Chavez v. County of Bernalillo (3 F. Supp. 3d 936, 2014)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 11, 2013 (Doc. 8). The Court held a hearing on July 2, 2013. The primary issues are: (i) whether the Defendants violated Plaintiff Fred Dean Chavez’ constitutional rights by incarcerating him pursuant to a bench warrant that had been cancelled before Chavez was arrested; (ii) whether the Defendants violated Chavez’ constitutional rights by continuing to detain Chavez after Chavez’ attorney sent notice that the bench warrant had been cancelled; and (iii) whether Chavez has established facts sufficient to maintain his municipal liability claim against the Defendant County of Bernalillo. The Court concludes that the Defendants did not violate Chavez’ constitutional rights, because they initially detained him pursuant to a facially valid warrant, and because they acted reasonably in requiring a court order setting Chavez’ conditions of release before releasing him. Even if there were a constitutional violation, the law was not clearly established. Without a constitutional violation, the Court concludes that Chavez cannot maintain a municipal liability claim. These conclusions dispose of all federal claims in this case. The Court will decline to exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and will, therefore, remand the case.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 5, 2011, Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”) arrested and booked Plaintiff Fred Dean Chavez into the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) on an outstanding warrant. See Complaint for False Arrest, False Imprisonment and Damages ¶ 3, at 1, filed in state court February 4, 2013, filed in federal court March 2, 2013 (Doc. 2) (“Complaint”); Affidavit of Alexis Iverson ¶ 6, at 3, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-1) (“Iver-son Aff.”); Bench Warrant, filed July 1, 2013 (Doc. 24-1 at 7); Pre-Booking Worksheet, filed July 1, 2013 (Doc. 24-1 at 8); Offender Booking Sheet, filed July 1, 2013 (Doc. 24-1 at 9); MSJ ¶ 1, at 2 (setting forth this fact). The Docket Sheet for State of New Mexico vs. Chavez Fred Dean, filed June 29, 2013 (Doc. 23-1) (“State Docket”), indicates that, on January 20, 2011, a bench warrant was issued for Chavez for a failure to appear at a plea hearing; the entry on the State Docket for January 28, 2011, states: “ORD: QUASHING WARRANT/ISSUED/FILING STIPULATED ORDER TO CANCEL BENCH WARRANT ON CHAVEZ.” State Docket at 2. See Response at 4 (setting forth this fact). Judge Flores can-celled the bench warrant on January 28, 2011. See Stipulated Order to Cancel Bench Warrant, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-19 to -20) (“Stipulated Order”).

On February 8, 2011, Scott Pistone, Chavez’ lawyer, sent a letter by facsimile transmission to Defendant Ramon Rustin, the MDC Director, requesting that he release Chavez from custody immediately, because a stipulated cancellation of Chavez’ bench warrant had been entered in Chavez’ pending criminal case on January 28, 2011. See Affidavit of Brandi Urrutia ¶ 4, at 2, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-16) (“Urrutia Aff.”); Facsimile Transmission from Scott Pistone, the Law Offices of Scott Pistone, Ltd. Co., to Ramon Rustin, Chief of Corrections, sent February 8, 2011, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-17 to -18) (“Pistone Fax”) (enclosing the “Stipulated Order”); Affidavit of Ramon Rustin ¶ 1, at 1 (filed March 11, 2013) (“Rustin Aff.”) (describing Rustin’s role at MDC); MSJ ¶ 2, at 2 (setting forth this fact).

Urrutia scanned the facsimile transmission, and sent it to the corrections tech supervisor and acting records supervisor Alexis Iverson on the morning of February 8, 2011 to investigate; Iverson supervised the technical units that handled bookings, releases, and monitoring of court paperwork at the MDC. See Urrutia Aff. ¶ 5, at 2; Electronic Mail Transmission from Brandi Brinkman-Urrutia to Aexis M. Iverson, sent February 8, 2011 at 10:10 а.m., filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-21) (“First Urrutia E-mail”); MSJ ¶ 3, at 2 (setting forth this fact). Within thirty minutes of receiving the facsimile transmission, Iverson sent Urrutia an electronic mail transmission reply, indicating that she had spoken with the MDC’s district court liaison Laura Christison. See Electronic Mail Transmission from Alexis M. Iverson to Brandi Brinkman-Urrutia, sent February 8, 2011 at 10:31 a.m., filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-21) (“Iverson Email”); Urrutia Aff. ¶ 6, at 2; MSJ ¶ 4, at 2 (setting forth this fact). Christison advised that she had spoken with Mr. Pistone’s office the previous day and advised that Mr. Pistone would have to submit an order setting conditions of release, and the court would have to approve it before the MDC could release Chavez from custody. See Urrutia Aff. ¶ 6, at 2; Iverson E-mail; Iverson Aff. ¶ 8, at 3; Affidavit of Laura Christison ¶¶ 4-5, at 2, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-22) (“Christison Aff.”); MSJ ¶4, at 2 (setting forth this fact). After receiving this information, it would have been customary for Urrutia to put the facsimile transmission in Rustin’s inbox; she sent an electronic mail transmission to Iverson indicating that she intended to do so. See Urrutia Aff. ¶ 7, at 2; Electronic Mail Transmission from Brandi Brink-man-Urrutia to Alexis M. Iverson, sent February 8, 2011 at 10:38 a.m., filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-21) (“Second Urrutia Email”); MSJ ¶ 5, at 2 (setting forth this fact). The records department received a court order for conditions of release in Chavez’s pending criminal case on February 10, 2011; the MDC processed Chavez’ paperwork and released him later that day. See Iverson Aff. ¶ 9, at 3; Order Setting Conditions of Release, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-14); Inmate Release Form, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-15); MSJ ¶ 6, at 3 (setting forth this fact).

Rustin has no specific recollection of taking any action in response to Mr. Pistone’s request, but MDC internal policy, which was consistent with the American Correctional Association guidelines for correctional facilities, would not permit him to release Chavez without a court order setting conditions of release. See Rustin Aff. ¶¶ 3-7, at 1-3, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-23); Releasing Procedures, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-24); American Correctional Association in cooperation with the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, Performance-Based Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities at 90 (4th ed., June 2004), filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-25) (“ACA Standards”); MSJ ¶ 7, at 3 (setting forth this fact). Rustin was familiar with MDC policy and was responsible for creating and instituting the policy. Rustin Aff. ¶ 2, at 1; id. ¶ 5, at 2; Response at 3. After the events, he determined that his staff “acted appropriately” in communicating with Mr. Pistone and in refusing to process Chavez’ release from custody without a court order. Rustin Aff. ¶ 2, at 1; id. ¶ 5, at 2; Response at 3.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 4, 2013, Chavez filed his Complaint in state court against Rustin and Bernalillo County, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and illegal detention, and that the Defendants violated his right to be free from an unreasonable seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. See Complaint ¶¶ 8-11, at 2. The Defendants removed the case to federal court on March 2, 2013, asserting that the Court has original jurisdiction over Chavez’ Fourth Amendment claims as claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. See Notice of Removal ¶ 4, at 2, filed March 2, 2013 (Doc. 1). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, including the false imprisonment and false arrest claims. See Response at 9-10.

On March 11, 2013, the Defendants moved the Court for summary judgment, arguing that Rustin did not participate in the alleged conduct and is further entitled to qualified immunity, and that Chavez has failed to plead facts that invoke municipal liability. See MSJ at 1. The Defendants argue that Rustin is not responsible for Chavez’ alleged false arrest, because the APD, not an MDC employee, arrested Chavez. See MSJ at 8. The Defendants argue that the “Plaintiffs arrest cannot be legally attributed to Defendant Rustin or any MDC employee, since jailers have no legal authority to arrest any person but rather are authorized solely to maintain custody of individuals who have been arrested by a law enforcement officer.” MSJ at 8 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-28(D)(1)). The Defendants explain that there are a limited number of situations in which jailers have “peace officer powers” — when arresting on the jail premises, while transporting a person to jail, while supervising a person committed to or under the supervision of a jail, or when engaged in an effort to pursue or apprehend such a person — and that none of those situations were present in this case, because an APD officer arrested Chavez “outside the detention facility, and his arrest was based on a warrant, rather than any conduct occurring while in MDC custody.” MSJ at 9 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-28(A)). The Defendants argue that Rustin is entitled to qualified immunity and is not liable for Chavez’ false arrest. See MSJ at 9.

The Defendants argue that Rustin is also entitled to qualified immunity for Chavez’ false imprisonment claim, which they describe as a supervisory liability claim. See MSJ at 9. The Defendants assert that “supervisors can be held liable only for their own unconstitutional or illegal policies, and not for the employees’ tortious acts.” MSJ at 9 (citing Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir.1998)). They contend that Chavez must demonstrate an “affirmative link” between the “constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation or his failure to supervise,” and that Chavez must demonstrate that “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” MSJ at 9 (citations omitted). Further, the Defendants assert that supervisory liability “requires a showing that such policies were a ‘deliberate or conscious choice,’ ” and that Chavez must establish “at a minimum a deliberate and intentional act on the part of the defendant-supervisor to violate the plaintiffs legal rights.” MSJ at 10-11 (quoting Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir.1998)). The Defendants contend that “[a] plaintiff can satisfy this prong by alleging that the defendant-supervisor had knowledge of the violation and acquiesced in its continuance.” MSJ at 11 (citing Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir.2010)). Regarding the initial incarceration, the Defendants argue that state law does not permit a jailer to refuse to incarcerate an individual that a law enforcement officer brings to the MDC pursuant to state law. See MSJ at 11 (citing N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-08, 1994 WL 721628; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-3). In the Defendants’ view, neither Rus-tin nor any MDC employee could legally refuse to incarcerate Chavez when the APD brought Chavez to the MDC on an outstanding warrant. See MSJ at 11. Further, the Defendants contend that Chavez has not asserted any facts to support that Rustin personally participated in Chavez’ initial incarceration. See MSJ at 11. Regarding Chavez’ continued detention after Rustin received “formal notice” that Chavez was illegally detained, the Defendants argue that Rustin did not personally participate in that continuing detention; “[t]he fact that a fax was sent to Chief Rustin is insufficient to meet the personal participation requirement.” MSJ at 12. The Defendants argue that, even if Chavez could meet the “personal participation” requirement, Chavez cannot show that Rus-tin or any MDC employees acted “ “with deliberate or reckless intent to falsely imprison[ ] the plaintiff,’ ” because New Mexico law required them to detain Chavez until receiving a court order for his release. MSJ at 12 (quoting Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir.1995)). The Defendants direct the Court to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-12(B): “Any jailer who deliberately and knowingly releases a prisoner without an order of release as provided in this section, except upon expiration of the prisoner’s term of commitment, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be removed from office.” MSJ at 12 (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-12(B)). They assert that the Tenth Circuit has “rejected the argument that a jailer can be held liable for refusing to investigate an inmate’s claim that he is being wrongfully held by a jailer,” MSJ at 12 (citing Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588, 597 (10th Cir.2000)), and that the Supreme Court of the United States of America has similarly held that an “ ‘official charged with maintaining custody of the accused named in the warrant is [not] required by the Constitution to perform an error-free investigation of [a claim of innocence],’ ” MSJ at 13 (alteration in original) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). The Defendants emphasize that, because there was not a court order to release Chavez until February 10, 2011, and the MDC released him later that day, the MDC employees did not violate Chavez’ constitutional rights, Rustin cannot have supervisory liability, and clearly existing law precludes Chavez’ claim, “because jailers have no authority to release an inmate even if s/he is innocent of the charges which resulted in his or her incarceration.” MSJ at 13. The Defendants contend that, had Rustin released Chavez from custody on February 8, 2011, Rustin would face potential criminal prosecution. See MSJ at 13-14.

The Defendants assert that Chavez failed to state a claim against Bernalillo County for municipal liability; to the extent that the municipal liability claim could be construed to include Rustin, the Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Rustin from the suit, because they contend that courts “routinely dismiss the official capacity claims as redundant when brought against the municipality and an official in his/her official capacity.” MSJ at 14. The Defendants further argue that “a municipality may not be held hable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because it employs a person who violated a plaintiffs federally protected rights,” but that Chavez must show “(1) the existence of a municipal custom or policy and (2) a direct causal link between the custom or policy and the violation alleged.” MSJ at 15. In the Defendants’ view, Chavez did not allege either prong of the two-part test. See MSJ at 15 (citing Complaint ¶ 9, at 2 (“The willful detention of Plaintiff by Bernalillo County after receiving notice that his arrest was unlawful and that the purported bench warrant was cancelled was intentional and malicious and done with knowledge of the unlawful harm being done to Plaintiff.”)). The Defendants argue that, even had Chavez properly pled a municipal liability claim, the Court should dismiss it, because Chavez cannot show that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation. See MSJ at 16.

At the initial scheduling conference on June 14, 2013, the Court noted that the Defendants filed the MSJ and that Chavez had not responded; the Court asked the parties how they would like to proceed. See Liberty Court Player at 2:03-2:53 (Court) (taken June 14, 2013) (“Liberty”). Chavez explained that it would be premature for him to respond to the qualified immunity arguments without further discovery regarding Rustin’s participation and requested that the Court postpone the hearing for at least seventy-five days until he has had an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Liberty at 2:56-4:08 (Lash). The Defendants noted that they filed the MSJ in April, 2013, that Chavez had not responded, and that he had not requested an extension of time; they contended that under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), they would be entitled to a stay of discovery for their qualified immunity defense unless Chavez could identify with specificity the discovery he needs to respond to the MSJ. See Liberty at 4:27-5:01 (Baker). The Defendants admitted that the ease is a bit unusual in that they filed the MSJ with the Defendants [sic] Answer to Complaint for False Arrest, False Imprisonment and Damages, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 7), but they argued that the case is an easy one and that they should not have to spend much more money defending the case. See Liberty at 5:01-5:25 (Baker). The Court noted that it would not save anyone time to move forward with the MSJ hearing if Chavez could demonstrate a need for discovery, and asked whether, from the Defendants’ perspective, Chavez would need any discovery to respond to the MSJ. See Liberty at 5:30-5:58 (Court). The Defendants explained what they contended were undisputed facts — that the APD arrested Chavez and turned him over to the MDC, that the MDC could consider only the four corners of the warrant when booking Chavez, and that, to release Chavez, the MDC needed a valid court order before releasing Chavez. See Liberty at 6:02-6:44 (Baker). Although Mr. Pistone sent information regarding a cancelled warrant, the Defendants explained that jail personnel face many different communications with people who purport to be judges or lawyers, demanding the release of prisoners, and to protect against improperly releasing prisoners, the MDC refuses to acknowledge those communications and requires a court order. See Liberty at 7:16-7:60 (Baker). In this case, Iverson called Mr. Pistone to tell him that the MDC would need a court order to release Chavez and that the cancelled bench warrant was insufficient to release Chavez. See Liberty at 7:51-8:25 (Baker). The MDC released Chavez the same day it received the court order. See Liberty at 8:25-8:38 (Baker). The Defendants asserted that these facts are undisputed, and that the only discovery that Chavez could need would relate to whether the jailers misinterpreted state law and whether they have authority to release prisoners without a signed court order, but that they are not sure what additional discovery would add to what is already known. See Liberty at 8:38-9:05 (Baker).

Chavez clarified that there was never a warrant that authorized Chavez to be arrested or incarcerated; the Court noted that Chavez could establish that as an additional fact by attaching an affidavit to his response, even if the Defendants contend that the fact is irrelevant. See Liberty at 9:30-10:20 (Lash, Court). Chavez argued that he needed additional discovery to show that the MDC does not need a court order to release prisoners and that the statutes on which the MDC relied did not justify keeping Chavez incarcerated. See Liberty at 10:45-12:05 (Lash, Court). The Court asked again what Chavez needs for discovery, as many of his statements appeared to be legal in nature; Chavez answered that he needs discovery from Rustin, such as whether he instituted the policy that prevented the MDC employees from releasing Chavez without a court order when, according to Chavez, the MDC releases prisoners without court orders in other situations, as well as discovery relating to other prisoners and whether they are treated differently, and more information about the policy itself, such as how it compares to the American Correctional Association (“ACA”) standards, whether the policy is constitutional, and whether the MDC employees followed the policies. See Liberty at 12:07-14:28 (Court, Lash).

The Court directed Chavez to respond to the MSJ; the Court said it would not place a stay on discovery, but advised Chavez to proceed with discovery cautiously, because it was inclined to let Mr. Baker, the Defendants’ counsel, control the amount of discovery in the case. See Liberty at 14:30-16:06 (Court). The Court said that, if Chavez feels as though he cannot get the discovery he needs, then he could file a rule 56(f) affidavit to request specific discovery, but at this point, the Court said it did not think it could make an informed decision regarding what discovery it would permit or deny, based on the qualified immunity defense, and so it encouraged the parties to work through the issues and come back to the Court with specific issues if they arose. See Liberty at 16:06-18:05 (Lash, Court). The Defendants pointed out they had included some of the discovery that Chavez requested in the MSJ; the Court encouraged Chavez to look closely at the evidence attached to the MSJ. See Liberty at 18:06-18:45 (Baker, Court). Chavez asked for the police report and booking sheet, and the Defendants said they would provide that discovery by the following week. See Liberty at 19:10-19:25 (Lash, Baker). The Court set a hearing on the MSJ for July 2, 2013. See Liberty at 19:35-40. The Court clarified that it would not enter a stay on discovery at that time, partially because the Defendants seemed to agree that a limited amount of discovery may be appropriate, but encouraged Chavez to focus his discovery on the issues in the MSJ and, if there were discovery disputes, it would likely grant the Defendants’ request for a discovery stay and Chavez could file a rule 56(f) affidavit for the Court to address at the summary judgment hearing. See Liberty at 33:08-32:08 (Court).

Chavez filed his Response on June 29, 2013, arguing that he has “an unquestioned right to be free from seizure and imprisonment without due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,” and under Article II, Sections 4 and 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. Response at 2. He argues that a jailer’s “fundamental duty” is to “incarcerate only those persons where there is legal cause to take away their fundamental right to liberty in conformance with appropriate Due Process under the U.S. and New Mexico Constitutions.” Response at 2. Chavez contends that his arrest warrant had been previously quashed, that Rustin was notified that Chavez was “arrested in error,” that Rustin’s staff informed Chavez’ counsel that the MDC policy required an order from a judge to release Chavez, and that MDC refused to release Chavez until they received the new court order. See Response at 2. Chavez contends that he is “at a disadvantage at this stage of the case before discovery is obtained,” but asserts that the facts that the Defendants set forth demonstrate that Rustin personally participated in “creating policies at MDC and training and supervising employees which resulted in the violation of Plaintiffs rights.” Response at 3. “More details of his actual knowledge, involvement in training and policies, and with Plaintiffs incarceration will be revealed in discovery.” Response at 3.

Chavez contends that Bernalillo County is liable for his alleged false arrest and false imprisonment; he asserts that the policies that Rustin instituted, ratified, or enforced “are policies adopted by the County of Bernalillo because they apply to all persons who are brought to the MDC operated by the County.” Response at 3-4. Chavez argues that MDC participated in his false arrest, because an “arrest is completed when custody of an arrestee is transferred to the MDC. State law and MDC procedures require proper documentation and/or legal cause to be presented by an arresting officer before accepting any arrestee into custody.” Response at 4 (citing The Policy: Booking Process, filed March 11, 2013 (Doc. 8-2) (“Booking Process”), which states that a correction technician at the time of booking shall “[e]n-sure the charges are listed on the pre-booking form with the date and time of arrest,” and, “[w]hen applicable, ensure a judge’s signature, sentence or court status is recorded.”). Chavez requests additional discovery to determine “[ejxactly what MDC employees did to verify the validity of the cancelled warrant....” Response at 4.

Chavez argues that the Defendants’ defenses are “premature or inapplicable”; regarding Rustin’s qualified immunity defense, Chavez contends that, because Rus-tin “instituted, directed, and ratified” the MDC policies, and those policies resulted in Chavez’ continued imprisonment, Rus-tin’s conduct is “affirmatively linked” to Chavez’ injury, precluding qualified immunity. Response at 5-6. In Chavez’ view, Rustin’s conduct was “deliberate and intentional,” because his “affidavit demonstrates no concern whatsoever for the illegal detention of Plaintiff and makes clear that the policies that wrongfully detained Plaintiff were intentional and will continue to affect future illegally detained persons,” and because Rustin admitted that Mr. Pis-tone’s notice would not affect Rustin’s decision to detain Chavez. Response at 6. Chavez argues that Rustin’s stated justifications for continuing to detain Chavez are inadequate, because “[j]ail policies cannot unreasonably infringe constitutional rights.” Response at 6.

Chavez disagrees with the Defendants’ reliance on Scull v. New Mexico and asserts that, in that case, the plaintiff was arrested based on a valid warrant from another state, but the parties disagreed how a New Mexico judge’s ruling in another county affected the warrant; in this case, Chavez contends that “the parties here know that no warrant existed ” when Chavez was arrested and incarcerated. Response at 7 (emphasis in original) (citing State Docket for proposition that the parties knew no warrant existed). Although the Defendants argue that state law did not allow the MDC to refuse to incarcerate Chavez, Chavez contends that the authorities that the Defendants cite “makes clear that there must be a proper commitment by competent authority according to law.” Response at 7 (emphasis omitted) (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-12; N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-08). Further, Chavez contends that the Defendants admit that the jailer had a duty to determine the facial validity of the warrant; in Chavez’ view, the Defendants confuse the issue by equating this analysis to determining Chavez’ guilt or innocence. See Response at 7. Chavez contends that, when the “MDC refused to verify the expiration of the warrant,” they violated N.M. Stat. Ann. 33-3-12(B) by refusing to “release a person ‘under expiration of the prisoner’s term of commitment.’ ” Response at 7 (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-12(B)). Chavez warns the Court that the Defendants’ legal defense will lead to repeated wrongful imprisonments in Bernalillo County, New Mexico. See Response at 7-8.

Chavez asks the Court for further discovery to determine the MDC’s policies and procedures, whether they were followed, the source of the policies, Rustin’s role in implementing the policies and procedures, Rustin’s knowledge and participation regarding Chavez’ incarceration and demand for release, Rustin’s knowledge of ACA policies, whether Rustin believed he could be prosecuted for releasing Chavez without a court order and whether that belief was reasonable, whether the MDC had a facially valid bench warrant, and when the MDC staff independently verifies court records. See Response at 8. Chavez asserts that the Defendants have not provided documents that they promised to provide, including the police report and booking sheet; he contends that the documents bear directly on whether the MDC employees had a facially valid warrant when Chavez was arrested and booked into MDC. See Response at 9. In Chavez’ view, “there should be no real argument by defendants that a valid warrant actually existed at the time of Plaintiffs arrest and booking.” Response at 9 (emphasis in original). Chavez urges the Court to consider the implication of the Defendants’ argument — that there “should be no legal consequences if Mr. Chavez was arrested and incarcerated based on a warrant that was invalid at the time of his arrest.” Response at 10 (emphasis omitted). He argues that a “mistaken arrest, invalid on its face, is insufficient justification to take away someone’s liberty for an indeterminate length of time (days-months-years) until the person arrested without cause is able to convince people outside the jail cell to engage the legal machinery required by MDC policies to have him released.” Response at 10.

The Defendants reply that Chavez has not demonstrated a viable cause of action or the need for discovery, because “it is uncontested” that the Defendants did not arrest Chavez, that Chavez was booked in the MDC on a facially valid warrant, that the Defendants did not have an independent duty to investigate the validity of the warrant, that they could not release Chavez until a judge issued a release order, and that the Defendants released Chavez the same day they received the order. Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, filed July 1, 2013 (Doc. 24) (“Reply”). The Defendants argue that they did not arrest Chavez and, although Chavez argues that the Defendants participated in the arrest when he was transferred to the MDC, the Defendants point out that Chavez did not cite any authority for that proposition. Reply at 2. Because the Defendants contend that they did not participate in Chavez’ arrest, they argue that further discovery is not required or warranted. See Reply at 2. The Defendants explain that the Honorable Jacqueline D. Flores, District Judge for the Second Judicial District, State of New Mexico, issued a bench warrant on January 20, 2011, after Chavez failed to appear for a plea hearing; although Judge Flores signed a stipulated cancellation of this warrant on January 28, 2011, “the bench warrant was still open on February 5, 2011. Defendants do not know why the warrant was still open, but this was fully outside Defendants’ control.” Reply at 2. The Defendants argue that the MDC employees were presented with a facially valid bench warrant and that they recorded the basis for Chavez’ arrest; the Defendants contend that the intake process “was in full accord with MDC policy” and that policy did not require MDC employees to do anything more than review the bench warrant to determine if it appeared to be facially valid. Reply at 2. Although Mr. Pistone sent the Stipulated Order to Rus-tin, the Defendants argue that “state law definitely prohibits any jailer from releasing an inmate absent a court order expressly ordering the inmate’s release.” Reply at 2-3 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3 — 12(B)). The Defendants emphasize that “a stipulated dismissal of a warrant is NOT a court ordered release from custody,” and, thus, Rustin could not have released Chavez based on the Pistone Fax. Reply at 3 (emphasis in original). In response to Chavez’ arguments that Rustin demonstrated indifference to Chavez’ rights, the Defendants argue that state law would not allow Rustin to release Chavez based on the Pistone Fax and that, “[i]f anything, Plaintiffs timely release on the same day that the MDC received the release order wholly contradicts Plaintiffs vague deliberate indifference claims.” Reply at 3. The Defendants note that “there is no indication” that Mr. Pistone asked Judge Flores to release Chavez until several days after he was arrested, and that Chavez is improperly shifting blame to the Defendants for his continued incarceration even though they did not have control over the court orders or warrant processing. Reply at 3.

The Defendants contend that Rustin did not have a duty to investigate a facially valid warrant and that Chavez’ warrant contained the required information to make it facially valid, including the reason for the warrant — Chavez’ failure to appear at a plea hearing. See Reply at 4. The Defendants provide examples of when the Tenth Circuit has “refused to hold jailers responsible for constitutional violations based on the fact that the warrant underlying a complainant’s arrest turns out to be erroneous.” Reply at 4-5 (citing Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir.2000) (explaining that a jailer does not need to analyze the probable cause for an arrest unless there is an objectively apparent lack of a basis for detention that should arouse suspicion); Turney v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1472-73 (10th Cir.1990) (granting qualified immunity where there was a facially valid warrant even though it allegedly violated several state statutes)). The Defendants contend that the Tenth Circuit cases, along with a number of cases from other circuits, magnify the flaws in Chavez’ allegations, because the cases demonstrate that, once the MDC determined that Chavez was arrested on a facially valid warrant, they did not have a duty to further investigate the warrant. See Reply at 6 (citations omitted). In the Defendants’ view, the jailers could not have relied on the State Docket, because the MDC did not have authority to release Chavez based on the Stipulated Order. See Reply at 6-7. The Defendants assert that Chavez’ “duty argument and alleged unlawful detention argument are simply unsupported by the law and facts of this case.” Reply at 7. In response to Chavez’ attempts to distinguish Scull v. New Mexico, the Defendants acknowledge that the record in that case was more fully developed and the facts are distinguishable, but they assert that Chavez’ reliance on the State Docket as proof that the Defendants knew or should have known that the bench warrant was not valid “would negate a whole body of law indicating otherwise.” Reply at 8. “The fact that the warrant had been cancelled has no bearing on whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs civil rights or committed any wrongdoing when they booked Plaintiff into the facility on a facially valid warrant and detained him until the presiding criminal court ordered his release from the MDC.” Reply at 8.

The Defendants argue that Rustin is entitled to qualified immunity, because “no constitutional violation occurred.” Reply at 7. Without a constitutional violation, the Defendants assert, Rustin’s state of mind is irrelevant. See Reply at 7-8. The Defendants acknowledge that it is “unfortunate that the cancelled bench warrant was somehow left open,” but they contend that Rustin “can hardly be held responsible for this error.” Reply at 7-8. Without a constitutional violation, the Defendants also assert, the municipal liability claims are “untenable.” Reply at 8-9. The Defendants contend that Chavez’ request for discovery is unwarranted. See Reply at 9. In response to Chavez’ request for the police report, the Defendants assert that they do not have a copy of that report, and, further, they did not arrest Chavez or book him into the MDC based on the police report, and so it would not be useful in this case. See Reply at 9. Further, the Defendants point out that Chavez could have obtained the copy of the police report through the public records. See Reply at 9. The Defendants dispute the remaining areas of requested discovery as “unnecessary, irrelevant, not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and otherwise futile.” Reply at 9. Regarding the source of the MDC policies, the Defendants explain that Rustin does not dispute that he is a final policy maker and responsible for the policies at issue; regarding the content of the booking and policy procedures, the Defendants explain that they attached them to their MSJ; regarding Rustin’s knowledge of Chavez’ case and whether Rustin believed he could be prosecuted for releasing Chavez without a warrant, the Defendants assert that they included this information in Rustin’s affidavit; and regarding Rustin’s knowledge of the ACA policies, the Defendants argue that, even if the MDC policies or conduct violated the ACA standards, such a violation would not be actionable or proof for a § 1983 violation. See Reply at 9-10.

The Defendants argue that Chavez’ state law claims also must fail, because the Defendants did not arrest Chavez, and so “any claim for false arrest is not actionable.” Reply at 10. In the Defendants’ view, the false-imprisonment claim must also fail, because “Rustin had lawful authority to detain Plaintiff based on the facially valid warrant and state law.” Reply at 10-11 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-3-13). Further, the Defendants contend that the MDC employees released Chavez consistent with state law by releasing him the same day they received a release order. See Reply at 11. The Defendants argue that Bernalillo County is immune from liability under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-4-1 to -30 (“NMTCA”), because Rustin did not falsely imprison Chavez. See Reply at 11. In the Defendants’ view, there are no material factual disputes, and the law supports summary judgment. See Reply at 11. Further, according to the Defendants, “[t]he short duration of Plaintiff’s incarceration is also a factor in negating Plaintiffs allegations.” Reply at 11-12 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 145-46, 99 S.Ct. 2689). The Defendants maintain that they did not have a legal responsibility for the bench warrant, and they point instead to the fact that Chavez’ attorney “did not immediately seek a release order from the judge who issued the bench warrant.” Reply at 12. The Defendants request that the Court deny any further discovery and grant the MSJ. See Reply at 12.

The Court held a hearing on July 2, 2013. See Transcript of Hearing, taken July 2, 2013 (“Tr.”). The Defendants argued that the facts of this case are straightforward — Chavez failed to show up for a court hearing, and so Judge Flores issued a bench warrant; she subsequently cancelled the bench warrant based on Chavez’ explanation that he was confused as to when he was supposed to appear, but for a reason unknown to the Defendants, the warrant was still open when the APD arrested Chavez on February 5, 2011. See Tr. at 3:20-4:5 (Baker). The Defendants explained that the Stipulated Order was filed in the state district court on January 28, 2011, and it shows that the district attorney who was handling the case tele-phonieally approved the order, that someone signed on behalf of Mr. Pistone, and that the Honorable Denise Barela Shepherd, District Judge for the Second Judicial District, State of New Mexico, signed on behalf of Judge Flores; the Defendants said they assumed that the Stipulated Order was filed with the district court clerk. See Tr. at 4:9-20 (Baker). Mr. Baker said he did not know how that information would be transmitted to the APD; he understood that the APD officer gave the MDC a copy of the original bench warrant, and under state law, the jailer ensures only that the person who is being booked has a facially valid warrant, unless the police arrested the person during the commission of a crime or another situation in which there would not be a warrant. See Tr. at 4:21-5:10 (Baker). The Defendants contended that the bench warrant, which was filed in state court on January 20, 2011, had all of the appropriate information — the defendant’s name, date of birth, social security number, weight and height, color of eyes and hair, case number, directive to any New Mexico officer authorized to execute the warrant to arrest Chavez, the reason for the warrant, that charges were being lodged against Chavez, the district court judge’s signature, and information regarding the amount of the bond. See Tr. at 5:11-23 (Baker). The Defendants contend that, after ensuring that the warrant was facially valid, the MDC’s responsibility was complete, and it could not release Chavez without a valid release order. See Tr. at 5:24-6:2 (Baker). The Court noted that state law may instruct a jailer to look only at whether the warrant is facially valid, but asked whether state law would impact the federal issue and question of qualified immunity. See Tr. 6:8-7:5 (Court). The Defendants argued that Rustin is entitled to qualified immunity, that the people who booked Chavez into jail are civilians who work at the jail and are entitled to rely on state law, and that Scull v. New Mexico makes it clear that there are no constitutional or statutory requirements that a jailer must independently investigate claims of innocence. See Tr. 7:6-19 (Baker). The Defendants said that, with the difficulty in keeping jails staffed, the requirements to become a jailer are not very high, and so it would be “inappropriate and unreasonable” to expect a jailer to independently investigate whether the arresting officer had probable cause and whether a prisoner has a legitimate claim to be released. Tr. at 7:24-8:14 (Baker). The Defendants clarified that they are arguing both that Rustin did not participate in any constitutional violation and that the jailers did not have a constitutional duty to investigate beyond ensuring that the bench warrant was facially valid. See Tr. at 8:19-9:9 (Court, Baker). The Defendants directed the Court to the facts in Scull v. New Mexico, in which the Bernalillo County jail director received information that the plaintiff should be released from the Taos County, New Mexico jail, but because the order did not mention Bernalillo County, the jail director kept the plaintiff in custody; the Tenth Circuit said it did not approve of the jail director’s failure to call the issuing court to obtain a release order for Bernalillo County, but said that the jail director’s reliance on the paperwork available to him did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional or statutory rights. See Tr. at 9:10-10:1 (Baker). In this case, the Defendants explained that Iverson went beyond what was required and called Mr. Pistone’s office for a release order, and although the Defendants do not know why it took until February 10, 2011, to receive that order, they released Chavez the day they received it. See Tr. at 10:2-15 (Baker). The Defendants asserted that the process worked the way it was supposed to work in this case, and although it is unfortunate that the bench warrant was still open, the Defendants took the steps they could to get Chavez released. See Tr. at 3-13 (Baker). The Defendants said that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Scull v. New Mexico is consistent with other circuits, including the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. See Tr. at 11:14-12:3 (Court, Baker).

Chavez directed the Court to Dry v. United States, a case that the Defendants cited in their Reply; he pointed out that the Tenth Circuit stated that, “absent any objectively apparent lack of a basis for a detention which should arouse suspicion, a jailer cannot be expected to assume the mantle of a magistrate to determine the probable cause for an arrest.” Tr. at 12:14-21 (Lash) (quoting Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d at 1259 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Chavez emphasized that, in this ease, the judge cancelled the warrant before Chavez was arrested, that the New Mexico statutes require a proper commitment before booking a person into jail, and that the initial commitment was improper in this case, because the warrant was cancelled before the APD arrested him. See Tr. at 12:22-13:12 (Lash). Chavez argued that the MDC’s policy, which Rustin instated, does not permit someone who has been erroneously arrested to be released until a court orders his release; instead of validating whether the warrant was cancelled, Chavez complained that Christison pointed to the MDC policy and said that the MDC does not release prisoners without a court order, even if arrested erroneously. See Tr. at 12:22-14:12 (Lash). Chavez argued that his case is different from Scull v. New Mexico, because, while the warrant was valid when Judge Flores issued it, it was not valid at the time of the arrest. See Tr. at 14:15-15:4 (Court, Lash). After the Court asked what happened to indicate to the APD that the warrant was still valid, Chavez explained that, while he does not know what the Defendants mean when they say that the warrant was still “open,” he knows that the State Docket showed that the warrant was quashed and he suspects that the APD officers have a method of checking outstanding warrants. Tr. at 15:5-16:2 (Court, Lash). Chavez argued that “there’s a duty to make sure that there’s a legitimate warrant” and that, in this case, the warrant did not exist. Tr. at 16:9-16 (Lash). The Court asked what Chavez meant by saying that the warrant did not exist, because the APD had the bench warrant when it turned Chavez into MDC; Chavez answered that the warrant was cancelled before the APD arrested him and that information was available to the public on the State Docket. See Tr. at 16:17-17:14 (Court, Lash). The Court noted that the officers were not likely looking at the State Docket, but that someone else was probably providing them with the warrants. See Tr. at 17:4-7 (Court). The Court questioned why a jailer should have to question the reason for the officer’s arrest, noting that issues such as whether the officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause would be better evaluated by a court, and that it seemed as though Chavez’ concern would be better aimed at whether the APD unlawfully arrested him rather than whether the MDC unlawfully detained him. See Tr. at 17:23-19:6 (Court). The Court also noted that, even after the MDC received notice that the warrant was cancelled, the employees would need some method to ensure that there was not some other reason to detain Chavez; Chavez argued that the court liaison could have checked Chavez’ record to determine if there was any other reason to detain Chavez and then released him. See Tr. at 19:14-21:5 (Court, Lash). Chavez contended that the MDC policies violate the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution, because the policy of keeping someone incarcerated when there is no valid warrant violates a person’s due process rights. See Tr. at 21:6-17 (Lash). He argued that the problem was the MDC’s unwavering application of the MDC policy and how nothing besides an order from a judge could release Chavez, emphasizing the Court’s earlier point that not all policies are consistent with the Constitution. See Tr. at 21:21-25 (Lash); id. at 22:18-24 (Lash).

Chavez pointed out that both sides recognize there was an error, and requested discovery to determine how it happened that Chavez was arrested when his bench warrant was cancelled. See Tr. at 22:4-6 (Lash). The Court asked whether there were any factual issues for which Chavez needed further discovery, noting that the parties did not dispute that the bench warrant was cancelled on January 28, 2011, or that the APD officers presented the bench warrant when they booked Chavez into the MDC. See Tr. at 26:10-27:22 (Court, Lash). Chavez said he thought he would need discovery regarding what happened between the time he arrived at the MDC and when he was released, including why Christison, the court liaison, got involved in the case. See Tr. at 28:12-29:4 (Lash).

The Defendants clarified that there were three separate government agencies involved: (i) the state courts and their clerk’s office, which issued and processed the warrant; (ii) the APD, which arrested Chavez; and (iii) the MDC, which took Chavez into custody and kept him until there was a valid release order. See Tr. at 29:10-18 (Baker). The Defendants emphasized that, in the Tenth Circuit and every other circuit they had researched, “a jailer has no duty to investigate. Zero.” Tr. at 29:19-21 (Baker). The Court said that the law did not seem as strong as the Defendants conveyed and that the law requires a jailer to consider whether there is an absence of objectively apparent basis for detention, which would arouse suspicion. See Tr. at 29:23-30:3 (Court). The Defendants clarified that Dry v. United States, which contains the standard the Court stated, requires the jailers to determine at the front end whether there is an objectively reasonable basis for detention, but that a jailer does not have a duty to investigate later. See Tr. at 30:4-8 (Baker). The Defendants noted that the MDC did more than what was required in this case, because it informed Mr. Pistone what he needed to do to get Chavez released; when he obtained the court order, the MDC released Chavez. See Tr. at 30:24-31:9 (Baker). The Defendants urged the Court to keep in mind the narrow issue in the case — whether the MDC violated Chavez’ constitutional rights or rights under the NMTCA when it held Chavez in custody until it received an order from Judge Flores ordering Chavez’ release. See Tr. at 31:18-22 (Baker). The Court asked whether the Defendants agreed with its suggestion that the constitutional violation seems to have occurred, if ever, before Chavez was booked into the MDC; the Defendants admitted the case would be different had Chavez sued the APD. See Tr. at 31:25-32:12 (Court, Baker). The Defendants explained that, once a person is booked into a jail, there are two ways to release someone from custody — either the person serves his or her time, or the person stays in jail until a court orders his or her release. See Tr. at 32:18-24 (Baker). In the Defendants’ view, the system was designed to rely on judges and their authority, removing any question whether jailers can second guess probable cause or other reasons for a person’s arrest. See Tr. at 32:24-33:7 (Baker). The Defendants noted that, if there was no constitutional violation, there would also not be municipal liability. See Tr. at 33:8-16 (Court, Baker).

Chavez explained that, as part of the MSJ, the Defendants assert that there are only three grounds for releasing prisoners — (i) when a court orders a prisoner’s release; (ii) when a bond has been posted; and (in) when the sentence is completed. See Tr. at 34:2-6 (Lash). Chavez contends that there are more grounds for releasing prisoners than just those three scenarios, such as when the statutory time limit passes to bring charges and a jail has to release a prisoner without a court order because no case has been filed, when a jail has discretion to release prisoners because of overcrowding, or when, as in Chavez’ case, the arrest was facially invalid. See Tr. at 34:7-37:16 (Court, Lash). Chavez contended that the ACA guidelines would reveal these additional grounds for releasing prisoners without court orders, and argued that the Defendants’ assertion that they needed a separate court order is not true. See Tr. at 37:21-38:5 (Lash). The Defendants disputed that Rustin could release prisoners due to overcrowding, asserting that the MDC cannot release any prisoners without a court’s permission. See Tr. at 38:23-39:10 (Baker). The Defendants noted that the ACA can make recommendations, but those recommendations are not equivalent to the constitutional requirements, and, thus, the ACA guidelines are irrelevant to the Court’s constitutional analysis. See Tr. at 39:11— 18 (Baker).

LAW REGARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). “The movant bears the initial burden of ‘showfing] that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.’ ” Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Schs., 956 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1221 (D.N.M.2013) (Browning, J.) (quoting Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991)). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party must support its motion with credible evidence — using any of the materials specified in Rule 56(c) — that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Once the movant meets this burden, rule 56 requires the nonmoving party to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” Applied Genetics Int’l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990). See Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir.1993) (“However, the nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to those disposi-tive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 56(c)(1) provides: “A party asserting that a fact ... is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). It is not enough for the party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment to “rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. See Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir.1990); Otteson v. United States, 622 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir.1980) (“However, ‘once a properly supported summary judgment motion is made, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in his complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine factual issue to be tried.’ ” (citation omitted)). Nor can a party “avoid summary judgment by repeating concluso-ry opinions, allegations unsupported by specific facts, or speculation.” Colony Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Omer, No. 07-2123, 2008 WL 2309005, at *1 (D.Kan. June 2, 2008) (citing Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir.2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “In responding to a motion for summary judgment, ‘a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial.’ ” Colony Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Omer, 2008 WL 2309005, at *1 (quoting Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1988)).

To deny a motion for summary judgment, genuine factual issues must exist that “can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A mere “scintilla” of evidence will not avoid summary judgment. Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d at 1539 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Rather, there must be sufficient evidence on which the factfinder could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448, 14 Wall. 442, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1871)); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d at 1539. “[T]here is no evidence for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative, ... summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). Where a rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole, could not find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court should keep in mind certain principles. First, the court’s role is not to weigh the evidence, but to assess the threshold issue whether a genuine issue exists as to material facts requiring a trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Second, the ultimate standard of proof is relevant for purposes of ruling on a summary judgment, such that, when ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must “bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Third, the court must resolve all reasonable inferences and doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, and construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 550-55, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). Fourth, the court cannot decide any issues of credibility. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

There are, however, limited circumstances in which the Court may disregard a party’s version of the facts. This doctrine developed most robustly in the qualified-immunity arena. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007), the Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate where video evidence “quite clearly contradicted” the plaintiffs version of the facts. 550 U.S. at 378-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769. The Supreme Court explained:

At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

That was the case here with regard to the factual issue whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life. Respondent’s version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.

550 U.S. at 380-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (emphasis in original).

The Tenth Circuit applied this doctrine in Thomson v. Salt Lake County, 584 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir.2009), and explained:

[B]ecause at summary judgment we are beyond the pleading phase of the litigation, a plaintiffs version of the facts must find support in the record: more specifically, “[a]s with any motion for summary judgment, when opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts[.]” York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Scott [v. Harris], 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.