Collier v. Buckner (303 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 2018)

W. Keith Watkins, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Tonya Collier, Donald Lee Alexander, Ginger Lowrey, R.L.P., Brian Burroughs, and Marlo Saunders allege that Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR") officials deprived them of procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and committed several state law torts. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of DHR placing their names on a Central Registry that catalogues the outcome of child abuse allegations, disclosing information from the Central Registry to third parties, and failing to provide Plaintiffs with due process hearings to challenge the information on the Central Registry. Before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. # 31), which is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

II. INDEX

This Memorandum Opinion is necessarily lengthy for three reasons: less than stellar pleading, less than stellar briefing by all parties on the motion to dismiss, and unduly complicated applicable law. The last reason is likely a partial cause of the first two.

The claims of the six Plaintiffs share some legal and factual issues and concern some of the same Defendants. However, not all Plaintiffs assert claims that arise out of the same transactions and occurrences, and, in many instances, not all Plaintiffs' claims are subject to the same legal standards. Not all of the seven Defendants are implicated in every claim of every Plaintiff. Some defenses apply to multiple counts in the amended complaint; some counts in the amended complaint are the target of multiple defenses; and some defenses are pertinent to only some Defendants.

To avoid the impossible exponential burden of considering each defense in the context of each relevant claim by each relevant Plaintiff against each relevant Defendant, the court limited its analysis by first determining which claims survive the most broadly applicable defenses, then considering more narrowly applicable defenses only with respect to claims that survived the broader analysis. Further, the court considered only defenses to claims that had not already been eliminated at an earlier point in the analysis. As a result, many of Defendants' numerous defenses are not discussed in this Memorandum Opinion because they pertain to claims that are due to be dismissed on other grounds.

To aid the reader, the following index is provided:

I. INTRODUCTION...1238

II. INDEX...1239

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE...1240

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW...1240

A. Rules 8(a) and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...1240

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim...1241

V. LEGAL CONTEXT...1241

III. FACTS...1244

A. Plaintiff Tonya Collier, a Teacher and Day Care Worker...1244

B. Plaintiffs Donald Lee Alexander, Ginger Lowrey, and R.L.P.: Non-educator Plaintiffs With "Indicated" Dispositions...1245

1. Plaintiff Alexander's "Indicated" Disposition ...1246

2. Plaintiff Lowrey's "Indicated" Disposition ...1246

3. Plaintiff R.L.P.'s "Indicated" Disposition ...1247

C. Plaintiffs Alexander, Brian Burroughs, and Marlo Saunders: Non-educator Plaintiffs With "Not Indicated" Dispositions...1247

IV. DISCUSSION...1248

A. The Amended Complaint...1248

B. Jurisdictional Considerations: Mootness, Standing, and Ripeness...1249

1. Mootness: Plaintiff Collier ...1249

2. Jurisdictional Issues Concerning Claims Arising From "Indicated" Dispositions of Non-educator Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P. ...1249

i. Claims for Monetary Damages Connected with "Indicated" Dispositions of Non-educator Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P. ...1249

ii. Claims for Prospective Relief of Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey Against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar With Respect to "Indicated" Dispositions ...1250

iii. Claims for Prospective Relief Against Defendants Buckner and Mashego with Respect to "Indicated" Dispositions of Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P.-Constitutional (Article III) Standing ...1251

iv. Claims for Prospective Relief Against Defendants Buckner and Mashego with Respect to "Indicated" Dispositions of Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P.-Prudential Standing ...1255

3. Standing as to Plaintiffs with "Not Indicated" Statuses: Plaintiffs Alexander, Burroughs, and Saunders ...1257

C. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel: Plaintiff Lowrey's Remaining Claims...1257

D. Statute of Limitations: Plaintiff Collier's Claims for Monetary Relief and Plaintiff R.L.P.'s Claim for Prospective Relief...1259

1. Plaintiff Collier's Claims for Monetary Relief ...1259

2. Plaintiff R.L.P. ...1260

E. Count I...1261

F. Count II...1262

G. Count III...1263

1. Policy of Refusal to Schedule Hearings Upon Request; Policy Resulting in Failure to Forward Hearing Requests to the Office of Administrative Hearings ...1263

a. Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. ...1263

i. What Process is Due ...1263

ii. Whether Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. Allege Injury to a Constitutionally Protected Interest ...1265

b. Plaintiff Collier ...1267

i. What Process is Due ...1267

ii. Supervisor Liability of Defendants Buckner and Mashego ...1268

2. Policy of Informing Those Requesting Hearings that They Are Only Entitled to a Record Review; Policy of Failing to Provide Information Regarding Methods For Challenging DHR Findings ...1269

3. Introduction of Evidence of Dispositions in Juvenile and Family Courts ...1270

4. Failure to Establish Adequate Expungement Procedures ...1270

5. Failure to Provide Adequate Training and Supervision in Investigation and Initial Dispositions of Child Abuse Reports ...1270

6. Failure of DHR Social Workers to Forward Hearing Requests ...1271

H. Count IV...1271

I. Qualified Immunity and Plaintiff Collier's § 1983 Claims for Monetary Relief...1272

J. Count V-State Law Negligence and Wantonness Claims...1274

K. Count VI...1277

L. Count VII...1277

M. Counts VIII and IX...1279

N. Count X...1279

V. CONCLUSION...1280

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Personal jurisdiction and venue are not contested.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rules 8(a) and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

"[T]he district court's inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits ... in some circumstances includes the power to dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 10(b)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office , 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). In exercising that discretion, the court is mindful of the overarching principle that "[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).

Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 10(b) requires the following:

A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence-and each defense other than a denial-must be stated in a separate count or defense.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

Rules 8(a) and 10(b) are not intended to serve as a difficult hurdle requiring pleading perfection. Instead, they impose a minimum, common sense drafting requirement. A complaint must simply be sufficiently

"discrete[ ] and succinct[ ] so that [the defendant] can discern what [the plaintiff] is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the court can determine that evidence which is relevant and that which is not."

Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1320 (quoting T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. , 760 F.2d 1520, 1544 n.14 (11th Cir. 1985) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc. , 693 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2012). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "[F]acial plausibility" exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

V. LEGAL CONTEXT

With certain exceptions not applicable in this case, DHR is the state agency in Alabama responsible for investigation of all reports of suspected child abuse and neglect. Ala. Code § 26-14-6.1. Pursuant to its statutory authority, DHR has propounded regulations and established procedures for investigation and disposition of child abuse reports and for review, recording, and disclosure of the outcome of child abuse investigations. Ala. Code § 26-14-12 ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-34-.01, et seq.

"Once a report of suspected child abuse/neglect has been received, it must be investigated." Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.04(3). Upon receipt of a report of child abuse or neglect, the state or county DHR promptly begins an investigation, which includes research into previous reports, home visits, interviews with the child and custodial parents, and so forth. Ala. Code 1975 § 26-14-7 ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-05. DHR also evaluates the safety of the alleged victim and other children living in the home and determines whether a safety plan is needed or whether, in extreme circumstances, the child or children should be removed from the home prior to completion of the investigation. Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.06.

After completing the investigation, the investigating DHR social worker reaches a disposition as to whether the child experienced abuse or neglect and the identity of the person responsible for the abuse or neglect. Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.06. The worker assigns one of the following dispositions to the report of abuse and to the person alleged to be responsible for the abuse: (1) "Indicated," which means that "a preponderance of the credible evidence ... and the professional judgment of the worker indicate that abuse/neglect has occurred;" (2) "Unable to Complete;" or (3) "Not Indicated," which means that "a preponderance of the credible evidence and professional judgment does not substantiate that abuse/neglect has occurred." Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.07 ; see also Ala. Code 1975 § 26-14-8 (defining "indicated" and "not indicated").

The county DHR submits a complete written report of the investigation and disposition to DHR's statewide Central Registry for reports of child abuse and neglect. Ala. Code 1975 § 26-14-7(d) ; Ala. Code 1975 § 26-14-8 ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.09. Cases in which child abuse or neglect has been determined to be "not indicated" are listed on the Central Registry without further ado. Ala. Code 1975 § 26-14-7.1 ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.09. A "not indicated" disposition "shall not be used or disclosed for purposes of employment or other background checks." Ala. Code § 26-14-8(c)(1).

All persons who have been assigned an "indicated" disposition are given an opportunity to disagree with DHR's findings "through either a CA/N hearing or an administrative record review." Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(1), (4). Some individuals qualify for a CA/N hearing based on the nature of their employment; the rest qualify only for administrative record review. Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(4). The accused is afforded ten DHR working days from receipt of the notice to submit a written request for either a CA/N hearing or an administrative record review, whichever of the two is available to that person. Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(4). If DHR receives no written request for review by the end of the ten-day period, the accused is considered to have waived review, and the "indicated" disposition is entered on the Central Registry. Id. Once an "indicated" disposition is entered on the Central Registry, it is confidential, but it may be released under certain circumstances to employers, prospective employers, licensing and certifying agencies, etc. Ala. Code 1975 § 26-14-8 ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(4) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.09.

Only certain persons-for example, those certified to care for children, such as teachers and educators, and those employed by certified child care facilities, such as day care workers-are entitled to a CA/N hearing. A CA/N hearing is "an internal investigatory hearing that is fact finding in nature and designed to elicit the facts in an atmosphere that allows the person responsible for the abuse/neglect to contest the evidence presented against him [or her]." Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(6) ; see also Ala. Code 1975 § 26-14-7.1 (providing due process rights for certain persons (such as educators) who have come under DHR investigation for child abuse or neglect). DHR bears the burden of persuasion at the CA/N hearing. Ala. Code 1975 § 26-14-7.1 ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(6). At a CA/N hearing, the accused has the following rights:

a. The right to present his case himself or be represented by legal counsel or any other person.

b. The right to present written evidence, oral testimony, and witnesses.

c. The right to be provided by the department a short and plain written statement of the matters asserted which will be presented at the hearing.

d. The right to review and copy at cost any written or recorded statement made by the alleged perpetrator to departmental personnel in the course of the child abuse/neglect investigation. This request must be made prior to the date for the hearing.

e. The right to review and copy at cost, before or during the hearing, the written material and other evidence in possession of the department which will be placed into evidence at the hearing.

f. The right to inspect any exculpatory evidence which may be in the possession of departmental investigators, and the right to be informed of such evidence if known by departmental investigators before the hearing; provided, that a request for such evidence is made at least five working days prior to the date set for the hearing.

g. The right to review and copy at cost all non-confidential department documents pertinent to the case, including written policies and rights.

h. The right to cross-examine witnesses testifying at the hearing.

i. The right to request issuance of subpoenas to witnesses and compel attendance. This request must be received no later than ten calendar days prior to the hearing, unless a shorter time is agreed upon by the hearing officer.

j. The right to review and copy at cost all documents in the official hearing file maintained by the hearing officer.

k. The right to have a hearing officer appointed who shall be disinterested, fair, and impartial.

Ala. Code 1975 § 26-14-7.1.

For the majority of Alabama citizens (everyone who is not a teacher, day care worker, or other person who falls within the narrow qualifications for entitlement to a CA/N hearing), only an administrative record review is available to challenge an "indicated" disposition. Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(3)-(4). Unlike a CA/N hearing, which is "fact finding in nature" and allows the accused to directly challenge the "indicated" disposition using evidence outside the administrative record, an administrative record review is limited to consideration of whether the DHR's own administrative record "contains sufficient documentation based on a preponderance of credible evidence to support the 'indicated' disposition of child abuse/neglect." Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(3). Although the reviewer may consider prior abuse/neglect reports, the court has not found, and the parties have not cited, any specific law, regulation, or policy that would, during a record review, allow the accused to be presented with the evidence against him or her, or to contest the "indicated" listing by presenting his or her own evidence or argument. "Administrative record reviews are conducted by [DHR] staff who are not involved with the case." Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(7). "The [administrative record] reviewers have the authority to overturn the dispositional finding of the worker and supervisor, and their decision is final. " Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(7) (emphasis added).

After the conclusion of the CA/N hearing or administrative record review, there are no further procedures available for challenging the merits of an "indicated" disposition. Limited procedures are available, however, for expungement from the Central Registry of "not indicated" and (in narrower circumstances) "indicated" listings. Ala. Code § 26-14-8(e) (providing for expungement of "not indicated" listings upon request if, after five years after placing the listing on the Central Registry, DHR has received no further reports of child abuse or neglect); Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.09(5)(i)-(j) (procedures for expungement of "indicated" and "not indicated" listings); see also Ala. Code § 26-14-3(e) ("[I]f any agency or authority investigates any report pursuant to this section [pertaining to reports by mandatory reporters] and the report does not result in a conviction, the agency or authority shall expunge any record of the information or report and any data developed from the record."); Slaton v. State , 71 So.3d 659, 661 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (holding that § 26-14-3(e) applied to the investigatory record of DHR because DHR was "the agency or authority that investigated an allegation" of child sex abuse).

III. FACTS

A. Plaintiff Tonya Collier, a Teacher and Day Care Worker

Plaintiff Tonya Collier is a former educator who resides in Shelby County, Alabama. Plaintiff Collier alleges that DHR officials and social workers wrongfully deprived her of procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and committed several state law torts in conjunction with disclosing an "indicated" disposition from DHR's Central Registry without affording her a due process hearing. Because of the nature of Plaintiff Collier's employment at the time DHR assigned an "indicated" disposition to her case, she is the only Plaintiff who, under existing Alabama law and DHR rules and regulations, was entitled to a CA/N investigative administrative hearing to challenge the "indicated" disposition before DHR disclosed the "indicated" disposition to her employers.

By letter dated April 17, 2012, DHR notified Plaintiff Collier that a report of child abuse had been lodged against her and that, upon investigation, DHR had concluded that the facts indicated child abuse had occurred. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 1, 21.) Defendants Corrine Matt and Leslie Henderson were the Shelby County DHR workers who made the "indicated" determination. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 3.)

On April 24, 2012, in response to DHR's letter, Plaintiff Collier notified Defendants Matt and Henderson of her status as a school teacher and requested a hearing to review the "indicated" disposition. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 2; Doc. # 33-1 at 10.) Plaintiff Collier's hearing request was ignored or denied. (Doc. # 28 ¶¶ 16-17.) On November 29, 2012, DHR notified Plaintiff Collier that an administrative record review had resulted in an affirmance of the "indicated" disposition and that the "indicated" status would be placed on the Central Registry. (Doc. # 33-1 at 10; Doc. # 31-4 at 1.)

"At the time the 'indicated' disposition was made by Defendants Matt and Henderson," i.e. , sometime in 2012, Plaintiff Collier was terminated from her teaching position after the "indicated" disposition was disclosed to her employer. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Collier subsequently obtained employment at a day care center, but, in October 2014, she was terminated from that position after DHR notified the day care of the "indicated" disposition and warned that the day care's license to operate was in jeopardy because of it. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 3.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff Collier retained an attorney, who secured her an administrative hearing approximately one month after she filed this action. (Doc. # 33-1 (May 12, 2015 letter from the Administrative Hearings Office notifying Plaintiff Collier that she would be given a hearing).) At the conclusion of the hearing, the administrative law judge reversed the "indicated" finding and concluded that child abuse was "not indicated." (Doc. # 28 ¶ 4.)

B. Plaintiffs Donald Lee Alexander, Ginger Lowrey, and R.L.P.: Non-educator Plaintiffs With "Indicated" Dispositions

Plaintiffs Donald Lee Alexander, Ginger Lowrey, and R.L.P. allege that DHR officials deprived them of procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and committed several state law torts in conjunction with placing a final "indicated" disposition on DHR's Central Registry of "indicated" child abusers without affording them a due process hearing. Unlike Plaintiff Collier, Plaintiffs Alexander (who was the subject of both an "indicated" and a "not indicated" listing), Lowrey, and R.L.P. were not employed as teachers or in other jobs that qualified them for an administrative CA/N hearing. Instead, under Alabama law and DHR regulations and policies, they qualified only for an administrative record review to challenge their "indicated" dispositions. Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(3)-(4), (7).

1. Plaintiff Alexander's "Indicated" Disposition

Plaintiff Alexander, a Shelby County, Alabama resident and the father of two minor children, was the subject of a DHR investigation in which DHR's investigators found that child abuse was "indicated." (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 5, 28.) Plaintiff Alexander was never notified of any right to a hearing to dispute the report or the "indicated" disposition by introducing evidence or argument. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 5.) However, the April 2, 2014 DHR letter notifying Plaintiff Alexander of the "indicated" disposition stated: "You have the right to an administrative record review." (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 29-30.) The letter was signed by Sara Haag, a Shelby County DHR social worker, and ratified by Defendant Kim Mashego, Director of Shelby County DHR. (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 30.)

In response to DHR's letter, Plaintiff Alexander submitted to DHR a written notice that he "denied and disputed the report, the allegations, and the 'indicated['] disposition" and that he wanted to proceed to a hearing to contest the "indicated" disposition. (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 31.) He submitted his request for a hearing to Defendant Haag, who did not forward the request to DHR's Office of Administrative Hearings. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 18.) No hearing was scheduled. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 18.) Alexander's name continues to be listed on the Central Registry as the subject of a DHR investigation in which child abuse was "indicated." (Doc. # 28 at 31.) Because of the "indicated" disposition, Alexander is unable to pursue normal activities available to other parents, such as volunteering and being involved in his children's educational and extracurricular activities. (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 35.)

2. Plaintiff Lowrey's "Indicated" Disposition

Plaintiff Ginger Lowrey, the mother of two minor children, resides in Jefferson County, Alabama. She was the subject of a DHR investigation of child abuse that led to a finding that child abuse was "indicated." (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff Lowrey was never notified of her right to a hearing to challenge DHR's findings by introducing evidence or argument. (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 19.) However, the September 7, 2007 DHR letter notifying Plaintiff Lowrey of the "indicated" disposition stated: "You have the right to an administrative record review." (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 42.) The letter was signed by Defendant Katie Walter, a Jefferson County DHR social worker, and Defendant Toni Dollar, a Jefferson County DHR supervisor. (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 42.)

Plaintiff Lowrey notified DHR that she denied and disputed the child abuse allegations and the "indicated" disposition and submitted a written request for a hearing.

(Doc. # 28 at ¶ 44.) The hearing request was not forwarded to DHR's Office of Administrative Hearings. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 45.) No hearing was scheduled, and Plaintiff Lowrey remains on the Central Registry as the subject of a DHR investigation in which child abuse was "indicated." Plaintiff Lowrey wishes to be active in the lives of her children, but, unlike other parents, she is prohibited from volunteering in their school and other activities because of the "indicated" disposition. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 47, 50.)

3. Plaintiff R.L.P.'s "Indicated" Disposition

Plaintiff R.L.P., a minor resident of Shelby County, Alabama, was the subject of a child abuse investigation that led to a finding of "indicated" child abuse. (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff R.L.P. was never notified of any right to dispute the report or the "indicated" disposition by introducing evidence or argument, or of the procedures by which he might pursue that challenge. (Doc. # 28 ¶ 10.) However, the June 1, 2012 DHR letter notifying Plaintiff R.L.P. of the "indicated" disposition stated: "You have the right to an administrative record review." (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 55, 57.)

The amended complaint does not state whether Plaintiff R.L.P. or his parents notified DHR that they wished to challenge the "indicated" disposition, or whether R.L.P. was afforded an administrative record review. However, in support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants submitted a letter dated April 16, 2013, informing R.L.P. that DHR had "completed [its] administrative record review" on R.L.P.'s case and had "determined that the County Department does have enough credible evidence to support a dispositional finding of 'indicated', i.e. true." (Doc. # 31-6 at 1.) In the letter, DHR notified that the report of child abuse involving R.L.P. would "be entered on the Department's Central Registry ... as an 'indicated' incident." (Doc. # 31-6 at 1.)

Plaintiff R.L.P. continues to be listed on the Central Registry as the subject of a DHR investigation in which child abuse was "indicated." Plaintiff R.L.P. wishes to one day have children, but, if he does, disclosure of the "indicated" status likely will prohibit him from volunteering and participating in his children's school and extracurricular activities the way other parents do. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 60-61.) In addition, Plaintiff R.L.P. is concerned that disclosure will hinder his ability to obtain employment and engage in an occupation. (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 61.)

C. Plaintiffs Alexander, Brian Burroughs, and Marlo Saunders: Non-educator Plaintiffs With "Not Indicated" Dispositions

Plaintiffs Alexander, Brian Burroughs, and Marlo Saunders are each listed on the statewide Central Registry as the subject of child abuse investigation that led to a "not indicated" disposition. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 7, 12, 13.) Alabama law and DHR regulations and policies do not include any provisions for hearings or record reviews to challenge a "not indicated" disposition before the disposition is included on the Central Registry. Alabama law and DHR regulations do provide, however, for expungement of "not indicated" listings upon request if, after five years after placing the listing on the Central Registry, DHR has received no further reports of child abuse or neglect. Ala. Code § 26-14-8(e) ; Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.09(5)(i)-(j).

A "not indicated" disposition "shall not be used or disclosed for purposes of employment or other background checks." Ala. Code § 26-14-8(c)(1). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs Alexander, Burroughs, and Saunders are concerned that their "not indicated" dispositions and the underlying allegations of child abuse might one day be disclosed, thus subjecting them to scorn and public humiliation and hindering their ability to pursue "goals and activities that are available to the citizens of the State of Alabama." (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 7, 12, 13.) They allege that there is no constitutionally adequate process by which they can seek removal of the "not indicated" status from the Central Registry. They do not allege, however, any facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that they ever unsuccessfully requested expungement of their "not indicated" dispositions under existing Alabama law and regulations. Apart from conclusory legal statements, they also do not allege facts supporting an inference that the existing expungement procedures are constitutionally deficient.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs previously were granted an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure problems of shotgun pleading. (Doc. # 27.) In the order to amend, they were given detailed instructions on how to file a proper complaint. (Doc. # 27.) Plaintiffs were expressly warned that "[c]laims and demands for relief that fail to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the requirements of [the order to amend] may be subject to dismissal without further opportunities for amendment." (Doc. # 27 at 11.) Claims over which the court has jurisdiction that fail to comply sufficiently with the order to amend to meet the basic notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) will be dismissed with prejudice and without further opportunity to amend, as no grounds exist for finding that further opportunities for amendment would be fruitful. See Zocaras v. Castro , 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that "a court ... has the inherent ability to dismiss a claim in light of its authority to enforce its orders and provide for the efficient disposition of litigation"); Etkin & Co., v. SBD, LLC , No. 11-21321-CIV, 2015 WL 11714357, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2015) (dismissing amended claims with prejudice for failure to comply with the basic requirements of notice pleading and failure to comply with prior orders regarding noncompliant complaints).

B. Jurisdictional Considerations: Mootness, Standing, and Ripeness

1. Mootness: Plaintiff Collier

After initially being denied a hearing, and after twice losing her employment as a result of DHR's two disclosures of her "indicated" status, Plaintiff Collier was provided a hearing in which she successfully challenged her "indicated" status, which was then changed to a "not indicated" status on the Central Registry. (Doc. # 28 at 4.) Plaintiff Collier seeks damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, based on the denial of a hearing to challenge the "indicated" disposition.

Because Plaintiff Collier is no longer under threat of future injury from the "indicated" status, her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief (but not her claims for damages incurred as a result of termination of her employment) are due to be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that her claims for prospective relief are moot. Adler v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd. , 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Equitable relief is a prospective remedy, intended to prevent future injuries. In contrast, a claim for money damages looks back in time and is intended to redress a past injury.... When the threat of future harm dissipates, the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief become moot because the plaintiff no longer needs protection from future injury."); Cotterall v. Paul , 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that claims for injunctive relief were moot on grounds that "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a pending case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury"); see also Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater , 777 F.2d 598, 604 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that the jurisdictional limits of Article III of the Constitution exclude cases that are moot).

Plaintiff Collier's claims for monetary damages for loss of employment, however, arise out Defendants' past conduct in disclosing her "indicated" statuses to two of her employers. Therefore, Plaintiff Collier's claims for monetary damages are not moot. Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P. , 814 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding, even though Defendants had already agreed to allow Plaintiffs to remain in their apartment, claims for compensatory damages arising out of a discriminatory eviction notice were not moot because compensatory damages arose out of Defendants' past conduct, not out of a threat of future harmful conduct).

2. Jurisdictional Issues Concerning Claims Arising From "Indicated" Dispositions of Non-educator Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P.

i. Claims for Monetary Damages Connected with "Indicated" Dispositions of Non-educator Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P.

Standing, like the related concepts of mootness and ripeness, is a concept of justiciability that consists of constitutional (jurisdictional) elements and prudential elements. To establish standing in the context of Article III, a plaintiff must allege an (1) "injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the challenged act; and (3) that it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative" that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P. seek monetary damages from Defendants Buckner, Mashego, Haag, Walter, and Dollar in their individual capacities on grounds that those Defendants are in various ways responsible for the denial of a hearing to challenge their "indicated" statuses. Unlike Plaintiff Collier, who lost two jobs in conjunction with disclosure of her "indicated" status, Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P. do not allege that they have already suffered any compensable injury from the fact that their names are listed on the Central Registry or from the disclosure of their "indicated" dispositions to third parties.

Accordingly, all claims of Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P. for monetary damages against Defendants Buckner, Mashego, Haag, Walter, and Dollar in their individual capacities in conjunction with "indicated" dispositions are due to be dismissed for lack of standing. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (holding that, to establish standing, plaintiffs must show they have "suffered an 'injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical").

ii. Claims for Prospective Relief of Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey Against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar With Respect to "Indicated" Dispositions

Because prospective relief regulates future conduct, a party establishes an "injury in fact" for standing purposes "if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and immediate-as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical-threat of future injury." Church v. City of Huntsville , 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) ; see also Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp. , 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[T]o meet the Article III standing requirement when a plaintiff is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.").

All Plaintiffs generally assert claims for injunctive relief against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar. However, Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar are not accused of wrongdoing with respect to any Plaintiffs other than Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey. Specifically, Plaintiff Alexander asserts claims against Defendant Haag for failing to notify him of his right to a hearing and failing to forward his hearing request to DHR's Office of Administrative Hearings, and Plaintiff Lowrey asserts claims against Defendants Walter and Dollar for failing to notify her of her right to a hearing and failing to transmit her hearing request to DHR's Office of Administrative Hearings. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 30-32, 43-48.)

As the amended complaint makes clear, Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey are already aware of their due process rights. Further, DHR is already aware of the demands of Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey for due process hearings to challenge their "indicated" statuses. Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar are not alleged to have supervisory or policymaking authority that would make them amenable to an order for prospective relief requiring DHR to provide hearings or amend its policies and procedures to comply with due process requirements for "indicated" dispositions of non-educators like Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey. Therefore, the amended complaint contains no facts that would support a request for prospective relief against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar because there is no reason to conclude that Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey personally would obtain meaningful relief from an order requiring those Defendants to notify them of their due process rights or forward the hearing requests to the Office of Administrative Hearings. Put another way, the amended complaint contains no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey are at risk of any future injury from the past conduct of Defendants Haag, Walter, or Dollar. Accordingly, the claims of Plaintiffs Alexander and Lowrey against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar for prospective relief from their indicated statuses are due to be dismissed for lack of standing.

Further, because all claims for prospective relief against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar are subject to dismissal for lack of standing, and because (as explained in Section IV.B.2.i.) all claims for monetary relief against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar are also due to be dismissed for lack of standing, all claims against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar, are subject to dismissal, and those Defendants are due to be dismissed from this action.

iii. Claims for Prospective Relief Against Defendants Buckner and Mashego with Respect to "Indicated" Dispositions of Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P.-Constitutional (Article III) Standing

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Alexander, Lowrey, and R.L.P. lack standing to seek prospective relief. At this point in the analysis, a few observations are necessary to explain the narrowing of the court's consideration of that argument solely to the claims of Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. against Defendants Buckner and Mashego for prospective relief from "indicated" statuses. First, as explained Section IV.B.2.iv., all claims for prospective relief against Defendants Haag, Walter, and Dollar are due to be dismissed for lack of standing. Second, Defendants Matt and Henderson are alleged to have engaged in conduct that only affected Plaintiff Collier, and, as explained in Section IV.B.1., Plaintiff Collier's claims for prospective relief against all Defendants are moot. Third, as will be explained in Section IV.C., Plaintiff Lowrey's claims against Defendant Buckner for prospective relief are due to be dismissed on grounds of res judicata. Fourth, Plaintiff Lowrey, who is a Jefferson County resident and was subject to a Jefferson County DHR investigation, has alleged no facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that she has any claim for prospective relief against Defendant Mashego in her official capacity as the Director of the Shelby County DHR. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 8, 15.) Thus, Plaintiff Lowrey's claims for prospective relief against Defendant Mashego are due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Therefore, of the claims for prospective relief from "indicated" dispositions, only the claims of Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. against Defendants Buckner and Mashego warrant further discussion. Unlike Defendants Matt, Henderson, Haag, Walter, and Dollar, Defendant Buckner (in her official capacity as Commissioner of Alabama DHR) and Defendant Mashego (in her official capacity as the Director of Shelby County DHR) are alleged to have policymaking authority regarding the handling of challenges to "indicated" dispositions of non-educators, including Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. Further, Defendants Buckner and Mashego are alleged to be the DHR authorities whose official acts and omissions prevented, and continue to prevent, Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. from challenging their "indicated" dispositions in accordance with constitutional due process requirements. Finally, any prospective relief against Alabama and Shelby County DHR would be appropriately entered against Defendants Buckner and Mashego in their respective official capacities as Directors of Alabama DHR and Shelby County DHR. See Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (holding that official-capacity suits " 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent' ") (quoting Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. lack standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge their "indicated" dispositions because those two Plaintiffs face no real threat of future injury. (Doc. # 31 at 18-20.) In support of this argument, Defendants cite City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 108, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who had been the subject of a police chokehold during an arrest had no standing to maintain claims for equitable relief against the police chokehold policy because nothing more than pure speculation would support any assertion that the plaintiff would again be arrested and placed in a chokehold.

Unlike the Plaintiff in Lyons , Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. have asserted facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that they face a real, concrete threat of future injury, regardless of whether they will one day be the subject of another DHR investigation. Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. are the subjects of "indicated" dispositions that are currently on the Central Registry. Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. contend that, as a result of actions taken under color of state law and tortious conduct by Defendants Buckner and Mashego in their official capacities, they have been and continue to be deprived of an adequate due process hearing to challenge those "indicated" dispositions. Aside from the administrative record review process, there are no procedures under Alabama law by which a non-educator like Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. could challenge the validity of an "indicated" disposition. Except for the opportunity for an administrative record review, which has already passed and which Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. contend is constitutionally insufficient, it is already a legal certainty that Alabama law and DHR regulations and policies afford Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. no opportunity to challenge the validity of their "indicated" statuses.

Further, Plaintiffs R.L.P. and Alexander allege that their "indicated" statuses, which are already listed on the Central Registry and which they have not been and never will be afforded due process to challenge, will likely be released to prospective employers or to their children's schools and other organizations conducting extracurricular children's activities at which they wish to volunteer. Ala. Admin. Code r. 660-5-34-.08(4) (providing that, once an "indicated" disposition is placed on the Central Registry, it may be released to third parties as allowed by law). However, Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. do not merely allege that they face potential reputational damage as a result of the likely publication of their "indicated" dispositions. See Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach , 250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that defamation by the government, without concomitant injury to some other legally protected interest, is not sufficient to "invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause"). Rather, Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. contend that, because of the potential for disclosure of their "indicated" dispositions (which they have not been and will not be afforded due process to challenge), they are or imminently will be deprived opportunities to engage in activities and pursuits available to other citizens, such as employment, volunteering, and being involved in their children's educational and extracurricular activities. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 35, 60-61.) Therefore, Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. seek prospective relief to prevent future injury to their constitutionally protected liberty interests, which include

not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of [one's] own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).

Plaintiff R.L.P. is a minor who has no children. (Doc. # 28 at ¶¶ 60-61.) Despite Plaintiff R.L.P.'s alleged present desire to have children at some unknown date in the future, it remains to be seen whether he will one day become a father. The possibility that disclosure of R.L.P.'s "indicated" status will prevent him from volunteering in his as-yet-unborn children's activities is too remote to satisfy the requirements of Article III. See Texas v. United States , 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (holding that "a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

However, even as a minor and young adult, R.L.P. is at the time of life when citizens ordinarily are faced with decisions directed at choosing a career, such as course selection in school, or deciding on, preparing for, and pursuing a trade or a path to college or the military. Options available to other young people, such as the potential for a teaching or military career, will likely be limited as to R.L.P. if and when his "indicated" status is disclosed.

The uncertainty caused by requiring R.L.P. to wait to resolve his challenge to his "indicated" status will harm him by burdening his choices at a time of life when he would otherwise be most able to set himself on the path to his chosen career. Unlike other young people, R.L.P. must either (1) forgo careers that are closed to persons with "indicated" child abuse listings on the Central Registry, or (2) invest substantially in preparing for a career in such a field on the chance that, after he one day applies for and is denied employment in that field, he then will be able to successfully challenge the lack of due process afforded by the administrative record review that ended in a "final" decision in April 2013.

Therefore, even before R.L.P's "indicated" status may be disclosed to potential employers, potential disclosure of his "indicated" disposition is substantially likely to burden his ability "to contract [and] to engage in any of the common occupations of life." Meyer , 262 U.S. at 399, 43 S.Ct. 625. R.L.P. faces a real, immediate, concrete threat of injury, that injury is fairly traceable to Defendants' failure to provide him with sufficient due process to contest his "indicated" status, and declaratory and injunctive relief are capable of preventing the injury. Adler , 112 F.3d at 1477 (holding that the purpose of injunctive and declaratory relief is to avert future harm).

Besides, delaying the availability of an action for prospective relief until the eventual date of rejection from employment is essentially useless to a teenager. As time passes, memories morph and fade, evidence is lost, witnesses move on, and R.L.P.'s designation as a child abuser will gradually ossify into an immutable monument to his own constitutional abuse at the hand of the State. By the time R.L.P. is one day rejected for employment, his remedy will be stone cold and dead.

Plaintiff Alexander, who is currently a parent, alleges that the threat of disclosure of his "indicated" disposition, which is already on the Central Registry, currently interferes with his ability to volunteer and participate in his children's school and extracurricular activities. See Thomas v. Buckner , No. 2:11-CV-245-WKW, 2012 WL 3978671, at *5-8 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 11, 2012) (noting that, in today's society, it is common practice for schools and organizations catering to children to require background checks (even if not statutorily required) on adult volunteers, including parents). Accordingly, with respect to claims for prospective relief from his "indicated" status, Plaintiff Alexander has shown that he faces a real, immediate, concrete threat of injury, that the threatened injury is fairly traceable to Defendants' failure to provide him with a sufficient opportunity to contest his "indicated" status, and that declaratory and injunctive relief are capable of relieving the injury.

Therefore, Plaintiffs R.L.P. and Alexander have constitutional standing to seek prospective relief from the denial of a hearing to challenge their "indicated" statuses, and, from an Article III standpoint, those claims are ripe for review.

iv. Claims for Prospective Relief Against Defendants Buckner and Mashego with Respect to "Indicated" Dispositions of Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P.-Prudential Standing

The claims of Plaintiffs R.L.P. and Alexander for prospective relief against Defendants Buckner and Mashego meet the prudential requirements of standing. In seeking relief from the denial of a hearing to challenge their own "indicated" statuses, Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. are seeking relief from injuries that are particular to them and that affect their own personal liberty interests. See Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (noting prudential aspects of standing include requirements that the asserted harm must not be a mere "generalized grievance" shared equally by a large number of people, and that the plaintiff must assert his or her own legal rights).

This is not a class action. Therefore, particularly as to requests for injunctive or declaratory relief involving DHR's handling of "indicated" dispositions of non-educators who are not parties to this lawsuit, determining the scope of prospective relief available to Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. may at some point require consideration of the prudential doctrine that "a party may not ordinarily claim standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party." Thomas v. Buckner , No. 2:11-CV-245-WKW, 2011 WL 4071948, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 2011) (quoting Touchston v. McDermott , 234 F.3d 1133, 1151 n. 50 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)). However, for two reasons, the court will not at this time decide the extent, if any, to which that prudential doctrine limits the scope of prospective relief available to Plaintiff Alexander and R.L.P. First, the rule against a plaintiff who has constitutional standing vindicating the rights of third parties "is a prudential, rather than jurisdictional, rule of practice." Id. Second, regardless of the viability of requests for prospective relief regarding DHR's handling of "indicated" dispositions of other non-educators who are not parties to this lawsuit, it is sufficient for purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss to note that, with respect to every cause of action on which they seek prospective relief, Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. do seek at least some prospective relief to vindicate their own rights. Therefore, there are no counts in the amended complaint that are due to be dismissed for failure of Plaintiff Alexander or R.L.P. to seek prospective relief on their own behalf.

In addition to concerns about the vindication of rights of persons not parties to the lawsuit, the prudential aspects of ripeness also require consideration of the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial review. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus , --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2347, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) ; Harrell v. The Florida Bar , 608 F.3d 1241, 1258 (11th Cir. 2010) ; Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation , 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997). At least some of the injury that would be averted by prospective relief-specifically, damage to protected liberty interests following disclosure of Plaintiffs' "indicated" statuses-has not yet occurred. However, the alleged wrongful conduct-denial of due process-has already occurred or is absolutely certain to occur, and there is no reason to suspect that future events would enhance, or even preserve, the court's ability to consider the legality of that past conduct. Accordingly, the alleged denial of due process is fit for consideration at this time.

Waiting to address prospective relief for Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P. until some future date when disclosure of their "indicated" statuses to third parties injures their employment or family interests poses risks (1) of hardship to Plaintiffs of burdens on or damage to their liberty interests in the interim; and (2) of hardship to all parties because, if prospective relief is warranted, evidence will grow stale with unnecessary passing of time, witness memories will fade, DHR personnel will shift, and review of the merits of the "indicated" statuses will become increasingly difficult. In addition, although not dispositive of the issue of prudential jurisprudence, the court notes that third parties-Plaintiff Alexander's family, alleged victims of child abuse by Plaintiffs Alexander and R.L.P., and (in the event of a meritorious "indicated" disposition) potential future victims-will benefit from the certainty of the earliest possible resolution of Plaintiffs' challenges to their "indicated" statuses.

Having weighed the fitness of the issues for adjudication and the relative harms of waiting until a future date to resolve the issues, the court concludes that Plaintiff Alexander's and Plaintiff R.L.P.'s due process challenges with respect to their "indicated" dispositions satisfy the requirements of prudential ripeness. Those claims " 'are sufficiently mature, and the issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court.' " Digital Props , 121 F.3d at 589 (quoting Cheffer v. Reno , 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) ); see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977) (holding that the purpose of the ripeness doctrine is "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements").

3. Standing as to Plaintiffs with "Not Indicated" Statuses: Plaintiffs Alexander, Burroughs, and Saunders

Plaintiffs Alexander, Burroughs, and Saunders bring federal and state law claims for monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief based on allegations that they are entitled to a hearing to contest their "not indicated" statuses. However, Plaintiffs Alexander, Burroughs, and Saunders have not alleged that they have suffered or are imminently in danger of suffering any injury as a result of DHR's conclusion that child abuse was "not indicated," the alleged lack of procedures to challenge or expunge the "not indicated" status, or the fact that their "not indicated" statuses are maintained on the Central Registry. They have not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that their "not indicated" statuses have or will be disclosed to any third party or that a hearing would result in any improvement to the "not indicated" status. Further, they have not alleged facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that they are entitled to a hearing to challenge the listing or disclosure of their "not indicated" statuses.

Accordingly, the claims of Plaintiffs Alexander, Burroughs, and Saunders for monetary, injunctive, or declaratory relief arising from the maintenance of their "not indicated" statuses on the Central Registry are due to be dismissed for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Friends of the Earth , 528 U.S. at 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693.

C. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel: Plaintiff Lowrey's Remaining Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Lowrey's claims challenging her "indicated" status are barred by collateral estoppel and/or res judicata. As noted in Section IV.B.2.i., Plaintiff Lowrey's claims for monetary relief are due to be dismissed for lack of standing. Plaintiff Lowrey seeks prospective relief only as to Defendants Buckner and Mashego in their official capacities. However, Plaintiff Lowrey, who was the subject of an "indicated" finding by Jefferson County DHR, (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 8) has alleged no facts indicating that her injuries could be addressed by prospective relief against Defendant Mashego, who is the Shelby County DHR Director. Therefore, Defendants' preclusion defenses to Plaintiff Lowrey's claims will be considered only with respect to her remaining claim for prospective relief against Defendant Buckner in her official capacity.

Defendants have submitted documents from a state court proceeding in which Plaintiff Lowrey challenged her "indicated" listing and sought to be removed from the Central Registry as an "indicated" child abuser. The state court complaint was filed on August 4, 2011, against Jefferson County DHR, Jefferson County DHR Director Amanda Rice, Alabama DHR, and Alabama DHR Commissioner Nancy Buckner, in her individual and official capacities. (Doc. # 31-1 at 1.) The state court case terminated with entry of summary judgment on the merits in favor of DHR on May 3, 2012. (Doc. # 31-2 at 1-2.) Lowrey did not appeal the judgment of the Jefferson County Circuit Court.

Alabama's law of res judicata determines whether the Alabama circuit court's judgment precludes Lowrey's federal and state law claims. Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc. , 758 F.2d 1486, 1509 (11th Cir. 1985). Under Alabama law, res judicata bars an action on a previously litigated claim when four requirements are met: (1) there must have been a prior judgment on the merits; (2) the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there must be substantial identity of the parties; and (4) both cases must involve the same causes of action. Kizzire v. Baptist Health System, Inc. , 441 F.3d 1306, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2006).

All four res judicata elements are met in this case. Lowrey's remaining claims in this action for declaratory and injunctive relief are directed solely to Defendant Nancy Buckner in her official capacity as Director of Alabama DHR. Nancy Buckner, along with Alabama DHR, was also a defendant in the state court action. Plaintiff Lowrey's complaint in the state court action, in which she received an adverse final judgment on the merits by a