Davila v. N. Reg'l Joint Police Bd. (370 F. Supp. 3d 498, 2019)

Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge Angelica Davila ("Ms. Davila") brought this lawsuit alleging violations of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, made actionable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ms. Davila alleges that Defendant Officer Andrew Bienemann ("Officer Bienemann") unlawfully detained her during a traffic stop when he extended the length of the traffic stop, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to do so, in order to investigate Ms. Davila's immigration status. Ms. Davila also alleges that this detention violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as being conducted because of Ms. Davila's Hispanic ethnicity and/or national origin. Ms. Davila further alleges that Officer Bienemann caused her to remain unlawfully jailed overnight after learning that she was legally residing in the United States by failing to notify the Allegheny County Jail (the "ACJ") of her lawful status.

At all times relevant to this case, Officer Bienemann was a patrol police officer employed by the Northern Regional Joint Police Board (the "NRJPB"), another Defendant in this case. (Third Amended Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 138 ). The NRJPB is a local governmental agency that provides police services for the municipalities of Pine, Richland, and Marshall Townships and Bradford Woods Borough in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. (Pl.'s Concise Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Pl.'s SMF") ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 236 ). Ms. Davila alleges that the NRJPB's customs, policies, and/or practices resulted in the deprivation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with these incidents.

This case has a long and complicated procedural history. The Court first issued a lengthy opinion addressing the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. Davila v. N. Reg'l Joint Police Bd. , 979 F.Supp.2d 612 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (" Davila I "). That Opinion was later vacated in part on further consideration. No. 13-70, 2014 WL 3735631 (W.D. Pa. July 28, 2014) (" Davila II "). Davila II was itself vacated in part on reconsideration. Davila v. United States , 247 F.Supp.3d 650 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (" Davila IV "). Officer Bienemann also moved to dismiss the claims in Ms. Davila's Third Amended Complaint against him, which the Court granted in part and denied in part. Davila v. N. Reg'l Joint Police Bd. , No. 13-70, 2016 WL 1252986 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016) (" Davila III ").

Now before the Court is Ms. Davila's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 234 ), Officer Bienemann's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 238 ), and the NRJPB's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 240 ). Ms. Davila seeks the entry of summary judgment in her favor and against Officer Bienemann on Counts I and V of the Third Amended Complaint for alleged violations of her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and from false imprisonment. She also seeks the entry of summary judgment in her favor and against the NRJPB on Counts I and II of the Third Amended Complaint for alleged violations of her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures. Defendants Officer Bienemann and NRJPB seek the entry of summary judgment in their favor in all claims asserted against them. These Motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, each Motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed. On January 22, 2011, Angelica Davila drove herself and her friend, Joel Garrete ("Mr. Garrete"), to Los Campos, a Mexican grocery store on U.S. Route 19 in Pine Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. (Defendants' Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs.' SMF") ¶¶ 36-38, ECF No. 242 ; see also ECF No. 242-8 ). Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete arrived at Los Campos sometime between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. (Defs.' SMF ¶ 44). As the two left Los Campos, Ms. Davila turned right/north onto U.S. Route 19, a highway with two lanes in each direction. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47).

Officer Andrew Bienemann observed Ms. Davila travelling northbound in the left lane of Route 19. (Defs.' SMF ¶ 49). Ms. Davila's vehicle did not have its headlights on. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 57). Officer Bienemann thereupon initiated a traffic stop and reported the stop to Allegheny County Dispatch ("ACD") at 6:07 p.m. (Id. ¶ 52). Ms. Davila pulled her car over into the parking lot of a nearby restaurant. (Id. ¶ 54). Officer Bienemann approached Ms. Davila's vehicle and requested Ms. Davila's driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. (Id. ¶ 56). Ms. Davila produced a valid and current Pennsylvania driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. (Pl.'s SMF ¶ 29). Officer Bienemann also requested identification from Mr. Garrete. (Id. ¶ 58).

Mr. Garrete did not speak English, and Ms. Davila interpreted for Mr. Garrete during the traffic stop. (Defs.' SMF ¶¶ 60-61). After Mr. Garrete, through interpretation, answered "no" as to whether he had identification on him, Officer Bienemann asked Ms. Davila to ask Mr. Garrete if he was in the country legally. (Pl.'s SMF ¶¶ 33-34). Through Ms. Davila's interpretation, Mr. Garrete answered "no." (Id. ¶ 35). Officer Bienemann questioned Mr. Garrete about his immigration status because Mr. Garrete did not speak English and did not have a form of identification on him. (Id. ¶ 36). Officer Bienemann then asked Ms. Davila whether she was in the United States legally, and Ms. Davila responded that she was a legal permanent resident. (Id. ¶ 41).

Ms. Davila was born in Mexico in 1984 and immigrated to the United States with her parents when she was approximately two years old. (Dep. of Angelica Davila ("Davila Dep.") at 15:25-16:3, 169, 170, ECF No. 237-4 ). Ms. Davila received derivative United States citizenship pursuant to the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431 - 33, on April 30, 2001. (Pl.'s SMF ¶ 10). Because she was a citizen, Ms. Davila had no obligation to carry a legal permanent resident card on January 22, 2011, the date of the incident. (Id. ¶ 12).

Officer Bienemann then returned to his patrol car and requested a backup unit to assist him. (Deposition of Andrew Bienemann ("Bienemann Dep.") at 62:3-25, ECF No. 237-3 ). Despite Ms. Davila indicating that she was lawfully present in the United States, and providing facially valid copies of the requested driving and identification documents, Officer Bienemann asked ACD to submit both Ms. Davila's and Mr. Garrete's names to United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") in order to check their immigration statuses. (Pl.'s SMF ¶ 43). Officer Bienemann admitted that, at the time of the request, Ms. Davila had done nothing to cause him to believe that she might not have been lawfully present in the United States. (Bienemann Dep. at 63:17-20). Rather, Officer Bienemann's justification for providing Ms. Davila's name to ICE was that "in the course of [his] years of experience" he had "encountered numerous people who ha[d] not told [him] the truth or had been less than truthful with [him]," and since he was already notifying ICE about Mr. Garrete, he wanted ICE to "run [Ms. Davila's] name as well just to confirm what she had told [him]." (Id. at 63:8-16).

A second officer, Officer Sabrina Devereaux, arrived on the scene at approximately 6:13 p.m. (Pl.'s Response to Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ("Pl.'s Resp. SMF") ¶ 68, ECF No. 250 ). Officer Mark Wolfe responded to the scene at 6:18 p.m. (Deposition of Mark Wolfe ("Wolfe Dep.") at 48:21-49:4, ECF No. 237-5 ). ACD entered Ms. Davila's and Mr. Garrete's information provided by Officer Bienemann into its system at 6:35 p.m. (Pl.'s Resp. SMF ¶ 73). At approximately 6:36 p.m., Officer Bienemann received confirmation from ACD that Ms. Davila's license, registration, and registration were valid and up to date. (Bienemann Dep. at 119:18-120:1, 121:7-15). ACD did not provide information about Ms. Davila's immigration status at that time. (Id. ). Sergeant John Sicilia arrived on scene shortly before 6:41 p.m. (Deposition of John Sicilia ("Sicilia Dep.") at 37:23-38:8, ECF No. 237-5 ). Sergeant Sicilia suggested that all of the cars on the scene at this point (four police cars, and Ms. Davila's) be moved to a vacant parking lot across the street. (Id. at 37:23-38:19). Officer Bienemann asked Ms. Davila to move her car to the vacant lot at approximately 6:41 p.m. (Bienemann Dep. at 114:6-13). Officer Bienemann remained roadside with Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete while awaiting contact with an ICE agent. (Id. at 69:24-71:12). Officer Bienemann testified during his deposition that Ms. Davila was not free to leave at any point during the roadside stop. (Id. at 86:5-9).

At 6:34 p.m., ICE received an immigration alien query ("IAQ") for Ms. Davila and responded that "this subject is not legally in the United States and appears to be subject to removal proceedings." (ECF No. 242-16 ). There was no match found in their database for Mr. Garrete. (ECF No. 242-10 ). At 6:54 p.m., an individual from ACD contacted the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center ("LESC") regarding Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete. (ECF No. 242-21 ). That individual inquired as to how to proceed with Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete and purported to be speaking with Officer Bienemann, who remained on the scene. (ECF No. 242-20 ). The individual from ACD advised the individual purported to be Officer Bienemann that "we're going to continue just where you are right now on these two individuals. We found something on the first one. We're still having a hard time on Joel, but we're trying to get a hold of an ICE agent now in the Pittsburgh area, so I'll let you know. Standby." (Id. ). Call records indicate that ICE Agent Jason Kenwood ("Agent Kenwood") contacted ICE Agent Briana Tetrault ("Agent Tetrault") at 7:04 p.m. (Pl.'s Resp. SMF ¶ 96). Officer Bienemann testified at his deposition that, after learning that Ms. Davila's driver's license was valid, he did not speak with anyone else from ACD until he was connected with Agent Tetrault at 7:22 p.m. (Bienemann Dep. at 69:24-71:6).

Agent Tetrault was patched through to Officer Bienemann at 7:22 p.m. Officer Bienemann informed Agent Tetrault that Mr. Garrete indicated that he was not lawfully present in the United States and that Ms. Davila claimed that she was a legal resident. (Bienemann Dep. at 72:14-25). Agent Tetrault then spoke with Ms. Davila over the phone. (Id. at 73:5-12). After speaking with Ms. Davila, Agent Tetrault told Officer Bienemann that Mr. Garrete and Ms. Davila were illegally present in the United States. (Id. at 75:19-76:1). Officer Bienemann then asked Agent Tetrault how he should proceed, and Agent Tetrault indicated that ICE was going to issue detainers for both Mr. Garrete and Ms. Davila. (Id. at 76:6-16). Agent Tetrault then asked Officer Bienemann to transport Mr. Garrete and Ms. Davila to the Allegheny County Jail (the "ACJ") for holding. (Id. at 77:14-24). Officer Bienemann then handcuffed Mr. Garrete and Ms. Davila and transported them to the Northern Regional Police Station, where he retrieved faxed copies of the ICE detainers. (Id. at 79:14-80:3). They arrived at the police station at 8:01 p.m. and remained there for approximately thirty minutes. (Id. at 116:8-23). Officer Bienemann then transported Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete to the ACJ, where they arrived at approximately 8:55 p.m. (Id. at 116:24-117:14).

Shortly after leaving the ACJ, Officer Bienemann was contacted by ACD and was alerted that ICE had possibly made an error. (Bienemann Dep. at 91:22-92:6). ACD requested that Officer Bienemann view a photo to confirm whether the photo depicted Ms. Davila. (Id. ). Officer Bienemann pulled over his vehicle and confirmed that he believed that the photograph was, in fact, a photograph of Ms. Davila. (Id. at 92:7-10). Shortly thereafter, Officer Bienemann received a phone call from Agent Kenwood, who told Officer Bienemann that Ms. Davila may have been incorrectly detained due to a mistake. (Id. at 92:19-93:13, 135:16-21). Agent Kenwood conveyed to Officer Bienemann that it would be Agent Tetrault's decision on how to proceed if Ms. Davila was incorrectly detained. (Id. at 135:22-136:5).

At 9:50 p.m., ICE sent ACD confirmation that Ms. Davila was legally present in the United States as a permanent resident. (Bienemann Dep. at 93:14-19; ECF No. 242-29 ). Officer Bienemann discussed this information with Sergeant Sicilia, but Officer Bienemann took no additional action to ensure that Ms. Davila was released from custody in part because he believed that "there was nothing within [his] power that [he] could have done to get her out of jail." (Bienemann Dep. at 93:23-95:1).

Later that evening, after Officer Bienemann received word that Ms. Davila was legally residing in the United States, Agent Tetrault faxed an Order to Release Ms. Davila to the Warden of the Allegheny County Jail, along with a copy of Davila's lawful permanent resident card and other proof of legal residence. (ECF No. 242-30 ). Ms. Davila was not released from the Jail until 7:30 a.m. the next morning. (Davila Dep. at 106:13-25). All told, Angelica Davila, a United States citizen, was detained for over fourteen hours, which included two hours of roadside detention, approximately one hour of transportation to and detention at the local police station, followed by overnight detention at the Allegheny County Jail.

II. STANDARD FOR REVIEW

A court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there are no genuine disputes of material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment must be granted "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the non-movant's] favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ). But, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine disputes of material facts. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc. , 974 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). The standard of review is the same on cross-motions for summary judgment-each moving party must independently establish that there are no genuine disputes of material facts. Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc. , 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968). If a moving party satisfies this burden, the opposing party must designate specific facts in the record that show that there is a genuine, material factual dispute to be resolved at trial. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party may rely on its own affidavits or on the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file" to designate these facts, but may not rely solely on its own pleadings. Id. ; see also Williams v. Borough of West Chester , 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). "A fact is "material" if, under the substantive law of the case, it is outcome determinative." Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. , 143 F.3d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Thus, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs may use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a vehicle to assert claims for violations of their constitutional rights against persons acting under the color of state law. See generally Monroe v. Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 171-72, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y. , 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (holding that municipalities and other local governmental entities may also be held liable as "persons" as the term is used in § 1983 ). "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't , 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) ). Neither party disputes that Officer Bienemann and the NRJPB were acting under color of state law during the events at issue. Thus, in resolving the pending summary judgment motions, the Court must and will focus its analysis on whether the record evidence conclusively establishes that Officer Bienemann and/or the NRJPB did-or did not-violate Ms. Davila's constitutional rights.

Officer Bienemann also argues that, even if his actions may have violated Ms. Davila's constitutional rights, he is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity and the claims against him should be dismissed on that basis. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to § 1983 damages claims available to individuals. Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow , 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity is intended to shield officers who "make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions" and provide protection for "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). In deciding whether qualified immunity applies, a court must determine whether the facts that the claimant has shown make out a violation of a constitutional right and whether the right at issue was "clearly established" when the alleged violation occurred. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 232-33, 129 S.Ct. 808. A court may decide these issues in any order. Id. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808. That is, if the officer demonstrates that the right at issue was not "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation, a court need not consider whether a violation of a constitutional right occurred. Id.

In order for a right to be "clearly established," "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the right." Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). That is, the allegedly violated right must be described at an appropriate level of generality and particularity. Id. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034.

It is particularly important in the Fourth Amendment context that the right be described with appropriate specificity, due to the fact-intensive nature of purported Fourth Amendment violations. Mullenix v. Luna , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015). There need not be a case with precisely the same facts in order to put an officer on notice that his conduct would violate a constitutional right, but "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." White v. Pauly , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (internal quotations omitted). Courts look first to relevant precedent from the Supreme Court and controlling authority from the regional court of appeals for this guidance. L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. , 836 F.3d 235, 248 (3d Cir. 2016). And, absent controlling authority on point, a right may be "clearly established" if there is a "robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority" that define the right at issue. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 741-42, 131 S.Ct. 2074.

Claims Against Officer Bienemann

a. Unreasonable Seizure in Violation of the Fourth Amendment

i. Liability

Ms. Davila alleges that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Officer Bienemann engaged in an unreasonable seizure during the initial traffic stop. She argues that her continued roadside detention constituted a de facto arrest that was unsupported by probable cause that she had committed an offense other than the headlight violation. (Pl. Br. in Supp. at 7, ECF No. 235 ). She argues in the alternative that, even if her detention did not rise to the level of a de facto arrest, it was an impermissibly prolonged investigatory seizure that was unsupported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Id. at 8.

Ms. Davila and Officer Bienemann both agree that nothing was out of the ordinary with how the traffic stop began. Ms. Davila committed a minor traffic violation by driving without her headlights on at dusk. See 75 Pa. C.S. § 4302(a). Having witnessed this, Officer Bienemann had probable cause to believe that Ms. Davila had committed a traffic offense and was thus authorized to pull her vehicle over. See Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Officer Bienemann then asked Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete their names and requested that Ms. Davila produce her driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. All of these inquiries and requests are permissible as part of a routine traffic stop when there is otherwise reasonable suspicion or probable cause to pull the vehicle over. Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ; Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 438, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). It was also permissible for Officer Bienemann, as part of this routine stop, to inquire as to both Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete's immigration status and place of birth. Muehler v. Mena , 544 U.S. 93, 100-01, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005). And finally, it would be reasonable for Officer Bienemann to continue to detain Mr. Garrete while he contacted ICE in order to verify his identity after he failed to produce identification and admitted that he was not in the country legally. See, e.g., United States v. Baldonado-Garcia , No. 11-215, 2012 WL 135698, at *3-*4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2012) (discussing United States v. Soriano-Jarquin , 492 F.3d 495, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2007) ). As explained by the Fourth Circuit in Soriano-Jarquin , there is a legitimate officer safety rationale for confirming the identities of individuals that are seized during a traffic stop. 492 F.3d at 500-01. Mr. Garrete's responses to Officer Bienemann's questions put his identity justifiably in doubt, and ICE provides identification services for foreign nationals. See Arizona , 567 U.S. at 412, 132 S.Ct. 2492. But the parties vehemently disagree about the import of Officer Bienemann's decision to submit Ms. Davila's name to ICE to verify her identity and/or immigration status, prolonging the traffic stop as he did so.

Both Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete were "seized" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Bienemann effected the traffic stop. Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 255-58, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). To be clear, Ms. Davila acknowledges that Officer Bienemann initially had probable cause to stop her vehicle, and this Court has so held. Davila I , 979 F.Supp.2d at 628 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) ). But, "a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution." Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005).

If a seizure or detention is extended beyond what was authorized by the initial reasonable suspicion or probable cause, that extended seizure is unconstitutional absent additional reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ("[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures."). Moreover, as illustrated by Rodriguez , there is no de minimis exception to this rule. Id. ; see also United States v. Bey , 911 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2018) (precedential) (holding that a Terry stop should have ended the moment that a suspect turned around and, based on his appearance, the police should have realized that he could not be the suspect they were pursuing). The defendant in Rodriguez was pulled over for a minor traffic violation and the police officer on the scene checked the defendant's license, registration, and other records before issuing him a written warning. Id. at 1613. Following the issuance of the warning, the officer asked if he could walk his drug-sniffing dog around the vehicle, and the defendant said no. Id. The officer nonetheless retrieved his dog and led him around the vehicle and the dog alerted to the presence of methamphetamine. Id. About seven to eight minutes passed after the warning was issued until the dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Id. However, because the objective of the traffic stop was already completed (investigating and issuing a warning for the traffic violation) and the dog sniff was not otherwise connected to roadway safety, the Supreme Court concluded that the extension of the traffic stop was unconstitutional. Id. at 1615-16.

In this Court's view, the holding in Rodriguez was not a revelation-it merely confirmed and exemplified what was clearly established by existing precedent. For instance, Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), though reaching a different result, is perfectly consistent with Rodriguez and articulates the same rule. The Caballes Court explained that the performance of a dog sniff in connection with an otherwise lawful traffic stop-even if the stop was for a non-investigatory purpose-was not a constitutional violation. 543 U.S. at 408-09, 125 S.Ct. 834. This is so because a dog sniff would "disclose[ ] only the presence or absence of narcotics," and thus the use of a dog in traffic stops does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Id. (quoting United States v. Place , 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) ). However, important to the Caballes Court's conclusion was that "the duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries to such a stop." 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834. That is, the dog sniff in Caballes was lawful only because it did not otherwise extend the length of the independently justified traffic stop. The Caballes Court also explained that "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Id. at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834 ; see also Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) ("An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.") (emphasis added); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) ("[T]he stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation."). Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that had the defendant in Caballes been unlawfully detained due to a prolonged traffic stop, they could "assume" that a dog sniff during that seizure would be unconstitutional. 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834. That was precisely the scenario presented by Rodriguez.

The Supreme Court's guidance is the same in the context presented by this case-an officer asking questions about immigration status while an individual is seized. See Muehler , 544 U.S. at 100-01, 125 S.Ct. 1465. In Muehler , Ms. Mena was detained while police officers executed a search warrant on her premises. Id. at 95, 125 S.Ct. 1465. During the search, while Ms. Mena was detained, police officers asked her and others for their name, date of birth, and immigration status. Id. at 96, 125 S.Ct. 1465. The Court held that there "was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment" when the officers made these inquiries because there was no evidence "that the detention was prolonged by the questioning." Id. at 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465. Officer Bienemann cites this case for the proposition that an officer may ask an individual for her "name, date and place of birth, or immigration status" without reasonable suspicion. See id. Even if accurate, this rule does not carry the day for Officer Bienemann. Muehler makes clear that questioning an individual about her immigration status is not in and of itself a "seizure" nor is any reasonable suspicion required to engage in such questioning, but it does not follow that an individual can be further detained in order to be questioned, or for her immigration status to be "verified." In fact, the Court's holding was explicitly conditioned on the immigration status inquiries not prolonging Ms. Mena's detention. Id. Ms. Mena was going to be detained for several hours due to the execution of the search warrant. Questioning her about her immigration status was not an independent Fourth Amendment event because the questioning occurred within the confines of the detention already justified by the officer-safety rationale in executing the search warrant. Id. at 100, 125 S.Ct. 1465 ; see also United States v. Ritter , 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he government bears the burden of showing that each individual act constituting a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment was reasonable.").

The initial questioning of Ms. Davila was permissible. It was conducted prior to Officer Bienemann's confirmation of Ms. Davila's identity and was within the scope of the stop for her minor traffic violation. However, it does not follow that Officer Bienemann's remaining actions pass constitutional muster. If Ms. Davila's seizure was extended "in scope and duration" longer than what was necessary to investigate her alleged headlight violation and confirm her identity, it became an independent Fourth Amendment seizure that required independent reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify. See Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).

The parties disagree about when and whether the "purpose" of the traffic stop here was completed. See United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) ("[W]e have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes."). Put differently, the parties disagree as to when the " Rodriguez moment" of the stop occurred, i.e. , when the stop was extended beyond its initial purpose and when additional reasonable suspicion would be needed to justify an extended seizure. See United States v. Green , 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018). In Ms. Davila's view, the mission of the traffic stop was completed at 6:36 p.m. when Officer Bienemann received confirmation of Ms. Davila's identity through ACD verifying the legitimacy of her documents.

A recent precedential decision from the Third Circuit, United States v. Clark , 902 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2018), supports this contention. In Clark , an officer performed a "routine[ ]" traffic stop and asked for the driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Id. at 406. The passenger did not have a copy of his vehicle registration, so the officer ran a records check of the driver which confirmed that the driver was legally authorized to operate the vehicle. Id. Regardless, the officer continued to ask the driver questions about his criminal history because he suspected that the driver may have been lying to him. Id. at 407. The Third Circuit held that this was impermissible because the records check confirmed that the driver was legally authorized to drive the vehicle and there was no reasonable basis for the officer to doubt that information. Id. at 411. In other words, the purpose of the traffic stop was concluded when the records check confirmed the driver's authority to drive the vehicle. Id.

Here, had this been a "typical" stop for driving without headlights on, Officer Bienemann would have simply checked Ms. Davila's documents, warned or cited Ms. Davila for the violation, and then allowed her to leave. (Bienemann Dep. at 13:16-15:9). The entire process would have taken ten to twenty minutes. (Id. at 27:2-21). Of course, that is not what happened. After going through all of the usual incidents of an ordinary traffic stop, Officer Bienemann extended the seizure as he took the further step of having Ms. Davila's name submitted to ICE without a reasonable suspicion that her identity was in question, or as to her immigration status. (Id. at 63:17-20).

Officer Bienemann received confirmation of Ms. Davila's identification documents at 6:36 p.m., (Bienemann Dep. at 119:18-120:1), roughly twenty-nine minutes after the stop began. (See id. at 103:17-104:16). At this point, he had no reasonable basis to further doubt Ms. Davila's identity, and the mission of the traffic stop was complete. See Clark , 902 F.3d at 411. Any further extension of the traffic stop to confirm Ms. Davila's identity would be impermissible. Id. In the interests of officer safety, Officer Bienemann acted reasonably in taking additional steps to verify Mr. Garrete's identity. See Soriano-Jarquin , 492 F.3d at 500-01. Mr. Garrete produced no identification and admitted that he was in the country illegally. Unlike Mr. Garrete, however, Ms. Davila produced identifying documents (driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance) that appeared to be facially valid, and were confirmed by ACD to be legitimate. (Bienemann Dep. at 53:17-18, 64:10-20; ECF No. 237-3 ). This fact alone is sufficient to distinguish Baldonado-Garcia , which Bienemann cites for a presumptive "two hours is okay" rule for immigration inquiries connected to traffic stops. (Bienemann Br. in Opp. at 8-9, ECF No. 239 ). In Baldonado-Garcia , the "court never had to weigh the impact of the reasonableness analysis of contacting ICE to investigate the immigration status of an individual who supplied proper identification." Davila I , 979 F.Supp.2d at 629. In fact, Officer Bienemann admitted that Ms. Davila had done nothing at this point to cause him to believe that she might not be lawfully present in the United States.

Q. Was there anything that she said or did that caused you to believe that she might not be lawfully present?

A. No.

(Bienemann Dep. at 63:17-20). Nonetheless, he submitted her name to ICE because, in his experience, he "ha[d] encountered numerous people who ha[d] not told [him] the truth or had been less than truthful with [him] and since [he] was already notifying ICE for Mr. Garrete," he wanted ICE to confirm what Ms. Davila had told him. (Id. at 63:10-16). Aside from Ms. Davila's passenger's admissions and Officer Bienemann's generalized "experience" of having other people lie to him in other situations, there was nothing that would have given Officer Bienemann a remote suggestion-let alone reasonable suspicion-that Ms. Davila was not who she said she was or was in violation of any laws (immigration or otherwise) so as to justify extending the length of her detention to run her name through ICE. United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ("Based upon th[e] whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."). The Court is mindful that reasonable suspicion determinations must be made in view of the "totality of the circumstances," including the "experience and specialized training" of the detaining officer. See United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273-74, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). But this does not mean that Officer Bienemann is given carte blanche to check and re-check Ms. Davila's identity or immigration status merely because he has the unfortunate experience of having had other people lie to him in the past. Crediting Officer Bienemann's justification would stretch the guidance in Arvizu far beyond the Supreme Court's direction. Doing so would seemingly authorize redundant investigations into anything that a detainee told an officer, regardless of whether there is a basis for the officer to doubt the information. Officer Bienemann's rationale boiled down to "we're checking out Garrete, so we might as well check out Davila, too." There is no legal principle that supports a seizure for that purpose, and plenty that invalidate it.

As previously recognized by this Court, it would be entirely inappropriate for Officer Bienemann to submit Ms. Davila's information to ICE merely because her passenger admitted to being in the United States illegally. Davila III , 2016 WL 1252986 at *3 ("[W]rongdoing by one person does not automatically impute wrongdoing to another-that law is clearly established."); see also United States v. De La Cruz , 703 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 2013) ("When the agents apprehended [a passenger], they discovered he was illegally in the United States. That is a status crime, which would not necessarily suggest that the driver of the vehicle from which he fled was also involved in criminal activity."). Moreover, "[a]s a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States." Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 407, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). "If the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent." Id. In other words, for Officer Bienemann to justifiably continue to detain Ms. Davila after her identification documents were verified, he would have needed a reasonable suspicion calling into question her identity, or a reasonable suspicion that she had committed some other crime. See Green , 897 F.3d at 182-83 ("We now ask whether, at our assumed " Rodriguez moment," [the officer] possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."). The record is devoid of any such suggestion. To the contrary, Officer Bienemann acknowledged that Ms. Davila was "[v]ery cooperative" throughout the stop. (Bienemann Dep. at 69:22).

And crucially, throughout this entire period, Ms. Davila was not free to leave:

Q. Now I am going to back up a little bit. During the course of the roadside stop with Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete, was Ms. Davila free to leave at any point?

A. No, she wasn't.

(Bienemann Dep. at 86:5-9). Given Officer Bienemann's plain and unqualified admission that Ms. Davila was not free to leave "at any point," no reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Davila was not "seized" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment for the entire encounter. See United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) ("[A] person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that [s]he was not free to leave."). The Fourth Amendment does not permit a local police officer to prolong an individual's detention in order to run an inquiry of that individual's immigration status, particularly when it is based only on the officer's self-reported history of being lied to by other people in other circumstances.

Officer Bienemann argues that the time spent waiting on ICE to run Mr. Garrete's and Ms. Davila's information is not attributable to him, as he was "diligent and prompt" in his efforts and the actions of "third-party law enforcement agencies" (including ICE) were "out of his control." (Bienemann Br. in Supp. at 6, ECF No. 239 ). The Court has already rejected this argument.

The Court finds unconvincing Officer Bienemann's argument that the portion of the time of the stop comprised of his waiting for ICE to get back to him should not count against him. Officer Bienemann made the stop himself, posed questions to Ms. Davila's passenger about his immigration status, and then affirmatively contacted ICE about both of the occupants of the vehicle. It is plain that he set the wheels in motion as to all that occurred during those two-plus hours. For purposes of analyzing this issue, he owns them.

Davila II , 2014 WL 3735631 at *4 n.4. Officer Bienemann has raised no arguments that would support a departure from this settled law of the case. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[W]hen a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.") (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. , 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) ). In fact, the more developed record at this stage in the proceedings confirms the Court's earlier conclusion. Officer Bienemann unilaterally decided to contact ICE regarding both passengers despite having no reasonable suspicion as to Ms. Davila's identity or immigration status. He cannot now complain about how long the inquiry took when there he decided on his own, without reasonable justification, to initiate that inquiry in the first place.

The Court is unpersuaded by Officer Bienemann's other arguments in support of his claim that the purpose of the traffic stop had not been completed-which are all essentially variations of the assertion that he still needed to confirm Ms. Davila's identity. The Court noted in its earlier opinion at the Motion to Dismiss stage that it was unclear, and apparently hotly contested, as to precisely when Officer Bienemann learned that Ms. Davila was "out of status." Davila III , 2016 WL 1252986 at *3 n.3. Even after further factual development, the Court concludes that this fact is still in dispute, but the Court further concludes that it is not material given the evidence in the record.

The record indicates that ICE received an IAQ for Ms. Davila at 6:34 p.m. that indicated that "the subject is not legally in the United States and appears to be subject to removal proceedings." (ECF No. 242-16 ). However, it remains uncertain as to when Officer Bienemann personally became aware of that information. He stated during his deposition that he learned from Agent Tetrault that Ms. Davila was apparently not legally present in the United States and that he did not learn this information until after 7:22 p.m. (Bienemann Dep. at 121:7-15). Notwithstanding that admission, Officer Bienemann now argues that he was on the 6:54 p.m. phone call with the LESC and that he was instructed during this call, by Agent Kenwood, to hold Ms. Davila and Mr. Garrete while they awaited further instruction from a local ICE agent (apparently in reference to Agent Tetrault). After the Court's review of the recorded call in question, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Bienemann, though not audibly heard during the call, was, in fact, a party to the phone call. The dispatcher refers to another caller as "N2283," which is Officer Bienemann's badge number. (ECF 242-20; Defs.' SMF ¶ 4). The dispatcher also instructs "2283" (presumably referring to the same badge number) to "stay on [channel] four for a bit" and later asks "Andy" (in apparent reference to Officer Andrew Bienemann) if he is still on the line. (ECF No. 242-20 ). There is more than sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Officer Bienemann was on the line and was aware that LESC had requested a continued detention of Mr. Garrete and Ms. Davila.

But even if this is so, and even when evaluating the facts in the light most favorable to Officer Bienemann, this call did not begin until 6:54 p.m. (at the earliest) and Officer Bienemann was aware at 6:36 p.m. that all of Ms. Davila's driving and identification documents were valid. A review of the phone call recording indicates that the request from LESC to hold Mr. Garrete and Ms. Davila did not occur until approximately eight minutes into the call, i.e. , 7:02 p.m. (ECF No. 242-20 ). Thus, the record is uncontroverted insofar as it establishes that Officer Bienemann took it upon himself for at least twenty-six minutes (from 6:36 p.m. until 7:02 p.m.) to continue to detain Ms. Davila without a reasonable suspicion as to her identity or involvement in criminal activity. Further, the Court does not accept Officer Bienemann's argument that the then-pending request by LESC to hold Mr. Garrete and Ms. Davila absolved Officer Bienemann of responsibility for the continued detention. As explained above and in the Court's earlier Opinions, see Davila II , 2014 WL 3735631 at *4 n.4, Officer Bienemann unilaterally decided to initiate an unsupported investigation into Ms. Davila's immigration status. The involvement of another player (ICE) in the situation (a delay arising from that entity's activities) does not mean that Officer Bienemann no longer has to answer for his putting the events in motion, or for his continued detention of Ms. Davila.

The time at which Officer Bienemann became aware of Ms. Davila's "out of status" designation would be material if Officer Bienemann learned of this information prior to 6:36 p.m., when Officer Bienemann learned from ACD that Ms. Davila's documents had been verified. If this was so, it could lay the basis for a reasonable suspicion of Ms. Davila's identity, notwithstanding the facially valid driver's license she supplied. Rather, even though the record indicates that ICE received the IAQ for Ms. Davila at 6:34 p.m., there is no evidence that Officer Bienemann received that information until 7:02 p.m. at the earliest. There would therefore have been no reasonable basis to continue detaining Ms. Davila after her documents were verified.

In summary, there is a period of time following the verification of Ms. Davila's documents at 6:36 p.m. for which Officer Bienemann needed an independent reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity in order to continue detaining Ms. Davila. Whether this period of time ended at 7:02 p.m. (as Officer Bienemann argues) or 7:22 p.m. (as Ms. Davila argues) is not material to the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred. Rodriguez demonstrates that any prolongation of a traffic stop that is unsupported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause is unconstitutional. 135 S.Ct. at 1612. Our court of appeals also recently emphasized that "[a]n investigative stop must ... cease once reasonable suspicion dissipates." Bey , 911 F.3d at 147. In Bey , the prolonged detention was mere moments. There, officers were pursuing an armed suspect and had viewed a photo of the suspect. The officers came across a man wearing similar clothes as the suspect and then drew their weapons and ordered him to stop. Id. at 141-43. The man then turned around and the police conducted a Terry stop and frisk, which produced a weapon. Id. In holding that the evidence should have been suppressed, the Third Circuit explained that the man's prolonged seizure-even though it was mere moments-was unconstitutional because the officers would have had no reasonable suspicion to continue detaining the man once he turned around and it was plain that he did not match the description of the suspect that they were pursuing. Id. at 147-49. Here, any doubts as to Ms. Davila's identity were dispelled once ACD confirmed that her driver's license was valid. Her seizure for the investigation of the headlight violation should have gone on no longer. But as admitted by Officer Bienemann during his deposition, Ms. Davila was not free to leave for the entirety of the encounter.

(Bienemann Dep. at 86:5-9). This admission, from the police officer that initiated the stop, is sufficient for the Court to conclude that no reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Davila was not seized at any point during the encounter. But there is additional record evidence to support this conclusion as well. For example, Ms. Davila testified at her deposition that she was denied permission to use the restroom during the stop. (Davila Dep. at 74:6-23). Ms. Davila was also requested to move her vehicle to another location, (Bienemann Dep. at 114:6-13), and the additional police cars that arrived to the scene parked behind her car. (Davila Dep. at 65:23-66:1).

While it is true that Sergeant Sicilia testified at his deposition that Ms. Davila was "free to go" until they had the detention order, (Sicilia Dep. at 80:7-10), this strikes the Court as a conclusory assertion from a non-party in the case that is unsupported by the objective evidence in the record and is contrary to Officer Bienemann's own admission. It does not create a factual dispute as to whether Ms. Davila remained seized for the duration of the encounter. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that it is undisputed that Ms. Davila was subjected to an unconstitutionally prolonged roadside seizure by Officer Bienemann.

ii. Qualified Immunity

Officer Bienemann argues that, even if his actions may have violated Ms. Davila's Fourth Amendment rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Having concluded that Ms. Davila has demonstrated that there are no material factual disputes as to whether her Fourth Amendment rights were violated, Officer Bienemann's qualified immunity defense hinges on whether the rights at issue were clearly established as of the date of the incident. Officer Bienemann argues that there was no clearly established law that would have put him on notice as of January 22, 2011, that a request for immigration status, see Muehler , 544 U.S. at 100-01, 125 S.Ct. 1465, for which a response time is out of his control, would result in an unreasonable seizure, where not only was he waiting for a response from ICE, but then there was clarification to be had, considering the nature of the response. Ms. Davila frames the right differently-that it was clearly established on January 22, 2011, that prolonging a traffic stop to investigate an individual's immigration status without any reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that the individual lacked lawful status violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court agrees with Ms. Davila's formulation of the right at issue and also with her conclusion. As discussed, Officer Bienemann cannot now claim that time spent waiting for ICE to respond to his request, when there was no reason to doubt Ms. Davila's lawful status, should not count against him.

Muehler , as discussed in greater detail above, is factually inapposite to this case and does not bolster Officer Bienemann's qualified immunity argument. For one, the propriety of the immigration status questioning was, in the Court's estimation, a subsidiary issue for the Muehler Court. The main dispute in that case was the permissibility of detaining the subject of a search warrant using handcuffs while the search warrant was being executed.

544 U.S. at 98-100, 125 S.Ct. 1465. And at any rate, the Court was very clear that questioning Ms. Mena about her immigration status was permissible only because it did not prolong her detention. Id. at 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465. Ms. Mena was already going to be detained for several hours while the search warrant was being executed. Asking questions about her immigration status and identity were not additional Fourth Amendment events in light of the preexisting officer-safety justification to detain her. Id.

But this situation is quite different. Had this been a typical traffic stop for a headlight violation, Ms. Davila would have been free to leave after approximately ten to twenty minutes. (Bienemann Dep. at 27:2-21). Instead, she remained detained in a parking lot for approximately forty-five minutes longer before being transported handcuffed in the back of a patrol car to the local lockup and then the Allegheny County Jail. In Ms. Mena's case, there was a preexisting and independent justification for her extended seizure and the questions about her immigration status were not additional Fourth Amendment events. Here, Ms. Davila's initial seizure was based only upon her violation of a minor traffic law. The Court is mindful of the Supreme Court's recent decisions emphasizing the importance of describing the right at issue at an appropriate level of specificity. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 577, 591, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (explaining that a qualified immunity analysis must begin "by defining the circumstances with which the officers were confronted") (internal quotations and alterations omitted). But even so, the Court has little difficulty concluding that the state of the law on January 22, 2011, put Officer Bienemann on notice that his actions would violate Ms. Davila's constitutional rights.

Officer Bienemann, prior to deciding to prolong Ms. Davila's stop at the side of the road, was confronted by the following facts: Ms. Davila was driving without her headlights on; Mr. Garrete admitted to being in the country illegally, and; Ms. Davila claimed she was a legal resident and had produced a valid (and shortly thereafter, confirmed to be valid) driver's license, proof of insurance, and car registration. Based on these facts, Officer Bienemann admitted that he subjectively had no doubt as to Ms. Davila's lawful immigration status, and there is no evidence in the record that he suspected that Ms. Davila had committed a crime (aside from the headlight violation), or that she had been untruthful in any way. But yet she was not free to leave at any time.

It is beyond debate that it was clearly established on January 22, 2011, that Ms. Davila had a clearly established right to not be subjected to a prolonged traffic stop in order to investigate her immigration status without a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to call her lawful status into question. See Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) ("An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.") (emphasis added); Caballes , 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834 ("A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission."); Royer , 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."); Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. at 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574 ("[T]he stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.").

The purpose of the traffic stop was to investigate a minor traffic violation. That purpose was completed when Ms. Davila's identification was verified at 6:36 p.m. A reasonable police officer in Officer Bienemann's position would know that prolonging Ms. Davila's seizure beyond then, without reasonable suspicion as to her identity or involvement in further criminal activity, would be unconstitutional. Therefore, Officer Bienemann is not entitled to qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment claims against him arising out of Ms. Davila's roadside detention.

There are no material factual disputes surrounding Ms. Davila's roadside detention prior to her transport to the Allegheny County Jail, and therefore summary judgment as to liability for Ms. Davila is appropriate as to this claim because Officer Bienemann indisputably violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free from a prolonged seizure without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support prolonging the seizure. Ms. Davila's motion for summary judgment on this claim will be granted, and Officer Bienemann's motion for summary judgment will be denied. Summary judgment as to liability will be entered on this claim in favor of Ms. Davila and against Officer Bienemann.

b. Selective Enforcement in Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

i. Liability

Ms. Davila claims that her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when Officer Bienemann selectively enforced the law or engaged in racial profiling by investigating her immigration status because of her protected characteristics-namely her Hispanic ethnicity and/or national origin. (Pl. Br. in Opp. at 1-2, ECF No. 248 ). Selective enforcement of facially neutral laws is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Whren , 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. In order to succeed on this claim Equal Protection Clause claim for selective enforcement, Ms. Davila must demonstrate that "the challenged law enforcement practice had a discriminatory effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Carrasca v. Pomeroy , 313 F.3d 828, 834 (3d Cir. 2002). To prove an officer acted with a discriminatory purpose, it must be demonstrated that he "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Wayte v. United States , 470 U.S. 598, 610, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) (quoting Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) ). In order to demonstrate a discriminatory effect, Ms. Davila must "show that she is a member of a protected class and that she was treated differently from similarly situated individuals in an unprotected class." Bradley v. United States , 299 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002). This may be proven by "naming similarly situated members of an unprotected class" who were treated differently or "by submitting statistical evidence of bias." Id. It is undisputed that Ms. Davila, as a woman of Mexican descent, is a member of a "protected class" for these purposes. Carrasca , 313 F.3d at 834.

The remaining issues for the Court are whether there are sufficient facts in the record such that a reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Davila, during the traffic stop, was treated differently from similarly situated individuals in an unprotected class and whether this disparate treatment was because of her ethnicity and/or national origin. As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with Officer Bienemann in that there is no record evidence that Ms. Davila was initially stopped because of her Mexican ethnicity. The record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Officer Bienemann was then aware of Ms. Davila's Mexican ethnicity or that he pulled over Ms. Davila because of her ethnicity. The Court also agrees that, up to the point