Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Yakubets (3 F. Supp. 3d 261, 2014)

OPINION

PRATTER, District Judge.

In Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.’s (“Joe Hand”) Renewed Motion for Default Judgment (Docket No. 14), Joe Hand seeks statutory and enhanced damages for Cafe Nostalgie and Victor Yakubets’s unlawful interception of cable programming under 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1); vicarious liability against Mr. Yakubets; and leave to move for attorneys’ fees and costs. Because Joe Hand is entitled to damages, the Court grants the Motion as set out below. But to determine the appropriate amount, and who is liable therefor, the Court must consider several issues not yet addressed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and to which district courts have adopted a variety of approaches.

An unopposed motion for default judgment can be a tempting invitation to defer automatically to, or at least consider more charitably, the plaintiffs view of the law in addition to his allegations of fact. The invitation is all the more tempting because of the work-intensive paradox that results from declining it: While in our adversarial system, a court’s acting sua sponte is the exception to the rule, a court evaluating a motion for default judgment must itself ask whether the plaintiffs complaint states claim(s) upon which relief can be granted. Where the complaint fails to state a claim, therefore, the paradox is that the defendant may have better luck by defaulting before an attentive (but unassisted) court than by engaging (and paying) a lawyer who, for one reason or another, fails to have the same causes dismissed early on with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

If, by contrast, the district court accepts the plaintiffs invitation and grants its imprimatur to the plaintiffs unchallenged legal theory, the court risks making bad law, even though that law is only persuasive authority, and even though the court is “confined from molar to molecular motions.” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). This risk is especially dangerous where a region of the legal landscape is typified by defaults, for default judgments not only often result from one-sided proceedings, but also rarely weather the appellate scrutiny necessary to ensure the law’s uniformity. The unintended consequence of different rules or applications to similar cases is not only the erosion of the principle that the rule of law comprises the justice of similar treatment for similar circumstances, but also the loss of one of the principal aims of the law: predictability or certainty, such that persons and entities, good or bad, may understand the law’s limits and adjust their behavior accordingly. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L.Rev. 457, 459-60 (1897). As Justice Holmes explained, “Far the most important and pretty nearly the whole meaning of every new effort of legal thought is to make these prophecies more precise, and to generalize them into a thoroughly connected system_The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what [is] mean[t] by the law.” Id. at 457-58, 461-62. Where the appellate courts have little opportunity to map the contours of certain statutory terrain, as with 47 U.S.C. § 553 here, litigants must contend with district courts’ differing measurements of the same topography. For good or ill, this Court sees its duties as including sowing seeds in the legal landscape so that its harvests will be better anticipated, if not better understood.

A survey of district court decisions on § 553 (and its satellite analog, 47 U.S.C. § 605) shows a variety of approaches to, and therefore outcomes under, the following questions presented in this case: First, how should “statutory damages” be measured under 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii), which, when taken alone, reveals few of which factors should be considered? Second, what must a plaintiff prove — or allege, at the default judgment stage-to show that the defendant committed the § 553 violation “willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain,” § 553(c)(3)(B), and thus trigger the court’s exercise of discretion to award the plaintiff so-called “enhanced damages”? And what factors should guide this decision? Finally, under what circumstances, if any, may an individual or entity be held vicariously liable for a violation of § 553, and how much is required to plead sufficiently such vicarious liability? And if a defendant is vicariously liable, is he jointly and severally liable?

For these reasons, in order to grant Joe Hand’s Motion, the Court both surveys the legal terrain and discusses several approaches to the issues posed in an attempt to provide reasoned guideposts rather than Delphic pronouncements.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Joe Hand, an international closed-circuit distributor of sports and entertainment programming, purchased the exclusive nationwide commercial distribution rights to broadcast the boxing match “The Big Challenge”: Adamek v. Grant (“the Match”) on August 21, 2010. Joe Hand then spent substantial sums marketing the Match to commercial establishments, some of which purchased sublicenses from Joe Hand to exhibit the Match to their customers.

Café Nostalgie is a restaurant in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On the night of August 21, 2010, without such a sublicense, Café Nostalgie intercepted and broadcast the Match to its patrons on four televisions, as observed by Joe Hand’s investigator, Daniel Szlezak. See Hand Aff. ¶ 7 (Docket No. 8); Szlezak Aff. (Docket No. 7-3). Because Café Nostalgie’s reception of the Match was unlicensed, the interception violated either 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (“Unauthorized interception or receipt” of “any communications service offered over a cable system”) or 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (“No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person....”). See also generally Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Yakubets, No. 12-4583, 2013 WL 5224123 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 17, 2013).

Joe Hand subsequently brought suit against Cafe Nostalgie and Victor Yaku-bets, who is identified on Café Nostalgie’s Liquor Control Board License as President, Secretary/Treasurer, Director, Stockholder, and Manager/Steward, and who Joe Hand thus alleges had the right and ability to supervise the activities of Cafe Nostalgie and its employees. Although both Mr. Yakubets and Cafe Nos-talgie appear to have been properly served, see Yakubets, 2013 WL 5224123, at *1, they failed to appear or answer Joe Hand’s Complaint, and the Clerk of Court entered their default, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Joe Hand then moved for default judgment under 47 U.S.C. § 605 and the tort of conversion (Docket No. 7), see Fed. R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2).

The Court concluded that because Joe Hand did not allege or subsequently show how Cafe Nostalgie intercepted the Match (i.e., by satellite or cable), Joe Hand could proceed only under 47 U.S.C. § 553, which governs cable transmissions:

[Wjhere a plaintiffs complaint pleads claims under both §§ 553 and 605, but at the default judgment stage the plaintiff can prove neither with individual specificity, then § 553 will be applied. A presumption in favor of § 553 is the more principled and persuasive approach. Because a defendant cannot violate both sections with the same conduct — “§ 605 encompasses the interception of satellite transmissions” whereas “[ojnce a satellite transmission reaches a cable system’s wire distribution phase, it is subject to § 553 and is no longer within the purview of § 605,” TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir.2001) — ... the substantive law itself forces a determination of which statute applies. But the enigmatic approach of awarding damages under “either statute,” even if expedient or practical, cannot be the general rule. For one, the syllogism that proves that a plaintiff violated either § 553 or § 605 lacks sufficient bandwidth to allow the plaintiff to proceed under § 605: if § 553 did not exist, neither would the syllogism, and such plaintiffs would be entitled to nothing.

Second, the fact that § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii)’s and § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II)’s damage ranges sometimes overlap cannot support the adoption of a categorical rule that damages may be awarded under either.... Additionally, while costs and attorneys’ fees must be awarded under § 605, the court may decline to award them under § 553.

In addition, the presumption that § 553 applies absent any evidence of interception by satellite is a more principled approach. The fundamental principle that a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence dictates that if he can present only insufficient evidence of a particular wrong, he should not be entitled to relief. Although it may be clear from the facts alleged, and accepted as true on a motion for default judgment, that a violation of either § 605 or § 553 must have occurred, in such a situation the plaintiff has not discharged that burden of proof with respect to either. If they had a choice, plaintiffs in every such case would elect to proceed under § 605: its damage range is higher than § 553’s, and it applies upon each violation. But in each such case, the plaintiff will have failed to allege a necessary element of § 605(a), to wit, radio transmission by satellite. See 47 U.S.C. § 605 (“No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.... ”). Thus, notwithstanding the similar remedial schemes of the two statutes, in the absence of evidence of a violation subjecting the defendant to greater damages (§ 605), the plaintiff should be restricted to pursuing damages under § 553.

Practical reasons also support channeling plaintiffs through § 553 under these circumstances: “a cable box is more easily hidden” than a satellite dish. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Guzman, No. 08-05469, 2009 WL 1034218, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 16, 2009). As a result, where a defendant has somehow intercepted a signal but the means remain undiscovered — subterranean or up in the air — then, “unlike § 605, a permissible inference can be drawn with respect to § 553.” [J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v.] Ayala, 2012 WL 4097754, at *2 [ (N.D.Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) ]; accord Guzman, 2009 WL 1034218, at *2; cf. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Saucedo, No. 12-04657, 2013 WL 2384258, at *4 (N.D.Cal. May 30, 2013) (“[T]he investigator indicated that Defendant’s establishment does not have a satellite dish. As a result, Defendant most likely intercepted the program via a cable signal in violation of Section 553.” (citation omitted)). Third-party subpoenas and orders for inspection to one side, a plaintiff who has gone to the trouble of sending an investigator to a defendant’s establishment, as here, can at the very least ask the investigator to keep his antennae up for evidence of a satellite dish.

Yakubets, 2013 WL 5224123, at *4-5 (some citations and footnotes omitted and/or reformatted).

For these reasons, the Court denied Joe Hand’s Motion for Default Judgment with prejudice as to § 605 and invited Joe Hand to move again under § 553 (Docket Nos. 11-13). Joe Hand’s Renewed Motion for Default Judgment is now before the Court. Joe Hand did “not request a hearing on damages,” Br. 8-9 n. 4 (Docket No. 14-1), but rather relies on its submissions on the Docket, including the affidavits of Joe Hand, Jr., Joe Hand’s President (Docket No. 8), and Daniel Szlezak, who investigated the unlawful interception of the Match (Docket No. 7-3), and Café Nostalgie’s liquor license, of which Joe Hand has submitted a copy (Docket No. 7-3) and of which the Court may also take judicial notice.

II. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 charts the course a plaintiff must navigate to obtain a default judgment against a nonresponsive defendant. First, if the plaintiff shows the defendant’s “fail[ure] to plead or otherwise defend, ... the clerk must enter [the defendant’s] default,” Fed. R.Civ.P. 55(a), which is valid only if the defendant was properly served. See Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1304 (3d Cir.1995).

The plaintiff may then “apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). The court’s initial inquiry is “whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action.” 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688 (3d ed.2013) (citing cases). As at the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepts as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the plaintiffs complaint, except those relating to damages, as though they were admitted or established by proof, Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir.1990), as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint, e.g., Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 286 (7th Cir.1994). Conclusory allegations and the parties’ legal theories or “conclusions of law” are not entitled to the same presumption and are not deemed admitted. Wright & Miller, supra, § 2688.

If the court determines that the plaintiff has stated a cause of action, it must then assess damages. Unlike liability, unless damages are “liquidated or computable,” they “cannot be awarded simply on the basis of the pleadings, but must instead be established at an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to [Rule] 55(b)(2),” Comdyne I, 908 F.2d at 1152, or otherwise by such proof as the plaintiff may submit without a hearing.

Default judgments are disfavored, see Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 764 (3d Cir.1982); the default judgment context usually offers none of the adversarial argument upon which the American legal system is founded and which remains a pillar of courts’ ability to make informed and well-reasoned decisions. Thus, under Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.2000), the district court must examine three additional factors to determine whether it should grant a default judgment: “(1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the defendant appears to have a litiga-ble defense, and (3) whether defendant’s delay is due to culpable conduct.” Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164.

“Considerable delays,” especially those that might “stretch on indefinitely,” are sufficient to show prejudice to the plaintiff. Grove v. Rizzi 1857 S.P.A., No. 04-2053, 2013 WL 943283, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 12, 2013) (citation omitted). Second, outside of the court’s obligation to decide whether it has jurisdiction and whether the complaint states a claim, the court may presume that an absent defendant who has failed to answer has no meritorious defense, e.g., Doe v. Simone, No. 12-5825, 2013 WL 3772532, at *5 (D.N.J. July 17, 2013), because “[i]t is not the court’s responsibility to research the law and construct the parties’ arguments for them,” Econ. Folding Box Corp. v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir.2008). Third, the defendant’s failure or refusal to “engage[ ] in the litigation process and [to] offer[] no reason for this failure or refusal” may “qualif[y] as culpable conduct with respect to the entry of a default judgment — indeed, for the Court to conclude otherwise would be to reward the recalcitrant or the oppositional and uncooperative.” E. Elec. Corp. of N.J. v. Shoemaker Constr. Co., 657 F.Supp.2d 545, 554 (E.D.Pa.2009).

The district court’s evaluation of these factors is reviewed for abuse of discretion and tends to be perfunctory because “when a defendant has failed to appear or respond in any fashion to the complaint, th[e] analysis is necessarily one sided.” T & C Leasing Inc. v. BBMC, LLC, No. 09-873, 2010 WL 231128, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Jan. 14, 2010) (citing Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 177 n. 9 (3d Cir.1990)). Thus, “entry of default judgment is typically appropriate in such circumstances at least until the defendant comes forward with a motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(c).” Id.; cf. Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., Ltd., 691 F.2d 653, 657 (3d Cir.1982) (“[Prejudice suffered by a non-defaulting party can often be rectified through the trial court’s power under Rule 60(b) to impose terms and conditions upon the opening of a judgment.”); Gross v. Stereo Component Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir.1983) (explaining that a defendant who appears after the entry of default judgment may show that his conduct was not “taken willfully or in bad faith”).

III. DISCUSSION

Section 553(a) of Title 47, U.S.Code, provides that “[n]o person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.” 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). The statute provides a civil cause of action that may be brought by “[a]ny person aggrieved by any violation” of the prohibition of interception or reception, id. at § 553(c)(1), as well as criminal penalties, id. § 553(b). See also TKR Cable Co., 267 F.3d at 207. Because the Match in this case was broadcast over cable and satellite, and Cafe Nostalgie intercepted it, Cafe Nostalgie must have done so either by cable or satellite. In the absence of any evidence to indicate which method was used, the Court applied the presumption that the interception was by cable. Yaku-bets, 2013 WL 5224123, at *4-5.

The Court concludes that Joe Hand is entitled to both statutory and enhanced damages under § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) and § 553(c)(3)(B), respectively, for Café Nos-talgie’s violation of § 553(a)(1). Under the test the Court adopts from copyright law, as have a number of other courts, Joe Hand is also entitled to a judgment of vicarious liability against Mr. Yakubets, but to a limited extent. Finally, Joe Hand may move for attorneys’ fees and costs under § 553(c)(2)(C). In arriving at these conclusions, the Court relies on the well-pleaded factual allegations in Joe Hand’s Complaint, and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, as well as the documentary evidence Joe Hand has submitted on the Docket. None of the three Chamberlain factors counsel against entering default judgment.

A. Statutory and Enhanced Damages under 47 U.S.C. § 553

A plaintiff may recover two types of damages under § 553. First, “plaintiffs [may] choose between actual damages or statutory damages” under § 553(c)(3)(A), Gen. Instrument Corp. of Del. v. Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg., Inc., 197 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir.1999), which provides:

Damages awarded by any court under this section shall be computed in accordance with either of the following clauses:

(i) the party aggrieved may recover the actual damages suffered by him as a result of the violation and any profits of the violator that are attributable to the violation which are not taken into account in computing the actual damages; in determining the violator’s profits, the party aggrieved shall be required to prove only the violator’s gross revenue, and the violator shall be required to prove his deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the violation; or

(ii) the party aggrieved may recover an award of statutory damages for all violations involved in the action, in a sum of not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers just.

47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A). Because “[tjhere are no mens rea or scienter elements” under § 553(a), defendants are strictly liable for actual or statutory damages. E.g., J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. De La Cerda, No. 11-1896, 2013 WL 5670877, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 16, 2013) (citation omitted).

Second, § 553 also provides for what courts have termed “enhanced damages”:

In any case in which the court finds that the violation was committed willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, the court in its discretion may increase the award of damages, whether actual or statutory under subparagraph (A), by an amount of not more than $50,000.

47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B). Thus, a particular mental state is required for enhanced damages.

Joe Hand requests statutory and enhanced damages in an amount “that both sufficiently compensates [it] and functions as an effective deterrent.” Br. 9. But while the terms of the statutory and enhanced damages subsections afford courts discretion in assessing damages (by awarding an amount of statutory damages it “considers just,” of up to $10,000, 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii), or of enhanced damages, “in its discretion,” of up to $50,000; id. § 553(c)(3)(B)), neither subsection spells out what factors should be considered. Nor, as Joe Hand notes, has the Third Circuit Court of Appeals provided “a formula for calculating damages” under § 553. The first task, then, is to outline the parameters of the court’s discretion.

1. Statutory Damages under § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii)

a. The measurement of statutory damages

Joe Hand argues that because § 553 is aimed at reducing signal piracy, deterrence is an appropriate consideration for determining statutory damages under § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii). Br. 10. Such methodology has tended to produce damages at the higher end of the case law’s spectrum. For instance, Joe Hand cites to a case proposing that a statutory damages award should be “enough to deter defendants and others like them from engaging in such conduct again,” and thus can be “well in excess of the probable licensing fee,” and another case finding “deterrence needed” and employing a per-patron approach as “an appropriate penalty.”

The Court disagrees with this approach. While deterrence is a universal issue addressed by § 553 — the cause of action itself is a general deterrent, and there is no doubt “that Congress drafted the provision to deter the newly emergent and previously unaddressed cable piracy,” TER Cable Co., 267 F.3d at 204 — deterrence as a factor is better considered under the enhanced damages rubric, which requires a showing of willfulness, see 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B), than the statutory damages provision, which imposes strict liability. The Court thus agrees with the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the only appellate court to have addressed the aim and evaluation of § 553’s statutory damages, that statutory damages should be “based solely on the estimated value of the services stolen, without consideration of other harms ... or of other policies favoring deterrence.” Charter Commc’ns Entm’t I, DST v. Burdulis, 460 F.3d 168, 181 (1st Cir.2006). Because “statutory damages are merely an alternative to actual damages,” they “should be ‘as reasonable an estimate of actual damages as the facts ... allow,’ not greater.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Comcast of Mass. I, Inc. v. Naranjo, 303 F.Supp.2d 43, 48 (D.Mass.2004)). Several reasons support evaluating statutory damages as an estimate of actual damages and not increasing them as a penalty or deterrent.

First, nothing in the actual or statutory damages subsections, § 553(e)(3)(A)(i) and (ii), suggests that deterrence is an appropriate decisional factor. Instead,

according to the plain language of the statute, statutory damages are merely an alternative to actual damages. The statute creates no difference between the two. Thus, although it is possible to conclude that the statutory damages provision is intended to allow a court to impose greater damages than available under the actual damages provision, “the plain language offers no identified reason to reach that conclusion.”

Burdulis, 460 F.3d at 181 (citing Naranjo, 303 F.Supp.2d at 49).

Second, § 553’s overall structure favors weighing deterrence under the enhanced damages provision and not under the statutory damages provision. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Charter Communications Entertainment I, DST v. Burdulis, 460 F.3d 168,

Congress addressed the need for deterrence in other statutory provisions. Section 553(c)(2)(A), for example, allows a court to impose an injunction on defendants, thus preventing future violations. Congress similarly focused on deterrence in enacting § 553(c)(3)(B), which authorizes enhanced damages for certain willful conduct. With the existence of these separate provisions addressing deterrence, there was no need for Congress to ask courts to address the issue when determining statutory damages.

Burdulis, 460 F.3d at 183. The threat of criminal liability under § 553(b) for willful violations also acts as both a general deterrent and a specific deterrent, as certain types of repeat offenders face increasingly stiff penalties. See 47 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2). Section 553’s language and structure suggest no reason to assume that Congress expected courts to double count deterrence by factoring it first into an actual or statutory damages award and then again into an enhanced damages award. See also, e.g., J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Martinez, No. 11-754, 2013 WL 2147790, at *8 (M.D.N.C. May 16, 2013) (“Plaintiff claims no other actual damages, aside from costs and attorneys’ fees, but rather points to speculative harm to Defendant La Hacienda Inc.’s competitors and the need for deterrence of future violations, arguments better suited to the determination of enhanced damages.” (citation omitted)). The cases Joe Hand cites offer no convincing reasoning to the contrary.

Joe Hand’s invocation of deterrence depends in part on its view that “Congress has equated a violation of the statutes to theft of service.” Br. 9. This perspective is misleading. While Congress enacted § 553 to combat cable piracy, see infra subsection III.A.2.C, the statute creates different penalties based on different mental states. Willful violations of § 553(a)(l)’s prohibition can subject violators to criminal penalties, 47 U.S.C. § 553(b), and additional, so-called “enhanced damages,” id. § 553(c)(3)(B). By contrast, actual and statutory damages are awarded without any showing of mens rea, or even if the conduct is merely negligent. Further, “[i]n any case where the court finds that the violator was not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted a violation of this section, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of damages to a sum of not less than $100,” id. § 553(c)(3)(C) — a sum which may be considerably less than what the court would otherwise have to impose. As a whole, § 553 plainly does not equate violation of § 553(a)(1) with piracy or theft. In fact, the deterrence rationale makes less sense with respect to negligent misconduct than intentional or willful misconduct, but statutory damages do not require intent or willfulness.

Finally, as the court pointed out in Com-cast of Massachusetts I, Inc. v. Naranjo, 303 F.Supp.2d 43, the consideration of deterrence in awarding statutory damages, “when carried through to its full implications, ... leads to absurd results” because under that theory,

an aggrieved party may receive as statutory damages premiums to deter future conduct in addition to actual or estimated actual damages. Statutory damages, however, may not exceed $10,000. As a result, parties that have suffered large actual damages (greater than $10,000) cannot receive any deterrence premiums. But if any violators require an additional deterrence premium, it is those who have caused the largest amounts of harm.

303 F.Supp.2d at 49; accord Burdulis, 460 F.3d at 183.

For these reasons, the Court holds, in accordance with the Naranjo-Burdulis approach, that statutory damages under § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) “should be calculated based solely on an estimate of actual damages,” without considering deterrence. Burdulis, 460 F.3d at 181-83. This interpretation also “best satisfies the command of the statute and the judicial interest in promoting predictability and transparency.” Id. at 181-82.

* * *

Only one court appears to have acknowledged and disagreed with the Naranjo-Burdulis approach (other courts have simply not engaged in the legal analysis). In Comcast of Illinois X, LLC. v. Toguchi, No. 05-5363, 2008 WL 360682 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 11, 2008), the court criticized Naran-jo’s approach as ignoring the difference between the actual damages provision and the statutory damages provision, because, in the Toguchi court’s words, “A plain reading of the statute demonstrates Congress’s clear intent to provide courts with two different methods in which to calculate and award compensatory damages. It is our duty to enforce § 553 as it was written and not to change its meaning by adopting a different construction.” Id. at *4.

The concern is a valid one, but the Nar-anjo-Burdulis approach still represents the best interpretation of § 553’s statutory damages, for the reasons discussed above. The Toguchi court assumes too much from the different language in the actual and statutory damages subsections. The statute’s language and structure suggest that statutory damages are an alternative to actual damages because of the difficulty of proving actual damages, not so that the plaintiff can recover more than actual damages. Indeed, the actual damages provision requires the aggrieved party to “prove ... the violator’s gross revenue” from the violation, 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis added); the statutory damages option, of course, does not, see id. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii). See also H.R.Rep. No. 98-934, at 85 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 4655, 4722 (“In determining the violator’s profits, the party aggrieved shall have the burden of establishing the violator’s gross revenues by the best means available, while the violator shall have the burden of proving any expenses he incurred which are normally deductible in determining profit, as well as any profit and revenues which are attributable to factors or activities other than the violation.”). The statutory damages provision thus makes sense as authorizing courts to use their discretion to fashion factors to “estimate,” rather than “com-put[e],” § 553(c)(3)(A)(i), actual damages, see, e.g., Coxcom, Inc. v. Chaffee, No. 05-0107, 2007 WL 1577708, at *3 (D.R.I. May 31, 2007), aff'd, 536 F.3d 101 (1st Cir.2008), and can help to explain the cap of $10,000 “for all violations involved in the action,” 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii); see Nur-Tek, 197 F.3d at 95, as a trade-off for demanding less proof.

A broader concern, however, is that the Toguchi court’s alternative, similar to the tack that many courts have pursued, leaves courts (and litigants) lost at sea. After criticizing the Naranjo rule, the To-guchi court turned to “a fact specific analysis.” Toguchi 2008 WL 360682, at *4. But while it indeed specified facts, the Toguchi court did not analyze how it reached its conclusion that $4000 would be a just award. See id.

Such “bottom line” approaches are common. Courts in a number of decisions have mixed and matched factors with little explanation of why those factors are relevant (or consistent with the Naranjo-Bur-dulis approach’s rationale), and in some cases, courts have chosen statutory damages figures after little more than a cursory survey of what a handful of other courts have done. Still other courts explicitly double-count the deterrence rationale by considering it in both the statutory damages and the enhanced damages inquiries, with no explanation of why doing so is appropriate; one court, for example, found “five times the [broadcast cost]” an “appropriate” multiplier for arriving at a “base amount [that] is appropriate for the statutory violation.” These decisions may be partly the consequence of the non-adversarial nature of the adjudication of default judgment motions and their only rare exposure to appellate scrutiny.

b. Factors for measuring statutory damages

If the aim of statutory damages is to estimate actual damages, what factors are to be considered? The court should begin by asking what the defendant would have paid had he sought to obtain a lawful license. If the plaintiff issued a card listing rates for its programming (e.g., segmented by the capacity of the establishment), this number can be easily determined and can form the basis for the statutory damages award. In cases without a rate card, courts have attempted to approximate a sublicense fee by estimating a per-patron charge and multiplying it by the number of patrons in the defendant commercial establishment.

Second, the court might consider “any profits of the violator that are attributable to the violation which are not taken into account in computing the actual damages,” one of the factors under the actual damages subsection, § 553(c)(3)(A)(i). (The Naranjo and Burdulis courts did not discuss whether profits should be added because they dealt with use of cable de-scramblers in residential settings. See, e.g., Burdulis, 460 F.3d at 182-83 (passing on the question of “restitution”).) Here, a court will necessarily have to exercise some discretion as to whether to award any further damages at all, for evidence of profits may be too speculative if the plaintiff cannot show that the profits “are attributable to the violation.” 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i); see, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. White, No. 11-01331, 2011 WL 4406354, at *6 (N.D.Cal. R & R Aug. 2, 2011) (“[T]he Court recommends awarding Plaintiff $1,400.00 in statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii) representing the $1,100.00 in actual losses based on the license fee, plus $300.00 to account for Defendants’ additional possible profits from food and beverage sales.”), adopted, 2011 WL 4406351 (Sept. 21, 2011); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Duong, No. 13-02002, 2014 WL 68904, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (“As there is no evidence of how much Defendant made during the unlawful exhibition of the Program, the Court shall base statutory damages on the cost of the commercial license.”). For instance, the court cannot estimate how many patrons came (and how much money they spent) because of the intercepted programming without any evidence of how many patrons come at similar times or what kinds of food and drink prices the establishment charges. Thus, in the absence of evidence, an estimate of profits should be a conservative figure that does not simply allow circumvention of the actual damages provision’s proof requirement.

Factors to consider in estimating profits might include, for instance, (1) the size of the establishment; (2) the number of patrons at the establishment, taken, to the extent possible, as the number of patrons present because of the interception (to which evidence of advertising to attract customers may be relevant); (3) the number, size, and position of screens displaying the broadcast (a factor to be considered in conjunction with (1) and (2) as an indication of who might be there specifically to watch); (4) any cover charge levied because of the interception; (5) what additional money patrons spent because of the interception (i.e., the amounts spent by those who otherwise would not have come, plus any other premiums or greater spending by those who would have come anyway); and (6) any such other factors as may appear relevant in the case before the court.

c. Estimating statutory damages in this case

The rate card in this case makes estimating actual damages straightforward as an initial matter. See Hand Aff., Ex. 1. Mr. Szlezak estimated that “[t]he capacity of [Café Nostalgie] is approximately 100 people,” Szlezak Aff. 2, and the rate card and Mr. Hand’s Affidavit establish that the “sublicense fee for the [Match] was based on the capacity of the establishment.... [I]f a commercial establishment had a maximum fire code occupancy of 100 persons, the commercial sublicense fee would have been $500.00.” Hand Aff. ¶ 8. The Court therefore finds that Joe Hand is entitled to $500 as an estimate of actual damages.

Second, estimating Café Nostalgie’s profits on account of its unlawful interception of the Match is difficult given the lack of evidence (due, in large part, to the Defendants’ own default). As Joe Hand points out, “The capacity of Cafe Nostalgie was estimated to be 100.” Br. 13 (citing Szlezak Aff. 3). There were between 44 and 48 patrons, according to Mr. Szlezak’s headcounts over a two-hour period, and “the Program was displayed on four televisions, one 36 “television and three 40” televisions.” Id. (citing Szlezak Aff. 1-3). Further, the televisions seemed to project their coverage to most of the square footage of the bar: one television “was to the right as [Mr. Szlezak] entered, above the small bar”; another was to his “immediate left” in “the main area”; a third was “[b]ack in the left corner”; and the fourth was “[i]n the back right ... booth area.” Szlezak Aff. 1. There is no evidence of a cover charge or advertising for the show.

What the Court does not have, however, is any evidence of Café Nostalgie’s prices or how many people are usually in the bar on a Saturday night. Even though Cafe Nostalgie and Mr. Yakubets defaulted, Joe Hand could have sent Mr. Szlezak or another investigator back on other nights at similar times to see how many patrons usually visit Café Nostalgie. In fact, during the two hours Mr. Szlezak spent at Café Nostalgie, he could have snapped a picture of the menu to establish prices or have talked with “Oksana the waitress,” Szlezak Aff. 1, to ask how many people come on different nights and when such shows are broadcast. Such expectations should come as no surprise, given that the default judgment standard itself requires a plaintiff to offer proof of damages.

Still, given Joe Hand’s inability to take discovery, the Court will assume that (a) half of the individuals present came solely because of the show and (b) each spent $20 on food and drink, such that 24 * $20 = $480, and, further, that (c) the remaining half each spent $10 more than they otherwise would have because they stayed longer to watch the Match, or 24 * $10 = $240, for a total of $720. These are generous allowances given the lack of evidence; their foundation on revenue rather than profit; and the fact that without evidence of damages, courts often award only the sublicense fee from the rate card. The inability to offer evidence of its expenses is, perhaps, how Café Nostalgie’s default may be balanced to hurt it no less than Joe Hand, which consequently cannot take discovery. Nonetheless, these estimates seem reasonable, and Joe Hand offers no reasons to the contrary. August 21, 2010, was a Saturday, so perhaps less can be inferred from the presence of 48 individuals than if the interception had occurred on a Monday night, for example. But all the televisions, which, taken together, were visible in most, if not all, of Café Nostalgie’s space, were playing the Match, thereby making it more likely that the patrons there were there to watch it.

For these reasons, the Court finds that as to statutory damages Joe Hand is entitled to the $500 it would have received had Cafe Nostalgie paid for a sublicense, plus an estimate of $720 in profits, for a total of $1220.

2. Enhanced Damages under § 553(c)(3)(B)

Congress “focused on deterrence in enacting § 553(c)(3)(B),” Burdulis, 460 F.3d at 183, which, by its plain terms, triggers the court’s discretion to increase actual or statutory damages by up to $50,000 if the violation was committed (a) “willfully” and (b) “for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain,” 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B). See Comcast of S. New Eng., Inc. v. Kacavas, No. 07-10780, 2007 WL 4556685, at *2 (D.Mass. Dec. 18, 2007) (“Once [plaintiffs] have met those conditions, this Court has the discretion to impose increased damages.”).

a. Whether “the violation was committed willfully”

Though a familiar term, “willfully” bears “no fixed meaning,” United States v. Jenkins, 275 F.3d 283, 287 n. 3 (3d Cir.2001) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 63 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); its definition must be determined according to context, id. at 287 & n. 3. See also McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988) (“The word “willful’ is widely used in the law, and, although it has not by any means been given a perfectly consistent interpretation, it is generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely negligent. .. ,”). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted what “willfully” requires under either § 553(c)(3)(B) or its counterpart, 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii), but several factors suggest that § 553(c)(3)(B) requires at least both intent and either knowledge or reckless disregard for whether the conduct violates § 553 — that is, slightly more than the intent, purpose, or deliberateness some courts have implied. For example, one court explained:

Courts generally have been imprecise in assessing willfulness, often assuming it rather than finding it in any reasoned way. This tendency may be due to the nature of the violation: even garden-variety cable piracy (i.e., purchasing and hooking up an unauthorized device) could be considered willful because it requires affirmative illegal steps to be taken. As one court noted, “Signals do not descramble spontaneously, nor do television sets connect themselves to cable distribution systems.” Time Warner Cable of N.Y. City v. Googies Luncheonette, Inc., 77 F.Supp.2d 485, 490-91 (S.D.N.Y.1999). The Court agrees that, in the ordinary case, the act of acquiring and installing a descrambling device is sufficient to demonstrate a willful violation. But there nonetheless must be a distinction between willful and non-willful violations, or the term “willful” has no meaning.

Burdulis, 367 F.Supp.2d at 29-30 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted). The court elaborated:

[T]he statute necessarily proscribes other types of conduct that are not “willful,” or the distinction is meaningless. An example of a possible non-willful violation would be a situation in which an adult child gave a descrambler to his unsophisticated elderly parent and told the parent that he was paying all relevant charges to the cable company. The parent would thus be unlawfully receiving cable transmissions, but under circumstances that were not “willful.”

Id. at 30 n. 17.

Indeed, willfulness usually includes some specific intent element of knowledge or reckless disregard that the unlawful conduct is in fact forbidden by law. Under the Supreme Court’s precedent, willfulness for civil enforcement actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) — the standard that some courts have borrowed in interpreting § 553 — requires that the defendant both acted intentionally as well as that it “either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.” Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. at 133, 108 S.Ct. 1677; accord Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir.2010) (“[Plaintiffs] must prove that the Port Authority knew it was violating the FLSA or acted in reckless disregard of whether it was violating the FLSA”). This knowledge or reckless disregard standard is, it should be clear, stricter than one requiring only negligence (e.g., one requiring that the defendant “acted without a reasonable basis for believing that it was complying with the statute,” Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. at 134, 108 S.Ct. 1677 (citation omitted)). As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, “Despite th[e] allowable variation,” in the meaning of “willfulness,” “no court or commentator of whom we are aware has ever adopted so lax a definition of ‘willfulness,’ in any other context,” Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F.2d 80, 82 n. 5 (3d Cir.1986) (emphasis added), affd sub nom. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 108 S.Ct. 1677, that would demand only that the defendant “knew or suspected that his actions might violate” the statute, id. at 81 (quoting Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir.1971), overruled, Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 108 S.Ct. 1677).

Several reasons suggest that § 553(c)(3)(B) requires intent and either knowledge of or reckless disregard for the illegality of the conduct, and not mere negligence. For one, because an unintentional signal interception is quite unlikely, the various mens rea distinctions Congress drew in § 553 — among “willfully” in § 553(c)(3)(B), strict liability or negligence for actual or statutory damages under § 553(c)(3)(A), and nonnegligence to qualify for damages reduction under § 553(c)(3)(C) — would make little sense if not referring to what the defendant knew about its violative conduct. If intentionality plus negligence sufficed to established willfulness, then almost any violation (save for the sophisticated child-unsophisticated parent scenario) would be willful. And if willfulness required mere intentionality, then even the sophisticated child-unsophisticated parent scenario would present a tension between § 553(c)(8)(C)’s damage reduction provision and § 553(c)(3)(B)’s damage enhancement provision. There is no reason to read the statute this way, especially when most individuals will presumably understand their actions to be unlawful.

Second, § 553 also imposes criminal penalties for willful violation; in one of the criminal provisions, the language is nearly identical to that of the enhanced damages provision. Compare § 553(b)(2) (“Any person who violates subsection (a)(1) of this section willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be fined ... or imprisoned .... ” (emphasis added)), with id. § 553(c)(3)(B) (“In any case in which the court finds that the violation was committed willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, the court in its discretion may increase the award of damages .... ” (emphasis added)). The criminal context favors a more stringent standard (i.e., of at least intentionality plus recklessness). Cf. Longview Ref. Co. v. Shore, 554 F.2d 1006, 1012-14 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1977), cited in Rich-land Shoe Co., 799 F.2d at 82 n. 5. And finally, legislative history, to the extent that it is appropriate to consider, comports with this reading of “willfully.”

Thus, the Court concludes, willfulness for purposes of § 553(c)(3)(B)’s enhanced damages requires both the defendant’s intentional signal interception as well as knowledge of or reckless disregard as to the unlawfulness of its signal interception. And, as courts have consistently held in other contexts, such willfulness may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (“And in determining whether that requisite bad purpose was present the jury would be entitled to consider all the attendant circumstances-the malice of petitioners, the weapons used in the assault, its character and duration, the provocation, if any, and the like.”)). This interpretation comports with the reading of the one court of appeals to have construed § 553’s “willfully” in the civil context, see Comcast of Ill. X v. Multi-Vision Elecs., Inc., 491 F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir.2007) (applying the FLSA standard and holding that “[willfulness is ‘disregard for the governing statute and an indifference to its requirements’ ” and that it can be inferred (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 127, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985))), as well as the appellate interpretations of willfulness under § 553’s criminal provision and the analogous civil provision in § 605.

Applying this standard in the default judgment context, when there has been no discovery and likely little evidence, is difficult. Joe Hand argues, in essence, that willfulness should be presumed, given (a) the defendant’s default and his concomitant failure to contest the issue and (b) the nature of the interception of encrypted cable programming. The default judgment standard demands more than just a passing glance: “Normally, for an interception to be found willful, there must be some factual specificity as to how defendants intercepted the signal.” Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Patton, No. 10-40242, 2011 WL 6002475, at *4 n. 5 (D.Mass. Nov. 29, 2011). Thus, after Twombly and Iqbal, is the allegation that an “unauthorized interception ... was done willfully,” Compl. ¶ 20, sufficient, even if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit “[mjalice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind [to] be alleged generally,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b); see, e.g., United Cable Television of E. San Fernando Valley, Ltd. v. Cruz, 116 F.3d 488, at *1 (9th Cir.1997) (table opinion) (context of §§ 553 and 605)? May willfulness be established by inference from the well-pleaded facts in the Complaint (and any other evidence adduced at the default judgment stage)?

Ultimately, the answer to that question is yes, because of the particular nature of cable distribution systems, not because of the fact of default per se. A defendant’s default itself is not relevant to a finding of willfulness (beyond requiring the admission of well-pleaded factual allegations); on its own, it does not support such an inference.

What makes the inference of willfulness permissible, notwithstanding the lack of any more specific factual basis, is the particular nature of cable programming and the means to intercept it, combined with the knowledge of the average individual. As one court quotably put it, “Signals do not descramble spontaneously, nor do television sets connect themselves to cable distribution systems.” Googies Luncheonette, 77 F.Supp.2d at 490-91. In his Affidavit, Joe Hand, Jr. (Joe Hand’s President), contends that Joe Hand’s “programming is not and cannot be mistakenly, innocently or accidentally intercepted,” and explains that it can be unlawfully intercepted by several means, including (1) the use of an unauthorized cable box that, when attached to a cable line, can de-scramble the programs without the providers’ consent; (2) (purposeful) misrepresentation of a commercial establishment as a residential property to obtain residential rates; and (3) splicing a residential connection to the commercial establishment to obtain a residential rate. Hand Aff. ¶ 9. And, indeed, a number of courts, often in the similar context of § 605, have subscribed to the view that “[i]t is difficult ... to see how Defendants could have accidentally intercepted and exhibited the encrypted Program; the signal had to be unscrambled by some deliberate act.” Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. McBroom, No. 09-0276, 2009 WL 5031580, at *5 (M.D.Ga. Dec. 15, 2009).

The Court agrees, but with a caveat regarding Mr. Hand’s exaggerated representation in his Affidavit. The chances of intercepting pay-per-view cable programming accidentally or innocently are slim, but they are not nonexistent, and thus courts should evaluate the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Because Mr. Hand’s Affidavit and the relevant case law are in accord in that in most cases, “[i]n order for [the defendant] to [have] receive[d] the closed-circuit broadcast, it had to have engaged in some deliberate act, such as using an unauthorized decoder or altering the cable service in some way so as to receive and view the scrambled transmission,” Time Warner Cable of N.Y.C. v. Taco Rapido Rest., 988 F.Supp. 107, 111 (E.D.N.Y.1997), the inference of intentionality, based on the remaining facts alleged in the complaint and offered by evidence, may be drawn. In other words, it is this nature of the technology at issue that permits a reasonable inference of intentionality to be drawn to substantiate what might otherwise be a conclusory allegation. See also, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Waldron, No. 11-0849, 2013 WL 1007398, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2013) (“The Court credits Plaintiffs contention that it would be virtually impossible to receive this encrypted broadcast inadvertently; rather, the interception must have involved actions taken with the intent to receive the Broadcast through illicit means.”).

The next question, however, is whether in addition to intentionality, the further knowledge of or recklessness with regard to the violation can be inferred. Some decisions have begged this question, but apart from the formal imperfection of such logic, the overall approach is justified when articulated. “[W]ithout a full factual record, ... further analysis [is] difficult,” Patton, 2011 WL 6002475, at *4, and the decision is a close one. Still, it is hard to believe that a defendant who acts intentionally to intercept cable programming unlawfully does not know the illegality of his actions (or at least recklessly disregards the distinct possibility of unlawfulness). The recognition of the intentional, unauthorized interception of programming as theft is probably within the ken of the average individual. Thus, the Court holds that the likelihood of a violation’s being intentional and, further, its likelihood of being knowingly illegal, suffices to establish a presumption of willfulness for the purposes of pleading, and, thus, default judgment.

In this case, Joe Hand has alleged that the “unauthorized interception ... was done willfully.” Compl. ¶ 20. Because accidental interception of the Match was highly unlikely — such an accident would have had to affect all four of the televisions set up in different areas throughout Cafe Nostalgie and all of which were showing the Match. Szlezak Aff. 1. The Court thus finds, for present purposes, that the interception was intentional. And, finally, for the reasons discussed above, the Court will accept for now that the violation was willful.

b. Whether “the violation was committed ... for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain”

To award the plaintiff enhanced damages, the court must also find that the defendant acted “for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 47 U.S.C. § 558(c)(8)(B). The courts of appeals have not addressed the meaning of this requirement, but it would seem to be satisfied by a broad set of circumstances. Cf. Cablevision Sys. N.Y.C. Corp. v. Lokshin, 980 F.Supp. 107, 114-15 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (discussing a difference between § 553(c)(3)(B) and the analogous provision in § 605 that establishes a particular way in which § 553(c)(3)(B) is broader); Bur-dulis, 367 F.Supp.2d at 31-32 (same, and relying on Lokshin).

In this case, the Complaint establishes that Cafe Nostalgie is a commercial establishment, and Mr. Szlezak’s Affidavit establishes that Cafe Nostalgie contains a bar area for ordering drinks, “an area made to look like the outside of a restaurant with outdoor seating,” and four televisions. Szlezak Aff. 1. As Mr. Hand opines in his Affidavit, often “the very purpose of pirating ... programming” is “to lure or retain patrons who seek to be entertained by [it].” Hand Aff. ¶ 17. From Café Nos-talgie’s four televisions all showing the Match, the Court can infer such a purpose here. See also Hand Aff. ¶ 18. “Because the intercepted signal was shown at a restaurant as an inducement for patrons to purchase food and beverages, the Court has no difficulty finding that the violation was made for the[ ] purposes ... ‘of commercial advantage or private financial gain.’ ” Patton, 2011 WL 6002475, at *4; see also, e.g., Waldron, 2013 WL 1007398, at *3 (“[Bjecause Defendants displayed the Broadcast at their place of business, the Court may infer that Defendants’ conduct was ‘for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or indirect pecuniary gain’.... ”); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Canipe, No. 12-0198, 2013 WL 1773741, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2013) (same reasoning).

c. Measure of enhanced damages

Courts have adopted a variety of approaches for deciding how much to award in enhanced damages. Some courts, with little more than a brief survey of other decisions, have granted awards that “appear[] to be somewhat arbitrary and, for the most part, not based on any specific articulated factors.” Burdulis, 367 F.Supp.2d at 33. Other courts, still “approaching] the enhanced damages analysis in a more cursory manner” employ a multiplier to the statutory damages award. Waldron, 2013 WL 1007398, at *8 (citing eases). Many courts look deeper through multifactor tests, some of which balance “[t]he need for deterrence ... against the harm to the defendant’s business if significant damages are assessed.”

Having recognized the disgorgement of profits as an appropriate consideration under the statutory damages inquiry, see text accompanying note 26, this Court will take a different approach and focus on the language and apparent aims of § 553’s enhanced damages provision. Although they are triggering factors, willfulness and “commercial advantage or private financial gain,” 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B), together with the statute’s legislative history and the foregoing analysis of § 553’s structure, suggest that the primary concern with the imposition of enhanced damages is deterrence. The factors a court should consider in order to produce a sensible enhancement of the actual or statutory damages award, then, should likewise target deterrence.

First, “Congress enacted § 553 specifically to combat the novel phenomenon of cable piracy,” and “[t]he legislative history to the Cable Act supports th[e] interpretation” that Congress “created strict new penalties to deter cable pirates who would otherwise exploit this phenomenon.” TKR Cable Co., 267 F.3d at 203-04; accord Prostar v. Massachi, 239 F.3d 669, 673 (5th Cir.2001) (“[0]ne of Congress’s principal objectives was to discourage theft of cable services....”); H.R.Rep. No. 98-934, at 83, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4720 (“The Committee is extremely concerned with a problem which is increasingly plaguing the cable industry-the theft of cable service.... ”). Accordingly, Congress appears to have been concerned not just with the fact that “[t]heft of services is depriving the cable industry of millions of dollars of revenue each year,” but also that such theft “creates an unfair burden on cable subscribers who are forced to subsidize the benefits that other individuals are getting by receiving cable service without paying for it.” H.R.Rep. No. 98-934, at 83, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4720. Because willful violations of § 553 constitute theft, the legislative history suggests that the deterrence rationale is the central driver of enhanced damages. “An additional award for willfulness will put violators ‘on notice that it costs less to obey the ... laws than to violate them.’ ” Googies Luncheonette, 77 F.Supp.2d at 491 (quoting Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 623 F.Supp. 889, 892 (W.D.Pa.1985) (violation of copyright laws)); see also, e.g., J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Castrillon, No. 07-02946, 2009 WL 1033364, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009) (“Absent substantial financial penalties, the defendant will likely continue to illegally display the plaintiff s programming and other such establishments will follow suit. The plaintiff cannot practicably investigate all these infractions, nor should they be expected to do so.” (citation omitted)).

Second, the “commercial advantage or private financial gain” prong suggests some consideration at the enhanced damages stage of whether and how the defendant profited from its violation. But if — as this Court views as the correct method of interpreting § 553 — a court has awarded profits made on account of the violation under the actual or statutory damages rubric, there is no reason to perform that analysis again under the enhanced damages provision. Further, another element in the statute’s structure suggests that specific deterrenc