Citations
- 307 F. Supp. 3d 1010
Full opinion text
After a lengthy jury trial, the Hardesty and Schneider plaintiffs obtained a verdict exceeding $100 million against defendant Sacramento County and three defendant county officials based on defendants' actions the jury determined caused the closure of the Hardestys' sand and gravel mine and violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law ("Renewed JMOL Mot."), ECF No. 537, and Motion for a New Trial ("New Trial Mot."), ECF No. 538, are before the court. Plaintiffs oppose the motions, ECF Nos. 547-48, and defendants have replied, ECF Nos. 550-51. The court heard oral argument on the motions on October 31, 2017, and then submitted the matters. See ECF No. 554. After careful consideration, for the reasons below, the court DENIES both motions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Between 2008 and 2012, California and Sacramento County regulators investigated reports that the Hardesty family was operating a sand and gravel mine illegally on the Schneider family's ranch. As a result of the investigations, regulators ordered the Hardesty and Schneider families to cease the mining operation; the Hardesty and Schneider families eventually complied. What happened during the four years from initial reports to closure of the mine forms the core of the case that went to trial.
According to plaintiffs, after a long period of regulatory disinterest, government officials were spurred to action not by their discovery of any actual legal violations, but by their desire to appease plaintiffs' competitors as well as state legislators and local politicians motivated by campaign contributions. Plaintiffs centrally allege the County recognized the Schneiders' historical right to continue mining on their property, also called a "vested right," as early as 1994, but that defendants then revoked that right in 2009 without any process and in violation of the Schneiders' procedural and due process rights. The regulatory action that followed culminated in the permanent shutdown of the mining operation. The Schneiders also allege defendants retaliated against them by dramatically increasing in 2012 the financial deposit necessary to continue operating the mine, after they filed this case in 2010.
Defendants' theory of the case was that the County never revoked plaintiffs' vested right, if they had any such right. Instead, in a series of hearings in 2010 and 2011, defendants merely determined that plaintiffs had expanded the mining operation beyond its permissible scope. The subsequent regulatory action, including requiring an amended reclamation plan and greater financial assurances, were required under state law and none of these actions were improperly motivated.
B. Procedural Background
Following extensive summary judgment practice, plaintiffs' case proceeded to trial against the following defendants: Sacramento County; Robert Sherry, a former Planning Director for the County; Roger Dickinson, a former member of the Sacramento County Board of Supervisors; and Jeff Gamel, a former Sacramento County Senior Planner and Aggregate Resources Manager. After a sixteen-day trial held from February 16 to March 16, 2017, the jury returned a unanimous verdict on plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process claims and the Schneiders' additional claim resting on the First Amendment's right to petition clause. See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 469. The jury found the County, but not the individual defendants, violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights, and awarded nominal damages of $1 to each set of plaintiffs on these claims. Id. at 2-3. The jury found all defendants violated plaintiffs' substantive due process rights, and awarded $75 million to the Hardestys and $30 million to the Schneiders. Id. at 4-5. The jury found the County, but not the individual defendants, violated the Schneiders' right to petition the government for redress, and awarded the Schneiders $30,000 on this claim. Id. at 6. The jury also found each individual defendant's conduct was "malicious, oppressive, or in reckless disregard" of plaintiffs' rights, and awarded punitive damages in the following amounts: $25,000 against Dickinson, $1 million against Gamel, and $750,000 against Sherry, with Sherry's payment broken down as $500,000 for the Hardestys and $250,000 for the Schneiders. Id. at 7-8.
After plaintiffs had rested their case but before the jury returned its verdict, defendants filed three motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). ECF Nos. 350, 353, 443. In the first motion, defendants asserted they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiffs failed to pursue relief by way of writ in state court, the County Board of Supervisors' decision and Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA") decisions had preclusive effect, the Hardesty plaintiffs were not entitled to notice related to the Hardestys' procedural due process claims, the Board of Supervisors' hearings complied with procedural due process, and plaintiffs' substantive due process claims failed. ECF No. 350 at 2-20.
In the second motion, defendants asserted defendants Dickinson and Sherry were not liable for conduct after 2010 and Dickinson was entitled to absolute immunity for his legislative acts and qualified immunity for his executive acts. ECF No. 353 at 2-4.
In the third and final Rule 50(a) motion, defendants contended plaintiffs lacked a federally protected property interest, plaintiffs received procedural due process, adequate state process precluded finding a violation of procedural due process, the only remedy for a due process violation was to order the process due, the Hardestys were not entitled to notice or alternately received actual notice of certain hearings, plaintiffs failed to exhaust remedies in state court, board determinations were entitled to preclusive effect, plaintiffs' substantive due process claims failed, all defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and Dickinson was entitled to absolute immunity for some of his conduct, no evidence permitted a reasonable jury to conclude defendants retaliated against plaintiffs, no evidence supported awarding punitive damages, and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a Williamson Act Claim. ECF No. 443 at 17-88. These three motions preserved defendants' right to file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)-(b).
On July 7, 2017, defendants filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, for a new trial. See Renewed JMOL Mot., ECF No. 537; New Trial Mot., ECF No. 538. As noted, plaintiffs jointly opposed the motions. Renewed JMOL Opp'n, ECF No. 547; New Trial Opp'n, ECF No. 548. Defendants filed replies. Renewed JMOL Reply, ECF No. 550; New Trial Reply, ECF No. 551. On October 31, 2017, the court heard both motions: Derek P. Cole, Gregory P. O'Dea and Mark O'Dea appeared for defendants; R. Paul Yetter, Christian J. Ward and George D. Robertson appeared for the Hardestys; and Glenn W. Peterson appeared for the Schneiders. H'rg Mins., ECF No. 554; see Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 556. II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) governs renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"), which may be raised only after the court denies a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment made during trial. Rule 50(b) provides in pertinent part that the court may: "(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b)(1)-(3). In rendering a Rule 50 motion decision, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Krechman v. Cty. of Riverside , 723 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc. , 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) ). The court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). "[A]lthough the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097.
A Rule 50(b) motion for JMOL is not treated as a separate motion; instead, it is a renewed Rule 50(a) motion. Go Daddy Software , 581 F.3d at 961. Before the court submits a case to the jury, a party must make a Rule 50(a) motion for JMOL. Id. If the court denies the motion, and if the jury returns a verdict against the movant, the movant may renew its motion under Rule 50(b). Id. As that motion is a renewed motion, it must be limited to the same grounds as asserted in the prior Rule 50(a) motion; a party cannot properly "raise arguments in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) that it did not raise in its preverdict Rule 50(a) motion." Id. (quoting Freund v. Nycomed Amersham , 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003) ). The Ninth Circuit strictly construes the procedural requirements of Rule 50, because failing to move for JMOL before submission to the jury may "lull the opposing party into believing that the moving party has abandoned any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and thereby prejudice the opposing party." Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 279 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. , 786 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1986) ). Accordingly, a party completely waives an issue that it failed to first raise in a Rule 50(a) motion. Wei Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc. , 339 F.3d 1020, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2003).
"The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict." Josephs v. Pac. Bell , 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). The verdict will be upheld if it is supported by "substantial evidence." First Nat'l Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Trust , 631 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," Fisher v. City of San Jose , 558 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009) (international quotations omitted), "even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion." First Nat'l. , 631 F.3d at 1067 (international quotations omitted). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate, however, when the jury "could have relied only on speculation to reach its verdict." Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah Cnty. , 556 F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 2009) ; id. (citing Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc. , 759 F.2d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1985) (reasonable inference "cannot be supported by only threadbare conclusory statements instead of significant probative evidence") ).
B. Motion for New Trial
The court may grant a motion for a new trial for any historically recognized grounds for permitting a new trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A) ; Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc. , 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). A grant may be based on claims "that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving." Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. , 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan , 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940) ). The Ninth Circuit has held that a trial court may grant a new trial "only if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods. , 212 F.3d 493, 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000) ; cf. Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd , 762 F.3d 829, 845-46 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Ultimately, the district court can grant a new trial under Rule 59 on any ground necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.").
Courts hold movants to a lower standard of proof on motions for a new trial than they do on motions for judgment as a matter of law. Thus, even if the court declines to grant judgment as a matter of law, it may order a new trial under Rule 59 ; in other words, a verdict may be supported by substantial evidence, yet still be against the clear weight of the evidence. Landes Const. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada , 833 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1987). Unlike a motion for judgment as a matter of law, in addressing a motion for a new trial, "[t]he judge can weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, and need not view the evidence from the perspective most favorable to the prevailing party." Id. Instead, if, "having given full respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," then the motion should be granted. Id. (quoting 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2806, at 48-49 (1973) ).
However, a motion for new trial should not be granted "simply because the court would have arrived at a different verdict." Pavao v. Pagay , 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) ; United States v. 40 Acres, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999). When a motion for a new trial is based on insufficiency of the evidence, "a stringent standard applies" and a "new trial may be granted...only if the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence" or "it is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result." Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp. , 734 F.2d 1336, 1347 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, the court should uphold a jury's award of damages unless the award is based on speculation or guesswork. See City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co. , 955 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir. 1992). Finally, the "denial of a motion for a new trial is reversible 'only if the record contains no evidence in support of the verdict' or if the district court 'made a mistake of law.' " Go Daddy Software, Inc. , 581 F.3d at 962 (citing Molski , 481 F.3d at 729 ).
Because defendants move both for renewed judgment as a matter of law and a new trial on many of the same issues, the court applies the standards applicable to each motion respectively, with its analysis organized by each claim implicated by the defense motions.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Defendants contend plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evidence to prove they possessed any liberty or property interests protected by the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Renewed JMOL Mot. at 5-9. Defendants also contend the County's actions were rational, and plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find the County's actions lacked a rational basis, a necessary finding to establish a substantive due process violation. Id. at 10-30.
The Due Process Clause prohibits government officials from arbitrarily depriving a person of her constitutionally protected liberty or property interests. See, e.g. , Action Apartment Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. , 509 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2007). But "only 'egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense': it must amount to an 'abuse of power' lacking any 'reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.' " Shanks , 540 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) ); accord N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica , 526 F.3d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The irreducible minimum of a substantive due process claim challenging land use regulation is failure to advance any governmental purpose."). Only conduct that "shocks the conscience" violates the Due Process Clause. See, e.g. , United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).
In their motions, defendants dispute: (1) the existence of a protected liberty interest; (2) the existence of some property interests; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that these two interests are present in this case; and (4) the existence of a vested right to conduct surface mining operations. The court addresses these four disputes below.
A. Liberty Interest and Waiver
Defendants contend no plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest. Renewed JMOL Mot. 6-9. Plaintiffs contend defendants have waived this argument. Renewed JMOL Opp'n at 5-7. The court agrees; defendants waived this argument as explained below.
The right to "follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of" substantive due process. Greene v. McElroy , 360 U.S. 474, 492, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). Plaintiffs contend defendants waived the claim that plaintiffs lacked any protectable liberty interests by not raising the claim in their original motions for judgment as a matter of law, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. Renewed JMOL Opp'n at 5-8. As discussed above, a Rule 50(b) motion is limited to the grounds first raised before the matter was submitted to the jury in a Rule 50(a) motion, and a party waives any issue not first asserted in a Rule 50(a) motion. Go Daddy Software , 581 F.3d at 961 ; Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc. , 339 F.3d 1020, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The failure to raise this issue prior to the return of the verdict results in a complete waiver, precluding our consideration of the merits of the issue.").
Because defendants addressed only a substantive due process interest in a vested right to mine in one of their Rule 50(a) motions, ECF No. 443 at 17-30, defendants have waived the claim that plaintiffs lacked any cognizable liberty interest, including one based on their right to pursue a chosen occupation. Defendants had notice at summary judgment that the court specifically found the Constitution protects two rights the plaintiffs asserted: "The Hardestys and Schneiders claim the County defendants stripped them of their vested right to operate a surface mine, which deprived them of their right to pursue their chosen profession and to devote their land to a legitimate use. The Constitution protects both of these interests." ECF No. 283 at 65. Further, defendants filed three Rule 50(a) motions, supported by more than 100 pages of briefing. See ECF Nos. 350, 353, 443. Defendants had ample opportunity to raise and preserve any issues in their Rule 50(a) motions and the record reflects they took full advantage of that opportunity. Defendants did not claim in their Rule 50(a) motions that plaintiffs lacked any protectable liberty interests. See ECF Nos. 350, 353, 443 at 17-30 (asserting only that plaintiffs have no "federally protected property interest"). Accordingly, defendants have waived the argument that plaintiffs lacked any cognizable liberty interest.
In reply, defendants cite Thompson v. Runnels , 705 F.3d 1089, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Pallares-Galan , 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004), to argue waiver rules apply only to "the assertion of new claims , not new arguments regarding a claim that was already asserted." Renewed JMOL Reply at 24-25 (emphasis in original). But neither case addresses Rule 50 motions. See Pallares-Galan , 359 F.3d at 1095 (addressing waiver of appellate claims to determine whether to apply the plain error or the de novo standard of review); Thompson , 705 F.3d at 1098 (addressing waiver of new arguments albeit in habeas context). Nor does either case account for the importance of first raising issues in the Rule 50(a) motion. See, e.g. , Freund v. Nycomed Amersham , 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining one purpose of first raising issues in a Rule 50(a) motion is that "it calls to the court's and the parties' attention any alleged deficiencies in the evidence at a time when the opposing party still has an opportunity to correct them"); Janes , 279 F.3d at 887 (observing that "failing to make a motion for JMOL at the close of all the evidence may lull the opposing party into believing that the moving party has abandoned any challenge....") (original emphasis, internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendants themselves proposed instructing the jury that "the Constitution protects plaintiffs' interests in the right to pursue their chosen profession," further evincing defendants' waiver of this argument. ECF No. 317 at 8. Their proposed instruction also stated "plaintiffs allege that defendants...deprived them of their Substantive Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution by stripping them of their right to operate a vested mine, which deprived them of their right to pursue their own chosen profession." Id. Defendants cannot now complain that plaintiffs lacked the right to stand on a claim based on their asserted right to pursue their chosen profession. Despite objecting to a draft final jury instruction on substantive due process, ECF No. 427 at 35, defendants did not object to the court's instructing the jury "that the Constitution protects plaintiffs' interests in the right to pursue their chosen occupation or profession." Id. ; see ECF No. 461 at 23-24 (final jury instruction given, stating "the Constitution protects a plaintiff's legitimate interests in his or her property and in the right to pursue his or her legitimate, chosen occupation or profession").see United States v. Perez , 116 F.3d 840, 845 n. 7 (9th Cir.1997) (holding jury instruction issues may be waived by defendant's attorney); United States v. Baldwin, 987 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir.1993) ("Where the defendant himself proposes the jury instruction he later challenges on appeal, we deny review under the invited error doctrine."); Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc. , 803 F.2d 1488, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986) ("A party who requests an instruction invites any error contained therein and, absent an objection before the instruction is given, waives appellate review of the correctness of the instruction."); United States v. Sumner , 125 Fed.Appx. 118, 120 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying review under invited error doctrine where defendant's counsel proposed jury instruction that mirrored model jury instruction defendant claimed on appeal was error).
Because the court instructed the jury using wording that was substantively similar to that defendants proposed, defendants have waived their argument based on liberty interest under Rule 50 as well as the invited error doctrine.
B. Property Interest and Waiver
Defendants also contend no plaintiff possessed a protected property interest. Renewed JMOL Mot. 6-9. Plaintiffs contend defendants also have waived this argument. Renewed JMOL Opp'n at 5-8. Generally, '[t] he right of [an owner] to devote [his] land to any legitimate use is properly within the protection of the Constitution.' " Harris v. Cty. of Riverside , 904 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge , 278 U.S. 116, 121, 49 S.Ct. 50, 73 L.Ed. 210 (1928) ).
Defendants have waived their claim that the Hardestys lacked a property interest independent of the Schneiders. Defendants argued in their Rule 50(a) motion only that the Hardestys were not entitled to notice under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (SMARA) based on the Hardestys' inability to cure a zoning violation. ECF No. 443 at 55-59. Defendants' claims, that plaintiffs lacked a property interest because they "have not applied for and been denied a conditional use permit" or otherwise failed to comply with zoning laws, ECF No. 443 at 17-30, do not logically extend to the claim that the Hardestys lacked a property interest independent of the Schneiders because contending only one party can have that property interest is distinct from contending only one party could have had a property interest. Contending neither party had a property interest in the Rule 50(a) motion would not have "call[ed] to the court's and parties' attention" the "alleged deficiencies in the evidence" about the Hardestys' lacking a separate property interest distinct from the Schneiders that defendants now raise. Freund , 347 F.3d at 761 ; see Go Daddy , 581 F.3d at 962-63. Defendants waived this new claim.
But defendants have not waived their claim that the Schneiders lacked a property interest absent lead agency approval. Defendants raised the following argument in their Rule 50(a) motion: "Plaintiffs' claim of a vested right does not create an entitlement to mine without complying with zoning laws." ECF No. 443 at 17-19. This argument logically extends to defendants' Rule 50(b) argument that the Schneiders not only exceeded the scope of any vested right they might have, but also that the Schneiders could not act upon such a right until a lead agency approved their reclamation plan, meaning the Schneiders lacked a property interest absent that approval. Renewed JMOL Mot. at 18-22. Thus, the court will address the merits of this argument.
That said, defendants' claim fails on the merits. Defendants assert the Schneider plaintiffs "could not have demonstrated a valid right to mine in any manner contrary to" their reclamation plan because "even vested-right mining operations are subject to [a statutory] prohibition on substantially deviating from a reclamation plan until lead agency approval is obtained." Renewed JMOL Mot. at 7 (original emphasis, citing Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2777 ). However, as explained immediately below, infra III.C., the evidence at trial permitted the jury to infer that the vested right recognized in the 2002 reclamation plan as attaching to the Schneider Historical Mine (SHM) covered the entire SHM tract without limits on production method or production amount. JX099 Exs. A-G (maps showing areas covering almost all land within the perimeter of the SHM tract and maps showing where mining was projected to occur in the future). In reply, defendants appear to implicitly concede this argument with respect to lead agency approval in asserting plaintiffs "could never have had valid expectations to mine SHM outside of the mining use recognized in the 2004 County staff letter to Jay Schneider or outside of the parameters established in the reclamation plan approved in 2002." Renewed JMOL Reply at 27. Moreover, "[v]ested rights [in mining], if established and continued, generally cannot be conditioned." Calvert v. Cty. of Yuba , 145 Cal. App. 4th 613, 626, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 (2006). In any event, the mandatory language of California Public Resources Code section 2776 -that a person "shall be deemed to have vested rights" when meeting certain requirements-undermines the assertion that plaintiffs required lead agency approval for their asserted property rights. Unless defendants could show an impermissible expansion of the property rights at issue here, or a "substantial deviati[on] from" the 2002 reclamation plan, see infra III.D., the jury's finding of a property right is supported by substantial evidence.
C. Evidence of Liberty or Property Interests
Even assuming waiver of some of its Rule 50 arguments, defendants maintain "the [c]ourt does still have authority to rule" given defendants' motion for a new trial. Hr'g Tr.at 20:1-15. The court therefore examines whether the verdict respecting plaintiffs' liberty or property interests was against the clear weight of the evidence. Passantino , 212 F.3d at 510 n.15.
1. Liberty Interest in Pursuing a Chosen Occupation
The clear weight of the evidence admitted at trial supports the conclusion plaintiffs had liberty interests in pursuing their chosen occupations. Evidence shows the Hardestys had a liberty interest in their chosen occupation as SHM mine operators, e.g. , Rep.'s Tr. (RT)1672:13-1675:13, 1677:20-24, 1678:3-6 (Hardesty Test.), and the Schneiders had a liberty interest in their occupation of owning and maintaining their ranch property and selling aggregate from their land to the mining operator and customers. See, e.g. , RT 1266:8-1267:6; 1272:23-1274:5 (Schneider Test.). As part of pursuing their occupation, the Schneiders handled issues such as establishing recognition of their vested right to mine, negotiating the reclamation plan and filing annual reports. E.g. , JX021; JX099; RT 1294:18-22, 1373:20-1374:20, 1443:25-1444:1, 1499:11-16 (Schneider Test.). The jury heard unrebutted testimony that selling mining aggregate to a mining operator has been the Schneiders' family plan "since 1935." RT 1273:14-1274:4 (Schneider Test.). And that sale of aggregate was "fundamental to the survival of the ranch" because "the mining income supplemented the income of the older generation and put the infrastructure back into the ranch to keep the building and the roads and everything repaired." Id. 1285:2-22.
The court finds the clear weight of the evidence supports a jury determination that plaintiffs had liberty interests in pursuing their chosen occupations. See ECF No. 469 at 4 (jury verdict finding violation of Hardesty and Schneider plaintiffs' substantive due process rights, which requires finding a federally protected liberty or property interest); ECF No. 461 at 23-24 (final jury instructions requiring a finding of either a "liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution").
2. Property Interest as Operators and Landowners
The clear weight of the evidence also supports plaintiffs' claim to have property interests in the land as mine operators and for the Schneiders also, as landowners. For instance, the Hardestys invested 30 years and millions of dollars into conducting their mining operations, re-investing earnings, at times millions of dollars, back into the operation. RT 1673:9-1674:8, 1684:4-18 (Hardesty Test.); 1351:18-24, 1354:11-14 (Schneider testifying to the "well developed financial relationship" between the Schneiders and the Hardestys and the Schneiders' informed belief that the Hardestys would have continued their mining operation well into the future). California Public Resources Code section 2776 supports the existence of a property right belonging to the Hardestys because that statute recognizes vested rights for any person "to conduct surface mining operations," not just landowners, and it vests that right in a person who has "diligently commenced surface mining operations and incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials necessary for the surface mining operations." See Calvert , 145 Cal. App. 4th at 630-31, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 (discussing "property rights" that "have been founded and deemed vested...under SMARA").
The court finds the clear weight of the evidence supports plaintiffs' claim to hold property interests as mine operators, and the Schneiders' additional claim to a property interest as landowners.
3. Property Interest in Goodwill of Mining Business.
The clear weight of evidence shows the Hardestys also had a property interest in the goodwill of their mining operation. "The goodwill of one's business is a property interest entitled to protection; the owner cannot be deprived of it without due process." Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan , 874 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, plaintiffs presented evidence of Joe Hardesty's building up his mining business over 30 years and accumulating "over 300 customers." RT 1677:20-1678:6 (Hardesty Test.). Hardesty developed "a good working business relationship" with the Schneiders and their ranching business. Id. 1678:19-24. Furthermore, the Hardestys were positioned to meet high demand during the economic boom of the mid-2000s. Id. 1679:4-7. Hardesty testified credibly that he developed new techniques that allowed him to get the sand and gravel cleaner more easily and otherwise grow the business, improving its efficiency and allowing for sale of additional products. Id. 1680:15-17; 1688:19-1689:1. According to Hardesty, he "had so many" customers because they were satisfied with the work he did for them. Id. 1688:3-5. This evidence supports a jury determination that the Hardestys held a property interest in the goodwill of their mining operation. See ECF No. 469 at 4 (jury verdict finding violation of Hardesty and Schneider plaintiffs' substantive due process rights, which requires finding a federally protected liberty or property interest); ECF No. 461 at 23-24 (final jury instructions requiring a finding of either a "liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution").
4. Property Interest in Devoting Land to Legitimate Uses
The clear weight of the evidence cited above supports the finding of a property interest in devoting land to legitimate uses as well-notably here, mining operations. Courts have long recognized a property interest in devoting one's land to a legitimate use. See, e.g. , Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge , 278 U.S. 116, 121, 49 S.Ct. 50, 73 L.Ed. 210 (1928) ; Harris v. County of Riverside , 904 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1990). And "[m]ineral rights have long been regarded as an interest in land" under California law. CCPA No. 1 v. Cty. of Sonoma , 122 Cal. App. 4th 1614, 1634, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 (2004).
D. Meaning of Vested Right, Nonconforming Use, and Scope of Right
Defendants contend they had a legitimate government objective in addressing an impermissibly expanding nonconforming use at the SHM. Renewed JMOL Mot. at 17-19. Plaintiffs contend substantial evidence supports and the clear weight of the evidence is not against the finding that plaintiffs had a vested right to mine the entire SHM tract, and that vested right did not limit method or production levels. Renewed JMOL Opp'n at 23-29. Plaintiffs are correct. As the first step in explaining this conclusion, the court explains the nature of a vested right to mine under California law.
In California, a person has a "vested right to conduct surface mining operations" if, "prior to January 1, 1976, the person has, in good faith and in reliance upon a permit or other authorization, if the permit or other authorization was required, diligently commenced surface mining operations and incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials necessary for the surface mining operations." Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 2776(a). This vested right requires no permit "as long as no substantial changes are made in the operation except in accordance with this chapter." Id. A surface mining operation with vested rights must still obtain approval of a reclamation plan and provide financial assurances. Calvert v. Cty. of Yuba , 145 Cal. App. 4th 613, 617, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 (2006).
As recognized by the California Court of Appeals, "In light of the state and federal constitutional takings clauses, when zoning ordinances or similar land use regulations are enacted, they customarily exempt existing land uses (or amortize them over time) to avoid questions as to the constitutionality of their application to those uses." Id. at 623, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 (citing Hansen Bros. Enterp., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors , 12 Cal. 4th 533, 551-52, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 778, 907 P.2d 1324 (1996) ). These "exempted uses are known as nonconforming uses and provide the basis for vested rights to such uses." Id. (citing Hansen Bros. , 12 Cal. 4th at 551-52, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 778, 907 P.2d 1324 ).
Here, in 1994, the Sacramento County Senior Planner, Richard Maddox, accepted evidence of a vested right to mining on the SHM from Jay Schneider. JX021. The county did not require Schneider to obtain a permit, but it did require a reclamation plan and financial assurances for all mining activities that had occurred since January 1, 1976. JX025; see JX072 (inter-department correspondence, dated December 28, 2001, from Environmental Coordinator Dennis Yeast stating, "Due to a long established practice of mining the County and State have formally recognized Schneider's vested right to mine without approval of a Use Permit."); JX071 (inter-department correspondence, dated November 13, 2001, from the Office of the County Counsel to Mr. Yeast, the Environmental Coordinator, stating, "Because the Schneider mine has a vested right to conduct mining, a use permit is not required under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (SMARA).").
The County Board of Supervisors approved a final reclamation plan for SHM November 2002, and the plan has not been amended since. JX099.
The reclamation plan describes the mining operation this way:
Material is excavated and classified, processed and stockpiled in anticipation of market demand and seasonal considerations. When the stockpiles are sufficiently diminished to justify further excavation or when there is an actual or anticipated market demand for a particular material, then such material is excavated, classified or processed as necessary and prudent, thus avoiding unnecessary excavation.
Id. , Ex. 099 at 5. The plan anticipated a "low annual average of sand and gravel mined," so reclamation was determined to proceed in annual phases. Id. It also anticipated mining would proceed in three phases. Id. The first area would be mined between 2003 and 2023, the second between 2023 and 2063 and the third after 2063. Id.
Defendants contend they had a legitimate government objective in addressing nonconforming use at the SHM based on three impermissibly expanding uses: (1) "mining outside areas intended to be mined when the use became nonconforming"; (2) "employing new mining methods or activities not used at the inception of the nonconforming use"; and (3) "increasing production levels." Renewed JMOL Mot. at 17. The court addresses these three contentions below.
1. Mining Outside the Area of the Original Nonconforming Use
Defendants contend plaintiffs impermissibly expanded their nonconforming use by mining outside areas intended to be mined when the use became nonconforming-that is, when the use no longer was inconformity with a zoning restriction. Renewed JMOL Mot. at 17-18; see Hansen Bros. , 12 Cal. 4th at 540 n.1, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 778, 907 P.2d 1324. Plaintiffs insist the jury "was entitled to understand" evidence that plaintiffs' vested right encompassed "all mining activity on the entire [SHM] tract." Renewed JMOL Opp'n at 25. A jury finding that plaintiffs' vested right to mine encompassed the entire SHM tract is not against the clear weight of the evidence, given the state of the law. Nonconforming mining uses are subject to the "diminishing asset doctrine," which permits mining uses to expand into new areas as long as their owners intended to mine these new areas when the mining uses became nonconforming. Hansen Brothers , 12 Cal. 4th at 553, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 778, 907 P.2d 1324. The diminishing asset doctrine requires: (1) the owners' manifested objective intentions to mine the new areas; and (2) those intentions existing at the time their uses became nonconforming. Id. As the California Supreme Court recognized, " '[s]uch a business must operate, if at all, where the resources are found.' If it may not expand, it cannot continue." Id. (citing Lockard v. City of Los Angeles , 33 Cal.2d 453, 467, 202 P.2d 38 (1949) ). "Were the diminishing asset doctrine inapplicable, a mining enterprise would be required to immediately initiate mining on all areas of its property lest, under a subsequent zoning change, its right to further mining be extinguished." Id. at 559, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 778, 907 P.2d 1324.
Defendants concede that "the historical record concerning what was determined with respect to SHM in 1994 was, at best, ambiguous." Renewed JMOL Mot. at 17. Against this backdrop, this is precisely the type of determination a jury was entitled to make as the factfinder. Although defendants observe that a 1994 letter from Richard Maddox to Jay Schneider (JX021) referenced only two of the SHM parcels, comprising "only 300 acres of the much larger SHM property," Renewed JMOL Mot. at 17-18, the 1994 letter also refers broadly to the "Gravel Mining Operation and "the mining operation." The jury was entitled to read this letter as encompassing all mining activity at SHM. On cross-examination, defendant Jeff Gamel acknowledged the lack of limitations in the 1994 letter, discussed more fully below. See RT 2060:25-2061:11 (agreeing that nothing in 1994 letter limited amount of production at SHM, the quantity of ore or gravel SHM could develop, the type of excavation or mining operation at SHM, or nothing that would limit the various kinds of aggregate, sand, gravel, pebbles, etc.). His testimony as to a lack of limitations also permitted the jury to conclude the vested right here extended to the entirety of SHM.
Additionally, the approved 2002 reclamation plan arguably contemplates expansion into new areas at the time the mining uses became nonconforming. See JX099. Jay Schneider testified to his understanding that the County "completely acknowledged our vested rights." RT 1319:4-15. Evidence before the jury reflected the County's understanding was similar. E.g. , JX141 (e-mail from Aggregate Resources Manager Mike Winter describing 2002 reclamation plan proceeding as "the hearing to declare the mine's vested status and to approve the reclamation plan"); PX568 at 145:21-24 (BZA hearing transcript in which County Counsel stated the "Reclamation Plan and that issue of what is vested pursuant to SMARA was decided at the time that the current Reclamation Plan was approved by the Board of Supervisors in 2002.").
Maps attached to the 2002 reclamation plan also permitted the jury to infer plaintiffs' vested right to mine at the SHM encompassed the entire tract, including expansion into new areas. These maps featured a bold-dotted line for the entire "PERIMETER OF THE SCHNEIDER HISTORIC MINING TRACT" and show areas covering almost all land within the perimeter of the SHM tract. JX099, Exs. A-G. Additionally, other maps show areas where mining was projected to occur in the future. Id. , Exs. F-G; see also, e.g. , JX071 (internal memorandum from Michele Bach, Supervising Deputy at Office of County Counsel, to Dennis Yeast, Environmental Coordinator, noting 2002 reclamation plan showed areas to be mined in the future); RT 387:8-13, 400:10-17 (testimony of plaintiffs' expert Bly-Chester about reclamation plan maps distinguishing "pre-1976 mined areas" from "things that had intended to be mined" and that "the Hardesty operations" were "[c]ompletely within" areas covered by the 2002 reclamation plan); RT 674:17-675:5 (defendant Sherry testimony acknowledging reclamation plan map shows areas that have been mined and areas not yet mined).
Defendants' own lack of clarity about the maps associated with the 2002 reclamation plan supports the conclusion that a jury finding that plaintiffs' vested right encompassed the entire SHM tract was not against the clear weight of the evidence. For instance, defendant Dickinson testified that "[i]t looks like a good portion of that map has been shaded" when asked if the shaded areas of the map looked limited to Dickinson. RT 1196:19-21. Although Dickinson testified that he "would eyeball it at less than half," Dickinson also testified that he did not know "what it [the shading] means." Id. 1196:22-1197:1. Defendant Gamel testified the maps were "very confusing because of the color overlay." RT 2063:17-19. And defendant Sherry testified that he "can't tell" and did not "know what the colors mean" in reference to maps with legends indicating estimates as to where mining likely would occur in the next 20, 40, and 100 years at the time the plan was adopted. RT 701:6-704:20.
To support their contention that plaintiffs impermissibly expanded their nonconforming use, defendants refer to evidence that County staff had referred to SHM as a "small scale operation." Renewed JMOL Mot. at 19 (citing JX084 at 6:22). But the jury also heard and saw evidence that the Hardesty mining operation remained a relatively "small operation" compared with competitors such as Teichert, Vulcan and Granite. Compare, e.g. , JX 484 at 24 (reported tonnage level for SHM at above 610,000 tons per year), with JX671 at 31-33 (describing Teichert quarry in Sacramento County producing 135 million tons from pits up to 200 feet deep and Granite quarry producing 354 million tons from a pit up to 400 feet); RT 508:9-509:1, 515:2-516:6 (Gamel Test.); RT 551:6-16 (Wheatley Test.). Thus, the jury could reasonably infer the SHM mining operation was still a relatively small-scale operation despite any expansion within the SHM tract.
In support of their impermissible expansion contention, defendants also observe "[t]he historical information Jay Schneider had provided the County prior to the 1994 letter did not expressly reference any intent to mine" the area near the Cosumnes River, "well north of Meiss Road," or "to mine the area to the extent it was being excavat[ed] by 2010." Renewed JMOL Mot. at 18. Defendants also point to evidence of plaintiffs' excavating new pits near the Cosumnes River, north of Meiss Road. Id. (citing JX 484 at 22, showing no pit near the river in 2004, and JX 484 at 23, showing pit as of 2007). Defendant Gamel also testified to his opinion that some of plaintiffs' mining in 2009 was not located in the area set out for mining between 2002 and 2022 in the 2002 Reclamation plan. RT 2164:18-2165:17; see JX099 at 15-16. But none of this evidence necessarily undercut the substantial evidence elsewhere in the record-notably, the 2002 reclamation plan maps and related testimony-, as discussed above, that plaintiffs' vested right included the areas plaintiffs mined in 2009 at the time they were mining. Nor are Gamel's opinion combined with a lack of historical evidence originally submitted by Schneider against the clear weight of the evidence in support of the verdict here: the County's 1994 letter spoke broadly about the SHM tract, the 2002 reclamation plan and its various maps were before the jury as evidence, and defendants themselves testified to a lack of clarity about the various maps in the 2002 reclamation plan. In sum, the evidence defendants cite does not shift the clear weight of the evidence.
Altogether, there was substantial evidence to support a jury finding that the plaintiffs' vested right to mine encompassed the entire SHM tract. And in light of defendants' own uncertain testimony and the other evidence of record, it is not for this court to override the jury's verdict given that the jury's finding that the vested right to mine encompassed the mining plaintiffs engaged in at the time was not against the clear weight of the evidence.
2. Employing New Mining Methods
Defendants rely on Endara v. City of Culver City , 140 Cal. App. 2d 33, 38, 294 P.2d 1003 (1956), to assert that "[n]ew types of mining methods added after the nonconformity are prohibited," including as relevant here plaintiffs' excavating riverbed aggregate near the banks of the Cosumnes River. Renewed JMOL Mot. at 17 n.14, 18. Here again, it is the court's job to review the evidence of record in light of the law, rather than to write on a clean slate. Performing this exercise, the court concludes that substantial evidence supports a finding that the vested right incorporates mining methods in place through 2010.
As noted above, Sacramento County's 1994 letter stated that information submitted by Jay Schneider "has been accepted as evidence of vested interest and therefore, we are not requiring a use permit for the mining operation." JX021. That letter does not impose any limitations on production methods. Id. In fact, Jay Schneider informed the county by submitting historical drill logs (JX001), with historical materials submitted by letter (JX011), that mining methods at SHM had historically varied and might change depending on technological and market conditions; at times in the 1940s, mining areas were located along the river and river terrace. RT 1302:22-25, 1308:3-15, 1312:21-1313:16. Although defendants refer to this historical material as providing only "vague indications," Renewed JMOL Mot. at 18, the jury heard Schneider's testimony and the historical material was admitted into evidence; it was for the jury to weigh the information in the context of the complete trial record. Defendant Gamel also testified the 1994 letter contained nothing that would limit the type of excavation or mining operation on SHM. RT 2061:6-8. Nor does the 2002 reclamation plan contain limits on the type of mining. JX099. Taking all of the evidence of record into account, the clear weight of the evidence does not contravene a finding that plaintiffs' vested right incorporates the mining methods plaintiffs used through 2010.
3. Increasing Mining Production Levels
Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that plaintiffs' vested right included varying production levels based on demand. The defendants' argument that plaintiffs' increased production in subsequent years was an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use is unavailing. See Renewed JMOL Mot. at 18-19.
According to defendants, "nonconforming mining uses are only entitled to 'gradual and natural' increases in production" to "meet the demands of population growth." Renewed JMOL Mot. at 17 (citing Hansen Brothers , 12 Cal. 4th at 573, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 778, 907 P.2d 1324 ). That plaintiffs expanded, enlarged, relocated, and increased annual production by over ten times over fifteen years was not disputed. JX287; JX483; JX484; DXA at 80. The dispute, however, is whether this increase was such that it exceeded plaintiffs' vested right. Defendants argue plaintiffs increased production too rapidly, specifically pointing to the increase from 10,000 tons in 1995 to "over 240,000 tons" by 2007. Renewed JMOL Mot. at 18-19. Defendants cite Jay Schneider's trial testimony that the SHM operation historically had produced between 5,000 and 25,000 tons per year. RT 1477:20-1478:12. Additionally, defendants note when plaintiffs sought approval of their reclamation plan in 2002, the mining operation was described as a "small scale tailing mining operation"-a mining operation separating the valuable fraction of an ore from the uneconomic fraction-that at the time mining ceased there would be at most a "maximum of 4.5 acres" per year of disturbed area and from which they expected "low annual production." JX080 at 5, 11. Defendants contrast those stated 4.5 acres per year with an inspection finding a total of 90 acres disturbed as of 2009 and 176 acres disturbed as of 2010, JX526 at 8, three to five times the 4.5 acre yearly projection.
Yet other substantial evidence supported a jury finding that the production increase was limited to meeting population increases such that the increase remained within the scope of plaintiffs' vested right. Much of the evidence shows no volume-based limitation on the vested interest. For instance, as noted above as well, evidence permitted the jury's finding that the vested right was not limited in production levels except by the boundaries of the SHM tract. The 1994 letter from the County's Richard Maddox describing the vested right says nothing at all about production volume. JX021. Defendant Gamel conceded it was correct that nothing in the 1994 letter limited the amount of production from the SHM, nothing limited the quantity of ore or gravel that the mine could develop and nothing would limit the various kinds of aggregate. RT 2060:25-2061:11. Schneider testified that the historical use of SHM showed variation in how much "material was excavated in a short period of time." RT 1302:22-25. Intensity in mining also varied over time. Id. 1308:6-15, 1314:7-1315:23. Even the 2002 reclamation plan does not state a limit on the quantity of production. JX099. In fact, the reclamation plan specifically observes, " "Material is excavated and classified, processed and stockpiled in anticipation of market demand and seasonal considerations." JX099, Ex.099, at 5.
Furthermore, as stated in Hansen Brothers , 12 Cal. 4th at 573, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 778, 907 P.2d 1324, "where increased population creates an increased demand for the aggregate used in road construction, an increase in production to meet that demand would not be construed as an enlargement or intensification of the use." See id. ("Neither an increase in the number of patrons or in the volume of goods sold [for a hypothetical grocery store operating as a lawful, nonconforming use] would be considered an enlargement or intensification of the use"). Between 2003 and 2008, demand for mining aggregate increased. JX131, 139, 157, 230, 341. The jury heard testimony and received evidence that there was a critical shortage of local aggregate for Sacramento County. RT 395:11-396:2 (Bly-Chester Test.); RT 505:1-24 (Gamel Test.). On March 23, 2009, Gamel, who was then Aggregate Resources Manager for the County, made a presentation to the Board of Supervisors about the "Importance of Aggregate Materials," especially the importance of having a local supply, and noted the critical shortage of local supply in the Sacramento region, which he reported was "Less than 10% of the 50-Year Need." JX671. In this same presentation, Gamel urged the County to prioritize huge quarries operated by large operators Teichert, Granite and other participants who entered into a funding agreement with the County to meet the critical need for local aggregate. Id. at 30-32; RT 507:1-10 (Gamel Test.).
This substantial evidence supports the implicit jury finding that the vested right included varying production levels based on demand, and the clear weight of the evidence is not against such a finding. See ECF No. 469 at 4 (jury verdict finding violation of Hardesty and Schneider plaintiffs' substantive due process rights, which requires finding a federally protected liberty or property interest); ECF No. 461 at 14 (final jury instruction stating "[t]he Schneiders' claimed right to mine or allow mining on their land is based on their ownership of the land and the history of mining on the land, which they say gave rise to the vested right to mine").
Because substantial evidence supports a jury finding that plaintiffs had a vested right to mine the entire SHM tract without limitation as to method or production levels, defendants' argument they had a legitimate government objective in addressing an impermissibly expanding nonconforming use also is unavailing.
The court now turns to the parties' contentions regarding defendants' violation of plaintiffs' substantive due process rights.
E. Violation of Substantive Due Process Rights
As discussed above, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that plaintiffs had a vested right to mine the SHM tract without limits on methods or production. A substantive due process claim requires a showing of government officials' arbitrarily depriving a person of her constitutionally protected liberty or property interests-here, the vested right to mine. See, e.g. , Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. , 509 F.3d at 1025-26. This deprivation must lack a legitimate governmental objective. Shanks , 540 F.3d at 1088. If plaintiffs' vested right has not impermissibly expanded, then defendants have no legitimate governmental interest in curtailing that vested right. But the parties dispute whether an improper motivation can show lack of a legitimate governmental objective and whether plaintiffs suffered a complete deprivation of their vested right. The court addresses these remaining disputes below.
1. Improper Motivation
Defendants contend improper motivation alone is insufficient to establish lack of a legitimate governmental purpose. Renewed JMOL Mot. at 27 n.32; Renewed JMOL Reply at 8. The court disagrees. Numerous cases detail the relevance of improper motivations in the context of substantive due process claims. For instance, in Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey , 920 F.2d 1496, 1508 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit determined a substantive due process claim must be heard at trial where plaintiffs asserted that a city council "abruptly changed course" and rejected a plan motivated "not by legitimate regulatory concern but by political pressure from neighbors and other residents of the city to preserve the property as open space." The appellate court ruled this substantive due process claim must go to trial despite the district court's previous reliance on "the affidavits and exhibits the parties had submitted" to dismiss plaintiffs' due process claim. Id. at 1507. Like defendants in Del Monte Dunes , defendants here changed course in their vested rights determinations after being the subject of political pressure. Substantial evidence showed defendants recognized plaintiffs' vested right in operating the SHM for years before abruptly changing course and taking steps to deprive plaintiffs of their vested right. See e.g. , JX021 (1994 letter recognizing vested right); JX 099 (2002 reclamation plan recognizing vested right); JX287 (April 2009 letter asserting plaintiffs' mining was "not protected by [plaintiffs'] vested right" without notice or a hearing). Substantial evidence of record was available to support the jury's decision: there was information on political influence brought to bear from at least one competitor mining company, Teichert, in the form of contributions to funding a County employee position; holding multiple meetings with County employees and discussing the Hansen Brothers decision as it relates to plaintiffs; drafting findings and providing them to County staff for use in the County's ruling on the SHM; and signing a renewed funding contract with the County the day after the Board rejected the Schneiders' appeal. See JX506; JX508. See, e.g. , JX 356; JX363; JX392; JX487; JX506-JX508; RT 341:23-343:7, 370:11-19 (Winter Test.); RT 534:15-23; RT 1232:7-1233:13. This substantial evidence supports the jury's implicit finding that defendants lacked a legitimate governmental interest in depriving plaintiffs of their vested right to mine. See ECF No. 469 at 4 (jury verdict finding violation of plaintiffs' substantive due process rights); ECF No. 461 at 23-24 (requiring finding defendants' conduct lacked "any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental purpose" to establish defendants' conduct was arbitrary as a required element of plaintiffs' substantive due process claim); Swenson v. Siskiyou Cty. , 498 Fed.Appx. 719, 721 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding summary judgment was not proper "because, viewing the evidence most favorably to [the plaintiff], he raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner when they invalidated a vested property interest due to political or other considerations").
In Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit held "the rational relation test will not sustain conduct by state officials that is malicious, irrational or plainly arbitrary." Despite acknowledging that "a water moratorium may be rationally related to a legitimate state interest in controlling a water shortage, [plaintiffs] ha[d] raised triable issues of fact surrounding the very existence of a water shortage." Id. Like the Lockary plaintiffs, the Schneider and Hardesty plaintiffs presented substantial evidence-discussed above-to support their position that they had engaged in no impermissible expansion of a vested right to mine at the SHM. Even if defendants' actions could be rationally related to a legitimate state interest in regulating vested rights in mining operations, substantial evidence supported the conclusion there was no impermissible expansion of the plaintiffs' vested right. The Lockary defendants' refusal to issue water hookups to plaintiffs is analogous to defendants here refusing to affirm plaintiffs' vested right.
Ninth Circuit case