Blakely v. Andrade (360 F. Supp. 3d 453, 2019)

JANE J. BOYLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

After reviewing all relevant matters of record in this case, including the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and any objections thereto, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the undersigned District Judge is of the opinion that the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and they are accepted as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court.

The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6) and Brief in Support of Defendants Steven Andrade, Brandon Howell, Keith Samet, Christopher Smith, Floyd Kincaide, Evelio Rivas, Doris Irvin, Candace Carlsen, David Robertson, Lupe Valdez and Dallas County , filed April 11, 2018 (doc. 110), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part ; and the plaintiffs' Sworn Emergency Motion for Injunction and Restraining Order , filed October 5, 2018 (doc. 150), is DENIED .

By separate judgment, Quincy Blakely's failure to train claim against Dallas County, and his claims against Doris Irvin, Candace Carlsen, David Robertson, and the Dallas County Sheriff will be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and his claims against Phillip Wainscott and remaining claims against Dallas County will be sua sponte DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Pretrial Management

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

By Standing Order of Reference , filed November 6, 2017 (doc. 69), this pro se case has been referred for full case management, including the determination of non-dispositive motions and issuance of findings of fact and recommendations on dispositive motions. Before the Court for recommendation are the following:

(1) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6) and Brief in Support of Defendants Steven Andrade, Brandon Howell, Keith Samet, Christopher Smith, Floyd Kincaide, Evelio Rivas, Doris Irvin, Candace Carlsen, David Robertson, Lupe Valdez and Dallas County , filed April 11, 2018 (doc. 110);

(2) Defendants Steven Andrade, Brandon Howell, Keith Samet, Christopher Smith, Floyd Kincaide, Evelio Rivas, Doris Irvin, Candace Carlsen, David Robertson, Lupe Valdez and Dallas County's Motion to Stay Discovery, All Unexpired Deadlines and Other Pretrial Litigation Procedures and Brief in Support , filed April 26, 2018 (doc. 114); and

(3) Sworn Emergency Motion for Injunction and Restraining Order , filed October 5, 2018 (doc. 150).

Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motion to dismiss should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part , the motion for injunction and restraining order should be DENIED , and the motion to stay discovery is DENIED as moot .

I. BACKGROUND

On March 14, 2017, Quincy Blakely (Husband) and Kimberly Blakely (Wife) (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this pro se action against several defendants based on a traffic stop that occurred on March 14, 2015. (See doc. 3.) They appear to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and for conspiracy, against Dallas County Sheriff's Deputies Steven Andrade, Brandon Howell, Keith Samet, Christopher Smith, Floyd Kincaide, and Evelio Rivas (collectively, Deputies), the Dallas County Sheriff (Sheriff), Dallas County (County), Doris Irvin (Court Coordinator), Candace Carlsen (Magistrate), David Robertson (Detective) (collectively, Defendants), and Phillip Wainscott (Attorney). (See docs. 36 at 1-33; 109 at 1-5, 11, 14-17, 22-51.) Sheriff is sued in both her official and individual capacities, and Deputies, Court Coordinator, Magistrate, Detective, and Attorney are all sued only in their individual capacities. (docs. 36 at 1, 7, 13, 18, 25, 31; 109 at 1-4.) Plaintiffs also appear to assert multiple state law claims against Magistrate, Sheriff, and Deputies, and Wife appears to assert claims for violations of the Declaration of Independence and Texas Constitution against Deputies. (See docs. 36 at 1-33; 109 at 11-51.) They seek "[c]ompensatory, special, exemplary, and punitive damages in the amount of five million dollars per defendant, per wrongful act," judicial interest, and "fees for litigation in bringing this 1983 action." (docs. 36 at 6, 12, 17, 24, 29, 33; 109 at 52-53.)

Plaintiffs allege that Deputies Smith and Rivas initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle that Husband was driving, and in which Wife and their child were passengers, on March 14, 2015, because their rear license plate light was not working. (docs. 36 at 2; 109 at 6.) Deputies Andrade, Howell, Samet, and Kincaide arrived on scene to assist. (docs. 109 at 7-9.) Husband handed Deputy Smith his driver's license and concealed handgun license. (docs. 36 at 2; 109 at 6.) Deputy Smith asked him to get out of the vehicle because he had a weapon, and Husband "respectfully declined" because he "had not committed a crime and was not in the commission of a crime." (docs. 36 at 2; 109 at 6-7.) Deputy Smith then reached into the vehicle and attempted to unlock the door, but Husband "defended [himself] and put [his] arm on top of [the] lock to prevent" Deputy Smith from unlocking the door. (doc. 109 at 7.) Deputy Kincaide shouted for Husband to get his " '[expletive] out of the vehicle,' " as he "assaulted [him] by reaching for [him] while displaying his service weapon." (Id. ) Husband was then "violently removed" from the vehicle, "thrown to the ground," and assaulted by several Deputies. (Id. )

Wife was recording the traffic stop on her cell phone, and she claims that while Husband was being removed from the vehicle, Deputy Andrade was "assaulting her and using excessive force by grabbing her personal cell phone and her arm while she was exercising her ... right to record" Deputies. (docs. 36 at 2; 109 at 7.) Wife attempted "to record the remainder of the arrest," but Deputy Andrade told her "that if [she] did not put [her] phone down and stop recording, he was going to break it." (doc. 36 at 2.) She turned her phone off as a result of his threat, and Deputy Andrade pulled her out of the car and told her to "stand out of the way." (Id. ) Wife then tried to start recording again, but she was told that if she did not stay to the side of the car, "then [she] would be put in handcuffs," and Deputy Andrade "grabbed [her] arm without consent while he had his hand on his gun." (Id. ) Wife again attempted to record Deputies "but as [she] was recording, [Deputy] Howell snatched [her] phone out of [her] hand and turned [the] phone off to prevent her from recording him and [Deputy] Smith violating her rights." (Id. at 8.) The video recording from the dashboard camera of one of the vehicles on the scene shows one of the Deputies take Wife's cell phone out of her hand because the light from the phone was shining in his face. (doc. 111.) The Deputy then handed the cell phone to another Deputy, and it was returned to her moments later as she was asked to stop shining the light from the phone at them. (See id. ) She alleges that Deputy Smith ordered Deputy Howell to "seize the phone," and Deputy Howell "acted in concert with [Deputy] Smith and seized [her] cell phone without consent." (doc. 36 at 8-9.) Plaintiffs allege that they "sustained medically documented injuries from the unnecessary and excessive force" used during the traffic stop, including a separated shoulder for Wife. (Id. at 8-9, 38; doc. 109 at 7, 11.)

Husband was subsequently arrested for "unlawfully carrying a firearm while intoxicated by a license holder." (doc. 109 at 8-9.) Following the arrest, Deputies searched Plaintiffs' vehicle without a warrant or consent. (Id. at 6, 9-10.) Husband's handgun was confiscated and "is still in the possession of the [County]," and Plaintiffs' vehicle was towed. (Id. at 10.) Husband claims that he asked that the Sheriff return his handgun, but it has not been returned, and he has not been compensated for it. (Id. at 30.) Husband was ultimately charged with "assault on a public servant, resisting arrest[,] and unlawfully carrying a firearm while intoxicated by a license holder." (Id. at 9.) Wife "was not charged with any offense" following the traffic stop. (Id. at 20.) Husband asserts that his arrest "was made pursuant to warrants issued after the apprehension." (Id. at 9.) He contends that the arrest warrant and a probable cause affidavit were "allegedly signed" by Magistrate, but she was not on duty at the time they were signed. (Id. at 16.) He also claims that Magistrate is not a magistrate and is "not a person authorized to administer an Oath or sign an arrest warrant." (Id. ) Plaintiffs filed a complaint with Detective regarding the traffic stop, and he took the recording of the stop and their statements and allegedly "used them against [Husband] to benefit [Deputy] Smith" as part of a conspiracy between him and Deputy Smith. (Id. at 27.) Husband alleges that Detective and Deputy Smith also provided false information to the issuer of his concealed handgun license in order to have his license revoked. (Id. at 29.)

Husband initially hired an attorney to represent him but terminated him and informed the Court Coordinator that he "would be defending himself in the prosecution," and she allegedly told him that the attorney he hired would be his attorney until he hired a new one. (Id. at 12-13.) He asserts that because he attempted to represent himself on October 23, 2015, a warrant was issued for his arrest on October 29, 2015, and he was forced to hire counsel. (Id. at 13.) He contends that the Court Coordinator conspired with a judge to deprive him of his constitutional right to represent himself. (Id. ) He also asserts that Attorney is a state actor who was hired as a bondsman, and who "filed a false affidavit of representation ... stating that he was employed as counsel" on Husband's case. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiffs further allege that the County has multiple customs or policies that violate the rights of individuals, that it failed to train Deputies, and that it "is liable under the Double Jeopardy clause of the [Fifth] Amendment ...." (See id. at 31-35.)

Husband was indicted by a grand jury for assaulting a public servant on September 4, 2015. See State of Tex. v. Quincy Blakely , No. F15-18020-M (194th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex. Apr. 9, 2015). His initial trial was held on May 18, 2018, and a mistrial was ordered after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. See id. His new trial is set for December 10, 2018. See id.

Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on March 14, 2017, and subsequently amended their complaint for the first time on March 30, 2017. (docs. 3; 10.) Defendants filed motions to dismiss the first amended complaint on November 10, 2017 and November 29, 2017 based, in part, on qualified immunity, and Plaintiffs then amended their complaint for the second time on March 22, 2018. (docs. 71; 109.)

On April 11, 2018, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, Plaintiffs responded on May 3, 2018, and Defendants replied on May 8, 2018. (docs. 110; 116-17.) Defendants then moved to stay discovery on April 26, 2018, Plaintiffs responded on May 22, 2018, and Defendants replied on May 29, 2018. (docs. 114; 125; 131.) On October 5, 2018, Husband filed an "Emergency Motion for Injunction and Restraining Order" against the County and Magistrate. (doc. 150.) County and Magistrate responded on October 18, 2018, and Husband replied on November 9, 2018. (docs. 153; 158.) The motions are now ripe for recommendation.

II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Husband moves for "injunction and restraining order" against Magistrate and the County to enjoin the state judicial criminal proceedings against him. (doc. 150.)

A. Legal Standard

A preliminary injunction can be issued only after notice to the adverse party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). The party seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden to show that he or she is entitled to it. Clark v. Prichard , 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987). In order to secure a preliminary injunction, the movant must show four elements:

(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued; (3) that threatened injury to the movant outweighs any damage the injunction might cause to the opponent; and (4) that granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest.

Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan, et al. , 335 F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir. 2003) ; Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard , 730 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1984).

B. Substantial Likelihood of Success

Magistrate and County assert that Husband cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because his claims for injunctive relief are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. (docs. 110 at 10-13; 153 at 3-7.)

1. Younger Abstention

Under the Younger abstention doctrine, "federal courts must[ ]refrain from considering requests for injunctive relief based upon constitutional challenges to state criminal proceedings pending at the time the federal action is instituted." Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Earle , 388 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing cases). "While it was once thought that Younger applied only to state criminal or 'quasi-criminal' proceedings, the [Supreme] Court has now made it clear that '[t]he policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.' " Women's Cmty. Health Ctr. of Beaumont, Inc. v. Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n , 685 F.2d 974, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n , 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982) ). The doctrine does not apply to claims for monetary relief, however. See Saloom v. Tex. Dept. Of Family and Child Protective Servs. , 578 F. App'x 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2014) (stating that "requests for monetary damages do not fall within the purview of the Younger abstention doctrine"). Three conditions must be met for the doctrine to apply: "(1) the dispute must involve an 'ongoing state judicial proceeding;' (2) an important state interest in the subject matter of the proceeding must be implicated; and (3) the state proceeding must afford an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges." Wightman-Cervantes v. Tex. , No. 3:03-CV-3025-D, 2004 WL 2512208, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2004) (citing Wightman v. Tex. Supreme Court , 84 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1996) ); see Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd. , 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012). If the three conditions are met, the "doctrine requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction" over the lawsuit unless " 'certain narrowly delimited exceptions to the abstention doctrine apply.' " Bice , 677 F.3d at 716 (citations omitted).

Here, Husband states that his "motion for an injunction is not being directed at the prosecution," but he argues that federal courts "have power to enjoin state officers from instituting a criminal action," he should have been discharged from his criminal case, and the state district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to bring a case against him, and he seeks to enjoin the criminal proceedings against him. (doc. 150 at 2, 14, 19, 25.) His second amended complaint essentially seeks the same relief, i.e., to have the indictment in his criminal case quashed and the charges against him dismissed, and to bar his prosecution. (See doc. 109 at 36, 40-41, 43.) Husband seeks "injunctive relief based upon constitutional challenges to [his] state criminal proceedings," which may not be had if the Younger conditions apply. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. , 388 F.3d at 518 (citing cases).

Husband's criminal case has been pending in state court since April 9, 2015. See State of Tex. v. Quincy Blakely , No. F15-18020-M (194th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex. Apr. 9, 2015). As of March 14, 2017, when this suit was filed, his criminal case was still pending, and it is currently set for trial on December 10, 2018. See id. The dispute therefore "involves an 'ongoing judicial proceeding.' " See Wightman-Cervantes v. Tex. , No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-3025-D, 2005 WL 770598, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2005) (quoting DeSpain v. Johnston , 731 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1984) ). Husband's criminal proceedings also implicate an important state interest because "[t]he state has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws." Id. at *3 (quoting DeSpain , 731 F.2d at 1176 ); see also Blakely v. Kelly , No. 3:16-CV-2801-K-BN, 2016 WL 6581283, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2016) (recognizing in a similar case that Plaintiffs previously filed, that criminal proceedings implicate an important state interest). Lastly, Husband "has not alleged any facts showing that [he will be] barred from raising [his] constitutional concerns in the state court proceedings." Shipula v. Tex. Dep't of Family Protective Servs. , No. H-10-3688, 2011 WL 1882521, at *9 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2011). He will have "a full opportunity to raise his constitutional challenges in the Texas state courts on direct appeal in the event of conviction or through a state habeas writ challenging his detention or conviction." Blakely , 2016 WL 6581283, at *2 (citing DeSpain , 731 F.2d at 1176 ); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. , 481 U.S. 1, 15, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (federal courts "should assume that state court procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary."); Kugler v. Helfant , 421 U.S. 117, 124, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975) ("ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights"); Childress v. Watkins , No. 5:14-CV-748-DAE, 2014 WL 4274311, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2014) (finding that "state proceedings, which include the appeal process, are adequate to redress any alleged constitutional deprivation").

Because all three conditions of Younger are met, jurisdiction over Husband's requests for injunctive relief is lacking unless an exception applies. See Gates v. Strain , 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that if the three conditions are met, a court may "enjoin a pending state-court criminal proceeding only if" an exception applies); Blakely , 2016 WL 6581283, at *2.

2. Exceptions

Husband asserts that exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine do apply in this case. (docs. 116 at 2; 150 at 17.)

The Younger abstention doctrine does not apply if:

(1) the state-court proceeding was brought in bad faith or to harass the federal plaintiff; (2) the federal plaintiff seeks to challenge a state statute that is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it, or (3) where other extraordinary circumstances threaten irreparable loss [that] is both great and immediate.

Gates , 885 F.3d at 880 (quotations omitted) (quoting Younger , 401 U.S. at 45, 91 S.Ct. 746 ); see also Bice , 677 F.3d at 716 n.3 (quoting Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Earle , 388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) ). The plaintiff "has the burden of showing that [an] exception applies." Wightman-Cervantes , 2005 WL 770598, at *5 (citing Stewart v. Dameron , 460 F.2d 278, 279 (5th Cir. 1972) ); see Malone v. Dutton , No. A-16-CA-1183-SS, 2017 WL 4399564, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2017) (citing cases) ("A plaintiff arguing against the application of Younger bears the burden of establishing one of the exceptions applies.").

a. Bad Faith

Husband alleges that his criminal prosecution was brought in bad faith, and that he is "being harassed with prosecution ...." (docs. 116 at 2-8; 150 at 17.)

"The Fifth Circuit has applied the bad faith exception in 'two major circumstances': first, when a state commences a prosecution or proceeding to retaliate for or to deter constitutionally protected conduct; and second, when the prosecution or proceeding is taken in bad faith or for the purpose to harass." All Am. Check Cashing, Inc. v. Corley , 191 F.Supp.3d 646, 660 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (citations omitted) (citing cases). A federal court must abstain from entering an injunction "unless the movant pleads and proves bad faith, harassment, or other exceptional circumstances ...." Wightman-Cervantes , 2004 WL 2512208, at *2 (citing Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas , 970 F.2d 82, 87 (5th Cir. 1992) ). The " 'bad faith' exception is narrow and should be granted parsimoniously."

Hefner v. Alexander , 779 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1985). It applies where:

(1) the plaintiff establishes that the conduct allegedly retaliated against or sought to be deterred was constitutionally protected, and that the state's bringing of the criminal prosecution was motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to retaliate for or to deter that conduct; and (2) the state fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have decided to prosecute even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.

Jordan v. Reis , 169 F.Supp.2d 664, 669 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Wilson v. Thompson , 593 F.2d 1375, 1382-83 (5th Cir. 1979) ).

Here, Husband asserts that evidence from his initial trial showed that he did not commit a crime, his arrest was fraudulent, and the indictment against him is fatally defective. (docs. 116 at 2-8; 150 at 17-19.) He does not identify any constitutionally protected conduct, and he fails to allege sufficient facts to show that his subsequent prosecution was "instituted and conducted ... to retaliate for or to deter constitutionally protected conduct ...." All Am. Check Cashing, Inc. , 191 F.Supp.3d at 660 (emphasis in original); see also Fitzgerald v. Peek , 636 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (the bad faith exception applies "if the plaintiff establishes that the conduct allegedly retaliated against or sought to be deterred is constitutionally protected and that the state's bringing of the criminal prosecution is motivated at least in part by a purpose to retaliate against or deter that conduct"). Husband makes only conclusory allegations that his "prosecution has been brought in bad faith and [he is] being harassed ...." See id. at 662 ; Wightman-Cervantes , 2004 WL 2512208, at *3-4 (declining to apply the bad faith exception where the plaintiff failed to plead facts in support of his conclusory allegations regarding the actions of a judge and prosecutor). Additionally, the fact that "a grand jury found the requisite probable cause to issue an indictment against [Husband] ... weighs against a determination" that he is being prosecuted "with no hope of obtaining a valid conviction." See Jordan , 169 F.Supp.2d at 669. Accordingly, Husband's allegations do not support application of the bad faith exception.

b. Unconstitutional State Statute

Husband also argues that section 547.322 of the Texas Transportation Code (the Code), the basis for his traffic stop, "is not positive law, nor does the Code apply to [him]." (doc. 116 at 9-10.) He contends that he has a "natural human right to travel ... without government interference," and that the Code is unconstitutional because it deprives him of his right to travel. (Id. at 10.)

As noted, Younger does not apply if a challenged state statute "flagrantly and patently" violates "express constitutional prohibitions ...." Bice , 677 F.3d at 716 n.3 (quoting Tex. Ass'n of Bus. , 388 F.3d at 519 ). " '[T]he possible unconstitutionality of a statute on its face does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it.' " Kolski v. Watkins , 544 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1977) (quotations omitted) (quoting Younger , 401 U.S. at 54, 91 S.Ct. 746 ); see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. , 420 U.S. 592, 602, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) ("facial invalidity of a statute is not itself an exceptional circumstance justifying federal interference with state criminal proceedings.").

"[C]ourts have held that 'driving an automobile on public roads is not a constitutionally protected right, but a privilege.' " Perkins v. Brewster , No. 1:17-CV-378-LY, 2018 WL 814250, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2018) (quoting Leverson v. State , Nos. 03-15-00091-CR, 03-15-00092-CR, 2016 WL 4628054, at *9 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug, 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ); see Gillaspie v. Dep't. of Pub. Safety , 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177, 182 (1953) ("a license or permit to drive an automobile on the public highways and streets is a privilege ...."). It is within a state's police powers to "reasonably regulate any who use public roads" in order "to protect the welfare and safety of the general public." Perkins , 2018 WL 814250, at *2 (citing Leverson , 2016 WL 4628054, at *9 ); Snyder v. State , Nos. 05-01-00121-CR, 05-01-00122-CR, 2001 WL 1382270, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 8, 2001, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing cases).

Section 547.322 provides that "vehicles shall be equipped with at least two taillamps," "including a separate lamp used to illuminate a rear license plate ...." Tex. Trans. Code Ann. § 547.322(a), (g). Husband cites to no authority to support a finding that statutes providing general lighting requirements for vehicles "flagrantly and patently" violate "express constitutional prohibitions," and such regulations are "a reasonable use of the police power to protect the welfare and safety of the general public." Snyder , 2001 WL 1382270, at *1 ; cf. Naff v. State , 946 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (citing cases) ("regulating licensing, inspection, and registration laws[,] and requiring proof of financial responsibility as a protection for Texas citizens is a proper subject of the State's police powers[.]"). Accordingly, Husband has failed to meet his burden of establishing that this exception to the Younger abstention doctrine applies.

c. Extraordinary Circumstances

Husband finally asserts that his prosecution for assault of a public servant constitutes double jeopardy "because there is no actual victim, complainant, or witness stated with exactitude" in the offense report or indictment, which subjects him "to subsequent prosecution." (doc. 150 at 19.)

"Double-jeopardy claims can constitute the kind of extraordinary circumstances that justify an exception from Younger ...." Gates , 885 F.3d at 882 (citations omitted). "The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against (1) a second prosecution after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense." United States v. Paternostro , 966 F.2d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) ). "In order for the Double Jeopardy Clause to have any application, there must be actions by a sovereign, which place an individual twice in jeopardy." United States v. Cruce , 21 F.3d 70, 74 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Goff , 847 F.2d 149, 169 (5th Cir. 1988) ; United States v. Stricklin , 591 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1979) ).

Here, Husband appears to argue that he could be subjected to subsequent prosecutions for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because "the indictment is fatally defective for failure to state the nature and cause of the accusation and fails to state the most basic elements of the alleged criminal acts, and fails to name a victim ...." (doc. 150 at 19.) He has not shown that he is being prosecuted after being acquitted of or convicted for assaulting a public servant, or that he has received multiple punishments for that same offense, however. (See id. ) "As the Supreme Court has explained, the collateral-estoppel element of double jeopardy prevents relitigating 'an issue of ultimate fact' that has already been 'determined by a valid and final judgment.' " Gates , 885 F.3d at 882 (quoting Dowling v. United States , 493 U.S. 342, 347-48, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) ). Because Husband has not been acquitted, convicted, or punished for the same offense for which he is currently being prosecuted, "double-jeopardy concerns are not implicated." Id. His pending prosecution "would not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and an injunction is not warranted on this basis." Id.

Because all three conditions of the Younger abstention doctrine are met, and Husband fails to show that an exception applies, his motion for injunctive relief should be denied, and any claims for injunctive relief alleged in the second amended complaint should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Thomas v. State , 294 F.Supp.3d 576, 593-96 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (finding that claims for injunctive relief should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Younger ).

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (doc. 110 at 9-10, 13-28.)

Rule 12(b)(6) allows motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under the 12(b)(6) standard, a court cannot look beyond the face of the pleadings. Baker v. Putnal , 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996) ; see also Spivey v. Robertson , 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 530 U.S. 1229, 120 S.Ct. 2659, 147 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000). It is well-established that "pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Miller v. Stanmore , 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981). Nonetheless, regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel, pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts, not mere conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace , 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). The court must accept those well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker , 75 F.3d at 196.

"[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.' " Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (emphasizing that "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions"). The alleged facts must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In short, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.' "

Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citations omitted). When plaintiffs "have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; accord Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

As noted, a court cannot look beyond the pleadings in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion. Spivey , 197 F.3d at 774 ; Baker , 75 F.3d at 196. When a party presents "matters outside the pleadings" with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or in a response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court has "complete discretion" to either accept or exclude the evidence for purposes of determining the motion. Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc. , 847 F.2d 186, 196 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) ; accord Gen. Retail Servs., Inc. v. Wireless Toyz Franchise, LLC , 255 F. App'x 775, 783 (5th Cir. 2007) ; see Walch v. Adjutant General's Dept. of Tex. , 533 F.3d 289, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2008). However, "[i]f ... matters outside the pleading[s] are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

Nevertheless, "pleadings" for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion include attachments to the complaint. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. , 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) ; Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter , 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Similarly, documents attached to a motion to dismiss or to a response to a motion to dismiss "are considered part of the pleadings, if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim[s]." Collins , 224 F.3d at 499 (quotations omitted); accord Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp. , 343 F.3d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 2003) ; see Walch , 533 F.3d at 293-94 (finding that reliance on documents attached to a response to a motion to dismiss was appropriate where the documents were "sufficiently referenced in the complaint"). It is also "clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record." Norris v. Hearst Trust , 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007) ; Cinel v. Connick , 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, documents falling in these three categories may be properly considered without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

Defendants attached to their motion to dismiss a video recording from the dashboard camera of one of the deputies' vehicles at the traffic stop, and copies of records related to Magistrate's hiring, job position, work schedule, work address, and payroll. (docs. 111; 110-2-110-6.) Although these filings are not attached to Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, they may be considered part of the pleadings because they are attached to Defendants' motion to dismiss, referred to in the second amended complaint, and central to Plaintiffs' claims. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. , 495 F.3d at 205 ; Collins , 224 F.3d at 498-99 ; see also King v. Fox Entm't Grp., Inc. , No. 4:08-CV-688-Y, 2009 WL 4573720, at *1 & n.2 (N.D. Tex. May 4, 2009) (considering a video recording in determining a motion to dismiss because it was referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and central to her claims).

Plaintiffs attached documents to their response to Defendants' motion to dismiss that were not attached to their complaint, including copies of the following: warrants for Husband's arrest that resulted from the traffic stop; Magistrate's work schedule, work address, payroll, and oath of office; a determination of probable cause to issue arrest warrants sheet signed by Magistrate; a general warranty deed signed by Magistrate; responses to records requests; an arraignment sheet for Husband; printouts from the Dallas County Appraisal District Website; an affidavit from Deputy Smith describing the events of the traffic stop and arrest; Husband's indictment for assaulting a public servant; images from a video of the traffic stop that was recorded by Plaintiffs; and part of a deposition apparently given by Deputy Smith. (doc. 116-1 at 1-33.) These documents are referenced in Plaintiffs' second amended complaint and appear to be central to their claims, so they may also be properly considered without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Walch , 533 F.3d at 293-94 (affirming judgment in which the district court relied in part on documents attached to the plaintiff's response to a motion to dismiss in deciding that motion); Smith v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. , No. 4:14-CV-682, 2016 WL 4974899, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2016) (recognizing that a court may consider documents attached to a response to a motion to dismiss); Carter v. First Nat. Collection Bureau, Inc. , 135 F.Supp.3d 565, 573-74 n.11 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (considering documents attached to a plaintiff's response to a motion to dismiss without converting that motion into a motion for summary judgment).

A. Heck Bar

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims on grounds that they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). (doc. 110 at 13-15.)

Under Heck , when a successful civil rights action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a plaintiff's conviction or sentence, the claim must be dismissed unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. A plaintiff does so by achieving "favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence." Muhammad v. Close , 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004) (per curiam). "[T]he Heck determination depends on the nature of the offense and of the claim." Arnold v. Slaughter , 100 F. App'x 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2004).

Heck does not extend to cases where a plaintiff files a civil rights action challenging his arrest before any conviction. Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) ; see also DeLeon v. Corpus Christi , 488 F.3d 649, 655 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Supreme Court in Wallace refused to extend Heck's application to pending criminal matters). In Wallace , the Supreme Court stated that:

If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.

549 U.S. at 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091.

Husband is currently facing a charge for assaulting a public servant arising from the traffic stop and arrest. (doc. 109 at 9.) He asserts numerous claims against Defendants, including claims for excessive force, false arrest, and illegal search and seizure against Deputies that all arise out of the traffic stop and his subsequent arrest. (See id. at 6-51.) These claims appear to be "related to rulings that will likely be made" in his pending criminal trial. See Wallace , 549 U.S. at 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091. Because his claims against Deputies appear to be based on the traffic stop and arrest, Heck may bar his claims against Deputies if he is convicted of that charge. See Whatley v. Coffin , 496 F. App'x 414, 416 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that claims against the city, chief of police, and police officers for excessive force were barred by Heck where they would imply the invalidity of a conviction for assault of a public servant); Walter v. Horseshoe Entertainment , 483 F. App'x 884, 887 (5th Cir. 2012) (false arrest claim barred where it would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction); Walker v. Munsell , 281 F. App'x 388, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2008) (claims for excessive force and malicious prosecution based on the defendant's arguments that he did not resist, did nothing wrong, and was attacked for no reason were barred under Heck ).

Although Wife's claims arise out of the same traffic stop, she was not arrested or charged with any crimes. She claims, in part, that she was unlawfully seized, deprived of her Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights as a result of the traffic stop, and that the vehicle was unlawfully searched and seized. (doc. 36 at 3-4, 9-10, 15-16, 20-22.) Even though no criminal proceedings are pending against her, it is possible that Heck may also bar those claims because they "are intertwined and based on substantially the same factual allegations" as Husband's claims, and it would be necessary to make a determination on the validity of the traffic stop and arrest in order to determine whether those alleged violations occurred. Willis v. City of Hattiesburg , No. 2:14cv89-KS-MTP, 2015 WL 13651763, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 30, 2015) (citing cases) (finding that claims of all plaintiffs, even those without criminal proceedings pending against them, were subject to stay based on Heck ); see also Blakely , 2016 WL 6581283, at *2 (recommending stay of proceedings under Heck as to both Plaintiffs in their previous lawsuit until Husband's state criminal case was resolved); Richardson v. Union Pub. Safety Dep't Police , No. 7:10-CV-2679-MGL-JDA, 2012 WL 4051826, at *5 (D.S.C. July 27, 2012) (staying proceedings as to both plaintiffs even though there was no criminal conviction or pending appeal associated with one of the plaintiffs). Heck could not bar her other claims, however, as they are based on Deputies' actions against her only, and would not require the Court to address the validity of the traffic stop or Husband's arrest.

At this point, "it is simply premature to determine whether or not" Husband's damages claims against Deputies and Wife's damages claims for unlawful seizure of her person, deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, and unlawful search and seizure of the vehicle are barred under Heck . Mackey v. Dickson , 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) ; see also Richardson v. Bridges , 2010 WL 11553418, at *4 (E.D.Tex. July 21, 2010) (finding that it was "premature to determine whether or not ... § 1983 claims [were] barred under Heck ."). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss on this basis should be denied, and the appropriate action is to "stay proceedings in [this] § 1983 case" as to Husband's claims against Deputies, and as to Wife's claims to the extent she asserts claims for violations of her due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, her seizure during the traffic stop, and the subsequent search and seizure of the vehicle "until [Husband's] related pending criminal case is resolved." Blakely , 2016 WL 6581283, at *2 (quoting Gross v. Normand , 576 F. App'x 318, 319 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) ); Willis , 2015 WL 13651763, at *5 (citing cases); see also Wallace , 549 U.S. at 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091 ; Profit v. Ouachita Parish , 411 F. App'x 708, 709 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting with approval that the district court had stayed a civil case attacking the legality of a detainee's arrest, prosecution, and detention pending the resolution of the criminal charges).

B. Absolute Immunity

Magistrate and Court Coordinator argue that Husband's claims against them are barred by absolute immunity. (doc. 110 at 26-28.)

1. Judicial Immunity

Magistrate contends that the claims against her should be dismissed based on the doctrine of judicial immunity. (doc. 110 at 26.)

The Supreme Court has recognized absolute immunity for judges acting in the performance of their judicial duties. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 731, 745-46, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982). Judges are immune from suit for damages resulting from any judicial act unless performed in "the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) ; Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 356-357, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) ; Young v. Biggers , 938 F.2d 565, 569 n.5 (5th Cir. 1991). Allegations of bad faith or malice do not overcome judicial immunity. Mireles , 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. 286.

"Texas courts employ the same judicial immunity analysis as the federal courts in this Circuit ...." Durrance v. McFarling , No. 4:08-CV-289, 2009 WL 1577995, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 2009) (citing Hawkins v. Walvoord , 25 S.W.3d 882, 890 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied) ); see Sharp v. Palmisano , No. 16-5429, 2013 WL 5969661, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2013) (citing Hawkins , 25 S.W.3d at 890 ) (recognizing that Texas' judicial immunity principles mirror the federal judicial immunity doctrine). Accordingly, to the extent Magistrate is immune from Husband's federal claims, she is also immune from any state law claims.

Here, Husband alleges that Magistrate is not a magistrate judge who enjoys judicial immunity, and is not "authorized to administer an [o]ath or sign an arrest warrant," or "perform any duties at all." (doc. 109 at 16-21.) He contends that Magistrate issued an invalid warrant for his arrest in violation of his constitutional rights because there was "no affidavit supported by oath or affirmation ... [when] a warrant was issued." (Id. at 21-22.) He makes no specific allegations that Magistrate acted outside the scope of her judicial duties and therefore acted without jurisdiction, however. The record shows that Magistrate was selected and confirmed for her position as a part-time magistrate judge for the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. (docs. 110-2 at 2; 110-3 at 2; 110-6 at 2-3.) Because Husband seeks damages for judicial acts that were within her jurisdiction, all of his claims against her are barred by judicial immunity. Florance v. Buchmeyer , 500 F.Supp.2d 618, 635-36 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (finding that claims against judges were barred by judicial immunity).

2. Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Court Coordinator argues that Husband's claims against her should be dismissed because they are barred by quasi-judicial immunity. (doc. 110 at 27-28.)

Individuals who perform judicial functions "have absolute [quasi-judicial] immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge's discretion." Clay v. Allen , 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) ; Tarter v. Hury , 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981) ; see also Mays v. Sudderth , 97 F.3d 107, 113 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that officials acting within the scope of their authority enjoy absolute immunity "from a suit for damages to the extent that the cause of action arises from his compliance with a facially valid judicial order issued by a court acting within its jurisdiction"). The reasoning for such immunity is that "court personnel should not serve as a lightening rod for harassing litigation." In re Foust , 310 F.3d 849, 855 (5th Cir. 2002). They "enjoy [ ] only qualified immunity[, however,] for those routine duties not explicitly commanded by a court decree or by the judge's instructions." Clay , 242 F.3d at 682. A court coordinator has absolute immunity when his actions are prescribed by court rules. Florence v. Buchmeyer , 500 F.Supp.2d 618, 643 (N.D. Tex. 2007).

Here, Husband alleges that the Court Coordinator conspired with a judge to deprive him of his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. (doc. 109 at 12-13.) He has not alleged that any actions were not taken under court order, according to court rules, or at a judge's discretion, however, so the Court Coordinator also has absolute immunity for these actions. See Small v. Dallas Cty. Tex. , 170 F. App'x 943, 944 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the clerk of a state district court was entitled to absolute immunity absent allegation that any of his actions were not taken under court order or at judge's discretion); Lewis v. City of Waxahachie , No. 3:10-CV-2578-N-BH, 2011 WL 7070991, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2011) (finding that a county clerk had absolute immunity for claims asserted against her under section 1983 ). Husband's § 1983 claims against the Court Coordinator should be dismissed. See Lewis , 2011 WL 7070991, at *3.

Because Magistrate and the Court Coordinator have absolute immunity, any claims against them should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Nalls v. LaSalle , 568 F. App'x 303, 304-05, 307 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claims for failure to state a claim based on judicial immunity); Florance , 500 F.Supp.2d at 635-36 (dismissing claims against a court clerk for failure to state a claim based on absolute immunity).

C. Qualified Immunity

Deputies argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Wife's remaining § 1983 constitutional claims. (doc. 110 at 15-19.)

Section 1983"provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw , 512 U.S. 107, 132, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). It "afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Id. To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks , 436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978) ; Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp. , 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).

A governmental employee who is sued under § 1983 may assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. White v. Taylor , 959 F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1992). Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suit and liability for civil damages to the extent their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The doctrine protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Because an official is entitled to immunity from suit, not merely from liability, immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in the litigation. See Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991).

The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs are not required to anticipate a qualified immunity defense by providing greater specificity in their initial pleadings.

Crawford-El v. Britton , 523 U.S. 574, 595, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). The Fifth Circuit has held that a plaintiff is not required to "fully anticipate the defense in his complaint at the risk of dismissal under Rule 12." Schultea v. Wood , 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); accord Todd v. Hawk , 72 F.3d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Although "[c]ourts in this district have [generally] denied without prejudice motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds when the motion is filed before the defendant has answered and actually raised the defense," McKay v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. , No. 3:06-CV-2325-L, 2007 WL 2668007, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2007), Deputies actually raised their qualified immunity defense in their initial motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint and addressed this defense. (See docs. 71; 109 at 11.) Plaintiffs "had the opportunity to file ... [their] amended complaint ... after having seen the motion to dismiss," and they sought to provide "the Court with specific facts answering the arguments in the [initial] motion." Parra-Sanchez v. Gusman , No. 07-5501, 2018 WL 4587302, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2008). Because Plaintiffs were able "to file an amended complaint with additional factual detail," and "the Court has sufficient factual allegations to make a ruling on the qualified immunity defense asserted in the most recent motion to dismiss ..., the Court [may] consider the qualified immunity defense as asserted in the motion to dismiss." Reitz v. City of Abilene , No. 1:16-CV-0181-BL, 2017 WL 3046881 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2017), adopted by , 2017 WL 3034317 (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2017) ; see Prater v. Wilkinson Cty., Miss. , No. 5:13-CV-23-DCB-MTP, 2014 WL 7334185, at *4-5 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2014) (considering qualified immunity defense raised in a motion to dismiss where the defendants asserted the defense in their initial motion to dismiss, the plaintiff amended his complaint, and the defendants reasserted the defense in a subsequent motion to dismiss); see also Parra-Sanchez , 2018 WL 4587302, at *4 (disagreeing with the plaintiff's argument that the court could not grant a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity where the defense was not raised in an answer).

In deciding whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts conduct a two-prong inquiry. The first prong entails consideration of whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show a violation of a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 235-36, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Under the second prong, courts determine whether " 'the defendants' actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the law that was clearly established at the time of the actions complained of.' " Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton , 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp. , 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005) ). "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. It is within the discretion of the court to decide which of the two prongs to address first in light of the circumstances particular to the case at hand. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808 ; Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex. , 560 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2009) (" Saucier's rigid 'order of battle' ... is now advisory."). If the court answers both the constitutional violation and clearly established questions in the affirmative, the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity. Lytle , 560 F.3d at 410.

"The issue of qualified immunity is often resolved on summary judgment, but the Court may also consider the issue in a motion to dismiss." Gill v. Delvin , 867 F.Supp.2d 849, 855 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (citing Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 677-78, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ); see also Brown v. City of Houston , 297 F.Supp.3d 748, 772-73 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (analyzing cases to determine that the issue of qualified immunity may be considered on a motion to dismiss). "Once a government official pleads the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut the defense." Ezell v. Wells , No. 2:15-CV-00083-J, 2015 WL 4191751, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2015) (citing Thompson v. Upshur Cty. , Tex ., 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001) ); accord Pierce v. Smith , 117 F.3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1997) ). To satisfy that burden on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must claim that a defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and that the violation was objectively unreasonable in light of law that was clearly established at the time of the conduct. Club Retro, LLC , 568 F.3d at 194 ; Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp. , 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005) ; see also Buehler v. City of Austin , No. 1:17-CV-724-LY, 2018 WL 4225046, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2018). Here, Deputies have asserted their qualified immunity defense, so the burden is on Wife to plead sufficient facts showing the inapplicability of that defense. (See doc. 110 at 15-19.)

1. Constitutional Violation

Deputies assert that their conduct did not violate Wife's constitutional rights. (doc. 110 at 15-17.)

a. Excessive Force

Wife contends that she was deprived of her constitutional rights "to be free from unreasonable and excessive force," and that the use of force by Deputies Andrade and Howell to remove her from the vehicle caused her "physical injuries that have been medically documented." (docs. 36 at 3, 5, 9, 11; 116 at 19, 21.)

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure of a person occurs when an officer "by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The Supreme Court has held that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard." Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). To succeed on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show "(1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable." Id. ; accord Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg , 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009).

Whether Wife has stated a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim depends on whether she has sufficiently alleged that Deputies Andrade and Howell's alleged use of force was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Graham , 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Objective reasonableness is "a pure question of law" that is considered after determining the relevant facts. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). To gauge the objective reasonableness of the force used, the courts "must balance the amount of force used against the need for force." Ramirez v. Knoulton , 542 F.3d 124, 129 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Flores v. City of Palacios , 381 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2004) ). Proper application of this balancing test "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The reasonableness inquiry must consider "the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

"Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (citing Terry , 392 U.S. at 22-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). The use of force or threat must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances, however. See id. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Here, Wife alleges that she was "simply sitting in the car" with her son and not being confrontational, and that Deputies Andrade and Howell used excessive and unnecessary force against her without probable cause or legal justification when they grabbed her arm and pulled her out of the vehicle. (doc. 36 at 5, 8-9, 11, 1, 265.) She argues that Deputy Andrade placed her in "fear of losing [her] life as the force occurred while [he] displayed his service weapon," and that the force he used "was applied intent