Lewis v. Am. Sugar Ref., Inc. (325 F. Supp. 3d 321, 2018)

Claire R. Kelly, Judge

Before the court are American Sugar Refining, Inc. ("ASR") and Mehandra Ramphal's ("Ramphal") (collectively "Defendants") post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur. See Mem. L. Supp. Defs.' [ASR] & [Ramphal]'s Renewed Mot. J. Matter of Law, or Alt., Mot. New Trial, or Alt., Mot. Remit Damages, May 18, 2018, ECF No. 190 ("Defs.' Post-Trial Br."); Notice of Mots. J. Matter of Law Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, or Alt. New Trial Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 or Remittitur, May 21, 2018, ECF No. 191. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' post-trial motions for a new trial, judgment as a matter of law, and remittitur of the jury's actual and punitive damages awards are denied. The court grants Defendants' post-trial motion to remit the jury's compensatory damages award.

Claude N. Lewis ("Plaintiff") brought this action against his employer, ASR, and his supervisor, Ramphal, alleging race and national origin discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation by Defendants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law. See Compl., Mar. 27, 2014, ECF No. 2; Am. Compl., Sept. 30, 2014, ECF No. 24. Jury selection in this action occurred on April 17, 2018, and a jury trial on this matter was held from April 18, 2018 until April 23, 2018. See Trial Trs., (Apr. 18-23, 2018), ECF Nos. 179-88. After Plaintiff presented his case and rested, Defendants' counsel moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to maintain his punitive damages claim, see Trial Tr. at 912:5-914:19, (Apr. 23, 2018), ECF No. 187 ("Apr. 23 Trial Tr."), his actual damages claim arising from alleged loss of overtime pay, see id. at 914:20-916:14, his state and federal disparate treatment claims, see id. at 916:15-919:18, and his federal and state hostile work environment claims. See id. at 919:19-921:5. Plaintiff's counsel had the opportunity to respond, explaining that Plaintiff presented adequate evidence on all counts, and requesting that the court reserve judgment on Defendants' Rule 50(a) motion and defer its ruling until after the verdict was rendered. See id. at 921:10-924:25. The court reserved ruling on Defendants' Rule 50(a) motion. Id. at 925:5-8. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amounts of $104,000 in actual damages, $250,000 in compensatory damages, and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 1082:13-1086:9; Verdict Form at 3-4, Apr. 24, 2018, ECF No. 166. On May 3, 2018, the court granted the parties' consent motion to delay the entry of judgment until the disposition of all post-trial motions. See [Ct. Endorsed] Consent Mot. Delay Entry J., May 3, 2018, ECF No. 172.

DISCUSSION

I. DEFENDANTS' RULE 59 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Defendants request the court to order a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 3-22. Specifically, Defendants contend that: 1) the jury was tainted by empaneled Juror 5 who did not disclose his alleged anti-corporate bias which, if disclosed, would have demonstrated that he could not be impartial; 2) the court erred by failing to dismiss for cause Prospective Juror 27, who Defendants allege was openly biased, causing Defendants to use a peremptory challenge to remove this prospective juror; 3) the court erred by permitting Plaintiff's counsel to introduce evidence of Defendant ASR's financial status, relevant only to punitive damages, throughout the trial; 4) the jury erred in its credibility determinations; 5) the court erred by permitting certain testimony from Plaintiff's witnesses Fred Gaffney ("Gaffney") and Darius Schullere ("Schullere"); and 6) because the jury's verdict is excessive. Id. For the reasons that follow, the court denies Defendants' post-trial motion for a new trial.

A. Legal Standard

Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for a new trial following a jury trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). Pursuant to Rule 59(a), "[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues--and to any party-- ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). "Unlike [a Rule 50 motion for] judgment as a matter of law, a new trial may be granted even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict." DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998) ; Bevevino v. Saydjari, 574 F.2d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 1978). Although the trial judge possesses "large" authority to grant or deny Rule 59(a) motions, Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432-33, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996), the "court ordinarily should not grant a new trial unless it is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 691 (2d Cir. 1983) ); see Bevevino, 574 F.2d at 684 ; DLC Management Corp., 163 F.3d at 134 ("A court considering a Rule 59 motion for a new trial must bear in mind ... that the court should only grant such a motion when the jury's verdict is egregious." (quotations and citation omitted) ). Courts have determined that

[t]he circumstances ordinarily recognized as supporting a new trial are that the jury has reached a "seriously erroneous result" or that the verdict is a "miscarriage of justice," i.e., that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages awarded were excessive, or that for stated reasons the trial was not fair to the moving party.

Mallis, 717 F.2d at 691 (citation omitted) (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940) ; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2805-10, at 37-77 (1973) ).

B. The Alleged Undisclosed Anti-Corporate Bias of Juror 5

Defendants argue that the jury was tainted and the trial rendered unfair because Juror 5 failed to disclose his alleged anti-corporate bias, which if disclosed would have demonstrated that he could not be fair and impartial. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 4-7. Plaintiff replies that Defendants' challenge is baseless because Juror 5 unequivocally asserted during voir dire that he could be fair and impartial, and that Juror 5's utterances on social media regarding the role and power of corporations in the United States, discovered post-trial, do not demonstrate his inability to be so or an intent to mislead the court and counsel. See Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Defs.' Mot. New Trial & J. Matter of Law at 47-48, June 22, 2018, ECF No. 198 ("Pl.'s Resp. Br."). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' arguments are unpersuasive and the court will not order a new trial based on this ground.

The court engages in a two-part inquiry to determine whether a new trial is warranted as a result of purported juror misstatements or nondisclosure. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). The court will order a new trial if it determines that a juror both failed to "answer honestly a material question on voir dire" and "that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." Id. Further, a district court has "broad flexibility" in investigating allegations of juror bias or misconduct when the conduct relates to a juror's own statements. United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Cox, 324 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) ).

During voir dire, the court and the parties' counsel reviewed each prospective juror's questionnaire, and the court questioned at sidebar each prospective juror who raised a concern among the court or counsel as to that prospective juror's ability to be objective and fair. After questioning each prospective juror in this way, the court and counsel discussed any remaining concerns as to that prospective juror's ability to be fair in this case, and the court struck for cause all prospective jurors who the court determined could not be fair. At the request of Defendants' counsel, the court questioned Juror 5 (then-Prospective Juror 28) about an answer he provided on his questionnaire that he previously sought the help of a supervisor or his union for a dispute in the workplace:

[Defendants' counsel]: I just had a quick question for him, because he said he sought [help] from his [union] and his supervisor, I'm just curious as to what was the nature of that help and why.

[Prospective Juror 28 was brought up to sidebar.]

[...]

THE COURT: I just wanted to ask you a follow-up, a couple of questions here. When we asked have you ever or any member of your immediate family, etc., sought help with a supervisor regarding a dispute, then here with a union same thing you had answered yes. Could you just tell us more about those?

JUROR: I am on the executive board of my union. I act as a shop steward often. I have been there a long time, and often grabbed both by union and management to intervene if there is interpersonal problems, in addition to just the contractual things I have to do.

THE COURT: So really as part of your job, it wasn't anything personal as to you.

JUROR: Oh, right. Yeah, yeah. Not to me, just acting as a rep.

THE COURT: And do you think that you can put your experience as a union rep out of your head and be fair?

JUROR: I have learned that there is always more than two sides to the story. Things are never black and white, and, yeah, I think I can.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

[Prospective Juror 28 was excused from sidebar.]

[Defendants' counsel]: No objection.

THE COURT: I don't have an objection.

[Plaintiff's counsel]: No objection.

Voir Dire Tr. at 116:18-117:25. The court and the parties were thus made aware that Prospective Juror 28 was not just a union member, but was in fact a union representative. It would not be unreasonable to expect that someone who is a union representative might have sympathies that were pro-worker and even anti-corporation. The court specifically asked the prospective juror whether he could "put [his] experience as a union rep out of [his] head and be fair." Id. at 117:17-18. He answered that he could. Id. at 117:19-21. As the transcript reflects, following this questioning, counsel for both parties affirmatively stated that they had no objection to this prospective juror. See id. at 117:23-25.

The allegations of this juror's alleged anti-corporate bias do not warrant a new trial. Defendants assert that this juror was lying during voir dire when he said he could be fair, given the later discovered information, and the fact that in an earlier section of the questionnaire asking prospective jurors whether they would be able to treat corporations with the same level of fairness as individuals, Prospective Juror 28 indicated that he could. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 4-5 (referring to Questions 18-21 of the court's second voir dire questionnaire, and reproducing Question 18); see also Voir Dire Tr. at 52:17-53:1. Defendants argue that the court should infer from this juror's social media comments on unrelated matters that he lied to the court regarding his ability to be fair towards corporate parties. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 5-7. The court does not find this juror's social media posts to evidence that he lied during voir dire.

The ability to be objective and fair does not require the absence of personal views outside of the case. The jury is asked to listen to the evidence presented objectively, weigh the credibility of witnesses and testimony, and assess the case based on what they hear and see in the courtroom. Jurors may and can have personal views on certain issues, but in evaluating the potential for juror bias and impartiality during voir dire, the relevant inquiry is whether a juror can set those views aside to assess the case based only on the evidence presented. The court questioned Prospective Juror 28, asking him if he could be fair and put his role as a union member and representative out of his mind. See Voir Dire Tr. at 117:17-18. He answered under oath that he could. Id. at 117:19-21.

C. Prospective Juror 27

Defendants argue that the court erred by not dismissing Prospective Juror 27 for cause. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 7-10. Plaintiff argues that Prospective Juror 27 informed the court that he could be fair and impartial and that relevant precedent implies that loss of a peremptory challenge does not constitute an injury.

See Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 48. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' arguments are unpersuasive and the court will not order a new trial based on this ground.

To "determine whether bias [is] sufficient to warrant a challenge for cause," the court must ask whether there are "any facts in the case suggesting that bias should be conclusively presumed; and if not, [whether] it is more probable than not that the juror was actually biased against the litigant." Bainlardi v. SBC Warburg, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 2861(KTD)(HBP), 1998 WL 872487, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1998) (quoting Green v. Vacco, 961 F.Supp. 46, 50 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) ). Such a determination is within the province of the trial judge, as it requires consideration of the credibility and demeanor of the juror in order to ascertain whether or not he or she will act with impartiality. See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2002). In the criminal law context, a party's use of peremptory challenge to remove a juror that should have been struck by the court will not give rise to a claim, post-trial, unless the party foregoes using their peremptory strike and the juror actually sits on the jury. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 315-16, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not opined on whether the result is the same in the civil context, but did note, in dicta, that the rule should be the same across the criminal and civil contexts. See Cruz v. Jordan, 357 F.3d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 2004). Finally, "[a] district court's findings concerning actual bias are 'based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province.' " Nelson, 277 F.3d at 201 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) ).

Defendants allege that Prospective Juror 27 was openly biased because, "[o]nly after being asked several times by the Court whether he could be impartial (suggesting that impartiality was the correct response) did Prospective Juror 27 respond affirmatively that he could try to ignore his bias." Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 9. Defendants contend that Prospective Juror 27 did not provide an unambiguous statement that he could be unbiased. Id. When evaluating the responses offered by Prospective Juror 27, the court asked that juror whether he would be able to put his experiences out of his mind and "listen to the facts and the law," as the court instructs. See Voir Dire Tr. at 113:25-114:22. Prospective Juror 27 explicitly stated that "[i]t shouldn't be that difficult." Id. at 114:23. The court found his response to be unambiguous based upon the words used, his tone and his body language. Moreover, and as the court emphasized during voir dire, the relevant inquiry is not whether a prospective juror has ever had certain experiences in the workplace, but rather whether that prospective juror will be able to put any relevant experiences out of his or her mind and hear the facts of the case objectively. See, e.g., Voir Dire Tr. at 104:7-11, 108:4-8.

D. The Introduction of Information Related to ASR's Financial Status

Defendants allege that the trial was tainted by Plaintiff's counsel's introduction of evidence related to ASR's financial status, relevant only to punitive damages, throughout the trial. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 11-13. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' arguments are unpersuasive and the court will not order a new trial based on this ground.

The court addressed and denied, pre-trial, Defendants' motion to bifurcate damages, reasoning that bifurcation would neither economize nor expedite the proceedings, would be inconvenient, and that any potential for prejudice could be rectified with a limiting instruction. Mem. & Order at 4-5, Mar. 27, 2018, ECF No. 148. The decision to bifurcate is in the discretion of the trial court, Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1984), and its decision is dependent on the unique facts and circumstances of the case and there is no "bright-line test[.]" Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., L.P., 827 F.Supp. 233, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citation omitted).

Contrary to Defendants' claims, see Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 12-13, Defendants were neither prejudiced by Plaintiff's counsel's characterization of certain workers at Defendant ASR's Yonkers plant as "blue-collar workers," nor by the few references Plaintiff's counsel made to Defendant ASR's corporate size, and sales volume and operations. This was a four-day trial, and Plaintiff's counsel's characterizations of ASR's workers and references to the scope and operations of Defendant ASR were limited in nature. Further, even if there was any risk of prejudice, the court's limiting instruction and jury charge would have cured it. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (the trial court retains discretion to tailor relief from potential prejudice); [Corrected] Tr. at 11:10-20, (Apr. 18, 2018), ECF No. 179 ("Apr. 18 Trial Tr."); Apr. 23 Trial Tr. at 1064:2-1066:3.

E. The Jury's Credibility Determinations

Defendants argue that the jury reached a seriously erroneous result finding for Plaintiff because Plaintiff did not demonstrate that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race and/or national origin, perpetuated a hostile work environment, or retaliated against him for filing a complaint with the United States Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and initiating this litigation. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 13-20. Defendants argue that four aspects of Plaintiff's trial testimony demonstrate Plaintiff's incredibility: 1) Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Ramphal "simultaneously" berated and cursed at him in private and in public; 2) Plaintiff's testimony that he was a "model employee," in light of impeachment evidence that he was issued various disciplinary notices; 3) Plaintiff's testimony that when Defendant Ramphal allegedly used the phrase "you people" he meant the "n word," in light of Plaintiff's failure to assert that equivalence in his EEOC Intake Questionnaire; and 4) Plaintiff's testimony at trial that he specifically used the word "discrimination" in conversations with ASR employees and witnesses Elizabeth Mendonca ("Mendonca") and Debra Troche ("Troche"), which conflicts with the trial testimony of Mendonca and Troche and was not alleged by Plaintiff at his deposition, complaint, or in any other documents filed in the case. Id. at 14-16 (citations omitted). Plaintiff responds that the returned verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and that all of Defendants' challenges are properly left to the jury's determination. Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 46-47. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' arguments are unpersuasive and the court will not order a new trial based on these grounds.

Although a district court may, on a motion for a new trial challenging the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, weigh the evidence to determine whether the verdict goes against it, "a court should rarely disturb a jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility." DLC Management Corp., 163 F.3d at 133-34 (citing Dunlap-McCuller v. Riese Org., 980 F.2d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1992) ; Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 363 (2d Cir. 1992) ). "[A] trial judge can never substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury, [unless] the judge is 'convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.' " See United States v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d at 370 ).

Here, sufficient evidence exists such that the jury could conclude that Plaintiff's testimony was credible. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's testimony that he was both privately and publically discriminated against and harassed by Defendant Ramphal is incredible. Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 14-15. Defendants' counsel questioned Plaintiff on this issue, and the jurors heard Plaintiff's responses to Defendants' counsel's questioning and Plaintiff's own testimony on the matter. Plaintiff's claims of being cursed at and berated by Defendant Ramphal in both private and public are not inconsistent or mutually exclusive, and given the testimony provided at trial contextualizing why Defendant Ramphal's behavior was discriminatory, see, e.g., Trial Tr. at 347:12-348:7, 348:21-349:10 (Apr. 19, 2018), ECF No. 181 ("Apr. 19 Trial Tr."), it was not unreasonable for the jury to find Plaintiff's testimony credible. It was also not unreasonable for the jury to credit Plaintiff's testimony despite evidence that Plaintiff was disciplined over the course of his approximately 30-year employment history with ASR. Further, Plaintiff did not characterize himself as a "model employee," as Defendants state. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 15. Instead, Plaintiff indicated that, in 2013, he had no previous major disciplinary history in the course of his then approximately 25-year employment with the company. See Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 440:5-22. On cross-examination, Defendants' counsel questioned Plaintiff regarding four disciplinary notices that he received. See Trial Tr. at 719:14-724:25, (Apr. 20, 2018), ECF No. 185 ("Apr. 20 Trial Tr."). The jury heard that these disciplinary notices showed that Plaintiff had in fact been disciplined for not running a machine properly and that Plaintiff had previously been on the last step of the progressive discipline system. The jury was free to decide whether Defendants' cross-examination, revealing past disciplinary issues, undercut Plaintiff's testimony regarding his allegations of discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation against Defendants. Plaintiff testified for a day and a half concerning his work history at ASR, his numerous positions and job responsibilities, and numerous encounters with multiple people at ASR over a period of over thirty years. Impeachment evidence is used to attack a witness's credibility or character for truthfulness. See Fed. R. Evid. 608. However, it is up to the jury to determine whether a given attempt at impeachment was successful and value the impact the information revealed had on a witness' credibility. See Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944) ("it is the jury, not the court which ... judges the credibility of witnesses"); Wade v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 844 F.2d 951, 955 (2d Cir. 1988). The court cannot say that it was unreasonable, given the breadth and detail of Plaintiff's testimony, for the jury to determine that Defendants' introduction of the prior disciplinary notices did not impeach Plaintiff's credibility.

Further, the fact that Plaintiff did not explicitly state in his EEOC Intake Questionnaire that he believed that "Ramphal's alleged use of 'you people' was the equivalent of the 'n word,' " see Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 15 (citation omitted), does not undermine the jury's credibility determinations. The jury heard that Plaintiff completed the EEOC Intake Questionnaire in a hurry, and that he left some answer fields incomplete under the belief that he would be "able to speak with someone later" and be able return to the form to thoroughly explain and add to his allegations. See Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 758:2-10, 767:9-11. During trial, the jury also heard Plaintiff's testimony of how he formed the belief that the use of the phrase "you people" by Defendant Ramphal was the equivalent of using the "n word." See Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 347:13-350:21, 353:2-8, 356:6-359:9, 361:13-20, 366:9-17. The jury also heard testimony that the EEOC Questionnaire Intake form included a statement by Plaintiff which indicated that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race and/or national origin. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably have determined that although Plaintiff did not submit the most complete Intake Questionnaire to the EEOC, Plaintiff believed that he was being discriminated against by the Defendants and filled out the form with the intent of seeking resolution of that issue.

Finally, the jury heard conflicting testimony regarding whether Plaintiff used the word "discrimination" in conversations with Mendonca and Troche. Compare Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 359:22-360:3, 364:16-22, with Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 110:22-111:3, 112:14-21, 126:21-127:4, 182:22-183:16. The jury is charged with weighing conflicting testimony, and a district court should not grant a new trial on the basis that there is conflicting testimony going to credibility. See Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 875 (2d Cir. 1992). The fact that Plaintiff's testimony on this issue was in conflict with the testimony of two of Defendants' witnesses does not render Plaintiff's testimony incredible. It is the province of the jury to weigh the conflicting testimony to determine which side is credible. The jurors did so here, and found Plaintiff's testimony credible. Defendants further emphasize that Plaintiff did not previously claim that he used the word "discrimination" in his conversations with Mendonca or Troche. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 15-16. However, as Defendants note, Plaintiff did previously indicate that he "spoke to Troche and Mendonca about Ramphal singling him out and badgering him[.]" Id. at 16. Therefore, the jury could have reasonably determined that Troche and Mendonca were on notice of Plaintiff's discrimination claim. Further, to the extent that Defendants insinuate that Plaintiff's testimony at trial that he explicitly used the word "discrimination" when reporting Defendant Ramphal's behavior to Mendonca and Troche was not truthful, Defendants' counsel questioned Plaintiff on this point during cross-examination. See Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 754:25-755:24, 794:4-14. The jury heard the conflicting testimony of Plaintiff, Mendonca, and Troche, and given the verdict, seemingly credited Plaintiff's narrative that he used the word "discrimination" in those conversations. The court does not find any reason to disturb that credibility determination.

Defendants' challenges highlight the fact that this case turned on the credibility of Plaintiff, as compared to the credibility of his supervisor, Defendant Ramphal and Defendant ASR's managerial staff. That is, the jury was asked to determine who was credible-Plaintiff who alleged discrimination, loss of overtime and demotion as a result of complaining of the discrimination he experienced, and further subjection to a hostile work environment, or Defendants, who claimed that Plaintiff never reported the allegedly discriminatory acts and that if he had, the company would have responded, and that Plaintiff was disciplined and demoted because of his skill. Much of the evidence at trial, and as made clear by the types of challenges raised by Defendants in their motion for a new trial, went to the parties' credibility or circumstantial evidence purporting to reveal a party's motivation for a given act. It was not unreasonable, based on the witness testimony and evidence presented, for the jury to find Plaintiff credible and to issue the verdict that it did. The court cannot say that the jury's verdict is seriously erroneous or against the weight of the evidence.

Defendants' arguments that Defendants had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their conduct and that ASR "maintains clear anti-harassment reporting policies and procedures which Plaintiff admitted he failed to follow[,]" Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 13, do not undermine the jury's credibility determinations. The jury heard Plaintiff's narrative of events, see, e.g., Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 346:21-353:8, 356:6-359:15, 361:13-20, 366:9-370:21, 403:24-409:1, as well as Defendants' alternative narrative. Specifically, Defendants presented evidence and argued to the jury that Plaintiff was not a good employee, see Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 719:14-724:25 (Defendants' counsel introducing evidence, on cross-examination, of Plaintiff's prior disciplinary history), that Plaintiff voluntarily bid out of the higher-paying job in the processing department, see, e.g., Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 39:18-40:7, 219:22-221:16; Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 796:17-798:21; Apr. 23 Trial Tr. at 1002:4-18, and attempted to rebut Plaintiff's testimony by questioning whether Plaintiff and witness Gaffney knew of and followed the procedures laid out by the company's codes of ethics and conduct for reporting discriminatory behavior or harassment. See Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 742:25-745:18, 749:3-755:24 (Defendants' counsel questioning Plaintiff on whether he actually reported the actions he alleges were discriminatory to Defendant ASR), 667:14-668:1 (Defendants' counsel questioning of Gaffney as to why he did not sign any paperwork reporting Plaintiff's allegations of discriminatory behavior and whether he was aware of Defendant ASR's codes of conduct and ethics). The jury credited Plaintiff's testimony that Defendant Ramphal was discriminating against him on the basis of his race and/or national origin, and that Defendant ASR ignored Plaintiff's reports of that discriminatory behavior. To the extent that Defendants' argument is that the jury should have believed their version of the facts, the court will not disturb the jury's verdict as it does not go against the weight of the evidence.

Defendants also allege that the testimony of Plaintiff's witness Gaffney was incredible and should be disregarded. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 16-17. Specifically, Defendants argue that Gaffney's testimony that Plaintiff complained to him on various occasions regarding Defendant Ramphal's use of the phrase "you people" and that Gaffney understood that phrase to mean the "n word" is incredible because at trial Gaffney testified that if one of his workers came to him with a claim of discrimination, he would report it, but that "he never once reported discrimination to anyone at ASR." Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 17 (citing Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 667:2-669:1). Defendants mischaracterize Gaffney's testimony before the jury, as Gaffney did not testify broadly that he never reported discrimination to anyone at ASR. Gaffney testified as follows:

Q. Can we agree, sir, that if you were quick to report cursing, you would also have reported something as serious as race or national origin discrimination?

A. Correct.

Q. Correct. And if you believed that one of your workers, as one of the people that ran for election, was actually experiencing discrimination, you would report it, right?

A. Correct.

Q. You are aware that the company had a code of conduct?

A. Code of ethics, conduct, yes.

Q. Code of ethics. And you are aware that if you realized that any of your workers or anyone, frankly, was experiencing discrimination, you had an obligation and duty to report it, isn't that true?

A. True.

Q. But sir, we can agree, can we not, that there is not a written document with your name on it anywhere reporting that [Plaintiff] perceived he was being discriminated against because of race and national origin, correct?

A. Correct.

Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 667:5-668:1. See Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 695:12-696:11. The jury also heard Gaffney's testimony that although Plaintiff spoke to him regarding Defendant Ramphal's alleged discriminatory treatment, Gaffney was not the Plaintiff's union representative at that time. See Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 602:10-603:18. Further, the jury heard Gaffney's testimony that on two separate occasions he reported to Mendonca, the manager of the processing department where Plaintiff worked at the time, incidents of mistreatment alleged by Plaintiff against Defendant Ramphal. See Apr.

20 Trial Tr. at 609:12-612:23 (testimony cited in this range is inclusive of both pages marked as page 611). While Gaffney did not testify that he used the word "discrimination" in reporting these incidents to Mendonca, he detailed the incidents as situations in which Defendant Ramphal was targeting Plaintiff in a way that could be viewed as discriminatory. See id. Viewing Gaffney's testimony in totality, the jury could have reasonably determined that Gaffney was aware of Plaintiff's claims of discrimination, that Gaffney attempted to convey these allegations to Mendonca, and that Gaffney's testimony was not impeached by the fact that he did not report, in writing, Plaintiff's grievances. Accordingly, Gaffney's testimony on cross-examination does not render incredible his testimony on direct-examination that Plaintiff came to him several times to complain that Defendant Ramphal used the phrase "you people" in addressing Plaintiff, and that Gaffney understood that phrase to be discriminatory.

Ultimately, Defendants ask the court to reweigh the evidence and determine that it was not reasonable for the jury to find for Plaintiff on the evidence presented. Based on all the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could determine that the weight of the evidence tipped in Plaintiff's favor. It was not unreasonable for the jury to find that credible evidence was presented to support Plaintiff's theory of the case, and the court therefore does not find that the verdict was seriously erroneous or against the weight of the evidence.

F. The Testimony of Plaintiff's Witnesses Fred Gaffney and Darius Schullere

Defendants argue that the trial was prejudiced by the court's errors in permitting testimony from Plaintiff's witness Gaffney regarding unrelated allegations of discrimination, and in permitting hearsay testimony from Plaintiff's witness Darius Schullere. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 20-21. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' arguments are not persuasive and the court will not order a new trial based on these grounds.

Defendants challenge as prejudicial Gaffney's testimony that the company "did nothing" to respond to other allegations of discrimination, which were unrelated to Plaintiff's case, but likewise resulted in litigation. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 21-22. Defendants' argument that Gaffney's testimony regarding other instances of employment discrimination at and filed against Defendant ASR is not persuasive. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence will be excluded if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by [the] danger" of "unfair prejudice[.]" Fed. R. Evid. 403. Defendants' explanation for why Gaffney's testimony was prejudicial does not rise to the level of unfair prejudice that clearly outweighs the probative effect of the testimony. Here, Gaffney's testimony is probative because it relates to the procedures he saw used by the company over an extended period of time to deal with grievances. Gaffney testified based on his experience as both the shop steward at ASR from 2013 through 2016, see Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 596:15-19, and as an ASR employee who held several elected positions with Plaintiff's union. See id. at 595:17-24, 596:8-15. In addition to the example cited by Defendants in their brief, Gaffney testified to another example where the company addressed an allegation of discriminatory conduct within two weeks. Id. at 603:18-604:6. The jury also heard other testimony at trial, from Plaintiff and witnesses Troche and Mendonca, that tended to show that Defendant ASR did not properly respond to Plaintiff's complaints. See, e.g., Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 61:2-63:14 (testimony of witness Mendonca, Plaintiff's manager while he was working within the processing department, denying Plaintiff's request to have a meeting and admitting that she conveyed her belief that a meeting was not necessary to human resources manager Troche); id. at 171:2-175:17, 180:14-182:12 (testimony of witness Troche, a human resources manager at ASR at the time Plaintiff was supervised by Defendant Ramphal); Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 359:10-372:2 (Plaintiff's testimony recounting his reports of Defendant Ramphal's behavior to manager Mendonca and human resources manager Troche).

Regarding the testimony of Plaintiff's witness Schullere, Defendants contend that the court allowed impermissible hearsay testimony which prejudiced Defendants by "improperly bolster[ing] Plaintiff's testimony." Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 21. Specifically, the line of questioning that Defendants take issue with is:

[Plaintiff's counsel]: And what would [Plaintiff] tell you about his experiences as it relates to Mahendra Ramphal?

[Defendants' counsel]: Objection, your Honor. That's hearsay.

THE COURT: Well, it is for his impression, so I'm going to say overruled.

[Plaintiff's counsel]: Thank you.

[Mr. Schullere]. Okay. Well, he became a manager at one point. Since [Plaintiff] had been at the job for over 25 years, he loved the job. Suddenly, once this person became a manager, his manager, it seemed to be devastating to [Plaintiff] because from things that I have heard the man seems to be a racist. He -- well, he is always harassing [Plaintiff]. He will not give him overtime, and seems to be the general way things go on the job with other black people and so forth with this guy.

Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 703:22-704:10; see Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 21. Schullere's testimony was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, it was offered for Schuller's impression of how Plaintiff's behavior and demeanor changed during the relevant time. In fact, during cross-examination Defendants' counsel elicited from Schullere that his testimony and perception of Defendants was based on Plaintiff's allegations, that Schullere has never spoken or met with Defendant Ramphal, and that Schullere never witnessed any of the allegedly discriminatory behavior. Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 708:13-709:12. Indeed, the jury heard the same statements from Plaintiff himself, to which Defendants did not object. The court does not find that allowing the jury to hear these comments from Schullere prejudiced Defendants. The jury was aware that these statements by Schullere were not based on his own observation and could weigh it accordingly.

G. The Alleged Excessiveness of the Jury's Award

Finally, Defendants allege that a new trial is warranted because the jury's verdict is excessive. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 21-22. Defendants support their challenge by citing to the reasons proffered in their brief for why remittitur is appropriate. Id.; see also id. at 43-50. The court addresses the issue of remittitur below, and for the reasons provided there, the jury's actual and punitive damages awards are not excessive as to warrant a new trial. However, the jury's compensatory damages award must be remitted as not to be excessive. Accordingly, Plaintiff may accept the remitted compensatory damages amount or proceed to a new trial on damages.

II. DEFENDANTS' RULE 50 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Post-trial, Defendants renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 22-43. Defendants raise five grounds in support of this challenge, arguing that: 1) the evidence does not support a finding of race and/or national origin discrimination; 2) the evidence does not support a finding of hostile work environment under Title VII or NYSHRL; 3) the evidence does not support a finding of retaliation; 4) Plaintiff failed to identify any evidence to support an award of punitive damages; and 5) the evidence does not support the jury's award of actual damages. Id. Defendants offered the same grounds when moving for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). See Apr. 23 Trial Tr. at 912:5-921:9. The court reviews each challenge in turn and, for the reasons that follow, denies on all grounds Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law.

A. Legal Standard

Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law after the jury has returned a verdict and judgment has been entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Pursuant to this rule,

[i]f the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment-or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged--the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:

(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict;

(2) order a new trial; or

(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.

Id. A post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b)"should be denied unless, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 'the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached.' " Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1970) ); see Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 47 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1995). Under Rule 50, a jury verdict should be set aside and the motion granted, only when there is "such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or ... such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [jurors] could not arrive at a verdict against him." Mattivi v. South African Marine Corp., "Huguenot", 618 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 1980) ; Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1154 (2d Cir. 1994). The court will credit evidence favorable to the moving party "that is uncontradicted and unimpeached," and must "disregard" evidence that the jury is not required to believe, but which is favorable to the moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The standard of review is the same whether the motion for judgment as a matter of law is submitted prior to the verdict being issued, or post-trial. See Alfaro v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2000). It is a strict standard, and the court will grant a Rule 50 motion only if it determines that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient basis for reaching a verdict for the nonmoving party.

B. The Jury's Finding of Race and/or National Origin Discrimination

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to put forth sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of race and/or national origin discrimination because he did not demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment action and that Defendants acted with the requisite discriminatory intent. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 23-28. Plaintiff argues that he was subjected to a variety of suspensions and arbitrary discipline, denied overtime, and demoted, and that Defendants' actions convey discriminatory intent. See Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 25-30. For the following reasons, the court agrees with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has the initial burden of providing sufficient evidence establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A prima facie case is composed of four elements, but here, Defendants only challenge Plaintiff's showing on the last two elements, namely that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action and that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817 ; see Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 23-24. An adverse employment action is characterized by the existence of a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.... [that is] more than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and citations omitted) (relying on the reasoning in Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) ). Examples of materially adverse changes include "a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, ... or other indices ... unique to a particular situation." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A de minimis showing has been characterized as being sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp., LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844-45 (2d Cir. 2013). In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law in a discrimination action, the court will, on a case-by-case basis determine whether plaintiff "could satisfy his 'ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.' " Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 ). Accordingly, the court must determine whether, given the totality of the record, see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Plaintiff sufficiently put forth a prima facie case of discrimination, and it was reasonable for the jury to disbelieve the defending party's proffered legitimate business explanation for the alleged discriminatory treatment. Id.

At trial, the jury heard sufficient testimony supporting Plaintiff's claim that he was subjected to several materially adverse employment actions. Specifically, the jury heard testimony explaining how, as a result of Defendant Ramphal's actions and Defendant ASR's inactions, Plaintiff lost overtime opportunities, was forced to transfer to a lower-paying position, and was ultimately demoted. Plaintiff testified that as a result of Defendant Ramphal's behavior, see, e.g., Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 356:6-359:9, his opportunities for overtime lessened, see Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 372:3-17, 374:7-375:9, and that he lost out on holiday pay and was improperly disciplined. See Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 336:8-342:3. The jury also heard that Plaintiff bid out to a lower-paying job to avoid the negative implications of working under Defendant Ramphal's supervision. See Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 403:24-409:14. While technically "voluntary," this was a change Plaintiff pursued after exhaustively appealing for help from manager Mendonca and human resources manager Troche and receiving no response, and out of concern for his well-being. See, e.g., Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 405:5-406:17, 407:23-409:14.

Plaintiff also testified that Defendant ASR's failure to respond to his complaints and issuance of unwarranted disciplinary notices led to several adverse employment actions. Specifically, the jury heard that because Plaintiff's grievances went unanswered by Defendant ASR's managerial and human resources staff, he transferred to a lower-paying position, and that the continued improper discipline resulted in Plaintiff being placed on the last step of the discipline process and demoted to a position in sanitation. See Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 336:8-342:3, 375:13-380:9, 403:24-409:14, 486:25-491:3. The jury also heard Mendonca testify that Plaintiff approached her on three occasions, beginning in the fall of 2011, to discuss how his supervisor, i.e., Defendant Ramphal, was treating him and requesting a meeting on two of those occasions, see Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 59:9-61:1, but that she denied his request for a meeting, told human resources manager Troche that a meeting would not be productive and should not happen, see Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 61:2-62:7, and that, instead, she would speak with Defendant Ramphal herself. See Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 63:16-64:23. However, during trial Defendant Ramphal testified that no one at the company made him aware of Plaintiff's complaints against him until October of 2016. See Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 826:2-828:13. The jury also heard Gaffney's testimony that after witnessing a specific instance of Defendant Ramphal "hollering" at Plaintiff, he reported the incident to Plaintiff's manager, Mendonca. See Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 609:16-611:3 (testimony cited in this range is only inclusive of the first page marked as page 611).

The jury also heard Mendonca testify that 24-months after Plaintiff's initial request for a meeting, that meeting was held because the relevant people happened to be in the room. See Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 65:8-68:23. According to Mendonca, the meeting was cut short and Plaintiff disciplined for "poor job performance," see Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 73:4-12, 75:22-76:1, because, in contrast to what Plaintiff told her previously, see Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 73:17-75:9, a machine at his station was not running, and it should have been. See Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 68:24-69:14. However, Plaintiff explained that Mendonca knew that the machine was down when she called him in for the meeting, see Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 434:8-435:24, 437:14-438:6, and testified that he believed he was disciplined in an effort to "put [him] on track to getting fired[.]" Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 439:4-17. Plaintiff testified about other instances when he was disciplined for improper or false reasons, and issued discipline harsher than would normally be warranted for the same infraction. Plaintiff explained that, as a result of this continuous and unwarranted discipline, he was at the last stage of the progressive discipline process, i.e., in the termination stage, and was presented with a last chance agreement by the company, which would have barred Plaintiff from filing grievances. Although the company did not proceed with the last chance agreement, Plaintiff was demoted to a lower-salaried position in the sanitation department instead. Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Plaintiff was subjected to several adverse employment actions.

The jury also heard testimony from which it could have reasonably determined that the adverse employment actions Plaintiff suffered "occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2011) (relying on several cases issued by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to provide the factors necessary to make out a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework). "[A]n inference of discriminatory intent may be derived from a variety of circumstances, including, but not limited to: ... the employer's criticism of the plaintiffs performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee's protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group[.]" Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 502 (2d Cir. 2009). Phrases such as "you people" can be construed "as circumstantial evidence of "discriminatory animus," Whitehurst v. 230 Fifth, Inc., 998 F.Supp.2d 233, 253 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) and as connoting a racial meaning, see Hill v. City of New York, 136 F.Supp.3d 304, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), especially when presented in conjunction with evidence of discriminatory treatment. See Winston v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 633 F.Supp.2d 42, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

At trial, the jury heard Plaintiff testify to Defendant Ramphal's use of the phrase "you people" and that he understood it to mean the "n word." See, e.g., Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 348:21-349:2. Gaffney testified that he had the same understanding of the phrase. Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 603:3-7. Plaintiff also testified that Defendant Ramphal would often engage in the same "rant," Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 349:19-350:2, comparing the capabilities and work ethics of Guyanese employees with those of "you people" and using language such as, "you people are so stupid" in comparison to the Guyanese employees at the company. Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 347:25-348:7, 349:15-350:21. Plaintiff testified to several other incidents in which he was singled out by Defendant Ramphal. See, e.g., Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 447:14-448:18 (Plaintiff's testimony that Defendant Ramphal, in the break room and in front of other employees, told Plaintiff that he had to ask for permission before taking a slice of pizza that was available for everyone); Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 448:20-449:1 (Plaintiff's testimony that, without his permission, Defendant Ramphal used Plaintiff's initials to run lab samples); Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 450:1-14 (Plaintiff's testimony that Defendant Ramphal changed the machine settings of another African-American ASR employee); Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 351:9-352:20, 450:21-451:23 (Plaintiff recounting several incidents where Defendant Ramphal would use the company's walkie-talkie system in a manner Plaintiff perceived was meant to "ridicule" and single him out specifically). The jury also heard testimony regarding Plaintiff's contact with Defendant ASR's managerial and human resources staff, and from which the jury could have reasonably inferred discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 61:2-63:14 (Mendonca continually denying Plaintiff's request for a meeting, despite knowing, at the very least, that Plaintiff had an issue with how Defendant Ramphal was treating him); Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 376:8-378:25 (Plaintiff's testimony that Mendonca dismissed his complaint that he was disciplined arbitrarily); Apr. 18 Trial Tr. at 250:23-257:25, 270:5-272:1 (Troche's testimony that other persons claiming discrimination relied on Article 10 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), but that Troche did not investigate further and instead dismissed approximately a year later two grievances filed by Plaintiff citing the same article). Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is sufficient evidence to find that, rather than being "hard on all employees, including Plaintiff," Defendant Ramphal exhibited discriminatory intent towards Plaintiff specifically. Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably determined that the adverse employment actions were motived by a discriminatory intent.

Defendants argue that the jury's finding of discriminatory intent was not reasonable because at trial, each of Plaintiff's allegations was explained by a non-discriminatory and valid business decision. On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court will credit testimony favorable to the movant, if that testimony was not impeached or contravened. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Defendants, however, continually refer the court to testimony that was contravened or testimony that on its own does not constitute "an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [jurors] could not arrive at a verdict against him." Mattivi, 618 F.2d at 168 ; see Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 25-28. In light of the factual record, the jury could have reasonably found for the Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff carried his "ultimate burden," see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) ), of demonstrating that he was intentionally discriminated against and rebutting any legitimate business reasons offered for the treatment.

C. The Jury's Finding of a Hostile Work Environment

Defendants argue that the testimony offered at trial is insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. at 28-34. Plaintiff argues that it is reasonable to infer from the record that Defendant Ramphal favored Guyanese employees and took actions to humiliate and harass Plaintiff on the basis of that preference. See Pl.'s Post-Trial Br. at 30-31. For the following reasons, the court agrees with Plaintiff.

"[T]o prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must make two showings: (1) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment and (2) that there is a specific basis for imputing the conduct creating the hostile work environment to the employer." Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 2009) ). The court evaluates the entire record "to obtain a realistic view of the work environment," Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 21 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), and should not "view individual incidents in isolation." Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2012). Further, plaintiff only needs to demonstrate that the alleged hostile working environment was "sufficiently severe or pervasive, or a sufficient combination of these elements, to have altered her working conditions." Id. at 175 (quoting Pucino v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) ). The court's analysis looks at whether the alleged conduct was objectively discriminatory to a reasonable person and subjectively perceived as such by the plaintiff, and is guided by the following non-exhaustive list of evaluative factors:

(1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating, or a "mere offensive utterance;" (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with plaintiff's work; and (5) what psychological harm, if any, resulted.

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993).

Here, looking at the record as a whole, Plaintiff set forth sufficient evidence to support an inference that the harassment he suffered was sufficiently severe to alter his working conditions and created a hostile working environment. Plaintiff testified to a variety of instances where Defendant Ramphal used discriminatory language on the basis of race and/or national origin against Plaintiff. See, e.g., Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 356:6-359:9, 366:9-17, 431:3-11. Plaintiff testified to the severity, frequency, and longevity of Defendant Ramphal's harassment over the walkie-talkie system, see Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 351:7-352:20, 450:15-451:17, 460:7-461:15, while Gaffney testified that he did not hear Defendant Ramphal berate the Guyanese employees in the same manner.

See Apr. 20 Trial Tr. at 608:16-609:9. Plaintiff also testified to Defendant Ramphal's use of the phrase "you people," which both Plaintiff and Gaffney interpreted to mean the "n word," in reference to Plaintiff and another African-American employee. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that Defendant Ramphal would "rant" that Guyanese employees were superior or predisposed in terms of working with sugar, see, e.g., Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 349:24-350:2, 356:6-359:9, and compare the Guyanese employees' abilities with those of "you people," who are stupid, in reference to Plaintiff and another African-American employee. Apr. 19 Trial Tr. at 348:21-351:6. The jury was free to accept Plaintiff's understanding of the phrase "you people" as a phrase having a racia