Livingston v. Marion Bank & Trust Co. (30 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 2014)

ORDER

L. SCOTT COOGLER, District Judge.

In this action, Plaintiffs Ragan Livingston (“Ragan”) and her husband Mitch Livingston assert claims against Marion Bank and Trust Co. and its president, Conrad Taylor (“Defendants”), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Alabama state law. The Magistrate Judge entered a report and recommendation recommending that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 44) be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 56.) No objections were filed. The Court has considered the entire file in this action, including the report and recommendation, and has reached an independent conclusion that the report and recommendation is due to be adopted and accepted.

The Court does note that as to Ragan’s claim in Count 3 of the complaint for “gender discrimination” against defendant Marion Bank and Trust Co. (“the bank”), the Magistrate Judge recommended granting summary judgment in favor of the bank on this claim because Ragan offered no response to the bank’s argument that it is entitled to summary judgment, so she has abandoned the claim. That may be true, but this Court is also required to consider the merits of the bank’s argument. See United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 7pth Ave., Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101-02 (11th Cir.2004) (Because “the district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that it is unopposed, it must consider the merits of the motion.”); James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 56.99[b] (3d ed. 1997) (The court “may neither grant nor deny summary judgment by default.”); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 advisory committee’s note (“[S]ummary judgment cannot be granted by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to the motion, much less when an attempted response fails to comply with Rule 56(c) requirements.”).

Ragan’s gender discrimination claim is based on alleged differences in her “work environment, training, promotion, job assignments, job pay, and terms and conditions of employment.” (Complaint at ¶ 35.) The Court has reviewed the record and agrees with Defendants that it contains no evidence regarding gender-based disparate treatment with respect to Ra-gan’s training, promotion, job assignments, and job pay. Ragan was replaced by another female employee, Angela Holifield. (Taylor dep. 62:16-22). As such, summary judgment is due to be granted as to the bank on this claim.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is ADOPTED and ACCEPTED. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 44) is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is granted as it relates to the following: (1) all Title VII claims against defendant, Conrad Taylor, individually; (2) Title VII claims against the bank for “gender discrimination” other than for creation of a hostile work environment; (3) state-law claims in Count 5 for negligent or wanton hiring, supervision, training, and retention; and (4) state-law claims in Count 9 for breach of implied contract. Those claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is otherwise denied.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JOHN E. OTT, United States Chief ' Magistrate Judge.

In this action, Plaintiffs Ragan Tolar Livingston and her husband Mitch Livingston assert claims against Marion Bank and Trust Co. and its president, Conrad Taylor, (“Defendants”), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Alabama state law. (Doc. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”)). The action was assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to this court’s general order of reference. The cause now comes to be heard for a report and recommendation, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(1), on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 44). The parties have submitted evidence and briefed their respective positions on the motion, which is ripe for decision. Upon consideration, it will be recommended that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the FEDERAL Rules of Civil PROCedure, party is authorized to move for summary judgment on all or part of a claim or defense asserted either by or against the movant. Under that rule, the “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Crv. Proc. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” relying on submissions “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Both the party “asserting that a fact cannot be,” and a party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed, must support their assertions by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. Proo. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). Acceptable materials under Rule 56(c)(1)(A) include “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” In its review of the evidence, a court must credit the evidence of the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir.2000). At summary judgment, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

In early February 2008, Plaintiff Ragan Tolar Livingston (“Ragan”) interviewed for a job with Defendant Marion Bank & Trust (“the Bank”). (Doc. 55-1 (“Ragan Aff.”) at 1). Interviewed by Defendant Taylor, who is the Bank’s president, and, Lisa Rayfield, his personal assistant at the Bank’s main branch in Marion, Alabama (Ragan Aff. at 1), Ragan was informed that she was being considered for a position as Taylor’s personal assistant at the Bank’s other branch recently opened in Selma, Alabama. (Id) After a second interview, Ragan was offered the position, at which time it was explained to her that she would train at the Marion branch for ap-' proximately two months and then transfer to the Selma branch. (Id) At that interview, Ragan was also told that Taylor was the highest ranking official at either branch and that no one else at the Bank had more authority or could make final decisions. (Id) Ragan accepted the position, and she began working at the Marion branch on February 11, 2008. (Deposition of Ragan Livingston (“Ragan Dep.”) at 65, 88-89).

Upon her hire, Ragan was 23 years old and had been married to her husband (and - co-plaintiff here) Mitch Livingston (“Mitch”), for approximately 10 months. One Saturday soon after Ragan her employment began, Taylor, who was then 62 years old, called her into his office around closing time for a private meeting to talk about Ragan and Mitch bringing into good standing certain of their accounts with the Bank. (See Ragan Aff. at 2; Ragan Dep. at 140-41). While the meeting started on that topic, Taylor began to ask Ragan personal questions about her marriage to Mitch and make disparaging remarks about him. (Ragan Aff. at 2; Ragan Dep. at 140-42). Several months before marrying Mitch, Ragan had given birth to a daughter by another man she had previously dated, who also happened to be Taylor’s nephew. (Ragan Dep. at 26-27, 141-42). Taylor asked Ragan whether “she was in love with” with Mitch, whether she had married him “for real” or married him “for show” just “to make his nephew angry,” and whether she “had ever considered divorce.” (Ragan Dep. at 141; Ra-gan Aff. at 2). Ragan responded that “of course” she and Mitch had gotten married “for real” and that they “loved each other.” (Ragan Dep. at 142; Ragan Aff. at 2).

In the period following that uncomfortable meeting, Taylor subjected Ragan to other conduct she considered sexually harassing. Also early in her employment, Ragan was in Taylor’s office when he pressed her for details about her sex life, asking her “how good the sex was” with her husband, and he attempted to engage her in a discussion about sexual positions, by asking her whether Mitch would “bend[her] over” and whether she preferred “to ride on top.” (Ragan Dep. at 142, 205-07). On another occasion, Taylor similarly suggested to Ragan that she take up horseback riding because it was “good practice for when it’s time to ride on top.” (Id. at 199-202, 206). Taylor also began to call Ragan “sexy” approximately every other day (Ragan Dep. at 148-49), and he would make other comments, like, “How are you doing, good looking?” (Regan Dep. at 186). On two or three occasions, Taylor invited Ragan to “sit in his lap” (Ragan Aff. at 3), and on another, as he was headed on vacation to Tennessee, he suggested that Ragan should accompany him and “leav[e her] husband at home.” (Ragan Dep. at 177-78). Once, when Ra-gan was talking to Taylor about a past due loan on a hearse owned by a local funeral parlor, Taylor remarked suggestively, “Imagine what you could do in the back of a hearse.” (Id. at 178). She claims that she also once heard him “imagine out loud sexual fantasies [he had] regarding the wife of one of the bank customers.” (Ra-gan Aff. at 3; see also Ragan Dep. at 217-19). On another occasion, when Ragan and her mother were walking together in town, they encountered Taylor, who made a remark likening women to “dogs ... with two legs” in which he stated that he had to “beat them dff with a stick.” (Ra-gan Dep. at 150-51). In another incident, Ragan had balked at altering a bank record in the way Taylor had directed her to, advising that it could cause problems if there were an audit. (Id. at 93). Taylor replied, “Well, I guess that makes me a bad boy, doesn’t it? Why don’t you bend me over your knee and give me a spanking. You know, I deserve it.” (Id.) Ultimately, Ragan alleges that the “number of inappropriate comments directed towards [her] is too many to count” and that she experienced “incidents” of “sexual harassment” “several times each week.” (Ragan Aff. at 2).

Ragan also alleges that Taylor made other remarks that might be viewed as innocuous in themselves, such as regular compliments on her dress and appearance. (See Ragan Aff. at 2). Ragan acknowledges that she would have ordinarily viewed those as flattering, but she claims that Taylor’s “body language, paired with the tone of his voice, always made [her] extremely uncomfortable,” as he would suggestively “give [her] a slow look down with a disgusting grin, look [her] in the eyes and tell [her] that [she] looked especially nice.” (Id. at 2-3; see also Ragan Dep. at 186-88). Ragan further suggests that she was put off by such compliments because of other, more overt, sexually vulgar and demeaning remarks and inquiries that Taylor made.

In particular, Ragan claims that her work environment became more hostile following an episode in May 2008. By that point, the original plan to transfer Ragan to the Selma branch had been put on hold indefinitely, and her duties at the Marion branch revolved primarily around collections on past due accounts. (Ragan Aff. at 4; see also Ragan Dep. at 250). Ragan became anxious one day because appearing in her past-due journal was the name of a certain bank customer who, she claims, had forcibly raped her at knife point and threatened to kill her in an incident that had occurred several years earlier when they were both in high school. (Ragan Aff. at 3-4). Desiring to avoid speaking directly with the customer, Ragan mailed him several notices that his account was past due. (Id. at 4). After no response was forthcoming, Taylor was reviewing Ragan’s journal entries a few weeks later when he asked her why she had yet to call the customer on the phone. (Id. at 4). Up to that time, Ragan had told only a few people about the rape and only then after about two years had passed. (See'id. at 3-4; Ragan Dep. at 123-29). Not wanting to disclose the incident to Taylor, Ragan answered vaguely that she and the customer had a problem when they were in high school and that they no longer spoke. (Ragan Aff. at 4). When Taylor inquired further, Ragan again attempted to put him off, telling him that it had happened a long time ago and that she just wanted to put it behind her. (Id.) Taylor replied that if it was going to interfere with her job he needed to know more about the matter. (Id.) Feeling she could no longer avoid doing so, Ragan told Taylor that the customer had raped her when she was 17, and she asked that his collections account be reassigned to another employee. (Id.) Taylor - allegedly responded by telling her that there was no reason to reassign the customer’s account and by further insisting that she tell him the details of the rape itself. (Id.; Ragan Dep. at 117-20). Ra-gan told Taylor that she could not recall much about .the episode. (Ragan Aff. at 4; Ragan Dep. at 119). Unsatisfied, Taylor stated that he did not believe that she could not remember, and he followed up with a string of intimate questions that included where the rape took place, what clothing had remained on her body, where the assailant had held the knife, what sexual position she was in, and what she was thinking while the rape was occurring. (Ragan Aff. at 4-5; Ragan Dep. at 118-19, 212). Although Ragan let Taylor know several times that it was “not okay” to be talking about the incident (Ragan Dep. at 223), he nonetheless forced her to relive the incident in vivid detail, causing “feelings of shame and guilt [to] flood[ ] back to [her] conscious memory.” (Ragan Aff. at 5; see also Ragan Dep. at 116-20). Ragan then attempted to gather her files and go to the ladies room, but Taylor instructed her to stop and sit down. (Ragan Aff. at 5). When Ragan complied, Taylor leaned forward on his desk and announced to Ragan that she “had not been raped.” (Id.) Rather, he proclaimed, ‘Women enjoy it when men treat them in that sort of way.” (Id.) Suggesting to Ragan that she was lying about the fear she said he experienced, Taylor told her that she had “wanted it,” that “women like to be forced,” that he knew that “she liked it,” and that Ragan herself “knew that too.” (Ragan Dep. at 115, 118-19; Ragan Aff. at 5).

Ragan farther claims that in the wake that discussion, Taylor would taunt her about claiming to have been raped. (Re-gan Dep. at 169-71, 212-14; Ragan Aff. at 5). Typically, Ragan says, any time that the name of the customer or a member of his family would come up on her past-due journal or otherwise in the Bank’s business, Taylor would ask her rhetorically whether the customer was the one that she said had raped her. Taylor allegedly made “many, many references similar to that,” sometimes in the presence of others, including once in front of the mayor of Marion. (Regan Dep. at 169-72, 212-14). On some those occasions, Ragan asserts, Taylor further added that “she knew she had liked it, though.” (Id. at 169).- Ragan claims that Taylor’s “habit of constantly bringing up this particular incident in conversation, whether in the presence of others or not, was very disturbing to [her] mental state.” (Ragan Aff. at 5).

Ragan claims that Taylor also frequently touched her in ways that made her uncomfortable. She states, for example, that he would at times “touch [her] hair ..., just in passing,” while complimenting her appearance. (Ragan Dep. at 189). For example, Ragan recalled that just before work one morning, she and Taylor crossed paths in a stairwell, at which time he complimented her appearance and reached out and touched her hair as it hung loosely on the side of her head, in an intimate way like her husband would play with her hair. (Id.) Ragan further alleges that she and Taylor would “quite often” be looking at the same file or document, which he would use as an opportunity to “tug on [her] skirt or blouse” or put his hand “in the small of her back” in an attempt to “guide” or “draw [her] closer to him.” (Ragan Aff. at 3; Ragan Dep. at 173-76). At times, she says, she would “pull away” to put space between them, to which Taylor would react by appearing “miffed.” (Ragan Dep. at 174). Ragan claims that this sort of touching occurred “at least once a week.” (Id. at 174-75).

On one such occasion, in late July 2008, Taylor and Ragan were alone in his office when he told her how “cute” she looked, and he “tugged at [her] blouse” so as to pull undone the tie strings securing the back of her blouse. (Ragan Aff. at 3; see also Ragan Dep. at 96-103). Ragan became embarrassed and quickly tried to leave his office. (Ragan Aff. at 3). Taylor stopped her, however, reaching out and grabbing her arm. (Id.) Then, with “a smug grin on his face,” Taylor told her, ‘You better be careful not to let anyone see you like my office like that. The other employees will assume that we have something going on, and the other women will be jealous. Close the door and let me tie that back for you.” (Id.) Ragan froze as Taylor then “took a seemingly extraordinary amount of time as he slowly tied [Ragan’s] blouse back into a perfect bow.” (Id.) Mortified by the incident, Ragan went to the ladies’ room and cried. (Id.) Ragan suggests that she suffered similar crying spells at work on other occasions as well because of Taylor’s harassment. (Ragan Aff. at 5). Eventually she became “terrified all the time” (Ragan Dep. at 147), and attempted to avoid having to discuss her past-due journal with Taylor, which led to a verbal reprimand. (See Ragan Dep. at 244-45, 252-53).

Ragan alleges in her affidavit that, in early September 2008, Taylor made a “remark suggesting that [she] make him happy by having sex with him.” (Ragan Aff. at 5). Rather than trying to ignore him as she usually did, she turned to Taylor and told him that “if he did not begin to respect [her] and stop harassing [her, she] would have no other choice than to speak with [his] wife about the problem.” (Id.) In recounting that episode in her deposition, Ragan articulated the substance of her statement somewhat differently, alleging that she told Taylor that if he “didn’t quit hitting on [her] [she] was going to have to say something to [his wife].” (Ra-gan Dep. at 132-33; see also Doc. 1-1 (“EEOC Charge”) at 1 (“I informed [Taylor] that if the sexual harassment did not stop, I would tell his wife, who is a bank employee.”). Although Taylor’s wife Linda also worked for the Bank at the Marion branch, it is undisputed that she had no supervisory authority over Taylor in an employment capacity. It should be noted, however, that while the Bank had promulgated a sexual harassment policy in an employee handbook shortly before Ragan was hired, the handbook specifically directs employees to report sexually harassing conduct to his or her “supervisor,” who is then to report it to the President of the Bank. (See Taylor Dep., at 68; Doc. 55-42 (“Employee Handbook”) at 6). And given that Taylor was both Ragan’s supervisor and the President of the Bank, he was the only person designed by the Bank’s policy to receive sexual harassment complaints from her.

On September 9, 2008, “less than a week” after Ragan made the complaint and threat to Taylor, he called her into his office around lunch time to discuss a past due account in her journal. (Ragan Aff. at 5). Without warning, Taylor began to make “hostile remarks” to Ragan, including “several” about her having been raped. (Id.) He told her at that time that she “carried to much emotional stress” and required her to go home immediately and take one week’s vacation. (Id.) A few days later, but before her mandated week of vacation had expired, Ragan stopped by the Marion branch.to check her account balance. (Id. at 5-6). When she went inside, Rayfield told her that Taylor wanted to see her. (Id. at 6). Ragan went into Taylor’s office, at which time he told her that the Bank had decided to terminate her employment, supplying no further explanation. (Ragan Aff. at 6).

On October 7, 2008, Ragan filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (EEOC Charge). That resulted in a determination by the EEOC that there was reasonable cause to believe that Ragan had been subjected to unlawful sexual harassment and was then terminated in retaliation for complaining about it. (Doc. 55-6). Ragan and Mitch (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this action in April 2011. In what are denominated as “Count One and Two” of the Complaint, Ragan asserts “two separate claims against Defendants Marion Bank and Trust by and through the actions of ... Taylor,” for “Sexual Harassment” and “Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment,” in violation of Title VII. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-33). In Count Three, captioned “Gender Discrimination” and also based on Title VII, Ragan alleges that she “has been discriminated against on the basis of her sex in regard to her work environment, training, promotion, job assignments, job pay, and terms and conditions of employment.” (Id. ¶ 35). Count Four asserts another Title VII claim, alleging that she was subjected to unlawful retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment. (Id. ¶¶ 38-42). In Counts Five through Nine, Ragan asserts claims under Alabama state law for “negligent and wanton hiring, training, supervision, and retention” (Compl., Count Five, ¶¶ 43-50); invasion of privacy (id., Count Six, ¶¶ 51-57); “assault and battery” (id., Count Seven, ¶¶ 58-64); intentional infliction of emotional distress (id., Count Eight, ¶¶ 65-72); and “breach of implied contract.” (Id., Count Nine, ¶¶ 73-78). In the tenth and final count, Mitch asserts a claim for loss of consortium. (Compl. ¶¶ 79-81). Both Defendants have moved for summary judgment.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII

Ragan claims she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. In Count Three she asserts another Title VII cause of action “gender discrimination,” based on allegations that she has “been discriminated against on the basis of her sex in regard to her work environment, training, promotion, job assignments, job pay, and terms and conditions of employment.” (Id. ¶ 85). Both types of claims allege violations of the substantive anti-discrimination provision of Title VII, which makes it an “unlawful employment practice ... for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

In Count Four, Ragan alleges that she was subjected to retaliation made unlawful by Title VII. Such claim is based upon an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), which provides in relevant part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [provisions of Title VII prohibiting discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin] or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the Title VII claims for sex discrimination and for unlawful retaliation.

1. Title VII Claims Against Taylor

Taylor contends that he cannot be liable under Title VII for either a discrimination or retaliation theory because, among other reasons, he is not alleged to be an “employer” under the statute, which does not allow for individual liability. See Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir.2006); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991). While Taylor’s belief that he is a target of Title VII claims may not be wholly unfounded, Plaintiffs expressly acknowledge that they are not asserting Title VII claims against Taylor individually. (Pis. Opp. Brief at 21). Accordingly, to the extent that the Complaint might be interpreted as raising Title VII claims against Taylor, such claims are due to be dismissed.

2. Title VII Claims Against the Bank

a. Hostile Work Environment

Ragan first claims that the Bank is liable under Title VII for allegedly subjecting her to a hostile work environment because of sex. To prove such a claim, she has the burden at trial to show

(1) that he or she belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee has been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature; (3) that the harassment must have been based on the sex of the employee; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a diseriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for holding the employer liable.

Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir.2010) (en banc) (quoting Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir.1999) (en banc)). The Bank argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Ragan cannot establish either the third or fourth element above, ie., that the harassment was because of sex or that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment. Those arguments are addressed in turn.

i. Harassment “Because of” Sex

The Bank first contends that “no evidence demonstrates that the conduct Ra-gan [complains of] was based on her sex.” (Dfts. Brief at 17). In support, the Bank emphasizes that the Eleventh Circuit has stated that

statements and conduct must be of a sexual or gender-related nature — ‘sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] conduct of a sexual nature,’ [Mendoza, 195 F.3d] at 1245 — before it can be considered in determining whether the severe or pervasive requirement is met. Innocuous statements or conduct, or boorish ones that do not relate to the sex of the actor or of the offended party (the plaintiff) are not counted.

Gupta v. Florida Bd. of. Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 583 (11th Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds, Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir.2008). On that score, the Bank contends that Ragan has not “alleged facts sufficient to show that Taylor’s alleged comments to her were related to her gender.” (Dfts. Brief at 18). The Bank acknowledges that Ragan “has alleged that Taylor complimented her on her appearance, inquired about her sex life with her husband, and on one occasion made her talk about an alleged rape.” (Id.) The Bank contends, however, that such compliments, “without more, [are] not inherently related to sex” and that asking Ragan about her “sex life does not violate Title VII because the question is not gender-specific and the offense (if any) associated with such inquiry would be equally shared by both genders.” (Id.) The Bank likewise argues that Ragan cannot demonstrate that the instances in which Taylor allegedly touched her were “based on her sex” because she does not claim that he “touched her breast, buttocks, vaginal area, or any other female-specific part of her anatomy.” (Id.) Instead, the Bank contends, Ragan claims only “platonic contact” in which he “touched her face, hair, back, and her shirt,” allegedly unaccompanied by “any sexual comments.” (Id.)

In order for statements and conduct of the employer or his agents to “count” towards the creation of a sexually hostile work environment actionable under Title VII, it is necessary that the jury be able to draw a reasonable inference that the harassment occurred “because of’ sex. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (“Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminatfion] ... because of ... sex.’ ” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)) (emphasis original)); see also Beeves, 594 F.3d at 809. Further, “[although gender-specific language that imposes a change in the terms or conditions of employment based on sex will violate Title VII, general vulgarity or references to sex that are indiscriminate in nature will not, standing alone, generally be actionable.” Reeves, 594 F.3d at 809. “The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace,” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81, 118 S.Ct. 998, so workplace harassment is not “automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations.” Id. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998.

On the other hand, any form of harassment that meets Title VU’s statutory definition of discrimination because of sex may give rise to an actionable hostile work environment. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80, 118 S.Ct. 998. The Eleventh Circuit has long recognized that a plaintiff can establish that harassment was “based on her sex” by showing “that but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of harassment.’ ” Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1248 n. 5 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Serv., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir.1983). It is typically easiest to draw that inference in male-female sexual harassment situations where the challenged conduct “involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998; see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. Further, in such situations, “unless there is evidence to the contrary, ... [courts] also infer that the harasser treats members of the ‘non-preferred’ gender differently — and thus that the harasser harbors an impermissible discriminatory animus towards persons of the preferred gender.” Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236,1246 (11th Cir.1998).

Indeed, as the Bank highlights, the Eleventh Circuit stated in Gupta that “statements and conduct must be of a sexual or gender-related nature — ‘sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] conduct of a sexual nature,’ [Mendoza, 195 F.3d] at 1245 — before it can be considered in determining whether the severe or pervasive requirement is met.” 212 F.3d at 583. Courts, however, must be careful not to take that admonition too far, which could be interpreted to suggest that “sexual advances, request for sexual favors, [and] conduct of a sexual nature” are the sine qua non of what qualifies as harassment “because of sex.” However, as explained below, such a construction would be contrary to. United States Supreme Court precedent and earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions, both of which would trump any holding in Gupta to the extent-they conflict. See United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246,1255 (11th Cir.2009).

More than 14 years before Gupta was decided, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with a plaintiffs Title VII claim alleging that she had been subjected to harassment because of sex that resulted in her constructive discharge. See Bell v. Craekin Good Bakers, Inc., Ill F.2d 1497 (11th Cir.1985). The district court had granted summary judgment to the employer as it related to a claim for a hostile work environment under Henson, based on its view that the plaintiff’s evidence failed to establish that “she was subject to sexual harassment” because she did “not even claim that she was subject to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” Bell, 111 F.2d at 1503 (quoting the district court’s decision). In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court had applied the “wrong standard,” recognizing that the plaintiff “was under no obligation to adduce proof of sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Rather, the Bell court explained, actionable harassment because of sex “can be of at least two kinds: (1) a threatening, bellicose, demeaning, or offensive conduct ... because of the sex of the victim of such conduct; or (2) ‘unwelcome sexual advances’.... ” Id. That view was confirmed correct in Oncale by the Supreme Court’s acknowledgments that “harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex,” 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, and that “a trier of fact might reasonably find [unlawful sex] discrimination ... if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms ... as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.” 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998; see also Hams, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 (recognizing that a sexually hostile work environment may be created by “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult”); Reeves, 594 F.3d at 811-12 (holding that “words and conduct” that might be “reasonably read as gender-specific, derogatory, and humiliating,” though not directed specifically at the plaintiff herself, were “sufficient to afford the inference that the offending conduct was based on the sex of the [plaintiff].”).

Further, the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court have both recognized that even if harassing conduct and statements are facially neutral, a plaintiff may establish by circumstantial evidence that such harassment was, in fact, because of sex or another protected characteristic. For example, the district court in Bell had dismissed the constructive discharge claim on summary judgment, concluding that, while the record showed that there had been a concerted campaign of harassment to force the plaintiff to quit, the evidence was insufficient to support that such was motivated by the plaintiffs gender. See Bell, 111 F.2d at 1499-1500. The Eleventh Circuit again disagreed, ruling that the lower court had failed properly to consider certain evidence of sexually discriminatory intent, including testimony that the supervisor primarily responsible for the harassment had previously stated that, if it were up to him, there would be no women in the workplace and testimony that the supervisor did not subject male employees to similar mistreatment. Id. at 1500-02. Other Eleventh Circuit decisions thereafter similarly recognized that facially neutral mistreatment might be shown to have been motivated by unlawful animus, including through evidence of the harasser’s disparate treatment of persons outside of the plaintiffs protected class. See Hud-dleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that the plaintiff made out a “prima facie case” of hostile environment sexual harassment based in part on evidence that her supervisor “grabbed [her] by the arm and physically moved her a few feet” and “berated her for her job performance,” which the “district court concluded ... would not have occurred but for [the plaintiffs] sex.”); Fredette v. BVP Management Assoc., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir.1997) (noting that “harassment is based on the victim’s sex” where “the harasser does not treat employees of the opposite sex the same way”); Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that harassment in which the plaintiff was “stripped of all responsibility, given only a chair and no desk, and isolated from conversations with other workers” could support a claim of constructive discharge if otherwise shown to have been motivated by an unlawful discriminatory or retaliatory animus); see also Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1248 n. 5 (noting that a plaintiff might show that harassment was because of sex by proof that the harasser “treated women employees differently from male employees”); id. at 1253-54 (Edmondson, J., concurring). That view was also validated in Oncale, where the Court indicated that even if a harasser does not use “sex-specific” terms in subjecting the plaintiff to mistreatment, the plaintiff “may also, of course,” show that such was motivated by discriminatory animus by offering “comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.” 523 U.S. at 80-81, 118 S.Ct. 998.

Thus, while a harasser’s use of sexual or gender-specific language and epithets may itself often support that such statements were sexually discriminatory, see Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998; Beckford v. Department of Corr., 605 F.3d 951, 960 (11th Cir.2010); Reeves, 594 F.3d at 809-10; Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1246, the absence of such language does not necessarily mean that the remarks were not motivated by an unlawful animus. In the end, that approach is the only logical one. “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). In assessing whether harassment is actionable, “workplace conduct is not measured in isolation.” Clark County Sch. Disk v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001). Rather, “the trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of the record as a whole and the totality of the circumstances, ... [including] the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); ■ accord Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1242 (“In sexual harassment cases, the courts must consider the alleged conduct in context and cumulatively.”); see also Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, ' 810-11 (7th Cir.2001) (“ ‘Courts should avoid disaggregating a hostile work environment claim, dividing conduct into instances of sexually oriented conduct and' instances of unequal treatment, then discounting the latter category of conduct,’ thereby robbing instances of gender-based harassment of their cumulative effect.” (quoting See O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 730 (1st Cir.2001))). Further, it is a bedrock principle of federal anti-discrimination law that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove that virtually any adverse treatment by an employer was motivated by prohibited discrimination, even if not accompanied by a statement directly evidencing unlawful intent. See generally McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (both discussing the' use of circumstantial evidence in Title VII disparate treatment cases); Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.2011) (“The plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence that creates a trial issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.”). Thus, no one doubts that a plaintiff might establish that an employer’s, facially gender-neutral act of terminating her employment violated Title VII notwithstanding that the employer’s decisionmaker did not call the plaintiff a “bitch” at the time she was fired. And because harassment creating a hostile work environment is just another species of unlawful disparate treatment, Reeves, 594 F.3d at 808 n. 2, it is likewise improper to categorize facially neutral or ambiguous harassment, such as repeatedly belittling a female employee as “incompetent,” “stupid,” or “worthless,” as inherently nondiscriminatory simply because the insult was not then accompanied by gender-specific language. See Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 156 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that a factfinder could infer that ostensibly gender-neutral abuse was gender-based given the contents of the harasser’s earlier tirade against the plaintiff that was laced with gender-specific epithets and obscenities); McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1116 n. 9 (9th Cir.2004) (“A trier of fact might certainly conclude that, in light of Hughes’ use of a racial slur, his other abusive remarks to McGinest were also motivated by racial hostility.”). Therefore, while harassment that is gender neutral on its face does not itself give rise to an inference of discriminatory motivation, such harassment may still be proven to have been “because of sex” by circumstantial evidence, including as it relates to the harasser’s sexual solicitations or use of gender-specific epithets on other occasions or his more favorable treatment of similarly situated male employees. See Reeves, 594 F.3d at 813 (“At the end of the day, [whether harassing conduct was motivated by sexual animus] is a question of intent, which, because intent may be difficult to discern, often requires recourse to circumstantial evidence.”).

Finally, the inquiry into whether harassment was “based on” a protected characteristic “requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1297 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81, 118 S.Ct. 998). Accordingly, whether an otherwise potentially ambiguous statement or incident might be reasonably construed as motivated by a prohibited animus may depend on a host of factors and circumstances, including the immediately surrounding context, the parties’ prior course of dealings, local custom, and historical practices. See id., 683 F.3d at 1297-99 (finding a question of fact with regard to whether banana peels left on a truck driven by the African-American plaintiff was intended “to send a message of racial intolerance.”); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s suggestion that a plant manager’s reference to each of the African-American plaintiffs as “boy” could not be evidence of discriminatory animus unless it was “modified by a racial classification like ‘black’ or ‘white.’”). “As the Supreme Court has observed, ‘[t]he real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.’ ” Reeves, 594 F.3d at 810 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82, 118 S.Ct. 998). With the above legal principles in mind, the undersigned now turns to consider whether a jury could reasonably find that Taylor’s alleged harassment of Ragan was because of sex.

Likely the most disturbing harassment in this case occurred in May 2008 when Taylor purportedly insisted, while he and Ragan were alone in his office, that she answer numerous pointed questions seeking a detailed description of an incident in which she claims to have been forcibly raped at knife point several years earlier. That inquisition, which appears to have had no possible legitimate purpose, was immediately followed by Taylor’s announcement to Ragan that she “was not raped” and that she had “wanted it” and “enjoyed it” because, as Taylor told her, “women like to be forced.” Directly related are Ragan’s allegations that Taylor on multiple instances thereafter mocked her about claiming to have been raped, which were at times accompanied by further suggestions that she had “enjoyed it.” In addition, Ragan alleges that Taylor also on several other occasions asked her about the intimate details of her sex life with her husband, including what sexual positions she preferred and whether her husband would “bend her over,” and whether her marriage was “for real.” The Bank would characterize all of this conduct as merely the indiscriminate use of sexual language that was not gender-specific and would be equally offensive to both sexes. The un.dersigned disagrees.

The Bank observes that there “may be eases when a supervisor makes sexual overtures to workers of both sexes or cases where the conduct complained of is equally offensive to male and female workers,” and that, in such circumstances, the harassment would not be “based upon sex because women and men are accorded like treatment.” (Dfts. Brief at 17). There indeed “may be cases” in which the employer is not liable under Title VII because the harasser is shown to be an “equal opportunity harasser” that treats both genders equally badly. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403-04 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. However, “that conduct is egregious enough to offend the sensibilities of men as well as women cannot serve to immunize it for Title VII purposes.” Hutchison v. Amateur Electronic Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir.1994); see also Reeves, 594 F.3d at 811-13 (even though employees of both genders were exposed to same objectionable remarks, a'jury could find that such were sexually discriminatory because they included widespread use of gender-specific epithets and obscenities that would be more offensive to women); cf. Beckford, 605 F.3d at 960 (holding that a jury could find that the practice of prison inmates openly masturbating toward female prison staff was based on sex, rejecting the employer’s argument that the plaintiffs “chose to work in a correctional facility that houses ... the worst of the worst.”).

Furthermore, as the movant for summary judgment, the Bank bears the initial burden to direct the court to record evidence that either negates an element of Ragan’s claim or that demonstrates that she will be unable to meet her burden of proof at trial as to that element; it is not enough just to say in a brief effectively that “there is no evidence” to support an element of her claim. See United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property in Greene and Tuscaloosa Counties, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437-38 & n. 19 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc); Clark, 929 F.2d at 608-09. To that end, the Bank has not referred the court to any evidence demonstrating that Taylor subjected male employees to questioning, touching, or mistreatment like Ragan alleges. Even if the record at this point may be unclear regarding how Taylor treated male employees, that does not entitle the Bank to summary judgment on the theory that Taylor was equally harassing to employees of both genders.

Moreover, courts in this circuit have not hesitated to consider a male harasser’s vulgar inquiries into a female employee’s sex life to be sexually discriminatory conduct that may contribute to the creation of a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Griffin v. City of Opcu-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1309 (11th Cir.2001); Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broadcasting Service, Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 506-08 (11th Cir. 2000); Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1527-29; Moore v. Corporate Facilities Mgmt., LLC, 2012 WL 4329288, at *10 (N.D.Ala. Sept. 17, 2012); EEOC v. SDI Athens East, LLC, 690 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1380 (M.D.Ga.2010); Edwards v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 603 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1348-49 (M.D.Ala.2009); McCoy v. Macon Water Awth., 966 F.Supp. 1209, 1218 (M.D.Ga.1997). So too it is here. A jury might find that Taylor’s inquiries seeking for Ragan to reveal and articulate intimate details of being raped, her sex life with her husband, and the status of her marriage were implied sexual overtures, trolling designed to test the waters regarding her receptiveness to more overt advances, see Anderson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 694 F.Supp. 1294, 1303 (N.D.Ohio 1988), or as a form of “sex talk” to gratify Taylor’s own prurient interests. See, e.g., Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1997); cf. United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir.2008) (characterizing the defendant’s online explicit discussions with his intended victim as “consistent with his having intended to obtain sexual satisfaction vicariously.”).

Further, Taylor’s questions and statements can be viewed as degrading to women in particular. In a manner they suggest, and, indeed, at least once outright declared, that the proper role of women is to be sexually available and subservient to men, to the point of denying that women are ever truly physically coerced to engage in sexual acts against their will. See Jennings v. University of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695-96 (4th Cir.2007) (en banc) (explicit questions and comments by male coach to members of university women’s soccer team about their sex lives “frequently carried the strong suggestion of promiscuity, provoked in several players acute feelings of humiliation and degradation that were directly linked to their gender.”); EEOC v. R & R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334, 339-40 (4th Cir.2001) (recognizing that harasser’s alleged conduct, which included having “described his sex life and discussed sexual positions” with female employees, asking a female employee “if she liked to be spanked” and if she had “gotten laid,” contributed toward the creation of “an environment consumed by remarks that ridiculed and demeaned the status of women”); Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 690 (2d Cir.2001) (complaint stated a viable hostile environment claim where it alleged, that the harasser made “demeaning comments about women” in which he explained to the plaintiff “in graphic detail[ ]” how a rape may occur, and told her “how easy it is to rape a woman.”); Eastwood v. Department of Corr. of State of Okla., 846 F.2d 627, 629-30 (10th Cir.1988) (plaintiffs allegations that the employer’s investigator demanded, in the name of investigating her report that she had been sexually assaulted by a co-worker, that the plaintiff reveal facts about her own sexual history and threatened to fire her unless she signed a statement promising to forget the incident if the coworker resigned, identified “actions that could constitute sexual harassment.”); cf. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n. 3 (3d Cir.1990) (“The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course.”).

A jury could also reasonably find that at least most of Taylor’s other comments about which Ragan complains were based on sex. Some of those were overtly sexual in nature, even assuming they did not amount to explicit requests or demands for sexual favors. Such would include Taylor’s repeatedly calling Ragan “sexy,” his two or three invitations to Ragan to sit in his lap, an occasion in which he told Ragan that she should bend him over her knee and “spank” him because he was a “bad boy,” his “suggesting] that [Ragan] make him happy by having sex with” him, and an instance in which he stated that Ragan should leave her husband at home and accompany him on vacation to Tennessee. Most of Taylor’s other remarks were comprised of more sexually ambivalent compliments of Ragan’s dress and appearance. However, even such routine compliments “[n]ot uncommonly show a flirtatious purpose,” Gupta, 212 F.3d at 584, and they “take color” from Taylor’s other more sexually explicit and objectifying remarks previously discussed. Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 338 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir.2003); cf. Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1248 (“ ‘[Fallowing and staring’ can betray romantic or sexual attraction.... ”). Ra-gan’s testimony indicates that Taylor delivered his compliments with such frequency as to be unduly solicitous and in a sexually suggestive tone that was often paired with leering looks up and down her body. Such implies a sexual or gender-specific motivation. See Johnson, 234 F.3d at 506, 509 (indicating that conduct in which the harasser “called out [the plaintiffs] name and then looked her up and down while staring at her in a sexual manner” contributed to a sexually hostile work environment); Frederick v. Sprint/United Management Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1309, 1312 (11th Cir.2001) (noting that “sexual asides and insinuations are the well-worn tools of a sexual harasser” and that the plaintiffs supervisor “subjected her to a range of discomforting behaviors” that included “starting] at her for prolonged periods [and] lookfing] her up and down”); Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 571 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence was sufficient to establish a sexually hostile environment based on testimony that her supervisor made repeated statements to the effect that “women should be barefoot and pregnant,” “would stand very close to women when talking to them and would look them up and down in a way that’s very uncomfortable” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Ragan also alleges multiple instances of gratuitous physical contact, often accompanied by the sort of compliments described above. On what appears to have been a few occasions, such contact entailed Taylor touching Ragan’s hair or the side of her face in an intimate manner. More frequently Taylor would touch or gently pull on her clothing or put his hand in the small of her back to “guide” her closer to him, ostensibly for the purpose of looking at documents Ragan was holding. Ragan says that on some of those occasions she would “pull away” from Taylor, at which he would appear “miffed.” 'Ragan also describes an incident in which Taylor pulled on the strings securing her blouse and they became untied. After instructing her to let him tie them back up, he took an inordinate amount of time to do so, simultaneously suggesting that other female employees might get jealous of Ragan if they thought she was having an affair with him. None of those instances of touching involved the “female-specific part[s] of her anatomy,” as the Bank puts it. That does not, however, reasonably preclude that such “unwelcome remarks and touching might be done to gratify the harasser’s own desires.” Durham Life Ins. Co., 166 F.3d at 151 n. 6. Thus, the type of repeated, deliberate physical contact Ragan describes may be deemed at least to contribute to a hostile work environment, particularly in light of Taylor’s other, sexual and gender-specific remarks and conduct. See Johnson, 234 F.3d at 509 (characterizing the harasser’s sexually harassing conduct as “severe” in part because he gave the plaintiff “unwanted [shoulder] messages”); Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1189 (11th Cir.2001) (supervisor’s solicitations to the plaintiff to reinstate their intimate relationship, coupled with evidence that “on several occasions he brushed up against her in an inappropriate way while at work,” was sufficient to support that the plaintiff had a reasonable belief that she was the victim of sexual harassment); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554,1556 (11th Cir.1987) (identifying a supervisor’s “unwelcomed sexual harassment” as including “putting his hands on [the plaintiff] to rub her shoulders or ‘fool with’ and smell her hair”); Parker v. Atlanta Newspapers Name Holding Corp., 2006 WL 1594427, at *3 (11th Cir. June 12, 2006) (holding that, “in conjunction with” the harasser’s other sexually explicit advances and comments, incidents in which he allegedly “touched [the plaintiffs] hands, elbows and shoulders a number of times and would stand ‘disturbingly close to her, nearly pressing his body against hers,’ ” could be “objectively threatening or humiliating” instances of sexual harassment). The Bank is not entitled to summary judgment on Ragan’s hostile environment claim on the ground that a jury could not find that Taylor’s alleged harassment was based on sex. .

ii. “Severe or Pervasive” Harassment

The Bank also argues that Ra-gan cannot establish that the harassment of which she complains was severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of her employment. See Reeves, 594 F.3d at 808. “Either severity or pervasiveness is sufficient to establish a violation of Title VIÍ.” Id. The Fifth Circuit has explained:

An egregious, yet isolated, incident can alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and satisfy the fourth element necessary to constitute a hostile work environment. Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 434-35 (5th Cir.2005). The inverse is also true: Frequent incidents of harassment, though not severe, can reach the level of ‘pervasive,’ thereby altering the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment such that a hostile work environment. exists. Thus, ‘the required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.’ Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir.1991).

Lauderdale v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div., 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir.2007); see also Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2002); Tademy v. Union 'Pacific Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1144 (10th Cir.2008). In evaluating whether allegedly discriminatory conduct is actionable, courts consider its “frequency ...; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. at 808-09 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367). As is done when considering whether harassment could be deemed to be based op sex, an inquiry into whether it was sufficiently severe or pervasive requires a court to view the evidence both cumulatively and in the totality of the circumstances, not in isolation. Id. at 808.

The plaintiff must prove that the environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. Id. at 809. That is, the employee must subjectively perceive the harassment as sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment, and this subjective perception must be objectively reasonable. Id. “So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 367 (citation omitted). “[T]he objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’ ” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81, 118 S.Ct. 998 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23,' 114 S.Ct. 367).

The Bank only challenges the “objective” prong of the test, arguing that a reasonable person in Ragan’s position would not consider Taylor’s harassment to have been sufficiently severe or pervasive to be illegal. In support, the Bank asserts that “the conduct Ragan alleges is the quintessential intersexual flirtation that the Eleventh Circuit cautions against mistaking for a Title VII claim.” (Dfts. Brief at 21) (internal quotation marks omitted). The undersigned again disagrees.

First and foremost, the Bank glaringly ignores almost all of Ragan’s testimony as it relates to Taylor’s response to her revelation that she allegedly