Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (372 F. Supp. 3d 609, 2019)

Joan B. Gottschall, United States District Judge

In February 2015, Monette Saccameno ("Saccameno") sued Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC ("Ocwen") and U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee for C-Bass Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007 RP1 ("U.S. Bank"), alleging that they had engaged in wrongful loan servicing and debt collection practices. In April 2018, the case went to trial and Saccameno prevailed on all of her claims. The jury awarded her a total of $ 582,000 in compensatory damages and $ 3 million in punitive damages. Ocwen has filed three post-trial motions: (1) a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 ; (2) a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) ; and (3) a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the reasons discussed below, the motions are denied.

I. Background

In January 2002, Saccameno obtained a home mortgage loan in the amount of $ 135,000 for a house located in Franklin Park, Illinois. See Ex. P1. In November 2008, Saccameno began to fall behind on her monthly payments, and in February 2009, U.S. Bank declared her to be in default. U.S. Bank accelerated the entire balance of the loan and filed a foreclosure action against her in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. See Ex. P2.

In December 2009, Saccameno filed for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 13. The bankruptcy plan called for Saccameno to repay the amount in arrears ($ 25,713.42) by making monthly payments to the Chapter 13 Trustee. It also required Saccameno to make forty-two monthly mortgage payments to Ocwen. See Exs. P5 & P6. It is undisputed that Saccameno made all of the payments to the Chapter 13 Trustee. See Tr. 295:14-16. The record also showed that Saccameno had made all forty-two monthly payments to Ocwen. See Tr. 287:9-293:23.

In June 2013, the Trustee filed a Notice of Final Cure Payment with the bankruptcy court. See Ex. P10. It is undisputed that Ocwen received notice of the final cure payment but did not file a response. See Tr. 471:25-472:5. On June 27, 2013, the bankruptcy court entered an order of discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings. See Ex. P11. It is undisputed that Ocwen received notice of the discharge as well. See , e.g. , Tr. 68:5-7.

The problems giving rise to this litigation began shortly after Saccameno's bankruptcy discharge. On or about July 2, 2013, an Ocwen employee identified as "Marla" mistakenly coded Saccameno's bankruptcy discharge as a dismissal in Ocwen's computer system. See, e.g. , Tr. 140:5-18. As a result, Saccameno's loan was returned to Ocwen's foreclosure department. During roughly the same time, Ocwen's bankruptcy department improperly advanced the post-petition due date for Saccameno's loan payments. See Tr. 116:7-15. In addition, Ocwen's records incorrectly indicated that Saccameno had made only forty of the forty-two ongoing mortgage payments required under her Chapter 13 plan. See, e.g. , Tr. 125:9-22; Tr. 181:11-21; Tr. 182:18-20; Tr. 775:17-21.

A few days later, Ocwen began sending letters to Saccameno stating that her account was delinquent. The first letter, dated July 6, 2013, stated:

Recently we called your attention to your severely delinquent mortgage loan referenced above. We either have not heard from you or we have not reached a resolution. It is imperative that you contact us immediately to resolve this matter. Failure to do so can result in the accumulation of fees and costs associated with foreclosure, the sale of this property at auction and even eviction.

Time is running out.

We may have resolutions available to help you avoid losing your home and having to make plans to vacate the property. Remember, poor credit may affect your ability to secure another place to live even as a tenant of a rental property.

There is still time to resolve this matter, and we may have programs available to help you.

Ex. P14 at 1. Ocwen sent Saccameno an identical letter dated July 9, 2013. Ex. D1 at 1.

On July 15, 2013, Saccameno phoned Ocwen to discuss the possibility of modifying or refinancing her mortgage. Tr. 763:12-16. (At the time of the call, it appears that Saccameno had not yet seen the July 6, 2013 and July 9, 2013 letters. Id. ). During the conversation, an Ocwen representative told Saccameno that she was behind on her payments. See Tr. 763:12-764:24. On July 17, 2013, Saccameno sent a fax to Ocwen stating that she had recently completed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy lasting forty-two months and that she had never missed a payment. See Ex. P16 at 16. In fact, she stated, she had sent three extra mortgage payments in May 2013. Id. Saccameno's fax included a copy of the bankruptcy discharge order. Id. at 2; Tr. 166:2-20.

By July 25, 2013, Ocwen had corrected the miscoding of the bankruptcy discharge in its computer system. See, e.g. , Tr. 550:5-9; Tr. 1078:10-12. By this time, Ocwen's records also included all forty-two payments by Saccameno, See Tr. 293:17-20; Tr. 296:12-19, Ex. 21 at 000051 (showing Saccameno's forty-second post-petition payment on June 18, 2013). Nevertheless, Ocwen continued to treat her account as delinquent. (Indeed, it appears that it was only during the trial that Ocwen acknowledged that Saccameno had made all forty-two payments).

Saccameno continued to make monthly mortgage payments as per usual. However, in September 2013, Ocwen began returning her checks because, according to its records, the payments were insufficient to cure her default. See Tr. 311:20-312:1. For the next seventeen months, Saccameno continued to make mortgage payments and Ocwen continued to reject them. Id. During this time, Saccameno had numerous communications with Ocwen representatives in an attempt to show that she had never missed any mortgage payments. See, e.g. , Tr. 861:8-863:22. None of these efforts was successful. Meanwhile, Ocwen continued to send Saccameno letters informing that her mortgage loan was "severely delinquent." See, e.g. , Ex. D7 (Letter from Ocwen to Saccameno dated Jan. 1, 2014); Ex. D8 (Letter from Ocwen to Saccameno dated Jan. 7, 2014); Ex D15 (Letter from Ocwen to Saccameno dated Apr. 30, 2014).

In March 2014, Saccameno enlisted the help of attorney Susan Van Sky ("Van Sky"), a friend of a friend, to help resolve the problem. See, e.g. , Tr. 781:24-782:22; Tr. 821:10-13. Despite several phone calls and written communications with Ocwen, Van Sky's efforts proved unavailing. See, e.g. , Tr. 513:2-15; Ex. P33 (Letter from Van Sky to Ocwen, Mar. 20, 2014); Ex. P34 (Letter from Van Sky to Ocwen, April 28, 2014). In December 2014, Saccameno stopped making monthly payments to Ocwen, and in February 2015, she filed this suit, asserting claims for breach of contract (Count I); violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Count II); violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), 810 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (Count III); and violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (Count IV).

The case went to trial on April 3, 2018. During her testimony, Saccameno stated that she suffered from depression and anxiety as a result of Ocwen's conduct and that she lived in fear that her home would be repossessed. See, e.g. , Tr. 818:3-17; 780:6-1. She further testified that she was so upset by Ocwen's continued collection attempts that she was unable to concentrate on her job and was fired. See Tr. 779:17-19. In addition to several other witnesses, the jury heard from Saccameno's doctor, William Sarantos, MD ("Sarantos"), who testified that he had diagnosed Saccameno with depression and panic disorder, see Tr. 205:23-206:9, and that he had prescribed medications to treat the conditions, see Tr. 210:2-6. Following the close of Saccameno's case, Ocwen moved for judgment as a matter of law. See ECF No. 265. The court reserved ruling on the motion. See Tr. 958:17-959:1; ECF No. 270. Ocwen's sole witness was Gina Feezer ("Feezer"), a senior loan analyst (whom Saccameno had also called as her first witness).

On April 11, 2018, the jury returned a verdict for Saccameno on all counts. It awarded her $ 500,000 in compensatory damages on her breach of contract, RESPA, and FDCPA claims. The jury awarded Saccameno an additional $ 82,000 in compensatory damages and $ 3 million in punitive damages on her ICFA claim.

Following the trial, Ocwen renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law. In addition, Ocwen has separately moved for a new trial based on purported evidentiary errors by the court. Ocwen has filed a third motion seeking to amend the judgment, arguing that the jury's punitive damage award is excessive. The court addresses these motions in turn.

II. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

The court turns first to Ocwen's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, "a court may enter judgment as a matter of law when it 'finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis' to support its verdict." Martinez v. City of Chicago , 900 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) ). Federal Rule 50(b) permits a party to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law after a case has been submitted to a jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). "The standard that must be met before judgment as a matter of law may be granted is formidable." Florez v. Delbovo , 939 F.Supp. 1341, 1342 (N.D. Ill. 1996). As the Seventh Circuit has explained:

in entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the evidence in the record. In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.... Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.

Robinson v. Perales , 894 F.3d 818, 833 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ). Here, Ocwen seeks judgment as a matter of law with respect to all of Saccameno's claims except her FDCPA claim.

A. Mootness

In her response to Ocwen's motion, Saccameno argues that the challenges to her RESPA and breach of contract claims are moot. Because mootness is a threshold jurisdictional issue, the court must address it before considering the merits of Ocwen's motion. See, e.g. , Worldwide St. Preachers' Fellowship v. Peterson , 388 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 2004).

Saccameno's argument rests on the fact that the jury awarded a single sum of compensatory damages for her FDCPA, RESPA, and breach of contract claims. She correctly notes that, under Illinois law, " 'where several causes of actions are charged and a general verdict results, the verdict will be sustained if there are one or more good causes of action or counts to support it.' " JMOL Resp. Br. 3, ECF No. 335 (quoting Hudson v. City of Chi. , 378 Ill.App.3d 373, 317 Ill.Dec. 262, 881 N.E.2d 430, 451 (2007) ) (brackets omitted). Since Ocwen has not challenged her FDCPA claim, Saccameno contends, the jury's verdict on that count is sufficient to support the award, irrespective of the merits of her breach of contract and RESPA claims.

Saccameno's reliance on Illinois' general verdict rule is misplaced. The general verdict rule comes into play where a verdict leaves uncertainty regarding the theory or claim on which a jury's finding of liability is based. Here, in contrast, the verdict form makes clear that the jury found Ocwen liable for each of the three claims in question. See Verdict Form, ECF No. 275. At issue is merely how much of the compensatory damage award is attributable to the various claims. See, e.g. , BP Amoco Chemical Co. v. Flint Hills Resources, LLC , 697 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (general verdict rule did not apply because the "verdict form in [the] case was not 'general' in the traditional sense as to the question of liability or defenses," but "simply did not itemize the amount of damages awarded").

Saccameno seems to suggest that the jury's apportionment of damages among the three claims does not matter because "her injuries arise from a single set of indivisible facts." JMOL Resp. Br. 3, ECF No. 335. Exactly what Saccameno means by this is unclear. She offers no explanation of the assertion nor any argument in support of it. However, she appears to claim that the damage award for the FDCPA, RESPA, and breach of contract claims would have been the same regardless of the jury's verdict on her RESPA and breach of contract claims. Otherwise, it is unclear how the verdict on the FDCPA claim alone could support the entire damage award for all three claims. To the extent that this is Saccameno's contention, it is implausible: it requires positing that the jury awarded the entire $ 500,000 in compensatory damages based exclusively on Saccameno's FDCPA claim, and that the jury awarded no damages for the RESPA and breach of contract claims-despite finding Ocwen liable on those claims.

Saccameno's claim that her injuries arise from a single set of "indivisible facts" is also implausible. As will become clear in what follows, her FDCPA, RESPA, and breach of contract claims are based on different conduct by Ocwen: Saccameno's breach of contract claim is based on Ocwen's rejection of her mortgage payments; her FDCPA claim is based on the collection letters that Ocwen sent to her; and her RESPA claim is based on Ocwen's responses to her inquiries requesting correction of her account. These facts, while obviously related, are not "indivisible." In addition, the claims provide redress for different kinds of injury. For example, the RESPA and FDCPA statutes allow compensation for emotional distress and other non-economic harm, while breach of contract claims generally do not. See, e.g., Parks v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. , 398 F.3d 937, 940-41 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Illinois ... does not ordinarily allow punitive and emotional distress damages for breaches of contract.").

In short, the fact that Ocwen does not challenge the jury's verdict with respect to Saccameno's FDCPA claim does not moot its challenges to her breach of contract and RESPA claims.

B. Breach of Contract (Count I)

Proceeding to the merits, the court first considers Ocwen's contention that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Saccameno's breach of contract claim. "Under Illinois law, to sustain a breach of contract claim a plaintiff must prove: '(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) substantial performance by the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the defendant; and (4) resultant damages.' " Roberts v. Columbia Coll. Chicago , 821 F.3d 855, 863 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting W.W. Vincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co. , 351 Ill.App.3d 752, 286 Ill.Dec. 734, 814 N.E.2d 960, 967 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) ). Ocwen argues that Saccameno's breach of contract claim fails for two reasons: first, because she failed to identify any contractual provision that Ocwen purportedly breached; and second, because she failed to present any evidence that she suffered actual damages as a result of the breach. Neither of these arguments is persuasive.

In response to the first argument, Saccameno asserts that Ocwen breached her mortgage contract by improperly rejecting her mortgage payments from October 2013 to February 2015. Courts have recognized that returning mortgage payments, or otherwise failing properly to apply them, may indeed constitute a breach of a mortgage agreement. See, e.g. , Catalan v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. , 629 F.3d 676, 690 (7th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff stated claim against transferee mortgage servicer by alleging that it refused to accept mortgage payments and apply them to plaintiff's debt); Gray v. Brown , No. 3:17-CV-153 (CDL), 2018 WL 1914287, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2018) ("The Court notes that normally, a claim that the mortgage servicer did not properly apply a borrower's payments would be a breach of contract claim for failure to apply the loan payments in accordance with the security deed."); Holt v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC , No. 3:13-CV-120, 2013 WL 7211759, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2013) ("Holt's allegation that Defendants breached the loan agreement by failing to credit her timely mortgage payments is sufficient to state a breach of contract claim."). In any event, Ocwen has not responded to Saccameno's argument on this score and has therefore conceded the point. See, e.g. , Perry v. Coles Cty., Illinois , 906 F.3d 583, 590 n.5 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Plaintiffs did not respond to this argument in their reply brief, so waiver applies."); Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Failure to respond to an argument ... results in waiver.").

Ocwen's second argument-that Saccameno presented no evidence of actual damages-i.e., economic harm or pecuniary loss-is contradicted by the record. Saccameno presented evidence of economic harm in the form of her loss of employment and her medication expenses. With respect to her loss of employment, Saccameno testified that she was so distracted by Ocwen's mishandling of her loan that she was unable to concentrate on her work. See, e.g. , Tr. 777:24-779:19. In particular, she testified that she brought with her to work each day all of the correspondence and other documents that she had received from Ocwen, and that she spent much of her time at work reviewing these materials, checking to see whether she had in fact made all of her payments, talking to Ocwen on the phone, and trying to figure out what had gone wrong. See Tr. 779:15-19. According to Saccameno, she frequently sought help from her coworkers, asking them, for example, to double-check her calculation of the number of payments she had made. See Tr. 777:24-778:7; 779:3-10. She testified that her job was not particularly challenging, but that she was unable to perform the work because she just "wasn't focused." Id. She was terminated from the position after less than a year. Tr. 837:12-14. It was the only time Saccameno could recall having been fired from a job. Tr. 814:27.

Saccameno's testimony was corroborated by Jill Anderson ("Anderson"), a former coworker, who testified that during the period in question, Saccameno "kept trying to get [her mortgage] straightened out, and it wasn't straightening out. And the longer it went, the more agitated she was about that and just things at work just started to kind of unravel." Tr. 890:8-11. Anderson corroborated Saccameno's testimony that she spent a great deal of time during working hours counting her payments and reviewing documents she had received from Ocwen. See Tr. 668:22-669:5. Anderson further corroborated Saccameno's testimony that she frequently sought assistance from her coworkers, going "from cubicle to cubicle, office to office, and just, you know, everyone down the line, the same stuff over and over again"-asking them to look at her checkbook and check her calculations. Tr. 891:8-10. Eventually, Anderson stated, things "got to ... the point where we both were talking about the possibility that she was going to get fired. She just really could not focus, and she did get fired." Tr. 891:25-892:2. Based on this testimony, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Saccameno was fired from her job due to Ocwen's mishandling of her loan, and that she incurred a monetary loss during the time she was unemployed-which, she estimated, was likely less than a month. See Tr. 789:4-6.

As for Saccameno's medication expenses, her physician, Dr. Sarantos, testified that during a visit in September 2013, Saccameno reported that "she was very depressed regarding her mortgage, that she was going to lose her house." Tr. 205:13-16; Tr. 211:18-22. Sarantos explained that he subsequently diagnosed Saccameno with anxiety and depression, see Tr. 205:9-12, and that he prescribed medications to treat the conditions, see Tr. 205:9-206:9. Saccameno testified that she paid out of pocket for the medications. See Tr. 820:9-25. On this record, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Saccameno suffered from depression and anxiety as a result of Ocwen's improper loan servicing practices, and that she suffered pecuniary loss in purchasing anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medications.

Ocwen advances a litany of arguments against the foregoing evidence. For example, Ocwen claims that Jill Anderson lacked competence to testify regarding the reason for Saccameno's firing, and that Saccameno's depression predated her mortgage problems and thus could not have been caused by Ocwen. The court has considered and rejected these arguments (along with many others) in prior orders and opinions. See, e.g. , Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC , No. 15 C 1164, 2017 WL 5171199, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2017) (ruling on Ocwen's motion for summary judgment); Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC , No. 15 C 1164, 2018 WL 1240347, at *4-*7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2018) (ruling on Ocwen's motion for reconsideration); ECF No. 235 (order ruling on Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Testimony Regarding Loss of Job); ECF No. 236 (order ruling on Defendants' Motion to Exclude Evidence or Testimony From Fact Witnesses on Medical Causation); ECF No. 240 (order ruling on Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence Regarding Actual Damages). The court will not rehearse its analysis of these issues here.

Because Saccameno presented sufficient evidence of a contractual breach by Ocwen, and of resulting pecuniary harm, the court denies Ocwen's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Saccameno's breach of contract claim.

C. Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (Count III)

Ocwen next argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Saccameno's claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. "The elements of a claim under the ICFA are: '(1) a deceptive or unfair act or practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deceptive or unfair practice; and (3) the unfair or deceptive practice occurred during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce.' " Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 673 F.3d 547, 574 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Siegel v. Shell Oil Co. , 612 F.3d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 2010) ). In addition, a plaintiff "must show 'actual damage' in order to maintain an action under the ICFA." Kim v. Carter's Inc. , 598 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2010). "The actual damage element of a private ICFA action requires that the plaintiff suffer 'actual pecuniary loss.' " Id. (quoting Mulligan v. QVC, Inc. , 382 Ill.App.3d 620, 321 Ill.Dec. 257, 888 N.E.2d 1190, 1197 (2008) ). Plaintiffs may assert claims under ICFA based on either deceptive conduct or unfair conduct (or both). See, e.g. , Camasta v. Omaha Steaks Int'l, Inc. , No. 12-CV-08285, 2013 WL 4495661, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013) ("Recovery may be obtained for unfair and deceptive conduct, and thus Camasta may proceed under either theory.") (citing Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. , 201 Ill.2d 403, 266 Ill.Dec. 879, 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (2002) ). Here, Saccameno proceeds under both theories. The court separately considers Ocwen's arguments with respect to each theory.

1. Deceptive Acts or Practices

The "Consumer Fraud Act defines deceptive acts or practices as: 'including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact ... in the conduct of any trade or commerce.' " Phillips v. DePaul Univ. , 385 Ill.Dec. 823, 19 N.E.3d 1019, 1028 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (quoting 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/2 ). It is undisputed that Ocwen made numerous false statements to Saccameno regarding the delinquency of her mortgage loan. Nevertheless, Ocwen argues that, given other information it provided to Saccameno, its communications cannot be deemed "deceptive." Specifically, Ocwen points to the following language included in fine print at the bottom of its letters to Saccameno:

This communication is from a debt collector attempting to collect a debt; any information obtained will be used for that purpose. However, if the debt is in active bankruptcy or has been discharged through bankruptcy, this communication is not intended as and does not constitute an attempt to collect a debt.

Ex. D1 at 1; see also Ex. D2 at 1; Ex. D7 at 1. In light of this "heads up" disclaimer, Ocwen insists, "every time she got a letter, Saccameno had express written notice that those letters were not an attempt to collect on her since she knew she had a bankruptcy discharge." JMOL Br. 6, ECF No. 314.

As an initial matter, the court notes that Saccameno claims to have received deceptive communications from Ocwen both orally and in writing. In addition to sending her multiple letters, Ocwen had numerous phone calls with Saccameno during which its representatives falsely told her that she owed past-due amounts on her mortgage. See, e.g. , Tr. 764, Tr. 766, Tr. 771, Tr. 778, Tr. 860. Since the disclaimer applies only to Ocwen's written communications, Ocwen's argument fails insofar as Saccameno's ICFA claim is premised on deceptive statements made in Ocwen's oral communications.

Even as to the written communications, however, Ocwen's argument is unpersuasive. For whatever the disclaimer might have said, Ocwen's conduct unquestionably indicated that it was attempting to collect a debt from Saccameno. For over a year, despite Saccameno's repeated efforts to show Ocwen that her bankruptcy had been discharged and that she had made all of her payments, Ocwen continued to send letters stating that her account was delinquent, demanding payment from her, and reminding her of the possibility of foreclosure. Although Ocwen's records were incorrect, it plainly believed that Saccameno had missed some of her mortgage payments and regarded itself as attempting properly to collect a debt from her. Indeed, Saccameno testified that Ocwen's persistence and intransigence caused her at times to doubt whether she had in fact made all of her payments. See Tr. 778:1-7. In light of Ocwen's conduct, the fine-print "heads up" language in its letters does nothing to dispel the notion that it was attempting to collect a debt from her. Cf. In re Marino , 577 B.R. 772, 784 (9th Cir. BAP 2017) ("[A]lthough Ocwen knew that the Marinos had filed for bankruptcy protection and received a discharge, thirteen of the fifteen letters with disclaimers spoke of bankruptcy as a hypothetical possibility (e.g., 'if you filed for bankruptcy and your case is still active, or if you have received an order of discharge, please be advised that this is not an attempt to collect a prepetition or discharged debt'). Ocwen makes no attempt to explain why it was proper for Ocwen to obscure the fact (known to Ocwen) that the Marinos had already received a discharge.").

Ocwen also contends that Saccameno's deceptiveness claim fails because there was no evidence of its intent to deceive Saccameno. It is well settled, however, that ICFA does not require a showing of the defendant's intent to deceive ; it requires a showing only of the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deceptive act or statement. See, e.g. , Wigod , 673 F.3d at 575 ("[A] claim for 'deceptive' business practices under the Consumer Fraud Act does not require proof of intent to deceive. It is enough to allege that the defendant committed a deceptive or unfair act and intended that the plaintiff rely on that act.") (quoting Siegel v. Shell Oil Co. , 480 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1044 n. 5 (N.D. Ill. 2007) ). There is ample evidence in the record indicating that Ocwen intended for Saccameno to rely on its statements.

For these reasons, the court concludes that Saccameno presented sufficient evidence to support a deceptive practices claim under ICFA.

2. Unfair Acts or Practices

Saccameno also presented sufficient evidence to support an ICFA claim based on unfair practices. "To show that something is an 'unfair practice' under the CFA, the practice must offend public policy; be immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; or cause substantial injury to consumers." Rickher v. Home Depot, Inc. , 535 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Robinson , 266 Ill.Dec. 879, 775 N.E.2d at 961 ). "All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three." Id. (citing Robinson , 266 Ill.Dec. 879, 775 N.E.2d at 961 ). The record in this case contains sufficient evidence of unfair practices under all three criteria.

First, the record supported a finding that Ocwen's conduct offended public policy. A practice offends public policy under ICFA where it "violates statutory or administrative rules establishing a certain standard of conduct." Saika v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC , 357 F.Supp.3d 704, 716 (N.D. Ill. 2018). This can encompass standards of conduct imposed by consent decrees and settlement agreements. In Lowry v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , No. 15 C 4433, 2016 WL 4593815 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2016), for example, the plaintiffs alleged that Wells Fargo had violated ICFA based on its handling of their mortgage after they had defaulted. Among other things, they alleged that Wells Fargo had engaged in unfair practices under ICFA by failing to adhere to the terms of a consent decree and national settlement that it had reached with the Office of Comptroller the Currency and the Department of Justice. Id. at *9. Although the plaintiffs were not parties to either of the agreements and were not seeking to enforce them, the court agreed that if Wells Fargo's handling of the plaintiffs' mortgage had violated the terms of the agreements, its conduct offended public policy and was thus "unfair" under ICFA. Id. at *9.

Here, Saccameno presented evidence of similar consent orders that Ocwen had reached with state and federal regulatory agencies. In December 2013, for example, Ocwen entered into a consent judgment to resolve a lawsuit brought against it by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau together with forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. See Settlement Agreement and Consent Order, In Re: Ocwen Financial Corporation and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC , No. C-13-1153-14-CO01 (Dec. 19, 2013). Pursuant to the consent judgment, Ocwen agreed to adopt numerous controls and standards in it servicing of loans. Specifically, Ocwen agreed to "maintain adequate documentation of borrower account information," to "maintain procedures to ensure accuracy and timely updating of borrower's account information," and to "take appropriate action to promptly remediate any inaccuracies in borrowers' account information." Ex. P42 at A-4 & A-7. In connection with Chapter 13 cases, Ocwen agreed to ensure that "the debtor is treated as being current so long as the debtor is making payments in accordance with the terms of the then-effective confirmed [bankruptcy] plan"; and to ensure "as of the date of dismissal of a debtor's bankruptcy case, entry of an order granting Servicer relief from the stay, or entry of an order granting the debtor a discharge, there is a reconciliation of payments received with respect to the debtor's obligations during the case and appropriately update the Servicer's systems of record." Id. at A-8. A jury could reasonably have concluded that Ocwen's servicing of Saccameno's loan failed to comply with these obligations and that it thereby offended public policy for purposes of ICFA.

Second, Saccameno presented evidence that Ocwen's conduct was "immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous." For purposes of ICFA, "a practice may be considered immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous if it imposes a lack of meaningful choice or an unreasonable burden on the consumer." Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Foxfire Printing & Packaging, Inc. , 633 F.Supp.2d 610, 616 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (brackets and quotation marks omitted). Here, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Ocwen's conduct left Saccameno with a lack of meaningful choice. After all, Saccameno had no choice in selecting Ocwen as her loan servicer and she had no ability to get rid of Ocwen after it began mishandling her account. In characterizing her experience in dealing with Ocwen, Saccameno stated: "I was speaking to vapors.... [It was h]opeless. There's no control. I can't write a check. I can't fix it with money." See Tr. 780:18-781:1. Nor, in any case, can there can be any doubt that Ocwen's conduct placed an "unreasonable burden" on Saccameno: for eighteen months she experienced depression and anxiety because of Ocwen's failure to fix errors that, to all appearances, could have been fixed in a matter of hours, if not minutes.

Finally, there was sufficient evidence that Ocwen's conduct resulted in substantial injury to consumers. "A practice causes substantial injury to consumers if it causes significant harm to the plaintiff and has the potential to cause injury to a large number of consumers." Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Foxfire Printing & Packaging, Inc. , 633 F.Supp.2d 610, 617 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). The record in this case makes abundantly clear that Ocwen's conduct caused Saccameno significant harm, particularly in the form of emotional distress. However, the record also contains evidence that Ocwen's conduct had the potential to injure a large number of other consumers. Although Ocwen maintains that the problems with Saccameno's account boil down to a one-off mistake by a lone employee, a jury could have concluded that the difficulties stemmed from systemic defects with Ocwen's loan servicing practices. For example, on direct examination, Gina Feezer testified that several of Ocwen's business units were involved in responding to Saccameno's requests that her account be corrected. In particular, she explained that the inquiries were received by the company's Research Department, which then sent out workflows to various other departments, see, e.g. , Tr. 617:13-17; Tr. 174:25-175:2, Tr. 280:10-15, including the Bankruptcy Department, see, e.g. , Tr. 170, Tr. 174, Tr. 178, Tr. 180; the Foreclosure Department, see, e.g. , Tr. 189, Tr. 308; and the Cashiering Department, see, e.g. , Tr. 174, Tr. 309, Tr. 470. There is no evidence that the procedures Ocwen used in handling Saccameno's inquiries and concerns deviated from its procedures for handling customer complaints and inquiries generally. The fact that Ocwen's procedures were unable to correct the errors it had made in servicing Saccameno's loan could have led a jury reasonably to conclude that the procedures themselves were defective. This is especially so given that the errors were fairly simple and straightforward, and the fact that the procedures failed not just once but repeatedly. To the extent that Ocwen's loan servicing practices are themselves defective, they carry the potential to result in similar harm to other consumers.

To be sure, Feezer testified that Saccameno's case was the only one in which she had seen a miscoding error of this sort. See Tr. 131:16-17. On cross-examination, however, Feezer admitted that she had conducted virtually no investigation to determine whether Marla, or any other employee, had miscoded bankruptcy discharge orders in other cases. See Tr. 130:13-17; Tr. 136:16-137:13. The record therefore sheds little light on how frequently similar problems might have occurred in Ocwen's servicing of other loans. But it does not matter how often similar problems actually occurred in other cases. The question is only whether Ocwen's conduct carries the potential to harm a large number of other consumers. On this record, a jury could reasonably have concluded that the loan servicing practices employed by Ocwen in this case hold the potential to harm other consumers. And given the sheer size of Ocwen's loan portfolio, it is likewise reasonable to conclude that the potential harm extends to a large number of consumers. Cf. Stephens v. Capital One, N.A. , No. 15-CV-9702, 2016 WL 4697986, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2016) ("Defendant's expansive consumer base similarly allows the Court to reasonably infer that a large consumer base may be at risk for similar conduct that has been alleged to qualify as 'unfair' under the ICFA.") (citation omitted); Wilson v. Harris N.A. , No. 06 C 5840, 2007 WL 2608521, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2007) ("Given that Harris Bank is alleged to have more than two hundred branches in the Chicagoland area and northwest Indiana, the court can reasonably infer that its large consumer base may be at risk of being subjected to cursory and inadequate investigations of claims of unauthorized transactions.") (citation omitted).

Thus, there is sufficient evidence under each of the criteria singled out above to support Saccameno's ICFA unfairness claim; and to the extent that the evidence is insufficient as to any of the criteria individually, the evidence is sufficient when viewed collectively. Hence, whether based on deceptive conduct or unfair conduct, Saccameno's ICFA claim is adequately supported by the record. Accordingly, the court denies Ocwen's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Count III.

D. Punitive Damages

Ocwen next argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Saccameno's request for punitive damages. "Under Illinois law, punitive damages may be awarded for ... violations of the ICFA based on unfair conduct in cases where the defendant acts maliciously or with deliberate indifference." Wendorf v. Landers , 755 F.Supp.2d 972, 981 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ; see also Linhart v. Bridgeview Creek Dev., Inc. , 391 Ill.App.3d 630, 330 Ill.Dec. 843, 909 N.E.2d 865, 875 (2009) ("The Consumer Fraud Act explicitly allows for the recovery of punitive damages where the conduct of the defendant was willful or intentional and done with evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others."). Ocwen argues that its conduct was not egregious enough to meet this standard. Ocwen additionally contends that, on this record, it cannot be held liable for punitive damages based on the actions of its employees. The court addresses these contentions in turn.

1. Ocwen's Conduct Was Sufficiently Egregious

Ocwen first maintains that its conduct was not sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. This is because, according to Ocwen, the record shows that the miscoding of Saccameno's bankruptcy discharge was an honest case of human error, not the result of malice or deliberate indifference.

For several reasons, this argument is unconvincing. As an initial matter, the record does not conclusively show that the miscoding was the result of human error. In fact, the precise reason for the miscoding is unclear. There is no dispute that the employee identified as Marla miscoded the discharge; but to show who committed the error is not to show how or why it occurred. When questioned on the matter, Feezer expressed bafflement and conceded that the error would have been a difficult one for an employee in Marla's position to make. See, e.g. , Tr. 139:6-10. More importantly, even assuming that the initial miscoding could be explained as an accident, the question remains as to why Ocwen failed to correct the problem in the months that followed. Ocwen's failure to correct the issue is especially puzzling in light of the fact that Ocwen continued to treat Saccameno's loan as severely delinquent even after the miscoding was corrected in its computer system in July 2013.

Further, in addition to miscoding Saccameno's bankruptcy, Ocwen improperly advanced the due date for her loan payments and failed to credit two of the payments that she made during her bankruptcy. While a single error might be explained as a mere accident, multiple errors might reasonably be viewed as a pattern indicating deliberate indifference, if not malice. Notably, all but one of Ocwen's errors in connection with Saccameno's account would have redounded to Ocwen's benefit, requiring Saccameno to make additional mortgage payments as well as to pay various fines and fees. See, e.g. , Tr. 156:16-158:2 (discussing inspection fees); Tr. 344:19-25 (property valuation and title fees). The sole exception is the fact that, between April and June 2013, Ocwen's records (apparently incorrectly) reflected a credit balance in Saccameno's favor of between of $ 1,156.83 and $ 2,840.12. See Tr. 113:14-17; Tr. 122:15-24. Unlike the errors that would have benefitted Ocwen, however, the error in Saccameno's favor was corrected swiftly and on Ocwen's own initiative.

On this record, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Ocwen's conduct was egregious enough to warrant punitive damages. In his closing argument, Saccameno's counsel suggested to the jury that Ocwen had essentially waged a war of attrition against Saccameno, pursuing its collection efforts in the hope that she eventually would capitulate by agreeing to make extra payments or by entering into a loan modification on terms more favorable to Ocwen. See Tr. 1041:17-21; Tr. 1049:7-1050:6. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Saccameno, the court cannot say that such an inference would have been unreasonable. But regardless of whether jurors might have accepted the specific theory advanced by Saccameno, a jury could reasonably have concluded-based on the number and nature of Ocwen's missteps, and the time it took to correct them-that Ocwen acted maliciously, or at least with deliberate indifference to Saccameno's rights.

Ocwen argues that such an inference is contradicted by the fact that it offered Saccameno various forms of assistance. For example, Ocwen points out that many of its letters to Saccameno included the phone numbers for housing counseling services approved by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the hotline for the Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere ("HOPE") Program. See, e.g. , Ex. DX1 at 3; Ex. DX6 at 3; Ex. DX7 at 3. But this information appears to have been included routinely in Ocwen's collection letters and shows no effort to address the specific problems with Saccameno's account. In fact, Ocwen's letters list these resources under the heading, "Financial Counseling Services." Having emerged from bankruptcy, however, Saccameno no longer needed financial assistance; she simply needed Ocwen to correct its records.

In July 2013, Ocwen also assigned a "Relationship Manager" to assist Saccameno. This individual, Anthony Gomes ("Gomes"), was to "be responsible for monitoring [Saccameno's] account, making sure that [Ocwen had] all of [her] critical information and carefully reviewing [her] situation." Ex. DX2 ("Relationship Manager Notice," July 16, 2013). There is no evidence, however, that Gomes actually performed these functions. The record indicates that Saccameno spoke with him once by phone in August 2013, at which time he instructed her to resubmit the information that she previously had faxed on July 17, 2013. See Tr. 472:6-15; Tr. 776:16-767:6; Tr. 860:15-861:20. Saccameno sent Gomes the materials, but nothing came of it.

Finally, Ocwen notes that it gave Saccameno several opportunities to modify the terms of her loan. However, the two proposals discussed at trial were offered to Saccameno only in 2015, after she had filed suit. See Ex. DX16; Tr. 493:17-19; Tr. 495:18-22 (discussing loan modification offered on Feb. 13, 2015); Ex. DX17; Tr. 497:5-8 (discussing loan modification offered in July 2015). Moreover, while the modifications would have lowered Saccameno's monthly payments, they also would have increased the loan's principal balance, see Tr. 622:17-623:4; Tr. 625:12-24, and lengthened the term of the mortgage from fifteen to thirty years, see, e.g. , Tr. 626:15-20. In the long run, therefore, Ocwen's proposed loan modifications might well have been costlier to Saccameno-and more beneficial to Ocwen.

In short, based on the record evidence in this case, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Ocwen's conduct was reprehensible enough to warrant punitive damages.

2. Corporate Complicity

Next, Ocwen argues that it cannot be held liable for punitive damages because Saccameno presented no evidence that its corporate management authorized or approved of its employees' actions. See JMOL Br. 10, ECF No. 314. Under Illinois' so-called "corporate complicity" doctrine, punitive damages may be awarded against a principal or corporation based on the acts of its employees where:

(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or (d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.

Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. , 61 Ill.2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1975).

Here, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Ocwen "ratified or approved" of its employees' actions. Under Illinois law, "[r]atification is the equivalent of authorization, but it occurs after the fact, when a principal gains knowledge of an unauthorized transaction but then retains the benefits or otherwise takes a position inconsistent with nonaffirmation." Progress Printing Corp. v. Jane Byrne Political Comm. , 235 Ill.App.3d 292, 176 Ill.Dec. 357, 601 N.E.2d 1055, 1067 (1992). "[R]atification need not be express; it may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, including long-term acquiescence, after notice, to the benefits of an unauthorized transaction." Id. The record in this case contains sufficient evidence both that Ocwen's management was aware of its employees' actions and that Ocwen took a "position inconsistent with nonaffirmation" of those actions.

First, there is sufficient evidence in the record that Ocwen's management was on notice of potential problems with its loan servicing practices throughout the company generally. For example, as mentioned above, see Part II.C.2, supra , Saccameno's exhibits included consent orders that Ocwen entered into with state and federal regulatory bodies. These exhibits showed that, based on investigations conducted in 2010 and 2011, state and federal regulatory agencies had raised a host of concerns regarding Ocwen's handling of distressed loans. See Exs. P42 & P44. Among other things, the regulators claimed to have found a "[l]ack of controls related to general borrower account management, including ... [m]isapplication of borrower payments" and "[a]ssessment of unauthorized fees and charges," Ex. P42 at 6; and "[d]eficiencies in management control and supervision necessary to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations," id. at 7; as well as "deficiencies in Ocwen's servicing platform and loss mitigation infrastructure, including ... failure to properly maintain books and records," Ex. P44 at 3. A jury could reasonably have inferred that various regulators had informed Ocwen that its procedures were subject to the kind of deficiencies that gave rise to the problems in Saccameno's case, and that, in light of the regulatory investigations on which the consent orders were based, Ocwen was aware of its employees' improper conduct in handling loans.

Ocwen appears to concede the consent orders constitute evidence of corporate complicity. It argues, however, that these exhibits were inadmissible. As previously noted, Ocwen's arguments on this point will be discussed in depth in Part III. However, even without the consent orders' evidence indicating knowledge of companywide problems with Ocwen's loan servicing practices, Saccameno presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found that Ocwen's management was aware that her account in particular was being improperly serviced. For more than a year, Saccameno and her attorney had numerous communications with Ocwen employees. Some of these should have been cause for alarm. For example, Van Sky's letters to Ocwen expressly threatened litigation. See Ex. P33; Ex. P34. The record shows that Saccameno's complaints and inquiries were distributed to and handled by several of Ocwen's corporate departments. Tr. 617:13-17; Tr. 174:25-175:2, Tr. 280:10-15. All of these communications-along with electronic images of the bankruptcy discharge order, the notice of final cure, and other documents-were logged in Ocwen's computer system, see generally Ex. P18; Tr. 138:18-139:3, and could be viewed by any Ocwen employee who accessed Saccameno's account, see, e.g. , Tr.

169:12-170:18. As of August 2013, Ocwen's records contained all of the information necessary to determine that Saccameno's account was current. See, e.g. , Tr. 328:21-23. Moreover, in the words of Ocwen's counsel, Saccameno's account was "bumped up" to a higher level when a Relationship Manager was assigned to monitor and review her situation. See Tr. 1077:15-1078:2. Given all of these facts, a jury could reasonably have found that awareness of the mishandling of Saccameno's account had percolated up to Ocwen's management.

Second, on this record, a jury could reasonably have inferred that Ocwen retained the benefits, or otherwise took a "position inconsistent with nonaffirmation," of its employees' conduct. We have seen that Ocwen stood to benefit from its mishandling of Saccameno's account in several ways. Among other things, its mistakes would have required Saccameno to make additional mortgage payments and to pay additional fees and charges, see, e.g. , Tr. 156:16-158:2; Tr. 344:19-25, and might also have led her to modify her loan on terms more profitable to Ocwen, see Part II.D.1, supra. To be sure, Ocwen ultimately did not retain these benefits: Saccameno did not make the extra payments Ocwen demanded; the fees and charges to her account were later reversed, see, e.g. , Tr. 471:5-23; Tr. 966:22-67:22; and Saccameno never accepted Ocwen's loan modification proposals. Nevertheless, it can reasonably be inferred that Ocwen would have retained these benefits if Saccameno had not filed suit.

Further, regardless of whether Ocwen ultimately retained any benefit from the mishandling of Saccameno's loan, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Ocwen took a "position inconsistent with nonaffirmation" of its employees' conduct. For example, the record indicates that Ocwen took no steps to prevent the problems that arose in Saccameno's case from recurring in the case of other consumers. As noted above, Feezer admitted that she had conducted virtually no investigation into the circumstances surrounding the miscoding of Saccameno's bankruptcy discharge: she admitted that she never spoke with Marla regarding the issue and did not check to see whether she or other employees had miscoded bankruptcy discharges in other cases. See, e.g., Tr. 132:3-136:1. Tr. 130:13-17; Tr. 136:16-137:13. To fail to take such corrective action is to take a "position inconsistent with the nonaffirmation" of employees' actions. See, e.g. , Langan v. Rasmussen , Nos. 15-1295 & 15-1207, 13-15 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2018) (jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant corporation ratified employee's unsafe driving because, based on corporation's auditing procedures, it "should have known that employee was falsifying his logs and operating in an unsafe manner") (quotation marks omitted); LeClercq v. Lockformer Co. , No. 00 C 7164, 2002 WL 992671, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2002) (evidence supported conclusion that management was aware of employees' unsafe delivery methods and potential environmental contamination and that, by taking no action to contact residents or test well water, corporation ratified employees' conduct); Robinson v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc. , 104 Ill.App.3d 1021, 60 Ill.Dec. 767, 433 N.E.2d 1005, 1009 (1982) (upholding punitive damage award against corporation for security guard's actions because, inter alia , "defendant has continued to defend the actions of its agent throughout the course of this litigation and has shown no attempt to alter its procedures in regard to situations such as the one encountered by plaintiff").

In short, on this record, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Ocwen's management was aware of the mishandling of Saccameno's account, and that by acquiescing in its employees' conduct, Ocwen ratified their actions. See Langan , 15-1295 & 15-1207, 13-15; LeClercq , 2002 WL 992671, at *3. For these reasons, the record supports holding Ocwen liable for punitive damages based on the actions of its employees. Having concluded that the record also supports a finding that Ocwen acted with the requisite culpability, the court denies Ocwen's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Saccameno's claim for punitive damages.

E. RESPA (Count IV)

Lastly, Ocwen seeks judgment as a matter of law with respect to Saccameno's RESPA claim. "RESPA is a consumer protection statute that regulates the real estate settlement process, including servicing of loans and assignment of those loans." Catalan v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. , 629 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2011). As relevant here, "the statute requires loan servicers to promptly respond to a 'qualified written request' ["QWR"] from a borrower seeking 'information related to the servicing' of his loan or alleging that his account is in error." Perron on behalf of Jackson v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 845 F.3d 852, 856-57 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A)-(B) ). Specifically, RESPA requires loan servicers to take one of following actions within thirty days of receiving a QWR: (1) "make appropriate corrections in the account of the borrower ... and transmit to the borrower a written notification of such correction," 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(A) ; (2) "after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written explanation or clarification that includes ... to the extent applicable, a statement of the reasons for which the servicer believes the account of the borrower is correct as determined by the servicer," 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(B) ; or (3) "after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written explanation or clarification that includes ... information requested by the borrower or an explanation of why the information requested is unavailable or cannot be obtained by the servicer," 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(C).

Saccameno claims that Ocwen failed to comply with these requirements in responding to her inquiries regarding her account. To prevail on her RESPA claim, Saccameno must show that Ocwen failed to comply with one of § 2605(e)(2)'s requirements and that she suffered actual injury as a result. See, e.g. , Baez v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC , 709 F. App'x 979, 982 (11th Cir. 2017) ("[T]o prevail on a RESPA claim, a plaintiff must show (1) a failure to comply with a RESPA obligation and (2) actual damages sustained as a result of the failure to comply."). The parties agree that Saccameno sent Ocwen at least two distinct QWRs: the first was Saccameno's fax to Ocwen in July 2013; the second was Susan Van Sky's letter sent in March 2014. The court considers the evidence with respect to each QWR separately.

1. The July 2013 QWR

Saccameno's first QWR was prompted by communications she received from Ocwen in July 2013 informing her that her account was delinquent. As noted above, on July 15, 2013, she called Ocwen to inquire about the possibility of refinancing her loan. Tr. 763:12-16. During the conversation, an Ocwen representative informed Saccameno that, according to its records, she was $ 8,000 in arrears. Tr. 764:12-19. On July 17, 2013, she sent a fax to Ocwen stating:

I just spoke to your company regarding the possibility of refinancing at a lower interest rate as I am at 8.5%. She indicated your company thinks I am > 8000.00 in arrears! This is not true! In fact in May I superfluously sent an extra 3 payments for my principal. As you can see in the attached I have just completed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy lasting 42 months during which time I didn't miss a mortgage payment!

See Ex. P16. Saccameno's fax included several pages of documentation, including a copy of the bankruptcy discharge order entered in her case. Id. at 7; Tr. 166:2-10.

On August 6, 2013, after speaking with Anthony Gomes, Saccameno sent Ocwen a second fax that included the same information. See Ex. P15 at 7; see also Tr. 182:5-8; Tr. 764:25-765:5. Ocwen consolidated the two requests, see Ex. P18 at 2324, and responded in a letter dated August 14, 2013, see Ex. P16. The letter summarized Saccameno's concerns, stating: "[Y]ou requested us to provide you with the details regarding the payments which were sent in the month of May 2013." Ex. P16 at 1. In addition, the letter acknowledged that Saccameno had "provided [Ocwen] the details of the discharged bankruptcy." Id. In response to Saccameno's concerns, Ocwen stated:

Our records reflect that you filed for protection under bankruptcy chapter 13 on December 31, 2009. Please note that we received 40 payments for the post petition plan, which were applied from January 1, 2010 through April 1, 2013 leaving the loan due for May 1, 2013 payment. Additionally, we have waived fees in the amount of $ 1,673.21, which were assessed to the loan by prior servicer and Ocwen.

Id.

A jury could reasonably have concluded that this response failed to meet RESPA's requirements under § 2605(e)(2). There is no dispute that Ocwen did not comply with § 2605(e)(2)(A), which requires servicers to "make appropriate corrections in the account of the borrower." Although Ocwen waived fees assessed by Saccameno's previous servicer, Ocwen did not correct its records to reflect that Saccameno had made all of her payments. Ocwen's response also did not comply with § 2605(e)(2)(C) because Ocwen did not claim that it was unable to obtain the information Saccameno had requested. The question is thus whether Ocwen complied with § 2605(e)(2)(B)'s requirement that the servicer, "after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower with a written explanation or clarification" as to why it believes the account does not need correction.

Here, there is sufficient evidence that Ocwen failed both to conduct a sufficient investigation and to provide an adequate explanation as to why Saccameno's account needed no correction. With respect to the adequacy of Ocwen's investigation, we have already seen that, by the time it sent its August 2013 response letter, Ocwen had all the information necessary to determine that Saccameno had in fact made all forty-two of her post-petition payments. See, e.g. , Tr. 328:21-23. Further, even if Saccameno had missed payments, Ocwen would have been unable to collect them because it failed to respond to the Chapter 13 Trustee's Notice of Final Cure Payment. See Tr. 471:25-472:5. Still further, we have seen that by the end of July 2013, Ocwen had in fact corrected the miscoding of Saccameno's bankruptcy discharge. This information, which was accessible to all of Ocwen's employees, unequivocally showed that Saccameno was not responsible for any missed payments. Yet Ocwen offers no explanation as to why it responded by telling Saccameno that her loan was delinquent. In the absence of an alternative explanation, a jury could reasonably have concluded that Ocwen's