Citations
- 329 F. Supp. 3d 98
Full opinion text
To prevail in this antitrust litigation, the FTC must prove that defendants possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and that defendants willfully acquired or maintained that power. See Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., 838 F.3d 421, 433 (3d Cir. 2016). Here, the FTC asserts that defendants maintained their AndroGel monopoly through the filing of sham litigation against Teva and Perrigo. To prove its case, the FTC must establish: (1) the lawsuits filed by defendants against Teva and Perrigo were objectively baseless; (2) defendants subjectively intended to file such lawsuits; and (3) that defendants possessed monopoly power in the relevant market. See Prof'l Real Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993) (" PRE"); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 132, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2017).
On September 15, 2017, this court ruled that defendants' infringement lawsuits against Teva and Perrigo were objectively baseless and entered summary judgment in favor of the FTC on this issue. See FTC v. AbbVie Inc., No. 14-5151, 2017 WL 4098688, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2017) (Doc. # 300). Thereafter the court held an approximately three-week nonjury trial on the issues of subjective intent and monopoly power. The court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I
To understand the claim presented in this action, we first set forth the regulatory scheme that governs the testing and approval of new drugs in the United States. That framework is governed by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., as amended by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, which is commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271. See Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
A drug manufacturer seeking to market a new drug must obtain approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). There are three pathways established by the FDCA and Hatch-Waxman: (1) a section 505(b)(1) New Drug Application ("NDA"); (2) a section 505(b)(2) NDA; and (3) a section 505(j) Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA").
An NDA is a full-length application containing information on the drug's safety and efficacy, an explanation of the drug's ingredients, a description of the methods used in the manufacture and packaging of the drug, samples of the proposed labeling, and samples of the drug itself. See id. § 355(b)(1). The NDA must also contain a list of any patents covering the drug. Id.
Once the FDA has approved a new brand-name drug, an applicant with a generic version of that drug can obtain approval through the use of abbreviated procedures. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). Most commonly, the applicant will file a section 505(j) ANDA stating, among other things, that the generic has the same active ingredients and is biologically and pharmacologically equivalent to the brand-name drug. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A). The applicant may then rely on the safety and efficacy data contained in the NDA for the brand-name drug. Id.
In the alternative, the applicant with a generic drug may file a section 505(b)(2) NDA, which is a hybrid between an ANDA and a full NDA. A section 505(b)(2) NDA is used for generics that have slight modifications from the brand-name drug. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.54. The applicant must submit additional data to the FDA demonstrating that any differences between the brand-name drug and the generic will not affect safety and efficacy but can otherwise avoid the other studies necessary for a full NDA application. Id.; see also Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2013). Because the Hatch-Waxman Act allows the applicant to "piggy-back" on the efforts for the approval of the brand-name drug, its provisions "speed the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market" and thereby promote drug competition. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 142, 133 S.Ct. 2223, 186 L.Ed.2d 343 (2013) (quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 405, 132 S.Ct. 1670, 182 L.Ed.2d 678 (2012) (alteration omitted) ).
Once the FDA approves a generic drug, the applicant may request from the FDA a therapeutic equivalence ("TE") rating. A TE rating is a code that reflects the FDA's determination regarding whether a generic product is pharmaceutically and biologically equivalent to the reference-listed brand-name drug. Products that are determined to be therapeutically equivalent are assigned an "A" or "AB" rating. Generic products for which therapeutic equivalence cannot be determined are assigned a "B" or "BX" rating. An "A" or "AB" rating is extremely desirable. Every state in the United States has generic substitution laws. See Mylan Pharm. Inc., 838 F.3d at 428. These laws "either permit or require pharmacists to dispense a therapeutically equivalent, lower-cost generic drug in place of a brand drug absent express direction from the prescribing physician that the prescription must be dispensed as written." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provides specialized procedures for parties to resolve intellectual property disputes. In submitting an ANDA or section 505(b)(2) NDA, an applicant must certify that any patent currently in force for the referenced brand-name drug "is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale" of the proposed generic. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). This certification is commonly referred to as a paragraph IV notice. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 143, 133 S.Ct. 2223.
The paragraph IV notice "automatically counts as patent infringement" and thus often leads to an infringement suit by the patentee. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) ). Upon receiving the paragraph IV notice, the patentee has 45 days to determine whether to file suit for infringement. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). The notice often includes an offer of confidential access whereby outside counsel for the patentee may review the application submitted to the FDA by the generic applicant to facilitate a determination regarding infringement litigation. If the patentee files an infringement suit against a generic entity within this 45-day period, the FDA is required to withhold approval of the generic drug for 30 months from receipt of the paragraph IV notice or until the infringement action is resolved in the district court, whichever occurs first. Id.
II
AndroGel is a brand-name transdermal testosterone gel product approved by the FDA for the treatment of hypogonadism, a clinical syndrome that results from failure of a man's body to produce adequate amounts of testosterone. It is estimated that this condition affects 2-6% of the adult male population in the United States. Hypogonadism is a lifelong condition which causes decreases in energy and libido, erectile dysfunction, and changes in body composition including decreased bone density. Patients with hypogonadism are typically treated with testosterone replacement therapy ("TRT") whereby exogenous testosterone is administered.
The first TRTs approved by the FDA were injectables in which testosterone is dissolved in a liquid and then injected into a muscle of the body. Injectable testosterones were introduced in the 1950s and have been available in generic form for decades. They are administered every one to three weeks. While many patients receive injections at their doctors' office, some patients opt to self-administer injections at home or visit clinics specializing in TRT commonly known as "Low-T" centers. Because they are available in generic form, injectables generally require a five to ten dollar patient copay on most insurance plans and thus are the least expensive treatment method for hypogonadism.
Testosterone injections typically require two needles: a withdrawal needle and an injection needle. The withdrawal needle is typically a 20-gauge wide bore and 1-inch long needle required to withdraw the testosterone from the glass vial. After withdrawal, the patient must switch to a 21- or 22-gauge narrow bore and 1.5-inch long needle to administer the injection. This needle must then be inserted deep into a muscle, typically the buttocks or thigh, until the needle is no longer visible. Because a deep intramuscular injection is required, this treatment method may cause pain and discomfort which will vary from patient to patient. Injectables generally provide an initial peak in testosterone level at the time of injection followed by troughs or valleys as the injection wears off. This variation in testosterone level may cause swings in mood, libido, and energy.
TRTs may also be administered through a gel or patch which is applied to the skin and thereby absorbed into the bloodstream. This group of products is known as topical testosterone replacement therapies or transdermal testosterone replacement therapies ("TTRTs"). Androderm, the first testosterone patch, was released in the 1990s. It is applied once a day to the back, abdomen, thighs, or upper arms. The patch formulation delivers a steady level of testosterone without the peaks or valleys associated with injectables. It is relatively easy to apply, although the patch may cause skin irritation in some patients and may be visible depending on where it is applied. Testoderm, a testosterone patch worn on the scrotum, was also introduced in the 1990s.
AndroGel was launched in 2000 as the first FDA-approved testosterone gel. It is applied once a day to one or more application sites, including the upper arms, shoulders, and abdomen. AndroGel comes in two strengths: (1) 1%, which was the original formulation launched in June 2000; and (2) 1.62%, which was first sold in May 2011. At the time AndroGel 1% came on the market in 2000, it was available only in sachets. In 2004 it became available in a metered-dose pump. AbbVie discontinued manufacture of the AndroGel 1% pump in December 2013.
AndroGel 1% was developed through a collaboration between Unimed and various subsidiaries of Besins' parent company. At the time of its launch, AndroGel 1% was marketed and distributed by Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Solvay"), the parent company of Unimed. Abbott Laboratories acquired Solvay and Unimed in February 2010. At that time Solvay was renamed Abbott Products Inc. In January 2013, AbbVie assumed all of Abbott's proprietary pharmaceutical business, including AndroGel 1%.
As the first gel in the market, AndroGel achieved great commercial success and quickly became one of Solvay's "flagship" products. In 2009, AndroGel's U.S. net sales were approximately $604 million and in 2010, that number grew to $726 million. After AbbVie acquired Solvay and Unimed in 2010, sales of AndroGel continued to grow, and AndroGel became one of AbbVie's blockbuster drugs. In 2011, U.S. net sales for AndroGel reached $874 billion and in 2012, U.S. net sales surpassed $1.15 billion. In 2013, AndroGel's U.S. net sales were approximately $1.035 billion while in 2014, net sales totaled $934 million. After entry of generic versions of AndroGel 1%, AndroGel U.S. net sales fell to $694 million in 2015. Throughout this time, AbbVie maintained a high profit margin of approximately 65% on AndroGel.
Transdermal gels have several advantages over the other forms of TRTs. A gel is relatively easy for a patient to apply without the potential for pain or discomfort associated with an injection. It also allows the patient to maintain a steady testosterone level without peaks and troughs. As compared to the patch form of testosterone, it has a lower rate of irritation and is not visible.
Gels such as AndroGel, however, are not without some drawbacks. There is a serious but rare risk of secondary exposure associated with gels, whereby testosterone may be transferred from a patient to others, including women and children, through skin-to-skin contact. Precautions such as washing hands after application and covering the application site with a t-shirt can prevent such exposure. Gels may also cause skin irritation in some patients. Finally, some patients may dislike having to apply the gel daily.
After AndroGel was released in 2000, several other brand-name TTRTs were launched by competing pharmaceutical companies. Testim, a 1% gel available in a five gram tube, was approved in 2002. In 2011, two brand-name testosterone 2% gels were brought to market: (1) Fortesta, a metered-dose pump product applied to the thighs; and (2) Axiron, a solution that is dispensed from a metered-dose pump and is applied to the underarms using a silicon applicator. And in 2014 Vogelxo, another brand-name low-volume testosterone gel, was launched along with an authorized generic version of the same product.
In addition to injectables and TTRTs, several other forms of TRT have been approved by the FDA. Striant, a buccal testosterone tablet that is applied twice daily to gums, was released in 2003. Testopel, a pellet that is surgically inserted in the hip, buttocks, or thigh every three to six months, was approved in 2008. And in 2014 the FDA approved Natesto, a nasal testosterone spray that is administered three times a day.
AndroGel 1% is protected by the '894 patent. That patent is owned by Besins and by Unimed, which as discussed above, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Solvay until 2010. Laboratoires Besins Iscovesco SA, a subsidiary ultimately owned by Besins' parent company and now known as Laboratoires Besins Iscovesco SAS ("LBI SAS"), licensed to Unimed certain intellectual property rights to AndroGel. In return, Unimed was obligated to pay a royalty on net sales of AndroGel. Under a separate supply agreement, LBI SAS agreed to manufacture and to sell to Unimed AndroGel products for sale and distribution by Unimed in the United States.
We have previously discussed the prosecution history of the '894 patent in our September 15, 2017 Memorandum (Doc. # 300) and therefore need not restate it in detail here. See AbbVie, 2017 WL 4098688, at *1-4. In summary, the initial patent application that resulted in the '894 patent claimed a pharmaceutical composition of a testosterone gel including a penetration enhancer, which according to the patent application "is an agent known to accelerate the delivery of the drug through the skin into the bloodstream." Id. at *1-2. The patent application claimed all penetration enhancers including isopropyl myristate, the penetration enhancer actually used in AndroGel. Id. at *2. The patent examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") rejected the claim which included all penetration enhancers. Id. Thereafter, Unimed and Besins submitted an amendment narrowing their claim encompassing all penetration enhancers to a claim naming only twenty-four specific penetration enhancers, including isopropyl myristate. Id. at *2-3. After a series of additional amendments, Unimed and Besins further narrowed their claim to one penetration enhancer, isopropyl myristate, only. Id. at *3. On this basis, the '894 patent was issued on January 7, 2003. Id. at *4. It is scheduled to expire on January 6, 2020.
As is often the case with successful pharmaceutical products, generic manufacturers sought entry into the market to compete with AndroGel. In December 2008, Perrigo submitted to the FDA two ANDAs for a generic testosterone 1% gel in both pump and packet form. The ANDAs referenced AndroGel and the '894 patent. However, the Perrigo product contained isostearic acid as its penetration enhancer rather than AndroGel's isopropyl myristate claimed in the '894 patent.
Pursuant to the procedures established by the Hatch-Waxman Act, Perrigo in June 2009 served paragraph IV notices on both Unimed and Besins as co-owners of the '894 patent. In those notices, Perrigo disclosed the filing of its ANDAs for a generic 1% testosterone gel. Perrigo further asserted that its ANDAs would not infringe the '894 patent for AndroGel because the Perrigo products did not contain "about 0.1% to about 5% isopropyl myristate," the sole penetration enhancer formulation claimed in the patent. Perrigo also stated in its notices that the prosecution history of the '894 patent would estop Unimed and Besins from filing a patent infringement claim. Finally, Perrigo offered to provide to outside counsel representing Unimed and Besins confidential access to the full ANDAs.
Thereafter Unimed and Besins, along with Unimed's parent Solvay, jointly retained the law firm of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett and Dunner, LLP ("Finnegan, Henderson") to assess the Perrigo paragraph IV notices and the Perrigo ANDAs. Finnegan, Henderson obtained confidential access to the full ANDAs and confirmed that Perrigo's ANDAs contained isostearic acid, not isopropyl myristate. Besins also separately retained the law firm of Foley and Lardner LLP ("Foley and Lardner"). Outside counsel at Foley and Lardner did not receive confidential access to the ANDAs.
On July 17, 2009, Solvay and Unimed issued a press release announcing that "[a]fter careful evaluation" the companies had decided not to file a patent infringement suit against Perrigo. The press release explained that the Perrigo product "contains a different formulation than the formulation protected by the AndroGel patent." It further stated that "[t]his distinction played a role in the company's decision not to file patent infringement litigation at this time" but "the company does not waive its right to initiate patent infringement litigation at a later stage based on new or additional facts and circumstances." The ultimate decision not to file suit was made by Solvay in-house attorneys Shannon Klinger, Peter Edwards, and Dominique Dussard. Besins also determined that it was "standing down" from bringing an infringement suit but did not join in the Solvay press release or issue its own public announcement.
Sometime in 2009, the FDA became aware of cases of accidental secondary exposure of children to TTRTs due to skin-to-skin transference from patients using these products. Based on this information, the FDA required safety-related labeling changes and a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy ("REMS") for transdermal testosterone gel products currently on the market. Thereafter Auxilium Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the manufacturer of Testim, submitted a citizen petition to the FDA regarding a generic version of Testim. To facilitate the drug approval process, the FDA permits private entities to provide comments and opinions by filing citizen petitions. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30. A petition can request that the FDA "issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order or take or refrain from taking any other form of administrative action." Id.
In response to the Auxilium citizen petition, the FDA directed on August 26, 2009 that any application for a generic testosterone gel product containing a penetration enhancer different from the referenced brand-name drug would be required to be submitted as a section 505(b)(2) NDA rather than an ANDA. The application must also include certain additional safety studies regarding the risk of secondary exposure.
On April 9, 2010, AbbVie, now the owner of AndroGel, filed its own citizen petition with the FDA. In that petition, AbbVie noted the FDA's ruling in response to the Auxilium citizen petition regarding all generic testosterone products containing penetration enhancers different than those contained in the reference-listed brand-name drug. AbbVie thus sought assurance from the FDA that Perrigo would be required to resubmit its 2009 ANDAs referencing AndroGel as section 505(b)(2) NDAs. AbbVie also requested that Perrigo be directed to provide to the AndroGel patent holders a new paragraph IV notice. Finally, it asked that Perrigo be required to conduct transfer and hand-washing studies as set forth in the FDA's response to the Auxilium petition.
On October 4, 2010, the FDA granted in part and denied in part AbbVie's citizen petition. The FDA directed that any application by a generic manufacturer for a product referencing AndroGel that contained a different penetration enhancer must be submitted as a section 505(b)(2) NDA. It also agreed that the applicants would be required to submit new paragraph IV notices.
On January 13, 2011, Teva filed a section 505(b)(2) NDA for its generic version of AndroGel 1% which described a different penetration enhancer, isopropyl palmitate, than AbbVie used in its brand-name AndroGel. The application sought approval to manufacture and to distribute the product in two different sachet sizes as well as in a pump form. This application superseded an ANDA for generic testosterone that Teva had filed on December 29, 2008, prior to the FDA's ruling on the Auxilium citizen petition.
On March 16, 2011, Teva sent to Solvay, AbbVie, Unimed, and Besins a paragraph IV notice regarding its section 505(b)(2) NDA. Teva asserted that its product did not infringe the '894 patent because "the Teva formulation does not contain isopropyl myristate," the penetration enhancer claimed in the '894 patent. Teva laid out the prosecution history of the '894 patent and its position that, because the claims of the '894 patent were narrowed to disclose only isopropyl myristate, "the prosecution history estops the patentees from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents." Teva also offered confidential access to certain information regarding its section 505(b)(2) NDA to allow the patent holders to assess whether an infringement action would have merit.
AbbVie retained outside counsel at the law firm of Munger, Tolles and Olson LLP ("Munger Tolles") to evaluate the Teva paragraph IV notice. Counsel at Munger Tolles was provided with access to the Teva section 505(b)(2) NDA and provided in-house counsel at AbbVie with its opinion.
Besins again retained Foley and Lardner to evaluate the notice. Foley and Lardner was supplied with confidential access to the NDA and submitted its analysis to Besins.
On April 29, 2011, within 45 days after receiving the paragraph IV notice, AbbVie, Unimed, and Besins commenced an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware alleging the Teva's product infringed the '894 patent. See Abbott Prods., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 11-384, 2011 WL 1765168 (D. Del. Apr. 29, 2011). The suit against Teva triggered the Hatch-Waxman automatic stay of FDA approval of the Teva product. Consequently, the FDA could not approve Teva's generic testosterone drug for 30 months after March 16, 2011 or until September 17, 2013 unless the district court resolved the lawsuit sooner.
The intellectual property ("IP") litigation group at AbbVie had direct accountability for patent litigation. Four in-house patent attorneys in that group had final responsibility for evaluating the Teva paragraph IV notice and made the decision to file the patent infringement suit against Teva: (1) Johanna Corbin; (2) Adam Chiss; (3) Anat Hakim; and (4) Jose Rivera. All of these attorneys had extensive experience in patent law and with AbbVie. Corbin is currently vice president of the IP group and the lead IP attorney at AbbVie who has worked in that group since 2005. Chiss was divisional vice president of IP litigation and before that had served as senior counsel in IP litigation. Anat Hakim was divisional vice president and associate general counsel of IP litigation at AbbVie and previously had been a partner at Foley and Lardner. Finally, Rivera was a divisional vice president of the IP group and had previously worked in private practice. The general counsel of AbbVie, Laura Schumacher, also signed off on the final decision. Schumacher has been with AbbVie since 2005. No business persons at AbbVie were involved in the decision to sue. At trial, AbbVie presented evidence that the decision whether to file a complaint is always made solely by the legal department and does not require approval from management.
As for Besins, the decision to sue was made by Thomas MacAllister, its in-house counsel. MacAllister is an experienced intellectual property attorney who previously worked as a patent examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Besins conferred with outside counsel as well as AbbVie about the Teva product and potential litigation. Like AbbVie, Besins or its agents had confidential access to the portions of Teva's NDA that disclosed the formulation of its product prior to filing the complaint against Teva. In addition, in-house counsel for Besins conferred with in-house counsel for AbbVie before making the decision to initiate the lawsuit.
Around this time AbbVie also was preparing for FDA approval and launch of its low-volume formulation of AndroGel, known as AndroGel 1.62%. The FDA issued final approval of brand-name AndroGel 1.62% on April 29, 2011, and AbbVie began selling it in May 2011. The 1.62% formulation is indicated for the same condition and has the same active ingredient but less total gel. Sales of AndroGel 1.62% grew more slowly after launch in 2011 than defendants initially anticipated but by June 2012 constituted the majority of total AndroGel sales. AndroGel 1.62% accounted for total AndroGel sales as follows: 57%
during the last 7 months of 2012, 67% in 2013, 76% in 2014, and 83% in 2015.
In June 2011, Teva submitted a case status report proposing a schedule for early summary judgment proceedings in the patent infringement suit in the District of Delaware. AbbVie, Unimed, and Besins filed a supplemental case status report opposing any summary judgment proceedings. On August 1, 2011, before discovery had commenced, Teva filed a motion for summary judgment. Teva asserted that based on prosecution history estoppel there could be no viable claim of infringement of the '894 patent. On October 25, 2011, the court set trial on the issue of prosecution history estoppel for May 21, 2012.
On August 18, 2011, AbbVie filed a citizen petition with the FDA requesting that it refrain from granting a therapeutic equivalence rating to section 505(b)(2) products referencing AndroGel, including Teva's testosterone product, or in the alternative, requesting that it assign the product a BX rating. If a BX rating was assigned, there could be no automatic substitution at the pharmacy under state law.
Meanwhile, on July 4, 2011 Perrigo re-filed with the FDA its application for approval of a generic testosterone 1% gel as a section 505(b)(2) NDA. On September 20, 2011, Perrigo sent AbbVie, Unimed, and Besins a new paragraph IV notice. As in its 2009 notice, Perrigo certified that the '894 patent was not infringed because its generic testosterone product did not contain "about 0.1% to 0.5% isopropyl myristate," the penetration enhancer claimed in the patent.
Perrigo's letter also explained that the prosecution history of the '894 patent precluded any valid infringement claim. Perrigo stated that "a lawsuit asserting the '894 patent against Perrigo would be objectively baseless and a sham, brought in bad faith for the improper purpose of, inter alia, delaying Perrigo's NDA approval." It further asserted that "a bad faith motive for bringing such a suit would be particularly apparent in light of representations and admissions made, inter alia, in [Solvay's] Friday, July 17, 2009 press release." Perrigo offered confidential access to certain information regarding the NDA. Again, AbbVie and Unimed retained Munger Tolles as outside counsel to analyze Perrigo's NDA. Foley and Lardner evaluated Perrigo's NDA on behalf of Besins and also issued its opinion to Besins.
On October 31, 2011, AbbVie, Unimed, and Besins filed suit in the District of New Jersey alleging that Perrigo's 1% testosterone gel infringed the '894 patent. See Abbott Prods., Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 11-6357, 2011 WL 5314659 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2011). As in the Teva litigation, the filing of the complaint against Perrigo triggered an automatic 30-month stay under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Thus, absent a court ruling or settlement resolving the litigation, the stay would preclude final FDA approval of the Perrigo generic testosterone product until March 20, 2014.
The same four AbbVie in-house attorneys as had made the decision to sue Teva again made the decision to file the suit against Perrigo with approval from the same general counsel. They conferred with outside counsel, who had confidential access to the Perrigo section 505(b)(2) NDA. No AbbVie business person was involved in the decision to file the Perrigo action. After consultation with AbbVie and outside counsel, Besins' same in-house attorney made the decision that it would join in bringing the Perrigo litigation.
AbbVie reached out to Teva to discuss an amicable resolution of the dispute before the complaint was filed in April 2011. Perry Siatis, an in-house attorney for AbbVie, was the main negotiator on behalf of AbbVie. At that time, Siatis was Divisional Vice President of the IP strategy group and head intellectual property attorney at AbbVie. Although that initial contact did not lead to a settlement, AbbVie again raised the subject with Teva during an in-person meeting on October 28, 2011, three days after the court in the Teva litigation had set a trial date. Although Teva at the outset pushed for an entry date as early as September 17, 2013, the final date of the 30-month Hatch-Waxman stay, AbbVie countered with an entry date of January 1, 2015. AbbVie thereafter agreed to an entry date of December 27, 2014, which would allow Teva to make some sales in 2014. On December 20, 2011 the parties reached a final settlement in the Teva litigation, in which Teva received a license to launch its product beginning December 27, 2014.
While the Teva negotiations were ongoing, settlement negotiations were taking place in the Perrigo litigation. Sometime on or before November 3, 2011, Siatis approached Perrigo to initiate settlement negotiations. On December 8, 2011 the parties executed a binding term sheet, which included the dismissal of all claims and counterclaims with prejudice. In addition, AbbVie agreed to pay Perrigo $2 million dollars as reasonable litigation expenses.
During the negotiations Perrigo pushed for an earlier entry date but was unsuccessful and ultimately accepted an offer from defendants of January 1, 2015. However, the settlement contained an acceleration clause whereby Perrigo would be permitted to launch if another generic came to market. Andrew Solomon, general counsel for Perrigo, explained that the company had been monitoring the Teva litigation and thought there was "a very good probability Teva could prevail" at the trial scheduled for May 2012 and thereafter launch its product, so "that would provide a much earlier Perrigo license date." As a result of the Teva settlement, Perrigo's licensed entry date was moved up to December 27, 2014 under the acceleration clause.
On February 14, 2012, the FDA approved Teva's section 505(b)(2) NDA for the packet presentation of its TTRT product. During review of the application, the FDA had identified a potential safety concern with the packaging used in the pump presentation of the drug. In response to this concern, Teva withdrew the pump presentation from its application. As a result, the FDA approved Teva's product in sachet form only.
After receiving FDA approval, Teva waited for the FDA Office of Generic Drugs to assign a TE rating for its product. On December 21, 2012, AbbVie filed a citizen petition supplement requesting that the FDA refrain from granting a TE rating to Teva's product or, in the alternative, grant it a BX rating.
Later, on January 31, 2013, the FDA approved Perrigo's section 505(b)(2) NDA for its generic version of AndroGel 1%. Thereafter the FDA considered a TE rating for Perrigo's generic product. During this period, AbbVie filed an additional citizen petition on December 11, 2013. The December 11, 2013 citizen petition supplemented the August 18, 2011 citizen petition and requested that the FDA issue a BX rating for Perrigo's product.
In the months before its December 27, 2014 licensed entry date approached, Perrigo took a number of steps to follow up with the FDA regarding its TE rating. Perrigo sent three letters to the FDA. It received no response other than being informed that the FDA needed more time to evaluate the therapeutic equivalence of the product.
Perrigo filed a lawsuit against the FDA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on March 21, 2014. See Perrigo Israel Pharm. Ltd. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 14-475 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014). Perrigo asserted that the FDA had engaged in unreasonable delay. It requested that the court enter a mandatory injunction compelling the FDA to publish a TE rating for Perrigo's NDA product as soon as possible. On April 10, 2014, the FDA filed its first response to the lawsuit. The FDA contended that "Perrigo has itself obviated the need for a prompt decision by reaching an agreement with the innovator not to market until December 2014." The FDA further represented that it expected to issue a TE rating for Perrigo's product "by July 31, 2014-some five months before Perrigo's planned product launch."
Prior to the deadline, on July 23, 2014, the FDA determined that Perrigo's section 505(b)(2) NDA product was therapeutically equivalent to AndroGel and issued it an AB rating. That same day, however, the FDA assigned a BX rating to Teva's product. Specifically, the FDA concluded that the data submitted by Teva was "insufficient to determine TE [therapeutic equivalence] to AndroGel 1%." As a result, under all state laws the Perrigo generic testosterone product would be auto-substitutable at the pharmacy for brand-name AndroGel 1% prescriptions, but the Teva product would not.
Perrigo launched its AB-rated generic version of AndroGel 1% on December 27, 2014, its licensed entry date under the settlement agreement with defendants. Perrigo would not have entered the market without first receiving a decision from the FDA on its TE rating. Perrigo achieved its goal to obtain an AB rating for its product and would have challenged the FDA had it received only a BX rating.
Teva, in contrast, never set in motion the sale of its generic testosterone replacement product. Timothy Crew, Teva's Commercial Operations Officer from the time that Teva filed its NDA until late 2012, was a strong proponent of bringing the Teva product to market even absent an AB rating. Crew identified a " 'brand' push through managed care" marketing strategy in which Teva would go directly to managed care organizations and pharmacy benefit managers in an attempt to negotiate preferential formulary placement for a non-AB rated product and thereby influence physicians' prescribing decisions.
Crew considered the Teva generic testosterone product his "pet project."
Teva underwent management changes in November 2012. Crew left the company, and Alan Oberman became the new Chief Executive Officer of Teva. Shortly thereafter, Maureen Cavanaugh, Vice President of Customer Operations and Marketing for Teva, recommended to Oberman that Teva not launch the BX rated product. Cavanaugh explained that Teva's generic group had no sales force and had never launched a non-AB rated retail pharmacy product. She further opined that a BX-rated product with no perceived advantage over brand-name AndroGel would capture only 10-11% of the brand-name product's sales and perhaps less than 5%.
Teva faced other obstacles to launching its BX-rated product. Teva had contracted with Cipla, an India-based company, to manufacture its generic testosterone replacement drug. Before it could begin the manufacturing process, Cipla required a $10 million capital expenditure from Teva, which could be paid up front or over time through a 35% royalty on sales. Cipla projected that it would require 12-24 months or more to achieve operational readiness. Pursuant to another contract, Teva was also required to pay a royalty of 5-7.5% on sales to a third company, BioSante.
As discussed above, Teva had received FDA approval for the sachet presentation of its product only. At the time that Teva withdrew the pump presentation from consideration by the FDA, pump sales made up 40-50% of AndroGel sales. Thus the failure to obtain approval for a pump product had a negative impact on the commercial viability of Teva's product.
Ultimately, on May 1, 2015, Teva transferred ownership of the 505(b)(2) NDA product and all intellectual property necessary to market the product to ANI Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("ANI"), its development partner.
III
To prevail on its claim of illegal monopolization, the FTC must establish that defendants filed sham litigation against Teva and Perrigo as outlined by the Supreme Court in PRE. Whether litigation is a sham involves a two part test. We have already resolved the first part of the test, that is, that the lawsuits were objectively baseless in the sense that "no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits." AbbVie Inc., 2017 WL 4098688, at *4 (quoting PRE, 508 U.S. at 60, 113 S.Ct. 1920 ). The second part of the test requires the court to decide whether defendants subjectively intended to interfere directly with a competitor's business interests by using the government process as an anticompetitive weapon. PRE, 508 U.S. at 60-61, 113 S.Ct. 1920. Only if the lawsuits were both objectively and subjectively baseless will the FTC have demonstrated that defendants engaged in sham litigation.
As stated above, we have already determined that the lawsuits against Teva and Perrigo in 2011 were objectively baseless as a matter of law in light of the undisputed facts concerning the prosecution history of the '894 patent. See AbbVie Inc., 2017 WL 4098688, at *1-4, *11. We found that Unimed and Besins secured the '894 patent only by amending their patent application from an initially broad claim covering all penetration enhancers to a narrow claim covering only one penetration enhancer-isopropyl myristate at a particular concentration. See id. at *6-8, *10. Instead of isopropyl myristate, Teva used isopropyl palmitate and Perrigo used isostearic acid as a penetration enhancer in their generic versions of AndroGel. We concluded that "any reasonable person who reads the prosecution history of the '894 patent can reach no other conclusion than that the applicants have purposefully and not tangentially excluded isopropyl palmitate and isostearic acid as penetration enhancers equivalent to isopropyl myristate." Id. at *11.
We emphasized that "the purpose of prosecution history estoppel is to protect the patentees' competitors from patent infringement litigation based on the doctrine of equivalents if the prosecution history demonstrates that an equivalent not specifically disclosed in the patent has been purposefully and not tangentially excluded from its scope." Id. at *11. Given the patent prosecution history for the '894 patent, AbbVie and Besins did not tangentially exclude all other penetration enhancers and could not reasonably have expected success on the merits in their suits against Teva and Perrigo alleging patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. Defendants cannot have it both ways. They cannot, as they did here, purposely surrender claims to all penetration enhancers except one to obtain a patent and then claim infringement when a party uses a penetration enhancer that they deliberately surrendered. See id. at *10-11.
We now focus our inquiry on the subjective component of the FTC's sham litigation claim, which was one of the issues litigated in the nonjury trial held in this action. At the outset, we readily acknowledge that a plaintiff claiming that a lawsuit was a sham faces an uphill battle. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits Congress from making any law respecting "the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I. It is well-established that the First Amendment right to petition the government includes the right to have access to the courts. PRE, 508 U.S. at 56-57, 113 S.Ct. 1920 ; see also U.S. Const. amend. I. Under the Noerr- Pennington doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court, "[t]hose who petition [the] government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability." PRE, 508 U.S. at 56, 113 S.Ct. 1920. Noerr- Pennington immunity, however, is not absolute. "[A]ctivity 'ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action' does not qualify for [First Amendment] immunity if it 'is a mere sham to cover ... an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.' " Id. at 51, 113 S.Ct. 1920 (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961) (alterations in original) ).
Later, in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., the Supreme Court explained:
The 'sham' exception to Noerr encompasses situations in which persons use the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of the process-as an anticompetitive weapon. A classic example is the filing of frivolous objections to the license application of a competitor, with no expectation of achieving denial of a license but simply in order to impose expense and delay.
499 U.S. 365, 380, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
We must initially decide not only the type of proof but also the burden of proof which are required to establish subjective intent. The parties disagree regarding both. According to defendants, the FTC must show that they brought the patent infringement actions with actual knowledge that actions were baseless. The FTC, in contrast, asserts that actual knowledge or bad faith is not required under PRE . Instead, the FTC argues that the subjective baselessness inquiry concerns only "whether the baseless lawsuit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor." See PRE, 508 U.S. at 60-61, 113 S.Ct. 1920 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the FTC urges the court to focus on the "economic viability" of the lawsuit and whether defendants "sue[d] primarily for the benefit of collateral injuries inflicted through the use of legal process." Id. at 65, 113 S.Ct. 1920.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in PRE did not elaborate on this issue. In that case, the Court of Appeals had affirmed an order granting summary judgment for the plaintiff on the defendant's counterclaim alleging a sham lawsuit. Id. at 62-65, 113 S.Ct. 1920. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the lawsuit was not objectively baseless and thus did not reach the subjective intent question. Id. at 65-66, 113 S.Ct. 1920.
In support of its position, the FTC cites Kilopass Technology, Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That case, however, involved a motion for attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides that a court "in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party." 738 F.3d at 1304, 1312. The Federal Circuit held that "actual knowledge of baselessness is not required" and that "a defendant need only prove reckless conduct to satisfy the subjective component of the § 285 analysis." Id. at 1310. It further explained that courts may "dra[w] an inference of bad faith from circumstantial evidence thereof when a patentee pursues claims that are devoid of merit" and that "[o]bjective baselessness alone can create a sufficient inference of bad faith to establish exceptionality under § 285, unless the circumstances as a whole show a lack of recklessness on the patentee's part." Id. at 1311, 1314.
Since then, the Supreme Court has expressly distinguished the standard for a claim of sham litigation from that applicable to motions for attorneys' fees under § 285. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1757-58, 188 L.Ed.2d 816 (2014). The Court reasoned that the Noerr- Pennington doctrine was created as "a narrow exception for 'sham litigation'-to avoid chilling the exercise of the First Amendment right to petition the government for the redress of grievances." Id. at 1757. It further observed that "[t]he threat of antitrust liability ... far more significantly chills the exercise of the right to petition than does the mere shifting of attorney's fees." Id. Thus the standard for fee-shifting, which is governed by the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 285, is irrelevant to the subjective intent standard for sham litigation under PRE. Id.
Many of the authorities cited by the FTC are not helpful to our analysis regarding subjective intent. For example, in In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, the defendant conceded that there was sufficient evidence for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment on subjective intent and as a result the court did not address the issue. 795 F.Supp.2d 300, 311 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Other authorities cited by the FTC dealt with motions to dismiss and do not contain a fulsome analysis of the evidence required to support the subjective intent prong of PRE. See Moldex Metric, Inc. v. 3M Co., No. 14-1821, 2015 WL 520722, at *7, *9 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2015) ; TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., No. 10-4413, 2011 WL 2181189, at *15 (D.N.J. June 1, 2011) ; Rochester Drug Coop., Inc. v. Braintree Labs., 712 F.Supp.2d 308, 316, 319-21 (D. Del. 2010) ; In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F.Supp.2d 618, 643-44 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
After review of the decisions cited by both parties, we conclude that the subjective intent required to overcome Noerr- Pennington immunity is not merely the intent to thwart competition. It is well-established that "the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention" and thereby to interfere with a competitor's business. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215, 100 S.Ct. 2601, 65 L.Ed.2d 696 (1980). As our Court of Appeals has recognized, the Hatch-Waxman Act "incentivizes brand-name drug manufacturers to promptly file patent infringement suits by rewarding them with a stay of up to 30 months if they do so" and therefore "[w]e are not inclined to penalize a brand-name manufacturer whose litigiousness was a product of Hatch-Waxman." In re Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 157-58 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Knowledge that the filing of a lawsuit would trigger the automatic stay is not by itself evidence of a bad-faith motive. Id.; see also In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 335 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
As the Supreme Court noted in Omni Outdoor Advertising, a classic example of "sham" activity is the filing of frivolous objections to a license application with no expectation of prevailing but simply in order to impose expense and delay. See 499 U.S. at 380, 111 S.Ct. 1344. Clearly, a frivolous lawsuit under those same circumstances is also a sham. The sham exception under Noerr- Pennington, of course, is narrow so as not to infringe on a party's constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Consequently, we conclude that the FTC must prove that defendants had actual knowledge that the patent infringement suits here were baseless in order both to meet its burden under Omni Outdoor Advertising and PRE and to avoid interference with defendants' First Amendment rights.
The parties, as noted above, further disagree as to the burden of proof required to establish subjective intent. The FTC contends that it must simply satisfy a preponderance of the evidence standard, the general standard for civil antitrust claims. See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 166-69 (3d Cir. 2003). Defendants counter that a finding of subjective intent demands clear and convincing evidence.
The Supreme Court has not addressed this question. Nor has our Court of Appeals. The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Seventh Circuits in decisions that predate PRE have both required clear and convincing evidence that defendants prosecuted actions in bad faith to satisfy the subjective prong of a sham litigation claim. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1288-93 (9th Cir. 1984) ;
MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1155 (7th Cir. 1983).
In support of their position that clear and convincing evidence is required, defendants point to Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 86 S.Ct. 347, 15 L.Ed.2d 247 (1965). There, the Supreme Court held that an allegation that the defendant "knowingly and willfully" obtained a patent through fraudulent representations to the Patent Office would not be entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity for a subsequent lawsuit alleging infringement of that patent. 382 U.S. at 177-78, 86 S.Ct. 347. The Federal Circuit has since specified that clear and convincing evidence is needed to establish a WalkerProcess monopolization claim. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998). It observed that "[t]he road to the Patent Office is so tortuous and patent litigation is usually so complex," that there must be "no less than clear, convincing proof of intentional fraud involving affirmative dishonesty." Id. (internal citation omitted).
The authorities cited by the FTC to support its position that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient are not on point. Those cases concern the standard for an award of attorneys' fees in a patent case under 35 U.S.C. § 285, not the subjective intent standard for sham litigation antitrust claims. See, e.g., Kilopass Tech., Inc., 738 F.3d at 1315-16. As stated above, the Supreme Court has expressly distinguished sham litigation in the Noerr- Pennington context from motions brought under § 285. See Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S.Ct. at 1757-58.
We conclude that the FTC must prove by clear and convincing evidence the subjective intent element of a sham litigation. We do so in light of the Federal Circuit's decision in C.R. Bard as well as the importance of the First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances as explained in Noerr, Pennington, and California Motor Transport Co.
Having determined that the FTC has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendants had actual knowledge that their infringement suits against Teva and Perrigo were baseless, we now consider the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
The FTC puts great emphasis on the 2009 press release by Solvay on behalf of its subsidiary Unimed, co-owner of the '894 patent, before Solvay and Unimed were acquired by AbbVie in February 2010. The press release announced the companies' decision not to sue Perrigo for infringement of the '894 patent after Perrigo filed with the FDA its ANDA for a generic version of AndroGel. Solvay gave as its reason that the Perrigo product "contains a different formulation than the formulation protected by the AndroGel patent." The FTC also presented evidence regarding a July 2009 email written by MacAllister, in-house counsel for Besins, stating that Besins, the co-owner of the '894 patent, was "standing down" from pursuing Perrigo for infringement.
None of the in-house AbbVie attorneys identified as the decision-makers regarding the 2011 suits against Teva and Perrigo was previously employed by Solvay or Unimed. As for Besins, it did not explain whether its decision not to pursue a patent infringement suit was based on the merits or was simply recognizing the reality that it alone could not initiate such a suit without Unimed, the co-owner of the '894 patent. See, e.g., Int'l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001). While Solvay and its in-house attorneys certainly got it right in 2009, this evidence is not probative as to the subjective intent of defendants' decision-makers here some two years later in 2011.
Both parties also rely on various business planning documents to support their positions on subjective intent. The FTC, for example, points to an August 8, 2011 meeting attended by Jeffrey Stewart, then Vice President of U.S. Proprietary Pharmaceuticals at AbbVie, and several other AbbVie executives and in-house attorneys to discuss AndroGel. This meeting took place shortly after Teva filed its motion for summary judgment in the patent infringement case in which AbbVie had sued it. During that meeting Stewart, looking into the future, drew a chart depicting a dramatic erosion of AndroGel sales following entry of an AB-rated generic after a "lost case" eight months hence in April 2012, the month in which this court had scheduled a hearing to take place on Teva's summary judgment motion.
Thereafter, AbbVie created "AndroGel Scenarios" with various potential dates for generic entry, including: (1) November 2011, the date by which the FDA had agreed to review Teva's section 505(b)(2) NDA ; (2) April 2012, the date on which the summary judgment motion could be decided in the Teva matter; and (3) April 2013, an estimate of the date on which a trial on the merits may have concluded in the Teva matter. In an email on September 30, 2011, James Hynd, one of the AbbVie executives responsible for the AndroGel franchise, characterized the April 2012 entry date as "[t]he most likely scenario."
Defendants, meanwhile, point to the official 2012 annual plan for AbbVie's U.S. Proprietary Pharmaceuticals Division. AbbVie began work on that plan in summer of 2011 and finalized it in late fall of 2011. In that plan, AbbVie forecasted increased sales for AndroGel. It also projected an increase in total "Selling, General, and Administrative" ("SG & A") spending for AndroGel from 2011 to 2012. While the plan "assumed LOE [loss of exclusivity]" for several other products, it made no mention of any loss of exclusivity for AndroGel. Defendants also highlight the AbbVie long range plan ("LRP") that was created in 2011. The LRP is a five to ten year business plan that is updated every year through a planning process that generally begins in January and ends in May. The LRP created in 2011 uses as the loss of exclusivity date for AndroGel August 31, 2015, the licensed entry date granted to two other generic competitors, Par Pharmaceutical and Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
We do not find these and other similar business documents to be persuasive or even relevant to the issue of subjective intent. Significantly, none of these corporate documents, as far as we know, was created by or influenced anyone who played a role in the decisions to sue Teva and Perrigo for patent infringement. Nor is there any evidence in the record as to what, if anything, the decision-makers in the legal department told the business people or vice versa about the merits or prospects of the litigation. These corporate documents are simply not probative of the state of mind of the in-house attorneys who made the decisions to sue.
As evidence of their subjective good faith, defendants also rely on the fact that they obtained favorable settlements in their lawsuits against Teva and Perrigo. Specifically, defendants point out that they initially proposed to both Teva and Perrigo a market entry date of January 1, 2015, a date which extended far beyond the maximum 30-month Hatch-Waxman stays applicable to the two lawsuits. Although Teva and Perrigo countered on several occasions with earlier entry dates, defendants held firm to their initial offers in both negotiations. In the end, Teva and Perrigo secured an entry date of December 27, 2014 for their products, just days earlier than defendants' first proposals. Defendants maintain that they would not have insisted on such a late entry date if they knew the infringement suits were frivolous or if they otherwise were motivated only to use the litigation process itself and the automatic Hatch-Waxman stay as an anti-competitive weapon. We find this argument unpersuasive.
Parties often settle litigation for a variety of reasons independent of the merits of the claims. It is true that the settlements prevented Teva and Perrigo from entering the market until after the automatic Hatch-Waxman stays would have expired. On the other hand, the settlements permitted Teva and Perrigo to enter the market years before the '894 patent was set to expire and before any other generic competitor could come to market. They also permitted Teva and Perrigo to limit their litigation costs, and Perrigo obtained $2 million from AbbVie for reasonable litigation expenses. Even frivolous lawsuits can be very costly to defend and to take to trial, especially when plaintiffs, such as the defendants here, have extensive resources.
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney's steadfast response, "not a six-pence, sir," in rejecting a request of French officials for a payment of money in the XYZ Affair, and Representative Robert Goodloe Harper's now famous toast in a similar vein, "Millions for Defense but not a Cent for Tribute," at a dinner in 1798 in Philadelphia, while admirable in many spheres of life, generally have no applicability in the real world when lawsuits are being settled. We find that the terms of the Teva and Perrigo settlements here do not support defendants' subjective good faith.
The FTC points to the various citizen petitions filed by AbbVie regarding the applications submitted by Teva and Perrigo for FDA approval and for TE ratings for its products. For all of these petitions, the FDA granted in part the relief requested by AbbVie. Because they were found to be at least partially meritorious, we do not consider the citizen petitions as evidence of any improper subjective intent by defendants.
The FTC further points to evidence that AbbVie attempted to accelerate the transition of patients from AndroGel 1% to AndroGel 1.62% in summer 2011. Again, there is no evidence that those who decided to bring the infringement actions against Teva and Perrigo played any role in this process.
It is, of course, the FTC which bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that defendants had the subjective intent to file sham infringement actions against Teva and Perrigo. In determining subjective intent, the court must zoom in on the individuals at AbbVie and Besins who made the decisions to file the infringement actions against Teva and Perrigo and discern what these individuals knew. The state of mind of individual decision-makers is of course imputed to the corporations for which they act. See, e.g., In re Color Tile Inc., 475 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 2007).
The individuals, as noted above, who made the decision on behalf of AbbVie on whether to file the objectively baseless lawsuits against Teva and Perrigo were four experienced patent attorneys with sign-off from the general counsel of AbbVie. The record reflects that no business executives were in any way involved-not even with a perfunctory sign-off. As for Besins, the decision to sue was likewise made by in-house counsel for the company. Again no business people participated in the decisions to sue or were otherwise involved.
As the finder of fact, the court may consider both direct and circumstantial evidence when evaluating defendants' subjective intent. See Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 1995) ). We may determine what weight and credence to give this evidence and may also draw reasonable inferences therefrom. See id. In making findings of fact, the court, like jurors, should not leave common sense at the courthouse steps.
Triers of fact are routinely called upon to determine a party's state of mind. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716-17, 103 S.C