Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo (35 F. Supp. 3d 457, 2014)

OPINION & ORDER

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Themis Capital, LLC (“Them-is”) and Des Moines Investments, Ltd. (“Des Moines”) (collectively, “plaintiffs” or “Themis”) bring this claim for breach of contract against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the “DRC”) and the Central Bank of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Central Bank of the DRC”) (collectively, “defendants”). Themis and Des Moines are successors-in-interest to portions of debt that the DRC restructured in 1980, which have been in default since 1990. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit seeks to recover on this debt.

Plaintiffs’ lawsuit would ordinarily be time-barred under New York’s six-year statute of limitations governing breach-of-contract claims. To sustain this claim, plaintiffs rely on a series of debt acknowledgment letters that purport to have been signed by officials of the DRC and Central Bank in 1991, 1997, and again in 2003. These letters, by their terms, tolled the statute of limitations, and, if effective, would make this lawsuit, brought in 2009, timely.

Defendants, however, assert that the signatories to these letters lacked actual or apparent authority to bind the DRC and the Central Bank. Thus, they argue, the statute of limitations expired long ago. Whether defendants are liable to pay the debts at issue here therefore turns on whether the debt acknowledgment letters are legally binding.

Following pretrial discovery and the resolution of pretrial motions, a bench trial on these issues was held on February 13 and 14, 2014. For the following reasons, the Court holds that the signatories to the 1991, 1997, and 2003 debt acknowledgment letters had actual and apparent authority to bind the DRC and the Central Bank. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ attempt to collect on this long-owed debt is not barred by New York’s six-year statute of limitations, and judgment must be, and is, entered in favor of Themis and Des Moines.

As to damages, the Court holds that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the outstanding principal and interest charges on their debt, and to recover compound interest on the interest that accrued on the unpaid principal. However, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any compound interest on such compound interest. Finally, the Court holds, plaintiffs may recover these damages, jointly and severally, from the DRC and the Central Bank of the DRC.

I. Background

A. The Credit Agreement

On March 31, 1980, the Republic of Zaire (“Zaire”), a sovereign state in Central Africa, and the Bank of Zaire, Zaire’s central bank, entered into a Refinancing Credit Agreement with various creditors and agents. Stip. ¶ 11; Pl. Ex. 10 (“Credit Agreement”). The Credit Agreement refinanced, consolidated, and restructured various debts that Zaire owed to its creditors, and designated the Bank of Tokyo Trust Company (“Bank of Tokyo”) as the servicing bank. Stip. ¶ 13; see Credit Agreement. In return, the agreement obliged Zaire to make periodic payments of principal and interest to the creditors (or their assignees), and to repay all principal and interest on or before April 2, 1990. Stip. ¶ 14. Attached to the agreement were credit schedules “setting forth outstanding principal amounts for the various debts refinanced, consolidated and restructured pursuant to the Credit Agreement.” Id. ¶ 15; Credit Agreement at R-1(a).

The Credit Agreement was executed, on behalf of Zaire, by the State Commissioner of Finances, and, on behalf of the Bank of Zaire, by the Bank’s Governor. Stip. ¶¶ 16, 17. On April 21, 1980 — about three weeks after the execution of the Credit Agreement — Zaire’s President, Mobutu Sésé Seko (“Mobutu”), signed an ordinance that officially authorized these two individuals — the Commissioner of Finances and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire — to sign the Credit Agreement. Id. ¶ 20; Def. Ex. 29 (Ordinance No. 80-073). That ordinance stated:

The President and Founder of the Popular Movement of the Revolution, President of the Republic, in light of the Constitution, in particular Article 42 therein;

HEREBY ORDERS:

Article 1 — The signing of the refinancing loan agreement between the Republic of Zaire, the Bank of Zaire and the private bank creditors is hereby authorized.

Article 2 — The State Commissioner of Finances and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire are each in turn assigned with the duties of implementing the present Executive Order, which enters into effect on the date of its signing.

Def. Ex. 29. It is therefore undisputed that the State Commissioner of Finances and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire had actual authority to execute the Credit Agreement in 1980.

Section 8.01 of the Credit Agreement included several “Affirmative Covenants of the Obligor,” including:

So long as any Credit shall remain outstanding, the Obligor will:

(b) Duly obtain and maintain in full force and effect all governmental approvals (including any exchange control approvals) which may be necessary under the law of the Republic of Zaire for the execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement by the Obligor or for the validity or enforceability hereof and duly take all necessary and appropriate governmental and administrative action in the Republic of Zaire in order to make all payments to be made hereunder as required by this Agreement.

Credit Agreement § 8.01. The Credit Agreement defines the Republic of Zaire, now the DRC, as the “Obligor.” See id. at R-l.

Zaire’s first missed payment under the Credit Agreement was in 1982; the second was in April 1985. See PL. Ex. 11 (Memorandum Regarding the Republic of Zaire Refinancing Credit Agreement, dated March 13, 1991). In March 1988, Zaire ceased making monthly payments on the Credit Agreement. Stip. ¶ 23. Payments resumed in July 1989, but ceased again in January 1990. Id. Neither the Republic of Zaire nor its successor state, the DRC, has made any payments under the Credit Agreement, whether of principal or interest, since January 1990. Id.

B. The Debt Acknowledgment Letters

1. The 1991 Letter

In 1991, a “Steering Committee” of Zaire’s creditors met with the Bank of Tokyo to discuss the payment missed in April 1985, and the fact that Zaire had ceased making payments in 1990. See PI. Ex. 11. The creditors sought “to obtain an acknowledgment from the Republic of Zaire and [the Bank of Zaire] of payments due in order to avoid any risk that the six-year prescription period established by the New York Statute of Limitations would apply to the payments now in default.” Id. The Steering Committee instructed the Bank of Tokyo to institute collection litigation against Zaire on behalf of all creditors if Zaire failed to sign an acknowledgment letter by March 29, 1991. Id. However, the Steering Committee stated that it was “optimistic that they [would] obtain the acknowledgment from Zaire at their meeting in Paris during the last week of March; and that any litigation against Zaire would be of the last resort.” Id. at 3.

On March 29,1991, Zaire’s Finance Minister and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire executed a debt acknowledgment letter. PL. Ex. 12 (“1991 Acknowledgment Letter”). The letter states:

To: All parts to the Refinancing Credit Agreement dated as of March 31,1980 among Republic of Zaire, Bank of Zaire, the Banks and Agents party thereto and the Bank of Tokyo Trust Company, as Servicing Bank.

The Republic of Zaire and the Bank of Zaire hereby refer to the Refinancing Credit Agreement dated as of March 31, 1980 among Republic of Zaire, Bank of Zaire, the Banks and Agents party thereto and The Bank of Tokyo Trust Company, as Servicing Bank.

The Republic of Zaire and the Bank of Zaire hereby acknowledge and confirm that Schedule 1 hereto sets forth the amounts of past due principal and past due interest on principal as of April 2, 1990 for each Credit Information Schedule under such Refinancing Credit Agreement. The past due interest on principal consists of both interest accrued on principal installments prior to their maturity (regular interest) and interest accrued on overdue principal. The Republic of Zaire and the Bank of Zaire further acknowledge and confirm their respective obligations with respect to such indebtedness and other obligations arising under such Refinancing Credit Agreement.

It is the intention of the Republic of Zaire and the Bank of Zaire in executing and delivering this acknowledgement formally to recognize and confirm all such obligations in order to eliminate any concerns any Bank holding any such indebtedness may have due to any possible application of any principles of prescription, including without limitation, those established by the New York statute of limitations, which might lead any Bank to coneludé that the forbearance demonstrated to date by such Bank in refraining from acting to enforce any rights it may have to collect such indebtedness might have an adverse effect on the ultimate collectability of such indebtedness.

Id. Schedule 1 to the 1991 Acknowledgment Letter was a table listing the amounts of principal and interest outstanding under the Credit Agreement as of April 2,1990. See PI. Ex. 17.

On March 29, 1991, in response to the execution of the 1991 Acknowledgment Letter, the Steering Committee sent a fax to the Bank of Tokyo, which read: “Please find attached the confirmation from the ... Steering Committee to cease any litigation against Zaire at this time.” PI. Ex. 14. Included with this fax were separate, but identical, messages from each of the three Steering Committee members to the Bank of Tokyo, which stated:

We refer to the Telex dated March 18, 1991 from Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, Citibank, N.A., and Credit Commercial De France to the Agents and Banks party to the Zaire Refinancing Credit Agreement dated as of March 31,1980.

This communication is to advise you that we have received a debt acknowledgment satisfactory to the three banks sending such Telex so as to make the litigation described in such Telex unnecessary at this time.

Id. Assuming that the 1991 Acknowledgment Letter restarted the statute of limitations on claims under the Credit Agreement, the creditors to the Agreement had, under New York’s six-year statute of limitations, until March 29, 1997 to file a lawsuit for breach of contract, or to otherwise preserve their rights.

2. The 1997 Letter

In early 1997, Cecilia Bartner (“Bart-ner”), an executive in the debt restructuring department at Citibank in New York, prepared, with the assistance of legal counsel, the draft of a new debt acknowledgment letter. Deposition of Cecilia Bart-ner, dated May 2, 2013 (“Bartner Dep.”) at 53-54, 70-71. The new letter was based on the 1991 Acknowledgment Letter, except that it did not contain an attachment with the reconciled amounts due under the Credit Agreement. Id. at 54-55. Bartner sent a draft of the new letter to Jean-Claude Masangu (“Masangu”), a Citibank executive in Kinshasa. Id. at 53-54.

Masangu was the Managing Director of Citibank’s Kinshasa office between April 1993 and August 1997. Deposition of Jean-Claude Masangu, dated June 12, 2013 (“Masangu Dep.”) at 118. Once Ma-sangu received the draft acknowledgment letter from - Bartner, he personally met with the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire to discuss the need for both parties to sign the new letter. Id. at 103. Masangu testified that he did so on behalf of Citibank and the other creditors who were owed money under the Credit Agreement. Id. at 102.

On March 7, 1997, the new debt acknowledgment letter was signed by both the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire. Pl. Ex. 17 (“1997 Acknowledgment Letter”). The letter states:

To: All persons holding claims under the Refinancing Credit Agreement dated as of March 31, 1980 among the Republic of Zaire, the Bank of Zaire, the Banks and Agents party thereto and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Trust Company (formerly known as Bank of Tokyo Trust Company), as Servicing Bank.

The Republic of Zaire and the Bank of Zaire hereby refer to the Refinancing Credit Agreement dated as of March 31, 1980 among Republic of Zaire, the Bank of Zaire, the Banks and Agents party thereto and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Trust Company (formerly known as Bank of Tokyo Trust Company), as Servicing Bank.

The Republic of Zaire and the Bank of Zaire hereby acknowledge and confirm as of the date hereof their respective obligations with respect to the principal and interest unpaid under such Refinancing Credit Agreement consisting, in the case of interest, both of interest accrued on principal installments prior to the maturity and interest accrued on overdue principal and interest, and all other obligations arising under such Refinancing Credit Agreement in accordance with the terms thereof.

It is the intention of the Republic of Zaire and the Bank of Zaire in executing and delivering this acknowledgement formally to recognize and confirm all such obligations in order to eliminate any concerns any person holding claims under such Refinancing Credit Agreement may have due to any possible application of any principles of prescription, including without limitation, those established by the New York statute of limitations, which might lead any such person to be concerned that the forbearance demonstrated to date by such person in refraining from acting to enforce such claims might have an adverse effect on the ultimate enforceability of such claims.

According to Masangu, his past experience caused him to conclude that it was unnecessary to inquire- into whether the signatories to the 1997 Acknowledgment Letter had authority to bind the principals to the debt acknowledgment. ■ Masangu Dep. at 104-105. Assuming that the 1997 Acknowledgment Letter restarted the statute of limitations on claims under the Credit Agreement, the creditors to that agreement had until March 7, 2003 to file a lawsuit, or to otherwise preserve their rights.

3. Events Between 1997 and 2003

In April 1997, Masangu, the former head of Citibank’s Kinshasa office, became the Governor of the Central Bank of the Congo, a position he held until May 2013. Masangu Dep. 133. On November 26, 2002, Masangu sent an invitation to Bart-ner of Citibank, the subject line of which was “Invitation to the London Club Agent Bank members’ meeting on December 7, 2002 in Paris”:

The Central Bank of the Congo plans to organize an informal meeting with all of the Agent Banks that are members of the [London] Club, including yours. The meeting will allow us to assess our relationships, particularly with respect to the treatment of the accumulated arrears on your loans (Gentlemen’s Agreement of June 24,1989) and the definition of the new cooperation agreement with the London Club.

I propose that this informal meeting, which I will personally chair and in which I invite your bank to take part, be held on December 7, 2002 in Paris, as a side event to the creditors’ meeting planned for December 4-6 in the same city. Accordingly, please be so kind as to confirm your participation as soon as possible.

Please find attached the list of the other Agent Banks, most of which have already expressed an interest in participating in this meeting.

PI. Ex. 22. An identical letter was sent to the other creditor banks, such as BNP Paribas. Pl. Ex. 23. On December 4, 2002, however, Masangu informed Bartner that he was unable to travel to Paris for the December 7, 2002 meeting. Pl. Ex. 24. Instead, he offered to have his subordinates organize an information meeting on December 6, 2002 at the World Bank office in Paris, France, regarding “the work product document drawn up to this effect,” which was sent as an attachment. Id.

The attached document was titled “Communication from the Governor of the Central Bank of Congo to the London Club Agent Banks.” Id. Section II of the document contained the following summary of “The DRC’s Relations with the London Club”:

5. The first refinancing bank debt agreement signed by the DRC with its London Club partners is dated March 31, 1980. This agreement covered a refinanced debt of 402 million USD for a duration of 10 years, with an end date of March 31,1990.

6. Because of coming up against payment difficulties, the DRC did not completely honor its engagements, which led it to negotiate and arrive at rescheduling agreements in the form of “Gentlemen Agreements” in May 1984 and June 1989 respectively.

7. These two agreements were not honored either. On June 30, 1991, at the time when the DRC was getting ready to negotiate a new global agreement to replace that which was signed in March 1980, its commitments to the London Club were reaching 490.70 million USD, broken down as follows:

359.51 million USD —Principal

24.10 million USD —Contractual interest

107.90 million USD —Late interest on the principal due

Id. Section III of the document described “The DRC’s Expectations of the London Club.”

11. After a long period of progress within the dialogue with other creditors, the negotiations with the London Club represent the next decisive step before the DRC’s eligibility for the HIPC Initiative [i.e., the World Bank’s debt relief program for Highly Indebted Poor Countries]. In order to allow the [International Monetary Fund] and the [World Bank] to proceed with a debt sustainability analysis, the DRC is planning to finalize negotiations with the London Club before the end of December 2002.

12. In a very clear way, the informal meeting with the London Club agent banks, organized on the sidelines of the Consulting Group’s work, should allow to set a calendar of meetings, the goal of which would be:

1) to determine the actual level of its commitments to the syndicated banks, in accordance with prior agreements;

2) to determine the actual level of the DRC’s commitments to the Bank of Tokyo in terms of service commission;

3) the composing of a new coordination committee with current agent banks at the lenders meeting;

4) the discussion of facilities that should be granted to the DRC as compared to the conditions set by the Paris Club on September 13, 2002;

5)the determining of [an] agreement negotiation calendar to be signed between the DRC and the London Club, replacing the Refinancing Agreement enacted March 31, 1980.

Id. Masangu did not anywhere suggest, in this document, that the debts under the Credit Agreement were time-barred or otherwise unenforceable.

4. The 2003 Letter

The 1997 Acknowledgment Letter had extended, until March 6, 2003, the statute of limitations on claims brought under the Credit Agreement. In 1999 or 2000, Bartner became chief of staff for William Rhodes, Citibank’s senior international officer, a position she held until 2006. Bartner Dep. at 23-24. In late 2002 and early 2003, Bartner was again involved with obtaining a renewed debt acknowledgment letter from DRC officials. Id. at 108. By then, Masangu had left Citibank to become the Central Bank’s Governor. Bartner therefore worked with Michel Losembe (“Losembe”), a Citibank employee in Kinshasa, in attempting to obtain the new letter. Id. at 125-26. On January 16, 2003, Bartner sent Losembe an e-mail, attaching a draft of the letter. PL Ex. 25. She instructed Losembe to get the Minister of Finance to sign it on behalf of the Government by March 7, 2003. Id. Bartner testified that she used the 1997 Acknowledgment Letter as the basis for the draft letter she sent to Losembe. Bartner Dep. at 125-26.

On February 4, 2003, Bartner sent Lo-sembe an e-mail, requesting an update on his progress in getting the new acknowl-edgement letter signed. Pl. Ex. 26. On February 5, 2003, Losembe responded to Bartner:

Sorry for this long silence. Since I came, I was unable to meet with the Min Fin. Between travels and Budget session in front of Parliament (based in Lubumbashi), we did not ha[ve] a chance to organize a meeting. He however promised to see me this week. The external debt management has been officially removed from Central Bank [in favor of] MinFin[.] Masangu will only be willing to countersign. I’ll keep you posted.

Id. Later that day, Bartner responded:

Thanks for your email. When you see the MinFin mention to him that the acknowledgment is a formality but if the Banks don’t have it, they would need to sue the country so that the statute of limitations on the debt does not run out. I am sure you will have a nicer way to say this to him if he gives you the runaround but in a nutshell that is what it is.

I would hope that we have it signed as soon as possible.

Id. On February 11, 2003, Losembe sent a formal letter to the DRC’s Finance Minister, Ilankir Mbuyamu Matungulu (“Matun-gulu”), which included as an enclosure a “draft recognition of debt document.” Pl. Ex. 27. In that letter, Losembe explained to Matungulu that:

The signing of this document will extend for six (6) years the validity of the [Credit Agreement] on the 31st of next March, the date of expiration of the last extension. It is understood that failure to sign the aforementioned document at its maturity by the [DRC] could lead creditors to seek forced recovery of their loans based on the law applicable to this Agreement.

Indeed the agreement is governed by the laws of the State of New York, United States and has a validity of six years. The latest extensions, copies attached, were signed on March 20, 19991 and March 7, 1997 by the Ministers of Finance and Governors of the Central Bank who held those offices on those dates.

Citibank Congo acts on behalf of all Banks and Agent Banks [that are] signatories] [to] the Agreement and the Recognition of Debt, duly signed, will be sent to the servicing bank designated by the Agreement, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Trust Company, in New York, which will communicate it to all lenders. In this way, the [DRC] can continue to manage the outstanding London Club loans within ... a well-defined framework.

Id. On February 17, 2003, Losembe sent Bartner an e-mail, informing her that Ma-tungulu had resigned as Finance Minister. Pl. Ex. 28. In response, Bartner sent Losembe the following email on February 18, 2003:

How about the Deputy to MinFin? I suppose we could wait for a few days if we knew there was an appointment .forthcoming but we really do not have the luxury of time. Could Masangu give us a hand talking to him?

Pl. Ex. 30.

At the time of Matungulu’s resignation, Leonard Luongwe (“Luongwe”) was the Vice Finance Minister. The next day, Losembe informed Bartner that he had spoken to Masangu, the Governor of the Central Bank of the DRC, and that Ma-sangu had agreed to help convince Luongwe to sign the letter. Id. Masangu testified that he helped persuade Luongwe to sign a new debt acknowledgment letter by explaining that the letter would extend the validity of the Credit Agreement for another six years, and that Citibank could take legal action if the DRC failed to sign. Masangu Dep. at 69-70,108-09.

On February 20, 2003, Losembe sent Luongwe a letter that included as an enclosure the same letter Losembe had sent to Matungulu on February 11, 2003. See PI. Ex. 76. Its subject line was “March 31, 1980 Credit Refinancing Agreement,” and it stated:

We have the occasion to congratulate you on your new responsibilities in the Ministry of Finance and Budget, which are key departments at the current stage of the [DRC’s] economic growth. You will find attached a copy of correspondence that we addressed to the Ministry on February 11, 2003, related to the above subject, for which we request your special attention, given the importance of the issues involved.

Indeed, the legal validity of the Credit Refinancing Agreement signed between the [DRC], the Central Bank of [the DRC] and the creditor Banks and Agents of the DRC within the scope of the London Club, arrive at their maturity next March 31. The only way to extend its validity is to sign a debt recognition in the attached format. This document has already been signed various times by the DRC (copies of the 1991 and 1997 extensions are attached). It is understood that [the] failure to sign said document could lead the creditors to a forced recovery of their loans based on the. agreement’s applicable laws.

We hope that you will kindly consider our request and that you will follow up on it at your earliest convenience.

Id. On February 26, 2003, Bartner sent another follow-up e-mail to Losembe:

Any progress? It’s getting to the point where if they do not sign we will need to get lawyers involved to look into suing the country to preserve the creditors’ rights. I am sure there is goodwill to sign, they just need to get it done.

Pl. Ex. 30.

On February 25, 2003, Luongwe and Masangu signed the letter on behalf of the DRC’s Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of the DRC, respectively. See Stip. ¶ 24; Pl. Ex. 29 (“2003 Acknowledgment Letter”). In all material respects, the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter was identical to the 1997 Acknowledgment Letter. Compare Pl. Ex. 17 with Pl. Ex. 29. It stated:

To: All persons holding claims under the Refinancing Credit Agreement dated as of March 31, 1980 among the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly known as the Republic of Zaire), the Central Bank of Congo (formerly known as the Bank of Zaire), the Banks and Agents party thereto and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Trust Company (formerly known as Bank of Tokyo Trust Company), as Servicing Bank.

The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central Bank of Congo hereby refer to the Refinancing Credit Agreement dated as of March 21, 1980 among the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly known as the Republic of Zaire), the Central Bank of Congo (formerly known as the Bank of Zaire), the Banks and Agents party thereto and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Trust Company (formerly known as Bank of Tokyo Trust Company), as Servicing Bank.

The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central Bank of Congo hereby acknowledge and confirm as of the date hereof their respective obligations with respect to the principal and interest unpaid under such Refinancing Credit Agreement consisting, in the case of interest, both of interest accrued on principal installments prior to the maturity and interest accrued on overdue principal and interest, and all other obligations arising under such Refinancing Credit Agreement in accordance with the terms thereof.

2003 Acknowledgment Letter. The letter also specifically provided that it was intended to overcome any concerns that the DRC’s and Central Bank’s debts were no longer collectible, including based on the New York statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract claims:

It is the intention of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central Bank of Congo in executing and delivering this acknowledgment formally to recognize and confirm all such obligations in order to eliminate any concerns any person holding claims under such Refinancing Agreement may have due to any possible application or any principles of prescription, including without limitation, those established by the New York statute of limitations, which might lead any person in refraining from acting to enforce such claims might have an adverse effect on the ultimate enforceability of such claims.

Id. Masangu testified that one of his responsibilities as the Governor of the DRC’s Central Bank was to “sign contracts concluded by the Bank,” Masangu Dep. at 129, and he acknowledges signing.the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter, id. at 13, 24. Neither side disputes that Luongwe also signed the letter, and that, at the time he did so, he held the position of Vice (or, Interim) Finance Minister. Pl. Ex. 89 at 12.

On February 26, 2003, Losembe sent Bartner an e-mail:

Good news! Just hung up the phone with Deputy Min Fin. He confirms having signed the Acknowledgment of Debt that will allow rollover of the March 31st, 1980 Refinancing Credit Agreement for another 6 years.

The Governor of the Central Bank cosigned the document. [I] should receive the letter tomorrow, and will fax it right away, so no need to “release” the lawyers as yet. Should I send the original to your office?

Pl. Ex. 38. Later that same day, Bartner sent an e-mail to Losembe:

Congratulations on getting the acknowledgment of debt signed. It could not have been done without you! Many thanks for the time you took to get it done.

You could send me the original and I will deliver it to Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi.

Id.

On February 27, 2008, Luongwe sent a letter, on the official letterhead of the DRC’s Ministry of Finance and Budget, to Losembe, copying the Central Bank Governor:

I have the honor of confirming receipt of your letter ... dated February 20, 2003 by which you sent me, for signature, the draft prorogation document of the refinancing credit Agreement dated March 31, 1980 with the London Club Banks.

And following suit, I return it to you duly reflecting the authorized signatures. As this document constitutes a recognition of debt, I request the Central Bank of Congo and the OGEDEP who are copied herein, to take it into consideration, each insofar as it is concerned, in the daily keeping of the great book of the public debt.

Pl. Ex. 33. On March 4, 2003, Bartner sent Losembe an e-mail that stated, inter alia, “[jjust wanted to let you know that I received the acknowledgment of debt. Thanks again!” Pl. Ex. 31. Losembe responded the next day: “I’ll also fax Min Fin’s transmission letter that I omitted to send (to complete the file).” Id.

Pursuant to the 2003 Debt Acknowledgment Letter, the creditors to the Credit Agreement had, under New York’s six-year statute of limitations, until February 25, 2009 to file a breach-of-contract lawsuit.

C. Procedural History of this Lawsuit

On February 23, 2009, Themis and Des Moines, after succeeding to the rights of the creditors who were their respective predecessors in interest, see note 2, supra, initiated this lawsuit. They alleged that defendants had breached the Credit Agreement by failing to pay the principal and interest owed to the assignees of the debt consolidated under the Credit Agreement. Dkt. 1.

On May 22, 2009, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Dkt. 5. On February 1, 2010, after defendants failed to appear, Themis moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for a default judgment. Dkt. 9-12. On April 28, 2010, the Hon. George B. Daniels, to whom this case was then assigned, entered an order granting plaintiffs a default-judgment. Dkt. 13.

On June 17, 2010, Judge Daniels referred this case to the Hon. Kevin N. Fox, United States Magistrate Judge, for a calculation of the damages owed to plaintiffs. Dkt. 15. On November 1, 2010, Judge Fox issued a Report and Recommendation, which recommended that the Court adopt plaintiffs’ interest calculations. Dkt. 16 (“Report”). The- Report recommended that plaintiffs be awarded a total of $18,003,558.32 in principal, $61,316,391.16 in interest, and $228,405.24 in “out-of-pocket” expenses. See Report at 6. This recovery was allocated so .as to provide roughly $44 million for Themis and roughly $35 million for Des Moines. Id.

On November 29, 2010, defendants made their first appearance in this case, in the form of a letter to the Court requesting additional time to object to the Report. Dkt. 18. Plaintiffs consented to that request. On January 21, 2011, defendants filed objections to the Report. Dkt. 23-24. On March 4, 2011, plaintiffs responded to these objections. Dkt. 28-29. On April 28, 2011, defendants moved to set aside the default judgment. Dkt. 30-32. Plaintiffs did not oppose defendants’ motion. On June 3, 2011, the Court granted the motion and entered an order setting aside the default. Dkt. 38.

On June 28, 2011, Judge Daniels referred the ease to Magistrate Judge Fox for settlement purposes. Dkt. 44. Settlement negotiations were unsuccessful.

On October 18, 2011, following reassignment of the case to this Court, the parties were directed to submit a proposed case management plan and briefing schedule. Dkt. 53. On December 6, 2011, the Court-set a schedule for the briefing of a pre-discovery summary judgment motion, which plaintiffs had asked to make. On April 3, 2012, after plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was fully briefed, the Court requested supplemental briefing, limited to the issue of whether the defendants had apparent authority to renew the 1980 Credit Agreement.

On July 26, 2012, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice. Dkt. 84; Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 881 F.Supp.2d 508 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“Themis I”). Plaintiffs had argued that summary judgment was merited because it was apparent on the face of the governing documents that the DRC was obliged to repay the principal and accrued interest. Defendants, in turn, had argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute due to sovereign immunity, and because plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred under New York law.

In Themis I, the Court held that it could properly exercise jurisdiction, and rejected defendants’ claim based on sovereign immunity. The Court also analyzed at some length the case law regarding when the doctrine of apparent authority can be applied to bind a sovereign. Based on its synthesis of that law, the Court held that the DRC can be so bound here, at least in principle. See 881 F.Supp.2d at 522-26. However, the Court held, it could not grant pre-discovery summary judgment, on either a claim of actual authority or apparent authority.

Instead, it held, “discovery on discrete topics” bearing on DRC’s argument that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred, was required before the Court could resolve the case. Id. at 515. Specifically, the Court directed that discovery be taken into: (1) “all communications leading up to the 2003 Letter between ... representatives of the DRC and the Central Bank, and ... plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest”; (2) “internal communications among [creditors] with respect to the initiation, drafting, or development of the 2003 Letter”; (3) “communications within the DRC and the Central Bank with respect to these subjects”; (4) “any evidence that rebuts the presumption that the signatures on the 2003 Letter are, in fact, authentic”; and (5) “evidence as to actual authority.” Id. at 531.

Notably, at the time of Themis I, the 1991 and 1997 Acknowledgment Letters had not yet come to light. The issue of apparent and actual authority appeared to arise in the context of whether the DRC and the Central Bank, in 2003, had thereby authorized the revival of by-then longtime-barred claims. See id. at 529; Dkt. 179 (“Nov. 26, 2013 Tr”) at 47-48 (Mr. Hranitzky: “[T]he reason the 1991, 1997 and 2009 acknowledgment letters weren’t addressed in summary judgment briefing is because we didn’t know about them at the time.”). However, in the discovery period that followed Themis I, the 1991 and 1997 Debt Acknowledgment Letters came to light. Consequently, as the parties and the Court came to appreciate, the issues of actual and apparent authority arose in a less remarkable context: Whether the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter, the latest in a series of tolling agreements each affecting non-time-barred claims, was binding so as to extend the deadline for plaintiffs to sue to collect the debts owed them by the DRC and the Central Bank from March 31, 2003, for an additional six years.

On April 18, 2013, the Court denied defendants’ motion to amend their Answer. Dkt. 147; Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, No. 09 Civ. 1652(PSAE), 2013 WL 1687198 (S.D.N.Y. April 18, 2013). In September 2013, the parties concluded fact and expert discovery.

A bench trial in this case was held on February 13 and February 14, 2014.

II. Discussion

Themis asserts that the DRC breached the Credit Agreement, and therefore owes, as damages, outstanding principal, plus three categories of interest, on the debt consolidated by that Agreement. See PI. Exs. 91 A-92A.

Under New York law, “to state a claim of breach of contract, the complaint must allege: (i) the formation of a contract between the parties; (ii) performance by the plaintiff; (iii) failure of defendant to perform; and (iv) damages.” Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 142 (2d Cir.2011) (citations omitted).

Here, the DRC concedes that a valid contract was formed, that plaintiffs performed their end of the bargain, that the DRC failed to make payments required by the Credit Agreement, and that this failure caused plaintiffs to suffer damages. The DRC asserts, however, that plaintiffs’ claim is barred by New York’s six-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2). The DRC made its last payment under the Credit Agreement in 1990; plaintiffs initiated their lawsuit in 2009. Ordinarily, then, plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim would be time-barred. However, plaintiffs assert that the debt acknowledgment letters signed in 1991, 1997, and 2003 tolled the statute of limitations, such that the present lawsuit was timely in 2009.

New York law recognizes that an acknowledgement of a debt may restart, or, as relevant here, reset the running of the statute of limitations:

A promise to waive, to extend, or not to plead the statute of limitation applicable to an action arising out of a contract ... if made after the accrual of the cause of action and made ... in a writing signed by the promisor or his agent is effective, according to its terms, to prevent interposition of the defense of the statute of limitation in an action or proceeding commenced within the time that would be applicable if the cause of action had arisen at the date of the promisef.]

New York General Obligations Law (“NYGOL”) § 17-103(1). Such an acknowledgment or promise must: (1) be in writing, (2) be signed by the debtor party, (8) recognize an existing debt, and (4) “contain nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it.” Faulkner v. Arista Records, 797 F.Supp.2d 299, 312 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (citing GP Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. Republic of Nicar., No. 99 Civ. 10302 (WEIP), 2000 WL 1457025, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2000)).

There is no dispute that the acknowledgment letters in this case satisfy three of the four requirements of NYGOL § 17-103 — they were in writing, they recognized an existing debt, and they contained nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay. The validity of the letters therefore turns on the second element — i. e., whether they were “signed by the debtor party.” Although defendants concede that Luongwe and Masangu signed the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter, they contend that these officials lacked the authority to do so. Accordingly, liability in this case turns on whether Luongwe and Masangu (the “signatories”) had the authority — actual or apparent — to bind the DRC and Central Bank, respectively, to an acknowledgment of their existing debt under the Credit Agreement.

A. Liability

1. Actual Authority

If the signatories had actual authority to sign the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter, then Themis’s lawsuit is timely, and the DRC is liable for breach of contract.

“Under New York law, an agent has actual authority if the principal has granted the agent the power to enter into contracts on the principal’s behalf, subject to whatever limitations the principal places on this power, either explicitly or implicitly.” Highland Capital Mgmt. v. Schneider, 607 F.3d 322, 327 (2d Cir.2010) (citing Ford v. Unity Hasp., 32 N.Y.2d 464, 346 N.Y.S.2d 238, 299 N.E.2d 659 (1973)). Actual authority “may be express or implied,” and in either case “exists only where the agent may reasonably infer from the words or conduct of the principal that the principal has consented to the agent’s performance of a particular act.” Minskoff v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., 98 F.3d 703, 708 (2d Cir.1996). Regardless, “[t]he existence of actual authority depends upon the actual interaction between the putative principal and agent, not on any perception a third party may have of the relationship.” Merrill Lynch Capital Servs. v. UISA Fin., No. 09 Civ. 2324(RJS), 2012 WL 1202034, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2012). “[T]he extent of the agent’s actual authority is interpreted in the light of all circumstances attending those manifestations, including the customs of business, the subject matter, any formal agreement between the parties, and the facts of which both parties are aware.” Peltz v. SHB Commodities, Inc., 115 F.3d 1082, 1088 (2d Cir.1997) (citation omitted).

In its previous opinion, the Court held that DRC law governs whether Luongwe and Masangu had actual authority to bind the DRC and the Central Bank to a commercial contract, see Themis I, 881 F.Supp.2d at 521 — here, an agreement to toll the running of the statute of limitations for an action to collect upon an unpaid debt. “In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1. At trial, the Court received live testimony from plaintiffs’ expert witness on DRC law, Nicaise Chikuru Munyi Ogwarha (“Chikuru”), and deposition testimony from defendants’ expert witness on DRC law, Emmanuel Lubala Mugisho (“Lubala”). Both witnesses also submitted expert reports. See Pl. Exs. 122 (“Chikuru Expert Report”), 124 (“Lu-bala Expert Report”), and 123 (“Chikuru Rebuttal Report”).

In asserting that the signatories possessed actual authority, plaintiffs’ expert, Chikuru, relied on § 8.01(b) of the Credit Agreement, combined with DRC Ordinance 80-073.

First, § 8.01(b) states that, so long as “any Credit shall remain outstanding,” the DRC is required to:

Duly obtain and maintain in full force and effect all governmental approvals (including any exchange control approvals) which may be necessary under the law of the [DRC] for the execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement by the Obligor or for the validity or enforceability hereof and duly take all necessary and appropriate governmental and administrative action in the [DRC] in order to make all payments to be made hereunder as required by this Agreement.

Credit Agreement § 8.01(b). Under the plain language of this section of the Credit Agreement, the DRC is affirmatively required to take all steps necessary to keep the Credit Agreement in effect until the DRC’s creditors are paid in full.

The dispositive question, then, is which officials in the DRC had the authority to ensure that the DRC abided by the terms of the Credit Agreement, including § 8.01(b). The answer, according to Chi-kuru, is found in Ordinance No. 80-073, which Zaire executed in 1980. Article 2 of the Ordinance states that:

The State Commissioner of Finances and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire are each in turn assigned with the duties of implementing the present Executive Order, which enters into effect on the date of its signing.

Def. Ex. 29 (emphasis added). The purpose of the Ordinance was to authorize the signing of the Credit Agreement, id., and the State Commissioner of Finances and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire were, in turn, charged with implementing the Ordinance. By extension, then, these two officials were also charged with the “execution, delivery, and performance” of the Credit Agreement, including § 8.01(b). See Feb. 13, 2014 Tr. at 54 (Ordinance No. 80-073 empowered the Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor to implement the obligations of the Credit Agreement “until the period the DRC could pay all ... its debt under the Credit Agreement”); accord Chikuru Expert Report ,¶¶ 9(b), 14 (Ordinance No. 80-073 and Section 8.01 gave the “unconditional authority to acknowledge, reaffirm and/or renew the obligations of the DRC and the Central Bank to the Minister of Finances of the DRC and the Governor of the Central Bank, respectively”).

This unremarkable interpretation of DRC law is strongly supported by actions taken by DRC officials after the Credit Agreement was breached in 1990. As recounted above in detail, three debt acknowledgment letters were executed in 1991, 1997, and 2003; all three were jointly signed by the same two officials — the Finance Minister and the Central Bank Governor — -who were named in Ordinance No. 80-073 and charged with implementing the Credit Agreement. There is no evidence that, before this litigation commenced, any of the affected parties treated the letters as illegitimate or, in any way, objected to the role these two officials had played in executing the letters. Indeed, based on their actions, recounted below, it appears that both Zaire (later DRC) and its creditors consistently regarded claims arising from the breach of the Credit Agreement as viable and enforceable in court at least as late as February 2003, when the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter was signed. The Court addresses each acknowledgment letter in turn.

In 1991, a steering committee of creditors sought a debt acknowledgment letter from Zaire in order to preserve their claims for payments that were missed beginning in April 1985. On March 29, 1991, a debt acknowledgment letter was signed and executed by the Finance Minister and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire. See Pl. Ex. 12. There is no evidence in the record that any of the relevant parties believed or stated that the Finance Minister or the Governor of the Bank of Zaire lacked the authority to execute this letter.

Much the same occurred in 1997. Concerned that their claims would become time-barred under New York’s six-year statute of limitations, the creditors, acting through Citibank, prepared a new debt acknowledgment letter. The 1991 letter had been signed on March 29, 1991; the 1997 letter was signed just before the six-year deadline, on March 7, 1997. See Pl. Ex. 17. Once again, the same two officials, the Finance Minister and the Governor of the Bank of Zaire, signed the 1997 letter. And once again, there is no evidence that any person ever objected, or took a negative position, as to the letter’s validity or legitimacy.

The only acknowledgment letter that defendants meaningfully challenge is the 2003 letter — the last of the tolling agreements and the one that, if valid, makes this lawsuit timely. Defendants’ expert, Lubala, asserts that the Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor lacked actual authority to sign the 2003 letter due to an intervening law passed in 2002. According to Lubala, that law— Decree 28/2002 — established the “Council of Ministers” as the sole entity with authority to acknowledge defendants’ obligations under the Credit Agreement. Lu-bala Expert Report ¶¶ 18-21. Specifically, Lubala points to Article 11 of Decree 28/2002, which states:

In carrying out their duties, Ministers, Delegated Ministers and Vice Ministers are required to obey the laws and regulations of the Republic, particularly the laws and regulations governing the matters that come under their respective ministries.

More particularly, they are required to comply strictly with the financial and budgetary laws. For this purpose, they will make sure that any legislative bill, executive order, decree, order or agreement, any decision that may have immediate or future budgetary repercussions both with respect to revenue and expenses, as well as any instrument creating or expanding employment and modifying the financial status of officials is submitted for the prior opinion of the Minister responsible for Finance and Budget and for deliberation by the Council of Ministers or, in case of emergency, the approval of the President of the Republic.

Def. Ex. 28 (emphases added). Lubala asserts that, under Decree 28/2002, the Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor could not sign the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter without first submitting it to the Council of Ministers for deliberation. See Lubala Expert Report ¶21 (“[W]ithout the prior agreement of the Council of Ministers, the letter of acknowledgment of debt signed by the Minister of Finance on February 25, 2003 cannot bind the [DRC].”). Because plaintiffs concede that the Council of Ministers was not consulted, the signatures on the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter were unauthorized if Decree 28/2002 means what defendants, and Luba-la, claim it means.

Plaintiffs, however, supported by then-expert, Chikuru, interpret Decree 28/2002 differently. They assert that the Decree did not deprive the signatories of authority to sign the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter for three independent reasons: (1) Decree 28/2002 cannot be enforced against private parties because it was never published in the Congolese “Official Journal”; (2) under the civil law doctrine of lex specialis derogate lege generali, a general provision like Decree 28/2002 cannot abrogate a specific provision like Ordinance No. 80-073; and (3) Decree 28/2002 does not apply to this case because the signing of the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter did not “have immediate or future budgetary repercussions.” See Pl. Br. 30-32.

The first of these reasons is unpersuasive. At trial, plaintiffs’ expert, Chikuru, was unable to identify a single instance in which a court in the DRC, or anywhere else, refused to apply a Congolese law against a private party based solely on a failure to publish that law in the “Official Journal.” See Feb. 13, 2014 Tr. at 67 (“The Court: [A]re there published decisions of a court in the DRC that hold that a law that was otherwise enacted properly is not enforceable and can’t apply because it wasn’t published? Are there other cases you can bring to my attention? Chikuru: I didn’t make such research, but if I search, I will find it.”). Plaintiffs also failed to provide the Court with any such case authority before or after trial. Plaintiffs’ position thus lacks objective legal support and reduces to a bare claim by Chikuru that non-publication of a decree in the “Official Journal” makes it ineffective. On this sparse record, the Court declines to hold that a law in the DRC that remains unpublished lacks legal effect against private parties.

Plaintiffs’ second argument presents a more difficult question. It is certainly true that, as a general matter of statutory construction, under the doctrine of lex spe-cialis derogate lege generali, a general provision like Decree 28/2002 cannot ordinarily abrogate a specific provision like Ordinance No. 80-073. However, as Chi-kuru acknowledged at trial, Decree 28/2002 served a unique purpose: It set forth the organization and functioning of the new government led by President Joseph Kabila. See Feb. 13, 2014 Tr. at 69 (“[T]he decree 28/2002 is a general regulation concerning the functioning of the government as a whole.”). The Decree, therefore, stands on a different footing, and is more consequential, than the typical general provision of the law that would be insufficient to abrogate a conflicting specific provision. And the principle of lex spe-cialis derogate lege generali is not addressed to this particular circumstance. In the Court’s view, that canon does not convincingly mandate that specific laws passed under a previous government necessarily survive a general law of this nature passed by the new government, where the purpose of the general law was to restructure and create an entirely new legal regime. Nor did Chikuru point to any authority to the effect that the principle of lex specialis derogate lege generali is determinative as applied to a Decree of this nature. Without some corroboration for his theory, the Court is unpersuaded by Chikuru’s claim that this canon carries the day in this unusual circumstance.

The Court is, however, strongly persuaded by plaintiffs’ third argument as to why Decree 28/2002 does not apply here: By its terms, the Decree applies only to actions with budgetary repercussions, and the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter, as Chi-kuru persuasively testified, see Feb. 13, 2014 Tr. at 70-74, did not have such repercussions. It is important to keep the 2003 letter in context. In light of the prior debt acknowledgment letters, executed in 1991 and 1997, the 2003 letter was merely the latest in a series of tolling agreements that had been entered into between the DRC and its creditors. The debt owed to these creditors had already been restructured by the Credit Agreement; the Agreement had already been breached by 1990. The sole purpose of the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter was to allow the DRC’s creditors to preserve their legal rights for another six years, and to forestall an imminent lawsuit against the DRC and the Central Bank. The letter thereby permitted (although it did not require) the DRC and the Central Bank to postpone, yet again, the final reckoning on their outstanding debt. In no sense, then, did the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter have “immediate or future budgetary repercussions.” Properly understood, all that létter did was maintain the status quo. Both before and after its execution, the DRC and the Central Bank owed, and continued to be legally accountable for, a determinate sum.

The analysis would perforce have been different had the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter revived time-barred claims. Execution of the letter would then have made the DRC, all of a sudden, on the hook for tens of millions of dollars in debt. Such an extraordinary step would have had a substantial budgetary impact, by making the DRC liable for debt that its creditors would otherwise have had no prospect of collecting. But that was not the case here. As the prior debt acknowledgment letters and the assembled record reflect, the DRC’s creditors had taken great care to ensure that their claims under the Credit Agreement never expired; the 1991, 1997, and 2003 debt acknowledgment letters all tolled the statute of limitations for six years and each was signed on a date before the previous six-year extension had run its course. Had Citibank failed in February 2003 to convince the Vice Finance Minister and the Central Bank Governor to sign the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter, then the DRC’s creditors could easily have initiated, at that point, a timely lawsuit against the DRC and the Central Bank. Viewed in proper context, the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter is, thus, nothing more than a routine tolling agreement.

For these reasons, the Court holds that the signatories to the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter had actual authority to bind the DRC and the Central Bank. Accordingly, this lawsuit, filed in 2009, was timely-

2. Apparent Authority

In the alternative, Themis argues that the signatories to the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter had the apparent authority to bind the DRC and the Central Bank.

Even where an agent lacks actual authority, it is well settled under New York law that an agent may “bind his principal to a contract if the principal has created the appearance of authority, leading the other contracting party to reasonably believe that actual authority exists.” Highland Capital, 607 F.3d at 328; see also Goldston v. Bandwidth Tech. Corp., 52 A.D.3d 360, 859 N.Y.S.2d 651, 655 (1st Dep’t 2008) (“[A]n agreement entered into within the exercise of a corporate officer’s apparent authority is binding on the corporation without regard to the officer’s lack of actual authority.”). This Court has previously held, in this case, that “apparent authority can bind foreign governments whose acts are private,” including' entering into “commercial transactions on apparent behalf of a sovereign state.” See Themis I, 881 F.Supp.2d at 526. Here, the governmental acts in question—restructuring debts owed to creditors and entering into tolling agreements regarding the dates on which collection actions may be brought—are quintessentially private. Accordingly, if the Court finds that the signatories—Luongwe and Masangu—had apparent authority to sign the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter, then the DRC and Central Bank are bound to honor that acknowledgment.

Apparent authority authorizes an agent to bind its principal when the “principal, either intentionally or by lack of ordinary care, induces a [third party] to believe that an individual has been authorized to act on its behalf.” Merrill Lynch, 2012 WL 1202034, at *6 (citing Highland Capital, 607 F.3d at 328); see also Reiss v. Societe Centrale du Groupe des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d 738, 748 (2d Cir.2000) (“[A]pparent authority depends on some conduct by the principal, communicated to a third party, which reasonably gives the appearance that the agent has authority to conduct a particular transaction.”). In this case, there are thus two requirements to finding apparent authority: First, Citibank must have reasonably believed, based on the DRC’s conduct, that the Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor had authority to sign the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter; Second, Citibank must have, considering the relevant circumstances, fulfilled its duty of inquiry. See First Fidelity Bank, N.A v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda—Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir.1989).

The Court evaluates each requirement in turn.

a. The DRC’s Conduct

To find apparent authority, the DRC and the DRC’s Central Bank (the principals) must have made a representation — upon which a third party (Citibank) could reasonably have relied' — that certain agents (the Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor) were acting on the principals’ behalf. Whether a party reasonably relied on a representation by the principal turns heavily on the circumstances surrounding both the representation and the reliance, and “requires a factual inquiry into the principal’s manifestations to third persons.” Id. at 193 (citing General Overseas Films, Ltd. v. Robin Int’l, Inc., 542 F.Supp. 684, 689 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir.1983)). This maxim applies equally to representations made by foreign states. See id. (“[A]n ambassador’s actions under color of authority do not, as a matter of law, automatically bind the state that he represents.”). Accordingly, in assessing whether a government official’s act binds a sovereign on the basis of apparent authority, courts must consider “whether the affected parties reasonably considered the action to be official.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 712(2) cmt. h).

Here, the document at issue — the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter — was signed by the DRC’s Vice Minister of Finance and Governor of the Central Bank. The Court has already held, supra Part II.A.1, that these two officials had actual authority to sign the letter. But even if they lacked actual authority, it was eminently reasonable for Citibank to believe, based on the powers vested in these officials and on the conduct of the principals, that the signatories possessed such authority. That is so for two independent and mutually reinforcing reasons.

First, the Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor are national-level officials charged with safeguarding the DRC’s monetary and fiscal health. These two officials had been vested with the authority to execute the Credit Agreement, see Ordinance No. 80-073, and to prevent that agreement from becoming unenforceable, see Credit Agreement § 8.01(b). Particularly in light of that authority, it would not have been unreasonable at all for Citibank to conclude that these same two officials had also been given the authority to enter into a tolling agreement that deferred the deadline for filing breach-of-contract lawsuits to collect debts owed under the Credit Agreement, and that served to deter creditors from filing such lawsuits. Indeed, given the role these two officials played in the national government, Citibank was completely reasonable in concluding that these two officials could act on behalf of the DRC and Central Bank in signing the 2003 Acknowledgment Letter.

Second, the Finance Minister and Governor had signed, without incident or objection, debt acknowledgment letters in 1991 and 1997. This would have also led a reasonable party to believe that these same two officials had the authority to sign a substantively identical letter in