Tinnus Enters., LLC v. Telebrands Corp. (369 F. Supp. 3d 704, 2019)

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 2019-03-15

Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Patents

Citations

Full opinion text

ROBERT W. SCHROEDER III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

(LEAD CASE)

REDACTED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are the parties' motions for post-trial relief. Having considered the parties' written submissions and the arguments at the April 18, 2018 hearing, the Court rules as follows:

• Plaintiffs' Motion for Enhanced Damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (Docket No. 578) is GRANTED ;

• Plaintiffs' Motion for Apportionment of Damages as to Retailer Defendants (Docket No. 579) is DENIED ;

• Plaintiffs' Motion for a Permanent Injunction (Docket No. 580) is GRANTED ;

• Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment and Post-judgment Interest (Docket No. 581) is GRANTED ;

• Defendants' Renewed Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New Trial (Docket No. 582) are GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART ;

• Defendants' Renewed Supplemental Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or Alternatively a New Trial (Docket No. 702) is DENIED ; and

• Plaintiffs' Motion to Declare These Consolidated Cases as Exceptional and for Attorneys' Fees (Docket No. 583) is GRANTED .

BACKGROUND

This case concerns a group of water balloon patents assigned to Tinnus Enterprises and invented by Tinnus's founder, Mr. Malone. Plaintiffs Tinnus Enterprises, LLC and Zuru Ltd. ("Plaintiffs") and Defendants Telebrands Corporation ("Telebrands") and Bulbhead.com, LLC ("Bulbhead") are direct competitors in the water balloon market. The parties' products fill multiple water balloons simultaneously; exemplary pictures of the products at issue are shown below:

(Plaintiffs' Bunch O Balloons) (Telebrands' Balloon Bonanza) (Telebrands' Battle Balloons)

This dispute led to multiple cases before this Court. Plaintiffs filed their first complaint on June 9, 2015, alleging that Telebrands' Balloon Bonanza product infringes U.S. Patent No. 9,051,066 ("the '066 Patent"). Case No. 6:15-cv-551 ("Tinnus I "), Docket No. 1. Defendants then filed an ultimately unsuccessful petition for post-grant review ("PGR") of the '066 patent. Case No. 6:15-cv-551, Docket No. 334.

In the early stages of Tinnus I , the Court granted a preliminary injunction, which enjoined the sale of Telebrands' Balloon Bonanza products. See Case No. 6:15-cv-551, Docket Nos. 66, 84, 91). During the pendency of the injunction, Plaintiffs sued Telebrands and Bulbhead in this action. See Amended Complaint, Docket No. 265. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' Battle Balloons product (a redesign of Balloon Bonanza) infringes claims 1-3 of U.S. Patent No. 9,315,282 ("the '282 Patent") and claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,242,749 ("the '749 Patent") (collectively "the patents-in-suit").

The '282 Patent is entitled "System and Method for Filling Containers with Fluids." '282 Patent. The disclosure of the '282 Patent relates to fluid inflatable systems, specifically to a system and method for filling containers with fluids. '282 Patent at 1:22-24. Like the '282 Patent, the '749 Patent describes a system for simultaneously filling multiple water balloons. '749 Patent at 6:35-57.

In early 2016, Plaintiffs filed suit against Bed Bath & Beyond, Fry's Electronics, The Kroger Company, Sears Holding Corporation and Walgreen Co. ("Retailers"), again alleging infringement of the patents-in-suit. See Amended Complaint, Case No. 6:16-cv-34, Docket No. 5. Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction in both cases as to the Battle Balloons products. Docket No. 19; Case No. 6:16-cv-34, Docket No. 26. The Court consolidated both actions, and issued an injunction against Defendant Telebrands. Docket No. 159.

However, the Retailers did not agree to be bound by the injunction against Telebrands. The Court held a hearing and ultimately issued an injunction against the Retailers. Docket Nos. 182, 211, 224. The Federal Circuit later affirmed the both injunctions. Tinnus Enterprises, LLC v. Telebrands Corp. , 708 Fed.Appx. 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

The parties agreed to consolidate the two cases for jury trial, which took place in November 2017. Docket Nos. 468, 473, 546-556. At trial, Defendants stipulated to infringement of claims 1-3 of the '282 Patent, and the jury found that those claims were not invalid. Docket No. 543 at 3. As to the '749 Patent, the jury found that Defendants infringed claim 1 and the claim was not invalid. Id. at 2. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $ 10,250,000 in lost profits and $ 2,000,000 as a reasonable royalty. Id. at 4. The jury further awarded Plaintiffs $ 67,000 to compensate Plaintiffs for the Retailers' infringement. Id. at 5. Finally, the jury found that Telebrands and the Retailers' infringement was willful. Id. The parties now move the Court for post-trial relief.

I. Plaintiffs' Motion for Enhanced Damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (Docket No. 578)

In exceptional cases, "the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." 35 U.S.C. § 284. The decision to increase damages, and the amount of such increase, is within the court's discretion. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc. , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1923, 1935-36, 195 L.Ed.2d 278 (2016). "As with any exercise of discretion, courts should continue to take into account the particular circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award damages, and in what amount." Id. at 1933. "When deciding how much to award in enhanced damages, district courts often apply the non-exclusive factors articulated in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. , 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated in part on other grounds by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996)." Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P. , 867 F.3d 1229, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

Read sets forth nine non-exclusive factors: (1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas of another; (2) whether the infringer investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3) the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) the defendant's size and financial condition; (5) the closeness of the case; (6) the duration of the defendant's misconduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; (8) the defendant's motivation for harm; and (9) whether the defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. , 970 F.2d at 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992). An award need not rest on any particular factor, and not all relevant factors need to weigh in favor of an enhanced award. See SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc. , 127 F.3d 1462, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1997). While the Read factors are helpful to the Court's exercise of its discretion, an analysis focused on "egregious infringement behavior" is the touchstone for enhancing damages rather, than a more rigid, mechanical assessment. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc. , No. 13-cv-3999, 2016 WL 3880774, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016).

Plaintiffs argue that enhanced damages are appropriate in this case because Telebrands' infringement was particularly egregious. Plaintiffs cite communications among Telebrands employees that demonstrate an intent to deliberately copy Plaintiffs' patented "Bunch O Balloons" product. Docket No. 578 at 8. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants presented no evidence of any reasonable investigation that led to a good-faith belief that the patents-in-suit were not infringed or invalid. Id. at 10. Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants' litigation tactics were designed solely to delay resolution of the case, obstruct Plaintiffs' ability to prove its case, frustrate the Court by ignoring important orders and ultimately drive up litigation costs. Id. at 13. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue Defendants filed numerous dilatory motions, attempted to inject Post Grant Review ("PGR") proceedings into the trial after the Court ruled that information regarding those proceedings was excluded, repeatedly argued claim constructions that were previously rejected by the Court and engaged in inappropriate discovery practices that caused unnecessary delay and expense. Id.

Plaintiffs also argue that this was not a close case because Defendants presented no legitimate defense as to infringement or invalidity for either of the patents-in-suit. Id. at 17. Plaintiffs assert that the duration of Defendants' misconduct was significant and that Defendants' infringement began on the day the patents-in-suit issued and continued until they were enjoined. Id. Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that "Defendants attempted to conceal their motivations behind the development of the Battle Balloons product under the guise of privilege and advice of counsel, even though Defendants changed their story at trial and claimed it was their expert, Dr. Kamrin, who spearheaded the development effort."Id. at 19. According to Plaintiffs, the totality of circumstances warrants enhancing the jury's damages award to the maximum amount permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 284, which would be $ 36,951,000.00. Id. at 21.

In response, Defendants argue this was a close, hard-fought case. Docket No. 589 at 10. Defendants contend that their non-infringement and invalidity arguments were reasonable. Id. at 11-12. According to Telebrands, the Battle Balloons product was the result of its efforts to design around the '066 Patent in order to avoid another lawsuit from Plaintiffs. Docket No.

589 at 13. Telebrands alleges it had a good-faith belief it had avoided the "common face" and "second end" claim limitations of the '066 Patent. Id. Telebrands further asserts that when the '749 Patent first issued in January 2016, it had a good-faith belief of non-infringement because the '749 patent claimed the same "common face" and "second end" limitations as the '066 Patent. Id. at 14. Telebrands contends it already began selling the infringing Battle Balloons before either of the patents-in-suit issued. Id.

Next, Telebrands argues that it had a good-faith belief that the patents-in-suit were invalid based, in part, on proceedings before the PTAB. Id. at 14. In June 2015, Telebrands filed a petition for PGR on Plaintiffs' '066 Patent. Id. at 13. Then, on January 6, 2016 (prior to the issuance of the '749 Patent ), the PTAB instituted the PGR, finding it more likely than not that the '066 Patent claims were obvious and indefinite. Id. at 14. Telebrands further contends that it also relied on declarations from its infringement/invalidity expert, Dr. Kamrin, who opined that the Battle Balloons product did not infringe the '749 Patent and that both patents-in-suit were invalid. Id. at 15. Thus, Telebrands asserts this weighs against enhancement under the second and fifth Read factors because its non-infringement and invalidity arguments were reasonable. Id. at 20, 28.

Defendants argue that other Read factors weigh against enhancement as well. According to Defendants, their litigation conduct was not egregious. Defendants rely on the fact that they stipulated to infringement of the '282 Patent to streamline the issues at trial. Id. at 21-22. Defendants also argue that their allegedly dilatory motions were, in fact, reasonable and brought in good faith. Id. at 22-23. As to size and financial condition, Telebrands argues it is a company with only 90 employees and that the total damages requested by Plaintiffs represent a [redacted] of Telebrands' overall yearly profits. Id. at 28. Telebrands further argues it had no motivation to harm Plaintiffs and that it made no attempt to conceal any misconduct. Id. at 28-29.

A. Whether Defendants Deliberately Copied Plaintiffs' Ideas or Design

Plaintiffs argue that Telebrands' copying is undeniably evidenced by internal communications from Telebrands' employees regarding Mr. Malone's Kickstarter campaign and the "development" of the Balloon Bonanza product. Docket No. 578 at 7. Defendants argue that the Battle Balloons product has different stair-cased housing and that the modification resulted from legitimate design-around efforts. Docket No. 589 at 7-8.

This factor weighs in favor of enhanced damages. The evidence presented at trial showed that Telebrands worked with an outside consultant, Mr. Rogai, to develop a copy of Plaintiffs' Bunch O Balloons product, which they originally discovered on a Kickstarter campaign started by Mr. Malone. See 11/15/17 P.M. Tr. at 11:13-26:18, 42:6-9; see also PTX 83, PTX 87, PTX 137. For example, one email from Mr. Rogai to Telebrands employees states: "Here it is with 37 fillers in one cap. Tested and it works just like Bunch of Balloons." PTX 137. In another email, Mr. Rogai further explains:

"So you know what the original actual product 'Bunch of Balloons' looks like. Here is a pic below. [Includes picture of Plaintiffs' Bunch O Balloons product.] Here is our version below where we would just paint the cap and change out the balloons using the bands removed from their product, new BLUE balloons we loaded on, and a painted cap. [Includes picture of prototype.]"

Id. These emails were exchanged in 2014 and describe the original development of Telebrands' first water balloons product, Balloon Bonanza. Id.

To be clear, Balloon Bonanza is not an accused product in this case. However, those emails are still highly relevant because the product at issue here (Battle Balloons) is a modified version of Balloon Bonanza, designed after Balloon Bonanza was enjoined in Tinnus I . Case No. 6:15-cv-551, Docket No. 84. The record shows that Telebrands discovered Mr. Malone's Kickstarter campaign (11/15/17 P.M. Tr. at 11:21-24) and decided it was a "cool idea" (11/14/17 P.M. Tr. at 45:17-18) before manufacturing the functionally similar product Balloon Bonanza. After Balloon Bonanza was enjoined, Telebrands only made superficial changes to the product's housing and renamed it Battle Balloons. In reality, Battle Balloons was functionally identical to Balloon Bonanza:

This modification does not change the fact that Telebrands copied Mr. Malone's idea. See Whirlpool Corp. v. TST Water, LLC , No. 2:15-CV-01528-JRG, 2018 WL 1536874, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018) (granting a motion for enhanced damages after finding that "the attempted design around process engaged in by [the plaintiff] began with copying"). For these reasons, the Court finds that the first Read factor favors enhanced damages.

B. Whether Defendants Investigated Plaintiffs' Patent and Formed a Good Faith Belief That It Was Invalid or That It Was Not Infringed

Plaintiffs argue that this factor strongly favors enhancement because Defendants did not provide any evidence supporting a good-faith belief that the patents-in-suit were not infringed or invalid. Docket No. 578 at 9. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants waived their advice of counsel defense and then attempted to rely on their expert, Dr. Kamrin, as having provided infringement and invalidity opinions. Id. at 10. Regardless, Plaintiffs argue that any of Dr. Kamrin's opinions would have been flawed because he offered positions that were excluded by the Court, he is not a lawyer and he failed to consider secondary considerations of non-obviousness in formulating his opinions. Id. at 11.

Defendants argue that they had a good-faith belief that they were not infringing the '749 Patent based on their interpretation of the terms "common face" and "second end." Docket No. 589 at 13. Defendants assert that they also believed the patent was invalid based on the PTAB's grant of their PGR petition for the '066 Patent, which also disclosed the "common face" and "second end" limitations. Additionally, Defendants argue that they relied on the analysis of their expert with respect to invalidity of the '749 and '282 Patents. Id. at 15.

A brief recap of the timeline of this case is important to the Court's analysis. On January 4, 2016, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) authorized a post-grant review to be instituted on claims of the '066 Patent. See '066 Institution Decision, Docket No. 589-8. The PTAB found that "the information presented in the Petition demonstrates that it is more likely than not that Petitioner [Telebrands] would prevail in showing that the challenged claims, except claims 7 and 9, are unpatentable." Id. at 3. The '749 Patent then issued on January 26, 2016. Docket No. 1-1. The '282 Patent issued on April 19, 2016. Docket No. 3-2.

As to the '749 Patent, it is possible that Defendants may have had a good-faith belief that they did not infringe. According to Telebrands, Battle Balloons was the result of redesign efforts intended to avoid the "common face" and "second end" limitation of the '066 Patent and Battle Balloons was released before the '749 Patent issued. See 6:15-cv-551, Docket No. 113 (Plaintiffs first learned of Battle Balloons on January 11, 2016).

After the '749 Patent issued, Dr. Kamrin examined the patent and determined that: (1) the Battle Balloons did not infringe the '749 Patent because it avoided the "common face" and "second end" limitations and (2) the '749 Patent was invalid because the claims were similar to those of the '066 Patent subject to PGR proceedings. See Docket No. 33-1. Thus, there is some evidence to support Defendants' assertion.

These arguments do not apply to the '282 Patent because that patent does not contain the terms "common face" or "second end." As stated, Defendants conceded infringement of the '282 Patent at trial. 11/14/17 P.M. Tr. at 57:5-12. However, Defendants argue that they had a good-faith belief that the '282 Patent was invalid for obviousness and lack of written description. According to Defendants, Dr. Kamrin examined the patent and submitted a declaration in May 2016 explaining that he believed the patent was invalid, in part, based on the institution decision of the '066 Patent because the subject matter and prior art were similar. See Docket No. 33-1. Thus, there is some evidence that Defendants investigated the '282 Patent and believed that the patent was invalid.

The operative question is whether Defendants' beliefs were in "good-faith." Dr. Kamrin did not examine secondary considerations when developing his obviousness opinions. 11/17/17 P.M. Tr. at 126:3-19 & 128:14-18; see also Docket No. 33-1 (no discussion of secondary considerations). Inventors had been trying to develop a better system for simultaneously inflating multiple water balloons for as long as water balloons have been available, and that the products-at-issue experienced great commercial successful. On this record, the Court is not convinced that Defendants' formed a "good-faith" belief as to invalidity. Nonetheless, Defendants, at the very least, did investigate Plaintiffs' patents. For these reasons, the Court finds this factor is neutral.

C. Defendants' Behavior as a Party to the Litigation

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' litigation tactics were designed to delay resolution of this case, obstruct Plaintiffs, frustrate the Court and drive up litigation costs. Docket No. 578 at 13. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants filed numerous dilatory motions, attempted to reargue rulings previously made by the Court, took frivolous positions and engaged in inappropriate discovery practices. Id. Defendants argue that there were few discovery disputes in this case and that they worked with Plaintiffs to reach a number of agreements. Docket No. 598 at 21. Defendants further contend that their motives were not dilatory and that their arguments were justified. Id. at 23-27. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds that this factor favors enhanced damages.

a. Motions Practice

Early on in this case, the Court admonished the parties for excessive motion practice and abuse of the Court's emergency motion procedure. See, e.g ., Docket No. 132. Specifically, Telebrands filed an emergency motion to compel a response, which the Magistrate Judge deemed a non-emergency. See id. at 2 (denying Telebrands' motion as a non-emergency and explaining that the Court had "already admonished the parties regarding their abuse of emergency motions").

Telebrands proceeded to file several non-meritorious motions, thereby expending significant resources of the parties and the Court. For example, after a full evidentiary hearing, extensive briefing and consideration of objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Telebrands filed a motion to reconsider the Court's preliminary injunction. Docket No. 153. Telebrands' motion to reconsider was denied as baseless (Docket No. 229), and the preliminary injunction was ultimately upheld on appeal. Tinnus , 708 Fed.Appx. 1019. Telebrands simultaneously moved to stay the injunction. Docket No. 146. The Court denied that motion as premature (Docket No. 157) and denied Telebrands' subsequent motion re-urging the Court to stay the injunction. Docket No. 229. Telebrands then filed a motion to stay this matter pending completion of PGR proceedings. Docket No. 239. Again, the Court denied Telebrands' motion and found that every factor weighed against a stay. Docket Nos. 262, 293. In the end, the PTAB found the asserted claims were not invalid. Docket Nos. 626-1, 626-2; Docket No. 543.

After repeated motions to stay this action were denied by the Court, Telebrands filed a motion to dismiss just a few months before trial but after the deadline for filing dispositive motions. Docket No. 298. Once again, Defendants directed the resources of the parties and the Court to a non-meritorious issue. Docket Nos. 359, 456. The excessive motions practice demonstrated an intent to delay and obstruct this action. For these reasons, this factor weighs in favor of enhanced damages.

b. Discovery Conduct

Telebrands' discovery conduct weighs in favor of enhanced damages. The Court became aware of this conduct when Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production of documents related to Telebrands' third generation of water balloon products, Easy Einstein Balloons. Docket No. 219. The Magistrate Judge found that Telebrands' refusal to produce the requested discovery was not justified. See Docket No. 223. The information was relevant to the Court's ability to enforce the injunction in this matter and the Protective Order provided sufficient means for the production. Id. at 3-4 ("these products are indisputably relevant and Telebrands was not substantially justified in refusing to produce the requested product samples. Telebrands provides no justification as to why it could not accept Plaintiffs' offer to designate the materials 'Attorney's Eyes Only' and provide a public release date."). Moreover, Plaintiffs' motion to compel was "a direct result of Telebrands' failure to be forthright with Plaintiffs and engage in good faith negotiations." Id. at 4. The Magistrate Judge concluded that "[t]hese types of tactics waste resources and necessarily prolong the resolution of discovery disputes" and awarded costs and fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Id. at 4-5.

Later, Plaintiffs were forced to file a motion to compel or modify the Protective Order because Telebrands' refused to produce documents related to the PGR proceedings. Docket No. 272. This caused the Court to sift through numerous individual disputes, all of which resulted in Defendants ultimately agreeing to de-designate material, the Court ordering material to be de-designated or the Court modifying the Protective Order. Docket No. 275. These disputes would have been avoided if Defendants had simply engaged in good-faith negotiations with Plaintiffs. Thus, this factor favors enhanced damages.

c. Re-argument of Issues Already Decided by the Court

Perhaps the most needless effort expended concerned disputes over the meaning of the "common face" and "second end." The Court first construed these terms in April 2016 in Tinnus I . Case No. 6:15-cv-551, Docket Nos. 181, 200. Despite the prior constructions, Telebrands and the Retailers continued to dispute the meaning of these terms through the preliminary injunction dispute and another full claim construction hearing.

At the preliminary injunction stage, the Court heard testimony from Dr. Kamrin, and found that Dr. Kamrin's proposal overstated the Court's prior construction of "common face." Docket No. 99 at 12. The Court therefore maintained its constructions and rejected Defendants' narrow interpretation. Id. With respect to "second end," the Court resolved a dispute between the experts and clarified its prior construction. Id. at 13-14. Based on these constructions, the Court found a likelihood of success on the merits as to infringement of claim 1 of the '749 Patent. Id.

Thereafter, Defendants continued to dispute the meaning of these claims. Docket No. 200 at 10-14; Docket No. 225. The Court conducted another claim construction hearing and re-heard arguments already considered. Docket No. 199. Ultimately, the Court maintained its prior constructions. Docket No. 200 at 10-14; Docket No. 225.

Despite the prior rejections, Dr. Kamrin still advanced the same opinions. As a result, Plaintiffs moved to strike Dr. Kamrin's opinions (Docket No. 329). The Court agreed, and struck numerous paragraphs of Dr. Kamrin's report that contained irrelevant opinions on the meaning of "common face" and "second end." Id. The Court warned that "should Dr. Kamrin submit a supplemental report that again so blatantly violates the Court's claim construction order or attempts to provide continued claim construction opinion, the Court will not hesitate to award sanctions in the form of an adverse inference and/or attorney's fees." Id. at 7.

Rather than offering new argument or evidence, Defendants found creative ways to reassert their rejected positions. The Magistrate Judge warned that Defendants' positions were preserved for appeal and that they need not continue to re-argue or disagree with the Court. See Docket No. 384 at 7 n.1 ("Dr. Kamrin may consider his claim construction arguments preserved for appellate purposes without the need to further articulate those opinions in his supplemental report."). Because Defendants repeatedly attempted to circumvent the Court's orders and drove up the expense of litigation, this factor favors enhanced damages.

d. Continued Assertion of Claims and Defenses

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants consistently took untenable positions, such as non-infringement of the '282 Patent and inequitable conduct by Plaintiffs. Docket No. 578 at 13. Defendants contend that their stipulation to infringement of the '282 Patent was an effort to narrow the case and that dropping the inequitable conduct claim did not burden Plaintiffs. Docket No. 589 at 21-22.

The Court appreciates parties' efforts to streamline claims and defenses as cases approach trial and such efforts should not normally form a basis for enhanced damages. However, the circumstances were such that the belated disposal of issues led to a significant waste of resources. Telebrands knew its inequitable conduct claim was weak because it barely survived Plaintiffs' initial motion to dismiss. See Docket Nos. 55, 100 ("Nothing in the factual allegations infers the omission of material information or the specific intent to deceive the PTO[;]" however, "[t]aking the allegations to be true, Telebrands has alleged facts to infer the possibility of a failure to properly notify the Examiner of the PGR decision" and "the Court finds that the counterclaim as to inequitable conduct based on the notice of the PGR decision has been sufficiently pled and is entitled to some discovery"); see also Docket No. 133 (Order adopting R & R (Docket No. 100) ). One year later, Plaintiffs filed a successful motion for summary judgment of no inequitable conduct (Docket No. 332), and the Magistrate Judge found the claim to be baseless. Docket Nos. 386, 413. Defendants did not object. See Docket No. 386.

Finally, while Defendants' only non-infringement defense was based on interpretations of "common face" and "second end," which were absent from the asserted claims of the '282 Patent, Defendants refused to stipulate to infringement of the '282 Patent until trial. Indeed, this occurred long after the Court granting its preliminary injunction. Docket Nos. 99, 142.

For these reasons, this factor weighs in favor of enhanced damages.

e. Trial Conduct

On the eve of trial, Defendants filed four motions and trial briefs on issues already resolved by the Court. See Docket Nos. 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 547 (11/14/17 A.M. Tr.) at 23:3-8 (Plaintiffs' counsel noted "Judge Love just dealt with this two weeks ago when the Defendants filed an emergency motion to file another summary judgment ... motion on this ruling[,]" and the Court noted that it "was denied").

Defendants then flagrantly ignored the Court's repeated ruling that mention of the PTAB or the PGR proceedings were excluded from evidence and not to be discussed in front of the jury. See, e.g. , Docket No. 453 (Granting Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 1, excluding reference to administrative proceedings before the PTAB). Defendants violated this order during examination of the first witness on the first afternoon of trial, questioning Mr. Malone on an article that was not admitted into evidence. 11/14/17 P.M. Tr. at 127:15-130:20. At that time, the Court warned Defendants' counsel that use of the article was a violation of the Court's ruling:

THE COURT: I'm troubled by this exhibit ... this article is not about the PTO. This article is about the PTAB. And when you get over here, all this information that is highlighted relates to PTAB defects.

And so I don't quite know how Mr. Dunlap was going to redirect his witness on that. But I want you to know I understand what happened here. And if there's an explanation for what occurred, I'm - I'm more than happy to hear it now. But I think this article clearly refers to what the PTAB does.

* * *

Well, I guess my concern about it is, you know, I think everybody understands PTAB proceedings are not going to come into this trial.

11/14/17 P.M. Tr. at 143:24-144:9; 144:25-145:2.

Two days later, Defendants' counsel attempted to solicit testimony from Telebrands' Chief Operating Officer about a declaration he submitted in the PGR proceedings. 11/16/17 P.M. Tr. at 11:24-18:9. The Court sustained Plaintiffs' objection and reminded counsel that "[w]e're not going there," but Defendants' counsel proceeded to solicit similarly prohibited testimony. Id. at 18:15-19:5. Plaintiffs objected again, and the Court again sustained the objection, directing the jury to disregard the statements. Id. at 19:6-11. Immediately thereafter, Defendants' counsel solicited testimony in further violation of the Court's repeated rulings. Id. at 19:24-20:4. Once again, Plaintiffs objected and the Court sustained the objection and ordered the jury to disregard the testimony. Id. at 20: 5-8. Undeterred, Defendants' counsel continued to solicit the same prohibited testimony, and the Court sustained Plaintiffs' objections three more times. 11/16/17 P.M. Tr. at 20:10-21:14. Defendants' flagrant disregard for the Court's rulings is inexcusable.

Defendants continued to open the door to prohibited issues throughout trial. On the morning of November 17, 2017, Defendants raised several objections to Mr. Ratliff's testimony on lost profits. One objection pertained to his reliance on Dr. Perryman's testimony for sales during a time period when other balloon products were being sold. See 11/17/17 A.M. Tr. at 9:12-15 ("MR. UNDERHILL: Okay. And the -- the huge objection we have is that Perryman's testimony was based on price erosion that was occurring with respect to the Balloon Bonanza product."). After discussion, Plaintiffs' counsel agreed to remove certain portions of Mr. Ratliff's slide deck. Defendants thus withdrew their objection. See Id. at 9:18-10:4.

However, on cross-examination, Defendants' counsel violated their own objection and purposely solicited testimony from Mr. Ratliff on the objected-to information. See id. at 79:15-80:14 ("Q: You testified about Dr. Perryman's analysis with respect to online sales; is that correct?" ... "So your testimony that you gave was not confined to his analysis with respect to online sales in 2016; is that correct?" ... "Okay. And so your testimony was referring to price erosion with respect to a different Telebrands product?"). The Court admonished Defendants' counsel for this behavior:

THE COURT: ... I think if there was any door open on this issue, Mr. Underhill, you opened the door, and now you're complaining about it....This did not come up on direct. You opened the door, and now you're complaining about it.... I do want to let you know, Mr. Underhill, in light of this conduct and the previous conduct that we've repeatedly discussed throughout this trial, I am on the verge of reducing your closing argument by 20 minutes.

11/17/17 A.M. Tr. (Sealed Portion No. 4) at 90:10-22.

Defendants' course of conduct throughout this case weighs in favor of enhancement. At nearly every stage of this litigation, Defendants took untenable positions and created unnecessary and wasteful work for the parties and the Court. This type of behavior is sanctionable and, indeed, did result in sanctions by the Court. See i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp. , 598 F.3d 831, 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding litigation misconduct typically refers to "bringing vexatious or unjustified suits, discovery abuses, failure to obey orders of the court, or acts that unnecessarily prolong litigation.")

D. Defendants' Size and Financial Condition

Plaintiffs argue that although Telebrands is a privately held company, discovery revealed $ [redacted] in revenue and $ [redacted] in profit. Docket No. 578 at 16, citing November 9, 2017 Iyer Dep. Tr. at 19:7-20:17. Plaintiffs argue that Telebrands is a leader in the television infomercial market and that the Retailer Defendants are all large corporations with substantial revenue. Docket No. 578 at 16. Telebrands maintains that it is a small company with only 90 employees and that its gross margin as to the accused products was [redacted] Docket No. 589 at 24.

After considering the parties' assertions, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.

E. Closeness of the Case

Plaintiffs argue that this was not a close case because Defendants presented no legitimate infringement defense for either of the patents-in-suit. Docket No. 578 at 17. For the same reasons discussed with respect to their litigation conduct, Defendants argue that this case was close. Docket No. 589 at 28.

This was not a close case. At the outset of this action, the Court held evidentiary proceedings on Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and found that Plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Docket Nos. 99, 159. From that time until the time of trial, Defendants did not pursue any new defenses. Rather, Defendants continued to re-argue claim construction positions, which the Court repeatedly rejected. Regardless, Defendants never proffered a non-infringement position for the '282 Patent and did not contest infringement at trial. As to invalidity, Defendants only pursued defenses that the Court previously considered and found unpersuasive. Docket Nos. 99, 159. Defendants relied on PGR petitions, but those petitions were instituted on obviousness and were ultimately unsuccessful. Docket Nos. 626-1, 626-2.

At the end of the six-day trial, the jury deliberated for just two-and-a-half hours before finding that Defendants infringed the patents-in-suit, that the patents-in-suit were valid and that Defendants' infringement was willful. Docket No. 544; 11/21/17 Tr. at 180:11-13. See SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc. , No. 08-CV-158-JRG, 2012 WL 4092449, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds , 769 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding this factor favored enhancement where the jury found willful infringement, that the patent was not invalid and awarded a $ 10 million lump-sum award).

For these reasons, the Court finds that this factor favors enhancement of damages.

F. Duration of Defendants' Misconduct

Plaintiffs argue that although the infringement period was shortened by the preliminary injunction, the duration of infringement was significant. Defendants continued selling the infringing products from the time the Magistrate Judge recommended granting the preliminary injunction in July 2016 (Docket No. 99) until the injunctions were entered in October 2016 (Docket No. 159) and February 2017 (Docket No. 224). Docket No. 578 at 17. Defendants argue that Telebrands' infringement was only around nine months, and they attempted a design-around during that time. Docket No. 589 at 28.

Although the period of infringement is nine months, the parties' history leading up to this point is relevant and significant. As discussed, Telebrands knew of Mr. Malone's related '066 Patent as early as June of 2015, when Plaintiffs first sued Telebrands. Case No. 6:15-cv-551, Docket No. 1. The preliminary injunction in Tinnus I caused Telebrands to redesign the Balloon Bonanza product and create the Battle Balloons product. 11/16/17 A.M. Tr. at 29:13-31:13.

The Court denied finding Telebrands in contempt based on the redesign efforts. Case No. 6:15-cv-551, Docket Nos. 144, 166. However, the redesign was superficial, and the Court determined that such redesign was not likely to change the outcome. Docket Nos. 99, 159. The Court determined that a subsequent redesign (resulting in the third generation of copycats, Easy Einstein Balloons) was not likely to escape an infringement finding. Case No. 6:17-cv-170, Docket No. 89. However, Telebrands continued selling the products even after the injunction recommendations. 11/15/17 P.M. Tr. at 32:19-33:1. See PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc'ns RF, LLC , No. 5:11-CV7-61 (GLS/DEP), 2016 WL 6537977, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2016), appeal dismissed , No. 16-4106, 2016 WL 10655596 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2016) ("continuing to sell the infringing products after notice of infringement and during the course of litigation supports enhancement.").

On this record, the Court finds that this factor weighs slightly in favor of enhancement.

G. Remedial Action by Defendants

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants took no remedial action once they were on notice about infringement. Docket No. 578 at 18. According to Plaintiffs, Telebrands made no effort to stop selling the accused products after the Court's rulings, and Telebrands attempted to conceal the development of its Easy Einstein Balloon products. Id. Further, Plaintiffs argue that the design-around in this case was spurred only by the recommendation for a preliminary injunction. Id. Defendants simply argue that they attempted design-arounds during the course of litigation. Docket No. 589 at 28.

As discussed above, the design-arounds were still likely to infringe the relevant patents-in-suit. Docket Nos. 99, 159; Case No. 6:17-cv-170, Docket No. 89. Telebrands' CEO, Mr. Khubani, admitted that the Battle Balloons design-around was not initiated by Telebrands' knowledge of Mr. Malone's original invention but rather spurred by the injunction recommended in Tinnus I. See 11/16/17 A.M. Tr. at 31:8-13 ("Q. Okay. Isn't it true, Mr. Khubani, that Telebrands didn't begin to develop Battle Balloons, the second product, until after a Court order recommended to the District Judge that told you to stop selling Balloon Bonanza; isn't that true? A. Yes."). Moreover, Telebrands attempted to conceal its redesign efforts-conduct for which it was sanctioned, as discussed above. Docket No. 223. Again, the Court found that this redesign was likely to infringe the patents-in-suit. Case No. 6:17-cv-170, Docket No. 89. Because Defendants failed to take remedial action and only took preventative action when forced by Court order, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of enhancement.

H. Defendants' Motivation for Harm

Plaintiffs argue that Telebrands' copying of their product and repeated attempts to introduce new infringing products in the face of injunctions show that Telebrands undertook these measures to harm Plaintiffs. Docket No. 578 at 19. Defendants argue that they were only motivated to sell the accused products to help their own businesses. Docket No. 589 at 29.

Defendants certainly had a profit-based motivation to continue selling the infringing products. However, because Telebrands and Zuru were the only two competitors in the market, any gain by Defendants necessarily came at Plaintiffs' expense. Moreover, the jury found that the infringing acts were willfully committed. For these reasons, this factor slightly favors enhancement of damages.

I. Whether Defendants Attempted to Conceal Their Misconduct

As previously noted, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants attempted to conceal Easy Einstein products and the development of their Battle Balloons products. Docket No. 578 at 19. Defendants contend that they disclosed their Battle Balloons products prior to the issuance of the patents-in-suit and that they properly disclosed their motivations to design-around. Docket No. 589 at 29.

While the circumstances regarding the development of the infringing Battle Balloons products are not clear, Telebrands was not forthright in its development of its Easy Einstein product as a design-around. As discussed above, Plaintiffs had to move to compel the production of this information. Docket No. 219. Despite the injunction, Telebrands refused to produce any information or a prototype. Docket No. 223. Telebrands argued that the Easy Einstein balloons were not relevant and had not yet been publicly released. The Magistrate Judge rejected those arguments and awarded fees and costs. Docket No. 223 at 4-5. This Court has since enjoined sales of the Easy Einstein balloons. Case No. 6:17-cv-170, Docket No. 89.

Given the unjustified withholding of relevant information, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of enhancement.

J. The Retailer Defendants

While the majority of the foregoing discussion focuses on Telebrands' conduct, the Retailers were either directly involved or complicit in a number of Telebrands' actions. The Retailers joined in a number of the motions discussed above; shared defense counsel throughout this litigation and at trial; shared experts with Telebrands (including Dr. Kamrin); and asserted the same claims and defenses. All Retailers are also indemnified by Telebrands.

The Retailers took additional actions that warrant enhanced damages. At the injunction hearing in this matter, the Court inquired whether the Retailers would agree to be bound by any injunction issued against Telebrands. See June 17, 2016 Preliminary Injunction Tr. at 8:12-20. The Court indicated that the appropriate course would be for the Retailers to abide by any rulings made as to Telebrands and counsel for the Retailers indicated they would discuss that matter. See id. at 9:1-7. The Retailers refused to be bound by the injunction. As a result, the Court conducted additional injunction proceedings and issued a separate injunction against Retailers. Docket No. 224. The Retailers unnecessarily prolonged these proceedings, which only concerned approximately 200,000 units of remaining balloon inventory. Docket No. 224 at 3.

The Retailers continued selling inventory after Telebrands was enjoined and after the Magistrate Judge recommended an injunction as to the Retailers. Id. The Retailers never gave a definitive inventory account and refused to produce discovery on the same. See id. ("the Retailer Defendants have produced no discovery to date on the state of their inventory ... none of the Retailers' submissions include accounts for the inventory, documents that should exist in the ordinary course of business.").

The Court denied a separate motion to stay the case as to the Retailers. See Docket No. 198 at 2-3 (reasoning that "[t]he fact that the Court was required to consider whether injunctive relief was appropriate as to the Retailers' stocked inventory-an issue separately raised by the Retailers in their disagreement to be bound by the injunction against Telebrands-demonstrates that the claims against the Retailers are not merely peripheral" and finding that "[t]he refusal to cooperate in forthright discovery shows that justice would be better served by permitting Plaintiffs to seek appropriate relief against the Retailers.").

After the injunction against the Retailers, at least one Retailer continued to sell the accused products. See, e.g ., Docket No. 323. While the Court commends the parties for resolving this matter without further Court intervention, communication breakdown between the parties caused the Court to facilitate the in-person meet and confer that resolved the issue. See Docket No. 344 ("[t]his motion is similar to other recent motions before the Court insomuch as a proper meet and confer would likely avoid unnecessary court intervention on this matter" ... "the Court will undertake the consideration of whether any sanction may be appropriately awarded for a party's unreasonable tactics in attempting to resolve this matter.").

K. Conclusion

The Court has discretion to "increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." 35 U.S.C. § 284. This case was initiated by an attempt to design around Plaintiffs' invention. However, the "design-around" was not a substantive alteration but a cosmetic change to a product that was enjoined. Ultimately, although the Court finds that this conduct does not merit a full trebling of damages, given Defendants' continued litigation misconduct and other actions described herein, the Court finds a significant enhancement is appropriate. See Whirlpool Corp., No. 2:15-cv-1528-JRG, 2018 WL 1536874, at *10 (enhancing damages in the amount of $ 3.8 million after considering egregious infringement behavior); compare ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v. Diamond Innovations Inc., No. 6:08-CV-325, 2010 WL 3238312, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2010) (trebling damages where the court found that seven of the nine Read factors weighed heavily in favor of enhancement). Having reviewed the Read factors and having considered the totality of the circumstances in this case, for the reasons discussed, the Court finds an enhancement of 100 percent is appropriate for both Telebrands and the Retailers.

Because the jury awarded $ 12,250,000 as a result of Telebrands' infringement, this award shall be increased to $ 24,500,000 . As to the Retailers' infringement, the jury awarded $ 67,000. As explained below, the Court is granting the Defendants' JMOL regarding the willfulness of Defendant Retailer Fry's. Since the Plaintiffs were seeking $ 13,756 for "unique" sales attributable to Fry's (Docket No. 579 at 6), the amount to be enhanced is $ 53,244. Accordingly, the final damages awarded from the Retailers is $ 106,488 .

II. Plaintiffs' Motion for Apportionment of Damages as to Retailer Defendants (Docket No. 579)

Plaintiffs request that the Court re-apportion the damages attributed to the Retailers. Docket No. 579. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that a "disagreement" has arisen as to the amount of reasonable royalties for which each Retailer is liable. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs contend that each Retailer Defendant is liable for a reasonable royalty on every unit of the infringing products it sold, which totals just under $ 1 million in the aggregate. Id. Plaintiffs cite testimony and a demonstrative exhibit (PTX-254) to show that their damages expert presented a damages model involving "overlapping" and "unique" sales. Id. at 5-6. Based on the evidence, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should "clarify" that the Retailers actually owe the "Total Adjusted Royalty," which would include "overlapping" sales in the amount of $ 981,623. Id. at 6-7. Lastly, Plaintiffs contend they "anticipated" this concern and raised it with the Court. Id. at 4.

In response, Defendants argue that the jury determined that the Retailer defendants' liability should be capped at $ 67,000, according to Question 4c of the verdict form. Docket No. 587 at 2. Defendants point out that PTX-254 never went back to the jury because it was a demonstrative exhibit. Id. They also argue that Plaintiffs' request amounts to asking the Court to "act as a substitute for the jury" and award increased damages. Id. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs did not raise this concern to the Court because they argued for a different format for the verdict form during the jury charge conference. Docket No. 587 at 3.

The Court will not disturb the verdict form. Question 4(c) was unambiguous. See Verdict Form, Docket No. 543 at 5. ("Question 4c: What sum of money do you find from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and reasonably compensate Plaintiffs for the Retailers' infringement through the time of trial? Answer in dollars and cents: $ 67,000"). Moreover, Plaintiffs have not cited a case in which a court altered the jury's final verdict form in the manner requested. The Court will not assume that the jury intended something other than the number it listed.

In addition, Plaintiffs had every opportunity during the charge conference to ask the Court to modify the verdict form but did not do so. Instead of asking the Court to break out the award according to each individual retailer, Plaintiffs sought to combine the question of damages as to Telebrands and the Retailers into a single question . See 11/20/17 P.M. Tr. at 145:1-3. Regardless, the time to raise this issue was during the charge conference, not in post-trial briefing. See Flexuspine, Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc. , 879 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that defendant's lack of objection to the verdict form prior to the jury's deliberations waived submission of invalidity as a counterclaim).

Thus, Plaintiffs' Motion for Apportionment of Damages as to the Retailers (Docket No. 579) is DENIED .

III. Defendants' Renewed Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New Trial (Docket Nos. 582, 702)

Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). "The grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is a procedural issue not unique to patent law, reviewed under the law of the regional circuit in which the appeal from the district court would usually lie." Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc. , 523 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Under Fifth Circuit law, courts are "especially deferential" to a jury's verdict and will not reverse jury findings that are supported by substantial evidence. Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc ., 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012). "Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc. , 211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000). The Court should "uphold a jury verdict unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable men could not arrive at any verdict to the contrary." Cousin v. Trans Union Corp ., 246 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2001) ; see also Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp ., 426 F.3d 281, 296 (5th Cir. 2005). However, "[t]here must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record to prevent judgment as a matter of law in favor of the movant." Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc ., 493 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Laxton v. Gap, Inc ., 333 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2003) ).

In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must "draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and cannot substitute other inferences that [the court] might regard as more reasonable." E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., L.L.C ., 731 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2013). Although a court must review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Ellis v. Weasler Eng'g Inc ., 258 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2001). However, a court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as those are solely functions of the jury. See id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc ., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ). The Court gives "credence to evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached if that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." Arismendez , 493 F.3d at 606.

In Defendants' Renewed Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Defendants make four main arguments. Docket Nos. 582, 702. First, Defendants argue that both patents-in-suit are invalid as a matter of law. Id. at 8-23. Second, Defendants argue that no reasonable jury could find infringement of the '749 Patent. Id. at 23-28. Third, Defendants contend that no reasonable jury could find willful infringement of either patent. Id. at 28-35. Fourth, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs cannot recover lost profits, including price erosion damages and excess freight charges. Id. at 35-46; see also Docket No. 702 (supplemental JMOL specifically addressing the issue of lost profits).

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the jury's verdict as to invalidity for both patents should stand. Docket No. 588 at 9-23. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of infringement of the '749 Patent. Id. at 23-27. Plaintiffs further argue that the jury heard sufficient evidence to support its willfulness finding. Id. at 27-37. Lastly, Plaintiffs assert that a reasonable jury could (and did) find that Zuru Ltd. incurred lost profits for the sales it would have made. Id. at 38-51; see also Docket No. 709.

A. Invalidity

a. Obviousness

A patent is obvious "if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains." 35 U.S.C.A. § 103. "Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual findings: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claims and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective indicia of nonobviousness." Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. , 688 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City , 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966) ). "A party seeking to invalidate a patent on the basis of obviousness must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Defendants have not met their burden as to any of the claims because Plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the claims were not obvious. For example, as to the differences between the claims and the prior art, Plaintiffs' technical expert (Dr. Kudrowitz) testified that the "sufficiently limited" limitation was lacking in all prior art references, including a specific discussion about the Donaldson and Lee references. 11/20/17 P.M. Tr. at 17:3-20:3. Dr. Kudrowitz also explained generally how the Donaldson and Lee references work. See id. In addition, the jury also heard substantial evidence, including testimony from Dr. Kudrowitz, that a motivation to combine was lacking. 11/20/17 P.M. Tr. at 20:11-21:23.

Plaintiffs also presented substantial evidence on objective indicia. "[O]bjective indicia may often be the most probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness in the record." Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. , 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1997). For example, the jury heard substantial evidence on copying, including communications between Telebrands employees and a contractor explaining how they copied Plaintiffs' Bunch O Balloons product after finding it on Kickstarter. See 11/15/17 P.M. Tr. at 11:13-26:18, 42:6-9; see also PTX 83, 87, and 137; see also Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ. , 212 F.3d 1272, 1285-86 (Fed Cir. 2000) (explaining how copying can help show an invention is nonobvious). As to commercial success, there was substantial evidence as to the success of both the Plaintiffs' Bunch O Balloons product and the accused infringer, Battle Balloons. See PTX 46; 11/15/17 A.M. Tr. at 75:08-25, 76:01-25 (explaining success of Bunch O Balloons). See PTX 147, 149, 150, 171, 304; 11/16/17 A.M. (Sealed Portion No. 3) at 13:4-11, 14:25, 15:01-04, 16:04-08, 23:19-21, 24:14-19 (explaining success of Battle Balloons). The jury also heard substantial evidence as to industry praise, including an appearance on the Today Show . 11/14/17 P.M. Tr. at 89:11-14, 134:15-24; 11/15/17 A.M. Tr. At 77:03-23. The jury heard substantial evidence regarding long-felt need, including testimony that the invention solved the problem of how to fill and tie multiple balloons at once. 11/14/17 P.M. Tr. at 85:24-86:12; 11/15/17 Tr. at 11:1-12; 11/16/17 P.M. Tr. at 129:14-17; see also 131:05-06 (Defendants conceded all non-infringing alternatives at a bench conference).

The Court also notes that Defendants' expert, Dr. Kamrin, seemingly did not account for objective indicia before reaching his ultimate conclusion on obviousness. For example, Dr. Kamrin testified that "secondary considerations were not discussed today" and disclaimed any analysis of specific objective indicia. 11/17/17 P.M. Tr. at 126:3-19 & 128:14-18. There is at least some Federal Circuit case law suggesting that it may be inappropriate to grant Defendants' JMOL for obviousness since Dr. Kamrin's testimony did not evaluate these objective factors. See InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc'ns, Inc. , 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that when "an expert purports to testify, not just to certain factual components underlying the obviousness inquiry, but to the ultimate question of obviousness, the expert must consider all factors relevant to that ultimate question").

Accordingly, for the reasons above, Defendants' JMOL for invalidity based on obviousness is DENIED . Defendants have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that any of the claims are obvious.

b. Written Description

Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), a patentee satisfies the written description requirement by "convey[ing] with reasonable clarity to [a POSA] that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention." Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar , 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Whether the written description requirement has been satisfied is a question of fact. Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc. , 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A district court "must accord deference to the jury findings on written description" and "not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder." Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co. , 208 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Finally, "under proper circumstances, drawings alone may provide a 'written description' of an invention as required by § 112." Vas-Cath , 935 F.2d at 1565.

Defendants contend that claims 1-3 of the '282 Patent are invalid because the patent's written description does not support the requirement that two or more of the containers press together when unfilled. Docket No. 582 at 21. Plaintiffs respond that the jury heard substantial evidence to support its finding that the patent was valid. Docket No. 588 at 21-23.

Here, a reasonable jury could find that the claims are not invalid for written description. Dr. Kudrowitz, testified that Figure 1 of the '282 Patent expressly shows containers in an unfilled state. 11/20/17 P.M. Tr. at 64:20-23, 65:15-20. Moreover, the ju