Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc. (371 F. Supp. 3d 668, 2019)

LUCY H. KOH, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Dropbox, Inc. filed a patent infringement suit against Defendant Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant infringes claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,058,399 ("the '399 Patent") and U.S. Patent No. 6,178,505 ("the '505 Patent") (collectively, the "patents-in-suit"). Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss, which contends that the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit fail to recite patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. ECF No. 57. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss the '399 Patent claims and the '505 Patent claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. The Parties and Technology at Issue

Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. ECF No. 49 (Amended Complaint, or "AC") at ¶ 1. Plaintiff was founded in June 2007, and launched "as a simple way for people to access their files wherever they are and share them easily." Id. at ¶ 10.

Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Bridgewater, New Jersey, and conducts business from a permanent physical location in San Jose, California. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 6. Defendant sells its "Personal Cloud" product "as a white-label data backup and transfer solution to network operators or service providers, such as Verizon." Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that the "Personal Cloud" product, as well as other Synchronoss Cloud products, infringe the '399, '505, and '547 Patents. The Court next summarizes these patents.

2. The '399 Patent

The '399 Patent is titled "File Upload Synchronization." '399 Patent at front page. It was filed on August 28, 1997 and was issued on May 2, 2000. Id.

Most of the claims in the '399 Patent generally relate to uploading data files, such as from a personal computer, to a service provider, such as a vendor. Id. at 1:55-67. More specifically, the '399 Patent is directed to combining the user interface of an interactive connection, like a website, with a file upload connection, such as an FTP (file transfer protocol) connection. Id. at 6:22-31. In layman's terms, the Court understands the '399 Patent's purported innovation to be combining a user-friendly website interface with a file upload connection so that users who are not tech-savvy can easily upload data to a service provider. Id. at 1:37-39, 6:22-31.

The specification of the '399 Patent describes several embodiments. In one embodiment, the customer is given a software package. Id. at 1:55-59. When a customer requests access to the service provider, the software package creates an internet session and a separate file upload session. Id. at 1:60-67. The customer can control the data uploaded through the file upload session via the interactive internet session. Id. In another embodiment, the internet session and the file upload session are assigned a single unique session ID, and the uploaded files are associated with that session ID. Id. at 2:64-3:3. The session ID can also be used to distinguish multiple users or multiple uploading sessions from a single user so that a single user can perform an upload in a number of sessions, not just one. Id. at 3:4-9. In a further embodiment, a password is associated with the session ID so that when files are uploaded using the file upload session, they are uploaded into a username and password-protected location. Id. at 3:16-20.

Figure 1 exemplifies the disclosed invention. Item 10 is the client and item 16 is the service provider. Id. at 6:21-22. There are two connections between the client and the service provider: a file upload connection and an interactive connection. Id. at 6:22-24. The file upload connection is an FTP (file transfer protocol) connection between an FTP client, item 12, and an FTP server, item 18. Id. at 6:24-27. The interactive connection is a WWW internet connection between a WWW client, item 14, and a WWW server, item 20. Id. at 6:28-31. The FTP server, item 18, and WWW server, item 20, are synchronized using a synchronization connection, item 22. Id. at 6:31-33. The '399 Patent continues on to give an example of using Figure 1 as applied to an image manipulation program to connect "to an outside service provider for special services which cannot be performed at home, for example, creating photographic-type hard copies or printing images on plastic objects." Id. at 6:53-57. When a customer "selects an outside service provider," an interactive connection (connecting items 14 and 20) is initiated via the internet through a standard web browser to connect to the WWW server (item 20). Id. at 6:58-64. The image manipulation program also opens a file upload [ ] connection (connecting items 12 and 18), also via the internet. Id. at 6:64-66. The service provider (item 16) assigns a unique session ID to the combined file upload connection and interactive connection. Id. at 7:3-5.

After the session ID is assigned, the FTP client (item 12) starts uploading image files when a file upload connection is established. Id. at 7:41-43. However, in one embodiment, the consumer can interact with the service provider via the interactive connection before any images are uploaded "by viewing and manipulating thumbnail images, full size images or image names." Id. at 7:58-65.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant "directly infringed one or more claims of the '399 Patent." AC at ¶ 29. Defendant's motion to dismiss focuses on claims 1, 25, 43, and 46. These claims recite:

1. A method of synchronizing an interactive connection and a non-interactive data transfer connection between a client and a service provider, comprising:

creating an interactive connection;

creating a data transfer connection; and

generating a single session ID for the two connections, which ID associates between the two connections.

Id. at 11:58-64.

25. Apparatus for uploading data files, comprising:

a file upload connection server;

an interactive connection server; and

a synchronizer which synchronizes the operation of respective connections formed by the file upload connection server and by the interactive connection server.

Id. at 13:19-24.

43. A method of local file information display, comprising:

uploading a list of file information for a plurality of local files to a remote server;

generating a data display at the remote server; and

locally displaying said data display, wherein said data display includes local data not downloaded from the remote server, responsive to said local file information.

Id. at 14:32-39.

46. A method of synchronized file upload, from an upload client to an upload server, comprising:

connecting from said client to said server;

receiving information comprising a username at said client from said server; and

uploading files from said client to said server, utilizing said information.

Id. at 14:46-53.

3. The '505 Patent

The '505 Patent is titled "Secure Delivery of Information in a Network." '505 Patent at front page. The patent generally relates to data security and is specifically directed to "providing only as much authentication and encryption security as is required for a given user, a given path through the network [to a given information resource], and a given [information] resource." Id. at 5:67-6:3. Therefore, a user's access to an information resource is dependent on multiple types of authentication and encryption methods.

Each information resource is assigned a "sensitivity level." Id. at 6:6. Each user is identified "according to one or more modes of identification such as an IP address, a token, or a certificate." Id. at 6:9-11. In turn, "each of these modes of identification is assigned a trust level from the same set of names as the sensitivity levels." Id. at 6:11-13. In other words, the trust levels and the sensitivity levels have the same names. "The path ... through the network from the user to the location of the information resource also has a trust level." Id. at 6:20-22.

When a given user requests access to an information resource, an "access filter will permit the user to access the information resource only if the trust level of the path [through the network from the user to the location of the information resource] is no lower than the sensitivity level of the resource. Where the path has several segments, the trust level of the path is the lowest trust level of any of its segments." Id. at 6:13-16.

Furthermore, "[m]ethods of encryption also have trust levels. Where the trust level of the path between the user and the access filter is insufficient for the sensitivity level of the resource, the access filter will forward the access request only if the user has encrypted the request with an encryption method whose trust level is sufficient for the sensitivity level. Where the trust level of the path between the access filter and the resource is insufficient, the access filter will automatically encrypt the access request using the minimum encryption method that has a sufficient trust level." Id. at 6:29-38.

In a preferred embodiment, "an access request for a[n information resource] will not be forwarded by the access filter unless the trust level of the mode of identification employed by the user and either the trust level of the path taken by the request through the network or the trust level of the encryption method used to encrypt the request are sufficient for the sensitivity level of the resource."Id. at 6:38-44.

Figure 2 (below) exemplifies the disclosed invention. Figure 2 depicts a virtual private network (VPN), item 201, "in which access to data is controlled by access filters." Id. at 7:59-60.

Virtual private network (item 201) is composed of 4 internal networks (item 103), which are connected to each other by the internet (item 121). Id. at 7:62-63. Each internal network has a number of connected user computer systems (item 209) and servers (item 211) which contain data. Id. at 7:67-8:4. However, no computer system (item 209) is directly connected to a server; rather, the connection passes through at least one access filter (items 203). Id. at 8:4-11. As described above, access to information found on the any of the servers depends on multiple authentication factors and levels. Each user has a mode of identification. Each mode of identification may have a different trust level, which may match the sensitivity level of the information resource the user is trying to request. If the trust level of the mode of identification is insufficient to gain access to an information resource of a particular sensitivity level, then the access filter will not forward along the user's information request. The same idea applies to the trust level of the path and the encryption method used to encrypt the information request. If the trust levels of the path or the encryption method are insufficient to access the information resource of a particular sensitivity level, then the access filter will not pass along the user's information request. If the trust level of the path between the access filter and the information resource is insufficient, then the access filter will "automatically encrypt the access request using the minimum encryption method that has a sufficient trust level." Id. at 6:35-38.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant "directly infringed one or more claims of the '505 Patent." AC at ¶ 52. Defendant's motion to dismiss focuses on claim 1. Claim 1 recites:

1. Apparatus that provides an information resource in response to a request from a user, the request including an identification of the user according to a mode of identification and the apparatus comprising:

access control information including

a sensitivity level associated with the resource and

a trust level associated with the mode of identification; and

an access checker which permits the apparatus to provide the resource only if the trust level for the mode of identification is sufficient for the sensitivity level of the resource.

Id. at 49:2-13.

B. Procedural History

On June 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant patent infringement suit asserting the '399 Patent, the '505 Patent, and U.S. Patent No. 7,567,541. ECF No. 1. On August 13, 2018, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 24 ("Mot."). On August 27, 2018, Plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF No. 27 ("Opp."). On September 4, 2018, Defendant filed a reply. ECF No. 31 ("Reply").

On October 18, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint. ECF No. 46. In its motion to amend the complaint, Plaintiff sought to "remove its assertion of U.S. Patent No. 7,567,541... from this lawsuit" because Plaintiff's wholly-owned subsidiary, Orcinus Holdings LLC, was going to assert that patent in another case. Id. at 1. Plaintiff also sought to remove its request for injunctive relief. Id. The Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. ECF No. 47. Thereafter, on October 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint which only asserts the '399 Patent and the '505 Patent. AC at ¶¶ 7-9. Plaintiff alleges that "Synchronoss's Cloud products, including without limitation its Personal Cloud product, infringes the Patents-in-Suit...." Id. at ¶ 15. On November 30, 2018, the Court denied as moot Defendant's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 24, in light of the amended complaint.

On December 3, 2018, Defendant refiled its motion to dismiss, incorporating the briefing from its previous motion to dismiss. ECF No. 57. On December 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss, incorporating the briefing from Plaintiff's previous opposition. ECF No. 60. On December 11, 2018, Defendant filed a reply, incorporating the briefing from its previous reply. ECF No. 61. Thus, even though the parties' briefing discusses U.S. Patent No. 7,567,541, this patent is not at issue in the instant motion to dismiss because it is no longer being asserted against Defendant in the instant case.

Also, in the amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to identify any specific claims that are being asserted against Defendant. See, e.g. , AC at ¶ 29 ("Synchronoss directly infringed one or more claims of the '399 Patent...."); id. at ¶ 52 ("Synchronoss directly infringed one or more claims of the '505 Patent...."). So, by the time Defendant refiled its motion to dismiss, the amended complaint had not put Defendant on notice as to which specific claim or claims in either the '399 Patent or the '505 Patent Defendant is alleged to have infringed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted).

For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, the Court is not required to " 'assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.' " Fayer v. Vaughn , 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting W. Mining Council v. Watt , 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981) ). Mere "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Adams v. Johnson , 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, " '[a] plaintiff may plead [him]self out of court' " if he "plead[s] facts which establish that he cannot prevail on his ... claim." Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles , 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Warzon v. Drew , 60 F.3d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir. 1995) ).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Patent Eligibility Challenges Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

Defendant's motion argues that the patents-in-suit fail to claim patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International , 573 U.S. 208, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 189 L.Ed.2d 296 (2014). The ultimate question whether a claim recites patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 is a question of law. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp. , 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Patent eligibility under § 101 is an issue of law[.]"); In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh) , 750 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same). However, the Federal Circuit has identified that there are certain factual questions underlying the § 101 analysis. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc. , 881 F.3d 1360, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Accordingly, a district court may resolve the issue of patent eligibility under § 101 by way of a motion to dismiss. See, e.g. , Secured Mail Sols.LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc. , 873 F.3d 905, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming determination of ineligibility made on 12(b)(6) motion); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n , 776 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same).

Although claim construction is often desirable, and may sometimes be necessary, to resolve whether a patent claim is directed to patent-eligible subject matter, the Federal Circuit has explained that "claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101." Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.) , 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Where the court has a "full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter," the question of patent eligibility may properly be resolved on the pleadings. Content Extraction , 776 F.3d at 1349 ; see also Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. , 72 F.Supp.3d 521, 539 (D. Del. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C. , 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

C. Substantive Legal Standards Applicable Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

1. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code"defines the subject matter that may be patented under the Patent Act." Bilski v. Kappos , 561 U.S. 593, 601, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010). Under § 101, the scope of patentable subject matter encompasses "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 ). These categories are broad, but they are not limitless. Section 101"contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2354 (citation omitted). These three categories of subject matter are excepted from patent-eligibility because "they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work," which are "free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. , 566 U.S. 66, 71, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012) (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that allowing patent claims for such purported inventions would "tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it," thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. Id. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also cautioned that "[a]t some level, all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2354 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Accordingly, courts must "tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law." Id.

In Alice , the leading case on patent-eligible subject matter under § 101, the U.S. Supreme Court refined the "framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts" originally set forth in Mayo , 566 U.S. at 77, 132 S.Ct. 1289. Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2355. This analysis, generally known as the " Alice " framework, proceeds in two steps as follows:

First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, "[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?" To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as an ordered combination" to determine whether the additional elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-eligible application. We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an " 'inventive concept' "-i.e. , an element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."

Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted); see also In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (describing "the now familiar two-part test described by the [U.S.] Supreme Court in Alice ").

2. Alice Step One-Identification of Claims Directed to an Abstract Idea

Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has set forth a bright-line test separating abstract ideas from concepts that are sufficiently concrete so as to require no further inquiry under the first step of the Alice framework. See, e.g. , Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2357 (noting that "[the U.S. Supreme Court] need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the 'abstract ideas' category in this case"); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. , 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (observing that the U.S. Supreme Court did not "delimit the precise contours of the 'abstract ideas' category" in Alice (citation omitted) ). As a result, in evaluating whether particular claims are directed to patent-ineligible abstract ideas, courts have generally begun by "compar[ing] claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases." Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. , 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Two of the U.S. Supreme Court's leading cases concerning the "abstract idea" exception involved claims held to be abstract because they were drawn to longstanding, fundamental economic practices. See Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2356 (claims "drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e. , the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk" were directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea); Bilski , 561 U.S. at 611-12, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (claims drawn to "the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk" were directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea because "[h]edging is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance class" (citation omitted) ).

Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that information itself is intangible. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. , 550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12, 127 S.Ct. 1746, 167 L.Ed.2d 737 (2007). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has generally found claims abstract where they are directed to some combination of acquiring information, analyzing information, and/or displaying the results of that analysis. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc. , 839 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims "directed to collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected" were drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A. , 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to an abstract idea because "[t]he advance they purport to make is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing those functions"); In re TLI Commc'ns LLC , 823 F.3d at 611 (claims were "directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner"); see also Elec. Power Grp. , 830 F.3d at 1353-54 (collecting cases).

However, the determination of whether other types of computer-implemented claims are abstract has proven more "elusive." See, e.g. , Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc. , 790 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[P]recision has been elusive in defining an all-purpose boundary between the abstract and the concrete[.]"). As a result, in addition to comparing claims to prior U.S. Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedents, courts considering computer-implemented inventions have taken varied approaches to determining whether particular claims are directed to an abstract idea.

For example, courts have considered whether the claims "purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself," Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2359, which may suggest that the claims are not abstract, or instead whether "computers are invoked merely as a tool" to carry out an abstract process, Enfish , 822 F.3d at 1336 ; see also id. at 1335 ("[S]ome improvements in computer-related technology when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display, and the like. Nor do we think that claims directed to software, as opposed to hardware, are inherently abstract[.]"). The Federal Circuit has followed this approach to find claims patent-eligible in several cases. See Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp. , 867 F.3d 1253, 1259-60 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claims directed to an improved memory system were not abstract because they "focus[ed] on a 'specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities'-the use of programmable operational characteristics that are configurable based on the type of processor" (quoting Enfish , 822 F.3d at 1336 ) ); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc. , 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to automating part of a preexisting method for 3-D facial expression animation were not abstract because they "focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules of a particular type"); Enfish , 822 F.3d at 1335-36 (claims directed to a specific type of self-referential table in a computer database were not abstract because they focused "on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table for a computer database)").

Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a "new and useful technique" for performing a particular task were not abstract. See Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States , 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that "claims directed to a new and useful technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform" were not abstract); Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc. , 827 F.3d 1042, 1048, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that claims directed to "a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepatocytes," a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr , 450 U.S. 175, 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to cure rubber that employed a formula to calculate the optimal cure time were not abstract).

Another helpful tool used by courts in the abstract idea inquiry is consideration of whether the claims have an analogy to the brick-and-mortar world, such that they cover a "fundamental ... practice long prevalent in our system." Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2356 ; see, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp. , 838 F.3d 1307, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding an email processing software program to be abstract through comparison to a "brick-and-mortar" post office); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp. , 100 F.Supp.3d 371, 383 (D. Del. 2015) ("Another helpful way of assessing whether the claims of the patent are directed to an abstract idea is to consider if all of the steps of the claim could be performed by human beings in a non-computerized 'brick and mortar' context.") (citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc. , 765 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ).

Courts will also (or alternatively, as the facts require) consider a related question of whether the claims are, in essence, directed to a mental process or a process that could be done with pencil and paper. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp. , 839 F.3d 1138, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims for translating a functional description of a logic circuit into a hardware component description of the logic circuit were patent-ineligible because the "method can be performed mentally or with pencil and paper"); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc. , 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claim for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over the Internet was patent-ineligible because the "steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper"); see also, e.g. , Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc. , 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims for computer-implemented system to enable borrowers to shop for loan packages anonymously were abstract where "[t]he series of steps covered by the asserted claims ... could all be performed by humans without a computer").

Regardless of the particular analysis that is best suited to the specific facts at issue in a case, however, the Federal Circuit has emphasized that "the first step of the [ Alice ] inquiry is a meaningful one, i.e., ... a substantial class of claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept." Enfish , 822 F.3d at 1335. The court's task is thus not to determine whether claims merely involve an abstract idea at some level, see id. , but rather to examine the claims "in their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter," Internet Patents , 790 F.3d at 1346.

3. Alice Step Two-Evaluation of Abstract Claims for an Inventive Concept

A claim drawn to an abstract idea is not necessarily invalid if the claim's limitations-considered individually or as an ordered combination-serve to "transform the claims into a patent-eligible application." Content Extraction , 776 F.3d at 1348. Thus, the second step of the Alice analysis (the search for an "inventive concept") asks whether the claim contains an element or combination of elements that "ensure[s] that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [abstract idea] itself." 134 S.Ct. at 2355 (citation omitted).

The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that transforming an abstract idea to a patent-eligible application of the idea requires more than simply reciting the idea followed by "apply it." Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo , 566 U.S. at 72, 132 S.Ct. 1289 ). In that regard, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that "[f]or the role of a computer in a computer-implemented invention to be deemed meaningful in the context of this analysis, it must involve more than performance of 'well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.' " Content Extraction , 776 F.3d at 1347-48 (alteration in original) (quoting Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2359 ); see also Mortg. Grader , 811 F.3d at 1324-25 (holding that "generic computer components such as an 'interface,' 'network,' and 'database' ... do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement"); Bancorp Servs. , 687 F.3d at 1278 ("To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible process, a computer must be integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations or computations could not.").

Likewise, "[i]t is well-settled that mere recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea" where those components simply perform their "well-understood, routine, conventional" functions. In re TLI Commc'ns LLC , 823 F.3d at 613 (citation omitted); see also id. (ruling that "telephone unit," "server," "image analysis unit," and "control unit" limitations were insufficient to satisfy Alice step two where claims were drawn to abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner). "The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact" that "must be proven by clear and convincing evidence." Berkheimer , 881 F.3d at 1368. This inquiry "goes beyond what was simply known in the prior art." Id. at 1369.

In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Bilski that "limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components [does] not make the concept patentable." 561 U.S. at 612, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (citing Parker v. Flook , 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978) ); see also Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2358 (same). The Federal Circuit has similarly stated that attempts "to limit the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment" are insufficient to render an abstract idea patent-eligible. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC , 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA) , 792 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("An abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or technological environment, such as the Internet.").

In addition, a "non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces" can amount to an inventive concept. BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC , 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For example, in BASCOM , the Federal Circuit addressed a claim for Internet content filtering performed at "a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user." Id. Because this "specific location" was different from the location where Internet content filtering was traditionally performed, the Federal Circuit concluded this was a "non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces" that provided an inventive concept. Id. As another example, in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc. , the Federal Circuit held that claims relating to solutions for managing accounting and billing data over large, disparate networks recited an inventive concept because they contained "specific enhancing limitation[s] that necessarily incorporate[d] the invention's distributed architecture." 841 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 469, 199 L.Ed.2d 356 (2017). The use of a "distributed architecture," which stored accounting data information near the source of the information in the disparate networks, transformed the claims into patentable subject matter. Id.

4. Preemption

In addition to these principles, courts sometimes find it helpful to assess claims against the policy rationale for § 101. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the "concern that undergirds [the] § 101 jurisprudence" is preemption. Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2358. Thus, courts have readily concluded that a claim is not patent-eligible when the claim is so abstract that it preempts "use of [the claimed] approach in all fields" and "would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea." Bilski , 561 U.S. at 612, 130 S.Ct. 3218. However, the inverse is not true: "[w]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility." FairWarning , 839 F.3d at 1098 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant's motion to dismiss contends that the claims of the patents-in-suit fall within the patent-ineligible "abstract ideas" exception to § 101. The Court applies the Alice framework described above to these claims. However, the Court need not individually analyze every claim if certain claims are representative. See generally Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2359-60 (finding claims to be patent-ineligible based on analysis of one representative claim). Here, the parties do not agree on any representative claims. Nevertheless, in the absence of agreed-upon representative claims, the Court need not analyze each and every claim of the patent. Content Extraction , 776 F.3d at 1348. A district court may conduct its own analysis and determine which claims are representative if "all the claims are substantially similar and linked to the same abstract idea." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

First, the Court discusses the representative claims of the '399 Patent, then turns to the substantive Alice analysis of the '399 Patent. Second, the court discusses the representative claim of the '505 Patent, then turns to the substantive Alice analysis of the '505 Patent.

A. The '399 Patent

The Court finds that claims 1, 25, 43, and 46 are representative of the '399 Patent. Each of these claims encapsulates the other claims in the '399 Patent, which are "substantially similar" and "linked to the same ... idea," per the Content Extraction court. 776 F.3d at 1348. The Federal Circuit has also held that if the claims "contain only minor differences in terminology but require performance of the same basic process, ... they should rise or fall together." Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth. , 873 F.3d 1364, 1368 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

Claim 1 discloses (1) the creation of an interactive connection, (2) the creation of a data transfer connection, and then (3) generating a single session ID associating the two connections. '399 Patent at 11:58-64. Claim 25 contains the above elements of claim 1, and additionally discloses "a synchronizer which synchronizes the operation of respective connections formed by the file upload connection server and by the interactive connection server." Id. at 13:22-24.

Claim 46 contains the above elements of claim 1, and additionally discloses the use of a username in connection with data transfer. Id. at 14:49-52.

Claim 43 of the '399 Patent is directed to (1) uploading data to a server, (2) displaying the data at the remote server, and (3) locally displaying the uploaded data as well as any data not uploaded to the remote server. Id. at 14:32-39

Thus, claim 1 is representative of claims directed to generating a single session ID for the interactive connection and the data transfer connection. Claim 25 is representative of claims directed to a synchronizer that synchronizes the operations of the interactive connection and the data transfer connection. Claim 43 is representative of claims directed to displaying local file information, where local data not downloaded from the remote server is displayed. Finally, claim 46 is representative of claims directed to using a username in the upload process. These chosen representative claims (claims 1, 25, 43, 46) comprise the majority of the independent claims of the '399 Patent.

The remaining independent claims (claims 11, 32, and 36) are directed to concepts that are substantially similar to and require performance of the same idea as the representative claims. For instance, independent claim 11 is directed to a "method of transferring data between a client and a service provider," which is substantially similar to representative claim 1, which discloses a "method of synchronizing an interactive connection and a non-interactive data transfer connection between a client and a service provider." Id. at 11:58-60, 12:31-32 (emphasis added). Both claims deal with data transfer connections between a client and a service provider. Additionally, independent claim 32 discloses an "[a]pparatus for uploading data files," which is substantially similar to representative claim 25, which also discloses an "[a]pparatus for uploading data files." Id. at 13:19, 45. Both claims disclose a file upload component, an interactive connection component, and a synchronizer. Id. at 13:20-25, 46-50. Lastly, independent claim 36 discloses an "apparatus for synchronizing a file upload connection and an interactive connection," which is substantially similar to representative claim 25. Id. at 13:63-64. Both claims disclose similar concepts of a file upload connection, an interactive connection, and a synchronizer. Id. at 13:20-25, 14:1-12.

Plaintiff points to dependent claims 2, 18, 26, and 41 as disclosing "many other features and details related to the claimed invention" not represented in the chosen representative claims. Opp. at 5. "For example, Claim 2 describes creating the data transfer connection responsive to the interactive connection; Claim 18 describes rejecting connections to a user name that are not from a particular identified client; Claim 26 describes generating a single session ID associated with each of the connections; and Claim 41 describes using two synchronizers in communication allowing further control over file uploading." Id. at 5-6. However, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff.

Claim 2 depends from representative claim 1, and merely discloses that the data transfer connection is created responsive to the interactive connection. '399 Patent at 11:65-67. Claim 2 and representative claim 1 "require performance of the same basic process" of data transfer via the data transfer connection; claim 2 appends nothing more than a temporal ordering to which the data transfer connections are created, which does not defeat the basic idea that the two claims are directed to the same idea. Smart Sys. Innovations , 873 F.3d at 1368 n.7.

Claim 18, like representative claim 46, discloses the idea of the use of a username. '399 Patent at 12:64-67. The use of a username to gain access to an information resource in both claim 18 and representative claim 46 share the same underlying concept and perform the same basic process because the '399 Patent discloses that the "synchronizer generates a username for use of said file upload connection." Id. at 5:12-13. Both claim 18 and claim 46 disclose the use of a username in connection with data transfer; thus, claim 46 encapsulates the idea of the use of a username in data transfer, which is exactly what claim 18 discloses.

Claim 26, like representative claim 1, discloses the use of a single session ID in connection with data transfer, so both claims require performance of the same basic process of assigning an identificatory label to the data transfer process. Id. at 13:26-28.

Lastly, claim 41 discloses the use of an additional synchronizer in the data transfer process. Id. at 14:25-28. However, representative claim 25 is directed to the same idea as claim 41 because claim 25 already discloses the use of a synchronizer. Adding an additional synchronizer, as claim 41 does, fails to transmute claim 41 into disclosing a fundamentally different idea than representative claim 25 because the additional synchronizer of claim 41 is also involved in the data transfer process, thus performing the same basic process as the synchronizer of representative claim 25.

In sum, claims 1, 25, 43, and 46 are representative of the '399 Patent.

Below, the Court conducts the Alice analysis for claims 1, 25, and 46 of the '399 Patent together. Then, the Court separately conducts the Alice analysis for claim 43 of the '399 Patent. Lastly, the Court discusses whether there are open factual disputes that prevent the Court from finding the '399 Patent invalid based on the pleadings.

1. Alice Step One for Claims 1, 25, and 46 of the '399 Patent -Whether the Claims are Directed to an Abstract Idea

Defendant argues that the '399 Patent is directed toward the abstract idea of "synchronizing data connections." Mot. at 18. Specifically, because the only physical components recited are generic, the '399 Patent is directed toward an abstract idea because the patent "merely attempts to accomplish known and conventional computer methods in a way that is 'more user friendly.' " Id. at 19. Plaintiff responds by arguing that the '399 Patent is not directed toward an abstract idea because it is addressing a problem specifically arising in 1997 computer technology, and the claims "also lack any brick-and-mortar analogy." Opp. at 6.

Step one of the Alice framework directs the Court to assess "whether the claims at issue are directed to [an abstract idea]." Alice , 134 S.Ct. at 2355. The step one inquiry "applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether 'their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.' " Enfish , 822 F.3d at 1335 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court conducts its step one inquiry by first identifying what the "character as a whole" of claims 1, 25, and 46 of the '399 Patent is "directed to," and then discussing whether this is an abstract idea. In distilling the character of a claim, the Court is careful not to express the claim's focus at an unduly "high level of abstraction ... untethered from the language of the claims," but rather at a level consonant with the level of generality or abstraction expressed in the claims themselves.

Enfish , 822 F.3d at 1337 ; see also Thales Visionix , 850 F.3d at 1347 ("We must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful.").

The Court finds that claim 1 of the '399 Patent is directed to the abstract idea of exchanging data using a computer. Claim 1 is simple. It discloses (1) the creation of an interactive connection, (2) the creation of a data transfer connection, and then (3) generating a single session ID associating the two connections. '399 Patent at 11:58-64. Thus, claim 1 boils down to starting two types of data connections, and then assigning a label (i.e., a session ID) to the data connections. Similarly, claim 25 tacks onto the concepts disclosed in claim 1 an additional limitation wherein the exchange of data is synchronized. Additionally, claim 46 adds to the concepts disclosed in claim 1 the idea of exchanging data with the use of a username. The Court finds that claims 1, 25, and 46 are all directed toward abstract ideas. The Court discusses each claim in turn.

a. Claim 1

In claim 1, the claim and specification are not directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality. As aforementioned, claim 1 discloses (1) the creation of an interactive connection, (2) the creation of a data transfer connection, and then (3) generating a single session ID associating the two connections. '399 Patent at 11:58-64. Exemplified in claim 1 (and also common to claims 25 and 46, also discussed in this section) are the interactive connection and the data transfer connection. The claims and specification describe in very broad, functional terms the creation of these two types of data connections between a client and a service provider. See, e.g., id. at 1:43-45 (specifying that the goal of the invention is to "provide a method of uploading large amounts of data [from a client] to a service provider"); id. at 1:60-63 ("[T]he software package preferably creates two sessions, an interactive session, such as one based on a WWW protocol and a file upload session....").

The Federal Circuit has recognized that "[g]eneralized steps to be performed on a computer using conventional computer activity are abstract...." RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd. , 855 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). For instance, the Federal Circuit found that a patent claim for taking digital images using a telephone, storing the images, then transmitting the images to a server which receives the images failed step one of Alice. TLI Comm'cns , 823 F.3d at 610, 612. In explaining why the patent claim failed step one of Alice , the TLI court wrote:

Contrary to TLI's arguments on appeal, the claims here are not directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality. Rather, they are directed to the use of conventional or generic technology in a nascent but well-known environment.... The specification does not describe a new telephone, a new server, or a new physical combination of the two. The specification fails to provide any technical details for the tangible components, but instead predominantly describes the system and methods in purely functional terms. For example, the "telephone unit" of the claims is described as having "the standard features of a telephone unit" .... Likewise, the server is described simply in terms of performing generic computer functions such as storing, receiving, and extracting data.

Id. In essence, the TLI court found that because the TLI patent's specification failed to provide technical details for the components, but instead described the system and methods "in purely functional terms," functions that were generic to a computer, the TLI patent claim failed step one of Alice . Id.

The '399 Patent's specification concedes that the interactive connection and the data transfer connection are known in the art as conventional computer activity. Specifically, the specification makes clear that the Patent did not invent either the interactive connection or the data transfer connection. See, e.g. , '399 Patent at 3:32-34 ("Preferably, the service provider includes a WWW server , for the interactive session and an FTP server for the file upload session."); id. at 6:61-64 ("The interactive connection is made between WWW client 14, which is preferably a standard browser and WWW server 20 which is preferably a commercially available WWW server. "); id. at 7:28-29 ("In a preferred embodiment of the invention, FTP client 14 and FTP server 18 are standard commercial FTP programs. ") (emphasis added). Thus, the "interactive connection" and "data transfer connection" are generic computer functions related to receiving and transmitting data. Therefore, the creation of the interactive connection and the data transfer connection are akin to the patent in TLI. The '399 Patent's disclosure of the interactive connection and the data transfer connection constitute the performance of generic computer functions such as transmitting and receiving data. As TLI held, "performing generic computer functions such as storing, receiving, and extracting data" is abstract. 823 F.3d at 612.

In claim 1 of the '399 Patent, there is an additional claim element wherein a single session ID is generated for the interactive connection and the data transfer connection. However, a single session ID is simply a label by which the connections are identified. Applying an identificatory label to the generic exchange of data via the interactive connection and the data transfer connection is hardly a specific improvement on computer functionality or a nongeneralized computer activity. Per the Content Extraction court, "[t]he concept of data collection, recognition , and storage is undisputedly well-known." 776 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis added). Thus, the well-known and abstract concept of data recognition is embodied by assigning a session ID to the data connections, because the session ID-as its name suggests-identifies the data connections that are created.

Plaintiff cites to DDR Holdings , a case Plaintiff claims is analogous, for the proposition that "claims directed to website usability and functionality 'rooted in computer technology' " are not directed to an abstract idea. Opp. at 6 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. , 773 F.3d at 1257-59 ). However, DDR Holdings is distinguishable from the instant case because the DDR Holdings patent claims "specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result-a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink." DDR Holdings , 773 F.3d at 1258. Here, we have the situation where generic aspects of computing-transmitting and receiving data-are performed using generic elements of data transfer via the internet-a WWW server and an FTP server. Neither the '399 Patent specification nor claims provide any additional details on how interactions with the internet are manipulated to yield a desired result, like in DDR Holdings. Thus, the '399 Patent is much more analogous to the patent in TLI , in which computer systems and methods were described and implemented in purely generic terms. See, e.g. , '399 Patent at 11:60-61 (claiming the process of "creating an interactive connection" and "creating a data transfer connection").

Thus, claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.

b. Claim 25

In claim 25 of the Patent, in addition to the file upload server and an interactive connection server (already discussed above in relation to claim 1), there is the additional claim element of a synchronizer which synchronizes the interactive connection server and the file upload connection server. But like in claim 1, synchronizing the operations of the interactive connection and the file upload connection does not rise to the level of nongeneralized computer activity. Specifically, according to the specification, the synchronizer "generates a single session ID for two associated sessions, each on a different one of said servers." Id. at 4:34-36. As such, the synchronizer is involved in the process of identifying the data exchanged which, as discussed with regard to claim 1, is directed to an abstract idea involving the recognition of data. See Content Extraction , 776 F.3d at 1347 ("The concept of data collection, recognition , and storage is undisputedly well-known" (emphasis added).).

c. Claim 46

In claim 46 of the Patent, in addition to the file upload server and an interactive connection server (already discussed above in relation to claim 1), there is the additional claim element of using a username during the data exchange. Usernames are common and generic. In Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC , 212 F.Supp.3d 887, 906 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff'd , 683 Fed. App'x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017), the court described the use of a username to authenticate a user in the context of data streaming as "conventional." Again, as discussed above, the addition of a username as an additional method to mark or label the exchanged data does not remedy the problem of the claim being directed to an abstract idea.

Therefore, the Court finds that claims 1, 25, and 46 of the '399 Patent are directed toward abstract ideas.

2. Alice Step Two for Claims 1, 25, and 46 of the '399 Patent -Whether the Claims Contain an Inventive Concept

Defendant argues that the '399 Patent does not contain an inventive concept because the Patent is "so result-based that it amounts to nothing more than patenting the abstract concept itself." Mot. at 19. In particular, Defendant argues that the claimed servers are generic, standard commercial products and the claimed synchronizer "offers no algorithm or function that describes how it synchronizes the claimed server connections." Id. at 20. Plaintiff argues that at the time the '399 Patent was filed, uploading to a server was quite a difficult feat. Opp. at 8. Plaintiff asserts that the '399 Patent solved the problem of uploading significant amounts of data "through a novel and unconventional combination of features unlike anything seen before." Id.

"In step two of the Alice inquiry, [the Court] search[es] for an 'inventive concept sufficient to transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application." RecogniCorp , 855 F.3d at 1327 (quoting McRO , 837 F.3d at 1312 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To save the patent at step two, an inventive concept must be evident in the claims." Id. This inventive concept "must be significantly more than the abstract idea itself," BASCOM , 827 F.3d at 1349 ; "must be more than well-understood, routine, conventional activity," Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC , 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ; "and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer." BASCOM , 827 F.3d at 1349. For example, it may be found in an "inventive set of components or methods," "inventive programming," or an inventive approach in "how the desired result is achieved." Elec. Power Grp. , 830 F.3d at 1355. "If a claim's only 'inventive concept' is the application of an abstract idea using conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea." BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc. , 899 F.3d 1281, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

The Court finds that none of the claims' elements, assessed individually, provide an inventive concept. The interactive connection and the data transfer connection are generic computer-related concepts as they literally are just data transfer modalities. As mentioned above, the specification confirms that the '399 Patent did not invent either the interactive connection or the data transfer connection. See id. at 1:60-64 ("[T]he software package preferably creates two sessions, an interactive session, such as one based on a WWW protocol and a file upload session...."); id. at 3:32-34 ("Preferably, the service provider includes a WWW server, for the interactive session and an FTP server for the file upload session."); id. at 5:16-18 ("Alternatively or additionally, said file upload server is a FTP server. Alternatively or additionally, said interactive connection server is a WWW server."); id. at 6:61-64 ("The interactive connection is made between WWW client 14, which is preferably a standard browser and WWW server 20 which is preferably a commercially available WWW server."); id. at 7:28-29 ("In a preferred embodiment of the invention, FTP client 14 and FTP server 18 are standard commercial FTP programs."). Thus, the "interactive connection" and "data transfer connection" are conventional and well-understood techniques as computers have long performed the process of transferring data, even according to the '399 Patent's own specification.

Moreover, as Content Extraction held, "[t]he concept of data collection, recognition , and storage is undisputedly well-known." 776 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis added). Claims 1, 25, and 46 are all directed to forms of further identifying the data or the data transfer process.

For instance, claim 1 associates a session ID with the interactive connection and the data transfer connection. This is an example of data recognition because the session ID is a form of identification that is associated with the interactive connection and the data transfer connection.

Additionally, claim 25 discloses a synchronizer, which, as explained above, "generates a single session ID for two associated sessions, each on a different one of said servers." '399 Patent at 4:34-36. Using the same logic as applied to claim 1, the synchronizer is a tool by which the data or data transfer process can be further identified. Furthermore, claim 25 discloses servers, which are generic as they are described functionally as the "interactive connection server" and the "file upload connection server." Id. at 13:20-21.

Furthermore, claim 46 discloses using a username in the data transfer process. As aforementioned, the use of usernames is common and generic. Williamson , 212 F.Supp.3d at 906 (describing the use of a username to authenticate a user in the context of data streaming as "conventional").

Finally, the ordered combination of these elements also does not yield an inventive concept. In BASCOM , the Federal Circuit held that "an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of