Favors v. Drayton (39 F. Supp. 3d 276, 2014)

SUMMARY ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DORA L. IRIZARRY, District Judge:

This Order is written for the benefit of the parties regarding the issue of the award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Familiarity with the underlying facts and the history of this redistricting litigation is presumed.

On November 5, 2013, the Court entered judgment in favor of various plaintiff-inter-venors on their claims related to the congressional redistricting following the 2010 census. (See Judgment Order, Dkt. Entry No. 639.) Subsequently, the Rose, Dray-ton, Lee, and Ramos Intervenors filed applications for attorneys’ fees, contending that, as prevailing parties, they were entitled to such fees. (See Rose Intervenors’ Motion for Attorney Fees, Dkt. Entry No. 647; Drayton Intervenors’ Motion for Attorney Fees, Dkt. Entry Nos. 650, 658; Ramos Intervenors’ Notice of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, Dkt. Entry No. 657; Lee Intervenors’ Motion for Attorney Fees, Dkt. Entry No. 659.) The Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the State of New York (collectively, the “State”) filed the sole opposition to the fee applications. (See State’s Opposition, Dkt. Entry No. 666.)

The Court referred the fee applications to United States Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann, who issued a report and reeom-mendation (the “R & R”) on May 20, 2014. (See R & R, Dkt. Entry No. 672.) The magistrate judge recommended that: (1) the Rose Intervenors’ motion be denied in its entirety; (2) the Lee Intervenors be awarded $61,444 in attorneys’ fees; (3) the Drayton Intervenors be awarded $88,502.75 in attorneys’ fees, $15,780 in expert fees, and $0.75 in litigation expenses; and (4) the Ramos Intervenors be awarded $97,196.25 in attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 1.) The State filed the sole objection to the R & R (see State’s Objections to R & R, Dkt. Entry No. 682), which was timely. The Drayton Intervenors filed the sole reply. (See Drayton Intervenors’ Repl. Mem. of Law, Dkt. Entry No. 683.) For the reasons set forth below, the R & R is adopted in its entirety.

DISCUSSION

When a party objects to a R & R, a district judge must make a de novo determination with respect to those portions of the R & R to which the party objects. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1997). If, however, a party makes conclusory or general objections, or attempts to relitigate the party’s original arguments, the court will review the R & R for clear error. Robinson v. Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, 2012 WL 123263, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) (quoting Walker v. Vaughan, 216 F.Supp.2d 290, 292 (S.D.N.Y.2002)). The district court may then “accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The State contends that the magistrate judge erred in recommending that the Court find that the plaintiff-intervenors achieved prevailing party status. (See State’s Objections at 4-10.) The State’s objections constitute nothing more than relitigation of its position in its opposition to the fee applications. (Compare State’s Objections at 4-10, with State’s Opposition at 4-7.) Notably, the magistrate judge anticipated the State’s objections, and squarely and correctly addressed each of them in the R & R. (See R & R at 286-90.)

Nonetheless, the Court has carefully considered the State’s objections to the R & R, which are meritless. First, the magistrate judge articulated and applied the correct legal standard for determining whether the plaintiff-intervenors achieved prevailing party status. In this action, the plaintiff-intervenors sought attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 1973i(e), which state that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee” and costs.

The Supreme Court has explained that, it is unnecessary for a party to prevail on every issue in a litigation to achieve prevailing party status. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (explaining that “plaintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit”). If prevailing party status is achieved, the Court must then evaluate the “reasonableness” of the application. Id. The Court further clarified that, “at a minimum, to be considered a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant.” Texas State Teachers Assoc. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). Some “purely technical or de minimis” victories may fail to support prevailing party status; however, a party crosses the threshold to prevailing party status when the party “succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieved[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.” Id. at 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)). Thus, “[t]he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.” Id. at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486. “Where such a change has- occurred, the degree of the plaintiffs overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award under Hensley, not to the availability of a fee award vel non.” Id. at 793, 109 S.Ct. 1486.

In this action, the magistrate judge properly evaluated the fee and cost applications under the well settled Garland framework. (See R & R at 286-90.) The magistrate judge properly declined the State’s request to apply the slightly different analysis set forth in Hastert v. Illinois State. Bd. of Election Commis., 28 F.3d 1430 (7th Cir.1993), a redistricting ease. In that case, the Seventh Circuit announced a special standard for fee applications “in the redistricting context,” noting that, in such cases, “the touchstone for whether a party ‘prevails’ is simply whether that party’s map (or the map the party ultimately embraces) is ultimately adopted.” Id. at 1443 (affirming denial of attorneys’ fees for plaintiff-intervenors who submitted a proposed redistricting map that was rejected by the court, even though the plaintiff-intervenors’ contributions to the litigation arguably were a “substantial factor in eradicating conduct that violates the Voting Rights Act”). Notably, Hastert is neither binding on this Court, nor does the Court find the analysis persuasive. The Hastert approach to evaluating requests for fees by parties to a redistricting litigation is unduly restrictive and inconsistent with the well recognized “broad remedial purpose of § 1988.” Wilder v. Bernstein, 965 F.2d 1196, 1203 (2d Cir.1992) (analyzing the legislative history and purpose of enacting § 1988); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (noting that courts should use “a generous formulation” to determine whether a party qualifies as a prevailing party under § 1988). Moreover, there is no authority from the Supreme Court or from this Circuit indicating that courts should analyze redistricting cases differently from other types of cases entitled to fee shifting under § 1988. As one court has recognized, the analysis of prevailing party status in Hastert is “contrary to the' overwhelming majority of reported decisions that have addressed prevailing party status.” Perrin v. Kitzhaber, 191 Or.App. 439, 83 P.3d 368, 375-76 (2004) (reversing denial of a fee application and finding that the plaintiffintervenors in a redistricting litigation achieved prevailing party status even though their proposed plan was rejected because their submissions were “helpful” to the court in creating a new plan). Thus, the magistrate judge correctly rejected the State’s request to analyze the fee applications under Hastert.

Second, although the State did not object to the magistrate judge’s calculation of the fees and costs for each of the plaintiff-intervenors, it bears noting that the magistrate judge applied the appropriate legal standards and reached the correct resolution with respect to each party’s application. The magistrate judge was in the best position to determine the merits of the applications as she served as the Special Master in this action, reviewing the parties’ submissions with respect to the congressional redistricting and crafting the new congressional map, which was adopted by the three judge panel. She was keenly aware of each of the plaintiff-intervenors’ contributions to the final map adopted by the Court, their overall success in achieving their goals in this litigation, and whether their efforts were merely duplicative of the original plaintiffs’ efforts. She skillfully adjusted their requested compensation to reflect their contribution to the litigation. Accordingly, upon review of the characteristically thorough, thoughtful, and well-reasoned R & R, the Court hereby adopts the R & R in its entirety.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the R & R is adopted in its entirety. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: (1) the Rose Inter-venors’ motion is denied in its entirety; (2) the Lee Intervenors are awarded $61,444 in attorneys’ fees; (3) the Drayton Inter-venors are awarded $88,502.75 in attorneys’ fees, $15,780 in expert fees, and $0.75 in litigation expenses; and (4) the Ramos Intervenors are awarded $97,196.25 in attorneys’ fees.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ROANNE L. MANN, United States Magistrate Judge:

More than two years ago, the Three-Judge Panel (the “Panel”) assigned to this case, assisted by the undersigned magistrate judge, undertook the “unwelcome obligation” of redrawing the State of New York’s electoral districts for the United States Congress. Perry v. Perez, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 934, 940, 181 L.Ed.2d 900 (2012) (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977)). Although the parties to the instant lawsuit continue to litigate the redistricting of the maps for the New York State legislature, the Panel has entered judgment on claims related to the congressional districts. Now, four groups of plaintiff-intervenors, referred to herein as the Rose, Lee, Drayton, and Ramos Inter-venors, move for awards of attorney’s fees and costs. These motions are before this Court on a referral from the Panel. For the reasons set forth below, this Court respectfully recommends (1) that the Rose Intervenors’ motion be denied in its entirety; (2) that the Lee Intervenors be awarded $61,444 in attorney’s fees; (3) that the Drayton Intervenors be awarded $88,502.75 in attorney’s fees, $15,780 in expert fees, and $0.75 in litigation expenses; and (4) that the Ramos Interve-nors be awarded $97,196.25 in attorney’s fees.

BACKGROUND

This Court recounts only the background necessary to resolve the pending motions for attorney’s fees and costs.

This litigation arose out of the failure of New York’s legislature to timely enact a new congressional redistricting plan in response to the 2010 Census. Plaintiffs Mark A. Favors, Howard Leib, Lillie H. Galan, Edward A. Mulraine, Warren Schreiber, and Weyman A. Carey (collectively, the “Primary Plaintiffs”) commenced this action on November 17, 2011, seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring the then-existing congressional districts invalid and appointing a Special Master to draw new congressional districts in compliance with the law. See Favors Complaint (Nov. 17, 2011) at 32-33, ECF Docket Entry (“DE”) # 1. Over the next few months, four more sets of individuals intervened in the litigation as plaintiffs: Donna Kaye Drayton, Edwin Ellis, Aida Forrest, Gene A. Johnson, Joy Woolley, and Shelia Wright (the “Drayton Intervenors”); (2) Juan Ramos, Nick Chavarria, Graciela Heymann, Sandra Martinez, Edwin Rol-dan, and Manolin Tirado (the “Ramos In-tervenors”); (3) Linda Lee, Shing Chor Chung, Jung Ho Hong, and Julia Yang (the “Lee Intervenors”); and (4) Linda Rose, Everet Mills, Anthony Hoffman, Kim Thompson-Werekoh, Carlotta Bishop, Carol Rinzler, George Stamatiades, Josephine Rodriguez, and Scott Auster (the “Rose Intervenors”). See Order Granting Motions to Intervene (Feb. 14, 2012); Order Granting Motion to Intervene (Feb. 21, 2012).

After several months of litigation, the Panel referred the creation of a congressional redistricting plan to the undersigned magistrate judge. See Order of Referral (Feb. 28, 2012), DE # 133. To provide technical assistance, the Panel appointed Dr. Nathaniel Persily, an expert in election law and redistricting. See id. ¶ 4. The Panel authorized this Court to “recommend a new plan” or to “incorporate all or parts of extant or newly proposed plans” submitted by either “the parties or interested members of the public.” Id. ¶ 6.

The four intervenor groups (the “Inter-venors”) submitted their proposed redistricting plans, along with supporting arguments and data, by February 29, 2012. The Rose Intervenors submitted a statewide redistricting plan. See Rose Interve-nors’ Maps (Feb. 29, 2012), DE # 141-1. The Ramos, Drayton, and Lee Intervenors submitted modified versions of the so-called “Unity Plan” or “Unity Map,” described as “the joint effort of four voting rights advocacy organizations for the protected population groups in New York City.” Drayton Intervenors’ Memorandum in Support of Congressional Unity Map (Feb. 29, 2012) at 4, DE # 139. Unlike the Rose Intervenors’ proposed plan, these maps covered only the New York City area. See, e.g., Lee Intervenors’ Proposed Congressional Plan (Feb. 29, 2012), DE # 138-6. Several groups of defendants also submitted plans, but the Primary Plaintiffs did not.

In accordance with a schedule set by this Court, see Minute Entry (Feb. 27, 2012), DE # 129, the parties filed responses and objections to the various plans submitted to the Court. The parties also advocated for their respective proposed plans and against competing proposals at a four-hour hearing before this Court on March 5, 2012. See Minute Entry (Mar. 5, 2012), DE # 183.

That same day, the undersigned magistrate judge unveiled a draft congressional redistricting plan (the “Proposed Plan”), and directed the parties to show cause why the Proposed Plan should not be presented to the Panel as this Court’s recommendation. See Order to Show Cause (Mar. 5, 2012) (“3/5/12 OTSC”), DE # 184. After receiving responses from the Intervenors and other parties, this Court recommended a slightly modified version of the Proposed Plan (the “Recommended Plan”) to the Panel. See Report and Recommendation (Mar. 12, 2012) (“3/12/12 R & R”), DE # 223; Changes Made From Proposed Plan to Recommended Plan (Mar. 12, 2012), DE # 223-9. Neither the Proposed Plan nor Recommended Plan adopted district lines advocated by any of the parties.

In the week following the filing of the Recommended Plan, the parties responded to that plan through written submissions and argument at a hearing before the Panel on March 15, 2012. See Minute Entry (Mar. 15, 2012), DE #238. Four days later,, the Panel issued an order adopting the Recommended Plan with a few minor modifications (the “Adopted Plan”). See Order Adopting Report and Recommendations (Mar. 19, 2012) (“3/19/12 Order”), DE #242. In its 3/19/12 Order, the Panel declared New York’s then-existing congressional districts unconstitutional and ordered the defendants to implement the Adopted Plan. See id. at 43-44. The following year, on November 5, 2013, the Panel entered final judgment on claims related to congressional redistricting. See Judgment Order (Nov. 5, 2013) at 2, DE #639.

Fourteen days after the Panel entered the aforesaid judgment, the Rose and Drayton Intervenors moved for attorney’s fees and costs. See Rose Intervenors’ Motion for Attorney Fees (Nov. 19, 2013), DE # 647; Drayton Intervenors’ Motion for Attorney Fees (Nov. 19, 2013), DE # 650. That same day, the Drayton Intervenors sought an extension to file an additional fee application. See Drayton Intervenors’ Letter Motion for Extension (Nov. 19, 2013), DE # 645. Likewise, the Ramos and Lee Intervenors requested extensions to file their respective fee applications. See Ramos Intervenors’ Letter Motion for Extension (Nov. 20, 2013), DE # 653; Lee Intervenors’ Letter Motion for Extension (Nov. 20, 2013), DE #654. The Panel granted these extensions, see Order Granting Motions for Extension (Dec. 3, 2013), and the Ramos and Lee Intervenors subsequently moved for fees, see Ramos In-tervenors’ Notice of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Dec. 13, 2013), DE # 657; Lee Intervenors’ Motion for Attorney Fees (Dec. 19, 2013), DE # 659. A second fee application also came forth from the Dray-ton Intervenors. See Drayton Interve-nors’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Expert Fees (Dec. 19, 2013), DE # 658.. The only parties to file oppositions to the Inter-venors’ fee applications were the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the State of New York (collectively, the “State”), who are defendants in this action.

The Panel referred the Intervenors’ various fee applications to the undersigned magistrate judge for issuance of a report and recommendation. See Order Referring Motion (Dec. 3, 2013); Order Referring Motion (Dec. 16, 2013); Order Refer-, ring Motion (Dec. 20, 2013). This Court has considered the parties’ submissions and provides its recommendations herein.

DISCUSSION

In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs....” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Similarly, a court may award reasonable attorney’s fees, expert fees, and litigation expenses “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment....” Id. § 1973Z(e). “Since § 1973Z(e) and § 1988 contain nearly identical language and are driven by similar Congressional intent, the Courts construe these fee shifting statutes similarly.” Davis v. City of New Rochelle, 156 F.R.D. 549, 553 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (footnote omitted) (citing, inter alia, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Hastert v. Illinois State Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 28 F.3d 1430, 1439 n. 10 (7th Cir.1993)). The purpose of such fee-shifting provisions is to ensure “ ‘effective access to the judicial process’ for persons with civil rights grievances. Accordingly, a prevailing plaintiff ‘should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.’ ” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (citations omitted); see Wilder v. Bernstein, 965 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (2d Cir.1992); Hastert, 28 F.3d at 1439. Here, the Intervenors assert that they are prevailing parties, but the State disputes this characterization. Hence, the Court addresses whether Intervenors prevailed before determining what amount of fees, if any, each group should recover.

I. Intervenors’ Eligibility for Fees

“[A] plaintiff prevails when actual relief on the merits of a claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendants’ behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff[.]” Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992); Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001)). To prevail, a party need neither “succeed on the central issue in the litigation” nor “achieve the primary relief sought.” Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 784, 790-91, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) [hereinafter “Garland”] (internal quotation marks omitted). Although a “purely technical or de minimis” victory may, in some circumstances, fail to support prevailing-party status, a party ordinarily passes the “prevailing” threshold where it succeeds on “any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit [the party] sought in bringing the suit.” Id. at 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)). If parties entering the litigation as intervenors satisfy this “generous formulation,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, they, like prevailing primary plaintiffs, are eligible for reasonable fee awards, see Wilder, 965 F.2d at 1201-02; United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Waterbury, 605 F.2d 573, 576-77 (2d Cir.1979) [hereinafter “Waterbury ”].

This Court concludes that' in the circumstances presented here, the Intervenors are prevailing parties. At a minimum, the Intervenors succeeded on a “significant issue in litigation which aehieve[d] some of the benefit” they sought in entering the case. Garland, 489 U.S. at 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486. The Intervenors’ complaints alleged that New York’s existing congressional districts were malapportioned in light of the 2010 Census and sought a judicially ordered congressional redistricting plan. See Drayton Complaint (Dec. 19, 2011), DE # 28-4; Ramos Complaint (Dec. 27, 2011), DE # 37; Lee Complaint (Dec. 28, 2011), DE #38-5; Rose Complaint (Feb. 15, 2012), DE # 81-2. In this respect, the Intervenors obtained the relief sought in their complaints: The Panel declared New York’s existing congressional districts unconstitutional and ordered the defendants to implement a judicially created redistricting plan. See 3/19/12 Order at 43-44. The Panel’s judgment achieved the requisite modification of the defendants’ behavior in a way beneficial to the Intervenors, see Abrahamson, 374 F.3d at 78, whose “ability to vote in upcoming elections in accordance with rights guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions” was no longer jeopardized, see 3/19/12 Order at 2. Moreover, the Intervenors’ success-was not a “purely technical or de minimis” victory insufficient to support prevailing-party status. Garland, 489 U.S. at 792, 109 S.Ct. 1486. For these reasons, the Intervenors are prevailing parties. Cf. Perrin v. Kitzha-ber, 191 Or.App. 439, 83 P.3d 368, 375 (Or.App.2004) (holding that plaintiffs and intervenors achieved prevailing-party status under section 1988 where trial court declared existing congressional districts unconstitutional and issued injunction preventing elections based on those districts).

The State’s arguments against prevailing-party status are unavailing. According to the State, the Second Circuit’s decision in Wilder, 965 F.2d at 1202-05, imposes two additional hurdles that an intervenor must overcome in order to prevail for fee-shifting purposes: i.e., an intervenor must (1) receive a direct benefit from the judgment; and (2) do more than “merely duplicate the efforts of the primary plaintiffs.” See State’s Memorandum in Opposition (Dec. 2, 2013) (“First Opp.”) at 3, DE # 656; State’s Memorandum in Opposition (Jan. 31, 2014) (“Second Opp.”) at 4-5, DE # 666. The State further argues that the Intervenors do not satisfy these requirements because the only direct benefit they received was “the fact of a redrawn map,” which they claim was the same relief sought by the Primary Plaintiffs and unchallenged by any party. First Opp. at 3; Second Opp. at 5. For an intervenor to prevail, the State contends, the court must adopt a map proposed by that intervenor. See First Opp. at 3-4; Second Opp. at 5-6 (citing Hastert, 28 F.3d at 1439; Korman v. Giambra, No. 01-CV-0369E(SR), 2003 WL 23350130, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2003)). In this case, the State argues, the Court “did not adopt a map or any portion thereof submitted by any of the Interve-nors.” Second Opp. at 5. Hence, the argument goes, the Panel’s judgment would have resulted without the Intervenors’ participation, and they therefore merely duplicated the Primary Plaintiffs’ efforts. See First Opp. at 3-4; Second Opp. at 5-7.

A fatal flaw in the State’s argument is that Wilder does not, as the State contends, create a different test for determining whether plaintiff-intervenors prevail in suits involving their own constitutional rights. In fact, Wilder says little about the Intervenors’ prevailing-party status in this case aside from affirming, generally, that an intervenor may be a prevailing party for fee-shifting purposes, see 965 F.2d at 1201-02.

To be sure, this Court’s approach to determining prevailing-party status departs from the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Hastert, 28 F.3d at 1439-43, which the State urges this Court to follow, see First Opp. at 3-4; Second Opp. at 5. In Hastert, the original plaintiffs (the “Hastert group”) filed suit in anticipation of a legislative deadlock on congressional reapportionment in Illinois. See 28 F.3d at 1435. The Hastert group sought a declaration that the existing congressional districts were unconstitutional, as well as an injunction preventing the use of existing districts in the 1992 elections. Id. Eventually, the case grew to include a total of six plaintiff groups, each with its own redistricting plan to present to the district court. See id. at 1435, 1439. As the litigation progressed, there was some consolidation of positions among the groups. See id. at 1439^3. Eventually, the district court adopted an amended map proposed by the Hastert group. See id. at 1435,1442. The plaintiff groups thereafter moved for attorney’s fees, and the district court denied their motions. See id. at 1435-37.

In reviewing five of the plaintiff groups’ fee applications on appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that “the principal issue in litigation ... involved the determination of which proposed [congressional redistricting] plan for the entire State of Illinois best met constitutional and statutory criteria.” Id. at 1440 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). The Seventh Circuit endorsed a “lay person’s perspective,” according to which the “winner ... is the litigant whose plan and objectives (usually incorporated in its map) the district court adopted.” Id. at 1439. Under this approach, four groups of voters whose objectives had been achieved were held to be prevailing parties, see id. at 144CM2, but a final group was found not to have prevailed. See id. at 1442-43. This latter group had proposed a map favoring Democrats, whereas the successful Hastert group’s map favored Republicans. See id. at 1443. -Notwithstanding the final group’s argument “that it was a substantial factor in eradicating conduct that violates the Voting Rights Act,” the Seventh Circuit concluded that that group was not a prevailing party, noting that “in the redistricting context the touchstone for whether a party ‘prevails’ is simply whether that party’s map (or the map the party ultimately embraces) is ultimately adopted.” Id.

Although intuitively appealing, the Seventh Circuit’s approach has not been adopted in this Circuit and seems incompatible with the Supreme Court’s decisions on prevailing-party status. See generally Perrin, 83 P.3d at 375-76. Simply put, at the first stage of the analysis, the relevant question is not, as the Hastert court asserted, whether a party succeeded on the principal issue in litigation, but whether it succeeded on “any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit [the party] sought in bringing the suit.” Garland, 489 U.S. at 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486; see also id. at 790, 109 S.Ct. 1486 (“[T]he degree of the plaintiffs success in relation to the other goals of the lawsuit is a factor critical to the determination of the size of a reasonable fee, not to eligibility for a fee award at all.”); see Fox v. Vice, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2214, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (“A court should compensate the plaintiff for the time his attorney reasonably spent in achieving the favorable outcome, even if the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention.’ ”) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933). “[S]ueeess on the threshold question of unconstitutional malapportionment suffices to confer ‘prevailing party’ status, regardless of the ultimate remedy.” Perrin, 83 P.3d at 375-76 & n. 10 (collecting cases).

Because the Intervenors are prevailing parties, the Court next considers the amount of fees that each group should be awarded.

II. Reasonable Fee Calculations

A party “who has ‘prevailed]’ in the litigation has established only his eligibility for, not his entitlement to, an award of fees.” LeBlanc-Stemberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 758 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933). “The district court retains discretion to determine, under all the circumstances, what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ fee, and in appropriate circumstances the court may conclude that, even though a plaintiff has formally prevailed, no award of fees to that plaintiff would be reasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). In exercising its discretion, the Court must “provide a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination.... ” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 558, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010). “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Nevertheless, the “most critical factor” in determining a reasonable fee award is the degree of success obtained. Id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. A reasonable fee award should be “just high enough to attract competent counsel.” Simmons v. New York City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174-75 (2d Cir.2009).

A. Reasonable Hours

An applicant for attorney’s fees “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended.... ” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The applicant’s documentation must include “contemporaneous time records ... [that] specify, ’ for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.” New York Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir.1983). Furthermore, “[i]f the documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.” Struthers v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-242, 2013 WL 5407221, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2013) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933).

“In determining the hours reasonably expended, the court must ‘examine the hours expended by counsel arid the value of the work product of the particular expenditures to the client’s case.’” Id. (quoting Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 876 (2d Cir.1998)). “In addition, the court should exclude ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary’ hours from the lodestar calculation.” Id. (quoting Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir.2009)). “In making this examination, the district court does not play the role of an uninformed arbiter but may look to its familiarity with the case and its experience generally as well as to the evidentiary submissions and arguments of the parties.” Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 876 (quoting DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.1985)). The goal is “to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox, 131 S.Ct. at 2216. Trial courts “need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade accountants.” Id. Instead, they “may take into account their overall sense of a suit” and “use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.” Id. Accordingly, district courts may “make across-the-board percentage cuts in hours as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.” Green v. City of New York, 403 Fed.Appx. 626, 630 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 237 (2d Cir.1987)).

As noted above, the “results obtained” constitute the most important consideration in determining what hours were reasonably expended. See generally Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. On the other hand, where a party achieves only limited success, the court has discretion to reduce the fees awarded, see id. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. 1933, or, “in appropriate circumstances,” to deny them entirely, see LeBlanc-Sternberg, 143 F.3d at 758. “A district court’s assessment of the ‘degree of success’ achieved in a case is not limited to inquiring whether a plaintiff prevailed on individual claims.” Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 152 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir.2005)). Both “the quantity and quality of relief obtained” are key factors in determining the degree of success a party achieved. Id. (quoting Carroll v. Blinken, 105 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir.1997)).

When the parties requesting fees are intervenors, courts must also consider the extent to which the intervenors’ “participation contributed importantly to the creation of remedies.” Wilder, 965 F.2d at 1204 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Waterbury, 605 F.2d at 576). Efforts that merely duplicate those of the primary plaintiffs should not count toward a fee award. See id. at 1204-05. However, “when nonduplicative efforts by intervenors effectuate the civil rights at issue they are entitled to an award because such a result furthers the purpose of the civil rights statutes in a fashion envisioned by Congress.” Id. at 1205.

The State advances several arguments for across-the-board cuts to the hours of all the Intervenors. First, the State contends that broad cuts are appropriate because the Intervenors achieved limited success. According to the State, the In-tervenors achieved only “a simple outcome: a judgment that the Congressional districts needed to be redrawn.” Second Opp. at 8. The State implies that the Panel’s Adopted Map did not represent success for the Intervenors because “[t]his Court did not adopt any of the Interve-nors’ proposed plans or any portion thereof.” Id. at 7. And, since there was a “relative lack of disagreement on” issues other than how the map should be redrawn, the Intervenors purportedly achieved at most a “small degree of success.” First Opp. at 5-6. In light of this limited success, the State’s argument continues, “a reasonable fee in this case is either zero or a low number that reflects the time reasonably necessary to prove that the district lines required redrawing.” Second Opp. at 2.

In order to assess the strength of the State’s arguments, the Court must consider the circumstances of each individual intervenor group; contrary to the State’s assumption, the Intervenors enjoyed varying degrees of success with respect to the Adopted Map. It is true, as the State suggests, that the proper measure of the Intervenors’ success is the extent to which the Adopted Map met the Intervenors’ objectives, and the similarity between the parties’ proposed maps.and the Adopted Map is clearly relevant on this issue. However, an intervenor may recover fees for its contributions to a remedy even if the ultimately adopted remedy is not the precise one it had proposed. See, e.g., Waterbury, 605 F.2d at 576-77. Hence, the fact that the Panel did not adopt the Intervenors’ proffered maps does not end the Court’s inquiry into their respective contributions and degrees of success, which will be considered below on a group-by-group basis. See infra pp. 293-300.

In further support of across-the-board cuts, the State also complains that the Intervenors did not collaborate sufficiently. According to the State, the Intervenors are “parties with common interests,” and should not have “filed separate motions to intervene, separate motions in support of their respective proposed Congressional maps, and separate fee applications.” Second Opp. at 9. Id. The Court remains unpersuaded. Each of the Intervenor groups represented different interests and had different concerns regarding the congressional districts. “While all the intervenors were interested in ensuring their votes were not diluted, they put forward plans focused on different areas and supported by different arguments.” Reply Memorandum in Support of Lee Intervenors’ Motion (Feb. 14, 2014) (“Lee Reply”) at 7, DE # 670; see Memorandum of Law in Reply to State Defendants’ Opposition (Feb. 14, 2014) (“Drayton Reply”) at 7, DE # 668; Reply in Support of the Rose Intervenors’ Motion (Feb. 14, 2014) (“Rose Reply”) at 8, DE # 669; Reply Memorandum of Ramos Intervenors (Feb. 14, 2014) (“Ramos Reply”) at 6, DE #671. Additionally, given the extremely compressed timeline involved in this case, it is understandable that counsel were not able to coordinate for maximal efficiency. See Rose Reply at 8. Notably, the State does not contend that the Intervenors duplicated the Primary Plaintiffs’ efforts in establishing liability. This Court therefore would not reduce the Intervenors’ compen-sable hours based on insufficient collaboration.

1. Rose Intervenors

The Rose Intervenors are a group of voters from districts that were overpopulated in light of the 2010 Census, and they sought to intervene to protect their individual voting rights. See Proposed Rose Intervenors’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs (Feb. 15, 2012) at 1-4, 13, DE # 81-1. As evidenced by the entire record, the Rose Intervenors’ main objective was to propose and persuade the Court to adopt that group’s statewide redistricting plan. See Rose Intervenors’ Memorandum on Proposed Map (Feb. 29, 2012), DE #141; Rose Intervenors’ Proposed Plan (Feb. 29, 2012), DE # 141-1. Their counsel in this litigation were attorneys with the firm Perkins Coie LLP. See Memorandum in Support of Rose Intervenors’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Expert Fees, and Costs (Nov. 19, 2013) (“Rose Mem.”) at 8, DE # 648. The Rose Intervenors seek compensation for 571.4 hours of work by Perkins Coie. See id. at 5. According to the Rose Intervenors, this number of hours was reasonable “[i]n light of the complexity of this case and the Rose Intervenors’ ultimate success....” Id. at 6.

The State opposes any award of fees to the Rose Intervenors, arguing that they have not identified any significant contri-buttons made by them toward the resolution of this case. See First Opp. at 4. The Rose Intervenors’ proposed (and rejected) map, the State argues, did not contribute to the remedy granted by the Court. See id. Relying on an isolated passage in Bar-field, 537 F.3d at 152, the Rose Interve-nors counter that they are entitled to fees because they achieved everything they sought in their complaint. See Rose Reply at 6-7. However, the outcome in Bar-field makes abundantly clear that in measuring a party’s level of success, a court is not confined to an examination of the pleadings but may consider the record as a whole to determine whether the fee applicant achieved its litigation objectives. So too here, the Rose Intervenors’ complaint is an inadequate guide to their primary aim in this litigation, which was the adoption of their proposed map or a substantially similar map, incorporating the principles espoused by them.

Taking into account the Rose Intervenors’ main objective in seeking to intervene in this case, it cannot be said that their participation—however capable their counsel—contributed significantly to the remedies granted. Although the simple fact that the Court rejected the Rose Intervenors’ map is not dispositive, cf. Waterbury, 605 F.2d at 576-77, the Rose Intervenors identify no aspect of the Adopted Map that was influenced by their advocacy or their proposed map. In fact, this Court rejected the Rose Intervenors’ challenges to the map that it had initially proposed; specifically, • they complained that the Court had failed to take incumbency into account or to better preserve the cores of existing districts. See Rose Intervenors’ First Response to 3/5/12 OTSC (Mar. 7, 2012), DE #191; Rose Intervenors’ Second Response to 3/5/12 OTSC (Mar. 7, 2012), DE #215. This Court declined to make the requested modifications, see 3/12/12 R & R at 28-38, and the Panel adopted its recommendations, see 3/19/12 Order at 5-6 & n. 5.

Nor could the Rose Intervenors be said to have made any meaningful contribution on the issue of liability—that is, to their entitlement to a judicially crafted redistricting plan. While the Rose Intervenors correctly observe that they intervened while the question of liability was technically still open, see Rose Reply at 5, they identify no contributions by them to the resolution of that question. Moreover, although the Primary Plaintiffs did not share the Rose Intervenors’ position on incumbency, the Rose Intervenors’ interests with respect to the question of liability were “adequately represented” by the Primary Plaintiffs, such that any work performed by the Rose Intervenors aimed at establishing liability would likely have been duplicative and ineligible for reimbursement. See Wilder, 965 F.2d at 1204-05.

Instead of identifying achievements, the Rose Intervenors cite their counsel’s efforts to “diligently defend[] their clients’ interests.” Rose Mem. at 7. They argue that they contributed to the outcome of this case through the submission of a statewide redistricting map based on expert testimony “that educated the Court about alternative ways to draw New York’s districts,” and through their research and explanation of governing legal standards, participation in hearings, and “identif[ication of] problems with other proposed maps by submitting comments and objections.” Id. at 4-5. Diligent though the efforts of Rose Intervenors’ counsel may have been, such efforts, without more, do not constitute “important contributions to the outcome of this case.” Id. at 4. If the Rose Intervenors were merely seeking an “A for effort,” this Court might indulge them. However, since their degree of success—not effort— is the most important consideration in a fee award, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, counsel’s diligent efforts cannot justify a fee award where those efforts produce no identifiable results beneficial to their clients.

The Rose Intervenors bear the burden of establishing their entitlement to fees, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, and since they have not identified an important contribution to the resolution of this case, this Court concludes that a reasonable award is no fee at all, see Wilder, 965 F.2d at 1204. The Rose Intervenors are in the same position as the plaintiffs in Hastert found ineligible for a fee award, in that they had proposed a map favoring Democrats while the court-adopted map favored Republicans. See 28 F.3d at 1443. Although this Court would eschew the Seventh Circuit’s prevailing-party analysis, it concurs with the practical result in Hasten. This Court respectfully recommends that the Rose Intervenors’ request for attorney’s fees be denied.

2. Lee Intervenors

The Lee Intervenors are four Asian American registered voters who reside in New York City and “represent the interests of Asian Americans, as well as their own interests as voters.” Lee Complaint ¶ 6. In this litigation, the Lee Intervenors primarily “sought to ensure that the redistricting process resulted in congressional districts that keep the Asian American communities of common interest in which they reside whole and together, to ensure that their voting power is not diluted.” Lee Reply at 4 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The Lee Interve-nors were represented by attorneys with the firm Kaye Scholer and the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (“AALDEF”), and they request reimbursement for a total of 290.01 hours of work by these attorneys.

The Lee Intervenors were substantially successful. Although the Court did not adopt their proposed district lines, the Court “ultimately adopted a map that included districts that maintained the integrity of several Asian-American communities.” Id. at 3. Hence, the Adopted Map “reflects the substance of the Lee Intervenors’ arguments to protect the integrity of Asian American communities in New York.” Id. at 3-4 (citing Declaration of Jerry G. Vattamala (Dec. 20, 2013) (“Vattamala Decl.”) ¶¶ 13-14, DE # 665). Specifically, the Lee Intervenors persuasively argue that this Court's redistricting map, adopted by the Panel, meets the Lee Intervenors’ objectives in several respects: (1) adopted District 6 retains within a single district the Asian American community in Flushing/Bayside, Elmhurst, and Briar-wood/Jamaica Hills, Queens; (2) adopted District 7 retains the community of interest in Manhattan’s Chinatown and Brooklyn’s Sunset Park; (3) adopted District 14 holds the Asian American community of interest in Jackson Heights and Woodside, Queens, within a single district; and (4) adopted District 5 retains the Asian American community of interest in Richmond Hill/South Ozone Park within a single district. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Lee Intervenors’ Motion (Dec. 19, 2013) (“Lee Mem.”) at 3, DE # 660.

The State suggests that the Lee Inter-venors did not succeed because the adopted districts cited by them as successes do not match their proposed districts, but instead were based on previously existing districts. See Second Opp. at 6 (citing Persily Aff. ¶¶ 76-77, 81, 83, 88). This argument has only partial merit. The fact that the Court did not adopt the Lee In-tervenors’ proposed lines qualifies their success, but does not completely negate it, because the Court’s plan- incorporated the substance of the Lee Intervenors’ proposal. First, District 6, which perhaps represents the Lee Intervenors’ greatest success, was largely redrawn to accommodate “many of Queens’ Asian communities in a compact district.” Persily Aff. ¶ 139; see also Lee Reply at 4-5 & n. 3 (noting that adopted District 6 had the highest Asian American percentage of any congressional district in New York’s history, and that this district elected New York’s first Asian American Congressperson in the 2012 elections). Second, notwithstanding the similarity of some of the new districts to prior configurations, this Court finds that the Lee Intervenors contributed importantly to the creation or retention of Asian American communities of interest in the Adopted Map. As the Lee Intervenors observe: “This outcome was by no means inevitable at the outset—notably, the maps submitted by the defendants and by the Rose Intervenors failed to protect the integrity of these communities.” Lee Reply at 4 (citing Lee Intervenors’ Response to Congressional Redistricting Plans (Mar. 2, 2012), DE # 167). Much like the Rose Intervenors, the Lee Intervenors submitted a redistricting plan, provided comments and critiques on alternative proposals, and participated in hearings before this Court and the Panel. See Lee Mem. at 7; Minute Entry (Feb. 27, 2012), DE # 129; Lee Intervenors’ Congressional Redistricting Submission (Feb. 29, 2012), DE # 138; Lee Intervenors’ Response to Congressional Redistricting Plans;' Lee Intervenors’ Response to 3/12/12 R & R. In contrast to the Rose Intervenors, however, the Lee Intervenors succeeded in having the substance of their proposal incorporated in the Adopted Map.

Accordingly, this Court believes that only a 20-percent reduction in the Lee Intervenors’ requested hours is appropriate on the basis of their degree of success. Cf. Healey v. Leavitt, 485 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in applying percentage reductions to plaintiffs fee award to reflect limited success in litigation as a whole). This moderate reduction ensures that parties like the Lee Intervenors can find competent counsel in redistricting cases, while incentivizing them to submit plans that meet not only their interests but other necessary characteristics of a court-supervised plan. Cf. Barfield, 537 F.3d at 152 (district court’s reduction in fees for plaintiff who succeeded on FLSA claim while failing to achieve primary aim of collective certification was appropriate because awarding the requested amount would decrease attorneys’ incentives to vigorously litigate collective action certification and encourage the filing of weak collective-action-based claims).

To ensure that the Lee Intervenors’ requested hours are otherwise reasonable, this Court has reviewed the timesheets submitted by their attorneys. See Declaration of James D. Herschlein (Dec. 19, 2013) (“Herschlein Decl.”) ¶ 5; Exhibit (“Ex.”) A to Herschlein Decl., DE # 661-1; Declaration of Glenn D. Magpantay (Dec. 20, 2013) (“Magpantay Decl.”) ¶2, DE #664; Ex. A to Magpantay Decl., DE # 664-1; Declaration of Jerry G. Vattama-la (Dec. 20, 2013) (“Vattamala Decl.”) ¶ 2, DE # 665; Ex. A to Vattamala Decl., DE # 665-1. The Court has found no significant issues warranting a further reduction in hours. The State likewise does not quibble with the Lee Intervenors’ time-sheets, except for complaining that the Lee Intervenors unnecessarily sent two attorneys to a hearing on March 21, 2012. See Second Opp. at 10. While in some cases, it might be excessive to have multiple attorneys work on a case and attend related hearings, see, e.g., Rostolder v. Life Energy & Tech. Holdings, Inc., No. 03-CV-3375 (SMG), 2006 WL 5838184, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006), it was reasonable to do so here in light of the extremely compressed time schedule. Hence, this Court respectfully recommends that the Panel award the Lee Intervenors attorney’s fees for their requested hours, reduced by only 20 percent on the basis of qualified success.

3. Drayton Intervenors

The Drayton Intervenors are six Black voters residing in New York City who intervened “to protect their rights as Black voters.... ” Proposed Drayton In-tervenors’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene (Dec. 19, 2011) at 1, DE' #28-3. Their primary aim in this litigation was to promote a modified version of the Unity Map to protect Black communities of interest. See Memorandum in Support of Congressional Unity Map (Feb. 29, 2012), DE #139. The Drayton Intervenors were represented by attorneys with the law firm Newman Fer-rara and the Center for Law and Social Justice at Medgar Evers College (“CLSJ”). The Drayton Intervenors seek compensation for a total of 331.05 hours of work by the attorneys and their support staff.

The Drayton Intervenors’ efforts, which paralleled those of the other Intervenors, were largely successful. While the Panel did not adopt the Drayton Intervenors’ proposed Unity Map, they nonetheless succeeded in preserving Black communities of interest. “[T]he geographical locations and the number of Black majority-minority congressional districts contained in the adopted plan are substantially similar [to] those contained in the Unity Map.” Drayton Reply at 3. Notably, the Drayton Intervenors persuaded this Court, based on their response to this Court’s 3/5/12 OTSC, to reallocate the Fort Greene and Clinton Hill neighborhoods. See Drayton Intervenors’ Response to 3/5/12 OTSC (Mar. 6, 2012), DE # 189; Recommended Plan Maps (Mar. 12, 2012), DE # 223-2; 3/12/12 R & R at 27. However, the Drayton Intervenors were unsuccessful in their other attempts, such as to have Greenpoint and Williamsburg reassigned. See Drayton Intervenors’ Response to 3/5/12 OTSC; Drayton Intervenors’ Response to 3/12/12 R & R (Mar. 14, 2012), DE # 226; 3/19/12 Order at 27-29. Considering the Drayton Intervenors’ partial success in persuading this Court to alter its Proposed Map and the relationship between the Drayton Intervenors’ proposed Unity Map and the Adopted Map, this Court concludes that the Drayton Interve-nors were only soniewhat less successful than the Lee Intervenors. Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that the Panel apply a 30-percent reduction on the basis of the Drayton Intervenors’ degree of success.

After examining the time records of the Drayton Intervenors’ attorneys, the Court finds that the hours claimed were generally reasonable. See Declaration of Randolph M. McLaughlin (Nov. 19, 2013) (“McLaughlin Decl.”) ¶ 3, DE # 652; Ex. B to McLaughlin Decl., DE # 652-2; Declaration of Joan P. Gibbs (Dec. 19, 2013) (“First Gibbs Decl.”) ¶¶ 8, 15, DE # 658-2; Ex. B to First Gibbs Decl.; Ex. D to First Gibbs Decl. The Court has identified two issues, however. First, the Drayton Inter-venors inexplicably request compensation for 91.25 hours for attorney Esmeralda Simmons’ work even though her time ree-ords account for only 88 hours and 25 minutes. See Ex. D to First Gibbs Decl. Accordingly, this Court uses 88.4 hours as the starting point for Simmons’ hours before applying the aforementioned percentage reduction. The second issue is that Newman Ferrara included tasks performed between March 23, 2012 and May 29, 2012, that appear to concern aspects of this case unrelated to congressional redistricting. See Ex. B to McLaughlin Decl. Hence, this Court has subtracted the time associated with these tasks prior to applying the recommended 30-percent reduction. Specifically, this Court has subtracted 20.6 hours from Randolph McLaughlin’s time charges, 3.4 hours from Jeffrey Norton’s time charges, and 3.0 hours from Courtney Chenette’s time charges.

The State raises two additional arguments for reducing the Drayton Interve-nors’ requested hours. First, the State criticizes the Drayton Intervenors for submitting two separate fee applications, contending that the Court should consider only one such fee motion. See Second Opp. at 10. In response, the Drayton Intervenors explain that they submitted multiple fee applications because, at the time fee applications were originally due, their lead counsel, Joan Gibbs, had been preparing for oral argument in connection with a later stage of this redistricting litigation, and they therefore filed for an extension. See Drayton Reply at 8. Since the extension was not granted until December 3, 2013, the Drayton Intervenors understandably first filed a separate motion to recover fees for Newman Ferrara’s work on the ease. They should not be penalized for filing two separate motions.

The State’s final argument is that a reduction is appropriate because the Dray-ton Intervenors unnecessarily sent three attorneys to court hearings on March 5 and March 15, 2012. See Second Opp. at 10. However, for reasons explained in its discussion of the Lee Intervenors’ requested hours, this Court would not apply a further reduction on this basis. Hence, it is respectfully recommended that the Panel award the Drayton Intervenors attorney’s fees for those’requested hours related to congressional redistricting, reduced by 30 percent on the basis of qualified success.

k- Ramos Intervenors

The Ramos Intervenors are six Latino voters who intervened to represent the Latino community’s interests in redistricting. See Ramos Intervenors’ Memorandum in Support of Complaint in Intervention (Dec. 27, 2011) at 6, DE #37-1; Memorandum of Law in Support of Ramos Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (Dec. 13, 2013) (“Ramos Mem.”) at 7, DE # 657-2. Like the Lee Intervenors and Drayton Intervenors, the Ramos In-tervenors promoted a partial redistricting plan based on the Unity Map. See, Ramos Reply at 4; Ramos Intervenors’ Plan Submissions (Feb. 29, 2012), DE # 142. The Ramos Intervenors were represented in this action by LatinoJustice PRLDEF (“LatinoJustice”), and they seek reimbursement for 343.1 hours of work.

This Court concludes that an award of fees is appropriate because the Ramos Intervenors substantially achieved their litigation objectives. Their proposed plan is not inconsistent with the Panel’s Adopted Map, and they “achieved the preservation of two Congressional districts held by preferred Latino minority representatives, in the Bronx and Kings County, and a district in Central Harlem, which was redrawn for the Latino majority residents .... ” Ramos Mem. at 4. However, one issue on which the Ramos Intervenors did not succeed is the placement of Green-point and Williamsburg. In response to this Court’s Proposed Map and Recommended Map, they (like the Drayton Intervenors) unsuccessfully argued for placing these neighborhoods in a different district than the one ultimately adopted by the Panel, see Ramos Intervenors’ Response to Proposed Map (Mar. 6, 2012), DE # 190; Ramos Intervenors’ Response to Recommended Map (Mar. 14, 2012), DE # 228-1; 3/19/12 Order at 27-29. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Ramos Intervenors’ level of success is roughly comparable to that of the Drayton Intervenors, and therefore recommends the same 30-per-cent reduction to the Ramos Intervenors’ hours on the basis of qualified success.

The State argues, as it did in connection with the Lee Intervenors, that the relevant adopted districts were based on previously existing districts, rather than on the Ramos Intervenors’ map. See Second Opp. at 6. The Court is not convinced that this provides a basis for further reducing the Ramos Intervenors’ hours. Even if the relevant districts resemble previous configurations, this similarity was by no means a preordained outcome. The Ramos Inter-venors’ efforts in this case, see generally Ramos Mem. at 3, 8, contributed importantly to their substantial success.

Upon reviewing the Ramos Intervenors’ time records, the Court concludes that the hours and tasks documented are reasonable. See Declaration of Jackson Chin (Dec. 13, 2013) (“First Chin Deck”) ¶ 3, DE # 657-1; Ex. A to First Chin Deck, DE # 657-3. However, no time records were submitted to document the hours of Latino Justice’s law clerk Natalie Knotts or law fellow Rodrigo Diaz, who purportedly performed 22 and 15 hours of work, respectively. Hence, the Court recommends that the Ramos Intervenors not be reimbursed for their work. See Carey, 711 F.2d at 1148.

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Panel award the Ramos Intervenors attorney’s fees for their requested hours (except for those attributed to Knotts and Diaz), reduced by 30 percent on the basis of qualified success.

B. Reasonable Hourly Rates

Generally speaking, a reasonable hourly rate “is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir.2007). Hence, courts look to rates “prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation,” commonly referred to as “prevailing market rates.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). A court, in determining the prevailing market rate, must evaluate the evidence proffered by the parties. Farbotko v. Clinton Cnty., 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir.2005). Additionally, the court may take judicial notice of rates awarded in prior cases and rely on its own familiarity with prevailing rates in the community. See id. “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits— that the requested rates are in line with” prevailing market rates. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541. If the fee applicant carries this burden, the requested rates are normally deemed reasonable. See id.

For purposes of determining prevailing market rates, the relevant community is the district in which the court sits. Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 208. According to the “forum rule,” courts ordinarily award in-district rates. See Simmons, 575 F.3d at 174 (citing Arbor Hill v. County of Albany, 493 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.2007)). “[W]hen faced with a req