Klein v. Madison (374 F. Supp. 3d 389, 2019)

Smith, District Judge.

In the middle of the night on May 2, 2016, the plaintiff heard a knock at her door. Answering the door in her pajamas, she found several City of Allentown police officers seeking information about her son's whereabouts and requesting permission to search her home without a warrant. The plaintiff flatly refused and attempted to close her door and end the encounter. What happened next is disputed by the parties. The plaintiff argues that two officers proceeded to violently pull her from her doorway, throw her over a railing, handcuff her, and drag her to a police car. The defendants allege that the plaintiff violently slammed the door shut on an officer's hand, then punched him in the face, and was restrained using a reasonable amount of force. Regardless of what occurred, it is undisputed that the encounter ended with a warrantless entry into her home and in her arrest.

The plaintiff brought the instant civil action against the officers who entered her home and arrested her, the former chief of police, the former mayor of the City of Allentown, and the City of Allentown. Concerning the asserted causes of action, she brings several 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and state law claims (i.e. , assault and battery, trespass, civil conspiracy) against the individual officers. Against the former police chief, she brings a claim for supervisory liability-policymaker liability under section 1983. Against the City of Allentown, she brings a section 1983 claim for municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Currently before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. The defendants request summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff has (1) failed to establish her claims as a matter of law and (2) the officers, for certain of her claims, qualify for immunity under federal and state law. As to all her claims but one, which the court dismisses without prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and partial summary judgment for another, the court finds disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Therefore, for the reasons stated below, summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff, Charlene Klein, filed her complaint against the defendants, Officer Stephen Madison ("Officer Madison"), Officer Christopher Hendricks ("Officer Hendricks"), Officer Michael Good ("Officer Good"), Officer Jacoby Glenny ("Officer Glenny"), John/Jane Does 1-X ("Does"), (former) Mayor Edwin Pawlowski ("Mayor Pawlowski"), the (former) Chief of Police Keith Morris ("Chief Morris"), and the City of Allentown (the "City") on October 10, 2017. Doc. No. 1. The complaint asserted twelve causes of action: (1) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under section 1983 against Officers Madison, Hendricks, and Glenny, in their individual capacities; (2) unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment under section 1983 against Officers Madison, Hendricks, Good, and Glenny (collectively, the "Officers") in their individual capacities; (3) failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities; (4) civil conspiracy under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities; (5) denial of medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities; (6) violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities; (7) supervisory liability/policymaker liability under section 1983 against Mayor Pawlowski and Chief Morris in their individual capacities; (8) municipal liability pursuant to Monell against the City; (9) assault and battery under Pennsylvania law against Officers Madison, Hendricks, and Glenny in their individual capacities; (10) violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution against the Officers; (11) trespass under Pennsylvania law against the Officers in their individual capacities; and (12) civil conspiracy under Pennsylvania law against the Officers. Compl. at 26-66, Doc. No. 1.

The defendants filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint on December 27, 2017. Doc. No. 13. After discovery concluded, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims brought by the plaintiff on December 14, 2018. Doc. No. 55. On January 4, 2019, the plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Doc. No. 58. The court heard oral argument on the motion on January 9, 2019. See Doc. No. 60. The defendants then filed a reply brief and a separate response to plaintiff's additional facts on January 14, 2019. Doc. Nos. 62, 63. Lastly, the plaintiff filed a sur-reply brief as to certain issues raised during oral argument on January 24, 2019. Doc. No. 68. On March 27, 2019, the parties dismissed the claims against the Does and Mayor Pawlowski by stipulation. Doc. No. 95.

The motion for summary judgment is ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review - Motions for Summary Judgment

A district court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Additionally, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Wright v. Corning , 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police , 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) ). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden "of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must counter with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that "[a] party asserting that a fact...is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by...citing to particular parts of materials in the record...; or...[by] showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence...of a genuine dispute"). The non-movant must show more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" for elements on which the non-movant bears the burden of production. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Fireman's Ins. Co. v. DuFresne , 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (indicating that party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not "rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions"); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E. , 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that "speculation and conclusory allegations" do not satisfy non-moving party's duty to "set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor"). Additionally, the non-moving party "cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Jones v. United Parcel Serv. , 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, it is not enough to "merely [ ] restat[e] the allegations" in the complaint; instead, the non-moving party must "point to concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essential element of his case." Jones v. Beard , 145 F. App'x 743, 745- 46 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Moreover, arguments made in briefs "are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey , 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985).

"When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter , 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). The court must decide "not whether...the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial' " and the court should grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, when one party's claims are "blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it," the court should not take those claims as true for the "purposes of ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment." Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

B. Undisputed Material Facts

On May 2, 2016, at approximately 2:30 a.m., the Officers were dispatched to the area of 9th and Cedar Streets in Allentown to investigate a domestic disturbance. Statement of Undisputed Facts in Supp. of the Allentown Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs.' Facts") at ¶ 7, Doc. No. 56; Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defendants, City of Allentown, (Former) Mayor Edwin Pawlowski, (Former) Chief Keith A. Morris, Officer Stephen Madison, Officer Christopher Hendricks, Officer Michael Good, and Officer Jacoby Glenny's Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Mem."), Ex. 1, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts") at ¶ 7, Doc. No. 58-3. Officer Madison was the first to arrive at the scene, and he began to interview the victim who appeared "distraught, crying, and holding her head." Defs.' Facts at ¶ 8; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 8. The victim informed Officer Madison that a man named Brandon Deher ("Brandon") "physically assaulted her, removed her from the car, and dragged her across the concrete by her hair." Defs.' Facts at ¶ 10; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 10. At this point, Officers Madison and Hendricks proceeded to interview two witnesses to the assault. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 12; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 12.

According to the defendants, witnesses informed several of the officers that Brandon lived at 830 North 9th Street (the "Residence") and that he ran up the alley towards his home. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13. Also according to the defendants, the victim informed the officers that Brandon ran into the home. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13. According to the plaintiff, the officers were never informed, at the time they approached the home, that Brandon was seen running into the house. Compare , Defs.' Facts at ¶ 13 ("The victim stated that Brandon assaulted her and fled into Plaintiff's home."), with Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 13 ("A genuine dispute exists. No witness told either Madison or Hendricks that the suspect 'fled towards the home through the alley.' ").

Armed with the information above, Officer Madison and, ultimately, the other officers, walked up to the Residence in search of Brandon. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 15; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 15. The Residence is a "row house," and as such, it shares a divided porch with the adjoining home. Defs.' Facts, Ex. F, Dep. of Charlene D. Klein ("Klein Dep.") at 68, 92-93, 95-97, Doc. No. 56-6. The home also has both a solid front door and a "screen door" that opened outward. See Defs.' Facts at ¶ 19; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 19; see also Klein Dep. at 91 (describing door as "screen door"); Defs.' Facts, Ex. B, Dep. of Stephen Madison ("Madison Dep.") at 84 ("Q. And the screen door - A. Opens outside."), Doc. No. 56-2.

Officer Madison then knocked on the front door of the Residence and the plaintiff answered by opening the solid door. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 16; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 16; see Madison Dep. at 84 ("Q. All right. So her coming to -- to the door, she would have had to open -- or did she open the solid door?" A. "Her main door? Yes."). Officer Madison informed the plaintiff that they were from the Allentown Police Department and were searching for her son, Brandon. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 16; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 16. The plaintiff informed the Officers that Brandon was not at home and that she suspected he was at work. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 17; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 17. Officer Madison then asked the plaintiff if they could search her home for Brandon. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 20; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 20. All parties agree that the plaintiff refused to consent to the warrantless search. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 21; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 21.

It is undisputed that at this time, Officer Madison's hand was holding the screen door open. See Defs.' Facts at ¶ 19; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 19; see also Klein Dep. at 91 ("So in the meantime, my door, the screen door, is jugged. You know he [Officer Madison] had it in his hand."); Madison Dep. at 75 ("I held the door to keep her from closing it."). When the plaintiff refused to allow the Officers into her home, she attempted to close the screen door and end the encounter. See Defs.' Facts at ¶ 22 ("Plaintiff then proceeded to close the door on Officer Madison's hand while his hand was still holding the door."); Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 22 ("A genuine dispute exists. According to Madison, Klein had the right to close the screen door and not speak with him....").

The parties dispute what occurred next. According to the defendants, Officer Madison tried to free his hand from the door and then the plaintiff punched him in the face. See Madison Dep. at 75 ("She then took both of her hands and forcefully closed it shutting my hand in the door. From then, I ripped the door open to get my hand out. And I stepped forward and she punched me in the face."), 94 ("Well, after I removed -- forced the door open and removed my hand, I stepped forward and she punched me in the face."). This prompted Officers Madison and Hendricks to approach the plaintiff and attempt to "detain her." Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23.

The plaintiff disputes that she ever punched Officer Madison. See Klein Dep. at 121 (Q. "And did you strike the officer?" A. "No."). According to the plaintiff, after she declined to allow the Officers to enter her home, Officer Hendricks said to Officer Madison, "[i]t's your call, Bud" and then Officer Madison "came into" her "doorway and yanked [her] out." Id. at 92. The plaintiff asserts that after Officer Madison removed her from the home, Officers Madison and Hendricks "jerked" her over the concrete barrier on the porch that divides the rowhouses. Id. at 92-93. The plaintiff indicates that she informed the Officers to be careful of her shoulder because her rotator cuff was "torn" and that they were hurting her. Id. at 92, 142. Once cuffed, she also states that she complained that the handcuffs were too tight and cutting off her circulation. See id. at 144 ("Correct. And I'm telling them they were too tight. I couldn't even feel my hands. I couldn't do anything.").

After being placed in handcuffs, Officers Glenny and Madison placed the plaintiff in the back of Officer Madison's police car. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23; Klein Dep. at 146; see Madison Dep. at 128 (describing the plaintiff as being "placed in the rear side of my -- my vehicle by Officer Glenny. I opened the door and he placed her inside[ ]"). The plaintiff was later transported to the Allentown Police Department. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 28; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 28. Once at the police department and sitting on a bench, the plaintiff allegedly began to feel stomach pains and a lump on her stomach. Klein Dep. at 175-76. The plaintiff testified that she requested, and was denied, medical care from an unnamed man at the police station. Klein Dep. at 177-78. The plaintiff reportedly suffered from the following injuries due to the force applied during her arrest: (1) bruising and tightness of her wrists due to the handcuffing; (2) a hernia, which required surgery, from being aggressively thrown onto the concrete barrier between the rowhomes; and (3) exacerbation of her pre-existing carpal tunnel which required surgery. Klein Dep. at 145, 180.

The plaintiff was subsequently "charged with aggravated assault, simple assault and harassment in connection with the incidents on May 2, 2016." Defs.' Facts at ¶ 30; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 30. The plaintiff successfully completed Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition ("ARD"). Defs.' Facts at ¶ 35; Pl.'s Resp. at ¶ 35; see also Defs.' Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I ("Klein ARD") at 2, Doc. No. 56-9.

C. Analysis of the Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims

" Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' " Halsey v. Pfeiffer , 750 F.3d 273, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ). "To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 'some person has deprived him of a federal right...[and] that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.' " Id. (quoting Gomez v. Toledo , 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) (alteration in original) ). Here, the plaintiff brings several section 1983 claims against the Officers in their individual capacities: (1) excessive force; (2) unlawful search; (3) failure to intervene; (4) civil conspiracy; (5) denial of medical care; and (6) violation of due process. The defendants argue that the court should grant summary judgment in favor of the Officers because they did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights as to each of the claims and, with respect to her excessive force and unlawful search claims, they have qualified immunity. Br. in Supp. of the Mot. for Summ. J. of Defs., City of Allentown, (Former) Mayor Edwin Pawlowski, (Former) Chief Keith A Morris, Officer Stephen Madison, Officer Christopher Hendricks, Officer Michael Good, and Officer Jacoby Glenny ("Defs.' Br.") at 4-28, Doc. No. 55.

In addressing the parties' arguments, the court first addresses whether the Officers have qualified immunity regarding the plaintiff's excessive force and unlawful search claims. Then, the court discusses the merits of the plaintiff's failure to intervene, civil conspiracy, denial of medical care, and due process violation claims.

1. Qualified Immunity: Excessive Force & Unlawful Search

The defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of qualified immunity as to the plaintiff's section 1983 claims for excessive force and unlawful search. The Officers have qualified immunity if their conduct "does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). "The doctrine is designed to 'give[ ] government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments by protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' " Bryan v. United States of Am. , 913 F.3d 356, 362 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting City and Cty. of San Francisco, Cal. v. Sheehan , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1774, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) ); see also Pearson , 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. 808 ("The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ). To determine whether an officer's conduct is entitled to qualified immunity, courts ask two questions,

[o]ne is whether the defendant's conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right. The other is whether the right at issue was clearly established when the conduct took place. [Courts] have discretion to address either inquiry first.

Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning , 905 F.3d 711, 716 (3d Cir. 2018).

During this analysis, the court views the facts as most favorable to the non-moving party and "courts must take care not to define a case's 'context' in a manner that imports genuinely disputed factual propositions." Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen , 543 U.S. 194, 195, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) ). Similarly, when addressing

...either prong, courts may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment. This is not a rule specific to qualified immunity; it is simply an application of the more general rule that a judge's function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In making that determination, a court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the opposing party.

Id. at 656-57 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

As to the first question, courts should not "define clearly established law at a high level of generality." Sauers , 905 F.3d at 716. Courts are not required to identify "a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, [however,] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." White v. Pauly , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Lastly, as an affirmative defense, "the burden of establishing qualified immunity falls to the official claiming it as a defense." Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr. , 642 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ).

a. Excessive Force

To determine whether Officers Madison, Glenny, and Hendricks (collectively the "Arresting Officers") are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiff's excessive force claim, the court first determines whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff established a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. "Police officers are privileged to commit a battery pursuant to a lawful arrest, but the privilege is negated by the use of excessive force." Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan , 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995). Force is excessive when it is unreasonable. Id. (citation omitted). Courts determine whether the force used is "objectively reasonable" based on the totality of the circumstances, id. at 634, and certain factors, including: "the facts and circumstances of each particular case,...the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In addition to the above factors (commonly referred to as the Graham factors), courts must also consider "other relevant factors [commonly referred to as the Sharrar factors] such as 'the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.' " Green , 246 F. App'x at 161 (quoting Sharrar v. Felsing , 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997) ).

Reasonableness is determined objectively, "but should give appropriate scope to the circumstances of the police action, which are often 'tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.' " Groman , 47 F.3d at 634 (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ); see also Gonzalez v. Murin , C.A. No. 17-324 Erie, 2019 WL 858096, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2019) ("Courts have found these elements - significant injury and repeated complaints of pain - to be particularly relevant in determining whether an excessive force claim may be maintained in the context of handcuffing cases." (citations omitted) ). "The reasonableness of the use of force is normally an issue for the jury." Rivas v. City of Passaic , 365 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Abraham v. Raso , 183 F.3d 279, 290 (3d Cir. 1999) ).

In the context of summary judgment, certain nuances arise. To the extent a police officer's version of events differs from the plaintiff's on summary judgment, "a police officer who is accused of having used excessive force is not 'precluded from arguing that he reasonably perceived the facts to be different from those alleged by the plaintiff,' but that 'contention ...must be considered at trial.' " Id. at 199 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bennett v. Murphy , 274 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2002) ). Further, to survive a motion for summary judgment, "a § 1983 plaintiff must produce evidence supporting each individual defendant's personal involvement in the alleged violation to bring that defendant to trial." Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale , 904 F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir. 2018).

Here, the parties do not dispute that the officers "seized" the plaintiff when they arrested her, thus, "the only question is whether it was unreasonable." Rivas , 365 F.3d at 198. Compare Defs.' Facts at ¶ 25 ("No additional force was used on the Plaintiff."), with Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 25 ("A genuine dispute exists."). The defendants argue that the Arresting Officers used appropriate force because the plaintiff shut the door on Officer Madison's hand and physically resisted arrest. Defs.' Br. at 6. The defendants also dispute the plaintiff's assertion that Officers Madison and Hendricks threw her into the porch railing. Id. ; Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 23, 25. In response, the plaintiff argues that disputed issues of fact preclude the court from granting summary judgment on the merits or because of qualified immunity. See generally Pl.'s Mem. at 7, 23.

As to the force applied, the parties dispute what force was applied during the plaintiff's arrest. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 23, 25; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 23, 25. Officers Madison and Hendricks both dispute that they "threw" the plaintiff over the barrier. Compare Hendricks Dep. at 90 ("Q. By somebody throwing her on a railing. A. She was not thrown.") and Madison Dep. at 122 ("Q. Was [the plaintiff's body] not placed against the banister? A. Absolutely not."), with Klein Dep. at 92 ("[Officers Madison and Hendricks] had me jerked over my concrete wall and I kept telling him they're hurting me, they're hurting me, and I'm screaming and telling these people to stop hurting me."). Officer Glenny admits only to helping Officer Hendricks handcuff the plaintiff. See Glenny Dep. at 63-64 ("Q. Why did you help him handcuff him [sic]? A. She was resisting and she was yelling at -- at all of us. And she was not -- she didn't cooperate and place her hands behind her back. She had her -- needed assistance with -- with getting her hands behind her back and handcuffed."). Whereas the plaintiff argues that the officers who transported her to the car caused her pain by lifting her off the ground while cuffed. Klein Dep. at 143-44.

The parties also dispute the nature of the plaintiff's behavior and demeanor during the entire incident. Evidence in the record supports two theories depending on whether the court believed the defendants or the plaintiff. Based on the record evidence cited by the defendants, the plaintiff was uncooperative to the point of violence, namely first slamming Officer Madison's hand in the door and then punching him in the face. See, e.g. , Madison Dep. at 117 ("She was very, very wild. She was swinging her arms around -- and just very uncooperative."). According to the plaintiff's testimony, four uniformed police officers tried to unlawfully enter her home, and she attempted prevent the unlawful search by denying consent and closing her door. Klein Dep. at 91- 92, 111-12, 120-21, 170-71. When she refused the Arresting Officers, they pulled her from her home, threw her over a barrier so violently that it caused a hernia, forcefully handcuffed her, and carried her from the porch with her feet floating in the air. Id. at 170-76. As the success of the plaintiff's claim depends on which version of events one believes, the court must deny summary judgment on this claim because disputed issues of material fact preclude the court from determining whether the Arresting Officers violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights as a matter of law.

As to the defendants' argument that the Arresting Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, even if there was a violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, the court cannot determine whether the Arresting Officers are entitled to the defense at this time. Both avenues to qualified immunity, i.e. , no violation or, if a violation, it is excused because the Arresting Officers made a reasonable mistake of law or fact, hinge on disputed facts (e.g. , whether the plaintiff punched Officer Madison, the degree to which the plaintiff resisted arrest, and the force applied during her arrest). See Giles v. Kearney , 571 F.3d 318, 327 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The question of whether Giles was fully subdued or not once he was on the ground with Blades sitting on him makes a difference as to whether a reasonable official would have considered the force used reasonable and necessary under the circumstances."). Therefore, the court denies the motion for summary judgment without prejudice with respect to the plaintiff's claim for excessive force against the Arresting Officers on the basis of qualified immunity. See, e.g. , Geist v. Ammary , 617 F. App'x 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2015) (dismissing interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction because district court found disputed issues of material fact precluded ruling on whether police officer had qualified immunity on excessive force claim); Rivas , 365 F.3d at 199 (holding that "it was for the jury to decide if the ensuing 'takedown' and force applied by the officers was objectively reasonable[ ]").

b. Illegal Search

To determine whether the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff's illegal search claim, the court first asks whether a reasonable jury could find that the Officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home without a warrant. Here, the parties do not dispute that the Officers entered the plaintiff's home without a warrant. However, the parties dispute whether such entry violated the Fourth Amendment because the Officers had exigent circumstances which privileged their entry. See generally Defs.' Br. at 7-10; Pl.'s Mem. at 8-11. The defendants primarily argue that either the "hot pursuit" and/or exigent circumstances exceptions privileged their entry because (1) the Officers were actively pursuing Brandon, a "fleeing felon;" (2) Brandon recently committed a "crime of violence;" and (3) witnesses "told the Officers his name, where he lived[,] and that he was seen running towards the back of [the p]laintiff's home in the alley." Defs.' Br. at 9-10. In response, the plaintiff argues the Officers do not satisfy the "hot pursuit" exception because the Officers were not actively chasing Brandon. Pl.'s Mem. at 10.

i. Whether the Officers Violated the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Rights When They gEntered the Residence

The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. When a search occurs without a warrant, it is "presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." See Parkhurst v. Trapp , 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). While a lawful search always requires probable cause, "certain circumstances can excuse the warrant requirement." Id. "One well-recognized exception applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts commonly refer to the exception as "exigent circumstances." Id. at 455, 131 S.Ct. 1849.

"Examples of exigent circumstances include, but are not limited to, hot pursuit of a suspected felon, the possibility that evidence may be removed or destroyed, and danger to the lives of officers or others." United States v. Coles , 437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). "The common thread is imminence-'the existence of a true emergency.' " United States v. Mallory , 765 F.3d 373, 384 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Simmons , 661 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir. 2011) ). The burden to establish exigent circumstances is on the government and it is not an easy burden to overcome. See Coles , 437 F.3d at 366 n.8 ("The Supreme Court has emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are few in number and carefully delineated,...and that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches...." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ). Lastly, law enforcement cannot create the exigent circumstance themselves through their own investigatory behavior or "justif[y] [a warrantless search] by its fruits." Parkhurst , 77 F.3d at 711 n.4.

"In determining whether exigent circumstances existed, [the court] must review 'the facts and reasonably discoverable information available to the officers at the time they took their actions and in making this determination consider the totality of the circumstances facing them.' " United States v. Jones , 155 F. App'x 62, 65 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco , 318 F.3d 497, 518 (3d Cir. 2003) ). Courts consider six factors (referred to as the " Dorman factors") when determining whether exigent circumstances existed:

(1) the gravity of the crime that has been committed; (2) a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed; (3) a clear showing of probable cause based upon reasonably trustworthy information; (4) a strong belief that the suspect is in the premises; (5) "a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended"; and (6) peaceable entry, affording the suspect "an opportunity to surrender...without a struggle and thus to avoid the invasion of privacy involved in entry into the home."

United States v. Anderson , 644 F. App'x 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Dorman v. United States , 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 130, 196 L.Ed.2d 102 (2016).

Application of the Dorman factors is fact intensive and difficult to generalize. However, the contours of the "hot pursuit" exception are clearer. The Supreme Court has stated that "some element of a chase will usually be involved in a 'hot pursuit' case[,]" United States v. Santana , 427 U.S. 38, 43 n.3, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), and a "claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing" without an "immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime." Welsh , 466 U.S. at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091 ; see also Ramirez v. City of Camden, N.J. , Civ. No. 13-1502 (JBS/AMD), 2015 WL 1403717, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2015) (denying summary judgment due to disputed issue of material fact regarding whether officers actually chased suspect into his mother's home because, without actual chase, officer could not rely on "hot pursuit" exception). Specifically, the Court has held that there is "no element of 'hot pursuit' in the arrest of one who was not in flight, was completely surrounded by agents before she knew of their presence, who claims without denial that she was in bed at the time, and who made no attempt to escape." Johnson v. United States , 333 U.S. 10, 16 n.7, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) ; see also Paredes v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ. , Civ. A. No. 15-2929 (JBS/JS), 2018 WL 3930087, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2018) (vacating previous grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on reconsideration because there was no hot pursuit and/or exigent circumstances to justify entry when defendant returned stolen goods to police and he did not flee into home, but rather, denied officers entry without warrant); United States v. Anderson , Crim. A. No. 13-119, 2014 WL 1281062, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2014) (finding case where restricted duty officer merely followed suspect from scene of crime to home and watched him until eventually arrested by on duty officers not a case of "hot pursuit"), aff'd , 644 F. App'x 192 (3d Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Dukes , Crim. A. No. 07-169, 2008 WL 2600296, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2008) ("Upon the approach of the police, Mr. Dukes attempted to evade police by running into the garage, thus initiating the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit." (emphasis added) ), aff'd , 387 F. App'x 196 (3d Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Francis , Crim. A. No. 90-41, 1990 WL 79414, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1990) (finding officer's chase of suspect from street into building "clearly a 'hot pursuit' situation").

In the present case, a reasonable jury could find that the defendants violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered the Residence without a warrant. The court addresses each Dorman factor in turn.

The first factor, the gravity of the crime, weighs in favor of finding that exigent circumstances privileged the search. The parties do not dispute that the Officers arrived at the scene in response to a violent crime, and the Officers acknowledge that they were investigating a violent crime and not a minor offense such as a traffic violation. See Madison Dep. at 145 ("Q. Did you know - well, you were - you were investigating what was a violent assault. Correct? A. Correct."). Compare Defs.' Facts at ¶ 10 ("The victim reported that a man named Brandon physically assaulted her, removed her from the car and dragged her across the concrete by her hair."), with Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 10 ("The statement of fact that Madison so testified is conceded."). When the nature of the crime is violent and not a "minor offense," it weighs in favor of finding exigent circumstances. See Welsh , 466 U.S. at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091 ("When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.").

As to the second factor, the Officers did not have a reasonable belief that the suspect was armed. The victim did not report that the crime occurred with a weapon. Madison Dep. at 145. The Officers' only rationale that he may have been armed is the general assumption that someone who commits a crime may have access to weapons inside their home. Specifically, Officer Madison testified that "it was a concern" that Brandon may have "access to weapons in the home." Id. at 146. While this general assumption has some significance, law enforcement officers likely have (or could have) this same assumption in almost all circumstances involving individuals accused of assault. Cf. United States v. Butler , 405 F. App'x 652, 661-62 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[P]olice officers will almost always have some reason to suspect that the targets of their drug investigations are armed." (emphasis in original) ). However, unlike instances where the victim reports that the suspect used a weapon in the commission of the crime, there was no such report here. See Madison Dep. at 48 (stating victim indicated that Brandon struck her with his fist); see also Anderson , 644 F. App'x at 194-95 (finding exigent circumstances when officer witnessed armed robbery of convenience store, suspect "retained the weapon" upon leaving scene, and officer knocked on door and suspect answered). If a general suspicion that a suspect may be armed was enough, it would be rare to find a case where the police did not have exigent circumstances. Therefore, the court finds that this factor does not weigh in favor of finding exigent circumstances.

Concerning the third factor, the police had probable cause to obtain a search warrant of the Residence and an arrest warrant for Brandon. Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." Orsatti , 71 F.3d at 483 (citations omitted). "In other words, the constitutional validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed any crime." Wright v. City of Phila. , 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Johnson v. Campbell , 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2003) ).

Here, the Officers were responding to a 9-1-1 call wherein a witness reported that a male recently assaulted a female. See Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 3, Notes from 9-1-1 Calls at ECF p. 25 ("Um, I heard screaming outside. A woman was being attacked by a man. She said she was taking him home. When I came out, um, I seen him punch her right in her face."), Doc. No. 58-3. The Officers went to the scene and several officers interviewed the victim and two witnesses, both of whom stated the suspect ran in the direction of the plaintiff's home. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13. The victim and witnesses also revealed the identity of the suspect, Brandon, and where he lived to several officers. Defs' Facts at ¶ 10; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 10. These facts gave the Officers probable cause to believe that Brandon committed an offense. Orsatti , 71 F.3d at 483 ; see Johnson v. 6 Unidentified City of Wilmington Police Officers , Civ. A. No. 08-479-JJF, 2010 WL 1644258, at *5 (D. Del. Apr. 21, 2010) (finding probable cause when police saw "bloody trail from sidewalk to the house[,]" knew victim was previously inside house, and knew shooting occurred in area). Thus, this factor weighs in favor of finding exigent circumstances.

As to the fourth factor, the Officers also had a reasonable belief that Brandon was at the Residence because of the information reported by the victim and witnesses. Even if the witnesses did not tell the Officers that Brandon ran into the home, it is reasonable to assume that it was his likely destination given the proximity of the Residence to the incident. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of finding exigent circumstances.

The fifth factor does not weigh in favor of justifying the Officers' entry into the Residence. While Brandon fled the scene of the crime, there was no active chase between him and the police. See Minnesota v. Olson , 495 U.S. 91, 101, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (finding no exigent circumstances when individual was merely driver of getaway car, it was 3:00 p.m. on Sunday, and it was "evident that the suspect was going nowhere; and that if he came out of the house he would have been promptly apprehended"). The Officers also did not report hearing sounds of flight when they spoke with the plaintiff at her doorway. Cf. Jones , 155 F. App'x at 65-66 (finding exigent circumstances present where suspected murderer knew he was wanted for murder, suspect previously evaded arrest, officers suspected suspect may violently resist arrest, officers received credible tip about suspect's whereabouts, and officers heard sounds of flight upon their arrival). Therefore, the court finds this factor weighs against finding exigent circumstances.

The sixth factor also does not weigh in favor of finding exigent circumstances. The Officers' entry into the home was not peaceable. While the Officers did attempt to gain the plaintiff's consent to enter, when she refused to let them inside, Officer Madison admits that he refused to allow her to close the door. Specifically, Officer Madison stated in his deposition that he "held the door to keep her from closing -- it was a screen door -- a storm door or screen door. I held the door to keep her from closing it so I could continue to speak with her." Madison Dep. at 74-75. Notably, in Officer Madison's "arrest narrative" he states that he "grabbed the screen door before it could be fully closed" which in turn caused his hand to get stuck and a struggle to ensue with the plaintiff. Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 4 ("Allentown Police Dep't Offense Reps.") at ECF p. 36, Doc. No. 58-3.

The defendants seek to rely on Grayer v. Township of Edison , 198 F. App'x 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2006), for support of their argument that the Officers' entry was peaceable. See Defs.' Br. at 26-28. Defendants' arguments based on Grayer fail because, unlike the plaintiff in Grayer who gave "some manner of consent" to the police officers, there was no modicum of consent provided by the plaintiff. Grayer , 198 F. App'x at 208. A physical struggle between an elderly woman and two police officers at 3:00 a.m. is not peaceable entry. Cf. Mallory , 765 F.3d at 387 (rejecting argument that family was hostile to search of home when they "briefly protest[ed] the warrantless entry of their home in the middle of the night" (citing United States v. Katoa , 379 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004) ). After considering the Dorman factors, the court finds that a reasonable fact finder could determine that the Officers lacked exigent circumstances to enter the Residence.

Lastly, this case does not fit within the "hot pursuit" exception. While the "hot pursuit" exception does not require a continuous chase or "an extended hue and cry in and about (the) public streets[ ]" typically "some type of chase" is required. Santana , 427 U.S. at 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike situations where the suspect runs away upon seeing uniformed officers, even if the police lose sight of the suspect, or the chase is short, here, the Officers merely knew he ran in the direction of the Residence. It is uncontested that the Officers never saw or chased Brandon. The lack of any chase is fatal to the defendants' reliance on this exception. See Ramirez , 2015 WL 1403717, at *4 (finding defendants not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's unlawful search claim because police did not actively chase plaintiff's son from street to plaintiff's door). Cf. Jordan v. McLaughlin , No. 1:09-cv-88-SJM-SPB, 2013 WL 1182746, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2013) (finding case sufficiently within "hot pursuit" doctrine where chase was briefly interrupted when one officer lost "site [sic] of the suspect van and the point at which Plaintiff's van (matching the general description) was discovered a short distance away"). Law enforcement cannot rely on the hot pursuit exception to justify their warrantless entry into a home based solely on the fact that a suspect commits a crime near his house and the officers conduct a successful investigation thereby leading them to the suspect's likely location. Therefore, the court finds that this exception does just justify the defendants' search of the Residence.

ii. Whether the Officers are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Unlawful Search Claim

As stated above, the court finds that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the Officers' violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home without a warrant; therefore, the court must determine whether the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the court has already determined that a reasonable jury could find the Officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights, the court moves onto the second question of whether the right at issue is clearly established.

The right to be free of warrantless searches of one's residence unless exigent circumstances apply is clearly established-"a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of 'exigent circumstances.' " Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (footnote and citations omitted). The defendants do not appear to dispute this contention. See Defs.' Br. at 28 ("It is well established that a warrantless entry may be justified by exigent circumstances, such as hot pursuit of a fleeing felon."). Therefore, the court finds that such a right is clearly established.

The defendants also argue the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity because "the situation, as perceived by the Defendants at the time was not so clear that a reasonable officer would conclude that exigent circumstances did not exist to enter the Plaintiff's home to search for her son." Id. "If the wrongfulness of the officer's conduct would have been clear, [the court] must then determine whether he made a reasonable mistake." Carswell v. Borough of Homestead , 381 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2004). The defendants make two arguments as to why the Officers were reasonably mistaken: (1) the defendants rely on Grayer as the basis for the Officers' reasonable belief their entry was privileged and (2) they made a reasonable mistake of law in applying the "hot pursuit" exception. Defs.' Br. at 27-28. The court addresses each in turn.

As to their first argument, Grayer does not stand for the proposition cited by the defendants. In Grayer , police officers spotted Thomas Raiford ("Raiford") out in public. 198 F. App'x at 205. The police had a warrant for Raiford's arrest. Id. Once Raiford saw the police, he ran and entered an apartment. Id. The police "lost sight of him" when he ran into the building but had "reason to believe Raiford thereafter entered the nearby apartment of Raiford's aunt[, the appellant, Grayer]." Id. at 205-06. The police approached Grayer's apartment and sought her consent to enter and search for Raiford. Id. at 206. Grayer gave one of the officers, Sergeant Anderko, her consent to enter. Id. Next, Grayer called out for Raiford. Id. When Raiford responded, the officers ordered him to surrender. Id. He surrendered and the police arrested him. Id. After Raiford's arrest, one of the officers, Detective Wheeler, tried to enter the kitchen of the apartment and Grayer put her body between him and the door and "told him not to open it." Id. The officer then testified that Grayer pushed him, so he detained and arrested her. Id.

The Third Circuit found that a "reasonable police officer could believe that the pursuit of Raiford into Grayer's home, even in the absence of the owner's consent, was constitutional[ ]" because "[p]olice officers had been chasing Raiford, for whom they had an arrest warrant, lost sight of him, had reason to believe he was in Grayer's apartment, and, apparently, saw him from the rear of the building at or around the time Anderko and Wheeler entered the building." Id. at 207. In determining that the Sergeant Anderko made a reasonable mistake of law in entering the apartment, the court also relied upon the fact that Grayer provided some element of consent to enter. Id. at 208. The court held that if Sergeant Anderko was mistaken about his ability to enter the apartment lawfully, "that mistake-in light of the exigency and at least a measure of consent- was reasonable." Id.

Here, each of the key facts in Grayer is distinguishable. First, the Officers never chased Brandon, even briefly, into the home. It is undisputed that Brandon fled the scene before the Officers arrived. Second, the plaintiff never consented, under any fair reading of the facts, to the Officers entering the Residence. See Defs.' Facts at ¶ 21 ("The Plaintiff advised that they could not come in without a warrant."). Therefore, Grayer is inapplicable to whether the Officers made a reasonable mistake of law.

The defendants also offer no basis for why the Officers needed to immediately enter the Residence. The "common thread" between all exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement "is imminence-'the existence of a true emergency.' " Mallory , 765 F.3d at 384 (quoting United States v. Simmons , 661 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir. 2011) ). Here, the Officers have failed to put forth any rationale why they could not wait to obtain a search warrant and, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the record does not support an argument that the Officers imminently needed entry into the home. The Officers arrived at the house and the plaintiff answered the knock at her door. The plaintiff did not appear to be in distress, and the victim was safely in the presence of the police. Additionally, there were at least four police officers at the scene. The defendants failed to provide a reason why some of the officers could not watch the Residence to ensure Brandon did not attempt to escape while one of the officers obtained a search warrant. "Inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate" are "never very convincing reasons, and in these circumstances, certainly not enough to bypass the constitutional requirement." Johnson , 333 U.S. at 15, 68 S.Ct. 367. Therefore, the court finds it was not a reasonable mistake of law for the Officers to believe they had exigent circumstances to enter the Residence without a warrant.

As to their second argument, that the Officers believed they were in "hot pursuit," this argument also fails. The defendants argue that because Brandon "assaulted a woman to the point of being unconscious and then fled the scene" and that "[w]itnesses identified who he was, where he lived, and where he had fled - Plaintiff's home[,]" the Officers were justified in believing they were in "hot pursuit" and could enter the home. Defs.' Br. at 28. This is not a reasonable mistake of law because every hot pursuit case involves "some sort of a chase." Santana , 427 U.S. at 42- 43, 96 S.Ct. 2406. Here, it is undisputed the Officers never chased Brandon. The Officers only knew of his likely location and that he was a suspect in a crime. Defs.' Br. at 28 ("Defendants responded to the home believing that the Plaintiff's son was hiding there."). Officers are not rewarded with the right to make warrantless searches simply because their investigations yield quick results. This is a rule that all but the "plainly incompetent" know. Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Therefore, because "[a]ny other rule would undermine 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,' and would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they are the law[,]" Johnson , 333 U.S. at 17, 68 S.Ct. 367 (internal footnote omitted), the court: (1) denies summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's section 1983 illegal search claim because a reasonable fact finder could determine that there was a violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights and (2) finds that the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

2. Remaining Section 1983 Claims: Failure to Intervene, Civil Conspiracy, Denial of Medical Care, and Fourth Amendment Due Process

The plaintiff brings four additional claims under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities: failure to intervene, civil conspiracy, denial of medical care, and a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court addresses each in turn.

a. Failure to Intervene

The plaintiff argues that the Officers failed to intervene to prevent the violation of her constitutional rights against excessive force and unlawful search. Compl. at ¶¶ 119-129. The defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) there was no predicate constitutional violation, and (2) even if there was a violation, the officers had no "reasonable opportunity to intervene." Defs.' Br. at 11-12. The plaintiff argues that there are disputed issues of material fact with respect to the underlying violations and whether the respective defendants had an opportunity to intervene. Pl.'s Mem. at 11-12.

To be directly liable under a failure to intervene theory, (1) the plaintiff must have "demonstrate[d] that her underlying constitutional rights were violated[,]" Adams v. Officer Eric Selhorst , 449 F. App'x 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Harper v. Albert , 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005) ); (2) the officer had a duty to intervene; and (3) the officer must have had a "realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene." Smith v. Mensinger , 293 F.3d 641, 650-51 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). In the context of excessive force cases, "a police officer has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a victim from another officer's use of excessive force, even if the excessive force is employed by a superior." Id. at 650. Courts should deny summary judgment if the parties dispute whether the officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene. See id. at 650 ("Moreover, it is undisputed that all of the named officers were in the vicinity at some point when Smith alleges he was beaten. The extent of each officer's participation is thus a classic factual dispute to be resolved by the fact finder."); Hayward v. Salem City Bd. of Educ. , Civ. A. No. 14-5200 (JBS/AMD), 2016 WL 4744132, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2016) ("A reasonable view of the facts may demonstrate that Officer Sieber, who was one of four persons in a small office room, was aware of the physical search, despite his contrary assertions.").

Here, the plaintiff alleges that the Officers failed to intervene with respect to two constitutional violations: excessive force and the illegal search of her Residence. First, for the reasons stated above, a reasonable jury could find the Officers violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered her Residence and used excessive force in arresting her.

Second, the court must deny summary judgment on her failure to intervene claim as to all the Officers because each of them was near both events and it is a disputed issue of material fact whether each officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene.

Offic