Corley v. Vance (365 F. Supp. 3d 407, 2019)

KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, United States District Judge

In 2014, Plaintiff Royce Corley was convicted in this District on federal charges involving trafficking of minors and possession of child pornography. Now, proceeding pro se , Plaintiff brings two civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging claims arising out his investigation, arrest, and prosecution on earlier state charges that were ultimately subsumed by his federal case. In addition to his federal claims, Plaintiff asserts state-law claims over which he asks this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Defendants Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., David Stuart, John Temples, Greg Weiss, Elizabeth Pederson (collectively, the "DA Defendants"); Brian Conroy, Michael Daly, Mark Woods, Jessica Sterling, Giancarlo Cavallo, Greg Smith, Shari C. Hyman (collectively, the "NYPD Defendants," and together with the DA Defendants, the "Government Defendants"); Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. ("Con Edison"), Michael T. Haggerty and Walter Panchyn (collectively, the "Con Edison Defendants"); T-Mobile USA Inc. ("T-Mobile"), Facebook Inc. ("Facebook"), Google Inc. ("Google"), Time Warner Cable Inc. ("TWC"), Municipal Credit Union ("MCU"), Capital One N.A. ("Capital One"), JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. ("Chase") (collectively, the "Corporate Defendants"); Michael J. Barry and Ports & Files, Inc. (collectively, the "Barry Defendants"); Glenn F. Hardy, Esq. and Glenn F. Hardy, P.C. (collectively, the "Hardy Defendants"); the Honorable Bonnie G. Wittner; and the City of New York (altogether, the "Moving Defendants") now move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Separately, Justice Wittner moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) ; Facebook moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) ; and the DA Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5). For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff filed his complaint in the first of his two civil rights cases, Corley v. Vance , No. 15 Civ. 1800, on January 13, 2015. (1800 Dkt. # 1). The 1800 Complaint alleged violations of the Constitution and of several federal statutes, including the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 - 2523, the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 - 2713, the Right to Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 - 3423, and the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721 - 25, as well as various state-law claims. The named defendants in that case include the DA Defendants, the NYPD Defendants, the Corporate Defendants, the Con Edison Defendants, and the City of New York. (Id. ).

The 1800 Complaint alleges that in 2007, Plaintiff "was informally doing business under the nom de guerre 'Ron Iron' providing advertising and web development services to escort, therapeutic and adult-oriented businesses." (1800 Compl. ¶¶ 5, 22). Subsequently, in 2008, Plaintiff began working as a technician for Con Edison. (Id. at ¶ 23). In 2009, an individual who had been convicted of promoting prostitution allegedly "vindictively" forwarded to law enforcement false information implicating Plaintiff in illegal activity. (Id. at ¶ 25). Plaintiff alleges that, in consequence, law enforcement officers: (i) induced a minor to work as a confidential informant and prostitute to manufacture evidence against Plaintiff; (ii) tampered with advertisements appearing on Backpage.com by "altering 'AdOId' posted by other individuals, or created by the defendants"; and (iii) used fabricated evidence to obtain court orders, subpoenas, and warrants. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-29, 37-41). Accordingly, it is alleged that despite using a warrant, "defendants had no probable cause" to obtain access to Plaintiff's accounts; to search his apartment and office at Con Edison; or to seize his cell phones, electronic media, and credit cards. (Id. at ¶¶ 47-48).

Plaintiff asserts that he "has not been provided with any court orders, subpoenas, warrants or notices in relation to any of these disclosures." (1800 Compl. ¶ 26). Backpage.com is further alleged to have "aided and abetted" law enforcement "by granting them unlimited access to password-protected accounts without the proper legal authority," while other of the Corporate Defendants are alleged to have provided law enforcement with Plaintiff's records, emails, and instant messages. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 38, 60-62).

Initially, Plaintiff was charged by the Office of the District Attorney for New York County (the "DANY") in New York County Supreme Court. However, the state charges were dismissed on February 1, 2013. (1800 Compl. ¶ 46). Instead, Plaintiff was prosecuted federally by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (the "USAO"). (9621 Compl. ¶ 49). He was indicted in this District on January 22, 2013, and a superseding indictment was returned on October 10, 2013. See United States v. Corley , No. 13 Cr. 48 (RPP/AJN) (S.D.N.Y.). Plaintiff was ultimately convicted of child exploitation and child pornography offenses in April 2014; his conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 9, 2017, United States v. Corley , 679 F. App'x 1 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order); and his petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on October 2, 2017, Corley v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 205, 199 L.Ed.2d 135 (2017).

As noted, the 1800 Complaint focuses on the conduct of law enforcement authorities before and immediately following Plaintiff's 2012 arrest. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for, inter alia , false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, unlawful search and seizure, malicious abuse of process, conspiracy to violate due process, fabrication of evidence, and violations of the rights to a speedy trial and to privacy, as well as state-law claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. (1800 Compl. ¶¶ 72-84, 95-99). Broadly speaking, Plaintiff alleges that private individuals and corporations (i) conspired with state actors to violate his constitutional rights and (ii) failed to train their employees properly with respect to the release of customer information. Plaintiff further asserts that the private defendants violated federal statutes that limit disclosure of electronic records and communications. (Id. at ¶¶ 60-63).

On December 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed a second complaint, this one against New York State Supreme Court Justice Bonnie G. Wittner, the judge who presided over Plaintiff's state prosecution; Michael J. Barry, Plaintiff's appointed counsel in that case; criminal investigator Glenn F. Hardy and his company, Ports & Files, Inc., also appointed to assist in Plaintiff's defense; several members of the DANY; and the City of New York. (9621 Dkt. # 2). Whereas the 1800 Complaint focused on the investigative work undertaken preliminary to Plaintiff's 2012 arrest, the 9621 Complaint focused on the conduct of those involved in Plaintiff's state prosecution from its inception until the case was turned over to federal prosecutors.

In the 9621 Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Justice Wittner and representatives of the DANY conspired (i) to establish a "quasi-grand jury" for the purpose of accessing, illegally, Plaintiff's communications and records (9621 Compl. ¶ 17); (ii) to "coerce or entice" an underage female to participate in an illegal sting operation against Plaintiff that would "manufacture" state-court jurisdiction over him (id. at ¶¶ 18, 24); (iii) to circumvent case assignment procedures so that Plaintiff's criminal case would be assigned to Justice Wittner (who, it is alleged, would then cover up the putative co-conspirators' prior misconduct, see id. at ¶ 27); and (iv) to solicit the USAO to prosecute Plaintiff (id. at ¶¶ 39-41, 46-49). Plaintiff further alleges that his attorney and criminal investigator publicized private information concerning Plaintiff and his case "for the purpose of financial gain and promoting their professional practices." (Id. at ¶ 50; see also id. at ¶¶ 50-52). Indeed, according to Plaintiff, attorney Barry and investigator Hardy actively promoted Plaintiff's case in the media in order to "entic[e] the U.S. Attorney to take the case." (Id. at ¶ 41).

B. Procedural Background

The procedural history of each case spans more than four years, although each was stayed several times. First, on January 13, 2015, Plaintiff initiated the 1800 action. (1800 Dkt. # 1). On June 22, 2015, after reviewing the 1800 Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), the Court issued an Order to Amend, addressing, in detail, what it perceived to be the legal and factual impediments to mounting Plaintiff's claims. See Corley v. Vance , No. 15 Civ. 1800 (KPF), 2015 WL 4164377, at *1-9 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2015). The Court warned Plaintiff that most of the counts in his Complaint might be subject to dismissal on the bases identified in the Order and provided Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his pleading within 60 days. See id. at *9.

Plaintiff declined to amend the 1800 Complaint, and the Court dismissed it on December 2, 2015, for failure to comply with the Court's orders, with leave to replead within 30 days. (1800 Dkt. # 20). In lieu of repleading, Plaintiff appealed the Court's Order of Dismissal to the Second Circuit. (1800 Dkt. # 21). On May 6, 2016, the Second Circuit vacated the Order of Dismissal and remanded the case, ordering this Court to consider the 1800 Complaint on the merits. (1800 Dkt. # 23).

Several months later, the 9621 case, which had initially been assigned to United States District Judge John G. Koeltl, was transferred to this Court. Upon motion, both cases were stayed by the Court by orders dated September 16, 2016, so that Plaintiff could pursue his appeal from his criminal conviction. (1800 Dkt. # 97; 9621 Dkt. # 60). At the time these stays were entered, several of the defendants in the 9621 case - specifically, Defendants Hardy, Vance, Stuart, Temple, and Weiss - had filed motions to dismiss. (9621 Dkt. # 32, 43).

As previously stated, the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition for certiorari in October 2017. See Corley , 138 S.Ct. at 205. By orders dated November 1, 2017, the Court lifted the stays in the 1800 and 9621 cases and scheduled a series of conference calls with the parties in order to discuss next steps. (1800 Dkt. # 135; 9621 Dkt. # 67). As detailed in several Court orders, technical and logistical difficulties foiled the Court's efforts to convene the parties telephonically. (1800 Dkt. # 144, 148; 9621 Dkt. # 72, 78). However, before the February 12, 2018 conference came to its premature end, the Court learned that Plaintiff wished to renew a previously-filed motion for the Court's recusal in both cases. The Court reimposed the stays and ordered Plaintiff to refile his recusal motion (1800 Dkt. # 148; 9621 Dkt. # 78), which Plaintiff did on or about February 26, 2018 (1800 Dkt. # 150; 9621 Dkt. # 79).

On June 19, 2018, the Court denied the motion for recusal, lifted the stays, and scheduled motion practice to occur concurrently in both matters. (1800 Dkt. # 152; 9621 Dkt. # 83). In September 2018, Plaintiff requested a 90-day extension to file his Opposition, from September 21, 2018, until December 20, 2018. (1800 Dkt. # 233; 9621 Dkt. # 107). The Court granted the request and ordered Defendants to respond to the Opposition on or before January 7, 2019. (1800 Dkt. # 234; 9621 Dkt. # 108). By letter dated December 12, 2018, Plaintiff again requested, and the Court again granted, an extension to file his Opposition, this time until January 25, 2019. (1800 Dkt. # 256-57; 9621 Dkt. # 114-15). Plaintiff's third request for an extension was denied on January 11, 2019. (1800 Dkt. # 262). Accordingly, Plaintiff filed his Opposition in late January 2019 (1800 Dkt. # 267-69; 9621 Dkt. # 117-19), and Defendants timely filed their briefs in reply (1800 Dkt. # 271-78; 9621 Dkt. # 120-26).

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

1. Motions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Several subsections of Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are invoked by the Moving Defendants, and to contextualize its legal analysis, the Court presents the standards for each in this section. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Lyons v. Litton Loan Servicing LP , 158 F.Supp.3d 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Makarova v. United States , 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) ). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "the district court must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint ... as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction." Fountain v. Karim , 838 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc. , 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014) ). "A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists." Id. (quoting Makarova , 201 F.3d at 113 ).

2. Motions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

When a defendant brings a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), "the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has [personal] jurisdiction over the defendant." DiStefano v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc. , 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); accord In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 , 714 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2013). "Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may defeat the motion by pleading in good faith, legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction. At that preliminary stage, the plaintiff's prima facie showing may be established solely by allegations." Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A. , 722 F.3d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citation omitted). All jurisdictional allegations "are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and doubts are resolved in the plaintiff's favor[.]" A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Bank , 989 F.2d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1993). However, the court "will not draw argumentative inferences in the plaintiff's favor" and need not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]" In re Terrorist Attacks , 714 F.3d at 673 (citations omitted); see also Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL , 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012).

District courts deciding motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction typically engage in a two-part analysis. First , the court assesses whether there is "a statutory basis for exercising personal jurisdiction." Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby , 726 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2013). In making this determination, the court "applies the forum state's personal jurisdiction rules" unless a federal statute "specifically provide[s] for national service of process." PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander , 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second , if there is a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction, the court must decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.S. , 750 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam).

It is well established that "[a] district court's personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the state in which the court is located."

Spiegel v. Schulmann , 604 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2010). New York's long-arm statute authorizes courts to exercise personal jurisdiction "over any non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent ... transacts any business within the state," so long as the cause of action "aris[es] from" that transaction. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). Accordingly, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary if two conditions are met: "first, the non-domiciliary must transact business within the state; second, the claims against the non-domiciliary must arise out of that business activity." Aquiline Capital Partners LLC v. FinArch LLC , 861 F.Supp.2d 378, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton , 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1986) ).

3. Motions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) governs insufficient process, whereas Rule 12(b)(5) governs insufficient service of process. "Objections to sufficiency of process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) must identify substantive deficiencies in the summons, complaint or accompanying documentation." Gianatasio v. D'Agostino , No. 11 Civ. 3095 (RWS), 2011 WL 5244961, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2011). "A Rule 12(b)(4) motion is proper only to challenge noncompliance with the provision of Rule 4(b) or any applicable provision incorporated by Rule 4(b) that deals specifically with the content of the summons." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Separately, "[b]efore a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied." Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd. , 484 U.S. 97, 104, 108 S.Ct. 404, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987). Under Rule 12(b)(5), "[o]nce a defendant raises a challenge to the sufficiency of service of process, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving its adequacy." Darden v. DaimlerChrysler N. Am. Holding Corp. , 191 F.Supp.2d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). "When a court considers a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), it must consider information outside the complaint to determine whether service was sufficient." Hernandez v. Mauzone Home Kosher Prods. of Queens, Inc. , No. 12 Civ. 2327 (SJ) (JMA), 2013 WL 5460196, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013).

"In deciding a Rule 12(b)(5) motion, a Court must look to Rule 4, which governs the content, issuance, and service of a summons." DeLuca v. AccessIT Grp., Inc. , 695 F.Supp.2d 54, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Under Rule 4(m), "[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court - on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff - must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). If the plaintiff is able to demonstrate good cause, however, a district court must grant a plaintiff an extension of time for service. See id.

Even where a plaintiff does not show good cause, district courts may exercise discretion to grant an extension of time to effect adequate service. See Zapata v. City of New York , 502 F.3d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 2007) ; George v. Prof'l Disposables Int'l, Inc. , 221 F.Supp.3d 428, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). In determining whether to grant a discretionary extension, courts look to "[i] whether any applicable statutes of limitations would bar the action once refiled; [ii] whether the defendant had actual notice of the claims asserted in the complaint; [iii] whether defendant attempted to conceal the defect in service; and [iv] whether defendant would be prejudiced by extending plaintiff's time for service." DeLuca , 695 F.Supp.2d at 66.

4. Motions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must "draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "While Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to 'nudge [a plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.' " In re Elevator Antitrust Litig. , 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Moreover, "the tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

In addition, the Court is obligated to construe the submissions of pro se litigants like Plaintiff liberally "to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pabon v. Wright , 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) ); see generally McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind , 864 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2017). To this end, the Court has considered factual assertions made by Plaintiff during the pre-motion conference on this matter and in his opposition papers. See Walker v. Schult , 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) ("A district court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider factual allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the motion.").

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Fed. R. Evid. 201, including public records such as Plaintiff's arrest reports, indictments, and criminal disposition data. See Kramer v. Time Warner Inc. , 937 F.2d 767, 773-75 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the Court may consider matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Fed. R. Evid. 201 ); see also Awelewa v. New York City , No. 11 Civ. 778 (NRB), 2012 WL 601119, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012) (judicial notice may be taken of arrest reports, criminal complaints, indictments, and criminal disposition data (citing Wims v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't , No. 10 Civ. 6128 (PKC), 2011 WL 2946369, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011) ) ). Where the Court takes judicial notice, it does so "in order to determine what statements [the public records] contained ... not for the truth of the matters asserted." Roth v. Jennings , 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and emphases omitted) (quoting Kramer , 937 F.2d at 774 ).

B. The Court Denies Wittner's Motion to Dismiss the 9621 Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

Justice Wittner argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's claims against her on the basis of sovereign immunity. "The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions in federal court against a state and against state officials acting in their official capacities, unless the state waives sovereign immunity or Congress abrogates it." Chris H. v. New York , 740 F. App'x 740, 741 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). Accordingly, Justice Wittner is entitled to sovereign immunity for any claims against her in her official capacity. However, in his Opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that "this argument is moot since Plaintiff only alleges claims against [Judge Wittner] in her individual capacity." (9621 Pl. Opp. 6). For that reason, Judge Wittner's motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is denied, though several of her arguments are addressed again in the Court's discussion of Rule 12(b)(6).

C. The Court Grants Defendant Facebook's Motion to Dismiss the 1800 Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)

Defendant Facebook, for its part, moves to dismiss the Complaint against it for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (1800 Dkt. # 185). Finding that the Court lacks both general and specific jurisdiction over this defendant, the Court grants Facebook's motion.

1. The Court Lacks General Jurisdiction over Facebook

A court's exercise of general jurisdiction under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 301 requires that "a company has engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of doing business in New York that a finding of its presence in New York is warranted." Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S. , 750 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see generally Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 137-38, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014). Facebook's "continuous activity of some sort[ ] within a state ... is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amendable to suits unrelated to that activity." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 927, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement , 326 U.S. 310, 318, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ). Rather, a corporation's "affiliations with the State" must be "so 'continuous and systematic' as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." Id. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (quoting Int'l Shoe , 326 U.S. at 317, 66 S.Ct. 154 ).

In its opening brief, Facebook argues that a district court in New York cannot properly exercise general jurisdiction over the company because Facebook is incorporated in Delaware and has a principal place of business in Menlo Park, California. (Facebook Br. 11). Facebook is correct that, broadly speaking, general jurisdiction does not lie over a party in a forum where that entity is neither incorporated nor maintains its principal place of business. Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 924, 131 S.Ct. 2846. That said, " Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums." Daimler , 571 U.S. at 137, 134 S.Ct. 746 (alteration in original).

Plaintiff counters that because Facebook is registered to do business in New York and has two offices in New York City, the Court is in fact able to exercise general jurisdiction over Defendant. (1800 Pl. Opp. 11). However, these contacts do not rise to the level required to "render [Defendant] essentially at home in [New York]." Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846. Defendant's offices in New York must be viewed relative to Defendant's overall activity "nationwide and worldwide," a view that dramatically lessens their significance. Daimler , 571 U.S. at 143, 134 S.Ct. 746. "[L]ess than 7% of [Facebook's] global workforce is located in its New York office." (Facebook Br., Duffey Decl. ¶ 3). Furthermore, "[t]he mere fact of a defendant's being registered to do business is insufficient to confer general jurisdiction in a state that is neither its state of incorporation nor its principal place of business." D'Amico Dry D.A.C. v. Primera Mar. (Hellas) Ltd. , 348 F.Supp.3d 365, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).

Plaintiff cannot support an argument that Facebook's activities in New York constitute an exceptional case where general jurisdiction would properly lie over a corporation "in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business." Daimler , 571 U.S. at 139 n.19, 134 S.Ct. 746. Accordingly, the Court does not exercise general jurisdiction over this Defendant.

2. The Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction over Facebook

In his Opposition, Plaintiff focuses almost exclusively on establishing the Court's ability to exercise general jurisdiction over Facebook. However, he does reference, albeit obliquely, New York's long-arm statute. (See 1800 Pl. Opp. 11). The Court suspects that Plaintiff conflates general and personal jurisdiction and, thus, with the appropriate solicitude to Plaintiff's pro se status, it addresses whether Facebook is subject to specific jurisdiction under that statute.

New York's long-arm statute authorizes courts to exercise personal jurisdiction "over any non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent ... transacts any business within the state," so long as the cause of action "aris[es] from" that transaction. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). Accordingly, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary if two conditions are met: "first, the non-domiciliary must transact business within the state; second, the claims against the non-domiciliary must arise out of that business activity." Aquiline Capital Partners LLC v. FinArch LLC , 861 F.Supp.2d 378, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

A defendant transacts business within a state if it has "purposefully availed [it]self of the privilege of conducting activities within New York and thereby invoked the benefits and protections of its laws." United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd. , 122 F.Supp.3d 57, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Reich v. Lopez , 38 F.Supp.3d 436, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ). Here, Facebook has plainly availed itself of New York law. In addition to being registered to do business in New York, the company has two offices in New York City, where 7% of its global workforce is located. (Facebook Br., Duffey Decl. ¶ 3). Facebook's contacts meet the low threshold specified in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) - a threshold that courts have found may be satisfied by a single act within New York. See Licci , 673 F.3d at 62. Accordingly, the Court considers whether Plaintiff's claim against Facebook arises out of Facebook's business activity within New York State.

Plaintiff does not make any argument, either in the Complaint or his opposition, that his claims - all of which relate to Facebook's voluntary disclosure of his personal information - arise out of in-state business activity. In point of fact, it is almost certainly the case that Plaintiff's claims against Facebook arise out of the latter's activity in California, where its records custodians are located. (Facebook Br., Duffey Decl. ¶ 5). Accordingly, New York's long-arm statute does not confer jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim against Facebook. See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker , 490 F.3d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that to support jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, there must be "an articulable nexus, or a substantial relationship, between the claim asserted and the actions that occurred in New York"). Defendant Facebook's motion to dismiss the 1800 Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) is granted. All claims against Facebook are dismissed.

D. The Court Denies the DA Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the 1800 Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5)

The DA Defendants move to dismiss the 1800 Complaint, as it pertains to them, for insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5), arguing that they have not been served. (1800 DA Br. 29-30). As Plaintiff points out, they are incorrect. (1800 Pl. Opp. 10). All but one of the DA Defendants were served on August 17, 2018. (Id. ; 1800 Dkt. # 222-25). The remaining defendant, Elizabeth Pederson, waived service of summons on December 28, 2018. (1800 Dkt. # 261). In their reply, buried in a footnote, the DA Defendants concede that their initial representations to the Court regarding lack of service were incorrect. (1800 DA Reply 1 n.1). Despite that concession, "[t]he DA [D]efendants continue to rely on their argument that Plaintiff failed to effect personal jurisdiction[.]" (Id. ).

In light of Plaintiff's pro se status and his diligent communications with the Court regarding service issues, the Court will not dismiss the case for insufficient service. To begin, "as an incarcerated pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis , [Plaintiff] was entitled to rely on service by the U.S. Marshals." Romandette v. Weetabix Co. , 807 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(B)(i) ). The Second Circuit has further cautioned that, when deciding service issues in pro se cases, district courts must construe Rule 4 generously:

As we observed in Grammenos v. Lemos , 457 F.2d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972), Rule 4 of the Federal Rules is to be construed liberally "to further the purpose of finding personal jurisdiction in cases in which the party has received actual notice." We further noted that "incomplete or improper service will lead the court to dismiss the action unless it appears that proper service may still be obtained." Id.

Jaiyeola v. Carrier Corp. , 73 F. App'x 492, 494 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order). Here, not only do all of the DA Defendants have actual notice of the 1800 Complaint, but, more importantly, "proper service has been obtained in the instant case," id. , with respect to all but one of the defendants.

In addition, the Court must "weigh the plaintiff's reasonable efforts and diligence against the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay." DeLuca , 695 F.Supp.2d at 66. The DA Defendants argue that, despite being entitled to rely on the Marshals, Plaintiff alone is at fault for the delay in effecting service. (1800 DA Br. 29-30). Specifically, these Defendants claim that Plaintiff "is the source of confusion over the failure to serve the complaint [because] Plaintiff filed a document labeled as a 'complaint supplement' which can be readily confused with the complaint." (Id. at 29).

The DA Defendants were served with the Complaint Supplement, but not the Complaint, on September 27, 2016. (1800 Dkt. # 98). They promptly notified the Court of this deficiency. (Id. ). However, in their briefing, the DA Defendants ignore the fact that Plaintiff made repeated attempts to remedy any service errors. On October 19, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a response to the Court seeking clarification from the Marshals as to how, and with what documents, each DA Defendant had been served. (1800 Dkt. # 110). Because the case was then stayed pending resolution of Plaintiff's appeal of his underlying criminal conviction, the Court did not immediately resolve the issue. (1800 Dkt. # 114).

Given Plaintiff's diligence in communicating with the Court, he will not be found at fault for any service delays. Over the past four years, Plaintiff has repeatedly written to the Court providing service updates or seeking to verify the status of his service requests. (See, e.g. , 1800 Dkt. # 28, 43, 84, 110, 122, 128, 141, 153, 246, 251, 270). Cf. Meilleur v. Strong , 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding no abuse of discretion by district court in dismissing case when plaintiff did not raise the issue of pending service with the court). The Court itself has noted that other factors, including the two stays in the case, may have complicated Plaintiff's attempts to effect timely service. (See 1800 Dkt. # 155 ("[G]iven the lengthy stay in this case, it is possible that service attempts were interrupted or otherwise failed.") ).

Undeterred, the DA Defendants cite to Meilleur , 682 F.3d at 63, where the Second Circuit found that the district court's dismissal of a pro se case for failure to achieve timely service was not reversible error. (See 1800 DA Br. 29-30). Although Meilleur is distinguishable from the instant action - the Meilleur plaintiff did not apprise the court of status of process or request an extension - the Second Circuit's language is illuminating. Even while affirming the district court, the Second Circuit noted that the lower court's holding was "harsh and we might well have exercised discretion differently were it for us to decide in the first instance." Meilleur , 682 F.3d at 63. Thus, for the reasons set forth here, the DA Defendants' motion to dismiss the 1800 Complaint against them for insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) is denied.

E. The Court Dismisses Some, But Not All, of the Claims in the 1800 Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

The remaining arguments of the Moving Defendants are made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and concern Plaintiff's alleged failures to state a claim. The Court therefore proceeds to consider these claims on the merits, beginning with Plaintiff's claims in the 1800 Complaint, which focus on conduct before and immediately following Plaintiff's 2012 arrest.

Plaintiff brings a combination of constitutional, statutory, and state-law claims, many of which the Court previously addressed in its 2015 Order to Amend. (1800 Dkt. # 15). The Court will address each category of claims in turn, ultimately dismissing all of the claims in the 1800 Complaint with the exceptions of certain of Plaintiff's claims for malicious abuse of process and unlawful search and seizure.

1. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff brings federal claims under Section 1983, which establishes liability for deprivation, under the color of state law, "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt v. Cole , 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) (citation omitted). As such, a " § 1983 claim has two essential elements: [i] the defendant acted under color of state law; and [ii] as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of h[is] federal statutory rights, or h[is] constitutional rights or privileges." Annis v. County of Westchester , 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998) ; see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ("By its terms, of course, [ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ] creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.").

As a prerequisite to an award of damages under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show the personal involvement of the defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations. See Farrell v. Burke , 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006). To show personal involvement, a plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' " Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

A court may consider supervisory personnel to be "personally involved" if a plaintiff plausibly alleges facts showing that those defendants: (i) participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation; (ii) failed to remedy the wrong after being informed of it; (iii) created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom; (iv) were grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts; or (v) exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens by failing to act on information indicating there were ongoing unconstitutional acts. Grullon v. City of New Haven , 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Colon v. Coughlin , 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) ).

Municipal entities may be sued directly for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), but cannot be held liable for the acts of their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior , see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). In other words, " Monell does not provide a separate cause of action for the failure by the government to train its employees; it extends liability to a municipal organization where that organization's failure to train, or the policies or customs that it has sanctioned, led to an independent constitutional violation." Segal v. City of New York , 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Monell , 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ) (emphasis in Segal ).

A plaintiff may establish municipal liability under Monell in several ways, including by presenting evidence of

[i] an express policy or custom, [ii] an authorization of a policymaker of the unconstitutional practice, [iii] failure of the municipality to train its employees, which exhibits a "deliberate indifference" to the rights of its citizens, or [iv] a practice of the municipal employees that is "so permanent and well settled as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policymaking officials."

Biswas v. City of New York , 973 F.Supp.2d 504, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Pangburn v. Culbertson , 200 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1999) ).

2. The Court Dismisses in Part and Sustains in Part Plaintiff's Constitutional Claims Against the Government Defendants

a. Plaintiff's Speedy Trial, False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Fabrication of Evidence, and Malicious Prosecution Claims Are Barred by Heck

As pleaded, Plaintiff's speedy trial, false arrest, false imprisonment, fabrication of evidence, and malicious prosecution claims are barred because Plaintiff's criminal proceedings were not terminated in his favor, as required by Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

In Heck , the Supreme Court established a favorable termination requirement for § 1983 actions that do not "seek damages directly attributable to conviction or confinement but whose successful prosecution would necessarily imply that the plaintiff's criminal conviction was wrongful." 512 U.S. at 486 n.6, 114 S.Ct. 2364. In relevant part, the Supreme Court held that

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Id. at 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 ; cf. Poventud v. City of New York , 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (allowing claim for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence before trial to proceed, despite subsequent guilty plea to lesser included offense).

Plaintiff asserts that the dismissal of the state charges brought against him constitutes a favorable termination, and thus that none of his § 1983 claims is barred by Heck . (1800 Compl. ¶ 46; 1800 Pl. Opp. ¶ 26). A brief overview of the procedural history of the case - particularly the relationship between the state and federal charges - is necessary to address Plaintiff's argument.

To review, the NYPD arrested Plaintiff on January 25, 2012. (1800 Compl. ¶ 43; 1800 DA Br., Ante Decl., Ex. E at 3). On January 26, 2012, Plaintiff was presented in New York County Supreme Court on a felony complaint. (1800 Compl. ¶ 44; 1800 DA Br., Ante Decl., Ex. E at 3). The same day, a New York County grand jury filed an indictment charging Plaintiff with two counts of promoting prostitution. (Id. ). Plaintiff was arraigned on this indictment on February 15, 2012. (1800 DA Br., Ante Decl., Ex. E at 3).

On January 22, 2013, Corley was indicted in this District, on two counts of sex trafficking of a minor. See United States v. Corley , No. 13 Cr. 48 (AJN), 2016 WL 9022508, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016). An additional count of sex trafficking of a minor, and one count of possession of child pornography, were added in a superseding indictment on October 10, 2013. See id. Because the subject matter of the federal indictments included the criminal conduct charged under the New York County indictment, the DANY recommended that the New York County indictment be dismissed. (1800 DA Br., Ante Decl., Ex. E at 4-6). On February 1, 2013, the state charges were dismissed in their entirety. (1800 Compl. ¶ 46).

On April 21, 2014, Plaintiff was convicted on all three counts of his federal indictment after a jury trial. (1800 DA Br., Ante Decl., Ex. G). Plaintiff's conviction was upheld by the Second Circuit and his petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Corley , 679 F. App'x 1, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 205, 199 L.Ed.2d 135 (2017).

In the instant action, Plaintiff argues that none of his claims is barred by Heck for a litany of reasons, including that: (i) the dismissal of the state indictment in 2013 was a termination in his favor (1800 Compl. ¶ 46; 1800 Pl. Opp. 26); (ii) his pending motions for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 and for vacatur pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 could reverse his conviction (1800 Pl. Opp. 27); (iii) he will eventually be released from custody (id. ); (iv) the "split verdict" renders Heck inapposite (id. at 27-28); and (v) the application of Heck causes prejudice (id. at 28). The Court addresses each argument in turn.

Where, as here, "the Federal and State actions are inextricably intertwined and substantially related to one another, the Heck rule applies to bar Section 1983 claims based on the dismissed state charges." Bogle v. Melamed , No. 09 Civ. 1017 (RJD), 2012 WL 1117411, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (quoting Thompson v. Delvalle , No. 07 Civ. 4691 (BSJ), 2010 WL 2505638, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2010) ). In this case, Plaintiff was arrested on federal charges arising out of the same events and conduct underlying the state charges. (1800 DA Br., Ante Decl., Ex. E at 4-6). In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the state charges were not identical to the federal charges, which covered a broader range of conduct. (See 1800 Pl. Opp. 26-27). However, Heck does not require that the state and federal charges be identical; instead, Heck applies when the dismissed state and federal charges derive from substantially the same conduct. See Bogle , 2012 WL 1117411, at *3. Therefore, since Plaintiff was convicted on federal charges stemming from the precise conduct underlying his dismissed state charges, the dismissal of the state charges was not a favorable termination. See Thompson , 2010 WL 2505638, at *3.

Plaintiff's remaining arguments do not compel a different conclusion. First , neither Plaintiff's pending motions, nor his eventual release, has any effect on the applicability of Heck . See Magnotta v. Putnam Cty. Sheriff , No. 13 Civ. 2752 (GBD) (GWG), 2014 WL 705281, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2014) ("Nor does the fact that [plaintiff] is actively appealing his criminal conviction ... lift the Heck bar inasmuch as the plaintiff in Heck itself was also pursuing an appeal of his criminal conviction at the time he brought his § 1983 claims." (citing Heck , 512 U.S. at 478-79, 114 S.Ct. 2364 ) ). Second , although a "split verdict" can render the Heck bar inapplicable in some circumstances, see Dunham v. City of New York , 295 F.Supp.3d 319, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), no split verdict occurred here; Plaintiff was convicted of all counts in the federal indictment, see Corley , 679 F. App'x at 3.

Finally , Plaintiff's argument that "Defendants willfully forfeited a trial to prove the strength of their case, [while trying] to ride on the coattails of a federal conviction," is nonsensical. (1800 Pl. Opp. 28). The DANY can hardly be said to have forfeited anything; it dismissed its indictment in favor of a federal indictment with additional charges and greater penalties. The result of the federal prosecution suggests the strength of the DANY's evidence. Despite the fact that Plaintiff may be "unable to reverse his federal conviction" (id. ), Defendants did not improperly invoke Heck , see 512 U.S. at 484-85, 114 S.Ct. 2364 ("This Court has long expressed ... concerns for finality and consistency and has generally declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack[.]").

Given the lack of a favorable termination, the Court now examines which of Plaintiff's claims implicate the validity of his conviction and thus are barred by Heck . Count XII of the 1800 Complaint, Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, necessarily implies that his conviction was erroneous and must be dismissed. See Montane v. Pettie , No. 10 Civ. 4404 (ARR), 2012 WL 1617713, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2012) (dismissing speedy trial claim as well as malicious prosecution claim under Heck ); Davis v. New York , No. 90 Civ. 6170 (MBM), 2003 WL 1787151, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003) (dismissing speedy trial claim); see also Zarro v. Spitzer , 274 F. App'x 31, 34 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of claims raising questions about plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because such claims implicated the validity of conviction).

Plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims, in Counts VI and VII of the 1800 Complaint, are also barred because relief would imply the invalidity of Plaintiff's conviction. See Younger v. City of New York , 480 F.Supp.2d 723, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment were barred by Plaintiff's conviction); see also Magnotta , 2014 WL 705281, at *5 (dismissing Plaintiff's false arrest claim "as success on that claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction resulting from that arrest").

In Counts IV and V of the 1800 Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Government Defendants fabricated and altered physical evidence and coerced informants into giving false statements. (1800 Compl. ¶¶ 37-41, 75-76). The Court construes these allegations as claims for fabrication of evidence, in violation of Plaintiff's right to a fair trial. See Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039 , 838 F.3d 265, 278 (2d Cir. 2016). They, too, necessarily imply that Plaintiff's underlying conviction was wrongful. Here, as in Warren v. Fischl , although Plaintiff has "not in so many words challenged the lawfulness of his conviction," the Court does "not doubt that his allegations of extensive conspiratorial misconduct between [the police] and the prosecution would render the conviction invalid if they were proved." 674 F. App'x 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (finding that Plaintiff's fabrication of evidence claims were barred by Heck), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 123, 199 L.Ed.2d 75 (2017). For that reason, Plaintiff's fair trial claims are barred by Heck . See also Smalls v. City of New York , 181 F.Supp.3d 178, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("A fabrication of evidence claim, like a malicious prosecution claim, seeks to impugn the validity of the extant conviction.").

Finally, favorable termination is an element of a malicious prosecution claim. See Heck , 512 U.S. at 484-86, 114 S.Ct. 2364. As Plaintiff has not shown favorable termination, his malicious prosecution claim, alleged in Count XI of the 1800 Complaint, cannot survive. In sum, Heck and its progeny require that Plaintiff's speedy trial, false arrest, false imprisonment, fabrication of evidence, and malicious prosecution claims be dismissed.

b. Plaintiff's Claims for Substantive Due Process and Conspiracy to Violate His Due Process Rights Fail

As clarified in his 1800 Complaint and Opposition, Plaintiff's claims for "Outrageous Government Conduct" and "Harassment" are properly construed as substantive due process claims. (See 1800 Compl. ¶ 74; 1800 Pl. Opp. 13). Therefore, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must allege government conduct that "is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." Velez v. Levy , 401 F.3d 75, 93 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Plaintiff's claim for substantive due process includes ample factual allegations, including five additional pages of briefing on the issue in his Opposition. (1800 Compl. ¶¶ 27-33; 1800 Pl. Opp. 13-17). Length, however, does not equal substance: Plaintiff's briefing, even liberally read, distills to allegations that the Government Defendants used informants in the course of undercover operations. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the Government Defendants worked with alleged prostitutes as confidential informants, while investigating alleged pimps and "individuals they believed to be associated with the Plaintiff." (1800 Compl. ¶ 30). Plaintiff does not indicate that the Government's conduct affected him. To the contrary, he asserts that he "declin[ed] to do any business" with any of the alleged informants. (Id. at ¶ 34).

The conduct alleged to have been undertaken by the Government Defendants does not shock the contemporary conscience. See Matican v. City of New York , 524 F.3d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that law enforcement's design of sting operation, including participation of informant, did not shock the conscience). Nor do Plaintiff's sweeping statements that Defendants "forc[ed] an underage girl to engage in prostitution in order to fraudulently arrest her pimp" (1800 Pl. Opp. 13), or that they "encouraged and promoted prostitution" (id. at 17), cure the 1800 Complaint's deficiencies. Plaintiff's factual basis for these statements is that the Government Defendants simultaneously pursued investigations into suspected prostitution while meeting with potential informants who may have been prostitutes, some of whom may have been underage. (Id. at 15). If true, that conduct is neither inconsistent nor illegal, much less outrageous.

Finally, Plaintiff's harassment claim lacks any factual development. Plaintiff merely claims that the Government Defendants "engag[ed] in a systematic and intentional pattern of harassment by abusing legal process to deliberately invade Plaintiff's privacy without probable cause[.]" (1800 Compl. ¶ 74). Although it reads Plaintiff's claims to raise the strongest arguments they suggest, the Court is not obligated to accept as true legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations. See Rolon v. Henneman , 517 F.3d 140, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2008). Without any supporting factual allegations, Plaintiff's claim of harassment does not suffice to save his due process claim.

Counts I and III of the 1800 Complaint are dismissed by reason of this analysis. By extension, Count II, which alleges conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's substantive due process rights, also fails. See Curley v. Vill. of Suffern , 268 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiffs may not maintain a § 1983 claim for conspiracy if they cannot establish the underlying constitutional violation). Plaintiff's conspiracy claim relies on the same due process allegations - that the Government Defendants engaged in undercover operations to root out prostitution of underage victims and met with informants in furtherance of that process. (1800 Compl. ¶¶ 34-36). Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a constitutional violation of his due process rights, his conspiracy claim is dismissed.

c. Plaintiff's Claim for Malicious Abuse of Process Survives in Part and Fails in Part

In Counts IX and X of the 1800 Complaint, Plaintiff advances two claims for malicious abuse of process. (1800 Compl. ¶¶ 80-81). First , Plaintiff alleges that the Government Defendants "arrest[ed] Plaintiff to compel his cooperation in Nuisance Abatement proceedings" (1800 Pl. Opp. 19), against "numerous Manhattan property owners" (1800 Compl. ¶ 50). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that during an interrogation in January 2012, one of the Government Defendants, Detective Woods, informed Plaintiff that the DA Defendants were "interested in Plaintiff's cooperation regarding the owners of apartment buildings alleged to be involved with illegal activities." (Id. at ¶ 49). When Plaintiff declined to cooperate, the Government Defendants arrested him. (Id. ). Second , Plaintiff claims that the Government Defendants, with knowledge that Plaintiff was seeking proof of employment with Con Edison to obtain lower bail, "disclos[ed] Grand Jury evidence to [Con Edison] which effectively caused his termination." (1800 Pl. Opp. 19).

To state a claim for malicious abuse of process under New York law, Plaintiff must allege "that defendant [i] employed regularly issued legal process to compel performance or forbearance of some act, [ii] with the intent to do harm without excuse or justification, and [iii] in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process." Arrington v. City of New York , 628 F. App'x 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (brackets omitted) (quoting Savino v. City of New York , 331 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cir. 2003) ). To raise this claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege an abuse of the criminal process. See Cook v. Sheldon , 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994). What is more, in the criminal context, a plaintiff must allege "a collateral purpose beyond or in addition to his criminal prosecution." Savino , 331 F.3d at 77.

Plaintiff plausibly alleges the Government Defendants' collateral objective as to his first claim, but not his second. With regards to his first claim, Plaintiff has alleged that the Government Defendants "had an ulterior purpose or objective in facilitating his prosecution." See Savino , 331 F.3d at 78. As alleged, the Government Defendants suggested to Plaintiff that if he agreed to do something for them, he would not be arrested. In contrast, Plaintiff's second claim does not allege a collateral purpose. While Plaintiff does allege that the Government Defendants were aware that he was seeking lower bail - as they necessarily would be - he does not allege that they unlawfully disclosed grand jury evidence with the purpose of getting him fired. (1800 Compl. ¶ 51). There is, therefore, no indication in the 1800 Complaint that the Government Defendants sought to achieve a collateral purpose "beyond or in addition to his criminal prosecution." Corso v. City of New York , No. 17 Civ. 6096 (NRB), 2018 WL 4538899, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2018) ; see also Goldring v. Zumo , No. 14 Civ. 4861 (BMC), 2015 WL 148451, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2015) ("[I]n the criminal context, harm to a plaintiff's business is not sufficient unless it is used a means to compel some other result."). For that reason, Count IX of the 1800 Complaint succeeds and Count X fails.

d. Plaintiff's Claims for Unlawful Search and Seizure Survive in Part and Fail in Part

Construed liberally, Plaintiff alleges four separate claims for unlawful searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment in Count VIII of the 1800 Complaint. The first three searches occurred on January 25, 2012, the day of his arrest; the fourth search took place on February 1, 2012. The Court addresses each alleged violation in turn.

i. The Search Incident to Arrest

In his first unlawful search claim, Plaintiff alleges that after he was arrested on January 25, 2012, "two cellphones, electronic media and credit cards" were "removed from his person[.]" (1800 Compl. ¶ 47). The Court understands the allegations to be a claim of unlawful search incident to arrest.

The Fourth Amendment, incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees all individuals the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. See, e.g. , Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). While searches typically require a warrant in order to qualify as "reasonable," the Supreme Court has held "that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment." United States v. Robinson , 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). Furthermore, "a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It