has questioned the vitality of the case's holding. See, e.g. , Wickware v. Manville , 676 Fed.Appx. 753, 767 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2017) (mentioning that the holding in Shikles may not be good law still, but not resolving the question and instead stating that "[c]onsequently, even if exhaustion is not jurisdictional, it is a condition precedent to suit" (citations omitted)); Hung Thai Pham , 630 Fed.Appx. at 737-38 (discussing whether Shikles 's holding was still good law, but declining to decide the issue and noting instead that "even if exhaustion is not jurisdictional, this Title VII requirement is vital," so "even if the exhaustion requirement is deemed to be a condition precedent to suit, we conclude that by indisputably failing to exhaust, Mr. Pham has failed to satisfy this condition" (citations omitted)); Arabalo v. City of Denver , 625 Fed.Appx. 851, 859-60, 864 (10th Cir. 2015) (mentioning that the holding of Shikles may not be good law still, but not resolving the question). The questions about the continuing vitality of Shikles arise from the Tenth Circuit's decision in Gad v. Kansas State University , 787 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 2015). But Gad did not overrule Shikles -at least not explicitly. Instead, the Circuit's decision in Gad appears limited to the question before it in that case: whether the EEOC's verification requirement is jurisdictional. Gad , 787 F.3d at 1038-40.

Although the court is mindful of concerns about Shikles 's status after Gad , "[t]his court is bound by the published Tenth Circuit decisions unless they have been overruled by the Tenth Circuit sitting en banc or superseded by a contrary Supreme Court decision." Brand v. Mazda Motor Corp. , 978 F.Supp. 1382, 1392 (D. Kan. 1997) (first citing Haynes v. Williams , 88 F.3d 898, 900 n.4 (10th Cir. 1996) ; then citing United States v. Spedalieri , 910 F.2d 707, 709 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) ; then citing Morris v. State of Kan. Dep't of Revenue , 849 F.Supp. 1421, 1428 (D. Kan. 1994), abrogated on other grounds , Burns v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Cty. of Jackson, Kan. , 197 F.Supp.2d 1278 (D. Kan. 2002) ). The Tenth Circuit has not overruled Shikles en banc, and the Supreme Court has not decided a case explicitly contrary to Shikles 's holding. So, the court believes it is still bound to follow Shikles 's holding.

*4 The court thus concludes that defendant's motion to dismiss, in reality, is a Rule 12(b)(1) motion and so it considers defendant's motion under the legal standard outlined in the next section.

I. Legal Standard

The court must dismiss any case that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The court must do so because "[a] court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment." Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974) (citing Bradbury v. Dennis , 310 F.2d 73, 74 (10th Cir. 1962) ). The party who invokes the court's jurisdiction bears the burden to establish that it exists. Id. Here, that party is plaintiff.

Generally, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) takes one of two forms: a facial attack or a factual attack. Holt v. United States , 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995). A facial attack questions the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in a plaintiff's complaint. Id. "In reviewing a facial attack on the complaint, a district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true." Id. (citing Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States , 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990) ). In contrast, a factual attack goes beyond the complaint's allegations and challenges "the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends." Id. at 1003. "When reviewing a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations." Id. (citing Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. , 922 F.2d at 325 ). In this context, a district "court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and [even conduct] a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1)." Id. (citations omitted). So, "[i]n a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1), the court's reference to evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment, unless the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case." Shipley v. I.R.S. , No. 04-cv-2573-JWL, 2005 WL 1334617, at *1 (D. Kan. June 6, 2005) (first citing Stuart v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co. , 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001) ; then citing Holt , 46 F.3d at 1003 ; then citing Wheeler v. Hurdman , 825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir. 1987) ); Sizova v. Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Tech. , 282 F.3d 1320, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 2002).

Here, some question exists whether defendant's motion presents a facial or factual attack. Plaintiff contends that defendant's motion strays beyond the Complaint and thus questions facts. Defendant disagrees. It contends that its motion only questions the sufficiency of the Complaint's jurisdictional allegations. In reality, defendant's motion melds the two approaches.

At first glance, it looks like a factual attack. Defendant attaches an exhibit to its Memorandum in Support. Doc. 7-1. Typically, this approach signals that defendant is making a factual attack challenging the complaint's jurisdictional allegations. Cf. Shipley , 2005 WL 1334617, at *1 ("Here, Defendant chose to make a factual attack by offering exhibits [to] support its motion." (footnote and citation omitted)). But here, closer inspection leads the court to a different conclusion.

*5 The exhibit attached to defendant's Memorandum in Support does not challenge any of the Complaint's jurisdictional allegations. Instead, the exhibit merely submits plaintiff's EEOC and KHRC administrative charges. See Doc. 7-1; see also Doc. 1 at 6-7 (referencing exhibits to the Complaint). But defendant's motion relies only on plaintiff's KHRC Charge and plaintiff already had appended this Charge as an exhibit to her Complaint. Doc. 2 at 4-5 ("EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT of Complaint") (filed by plaintiff). Federal Rule 10(c) makes that exhibit part of plaintiff's Complaint. See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson , 586 F.2d 1375, 1382 (10th Cir. 1978) ("We first observe that any contention that a substantial federal question was not set forth 'on the face' of the Mountain Fuel complaint is without merit. [Rule 10(c) ] provides that 'A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.' " (citations omitted)); accord City of Rome, N.Y. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. , 362 F.3d 168, 175 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004). Plaintiff's EEOC Charge is not part of her Complaint. She did not attach it to the Complaint and objects to defendant's reliance on it here. See Gee v. Pacheco , 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010) (listing exceptions to the rule against looking beyond the four corners of the pleadings). But, defendant does not rely on plaintiff's EEOC Charge.

Because defendant's motion does not rely on any material outside the pleadings, it presents a facial attack. This conclusion means that the court applies "the same standards under Rule 12(b)(1) that are applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm'n , 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010). So, the court accepts the allegations in plaintiff's Complaint as true. But, where the Complaint's allegations are legal conclusions or contradict information contained in the documents attached to it, no such presumption of truth attaches. See GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. , 130 F.3d 1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the court need not accept "legal conclusions and factual allegations that contradict ... a properly considered document" as true (citing Jackson v. Alexander , 465 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1972) )).

Last, plaintiff's decision to attach the EEOC's Right to Sue Letter and her KHRC Charge to her Complaint provides something of a governor on the Complaint's allegations. In GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. , the Circuit explained that district courts need not accept factual allegations as true if they contradict a "properly considered document." Id. (citation omitted).

II. Exhaustion

"Title I of the ADA requires a plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit." Jones v. U.P.S., Inc. , 502 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). To determine whether a plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies, the court uses a two-step test. Id. at 1183, 1186. In the first step, the court asks whether the plaintiff has filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at 1183. In the second, the court must "determine the scope of the allegations raised in the EEOC charge because '[a] plaintiff's claim in federal court is generally limited by the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination submitted to the EEOC.' " Id. at 1186 (quoting MacKenzie v. City & Cty. of Denver , 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005) ; further citation omitted). Here, defendant concedes that plaintiff has satisfied step one. But, defendant contends that her ADA claims cannot survive step two.

In step two, the court liberally construes plaintiff's Charge. Id. But, plaintiff's Charge "must contain facts concerning the discriminatory and retaliatory actions underlying each claim; this follows from the rule that 'each discrete incident' of alleged discrimination or retaliation 'constitutes its own "unlawful employment practice" for which administrative remedies must be exhausted.' " Id. (quoting Martinez v. Potter , 347 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003) ). So, the court's inquiry "is limited to the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow from the discriminatory acts alleged in the administrative charge." Id. (emphasis in original).

*6 Here, plaintiff principally submitted her charge of discrimination to a state administrative agency-the KHRC. See Doc. 7-1 at 3-4 (assigned KHRC docket No. 38214-16). She then provided notice to the EEOC of her state charge filing, notifying this federal agency that her federal submission was made under the EECO's "dual filing" procedure. Id. at 2.

Plaintiff's KHRC Charge identified the "unlawful employment practice" that she alleged defendant had committed. Plaintiff checked the boxes identifying race, color, national origin, disability, and retaliation as the types of discrimination claimed. Doc. 2 at 4. Plaintiff's Charge alleged only the following facts: she worked for defendant from March 16, 2009, to March 27, 2015, and her last position was in packaging; she is from Mexico; her son has a disability; defendant knew about her son's disability starting in March 2009; her supervisor physically harassed her on December 23, 2014, by pushing her twice; and that defendant terminated her employment on March 27, 2015, because of her national origin and her "association with [her] son, who has a disability." Id. at 4-5.

In her Complaint, plaintiff alleges three claims under the ADA. She bases all three claims on her own disability-which was caused by a workplace injury in April 2012. This Complaint never mentions her son. Plaintiff's Charge exhausted only an ADA claim based on her association with her son's disability. But her Charge never alleges that she, herself, has a disability, or that she suffered adverse employment actions because of her disability. Her Charge therefore does not contain facts about the discrete incident of discrimination and retaliation relied on by Counts One through Three of her Complaint. No "administrative investigation [could] reasonably be expected to follow from" plaintiff's administrative allegations about her son's disability to plaintiff's judicial allegations that she was disabled. Jones , 502 F.3d at 1183, 1186 ; see also Andrews v. GEO Grp., Inc. , 288 Fed.Appx. 514, 518 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff did not exhaust her job-modification claims because her administrative "filing [was] devoid of any facts concerning such a request").

Sensing her predicament, plaintiff asks the court to consider, in addition to her Charge, a disability questionnaire that she filled out after filing her Charge with the KHRC. Defendant objects to plaintiff's use of the questionnaire, arguing that the court cannot consider the questionnaire without converting defendant's motion into one for summary judgment. This argument creates a dilemma that the court cannot resolve from the current record. On one hand, defendant argues, correctly, that the court cannot consider the contents of the administrative questionnaire because plaintiff's Complaint does not allege it or otherwise invoke it under Rule 10(c). See Pacheco , 627 F.3d at 1186 (listing exceptions to the rule against looking beyond the four corners of the pleadings). On the other hand, plaintiff may not have alleged that the questionnaire's contents provided a platform to establish the jurisdictional requisite-administrative exhaustion-because she did not know that defendant would challenge her administrative charge's sufficiency for that requisite.

*7 In the end, the court concludes that it is not proper to resolve this dilemma on the current motion. The parties' filings manifest one dispute, in particular, that leads the court to this conclusion. Plaintiff contends that a KHRC questionnaire establishes that she exhausted her claims based on her own alleged disability. And, indeed, the Circuit's most recent comment on this idea- Jones v. Needham -leaves room for this argument to succeed. See 856 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2017) ("[T]here are times in which a different filing such as an intake questionnaire, can constitute [an administrative] charge for certain purposes." (citations omitted)). While the "general rule" remains that the administrative charge defines the scope of the administrative investigation, id. , Needham recognizes that exceptions to this general rule still exist. Also, defendant's Reply raises a series of unanswered questions. Did defendant receive the questionnaire before plaintiff filed this lawsuit? And, if not, does that matter?

The court concludes that it should not decide questions so central to the case on a record as unsettled as the one presented by the current motion to dismiss. The court denies the current motion because it concludes that the current record is insufficient to decide the first question in every federal court case: Does subject matter jurisdiction exist? On its own motion, then, the court grants plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint. The court establishes a comprehensive schedule at the end of this order. Plaintiff's amended complaint must plead sufficient material so the court can decide whether its jurisdiction reaches plaintiff's claims. This obligation includes each fact she relies on to establish administrative exhaustion and thus, jurisdiction. If defendant contends that plaintiff's amended allegations do not suffice to establish exhaustion, it may renew its motion to dismiss. If defendant believes the new filing establishes jurisdiction-for the moment, anyway-it should file an Answer. If defendant renews its motion to dismiss, the parties' filings should discuss the implications of the Circuit's decision in Needham , a case decided after briefing on the current motion concluded.

The following interim schedule governs the proceedings in this case:

(1) No later than 10 days from the date of this Order, plaintiff must file an amended complaint alleging all facts she relies on to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

(2) Within 15 days of plaintiff filing her amended complaint, defendant may file a renewed motion to dismiss challenging the jurisdictional sufficiency of plaintiff's amended allegations. If defendant elects not to file such a motion to dismiss, it must file a timely Answer.

(3) Within 15 days of any new motion to dismiss filed by defendant, plaintiff must file her Opposition to the motion.

(4) Defendant must file any Reply within 10 days of plaintiff's Opposition.

Finally, consistent with Rule 1's mandate that the court must apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every civil case, the court stays discovery and all other pre-trial proceedings until the jurisdictional questions are resolved. If defendant does not file a renewed motion to dismiss, the parties are directed to notify Deputy Clerk Megan Garrett (by email at KSD_Crabtree_Chambers@ksd.uscourts.gov) so that the court can lift the stay and return the case to normal case-management procedures.

*8 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT defendant Kansas City Steak Company, LLC's Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 6) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff must file an amended complaint within 10 days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2017 WL 2985748

2017 WL 1551990

United States District Court,

D. New Mexico.

LJ DOLIN, Plaintiff,

v.

THYSSENKRUPP ELEVATOR CORPORATION, Defendant.

No: 2:16-cv-00529-MCA-GBW

Signed 03/31/2017

Attorneys and Law Firms

Amelia P. Nelson, Rio Grande Attorneys at Law, PC, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

Frank Leo Kollman, Joseph Garrett Wozniak, Kollman & Saucier, PA, Timonium, MD, for Defendant.

Opinion

Memorandum Opinion and Order

M. CHRISTINA ARMIJO, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

*1 THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corporation's (TKE's) Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Motion ), filed on June 5, 2016. [Doc. 7] Plaintiff L.J. Dolin (Dolin) responded on August 19, 2016. [Doc. 13] TKE replied on September 2, 2016. [Doc. 15] The Court has considered the parties' submissions and the relevant law, and is otherwise fully informed. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS TKE's Motion as to Dolin's hostile-work-environment claim. The Court DENIES TKE's Motion in all other respects.

I. Background

TKE manufactures, installs, and services elevators throughout the United States. [Doc. 7-1, pg. 3 (asserting this fact); Doc. 13 (not disputing this fact) ] Its mechanics who maintain those elevators are represented by the International Union of Elevator Constructors (IUEC). [Id. ] The IUEC and TKE entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which governs wages and employment of those mechanics. [Id. ] In addition, "Local Representative (LR)" agreements govern mechanics who work in remote locations and provide for additional terms and conditions of employment. [Id. ] Dolin worked in such a remote location and was subject to an LR agreement. [Doc. 7-1, pg. 3 (referencing the LR agreement applicable to Dolin); Doc. 13, pg. 3 (not disputing this fact) ]

The LR agreement governing Dolin in 20