Citations
- 327 F. Supp. 3d 1218
Full opinion text
Lawrence J. O'Neill, UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants: the first (Doc. 25) was filed by the California Department of Education ("CDE") and Thomas Torlakson (Torlakson) (collectively, Agency Defendants); the second (Doc. 28) was filed by the State of California (the State) and Edmund Gerald Brown, Jr. (Brown) (collectively, State Defendants). Both motions are accompanied by requests for judicial notice. Plaintiffs oppose both motions. For the reasons set forth below, State Defendants' motion (Doc. 28-1) is GRANTED and all claims against the State and Brown are DISMISSED. Agency Defendants' motion (Doc. 25) is GRANTED in part; all claims against CDE are DISMISSED; and Agency Defendants' motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim against Torlakson is DENIED.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. S.B.'s Relevant School-Placement History
Pursuant to the allegations of the First Amended Complaint (FAC), Plaintiff S.B. is a 16-year old student who is eligible for special education due specific health and learning disabilities. She has been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder with Mood-Incongruent Psychotic Features, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Major Depressive Disorder with auditory and visual hallucinations, along with a specific learning disability.
During the 2014-2015 school year, S.B. was in the seventh grade and enrolled in the Fresno Unified School District (Fresno Unified). In August 2014, S.B.'s individualized Education Plan (IEP) placed her in a mild/moderate special day class four periods per day and provided a behavior intervention plan that provided 10 minutes per day of behavior intervention services. (Doc. 26-1, Amended Due Process Cmplt. (ADPC) ¶¶ 4-9.)
In July 2015, S.B. was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold for being a danger to herself or others and she remained in a psychiatric hospital until August 5, 2015. (Doc. 26-1, ADPC, ¶ 13.) After her release from the hospital, she was placed at Phoenix Secondary Academy, within Fresno Unified, during the 2015-2016 school year. (Id. ¶ 14.) S.B's mental health continued to decline. In October 2015, she was again admitted to the hospital on an involuntary psychiatric hold due to suicidal ideation, was admitted to an acute psychiatric facility in November, and after release, was again placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold for suicidal ideation. (Id., ¶ 16.) S.B. returned to school at the beginning of December 2015. By December 16, 2015, S.B. was suspended for two days for disruptive behavior - i.e., yelling profanity at staff and peers, and she was thereafter again placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold as being a danger to herself or others. (Id. , ¶ 30.)
In February 2016, Fresno Unified IEP team met to change S.B.'s placement and offered a nonpublic school with 10 minutes per day of behavior services, and 30 minutes per week of individual counseling. (Id. , ¶ 33.) In early March 2016, S.B. was again placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold as a danger to herself or others; she was discharged a week later, only to be readmitted again on March 29, 2016, on the same basis. (Id. , ¶ 40.)
On April 5, 2016, Fresno Unified convened a 30-day IEP to review the non-public placement; Fresno Unified again offered a nonpublic school placement with 10 minutes per day of behavior services, and thirty minutes per week of individual counseling. (Id. , ¶ 42.) On April 16, 2016, S.B. was placed in juvenile hall for acts of physical aggression Plaintiffs maintain resulted from her mental health deficits. (Id. , ¶ 49.)
The juvenile hall school was operated by Fresno County Office of Education which offered an interim IEP to S.B. of 150 minutes of specialized instruction, 10 minutes per day of behavior services, and thirty minutes per week of counseling services (essentially the same IEP as offered by Fresno Unified). (Id., ¶ 55.) In May 2016, Fresno County convened a 30-day IEP team meeting, which resulted in the same IEP offer as before. For the remainder of the school year, S.B. continued to struggle with her behavior, lack of work completion, and mental health issues. (Id. , ¶ 60.)
Because S.B. was now under the auspices of the Fresno County Juvenile Probation, that agency determined her ninth-grade placement for the 2016-2017 school year. Fresno Juvenile placed S.B. at Victor Treatment in Santa Rosa, California. (FAC, ¶¶ 25-26.) According to Plaintiffs, this change in Local Educational Agency ("LEA") was mandated by California Education Code § 56162 and § 56156.4. In relevant part, Section 56162 requires that students with exceptional needs placed by a public agency (other than an educational agency) in a children's institution shall be considered residents of the geographical area where the children's institution is located for purposes of special education and related services. Section 56156.4 provides direction as to how and which local agency would provide special education services. As a result of these provisions, Sonoma County Office of Education, not Fresno Unified, was charged with overseeing S.B.'s IEP and educational needs.
S.B.'s placement at Victor Treatment did not go well. She received at least ten major behavior reports for leaving the program, self-injurious behavior, assaultive behavior, property destruction, and running away from staff; she had to be restrained and, on at least seven occasions in a two-week period, was hospitalized for being a danger to herself or others. Her placement at Victor Treatment was terminated on September 7, 2016, and because she was ostensibly returned to Fresno, her LEA changed back to Fresno County Office of Education. Because S.B. was only within Sonoma County's jurisdiction for 3 weeks, she was not assessed, no IEP was convened, and S.B.'s parents did not have time to exercise their right to obtain a new assessment or IEP. (FAC, ¶¶ 29-30.)
On October 3, 2016, Fresno Juvenile placed S.B. at Milhous in Elk Grove, California. As a result, S.B.'s supervising LEA changed to Elk Grove Unified School District. S.B. was hospitalized within two days of her admittance to Milhous, and she remained in a psychiatric hospital until November 7, 2016, when she was again returned to juvenile hall by Fresno Juvenile. Again, her LEA changed from Elk Grove back to Fresno County Office of Education. (FAC, ¶¶ 32, 34, 35.)
In early January 2017, Fresno Juvenile transferred oversight of S.B. to Fresno County Department of Social Services (Fresno DSS), as Plaintiffs maintain Fresno Juvenile could not meet S.B.'s needs. (FAC, ¶ 37.) Fresno DSS placed S.B. in a group home in Kern County, and her supervising LEA changed yet again, this time to Kern County High School District. (FAC, ¶ 38.) Kern County failed to make any interim placement offer and S.B. was put on an independent study program, but no comprehensive assessment or new IEP was formulated. (FAC, ¶ 39.) From January 9, 2017, through February 15, 2017, S.B. refused to perform work, left class without permission, exhibited aggression toward staff, engaged in self-injurious behaviors, and attempted inappropriate sexual conduct. S.B.'s parents also believe she was hospitalized during this time as being a danger to herself or others. (FAC, ¶ 40.)
On February 17, 2017, Fresno DSS changed S.B.'s placement to Charis Youth Center in Grass Valley, which changed S.B's supervising LEA for the eighth time in less than a year to Nevada Joint Union High School District. (FAC, ¶ 42.) S.B. was moved again after about 6 weeks to a group home in the Redlands Unified School District. (FAC, ¶ 44.) S.B. exhibited all the previous behavioral problems including refusal to work, leaving class without permission, aggression toward staff, and self-injurious behaviors including intentionally stepping into oncoming traffic. On April 19, 2017, Redlands Unified suspended S.B. for five days for assaultive behavior and on April 28, 2017, S.B. was discharged from the group home for running away. (FAC, ¶ 45.)
Fresno DSS placed S.B. in a group home in Fresno under the educational supervision of Fresno Central Unified School District, but she was never enrolled in school. (FAC, ¶¶ 48-49.) By May 15, 2017, S.B. was again placed in juvenile hall due to assaultive behavior in the group home, and her LEA changed once again to Fresno County Office of Education. S.B. was returned to the group home in Fresno Central Unified (again changing her LEA from Fresno County Office of Education to Fresno Central Unified), but by May 25, 2017, S.B. was again admitted to a psychiatric hospital as a danger to herself or others. (FAC, ¶¶ 54-55.)
In June 2017, Fresno Juvenile or Fresno DSS (it is unclear which) placed S.B. at Victor Treatment Center in Lodi, changing her LEA to Linden Unified School District. (FAC, ¶ 56.) In October 2017, this placement was terminated, and Fresno DSS placed S.B. with her mother for 6 days, during which time Fresno Unified was her assigned LEA. On October 9, 2017, S.B. was placed in a group home in Ventura County, but within two days she had run away and was hospitalized as a danger to herself. (FAC, ¶ 65.) By October 16, 2017, S.B. was given a seven-day termination notice from the Ventura group home, and she was again returned to the care of her mother. As of November 1, 2017, the jurisdiction of the "dependency court" was terminated, and S.B. was waiting for placement at Judge Rotenberg, an out-of-state residential treatment program in Massachusetts.
B. Plaintiffs' Complaint to OAH
In July 18, 2017, S.B. and her parents filed a due process complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) with the California Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), naming as defendants the State Defendants, the Agency Defendants, Fresno Juvenile, Fresno DSS, and the eight LEAs who had responsibility for S.B. over the prior two years.
On July 19, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an amended due process complaint with the OAH, and both the CDE and the State of California filed motions to be dismissed as parties from the administrative proceedings. OAH dismissed CDE and the State of California, determining that the claims against these entities were outside the scope of OAH's jurisdiction.
On December 15, 2017, the OAH issued a notice of case dismissal indicating that Plaintiffs' due process complaint against the remaining parties, the LEAs, had been settled through mediation. (Doc. 26-1, p. 50.)
C. Plaintiffs' Complaint Before This Court
Meanwhile, on November 8, 2017, Plaintiffs filed suit against the parties dismissed from the OAH proceeding, i.e., the State of California and CDE, and named additional Defendants Brown and Torlakson.
Plaintiffs' FAC sets out six claims for relief. The first claim for relief against CDE and the State is under the IDEA. Plaintiffs maintain California's Education Code requires a student's assigned LEA to be based on geographic placement of the student. This, however, resulted in a constant change of LEA and precluded S.B. from receiving an assessment, an appropriate IEP, and, ultimately, a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). In S.B.'s case, in the time it took for the receiving LEA to convene an IEP and offer to assess S.B., S.B. was either sent back to juvenile hall, was admitted to a psychiatric hospital, or was otherwise moved by either Fresno Juvenile or Fresno DSS. Because of these residency rules requiring a student's LEA to be assigned based on geographic placement of that student, S.B. was denied the processes necessary to ensure her educational rights. Plaintiffs allege that the State and CDE have an obligation to ensure a FAPE is available to all children, including children who are in the dependency and delinquency system, as well as children with severe mental health deficits. Plaintiffs seek a judicial order requiring the State and CDE to develop policies and procedures to ensure that students within the juvenile justice system have one designated LEA responsible for development of IEPs, not dependent on the geographic location of their placement.
Plaintiffs' second claim is also under the auspices of the IDEA's requirement that special education students be placed in the least restrictive environment under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5), as close as possible to a student's home as required by 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(3) and California Education Code § 56342. Moreover, there must be a continuum of placements available to meet the needs of a disabled student under 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 and California Education Code § 56342. Plaintiffs allege that, due to the severity of her mental health needs, S.B. required an educational placement in an appropriate residential treatment center within the state of California in order to receive a FAPE. Plaintiffs allege the State and CDE have failed to ensure that special education students with the most severe mental health needs have access to in-state residential treatment centers. Instead, students are "shipped out of state far from their homes" to receive the care they require, which makes it impossible to transition back into their communities when the placement ends. Plaintiffs seek a judicial order requiring the State and CDE to develop policies and procedures to assure residential treatment centers are available in-state for students with severe mental health needs.
Plaintiffs' third claim for relief is against CDE and the State for violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA). Plaintiffs allege the State and CDE, by failing to ensure appropriate residential treatment centers are available inside California, deny equal access to education services to those with severe mental health needs.
Plaintiffs' fourth claim for relief is against the State and CDE for violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Plaintiffs allege the State and CDE's failure to ensure access to residential treatment facilities inside California resulted in S.B. missing numerous instructional hours and led to recurrent hospitalizations. Moreover, S.B.'s emotional lability made it impossible for her to meet and sustain the behavioral requirements of the various institutions where she was placed, which resulted in a plethora of different placements in different geographic locations, each supervised by a different LEA. As a result, no LEA had time to conduct an assessment, revise S.B.'s IEP, and S.B.'s parents did not have time to initiate a request for this type of review. As such, Plaintiffs maintain S.B. was denied access to an educational program within California specifically because of her mental health needs.
Plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief is against Brown and Torlakson in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs maintain that as S.B's responsible LEA changed with each new placement, it was impossible for S.B. to receive an appropriate education and denied her due process of law.
Finally, Plaintiffs' sixth claim is against all Agency and State Defendants for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs maintain the residency scheme set forth in California Education Code sections 56156.4 and 56162 result in a disparate impact on students with significant mental health disorders and/or other highly mobile students with disabilities such as S.B., in that they are denied the benefits of one consistent agency responsible for their educational assessments. Plaintiffs seek a determination that these California Education Code sections violate the California Constitution.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)
A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion tests whether a complaint alleges grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be granted if the complaint on its face fails to allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. , 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court "is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction." McCarthy v. United States , 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the opposing party bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).
B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't. , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations in the complaint, construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all doubts in the pleader's favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens , 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Thus, "bare assertions ... amount[ing] to nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements'... are not entitled to be assumed true." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "[T]o be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint ... must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca , 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). In practice, "a complaint ... must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955. To the extent that the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, a plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc. , 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Eleventh Amendment Precludes Certain Claims
1. Declaratory Relief Claim is Precluded Under the Eleventh Amendment
Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action seeks declaratory relief against all Defendants requesting a determination that the California Education Code sections 56156.4 and 56162 violate the California Constitution. State Defendants argue that pursuant to Pennhurst v. Halderman , federal courts are prohibited from enjoining state officials from violating state law under the Eleventh Amendment, and therefore this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action. 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Agency Defendants make the same argument, citing Alden v. Maine , 527 U.S. 706, 749-50, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).
Although acknowledging the State and its agencies may exercise the right to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims made on the basis of state law, Plaintiffs argue that, as a matter of judicial economy, Defendants should not be able to shield themselves from their alleged unconstitutional statutory provisions. Plaintiffs argue their claims challenging the validity of Education Code Sections 56156.4 and 56162 under the IDEA (a federal statute that expressly waives sovereign immunity of the states who accept federal funding under the statute), under the Procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and under the California State Constitution are all inextricably intertwined. Plaintiffs contend they should not be compelled to separately file their challenge to the California Constitution on the same intertwined grounds in state court.
It is well-settled that the "Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest ...." Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 101-02, 104 S.Ct. 900.
Consequently, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court may not grant relief "in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law." Id. at 106, 104 S.Ct. 900 ; see also Han v. United States Dept. of Justice , 45 F.3d 333, 339 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We are barred by the Eleventh Amendment from deciding claims against state officials based solely on state law."). Pursuant to this well-settled precedent, whether Plaintiffs' declaratory relief claim asserting portions of the California Education Code violate the California Constitution is intertwined with their other federal claims, federal courts have no discretion to entertain private suits against a state and its officials on the basis of state law. Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 106, 104 S.Ct. 900. This Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state law claims over which a federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn. , 534 U.S. 533, 541, 122 S.Ct. 999, 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002). Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief on state law grounds against the State, its agency the CDE, and state officials, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action for declaratory relief based on violation of the California State Constitution against all Defendants is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.
2. Section 1983 Claim For Violation of Procedural Due Process
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Brown and Torlakson, in their official capacities as Governor of California and Superintendent of Public Instruction in California, respectively, deprived S.B. of her constitutional procedural due process rights through "enactment and enforcement of the statutory scheme that caused [S.B.'s] local educational agency to change with each placement change." (FAC, ¶ 112.) Plaintiffs allege "[t]his frequent change in responsible [LEA] made it impossible for S.B. to receive an appropriate education and denied her due process of law." (FAC, ¶ 113.) More specifically, S.B.'s placement was changed ten times in approximately one academic school year, resulting in ten different responsible LEAs. (FAC, ¶ 50.) Because the placement changes occurred so frequently, Plaintiffs contend no LEA was able to commence the proper educational assessments, IEP meetings, or include S.B.'s parents in the IEP process - not only did this ultimately result in depriving S.B. of a FAPE under IDEA, it also denied Plaintiffs procedural due process rights.
a. Section 1983 Claim Against Brown is Barred
State Defendants argue the § 1983 claim against Defendant Brown must be dismissed for three reasons: (1) there is no case or controversy between Plaintiffs and Defendant Brown; (2) the claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (3) Defendant Brown has absolute legislative immunity.
State Defendants contend Brown has no connection to the due process violations alleged and thus is immune from suit under § 1983 ; State Defendants contend that where the official's connection to the challenged action is so attenuated such that relief as to that official would not redress the plaintiff's injuries, that official must be dismissed for lack of redressability under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. 28-1, 14:25-15:6 (citing Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Brown , 651 F.2d 613, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1980) ).) Plaintiffs did not address these arguments in their opposition as to Brown. (See Doc. 33.)
The Court agrees with State Defendants. Brown is not alleged to have any direct connection to the enforcement of the California Education Code such that any relief ordered against Brown would redress Plaintiffs' injuries. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 559, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (Article III standing requires injury, a causal connection between injury and conduct traceable to the defendant, and the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision). Moreover, Brown is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. As discussed above, the Eleventh Amendment poses a general bar against federal lawsuits brought against a state. Porter v. Jones , 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003). And, while it does not bar actions for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities for their alleged violations of federal law, Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the individual state official sued "must have some connection with the enforcement of the act," and that connection "must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit," id. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441. Brown, sued in his official capacity, has no alleged factual connection to the enforcement of the California Education Code, other than a general duty to enforce California law as the governor. L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Eu , 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992) ; Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris , 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013) (Governor entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity where his only connection to challenged California statute was a general duty to enforce California law). The § 1983 claim against Defendant Brown is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
b. Section 1983 Claim Against Torlakson is Viable Under Ex Parte Young
Agency Defendants assert the Eleventh Amendment precludes a Section 1983 official-capacity suit against Torlakson. Plaintiffs maintain they seek only prospective injunctive relief against Torkalson under Section 1983, thus the claim meets the exception to the Eleventh Amendment outlined in Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 157, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
The Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief if suit is brought against a state official acting in an official capacity. Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The "obvious fiction" of Ex parte Young , however, stretches only so far and is subject to several constraints. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe , 521 U.S. 261, 270, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997). These limitations include the following: (1) the action must seek only prospective injunctive relief; it may not challenge past conduct; (2) the action must address an ongoing federal violation; (3) the action cannot be based on state law; and (4) the official sued must have a connection with the law and direct responsibility for enforcing it. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441 (official sued must have some connection to enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional act); Verizon v. Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n of Md. , 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) ( Ex parte Young applies where complaint alleges ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective); Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 675, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (federal court's remedial power consistent with the Eleventh Amendment is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief).
As to the first limitation under Ex parte Young , Torlakson argues Plaintiffs seek an injunction asking the court to intervene in the State legislative process, but there is no authority that permits a court to direct an elected official or an agency to take a particular position regarding legislation. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs seek damages for past conduct, such remedies are foreclosed under the first element of the Ex parte Young analysis. Plaintiffs maintain they do not seek anything under their Section 1983 claim other than prospective injunctive relief, and the court can order state officials to work with the state legislature to bring the Education Code into compliance with the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution pursuant to Serrano v. Priest , 18 Cal. 3d 728, 749, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1976).
Plaintiffs' prayer for relief is not specific as to what relief is sought with respect to which claims. Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim specifically alleges personal injury, educational loss, and emotional distress; the prayer for relief seeks compensatory damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. Due to this ambiguity, the Court must presume all forms of relief alleged in the prayer are directed toward each claim. State officers in their official capacities are not amenable to a suit for damages under § 1983, thus any claim for monetary damages against Torlakson in his official capacity is barred. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona , 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997).
However, Plaintiffs also seek prospective injunctive relief: (1) "An Order directing Defendants to work with the State Legislature to amend the Education Code to ensure students in the juvenile justice system have one responsible educational agency assigned to them regardless of their physical placement location" (FAC, ¶ 127); and (2) "Injunctive relief requiring Defendants to develop policies and procedures to ensure that students in the juvenile justice system have a free and appropriate public education available to them and are evaluated in accordance with the requirements of IDEA" (FAC, ¶ 125.) While the Court may not be empowered to order prospective injunctive relief exactly as Plaintiffs seek it, the Court has considerable discretion in granting and tailoring injunctive relief so long as the injunction is narrowly tailored to supply only the relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled. U.S. v. AMC Entertainment, Inc. , 549 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2007) ; Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh , 919 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). The scope of prospective injunctive relief that could be awarded, however, does not affect the cognizability of Plaintiffs' official-capacity claim. Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim seeks prospective injunctive relief, which is the type of relief that can be pursued in an official-capacity suit under Ex parte Young , notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment.
As to the second limitation of Ex parte Young , Plaintiffs must allege an ongoing violation of federal law. Agency Defendants argue because S.B. is no longer in the jurisdiction of the juvenile or dependency court, she will no longer be subject to the residency rules Plaintiffs challenge, and the alleged violation is therefore not ongoing. At this stage, it is inappropriate to determine to what degree S.B. may or may not be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile or dependency court in the future such that she would be subject to placements by those agencies under the challenged statutes. Verizon Maryland, Inc. , 535 U.S. at 646, 122 S.Ct. 1753 (citing Coeur d'Alene , 521 U.S. at 281, 117 S.Ct. 2028 ("An allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law ... is ordinarily sufficient") ).
Until S.B. can no longer, as a matter of law, be placed in an institution by a public agency and assigned an LEA as provided by the California Education Code, the ongoing nature of the violation is sufficiently alleged.
The third prong under Ex parte Young requires that the action cannot be based on state law. Agency Defendants argue Plaintiffs allege state laws violate the federal constitution, and though the claim alleges a constitutional violation under § 1983, it is nonetheless based on state law. Agency Defendants cite Everett H. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary School Dist. , No. 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DAD, 2014 WL 3867461 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2014), but that case does not state that a § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of the U.S. Constitution is one predicated on state law. In Everett , pro se plaintiffs attempted to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant Torlakson, but they did not allege a constitutional violation. Id. at *3-4. Instead, they attempted to use § 1983 to allege Torlakson violated the law by failing to sanction a school under California Education Code § 56845. Id. at *4. In dismissing this claim, the court explained a federal court may not grant injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacities for a violation of state law. Id. Here, as already discussed, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim is predicated on alleged procedural due process violations under the U.S. Constitution. Any injunctive relief ordered on such a claim would be made on the basis of federal law, not state law. Ex parte Young does not preclude such a claim.
The fourth prong of the Ex parte Young doctrine requires that the official sued has a connection with the challenged law and direct responsibility for enforcing it. Here, because Torlakson is the California State Superintendent of Public Instruction, he is sufficiently connected to the enforcement of the Education Code, which Plaintiffs challenge as violative of procedural due process, to be amenable to suit. The California State Superintendent of Public Instruction is elected to act as the Secretary and Executive Officer for the State Board of Education and the Chief Executive Officer for the California Department of Education. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 33301 - 33303. This requires the Superintendent to ensure that school districts comply with the California Constitution and state laws. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 33301 - 33307. The Superintendent is the Director of Education in whom all executive and administrative functions of the California Department of Education are vested. Id. at §§ 33301 - 33307. Torlakson's role as the Executive Officer of the Department of Education requires him to administer and enforce all state laws applicable to schools under the California Education Code. As such, the Superintendent is connected to the enforcement of the Education Code, sections of which Plaintiffs allege violate federal law. Torlakson's specific enforcement obligations are a sufficient causal connection to state an official capacity § 1983 claim, see McRorie v. Shimoda , 795 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1986) and to show a sufficient direct connection under Ex parte Young , see Harris , 729 F.3d at 943 ; see also P.P. v. Compton , 135 F.Supp.3d 1098, 1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (finding fairly direct connection under Ex parte Young where school officials had duty to enforce the challenged provision).
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim adequately alleges a procedural due process violation against Torlakson in his official capacity that fits within the exception to the Eleventh Amendment provided in Ex parte Young .
B. Section 1983 Claim Against Torlakson is Sufficiently Pled
Agency Defendants make multiple arguments that, even if the § 1983 claim against Torlakson is not precluded by the Eleventh Amendment, it is insufficiently pled because (1) Plaintiffs claim is really seeking rights to a different statutory scheme, but this cannot be the predicate of a procedural due process claim; (2) there are no allegations showing how S.B. was denied due process given the amount of process available under IDEA; (3) there are no allegations showing that Torlakson caused any alleged deprivation of due process; and (4) the due process claim is improperly premised on a violation of IDEA.
The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses a guarantee of fair procedure. Zinermon v. Burch , 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). In the context of procedural due process claims, "the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in 'life, liberty, or property' is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law. " Id. In these type of claims, the constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is only complete when the state fails to provide due process. Id. To determine whether a procedural due process violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the state provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate. To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest; and (2) denial of adequate procedural protections. Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist. , 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998).
As the Court understands their first argument, Agency Defendants contend Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim wrongly asserts a right to a different statutory scheme from the one that actually exists under IDEA and the California Education Code. (Doc. 25-1, 35:22-36:3.) The Court does not interpret Plaintiffs' complaint to make such an assertion. Plaintiffs allege S.B. has been deprived of her constitutional right to the education that California has entitled her without sufficient due process procedural protections. They allege the procedural safeguards for ensuring a FAPE were rendered useless and unavailable because of the multiple LEA changes S.B. was subjected to resulting from application of the Education Code's residency rules; the only procedure that was available was a due process complaint after S.B. had been denied a FAPE. Plaintiffs' theory appears to be that the California Education Code obviated necessary pre-deprivation procedural safeguards (e.g., notice and some opportunity to participate and be heard regarding S.B.'s educational requirements before S.B. was deprived her right to a FAPE). This is a cognizable § 1983 claim for violation of the Constitution's procedural due process guarantee.
Agency Defendants argue the FAC is devoid of facts alleging the extensive procedural processes provided by the IDEA were insufficient; specifically, Agency Defendants argue there is no allegation S.B.'s parents ever requested any process such as an IEP meeting or an educational assessment. Agency Defendants note the California Education Code requires completion of assessments when an exceptional needs student is transferred from one district to another within an academic year; because Plaintiffs never requested an evaluation, Plaintiffs cannot show it could not have been accomplished, even in light of the multiple transfers S.B. experienced.
While Agency Defendants point to many types of process available to ensure parental participation in the IEP process, Plaintiffs' allegations plausibly imply the procedural safeguards normally available (educational assessments, IEP meetings, etc.) were rendered useless and constructively unavailable because S.B.'s assigned LEA changed so rapidly; in other words, there was insufficient time to request an educational evaluation or an IEP meeting. Plaintiffs allege S.B. was sometimes transferred to a new LEA before they were even aware of the identity of the previously assigned LEA. (FAC ¶ 65.) The facts alleged plausibly imply S.B.'s placements were changed with such frequency there was no time to initiate any of the procedural safeguards to ensure a proper FAPE determination, nor any time to complete those processes. (FAC, ¶¶ 21-68.) Whether Plaintiffs were, in fact, owed constitutional due process protections before a FAPE determination was made (in the form of IEP offers), what type of process was required, and whether Plaintiffs were unable to effectively initiate any of the required procedures are matters to be addressed on the merits.
Agency Defendants next argue the claim is deficient because it does not sufficiently allege how Torlakson performed any acts that precluded S.B. from receiving an education and due process. In an official-capacity suit, a defendant's liability is connected to the entity's policy or custom that played a part in the violation of federal law. McRorie , 795 F.2d at 783. Plaintiffs contend the California Education Code's residency rule precluded proper educational assessments and parent participation in the IEP process which are important and required procedural safeguards to ensuring that a FAPE is not denied. Torlakson's specific enforcement obligations of the California Education Code, as discussed above, is a sufficient causal connection to state an official capacity § 1983 claim, see id. , and to show a sufficient direct connection under Ex parte Young , see Harris , 729 F.3d at 943 ; see also P.P. v. Compton , 135 F.Supp.3d 1098, 1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (finding fairly direct connection under Ex parte Young where school officials had duty to enforce the challenged provision).
C. Plaintiffs' IDEA Claims Against CDE and the State
1. Plaintiffs' IDEA Allegations
As noted above, Plaintiffs' first IDEA claim challenges California's residency rules assigning an LEA based on the geographic location of a student's placement by a public agency (rather than the student's parents' geographic location). In the course of the 2016-2017 academic school year, under these residency rules, S.B. experienced 10 different placements with 10 corresponding changes in the LEA who oversaw her education. (FAC, ¶ 50.)
Plaintiffs maintain the State of California and CDE have the ultimate obligation to ensure a FAPE is provided to special needs students. When it is impossible for a student to receive a FAPE - such as here, by operation of state education law - Plaintiffs maintain the IDEA requires CDE to step in to ensure the educational rights of students like S.B. are protected pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1413(g). Plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring Defendants to develop policies and procedures to ensure that students in the juvenile justice system, such as S.B., have a FAPE available to them and are evaluated in accordance with the requirements of the IDEA.
Plaintiffs' second claim under IDEA contends the State and CDE failed to ensure that students who require a residential treatment have placements in the least restrictive environment (LRE), 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5), which Plaintiffs assert is "as close as possible to the student's home," 35 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(3). (FAC, 84.) Plaintiffs maintain that to meet the LRE standard under the IDEA, students must have access to an appropriate residential treatment center within the State of California. Placements out of state do not fulfill the LRE standard because it is impossible for students to transition back to their communities when the placement ends, and it impedes parents' right to meaningfully participate in opportunities for family therapy, as may be required by the student's IEP. Plaintiffs seek a judicial order requiring Defendants to develop policies and procedures to assure residential treatment centers are available in-state for students with severe mental health needs such as S.B. (FAC, ¶ 91.)
2. Private Right of Action Under IDEA
The State argues Plaintiffs have no private right of action against it under the IDEA. The State notes Plaintiffs' claims seek injunctive relief to develop policies and procedures to ensure compliance with IDEA, which implies a breach of the State's duties under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a) and 1415(a) of IDEA. The State argues the Ninth Circuit's decision in M.M. v. Lafayette School District , 767 F.3d 842, 860 (9th Cir. 2014), holds these IDEA provisions do not provide a private right of action; as such, Plaintiffs cannot compel the State to develop or implement policies and procedures under §§ 1412 or 1415 of the IDEA. Plaintiffs maintain a private right of action exists when challenging a systemic violation of the IDEA, similar to those permitted to proceed in Kerr Center Parents Assoc. v. Charles , 897 F.2d 1463, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990), Beth V. v. Carroll , 87 F.3d 80, 86 (3d Cir. 1995), and Heldman v. Sobol , 962 F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1992).
The State's initial argument is cursory: in three sentences and one citation to Lafayette , the State asserts §§ 1412 and 1415 lack a private right of action compelling any of the defendants to develop or implement policies and procedures required by these portions of IDEA. As discussed in Beth V. v. Carroll , 87 F.3d 80, 86 (3d Cir. 1996), a case favorably cited by the Ninth Circuit, see Doe v. Arizona Dept. of Educ. , 111 F.3d 678 (1997), the express private right of action provided in § 1415 is broad - it encompasses any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Systemic complaints against state educational agencies for failure to implement or maintain adequate procedures under IDEA have been determined to fall within the scope of this private right of action. Doe , 111 F.3d at 681-83 (cataloging cases involving systemic challenges under IDEA). As discussed below, while the Court does not find Plaintiffs' complaint to be systemic, it does relate to S.B.'s evaluation, placement, and provision of a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The State's fails to show how the broad and express right of action in § 1415(i) does not encompasses Plaintiffs' claims or how the claims here are analogous to those in Lafayette . In Lafayette , the claim against CDE under IDEA was neither systemic in nature, nor involved a matter sufficiently "relat[ed] to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child." Rather, the claim involved a challenge to CDE's oversight of OAH hearings and CDE's decision to stay its investigation of the parents' complaint under 34 C.F.R. § 300.152 pending the outcome of a due process hearing.
Lafayette , 767 F.3d at 860. The court concluded neither § 1412 or § 1415 provided a right of action to challenge CDE's oversight of the OAH, over which CDE has no jurisdiction, or to challenge CDE staying its investigation. Based on the argument presented, the Court finds Plaintiffs' claims are not precluded for lack of a private right of action under IDEA.
3. State is Not a Proper Party Defendant to Plaintiffs' IDEA Claims
The State argues it is not a proper party in any action for declaratory or injunctive relief under IDEA. Plaintiffs assert only that they are entitled to a remedy from the State, but offer no authority or compelling reasons why the State is a proper party defendant to their IDEA claims.
Although it is the State which receives federal funding under IDEA, administrative implementation, oversight, and enforcement of IDEA at the state and local level is accomplished by the "state educational agency" which in California is the CDE. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(11)(A) ; 1401(32). The State of California itself does not implement, oversee, or enforce the provisions of the IDEA. The State of California is not alleged to have any role in enforcing the California Education Code or carrying out and overseeing the mandates of IDEA. As such, Plaintiffs provide no allegations how the State is a proper party defendant and how the State itself could supply any relief to Plaintiffs under IDEA. The State is not a proper party defendant to Plaintiffs' IDEA claims.
D. IDEA Exhaustion Requirements
1. Parties' Arguments
Defendants (both Agency and State Defendants) argue Plaintiffs were required to exhaust completely their administrative remedies before pursuing the IDEA claims filed with this Court; to accomplish exhaustion, Defendants contend, Plaintiffs were required to complete the administrative process against the LEAs, even after CDE and the State of California were dismissed from the administrative process for lack of OAH jurisdiction. Defendants argue the claims against CDE and the State are fundamentally predicated on whether S.B. was denied a FAPE when her LEA was reassigned based on the location of S.B.'s placement by various public agencies; whether a FAPE required that S.B. receive a residential placement; and, if so, whether that placement must be in-state to provide S.B. with the Least Restrictive Environment under the IDEA. Defendants argue these findings first should be made by education experts in the administrative setting. Because Plaintiffs voluntarily settled their IDEA claims against the LEAs, Defendants argue Plaintiffs' IDEA claims against CDE and the State are not exhausted.
When the OAH agreed and dismissed CDE and the State as parties, Plaintiffs maintain the claims against those entities were exhausted to the extent possible. (Plaintiffs' Oppo., Doc. 31, 9-10 (citing Abraham P. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. , No 2:17-cv-03105-GW, 2017 WL 4839071, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2017).) Plaintiffs argue any further exhaustion (completion of the administrative process against the LEAs) should be excused because pursing a decision against the individual school districts (as opposed to the settlement that Plaintiffs reached with the LEAs) does not "make sense." Plaintiffs contend they would not be able to enforce findings made by the OAH in a subsequent proceeding against CDE and the State because they were no longer parties to that process. Moreover, the relief Plaintiffs seek against CDE and the State was, as determined by OAH and argued by CDE and the State, outside the OAH's jurisdiction to grant. And, Plaintiffs' note, pursuing the administrative process to a decision against the LEAs before instituting suit against CDE and the State would create other procedural problems. Specifically, if forced to complete administrative proceedings against the LEAs following CDE and the State's dismissal by the OAH, the limitation period to file suit against CDE and the State in this Court would expire and time-bar the claims. Also, if Plaintiffs were required to complete exhaustion by obtaining a hearing-officer decision on the remaining claims against the LEAs, Plaintiffs argue they would lose the benefit of settling with the LEAs and receiving an immediate placement for S.B., and would potentially be required to pay their own attorney fees, even if they were ultimately the prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(D)(i) (attorneys' fees may not be awarded to prevailing parent if relief finally obtained by parent is not more favorable to the parents than a timely offer of settlement). Finally, Plaintiffs note that, in support of their motions to be dismissed from the OAH process, CDE and the State characterized Plaintiffs' claims as systemic issues of statutory compliance. Plaintiffs maintain the Ninth Circuit has not required exhaustion of systemic IDEA claims.
Defendants respond that Plaintiffs' opposition argument ignores the importance of the administrative process as explained in Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School District , 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992). According to Defendants, because Plaintiffs settled the underlying administrative complaint against the LEAs, Plaintiffs did not pursue to decision whether any LEA failed to provide Plaintiff a FAPE, and therefore there is no final determination of what S.B.'s education needs are, if different from what was provided in her operative IEP. Defendants maintain Plaintiffs' claims against CDE and the State are predicated on the "unsubstantiated presumption" that S.B. was denied a FAPE, and insist there is a dispute as to what educational program S.B. required to receive a FAPE. Moreover, Defendants argue, to the extent that CDE was responsible for provision of any services to S.B. directly, that would require a finding that the underlying LEAs were not able to provide education and special services to offer S.B. a FAPE. Defendants maintain that without these underlying findings, exhaustion is incomplete and cannot be excused as to any of Plaintiffs' claims.
2. Applicable Legal Framework
a. IDEA Administrative Procedures
IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 - 91, was enacted to confer on disabled children the substantive right to a FAPE, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c), which consists of education instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a disabled child, supported by those services necessary to permit a child to benefit from the instruction, Board of Educ. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 188-89, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Under the statute, an exceptional needs student is entitled to an IEP, a tailored education program detailing the student's abilities, educational goals, and specific services designed to achieve those goals within a designated timeframe. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20), § 1414(d). The IDEA places on the individual States the primary responsibility for carrying out the goals of the statute and authorizes federal funding for states providing the special education required by the statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1412.
The IDEA requires educational agencies to implement procedures which provide "[a]n opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child[.]"
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The parent or educational agency begins the process by filing a due process complaint. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (b)(7). The matter proceeds to a "due process hearing" before an impartial hearing officer. § 1415(f)(1)(A). The hearing officer may order relief, such as requiring the educational agency to provide services to fulfill its obligations to provide a FAPE or to reimburse the parent for the cost of acquiring necessary services. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(22), 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). A party aggrieved by the findings and decisions made by the hearing officer has the right to bring a civil action in federal or state court within 90 days from the date of the decision of the hearing officer. § 1415(i)(2).
These administrative appeal procedures must be pursued before seeking judicial review. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 ; Smith v. Robinson , 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). The IDEA exhaustion requirements embody principles of administrative law and the educational underpinnings of the IDEA: it is the agencies, not the courts, which "ought to have primary responsibility for the programs Congress has charged them to administer." McCarthy v. Madigan , 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992). This promotes the twin purpose of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency. Id. In the IDEA context, exhaustion of administrative remedies "allows for the exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state and local agencies, affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children." Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303. Courts have frequently concluded that, based on these policy aims, settlement or dismissal of IDEA claims during the administrative process before the matter has been heard and a decision issued by the hearing officer does not constitute exhaustion. See, e.g, S.A.S. v. Hibbing Pub. Sch. , No. 04-cv-3204-LRT-RLE, 2005 WL 1593011 (D. Minn. July 1, 2005) ; Hamilton v. Bd. of Sch. Commrs. , 993 F.Supp. 884, 889 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (considering settlement tantamount to exhaustion undermines purposes of the exhaustion requirement).
b. IDEA Administrative Procedures Applicable to Certain Non-IDEA Claims
IDEA's exhaustion requirement has application to other types of federal claims because IDEA is not the only statute protecting the interests of children with disabilities in a school setting. For example, ADA's Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et. seq. , forbids any "public entity" from discriminating based on disability. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, prohibits any federally funded "program or activity" from discriminating based on disability. When disability issues arise in schools, IDEA often overlaps with other disability statutes. The Supreme Court considered the overlap of these laws in Smith where the plaintiffs sought a FAPE, but stated claims under RA and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause along with their IDEA claim. 468 U.S. at 1009-21, 104 S.Ct. 3457. Smith held IDEA altogether foreclosed those additional claims because IDEA was "the exclusive avenue" through which a child with disability could challenge the adequacy of his education. Id. at 1009, 104 S.Ct. 3457. In passing the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 796, Congress overturned Smith 's preclusion of non-IDEA claims while also including an exhaustion requirement for non-IDEA claims:
Nothing in [IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation Act [including § 504], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [IDEA], the [IDEA's administrative procedures] shall be exhaustion to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under [IDEA].
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l ). Congress noted the first half of § 1415(l ) (up until "except that") "reaffirm[ed] the viability" of federal statutes like ADA or RA "as separate vehicles," no less integral than the IDEA, "for ensuring the rights of handicapped children." H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, p. 4 (1985); Fry , at 750. Following this enactment, federal circuit courts interpreted the scope of § 1415(l ) under two dominant paradigms: an injury-centered approach and, later, a relief-centered approach.
The Ninth Circuit first considered the scope of § 1415(l ) in Witte v. Clark County School District , where parents complained that school officials physically and emotionally abused their son who suffered from Tourette's Syndrome; the parents sought compensatory and punitive damages under § 1983, RA, ADA, and state tort law. 197 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court granted summary judgment to the school officials on the federal claims for lack of exhaustion under § 1415(l ), but the Ninth Circuit reversed, emphasizing that monetary damages were ordinarily unavailable under IDEA and thus the plaintiffs were "not seeking relief that is also available under" IDEA as required "under the plain words" of § 1415(l ). Id. at 1275.
The Ninth Circuit then revisited this interpretation in Robb v. Bethel School District v. Bethel School District # 403 , holding that "when a plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any degree by the IDEA's administrative procedures and remedies, exhaustion of those remedies is required." 308 F.3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002). In Robb , a student diagnosed with cerebral palsy was regularly removed from her classroom for peer-tutoring without the supervision of a certified teacher and conducted in a dim hallway without a chair or desk. Id. The Robbs filed suit under § 1983 for money damages only, but specified those damages were for "lost educational opportunities and emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and psychological injury. Id. at 1048. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust under § 1415(l ), which the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court stated concern that