Citations
- 307 F. Supp. 3d 171
Full opinion text
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
The parties to this interpleader all claim ownership over certain property purchased with funds that Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos allegedly misappropriated during Mr. Marcos's presidency of the Philippines (the "Interpleader Property"). The property at issue includes approximately $15 million in cash and seized funds from several bank accounts; Claude Monet's L'Église et La Seine à Vétheuil and Alfred Sisley's Langland Bay (and other paintings); and sundry personal items (including jewelry, carpets, pens, boxes, and a jade and wooden screen). The District Attorney for New York County ("District Attorney" or "DANY") seized the contested assets during its criminal investigation and prosecution of Vilma Bautista, a confidante and personal secretary of Imelda Marcos. The DANY, an innocent stakeholder with no claim of ownership to the Interpleader Property, transferred the property to this Court so that the rightful owner or owners could be determined. Among the claimants are: the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic"); a class of human rights victims led by Jose Duran, who are judgment creditors against Imelda Marcos ("Class Plaintiffs"); Vilma Bautista, who in addition to serving as Imelda Marcos's personal aide during the relevant time period also worked for the Philippine government from 1966 until 1986, including as a Foreign Service Officer for the Philippine Mission to the United Nations; and the Golden Budha Corporation along with the Estate of Roger Roxas (together, "Roxas").
Pending before the Court are seven motions, comprising five cross-motions for summary judgment, one motion to dismiss, and one motion for imposition of attorneys' retaining and charging liens. The motions are:
• Class Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment against the Republic (Dkt. # 193);
• Class Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against Roxas (Dkt. # 369);
• Bautista's motion for summary judgment against Class Plaintiffs and the Republic (Dkt. # 201);
• Bautista's motion for summary judgment against Roxas (Dkt. # 377);
• Roxas's motion for summary judgment against Class Plaintiffs and Bautista (Dkt. # 383);
• The Republic's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the case (Dkt. # 411); and
• Simon & Partners LLP's ("S&P's") motion to authorize imposition of attorneys' retaining and charging liens (Dkt. # 357).
The Court addresses each motion in turn. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies each motion except S&P's motion to authorize imposition of attorneys' liens.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
This interpleader action is the latest in what is now a long series of proceedings-spanning decades and pursued in numerous jurisdictions -in which claimants have sought ownership over assets that Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos allegedly misappropriated during Mr. Marcos's tenure as President of the Philippines. A full recitation of the history of the disputes between Mr. and Mrs. Marcos, on one side, and the claimants, on the other, would fill volumes. Rather than engage in such an exhaustive factual recitation, the Court instead focuses on the facts that pertain directly to the pending motions.
1. Ferdinand Marcos's Presidency, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government
Ferdinand Marcos served as President of the Philippines from 1965 until 1986. (Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶ 2). He was elected to two terms in office, in 1965 and 1969. Rather than leaving office at the end of his second term, as required under the Philippine Constitution, Mr. Marcos instead imposed martial law in September 1972. He "confiscated businesses[,] particularly those of his adversaries[,] and ordered mass arrest and detention which, in many instances, resulted in the torture of political opponents, critics, independent publishers[,] and journalists[.]" (Swift Decl., Ex. 15).
In February 1986, a popular uprising removed Mr. Marcos from office, and he and Mrs. Marcos fled to Hawaii. (Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶ 3). On February 25, 1986, Corazon Aquino was sworn in as the new President of the Philippines. (Id. at ¶ 4). Shortly after her inauguration, President Aquino enacted Executive Order No. 1, which, inter alia , created the Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). (Id. at ¶ 5). The PCGG was charged with recovering assets that Mr. Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, and their family had misappropriated during the Marcos presidency. To date, the PCGG has collected over 8 million pages of documents relating to Mr. and Mrs. Marcos's assets. (Id. at ¶ 22).
In 1986, the PCGG established an office in New York City to track down assets that Mr. and Mrs. Marcos had acquired. (Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶ 23). It identified artwork that had been removed from properties in New York City, including a townhouse at 13-15 East 66th Street, which was owned by the Republic but had been used as a residence by Mr. and Mrs. Marcos. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). Artwork had similarly been removed from an apartment in the Olympic Tower at 641 Fifth Avenue that Mr. and Mrs. Marcos had used as a private residence. (Id. at ¶ 9).
The PCGG inventoried the paintings that had been displayed at the New York properties. (Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶ 24). Using bills, invoices, and labels placed on the walls where the paintings had been hung, the PCGG created a list of specific works of art that had gone missing. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 28). The PCGG then took several steps to try to locate the missing artwork. It served subpoenas duces tecum on art galleries and auction houses in New York and elsewhere, including Marlborough Gallery. (Id. at ¶ 26). It launched a campaign, called "Where's the Art?", aimed at increasing public awareness of the PCGG's efforts to recover the artwork and ratcheting up the pressure on Mr. and Mrs. Marcos to return whatever artwork they possessed. On June 23, 1986, the PCGG issued a press release in which it "ask[ed] artists, school children, media specialists, the general public and the press to cheerfully join the campaign by writing to Mrs. Marcos on Where's the Art? postcards[.]" (Swift Decl., Ex. 13). That press release included a list of missing paintings; the list made specific reference to Monet's L'Église et La Seine à Vétheuil and Sisley's Langland Bay , but made no mention of Monet's Le Bassin aux Nymphéas . (Id. ).
2. Interpleader Property
The DANY seized most of the Interpleader Property from Bautista and from bank accounts holding funds in Bautista's or her sisters' names on July 18 and July 19, 2011. (Compl. ¶ 19). The seized property included: (i) 10 paintings, a Serafian Isfahan rug, and $251,142 in cash from Bautista's Manhattan residence; (ii) 114 items of jewelry and $2,386 in cash from the residence of Bautista's sisters; (iii) 42 paintings and a rug from Bautista's Long Island residence; and (iv) approximately $13,654,349.32 from bank accounts in Bautista's name and $1,270,000 from an account jointly controlled by Bautista and one of her sisters. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20). The DANY also froze six life insurance or annuity accounts in Bautista's name. (Id. at ¶ 20). And on July 28, 2011, Hoffinger, Stern & Ross LLP, Bautista's former attorneys, surrendered two additional paintings in connection with the criminal action. (Id. at ¶ 21).
a. The 1975 Acquisition of Monet's L'Église et La Seine à Vétheuil and Sisley's Langland Bay
On August 12, 1975, Marlborough Gallery in London sold six paintings on consignment-for a total of $450,000, of which $200,000 was paid at the time of sale-to Fe Gimenez, personal secretary and confidante of Imelda Marcos, on Mrs. Marcos's behalf. (Swift Decl., Ex. 2). The paintings included Monet's L'Église et La Seine à Vétheuil , which sold for $138,000, and Sisley's Langland Bay , which sold for $82,000. The Sales Report lists Mrs. Gimenez's address as "Study Room, Malacanang Palace, Manila, Philippines." (Swift Decl., Ex. 2). The delivery instructions state: "All taken except Moore[,] which should be delivered to the Philippines['] London Embassy." (Id. ). The Consignment Note, on Marlborough Gallery's letterhead and dated November 26, 1975 (when the paintings were dispatched), is addressed to "Madame Marcos, Malacanang Palace, Manila, Philippines." (Id. ).
b. The 1977 Acquisition of Monet's Le Bassin aux Nymphéas
On March 31, 1977, Mrs. Marcos purchased nine paintings from Marlborough Gallery for a total of $2.9 million. (Swift Decl., Ex. 3). The most expensive was Monet's Le Bassin aux Nymphéas (the "Water Lily" painting), which sold for $791,800. (Id. ). The money used to purchase the paintings came from a Swiss bank account held in the name of Trinidad Foundation, a foundation created in 1970. (Id. , Ex. 5; Republic Opp. Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶ 17). Mrs. Marcos was the primary beneficiary of the Trinidad Foundation. (Id. ).
In 1986, after Mr. Marcos was removed from office, the Swiss government froze several of the Trinidad Foundation's bank accounts. It did so based on the Republic's claim that all of the money in the accounts had been misappropriated by Mr. and Mrs. Marcos, and that the Republic was the rightful owner. (Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶ 31). In August 1991, the Swiss government provided documentation of transactions that had been processed through the Trinidad Foundation's bank accounts, including specific references to the March 29, 1977 payment of $2.9 million to the London bank account of Marlborough Fine Arts. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-33).
c. The Display and Subsequent Removal of the Paintings
During the Marcos presidency, artwork purchased on behalf of Mrs. Marcos was displayed at the townhouse at 13-15 East 66th Street in New York City. (Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶¶ 7-8). The Republic owned that property, which served as the Philippine Consulate in New York, though it was also used by Mr. and Mrs. Marcos as a private residence. (Id. ). Mrs. Marcos also displayed some of the artwork at a second residence in New York, an apartment in the Olympic Tower. (Id. at ¶ 9).
Bautista took possession of the paintings, though the timing of her appropriation of the paintings is a point of speculation and of some contention. Class Plaintiffs assert that, "[i]n late 1985 or early 1986, the three paintings were removed and hidden by Bautista[.]" (Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶ 20). The Republic, by contrast, is unwilling to provide even a general timeframe for Bautista's appropriation of the paintings. It states merely that "[t]he time period when the[ ] [paintings] were taken is yet unclear." (Republic Opp. Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶ 20). What is undisputed is that, when officials from the PCGG searched for the paintings after Mr. Marcos was swept from power in 1986, it did not find them in either the townhouse or the Olympic Tower apartment.
d. Bautista's Sale of the Water Lily Painting, and Her Subsequent Prosecution
i. Sale of the Water Lily Painting
On September 14, 2010, Bautista sold the Water Lily painting to a London gallery for $32 million. (Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶ 34). In connection with that sale, Bautista provided the purchaser with a Certificate of Authority, signed by Mrs. Marcos and dated June 21, 1991, stating that Bautista was "[Mrs. Marcos's] authorized representative to offer and negotiate, on [Mrs. Marcos's] behalf, the sale and/or disposition of [Monet's Water Lily painting.]" (Swift Decl., Ex. 11). It further indicated that Bautista was "authorized to sign, on [Mrs. Marcos's] behalf, the corresponding deeds of transfer of ownership of [the] painting[ ]" and "to receive and/or sign receipts for the proceeds of the sale of [the] painting[ ]." (Id. ).
In a letter issued to the purchaser of the Water Lily painting, Bautista explained that, during one of Mrs. Marcos's visits to New York in 1991, "a number of original copies of a pro forma Certificate of Authority [were] prepared and notarized ... and each one was signed by Mrs. Marcos." (Swift Decl., Ex. 12). For each, "the central section where the description of the asset to be sold ... was left blank for later completion." (Id. ). In February 2010, Bautista "used one of the signed and notarized Certificates of Authority and typed in the appropriate section therein the description for the painting now being sold." (Id. ). She went on to note that "Mrs. Marcos believes that all her correspondence as well as other communications are always subject to constant monitoring and surveillance by the government (both Philippine and U.S.)," and thus that "confidentiality should always be preserved and maintained for all sensitive matters such as the sale of the [p]ainting in question." (Id. ).
Bautista further stated that she had "received instructions from [Mrs. Marcos] to sell the [p]ainting, and [Mrs. Marcos] [wa]s aware of the sale." (Swift Decl., Ex. 12). She was "acting as [Mrs. Marcos's] agent with authority to sell the [p]ainting of which [Bautista] ha[d] physical possession[.]" (Id. ). The painting "ha[d] been in [Bautista's] possession for a good number of years and ha[d] been kept in different locations in New York." (Id. ). Bautista did not "have any documentary record of when the [p]ainting was purchased by Mrs. Marcos, but to the best of [Bautista's] recollection ... it was bought together with other paintings in London during the late 70s or early 80s." (Id. ). Bautista closed by stating: "In entering into the Agreement and at the Closing, I shall continue to act as [Mrs. Marcos's] authorized agent and representative." (Id. ).
ii. Bautista's Criminal Prosecution
In 2011, the DANY launched an investigation into the sale of the Water Lily painting, which investigation culminated in Bautista's indictment on October 8, 2012. (Bautista 56.1 ¶ 22). Bautista was "charged with having illegally conspired to possess and sell valuable works of art acquired by Marcos during her husband's presidency, keep the proceeds for herself, and hide those proceeds from New York State tax authorities and others." (Compl. ¶ 16). She and her co-conspirators "attempted to sell the paintings covertly using a variety of illicit means." (Id. at ¶ 17). After selling the Water Lily painting, Bautista received $32 million dollars, "paid her accomplices 'commissions,' and kept the rest of the money herself." (Id. ). And in April 2011, Bautista filed a 2010 tax return that did not mention the sale or any income derived therefrom. (Id. ).
On November 18, 2013, after a five-week trial, Bautista was found guilty on all counts, including Conspiracy in the Fourth Degree, Criminal Tax Fraud in the First Degree, and Offering a False Instrument for Filing in the First Degree. (Compl. ¶ 18). The criminal action determined that "Bautista was not the rightful owner of the [paintings], including the Water[ ] Lily painting[.]" (Id. at ¶ 22). On October 20, 2015, the Appellate Division reversed the conspiracy conviction (but affirmed the remaining convictions) after finding, inter alia , that "[t]he trial court erred in reading or paraphrasing approximately eight sentences from an order of the Supreme Court of the Philippines ... [where] [o]nly one sentence read by the court to the jury purported to state the law of the Philippines[.]" People v. Bautista , 132 A.D.3d 523, 18 N.Y.S.3d 47, 49 (1st Dep't 2015). The DANY elected not to retry Bautista on the conspiracy conviction.
3. Prior Judgments That Claimants Seek to Enforce in This Interpleader
a. Roxas's Hawaii Judgment
Roxas brought suit against Mr. and Mrs. Marcos in Hawaii state court on February 19, 1988, alleging then-as he does now-that, in January 1971, he discovered a "lost treasure" that was reputed to have been left by General Tomoyuki Yamashita (the "Yamashita Treasure") in underground tunnels in Baguio City in the Philippines. (Roxas 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3, 32-33). The treasure included a Buddha statue made of one metric ton of gold, handfuls of uncut diamonds, and boxes filled with gold bars. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-7). Roxas further alleged that, in May 1971 and again in July 1972, he was taken into custody and tortured at President Marcos's direction. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13). Roxas claimed that, in late 1974, government soldiers seized the Yamashita Treasure and that Marcos subsequently sold much, if not all, of the gold. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-30).
The Hawaii lawsuit sought compensation for Roxas's torture and false imprisonment, as well as for the treasure that [Mr. Marcos] had allegedly converted. (Roxas 56.1 ¶ 33). Mr. Marcos died on September 28, 1989, and Mrs. Marcos stipulated that she would serve as the decedent's representative. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37). The case went to trial in the summer of 1996. On July 19, 1996, the jury issued a verdict: It found Mr. Marcos liable and awarded Roxas $6 million in damages for battery and false imprisonment; $1.3 million for the golden Buddha statue; $100,000 for seventeen gold bars and $5,000 for a coin collection taken from Roxas's house; and $22 billion for the gold bullion that Mr. Marcos had converted from an underground storage area, which constituted the bulk of the Yamashita Treasure. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-50). The verdict was issued against Mr. Marcos and subsequently amended by the intermediate appellate court to reflect that it was a judgment against Mr. Marcos's estate (the "Marcos Estate" or the "Estate") and against Imelda Marcos as the Estate's personal representative. (Id. at ¶ 58).
Mrs. Marcos appealed. (Roxas 56.1 ¶ 51). The Hawaii Supreme Court addressed two issues relevant to the instant action. Preliminarily, it assessed whether the lower court had erred in appointing Mrs. Marcos as representative of the Marcos Estate. It held that, even though "an heir of an undistributed estate ... is not a 'proper party' for substitution," Mrs. Marcos was "judicially estopped from attempting to renounce her prior disingenuous position regarding her legal status[.]" Roxas v. Marcos , 89 Hawai'i 91, 969 P.2d 1209, 1240 (1998). For this reason, the court rejected Mrs. Marcos's argument that the judgment should not have been entered against her as representative of the Estate. As the court noted, "in order to achieve manifest justice consistent with the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the equities of this case require us to hold Imelda personally liable, at least to the extent of her interest in the assets of the Marcos Estate[.]" Id. at 1244.
The court next addressed whether Roxas had produced sufficient evidence to support the verdict. It began by noting that "Ferdinand's witnessed possession of large amounts of gold, combined with the testimony of [co-conspirators] that at least some of the gold was resmelted and surreptitiously sold, constitute[d] sufficient corroboration of the testimony that Ferdinand was attempting to launder and fraudulently convey Roxas's gold." Roxas , 969 P.2d at 1256. The court further found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Mr. Marcos had converted some of the Yamashita Treasure and had battered and falsely imprisoned Roxas. Id. at 1256-60. It therefore upheld the damage award as to the battery and false imprisonment claims, as well as the damages flowing from the theft of the golden Buddha statue and the seventeen gold bars and coin collection taken from Roxas's home. Id. at 1266-75.
However, the court reversed the portion of the verdict awarding Roxas $22 billion for "one storage area" of gold bullion. Roxas , 969 P.2d at 1275. The court found that the testimony regarding the quantity of gold in the storage area was "extremely vague." Id. at 1260 ("For example, Jonsson testified that the room he had seen was '[m]aybe 40 feet by 20, something like that ' ... and that he 'believed' that the ceiling was twelve feet tall, '[m]aybe more. I don't remember .' " (emphases in original) ). Because the testimony was so imprecise, it "afforded the jury no legitimate basis for determining damages." Id. The vacillations in the testimony concerning volume admitted a "margin of error comprising thousands of tons." Id. Accordingly, the court overturned the $22 billion award for the gold bullion. Roxas was left with a judgment of $6 million in damages for battery and false imprisonment, and $1,405,000 for the theft of the golden Buddha statue and the seventeen gold bars and coin collection taken from Roxas's house (the "Roxas Judgment").
b. Class Plaintiffs' Hawaii Judgment
Roxas was not the only victim of the Marcos regime that brought suit following Mr. Marcos's removal from power. Shortly after Mr. Marcos fled to Hawaii, human rights victims and their families brought actions against Mr. Marcos seeking damages for torture, summary execution, and disappearance. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos , 103 F.3d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1996). In 1991, these actions were consolidated and certified as a class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii comprising approximately 10,000 individuals. Id. The court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Marcos Estate and its agents from disposing of any of the Estate assets. Id. The class obtained a verdict of liability against Marcos's Estate and an award of nearly $2 billion in damages, which made the preliminary injunction permanent. Id.
In 2011, the Class obtained a second judgment-which they seek to enforce in the instant action-in the amount of $353,600,000. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig. , 496 Fed.Appx. 759, 760 (9th Cir. 2012) (memorandum opinion). That judgment was entered after the court granted Class Plaintiffs' motion for entry of final judgment for civil contempt, stemming from violations of a February 19, 1995 Order enjoining the Marcos heirs from transferring or otherwise disposing of Estate assets. See id. ; see also Hilao , 103 F.3d at 763-64. Both the 1995 and 2011 judgments have been transferred to and registered in the Southern District of New York.
B. Procedural Background
On February 11, 2014, the DANY filed an interpleader complaint. (Dkt. # 2). In that complaint, the DANY identified various parties that had already asserted or were expected to assert claims to the Interpleader Property, including: the Republic, Class Plaintiffs, Bautista and her sisters, Imelda Marcos, and an unnamed artist and museum in the Philippines. Of those parties, only the Republic, Class Plaintiffs, and Bautista remain in this action. On July 11, 2016, Roxas filed a motion to intervene (Dkt. # 237), which the Court granted on August 12, 2016 (Dkt. # 262).
On April 22, 2015, Class Plaintiffs filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Republic's cross-claims and affirmative defenses. (Dkt. # 76-79). The Court held oral argument on November 24, 2015, and again on December 28, 2015. (See Dkt. # 131, 134). The Court denied the motion on January 20, 2016. (Dkt. # 137). In doing so, the Court noted that, "[p]erhaps the most perplexing issue presented by the [m]otion arises from the choice-of-law analysis implicated by the parties' arguments." Dist. Atty. of N.Y. Cty. v. Rep. of the Philippines (hereinafter, " Philippines I "), No. 14 Civ. 890 (KPF), 2016 WL 9022580, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2016). The Court observed that "neither party has proffered expert testimony to aid the Court in identifying, interpreting, or contextualizing the foreign law or laws that apply." Id. at *4. The Court further noted that it "cannot resolve the ownership arguments raised ... because the parties have not provided a sufficient basis for selecting the law that determines the ownership of the property at issue." Id. Nor could the Court conclude as a matter of law that "the Republic's claims [we]re barred by the applicable statutes of limitations in the face of the Republic's fact-intensive invocation of equitable estoppel." Id. at *5.
Currently pending before the Court are the following seven motions:
• Class Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment against the Republic: Class Plaintiffs filed their opening papers on June 1, 2016 (Dkt. # 193-196), the Republic filed its opposition brief on July 1, 2016 (Dkt. # 225), and Class Plaintiffs filed their reply on July 18, 2016 (Dkt. # 240);
• Class Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against Roxas: Class Plaintiffs filed their opening papers on July 24, 2017 (Dkt. # 369-372), Roxas filed an opposition brief on August 25, 2017 (Dkt. # 401), and Class Plaintiffs filed their reply on September 11, 2017 (Dkt. # 417);
• Bautista's motion for summary judgment against Class Plaintiffs and the Republic: Bautista filed her opening papers on June 1, 2016 (Dkt. # 201-202, 208-209), Class Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief on June 30, 2016 (Dkt. # 214), and an amended opposition brief on December 8, 2016 (Dkt. # 313), the Republic filed an opposition brief on July 1, 2016 (Dkt. # 225), and Bautista filed a reply on July 18, 2016 (Dkt. # 241);
• Bautista's motion for summary judgment against Roxas: Bautista filed her opening papers on July 24, 2017 (Dkt. # 377, 388-390), and Roxas filed his opposition brief on August 25, 2017 (Dkt. # 401);
• Roxas's motion for summary judgment against Class Plaintiffs and Bautista: Roxas filed his opening papers on July 28, 2017 (Dkt. # 383-386), Class Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief on August 25, 2017 (Dkt. # 398), which Bautista joined by letter dated August 25, 2017 (Dkt. # 407), and Roxas filed a reply on September 11, 2017 (Dkt. # 419);
• The Republic's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the case: the Republic filed its opening brief on July 24, 2017 (Dkt. # 374), and then refiled the brief on August 29, 2017, and again on September 11, 2017 (Dkt. # 411, 415), Class Plaintiffs filed an opposition on August 25, 2017 (Dkt. # 396), and a supplementary letter brief on January 23, 2018 (Dkt. # 426), Roxas filed an opposition brief on August 29, 2017 (Dkt. # 413), and the Republic filed its reply on September 18, 2017 (Dkt. # 422);
• S&P's motion to impose attorneys' liens: S&P filed its opening papers on June 9, 2017 (Dkt. # 357-359), and no opposition papers were filed.
The Court notes that, before the Republic filed the motion to dismiss mentioned above, it had moved for partial summary judgment against Class Plaintiffs. (See Dkt. # 197-200, 242). After the Republic caused various delays by failing to make witnesses available for depositions (see Dkt. # 332), and by failing to address four issues in a letter to the Court dated May 24, 2017 (Dkt. # 341), that were critically important to the Court's adjudication of the Republic's claims (see Dkt. # 343), the Court sanctioned the Republic by, inter alia , striking the Republic's pending motion (see id. ). Accordingly, the Court will not consider that motion here, nor will the Court consider any of the associated documents or evidence cited therein.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
1. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(a) provides that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine dispute exists where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 822 F.3d 620, 631 n.12 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]" Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
While the moving party "bears the initial burden of demonstrating 'the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' " ICC Chem. Corp. v. Nordic Tankers Trading a/s , 186 F.Supp.3d 296, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Catrett , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ), the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; see also Brown v. Henderson , 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001). Rather, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Parks Real Estate Purchasing Grp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 472 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ).
"When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp. , 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). In considering "what may reasonably be inferred" from witness testimony, however, the court should not accord the non-moving party the benefit of "unreasonable inferences, or inferences at war with undisputed facts." Berk v. St. Vincent's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. , 380 F.Supp.2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Cty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co. , 907 F.2d 1295, 1318 (2d Cir. 1990) ). Moreover, "[t]hough [the Court] must accept as true the allegations of the party defending against the summary judgment motion, ... conclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment." Kulak v. City of N.Y. , 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ; Wyler v. United States, 725 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1983) ); accord Hicks v. Baines , 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010).
2. Interpleader Actions
Interpleaders are "a handy tool to protect a stakeholder from multiple liability and the vexation of defending multiple claims to the same fund."
Washington Elec. Co-Op, Inc. v. Paterson, Walke & Pratt, P.C. , 985 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). An interpleader is triggered by "a real and reasonable fear of double liability or ... conflicting claims." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "As a remedial joinder device, interpleader is to be liberally construed." Weininger v. Castro , 462 F.Supp.2d 457, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
There are two forms of interpleader: rule interpleader, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 ; and statutory interpleader, under 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Both serve the same function of joining two or more adverse claimants to a single proceeding in order, in turn, to promote efficiency and to protect the stakeholder from multiple lawsuits. Bradley v. Kochenash , 44 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1995). Differences between the two concern personal and subject matter jurisdiction, service of process, and venue. See 4 J. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 22.04[1] (3d ed. 2017). The most important distinction involves the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction. For rule interpleader, subject matter jurisdiction must be based on Article III of the Constitution and the jurisdictional statutes. In other words, "a traditional basis for subject matter jurisdiction must exist." 6247 Atlas Corp. v. Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., No. 2A/C , 155 F.R.D. 454, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Statutory interpleader, by contrast, requires only minimal diversity-"that is, diversity of citizenship between two or more claimants, without regard to the circumstance that other rival claimants may be co-citizens." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire , 386 U.S. 523, 530, 87 S.Ct. 1199, 18 L.Ed.2d 270 (1967).
Here, the DANY filed the interpleader action under § 1335(a), according to which district courts "have original jurisdiction of any civil action of interpleader ... [involving] money or property of the value of $500 or more ... [and where t]wo or more adverse claimants [are] of diverse citizenship[.]" This interpleader involves parties that are citizens of the State of New York and of the Republic of the Philippines, and the amount in controversy far exceeds $500. (See generally Compl.). The Court may therefore exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
a. Two-Step Analysis
Interpleader actions typically proceed in two stages. In the first stage, the Court determines "that the requirements of § 1335 are met and reliev[es] the plaintiff stakeholder from liability[.]" N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Dev. Auth. , 700 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). In the instant matter, the Court has already determined that interpleader was proper and ordered the deposit of the Interpleader Property into the Court. (See Dkt. # 72). The second stage of the interpleader process requires the Court to adjudicate the parties' adverse claims on the merits. See Truck-A-Tune, Inc. v. Re , 856 F.Supp. 77, 79 (D. Conn. 1993), aff'd , 23 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1994).
b. Equitable Nature of Interpleader Remedy
Interpleader actions are often characterized as equitable in nature. The Second Circuit has observed that "[i]nterpleader is an equitable proceeding," Truck-A-Tune, Inc. , 23 F.3d at 63, and district courts have long held similarly, see, e.g. , William Penn Life Ins. Co. v. Viscuso , 569 F.Supp.2d 355, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Although sanctioned by statute, interpleader is fundamentally an equitable remedy."); Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. KLCC Invs., LLC , No. 06 Civ. 5466 (LBS), 2007 WL 102128, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2007) ("[I]nterpleader is an equitable remedy that should be applied liberally[.]"); Irving Tr. Co. v. Nationwide Leisure Corp. , 93 F.R.D. 102, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Interpleader is an equitable device[.]"). References to interpleaders as an equitable remedy appear with such frequency-but with such little exposition-that claimants would be forgiven for wondering what role, if any, the remedy's equitable nature plays in a court's adjudication of the merits.
This Court therefore pauses to provide some explanation of the contours of interpleaders' equitable nature. The Court is compelled to do so here, in part because some of the claimants evince a rather expansive-and, in this Court's view, impermissibly broad-understanding of interpleaders' equitable nature. For example, in Roxas's opposition to Class Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, Roxas suggests that this Court may consider equitable principles even where they might conflict with traditional legal principles and that the Court may exercise its broad discretion to fashion a remedy that achieves equity but derogates well-established legal principles. (See Roxas SJ Opp. Class Plaintiffs 14 ("In sum, in weighing the equities among the parties, the Court should favor [Roxas].") ).
The Court does not understand its discretion to be quite so broad, nor the equitable principles that apply to interpleader actions to be quite so far-reaching. To be sure, interpleader is an equitable remedy. But the Court is still required to apply legal principles in adjudicating the merits of the parties' claims. The U.S. Supreme Court has advised that "[c]ourts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions than can courts of law." Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1378, 1385, 191 L.Ed.2d 471 (2015) (quoting I.N.S. v. Pangilinan , 486 U.S. 875, 883, 108 S.Ct. 2210, 100 L.Ed.2d 882 (1988) ). In the interpleader context, courts in this Circuit have held-properly so-that legal, rather than equitable, principles govern the adjudication of the merits. See, e.g. , XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lakian , 243 F.Supp.3d 434, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) ("[Party's] appeal to the Court's equitable powers does not justify deviating from the clear legal principles in this case.").
A review of the context in which courts discuss the equitable nature of interpleaders is revealing: Courts most often do so in deciding whether to allow an interpleader to go forward at all; they rarely do so in adjudicating the merits of the parties' competing claims. See, e.g. , Truck-A-Tune , 23 F.3d at 63 ; Great Wall De Venezuela C.A. v. Interaudi Bank , 117 F.Supp.3d 474, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ; Viscuso , 569 F.Supp.2d at 362. The equitable nature of the remedy, in other words, applies principally at step 1 (determining whether interpleader is proper), not at step 2 (deciding the merits). To the extent that a court has greater discretion in the interpleader context than it does in other contexts, that discretion finds its currency in a court's decision to permit a plaintiff to consolidate multiple adverse claims into a single action in order to "protect [the plaintiff] from vexatious and multiple litigation." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 386 U.S. at 534, 87 S.Ct. 1199. It does not provide courts with latitude to eschew clear legal principles in favor of an amorphous sense of equity. Lakian , 243 F.Supp.3d at 448.
With that, the Court turns to the choice of law issue, which this Court previously addressed, but was unable to decide, at the motion to dismiss stage because the parties "ha[d] not provided the Court with sufficient information[.]" Philippines I , 2016 WL 9022580, at *3.
3. Choice of Law
The Court addresses the threshold issue of which law should apply to the parties' claims. At the motion to dismiss stage, this issue was raised, with Class Plaintiffs and the Republic advancing competing views of the applicable law. Then, the Republic argued that Philippine Law R.A. 1379 applies to-and is dispositive of-the question of ownership of the Interpleader Property. (See Dkt. # 89 at 9-10). Class Plaintiffs, for their part, argued that Philippine law did not apply, and that the action instead was governed by New York law. (See Dkt. # 99 at 3-7). Class Plaintiffs suggested, in the alternative, that the law of Switzerland or Liechtenstein might apply to some subset of questions regarding the funds that the Trinidad Foundation had deposited in a Swiss bank account, but that, in any event, Philippine law could not apply. (Id. at 3 n.3).
In denying the motion to dismiss, this Court wrote at some length on the choice of law issue, which it characterized as "[p]erhaps the most perplexing issue presented[.]" Philippines I , 2016 WL 9022580, at *3. It observed that two statutory schemes arguably were relevant to determining the controlling law: (i) the interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 ; and (ii) the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the "FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 - 1611. The Court found that, under either statute, New York choice of law principles apply. As the Court explained, "[w]hen a federal interpleader action 'is based on [ ] diversity of citizenship ... courts apply the [choice of law rules] of the forum state[.]' " Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. KLCC Invs., LLC , 2015 WL 5853916, at *6 ). And, "in FSIA cases, we use the forum state's choice of law rules to resolve all issues, except jurisdictional ones." Id. (quoting Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("Pertamina "), 313 F.3d 70, 84 (2d Cir. 2002) ). Therefore, "whether by operation of the interpleader statute or the FSIA, New York's choice-of-law rules apply in this case." Id.
The Court then recited the New York choice of law principles. It explained that, under New York law, "[t]he first step in any case presenting a potential choice of law issue is to determine whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions involved." Philippines I , 2016 WL 9022580, at *4 (brackets in original) (quoting Pertamina , 313 F.3d at 85 ). It further observed:
[I]n property disputes, if a conflict is identified, New York choice of law rules require the application of an interests analysis, in which the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation [is] applied and ... the facts or contacts which obtain significance in defining State interests are those which relate to the purpose of the particular law in conflict.
Id. (quoting Pertamina , 313 F.3d at 85 ). Finally, it noted that, as in property disputes, " 'the relevant analytical approach to choice of law in tort actions in New York' is the 'interest analysis.' " Id. (original alterations omitted) (quoting GlobalNet Financial.Com, Inc. v. Frank Crystal & Co. , 449 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2006) ).
The Court found that "the parties ha[d] not provided the Court with sufficient information to perform a proper choice-of-law analysis[.]" Philippines I , 2016 WL 9022580, at *3. In particular, "neither party ha[d] proffered expert testimony to aid the Court in identifying, interpreting, or contextualizing the foreign law or laws that may apply." Id. at *4. Without that information, "the Court cannot determine whether a conflict of law exists, let alone ascertain which jurisdiction has a greater interest in the outcome of this case." Id. Similarly, though Class Plaintiffs asserted that the Court may not apply the Philippine law advanced by the Republic, "in the absence of expert testimony on the contours of that law, the Court cannot conclude ... that the Philippine law is categorically unenforceable." Id.
By discussing the deficiencies in the parties' choice of law analyses, the Court understood itself also to be inviting the parties to provide additional information in any future motion practice. It thought that it had made clear to the parties that, to decide the choice of law issue, the Court would require expert testimony regarding any foreign law that might apply. Yet the parties have largely failed to take up the Court's invitation. Just one party-Class Plaintiffs-filed an expert affidavit on foreign law. And Class Plaintiffs' affiant, Mr. Federico Agcaoili, opined on just one of the issues implicated by this action-namely, the validity vel non of the 1993 Deed of Assignment that purportedly transferred ownership over various paintings from Mrs. Marcos to Bautista. (See Dkt. # 312). And as the Court explained supra in note 5, it will only consider the expert affidavit for limited purposes, as it was submitted alongside an amended brief that was filed late and without leave of Court or consent of the parties.
The parties' briefs themselves fail adequately to address the choice of law issues. If anything, choice of law seems to have receded from the parties' view. Whereas the Republic devoted several pages to the issue in its opposition to the motion to dismiss (see Dkt. # 89 at 9-14), its opposition to Class Plaintiffs' pending summary judgment motion contains but a single parenthetical on point (Republic SJ Opp. Class Plaintiffs 4). The Republic merely states that, "[i]n the end, regardless of what law applies (i.e.[,] even if R.A. 1379 does not apply, which we do not concede), the general principle that no [one] may take advantage of their own wrong ... forecloses any statute of limitations argument[.]" (Id. ). Far from providing the Court with the requisite analysis or expert testimony on point, the Republic instead opines that it "perhaps ... spent too much of the Court's time addressing the choice-of-law analysis [at the motion to dismiss stage.]" (Id. ). To the contrary: The Court had expected that the Republic would expend more effort, and provide greater analysis, to elucidate the choice of law issue. Instead, the Republic and the other claimants have analyzed each of the issues in this interpleader action-with two exceptions discussed below-under New York law.
The Second Circuit has held that courts need not "examine foreign legal sources independently ... in the absence of any suggestion that such a course will be fruitful or [that the court will receive] any help from the parties." Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. , 391 F.2d 150, 155 n.3 (2d Cir. 1968). And courts in this District have noted that where "there is a failure of proof of foreign law, the court may presume that it is the same as local law." In re Parmalat , 383 F.Supp.2d 587, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Similarly, where a party cites both New York and foreign law but "ma[kes] no objection to the application of New York law and has not briefed the choice of law question," the court may "deem the parties to have implicitly consented to having New York law apply, and this 'implied consent ... is sufficient to establish choice of law' on the question." Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern , 693 F.Supp.2d 327, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens, Inc. , 238 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) ); accord Clarex Ltd. v. Natixis Sec. Am. LLC , No. 12 Civ. 7908 (PAE), 2013 WL 2631043, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013) ("[T]he Court applies New York law for both plaintiffs, because all parties apply New York law in their submissions: Where '[t]he parties' briefs assume that New York law controls ... such implied consent ... is sufficient to establish choice of law.' " (quoting Wolfson v. Bruno , 844 F.Supp.2d 348, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ) ).
In the instant action, there are only two areas where parties have suggested that non-New York law applies and have adequately briefed the issue. First , Roxas asserts that Hawaii law applies to determine the preclusive effect, if any, of the Roxas Judgment. The Court agrees. It is well established that, "[t]o determine the effect of a state court judgment, federal courts, including those sitting in diversity, are required to apply the preclusion law of the rendering state." Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Intern. , 231 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) ); see also id. ("Federal courts may not employ their own rules ... in determining the effect of state judgments, but must accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ). Because a Hawaii court issued the Roxas Judgment, this Court must apply Hawaii preclusion law to determine the res judicata effect, if any, of that judgment.
Second , Class Plaintiffs argue that the validity of Bautista's Deed of Assignment must be assessed under Philippine law. As mentioned, "[t]he first step in any case presenting a potential choice of law issue is to determine whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions involved." Pertamina , 313 F.3d at 85. As attested by Mr. Agcaoili, Article 748 of the Philippine New Civil Code establishes that, for any donation of personal property worth more than five thousand Philippine pesos (equivalent to approximately $95, as of the date of this Opinion), "the donation and acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void." (Dkt. # 312 ¶ 24). The Philippine Supreme Court has enforced this requirement: In a case involving a donation of 3,297,800 pesos, where the acceptance was not in writing, the court held that the donation was invalid under Article 748. (Id. at ¶ 25). New York law, by contrast, does not require written acceptance of a gift of value. See, e.g. , Gruen v. Gruen , 68 N.Y.2d 48, 57, 505 N.Y.S.2d 849, 496 N.E.2d 869 (1986) ("[W]hen a gift is of value to the donee, as it is here, the law will presume an acceptance on his part[.]") (internal citations omitted); Anagnostou v. Stifel , 168 A.D.2d 256, 562 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (1st Dep't 1990) ("[Acceptance] can be presumed where, as here, the works of art are of intrinsically significant value[.]" (internal citation omitted) ).
Having found that a conflict of law exists, the Court turns to the second step of New York's choice of law analysis to determine which jurisdiction has the greatest interest in adjudicating the issue. In property disputes, "New York choice of law rules require the application of an interests analysis, in which the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation [is] applied and ... the facts or contacts which obtain significance in defining State interests are those which relate to the purpose of the particular law in conflict." Pertamina , 313 F.3d at 85 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As to the Deed of Assignment's validity, there can be little doubt that the Republic has the greatest interest in having its law apply. The Deed was signed on August 5, 1983, by Imelda Marcos, then-First Lady of the Philippines, at the Malacanang Palace in Manila. (Dkt. # 208-5). The notary public who witnessed the signature, Eliseo A. Razon, attested that the Deed was executed "in the City of Manila." (Id. ). And the Deed itself is being held by the Clerk of Court at the Regional Trial Court in Manila. (Id. ). A review of the Deed's contents reveals but a single connection to New York: At the time, Bautista resided at 210 West 70th Street in New York. (Id. ). But even that fact does not militate against applying Philippine law, given that Bautista was sent to New York by the Philippine government in connection with her work as a Philippine Foreign Service Officer. This constellation of facts establishes that the Republic has the greatest interest in having its law determine the validity of the Deed. Accordingly, the Court will apply Philippine law to that issue.
B. Analysis
The Court analyzes the seven pending motions in turn. With one exception, the Court considers each motion separately, as the motions raise unique questions of fact and law. The only motions that are sufficiently similar to justify joint consideration are Class Plaintiffs' and Bautista's motions for summary judgment against Roxas.
1. Class Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against the Republic Fails
a. The Court Remains Unpersuaded That Class Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring This Motion
The Court begins by addressing an issue that it raised in its January 20, 2016 Order denying Class Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss-namely, Class Plaintiffs' standing to file a motion against cross-claims in which they are not named. Philippines I , 2016 WL 9022580, at *1-3. Then, the Court was "concerned about their standing to file a motion to dismiss given the state of pleadings." Id. at *2. It noted the tension between procedures that apply to interpleader actions-whereby each claimant is adversarial to the others and is expected to respond to the others' claims-and rules governing motion practice more generally in federal court, according to which a party "lacks standing to attack the legal sufficiency of those other counts" to which "he has not been named as a defendant." Id. (quoting Dover Ltd. v. A.B. Watley, Inc. , No. 04 Civ. 7366 (FM), 2006 WL 2987054, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2006) ). The "seeming incongruity between interpleader law and federal procedure" left the Court "concerned about [Class Plaintiffs'] standing to file [the motion]." Id.
The Court was unpersuaded by Class Plaintiffs' assertion that their levy confers standing. Class Plaintiffs had "not offered any basis for concluding that a levy filed by a party in connection with a state court action confers standing on that party in federal court to move to dismiss claims in which the party was not named." Philippines I , 2016 WL 9022580, at *2. And even if the levy had been filed in this Court, "Class Plaintiffs ha[d] not cited any law, rule, or precedent allowing a party, by operation of a levy, to move to dismiss claims in which it is not named." Id. In an effort to convince the Court to the contrary, Class Plaintiffs cited United States v. Barry Fischer Law Firm, LLC , No. 10 Civ. 7997 (TPG), 2012 WL 591396 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012). The Court found that case to be inapposite as it "does not involve a co-defendant moving to dismiss state law cross-claims in which it is not named as a party." Philippines I , 2016 WL 9022580, at *2 n.2. It therefore "d[id] not fully assuage the Court's concerns[.]" Id.
The Court's concerns apply with equal force to Class Plaintiffs' present motion for summary judgment against the Republic. The fact that the dispositive motion is now brought under Rule 56, rather than Rule 12, does not render the issue moot. See Dover, Ltd. , 2006 WL 2987054, at *8 ("[D]efendant lacks standing to move for dismissal or summary judgment with respect to count in which he is not named[.]" (citing Std. Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Sinibaldi , No. 91-188-SLR, 1994 WL 796603, at *7 n.5 (D. Del. Dec. 8, 1994) ). In their motion for summary judgment, Class Plaintiffs assert that "[t]his Court's January 20, 2016 decision ..., questioning the standing of one interpleader defendant to attack the claims of another, was limited to Rule 12 motions." (Class Plaintiffs SJ Br. Republic 11 n.8). The Court does not share Class Plaintiffs' view. To be sure, the Court stated that it was "concerned about [Class Plaintiffs'] standing to file a motion to dismiss given the state of the pleadings." Philippines I , 2016 WL 9022580, at *2 (emphasis added). But nothing in the Opinion suggests that the Court's analysis would somehow not apply equally to summary judgment motions. To the extent the Court focused its analysis on Class Plaintiffs' standing to bring a motion to dismiss, it did so because that was the motion pending before it, not because its concern was confined to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. And Class Plaintiffs have provided no reason to distinguish-for purposes of the standing issue-between motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.
The Court is struck that Class Plaintiffs' most recent submissions fail to address the Court's concerns in any meaningful way. Class Plaintiffs merely restate, in conclusory terms, their previous position that "[t]he nature of a statutory interpleader is that a defendant may assert his own claims to the property at issue and dispute the claims of others to that property." (Class Plaintiffs SJ Br. Republic 11). They cite no new authority; as before, they rely on the Barry Fisher Law Firm decision that this Court previously found unpersuasive. And though they still maintain that they have a levy on the property and that such levy confers standing, they have provided no authority at all suggesting that a party may, by operation of a levy, move for summary judgment against claims in which it is not named. (See id. at 11-12).
Class Plaintiffs have failed to assuage any of the Court's concerns regarding standing. For this reason, the Court continues to question Class Plaintiffs' standing to file dispositive motions, including this motion for summary judgment. Still, the Court proceeds to address Class Plaintiffs' substantive claims that (i) the Republic lacks standing to bring most of its cross-claims, and (ii) all of the cross-claims are time-barred under the relevant statutes of limitations. For the reasons stated below, the Court rejects both claims on their merits.
b. The Republic Has Standing to Bring Each Cause of Action
Class Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on seven of the Republic's eight causes of action, arguing that those claims "must be dismissed for lack of standing because the Republic is not the 'owner' of the paintings or the proceeds therefrom." (Class Plaintiffs SJ Br. Republic 18). As Class Plaintiffs would have it, the Republic lacks standing to bring the following claims: conversion, aiding and abetting conversion, unjust enrichment, misappropriation of public property, New York Executive Law § 632-a(3), monies had and received, and replevin. (Id. at 18-20). Class Plaintiffs' position is that each of these causes of action may be brought solely by the owner of property at issue, and "[s]ince the Republic is not the owner of the paintings, it has no legally protected interest in the paintings or the proceeds from their sale, and may not assert the rights of the owner." (Id. at 18).
Despite Class Plaintiffs' claims to the contrary, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that the Republic lacks standing to bring these claims. To begin, Class Plaintiffs misconstrue the law when they suggest that these seven causes of action may only be brought by parties who owned and possessed the personal property at stake. In Torrance Construction, Inc. v. Jaques , an employer brought claims for, inter alia , aiding and abetting conversion, money had and received, and constructive trust against defendants who had stolen money and used that money for personal purchases used to make improvements to defendants' home. 127 A.D.3d 1261, 8 N.Y.S.3d 441, 443-44 (3d Dep't 2015). Though the plaintiff had not physically possessed any of the items purchased with the stolen money, the court upheld each of these claims. So too have courts in this District. For example, a court in this District explained that, "[t]o establish a cause of action in conversion, the plaintiff must show legal ownership or an immediate superior right of possession to a specific identifiable thing[.]" Dore v. Wormley , 690 F.Supp.2d 176, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish standing to bring a replevin claim, a plaintiff need only "establish that the defendant is in possession of certain property of which the plaintiff claims to have a superior right." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the Republic claims to have a right to the property superior to any of the other claimants. It need not establish that it physically possessed any of the Interpleader Property to bring these claims.
Similarly, unjust enrichment, misappropriation, and § 632-a(3) claims are actionable to recover property purchased with ill-gotten funds. As Class Plaintiffs note, "[a] claim arising under New York Executive Law § 632-a(3) requires that the Republic be a 'victim' of a crime." (Class Plaintiffs SJ Br. Republic 20); see also Ciafone v. Kenyatta , 27 A.D.3d 143, 807 N.Y.S.2d 114, 119 (2d Dep't 2005). The Republic has alleged as much here. It has also sufficiently alleged a claim of misappropriation of public property. So too a claim of unjust enrichment, which requires only "that [i] the other party was enriched, [ii] at that party's expense, and [iii] that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other party to retain what is sought to be recovered." Cohen v. BMW Invs. L.P. , 668 Fed.Appx. 373, 374 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (quoting Corsello v. Verizon N.Y., Inc. , 18 N.Y.3d 777, 790, 944 N.Y.S.2d 732, 967 N.E.2d 1177 (2012) ). That the property was purchased with misappropriated funds, rather than stolen directly from the Republic, would not strip the Republic of standing to bring these claims.
But Class Plaintiffs' argument fails for a more fundamental reason: The Court cannot conclude at this juncture that Mrs. Marcos, and not the Republic, owned and possessed the paintings when purchased and subsequently displayed at the townhouse in New York City. The fact that Mrs. Marcos was First Lady of the Philippines at the time of the purchase raises genuine disputes as to whether she owned and possessed the paintings in her personal capacity, or if she did so in her capacity as a public servant. The Republic's claim that Mrs. Marcos paid for the paintings with public funds means that this Court cannot conclude that Mrs. Marcos ever owned the paintings. And the record creates genuine questions of material fact on this point. The Sales Report for Monet's L'Église et La Seine à Vétheuil and Sisley's Langland Bay lists the purchaser's address as "Study Room, Malacanang Palace, Manila, Philippines" (Swift Decl., Ex. 2), and the paintings were "delivered to the Philippines['] London Embassy" (id. ).
The Consignment Note is addressed to "Madame Marcos, Malacanang Palace, Manila, Philippines." (Id. ). Similarly, the Sales Report for Monet's Water Lily painting indicates that it was sold to the "First Lady of the Philippines." (Swift Decl., Ex. 2). And, during the Marcos presidency, the artwork was displayed at a townhouse in New York City that was owned by the Republic. (Class Plaintiffs 56.1 ¶¶ 7-8). The question of ownership would persist even if Mrs. Marcos had physical possession over the paintings, and is captured, rather poignantly, by the dual status of the townhouse in which the paintings were displayed: The property served as both