Barrett v. Forest Laboratories, Inc. (39 F. Supp. 3d 407, 2014)

OPINION AND ORDER

RONNIE ABRAMS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are eleven current or former female employees of Defendants Forest Laboratories, Inc. and Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants,” “Forest” or “the Company”). In their Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiffs allege primarily that Defendants discriminated against female employees with respect to pay and promotions.

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss each of Plaintiffs’ class claims and the majority of their individual claims. In the alternative to dismissing the class claims, Defendants ask the Court to narrow the putative class.

For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. To summarize: in addition to stating a number of individual claims, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants have engaged in a pattern or practice of gender-based discrimination with respect to pay and promotions, and that several- of Defendants’ policies have a disparate impact on women. With one modification, the Court grants Defendants’ request to narrow the scope of the putative class.

BACKGROUND

The Court draws the following facts from the SAC, all of which it assumes to be true for purposes of this motion. See, e.g., Fahs Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Gray, 725 F.3d 289, 290 (2d Cir.2013).

A. Defendants

Defendant Forest Laboratories, Inc. is “a multi-national corporation engaged in the business of developing, manufacturing, and marketing pharmaceutical products.” (SAC ¶ 22.) Its wholly-owned subsidiary, Defendant Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., is responsible for the “manufacture, distribution, and sales of prescription medicine” for its parent company. (Id. ¶ 23.) Both entities are incorporated in Delaware; Forest Laboratories is headquartered in New York and Forest Pharmaceuticals has eight offices in the state. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.)

B. Plaintiffs

Although many of Plaintiffs’ claims are similar—in that all allege some form of gender-based discrimination—the Court details briefly the circumstances surrounding each Plaintiffs employment as alleged in the 126-page SAC.

1. Plaintiff Megan Barrett

Defendants hired Barrett in January 2004 as a Territory Representative. (Id. ¶ 25.) During the period at issue in the SAC, she worked in Scranton, Pennsylvania region until she was terminated on April 26, 2011. (Id.)

As do all but one other Plaintiff, Barrett identifies a “male colleague” and alleges “[u]pon information and belief’ that he was paid a higher base salary than she was, “even though he did not have superior qualifications, and even though Ms. Barrett and he held jobs requiring the same skills, efforts and responsibilities, which they performed under similar working conditions.” (Id. ¶ 30.) She alleges further that the Company’s policy “of awarding merit increases as a percentage of salary” exacerbated this pay disparity. (Id. ¶ 31.)

The thrust of Barrett’s allegations is that her male manager began to mistreat her after she returned from maternity leave in February 2009—despite her excellent sales record—and continued mistreating her after she returned from another maternity leave in February 2010. Manager performance assessments, known as “Field Trip Evaluations” or “FTE’s,” are a significant component of an employee’s annual review score. (Id. ¶¶ 39^41.) Barrett alleges that when she returned from maternity leave in February 2009, her manager began rating her 2.4 or 2.5 on a 5.0 scale—the lowest ratings she had received, and well below the 3.0 or higher she had received before her maternity leave began in “late 2008.” (Id. ¶40.) These low scores '“resulted] in a reduction in her bonus compensation” and rendered Barrett ineligible to apply for promotions. (Id. ¶ 41-42.)

This mistreatment allegedly worsened after Barrett returned from maternity leave in February 2010, which led her to contact a human resources representative after she was issued a disciplinary letter in July 2010. (Id. ¶ 50.) Aside from recommending that she document her concerns, Barrett alleges, the Company did not contact her again or investigate her complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 50-51.) In December 2010, her manager placed her on “probation,” which required her to undertake certain remedial measures, such as submitting weekly self-assessments. (Id. ¶ 52.)

Barrett asserts that she was singled out for such treatment, alleging that she was the only member of her team placed on probation, even though “other team members had performance numbers lower or similar to hers.” (Id. ¶ 54.) She further alleges that a male team member committed “a serious infraction,” but was not disciplined, and the manager allegedly told this individual “Don’t worry, I have your back,” (Id. ¶ 56.) Barrett remained on probation even though she continued to “achieve her sales goals” and receive praise from customers. (Id. ¶¶ 55-58.) Despite her alleged success, Barrett was terminated in April 2011. (Id. ¶ 59.)

2. Plaintiff Lindsey Houser

Defendants employed Houser from June 2003 to November 2010, initially as a Territory Representative and then as a Sales Representative, in several offices in Texas. (Id. ¶ 60.) In addition to identifying male colleagues who were paid a higher base salary despite equivalent qualifications and responsibilities (id. ¶ 63), Houser alleges that she earned certain bonus payments in the quarter before she took maternity leave, but never received those payments because of a Company policy prohibiting representatives “who are on leave for a period of more than six weeks” from collecting “bonuses distributed during the leave period.” (Id. ¶ 84).

In her allegations, Houser also describes applying for a promotion while eight months pregnant, asserting that the questions at her interview focused almost exclusively on her pregnancy. (Id. ¶¶ 75-76.) Despite being told by a previous supervisor that management would be “crazy” not to promote her, Houser alleges, Defendants instead promoted another employee—who also happened to be pregnant, but was not visibly so at the time of the interview. (Id. ¶ 77.)

The SAC further asserts that Houser’s manager began reducing her FTE scores after her return from maternity leave— despite her allegedly “strong performance”—which reduced her annual salary increase and stock options.' (Id. ¶¶ 95-96.) This manager also allegedly made comments to male colleagues about Houser’s breasts (id. ¶ 72), sent her a sexually-suggestive birthday card (id. ¶79), and remarked to another employee that “he was not going to hire women anymore because they all get pregnant and go on maternity leave, like Ms. Houser” (id. ¶ 83). After she was denied the opportunity to take a job-share position in her sales territory— although she did temporarily share a position in a different territory—Houser resigned from the Company. (Id. ¶¶ 97-103.)

3. Plaintiff Jennifer Jones

Jones worked as a Territory Representative at the Company’s Fort Worth, Texas office from January 2008 to September 27, 2010. (Id. ¶ 104.) Like the other Plaintiffs, Jones alleges that a similarly-qualified male, performing a similar job, received a higher base salary. (Id.% 106.) Unlike the nine other Plaintiffs who allege discrimination in base pay, the SAC states precisely how much Jones’s male comparator was paid. (Id. ¶ 106.)

Jones alleges that her manager engaged in overt sexual harassment at a work function one evening, which included (1) mouthing to another employee, about Jones, ‘You need to fuck her”; (2) remarking to a table of employees, after Jones excused herself to use the restroom, that “he would ‘fuck the shit out of her’ ” and asking why no one had done so yet; (3) walking Ms. Jones back to her condominium and then propositioning her, an overture that she rejected; and (4) “aggressively urg[ing] her not to say anything to anyone” about what happened. (Id. ¶¶ 108-10.)

In the following months, the manager continued to confirm with Jones that she had not reported the incident. (Id. ¶ 111.) She did not, despite learning that the individual had allegedly harassed other women and that he continued to ask team members about Jones’s relationship status. (Id. ¶¶ 111-13.) Eventually, this manager became Jones’s direct supervisor, and after he told another manager that Jones “was not a valuable member of the team,” Jones finally described the harassment— first to the other manager, then in a written report to the Company’s Human Resources (“HR”) department, and then in a phone call to the Company’s “Compliance Hotline.” (Id. ¶¶ 114-18.)

Over two months after the phone call to the “Compliance Hotline”—during which time Jones continued to report to her alleged harasser (id. ¶ 120)—an HR director interviewed Jones (id. ¶¶ 121-22). According to Jones, “the majority of the meeting” was spent discussing her work performance, and she was ultimately placed on “probation”—despite being ranked sixteenth in her region out of one hundred sales representatives. (Id. ¶ 121.) Another individual, who also “acted as a witness on Ms. Jones’ behalf during the investigation” was also interviewed and placed on “probation.” (Id. ¶ 122.) Jones resigned from the Company five days after her interview. (Id. ¶¶ 121,123.)

4. Plaintiff Jennifer Seard

Seard served as a Territory and Specialty Sales Representative in the Waco, Texas region from December 2003 until April 2011. (Id. ¶ 124.) She is the only Plaintiff who does not allege that a male comparator received a higher base salary than her for performing the same work. She does allege, however, that she was denied bonus compensation during her two maternity leaves “based on Forest’s policy of denying bonuses to representatives on leave, even for commissions earned before the period of leave.” (Id. ¶ 126.)

According to Seard, after she unsuccessfully requested a job-sharing position in March 2010, her manager “began reviewing Ms. Seard’s assignments with unusual detail,” and told her that she “had no place at Forest.” (Id. ¶¶ 138-39.) Despite ranking “first in sales” on her team and placing in the top quarter of sales representatives nationwide, her manager gave her some of the lowest FTE rankings she had received since her first year as a sales representative, resulting in lower annual salary increases. (Id. ¶¶ 140-41.) Seard sought advice from the Company’s HR department; in subsequent discussions with her manager, he would make remarks such as “Are you going to call HR again? I thought we were over that,” and “While you’re at it, why don’t you just copy HR on it?” (Id. ¶¶ 145^16.) After continued scrutiny from her manager, Seard resigned in April 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 147-52.)

5. Plaintiff Kimberly Clinton

Clinton worked as a Territory Representative in the Company’s Norwich, Connecticut territory from May 2011 until November 30, 2012. (Id. ¶ 153.) She alleges that her base salary was lower than a male coworker’s, who performed a similar job and was no more qualified. (Id. ¶ 156.)

Clinton’s allegations reveal a contentious relationship with her coworkers. According to the SAC, Clinton’s male coworkers accused her of forging doctors’ signatures and falsifying call information; these accusations ultimately resulted in the Company issuing Clinton a “Formal Warning Letter.” (Id. ¶¶ 164, 175.) Clinton believed that these accusations were discriminatory, and alleges that her coworkers made comments to her about being a single parent (id. ¶ 165), and that on one occasion, her manager encouraged her to be more “ ‘positive’ and enthusiastic’ during her calls with doctors,” punctuating the phrases by cupping his hands underneath his chest to mimic a woman showing cleavage (id. ¶ 174). Clinton then filed a complaint with the HR department, alleging that her coworkers were discriminating against her and had falsified the accusations. (Id. ¶ 180.)

Clinton further alleges that her manager decreased her FTE scores after she filed the complaint with HR, (Id. ¶ 188.) She eventually resigned on November 30, 2012. (Id. ¶ 192.)

6. Plaintiff Erin Eckenrode

Eckenrode worked as a Territory Representative and Specialty Sales Representative in the Harrisburg and York, Pennsylvania territories from October 2003 until May 2012. (Id. ¶ 48.) She alleges that three male Territory Representatives, from her territory or nearby territories, were paid higher base salaries even though they performed similar jobs and had similar qualifications. (Id. ¶ 198.)

According to Eckenrode, the Company waited almost a decade to promote her, even though she twice applied for a promotion and was the most qualified candidate. (Id. ¶¶ 202-206.) On the first occasion, the Company gave the promotion to a male employee; on the second, it promoted a female employee who, unlike Ecken-rode, was not pregnant. (Id. ¶¶ 202-03, 206.) Eckenrode was promoted on her third try—despite the hiring manager’s lament, during Eckenrode’s interview for the promotion, that “everybody who works for me gets pregnant.” (Id. ¶¶ 217-18.) Eckenrode further alleges that once she was promoted to Specialty Sales Representative, she still received a lower base salary than two other male Specialty Sales Representatives, even though the other employees had similar responsibilities and were no more qualified. (Id. ¶ 221.) She resigned in May 2012. (Id. ¶ 223.)

7. Plaintiff Julie Smyth

Smyth served as a Territory Representative and Specialty Sales Representative from May 2005 to August 2012 in the Hershey, Harrisburg, and York territories in Pennsylvania, (Id. ¶¶ 224-25.) She alleges that a male colleague, who was also a Territory Representative, received a higher base salary, even though he performed a similar job and did not have superior qualifications. (Id. ¶ 228.) In fact, according to the SAC, this individual did not have any prior sales experience—whereas Smyth had three years—and he joined the Company four months after Smyth did. (Id.)

Smyth was promoted to Specialty Sales Representative the year after she joined the Company. (Id. ¶ 230.) Several years later, she applied for another promotion, but was unsuccessful; according to the SAC, the position was awarded to a male Specialty Sales Representative who, “[u]pon information and belief,” had a shorter tenure as a Specialty Sales Representative and who had not performed as well as Smyth had in the year prior to the promotion. (Id. ¶ 234.)

Smyth further alleges that after she learned she did not receive the promotion, her manager asked her to step down from her Specialty Sales Representative position, and stated that if she “did not agree to step down, he would gradually lower her ride-along scores until she received a Letter of Concern that would effectively place her on probation.” (Id. ¶ 238.) He then gave her “the lowest ride-along score she had received to date.” (Id.) Later that day, Smyth informed her manager’s supervisor about these comments; the manager subsequently “retracted his request that she step down.” (Id. ¶ 240.)

After Smyth returned from maternity leave, she inquired about a job-sharing position. (Id. ¶ 247.) She then applied three times—accepting a voluntary demotion to Territory Representative based on a supervisor’s representation that such a demotion was necessary—but did not receive the job-sharing position. (Id. ¶¶ 247-57.) Smyth “reluctantly resigned” in August 2012. (Id. ¶ 258.)

8. Plaintiff Marie Avila

Avila served as a Territory Representative in the Company’s Los Angeles territory from June 2010 through August 2011. (Id. ¶ 260.) As do most of her eo-Plain-tiffs, she alleges that a male colleague was paid a higher base salary, despite holding a similar job and despite being no more qualified. (Id. ¶ 263.)

Avila alleges that after she inquired about job-sharing (so she could care for her two young children), her manager denied her request, remarked “Maybe this job isn’t for you if you’re not committed,” and gave her a low FTE score. (Id. ¶¶ 267-269.) Subsequently, her manager twice extended her probation—on which all new employees are placed, typically for only their first six months of employment—and also set unrealistic sales goals and assigned Avila certain administrative tasks that he did not assign to other employees he supervised. (Id. ¶¶ 270-75.) Avila alleges that before she inquired about job-sharing, she had received only positive feedback (id. ¶ 266), and was ranked in the top five percent of sales representatives nationwide when she re-, ceived this low score (id. ¶ 273). During a subsequent “ride-along” assessment, the manager asked Avila “if she was planning on having more children.” (Id. ¶ 286.)

Because her manager twice extended her probation, Avila was ineligible to apply for a promotion to a Specialty Representative position that opened in her territory. (Id. ¶ 284.) A male employee—who joined the Company at the same time Avila did and, according to the SAC, had a less impressive sales record—obtained the promotion instead. (Id. ¶ 285.)

Avila resigned from the Company in August 2011, “[d]ue to the continued discrimination and retaliation.” (Id. ¶ 289.)

9. Plaintiff Andrea Harley

Harley served as a Territory Representative in the Company’s Louisville, Kentucky territory from March 2011 until June 2013. (Id. ¶ 291.) A “male colleague,” who “was hired by Forest at the same time as Ms. Harley” and who also served as a Territory Representative, was paid a higher base salary, despite being no more qualified and despite performing a similar job. (Id. ¶ 293.)

Harley alleges that her manager initially gave her strong FTE scores, offering positive feedback and telling her that she was “very coachable.” (Id. ¶ 295.) After she informed him that she was four months pregnant, however, this positive feedback changed. (Id. ¶ 296.) Her manager began to give her lower FTE scores, called her “unteachable,” and reviewed her performance more often than he did that of her team members. (Id. ¶ 296-99, 306.) Eventually, Harley was issued a “Letter of Concern,” which placed her on ninety-day probation—even though at the time she was “rated number one among the 400 sales representatives in Forest’s ‘FPL group.’ ” (Id. ¶ 297.)

Harley complained to the Company’s HR department about this discriminatory treatment on three separate instances—in August, September, and October 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 302, 307, 309.) She did not receive a response until January 10, 2013, after she resigned. (Id. ¶¶ 310-11.)

10. Plaintiff Christy Lowder

Lowder was hired as a Specialty Representative in the Company’s Champaign and Springfield, Illinois territories in September 2010. (Id. ¶ 312.) She identifies three male Specialty Representatives who, “[u]pon information and belief,” were paid higher base salaries than Lowder, even though they were no more qualified and performed the same job. (Id. ¶ 315.)

The SAC alleges that one of Lowder’s managers, Pennington, “has insinuated that Ms. Lowder’s success in the field is due to sexual favors she performs for clients in exchange for prescriptions” and once suggested that she “ ‘fuck’ a doctor.” (Id. ¶ 319-20.) Lowder continues by alleging that she has been subjected to degrading remarks from other Territory Representatives (id. ¶¶ 317, 321), and that Lowder’s supervisor refused to take action after he was notified of this harassment (id. ¶ 322).

The SAC also details Lowder’s unsuccessful attempts to apply for promotions. During one such attempt, her manager informed her that she was ineligible to apply because she was on probation for a disciplinary infraction; according to Low-der, two male employees, who were also on probation for the infraction, were permitted to apply for the promotion and one obtained it (the other obtained a different promotion). (Id. ¶ 327.) On another occasion, her manager noted “that he was surprised by the strength of Ms. Lowder’s application and asked if her husband had written the application”; Lowder did not receive that promotion, either. (Id. ¶ 328.)

According to Lowder’s allegations, her coworkers were not the only ones who acted inappropriately. The SAC alleges that several of Lowder’s clients—both of whom were doctors—made sexually explicit comments and, on one occasion, one of the doctors “leaned into [Lowder], pulled her breast out from her shirt, and attempted to lick it.” (Id. ¶¶ 330-32.) When Lowder reported these incidents to her manager, he “commented how important it was to make a sale” and insisted “that he did not wish to know about clients’ indiscretion” because “if he heard the full extent of such incidents, he would be obligated to report them to management, which could lead those doctors to stop prescribing Forest products.” (Id. ¶¶ 331-34.) The SAC alleges that Lowder complained about this behavior to HR; although the SAC states that HR initially did not remove the doctors from Lowder’s “call panel” (id. ¶ 339), the SAC does not indicate whether the doctors were ultimately removed.

Lowder also alleges that after joining the instant lawsuit, her coworkers stopped communicating with her, and a promotion she applied for was given to another male employee “with far less experience than Ms, Lowder’s two-and-[a-]half-years at Forest and ten years as a sales representative in the industry.” (Id. ¶¶337, 344.)

11. Plaintiff Tracy Le

Le was hired in March 2012 as a Territory Representative in the Company’s Southern California region, and continued to work at the Company as of the filing of the SAC. (Id. ¶ 347.) Like most of her co-Plaintiffs, she alleges that a “male colleague” is paid a higher base salary, even though he and Le perform the same job and have comparable qualifications. (Id. ¶ 349.)

The SAC alleges that one of Le’s coworkers, Steve Yeu, would “ ‘accidentally’ brush his hands over Ms. Le’s breasts and touch her leg,” and commented “that Ms. Le’s body could be an asset for sales.” (Id. ¶ 351.) When Le informed her manager, Raymond Gerace, of this harassment, Gerace “explicitly instructed Ms. Le not to contact Forest’s Human Resources (“HR”) Department.” (Id. ¶ 352.) Le alleges that in the wake of this complaint, not only did Gerace “order[] Ms. Le to work even more closely with her harasser going forward,” Gerace began to freeze her FTE scores below 3.0 and extended her probation—even though her sales performance placed her near the top five percent of representatives in the nation. (Id. ¶¶ 353, 358-59.) According to Le,-Gerace refused her requests for constructive criticism and “treat[ed] other female employees under his supervision with hostility,” by, for example, making disparaging comments. (Id. ¶¶ 363-65.)

Although Le reported Gerace’s behavior to HR, at the time of the SAC her probation had been extended again, and she remained ineligible for merit increases, awards, and promotions. (Id. ¶ 375.)

C. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the instant action on July 5, 2012, and filed an Amended Complaint on November 5, 2012. (Dkt. nos. 1, 13.) After Defendants moved to dismiss—raising arguments similar to those now before the Court—Plaintiffs sought leave to file the SAC. (Dkt. no. 27.) The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend and stated that the SAC “would be Plaintiffs’ final opportunity to amend to cure any pleading deficiencies.” (Dkt. no. 33.)

The SAC seeks to certify a class (the “Class”) consisting of “[a]ll female Sales Representatives who are, have been, or will be employed by Forest in the United States from 2008 to the date of judgment. ‘Sales Representatives’ include Territory Sales Representatives, Field Sales Representatives, Medical Sales Representatives, Professional Sales Representatives, Specialty Sales Representatives, Field Sales Trainers, and Regional Sales Trainers.” (SAC ¶ 402.) It also seeks to certify a “Pregnancy Sub-class,” defined as “All female Sales Representatives who are, have been, or will become pregnant while employed by Forest in the United States from 2008 to the date of judgment.” (Id.) Additionally, the SAC seeks to bring an opt-in collective action under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“Equal Pay Act” or “EPA”) on behalf of “all current, former, and future female Sales Representatives” who were subjected to unequal pay in one of four enumerated ways.

In total, the SAC asserts seven counts: (1) pay discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) on behalf of the Class and all Plaintiffs; (2) promotion discrimination under Title VII on behalf of the Class and all Plaintiffs; (3) pregnancy discrimination under Title VII on behalf of “Class Representatives Ms. Barrett, Ms. Houser, Ms. Eckenrode, Ms. Smyth, Ms. Harley, and all members of the Class Against Defendants”; (4) violation of the Equal Pay Act, on behalf of all Plaintiffs and EPA Collective Action Plaintiffs; violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, on behalf of Plaintiffs Barrett, Houser, and Smyth; (5) retaliation under Title VII, on behalf of Plaintiffs Jones, Seard, Eckenrode, Lowder, and Le; and (6) sexual harassment under Title VII, on behalf of Plaintiffs Jones and Lowder.

The Court notes at the outset that the organization of the SAC makes it difficult to understand the exact nature of many of Plaintiffs’ claims. The SAC begins with eighty-nine pages of factual allegations, providing a narrative of each of the eleven Plaintiffs’ experiences while employed by Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 25-376.) Following these allegations, the SAC lists each of the policies or practices—approximately fifteen in total—that it asserts are discriminatory. (Id. ¶¶ 377-93.) After class and collective allegations (id. ¶¶ 394-435), the SAC conclusorily recites the elements of each of its seven claims (id. ¶¶ 436^195).

Whether intentionally or not, Plaintiffs have left it to the Court to attempt to sort out which policy or practice corresponds to each claim. Although the task is straightforward for some policies or practices, it is more difficult for others. For instance, as described below, the SAC’s allegations about Defendants’ job-sharing policies could relate to Plaintiffs’ pay discrimination claim, their promotion discrimination claim, their pregnancy discrimination claim, or some combination of the three. The SAC does not specify. At oral argument on the instant motion, Plaintiffs twice acknowledged that aspects of the pleadings in the SAC were “inartful.” (Jan. 16, 2014 Tr. at 27:5, 38:16.) In the Court’s view, this is an understatement.

In spite of the SAC’s somewhat haphazard organization, the Court concludes that its factual allegations state a number of plausible claims.

DISCUSSION

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although the Court accepts as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, it need not credit legal conclusions: “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do . not suffice.” Id. Determining whether the complaint states a plausible claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

A. Legal Framework for Title VII Claims

Counts One through Three of the SAC assert claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. These claims—and, as described below, a closely related claim under the Equal Pay Act in Count Four—form the heart of the SAC and are the focus of the majority of Defendants’ arguments on the motion to dismiss. The Court therefore begins by articulating the legal standard for Title VII claims—particularly those asserting a “pattern or practice” of discrimination—and then considers several overarching issues related to each of Plaintiffs’ Tille VII claims.

Title VII “prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009). The law protects employees from “both intentional discrimination (known as ‘disparate treatment’) as well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as ‘disparate impact’).” Id.

1. Disparate Treatment

Disparate treatment is “the most easily understood type of discrimination” and was “the most obvious evil Congress had' in mind when it enacted Title VII.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (“Teamsters”). To that end, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). “Proof of discriminatory motive is critical” in disparate treatment claims, “although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843.

Disparate treatment may be shown in one of two ways. An individual plaintiff may prove disparate treatment under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework by first establishing “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir.2000). If she makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the employer to “articu-lat[e] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.” Id. In order to prevail after the employer makes this showing, plaintiff must then offer “sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate, non-diseriminatory reasons proffered by the defendant were false, and that more likely than not discrimination was the real reason for the employment action.” Id. (alterations omitted).

Alternatively, a “group of plaintiffs, entitled to be certified as a class, may also initiate a pattern-or-practice suit.” United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir.2013). Whereas an individual disparate impact claim “requires an intent to discriminate against one person,” id. at 83, a pattern-or-practice claim requires plaintiffs to show that “discrimination was the company’s standard operating procedure”—the “regular rather than the unusual practice,” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843—and that “the discrimination was directed at a class of victims,” City of New York, 717 F.3d at 83 (alteration omitted). A “pattern or practice case is not a separate and free-standing cause of action, but is really merely another method by which disparate treatment can be shown.” Id. (alteration omitted).

A plaintiffs initial burden in a pattern-or-practice case “is heavier in one respect and lighter in another respect than the burden in an individual case.” Id. at 84. It is heavier “in that the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of a pervasive policy of intentional discrimination,” instead of only “a single instance of discriminatory treatment.” Id.; see also Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 878, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984) (“[A] class plaintiffs attempt to prove the existence of a companywide policy, or even a consistent practice within a given department, may fail even though discrimination against one or two individuals has been proved.”). The burden in a pattern-or-practice claim is lighter “in that the plaintiff need not initially show discrimination against any particular present or prospective employee”: although “instances of discrimination against particular employees are relevant to show a policy of intentional discrimination, they are not required,” and “a statistical showing of disparate impact might suffice.” City of New York, 717 F.3d at 84.

As in an individual claim, once plaintiffs make their initial showing in a pattern-or-practice case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to rebut the inference of discrimination, which it may do by attacking plaintiffs statistical evidence or by offering affirmative evidence demonstrating the absence of an intent to discriminate (such as the existence of an affirmative action program). Id. at 85-87. The trier of fact then must determine whether plaintiffs have proven “the ultimate fact at issue”: whether the employer has “a policy of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 87.

If plaintiffs successfully establish the existence of a “pattern or practice” of discrimination, the Court may fashion classwide injunctive relief. Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir.2001), abrogated on other grounds • by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). The litigation then proceeds to a “remedial” stage, at which individual employees seeking relief are entitled to a presumption “that any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy. The burden then rests on the employers to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons.” United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 87-88 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362, 97 S.Ct. 1843) (alterations omitted).

2. Disparate Impact

Title VII also prohibits “employers’ facially neutral practices that, in fact, are discriminatory in operation.” Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577-78, 129 S.Ct. 2658. To establish a prima facie violation, a plaintiff must show that the employer “uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, col- or, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i). The employer may defend against liability by demonstrating “that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Id. Even if the employer makes this showing, a plaintiff may still prevail by “showing that the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.” Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii) and (Q).

To make out a prima facie disparate impact case, a plaintiff therefore must “(1) identify a specific employment practice or policy; (2) demonstrate that a disparity exists; and (3) establish a causal relationship between the two.” Chin, 685 F.3d at 151 (citation omitted). The facially-neutral “policy” must be something more than an isolated incident. See, e.g., Collette v. St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp., 132 F.Supp.2d 256, 277 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (Lynch, /.) (concluding that “one alleged instance of the defendant’s failure to post a job” was insufficient “to plead an actionable employment practice or policy”). The complaint must then plead a connection between the policy at issue and the disparity. See Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 712 (2d Cir.1998) (“Allegations which contend only that there is a bottom line racial imbalance in the work force are insufficient.”).

3. Pleading Standard for an Individual Disparate Treatment Claim

The elements required to make out a prima facie disparate treatment claim are well-established, as is the subsequent burden-shifting analysis. What a disparate treatment plaintiff must allege in her complaint is, however, somewhat of an open question in the Circuit.

Prior to Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), the Second Circuit required plaintiffs to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas in order to state a claim. See id. at 510, 122 S.Ct. 992. In Swierkiewicz, however, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that a plaintiff need not allege a prima facie case of discrimination, but rather need provide only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 513, 122 S.Ct. 992 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). This statement “must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” the Court explained. Id. “Liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions,” the Court continued, are the appropriate means to “define disputed facts and issues” and “dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Id.

Five years later the Supreme Court handed down Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twom-bly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)—which subjected complaints to the familiar “plausibility” requirement, id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955—and in it, expressly affirmed the validity of Swierkiewicz, see id. at 569-70, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Second Circuit is yet to address how district courts should treat Swierkiewicz in the wake of Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Recently, the Circuit noted that it was “skeptical” of decisions by other courts that “questioned the continued vitality of Swierkiewicz.” Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 228 & n. 10 (2d Cir.2014). The Circuit in Daikin, however, concluded that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged a Title VII claim under both the pre-Swierkiewicz “prima facie” standard as well as the Swierkiewicz “fair notice” standard and thus declined to reach the issue. See also Chepak v. Metro. Hosp., 555 Fed.Appx. 74, 76 (2d Cir.2014) (reversing district court’s dismissal of pro se plaintiffs claim because the “complaint, on its face, was sufficient to give [defendant] fair notice of [plaintiffs] claims and the grounds upon which they rested” (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512, 122 S.Ct. 992)); Hedges v. Town of Madison, 456 Fed.Appx. 22, 23 (2d Cir.2012) (“Swierkiewicz’s reliance on Conley suggests that, at a minimum, employment discrimination claims must meet the standard of pleading set forth in Twombly and Iqbal, even if pleading a prima facie case is not required. We need not resolve these conflicts here, however, for Hedges’s claims fail any conceivable standard of pleading.”).

Other courts in this District, before the Second Circuit’s most recent discussion of the issue in Daikin, have treated the elements of a prima facie case as “an outline of what is necessary to render a plaintiffs employment discrimination claims for relief plausible” and have “considered] these elements in determining whether there is sufficient factual matter in the complaint which, if true, gives Defendant a fair notice of Plaintiffs claim and the grounds on which it rests.” Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 925 F.Supp.2d 453, 461 (S.D.N.Y.2013); accord Graham v. Women in Need, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 07063(LGS), 2014 WL 2440849, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014); Pahuja v. Am. Univ. of Antigua, 11 Civ. 4607(PAE), 2012 WL 6592116, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2012). This standard reconciles Swierkiewicz, Twombly, and Iqbal, and the Court applies it in this case.

4. Pleading Standard for a Pattern- or-Practice Claim

A similar question arises with respect to pattern-or-practice claims: although the law is clear that a pattern-or-practice claim requires a plaintiff to show a “pervasive policy of intentional discrimination,” City of New York, 717 F.3d at 84, few courts have addressed what a complaint must allege in order to state a plausible pattern- or-practice claim.

Defendants assert—in an argument they repeat with respect to each of Plaintiffs pattern-or-practice claims—that Plaintiffs must allege statistics in order to make their claims plausible. (E.g., Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 16, 19-20.) To be sure, statistics are an important way of proving pattern-or-practice claims, and Plaintiffs will be unlikely to survive summary judgment without them. See Robinson, 267 F.3d at 158 (“The heavy reliance on statistical evidence in a pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claim distinguishes such a claim from an individual disparate treatment claim proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas framework.”); 1 Arthur Larson et al, Employment Discrimination § 9.03[1] (2014) (“Plaintiffs have typically depended upon two kinds of circumstantial evidence to establish the existence of a policy, pattern, or practice of intentional discrimination:. (1) statistical evidence aimed at establishing the defendant’s past treatment of the protected group, and (2) testimony from protected class members detailing specific instances of discrimination.”).

None of the cases Defendants cite, however, stand for the proposition that statistics must be pled in the complaint in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Indeed, the weight of the case law from other district courts points in the opposite direction. See E.E.O.C. v. Performance Food Grp., Inc., 16 F.Supp.3d 584, 590, NO. CIV.A. MJG-13-1712, 2014 WL 1760936, at *5 (D.Md. Mar. 11, 2014) (“To the extent that PFG contends the EEOC’s use of statistical allegations in the Amended Complaint is insufficient to support a plausible claim of entitlement to relief, the Court agrees with the EEOC that it is not required to plead statistical allegations, much less provide detailed explanations of those statistics to survive a motion to dismiss.”); E.E.O.C. v. Propak Logistics, Inc., 1:09CV311, 2010 WL 3081339 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2010) (“[T]he EEOC may prove this pattern or practice of discrimination through statistical and anecdotal evidence that need not be recited in the complaint.”); United States v. Nobel Learning Communities, Inc., 676 F.Supp.2d 379, 384 (E.D.Pa.2009) (“Although many courts use statistical information at the summary judgment stage to evaluate pattern or practice claims, such data is not required to survive a motion to dismiss.”); see also Sidor v. Reno, No. 95 Civ. 9588(KMW), 1997 WL 582846, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1997) (denying, under pre-Twombly standard, defendant’s motion to dismiss, which argued that plaintiff had failed to allege statistical evidence of discrimination against deaf employees within FBI’s New York office). The reasoning underlying these decisions is valid: in most cases, plaintiffs will be unable to provide reliable statistics before they have access to discovery.

Additionally, at least “when there is a small number of employees, anecdotal evidence alone can suffice” to survive summary judgment and even to impose liability after a trial. Sidor v. Reno, 95 CIV. 9588(KMW), 1997 WL 582846, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1997); see United States v. City of New York, 713 F.Supp.2d 300, 318 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (concluding, after a bench trial, that anecdotal evidence was sufficient to show a pattern of gender-based discrimination among bridge painters employed by New York City’s Department of Transportation); see also Stoler v. Inst. for Integrative Nutrition, 13 Civ. 1275, 2013 WL 6068598, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2013) (“In class actions such as this, individual and class issues are not readily separated. Evidence of company-wide policies of discrimination strengthen individual discrimination claims and vice versa.”). It follows that allegations of a sufficient number of instances of discrimination may permit a plausible inference that discrimination was the defendant’s standard operating procedure, even if the defendant is a multinational company.

This is not to say that every complaint that alleges instances of discrimination necessarily states a pattern or practice claim. See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2371, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) (“If one allegation of specific discriminatory treatment were sufficient to support an across-the-board attack, every Title VII case would be a potential companywide class action,”). Plaintiffs must still plead facts supporting an inference that discrimination was the Company’s “standard operating procedure,” and allegations of statistical disparities will go a long way toward making such a claim plausible. Statistics are not necessary, however, if a complaint pleads other facts that allow the court to infer a pattern of discrimination.

The question, then, is how many instances of discrimination are sufficient to allege a pattern in the absence of statistics. Reviewing a verdict after trial, the Second Circuit explained that “[w]hile the definition of a pattern or practice is not capable of a precise mathematical formulation, more than two acts will ordinarily be required.” Ste. Marie v. E.R. Ass’n, 650 F.2d 395, 406 (2d Cir.1981) (citations omitted). If, however, “there were evidence that a policy of discrimination had been adopted, perhaps two or even one confirmatory act would be enough.” Id. Several years later, in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 879, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984), the Supreme Court similarly suggested that “two or three instances of discrimination” would not be “sufficient to establish a general policy.” Specifically with respect to motions to dismiss, courts have held that three instances of discrimination were insufficient to state a plausible pattern-or-practice claim, see Krish v. Connecticut Ear, Nose & Throat, Sinus & Allergy Specialists, P.C., 607 F.Supp.2d 324, 332 (D.Conn.2009), as were six instances, Ru-binow v. Ingelheim, No. CIVA 3:08-CV-1697VLB, 2010 WL 1882320, at *4 (D.Conn. May 10, 2010), but that eleven or twelve instances were sufficient, see Nobel Learning Communities, Inc., 676 F.Supp.2d at 384.

With these principles in mind, the Court considers the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations.

B. Count One: Title VII Pay Discrimination

The SAC alleges that Defendants discriminate against women (1) with respect to the determination of their initial base pay and (2) with respect to payment of annual salary increases, bonuses, and other compensation.

1. Discrimination in Base Pay

Plaintiffs assert class pattern-or-practice, disparate impact, and individual disparate treatment claims with respect to base pay.

Pattern-or-Practice Claim,: The SAC alleges that “at the time of hire and in connection with promotions or assignments to different positions, women are disproportionately afforded lower base salaries than men.” (SAC ¶ 377.) Ten of the eleven Plaintiffs identify a male employee and allege that the male colleague was paid a higher base salary, despite being no more qualified and despite holding a job “requiring the same skills, efforts and responsibilities,” which was “performed under similar working conditions,” (Id. ¶¶ 30 (Barrett), 63 (Houser), 106 (Jones), 156 (Clinton), 198 (Eckenrode), 228 (Smyth), 263 (Avila), 293 (Harley), 315 (Lowder), 349(Le).)

In Defendants’ view, the SAC’s allegations fail to state a plausible pattern-or-practice claim of discrimination in base pay.

First, Defendants assert that the claim fails because Plaintiffs have only alleged “upon information and belief’ that their male comparators received higher base salaries. (Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 10; Reply at 7.) Of the ten Plaintiffs who allege that a male coworker received a higher base salary, only one Plaintiff—Jones— specifies her male comparator’s base salary. (SAC ¶ 106.) The nine other Plaintiffs simply allege “upon information and belief’ that an identified male, who performed a similar job, was paid more. (Id. ¶¶ 30 (Barrett), 63 (Houser), 156 (Clinton), 198 (Eckenrode), 228 (Smyth), 263 (Avila), 293 (Harley), 315 (Lowder), 349(Le).) According to Defendants, these Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim because they have failed to allege the facts supporting their “belief.”

“When a plaintiff sets out allegations on information and belief, he is representing that he has a good-faith reason for bélieving what he is saying, but acknowledging that his allegations are ‘based on secondhand information that [he] believes to be true.’ ” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 442 (7th Cir.2011) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 783 (7th ed.1999)) (alteration in original). The Second Circuit has explained that the “Twombly plausibility standard ... does not prevent a plaintiff from pleading facts alleged ‘upon information and belief where the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the defendant.” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir.2010). Information about how much a coworker is paid would seem to be precisely the type of information Plaintiffs would not have access to until discovery.

Yet Defendants’ argument in this case is not without force: a plaintiff who invokes the protection of the federal courts by asserting that a male coworker is paid more should have some reason for doing so. Even if the plaintiff cannot allege the precise amount of her coworker’s salary, she should at least be able to allege the facts that form the basis for her belief that he is paid more, as some courts in this District have required in other contexts. See JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F.Supp.2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (“[Although a plaintiff may do so [plead facts upon information and belief] where the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the defendant or where the belief is based on factual information that makes the inference of culpability plausible, such allegations must be accompanied by a statement of the facts upon which the belief is founded.” (citations omitted)); Prince v. Madison Square Garden, 427 F.Supp.2d 372, 385 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“However, allegations pled on ‘information and belief are proper if ‘accompanied by a statement of the facts upon which the belief is founded.’ ”).

Although the Court is skeptical of Plaintiffs’ inability to allege any facts supporting their belief that the male comparators receive a higher base salary, at this early stage of the case Plaintiffs have the better of the argument. The Court need not decide the appropriateness of pleading “upon information and belief’ in every circumstance: deciding the plausibility of a complaint is, of course, a “context-specific task.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Here, the SAC’s pleading “upon information and belief’ is not fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims because each of the ten Plaintiffs (1) states the amount of her base salary, (2) identifies at least one male comparator, and (3) alleges that the comparator received a higher base salary.

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under Twombly/Iqbal and Swier-kiewicz. Both Twombly and Iqbal recognize that, on a motion to dismiss, courts must assume as true the factual allegations in a complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Here, the allega- • tion that an identified male coworker receives a higher base salary is a factual allegation, not a legal conclusion. In holding that plaintiffs need not prove a prima facie McDonnell Douglas case to survive a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz emphasized that a complaint need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and that “[t]his simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeri-torious claims.” 534 U.S. at 512, 122 S.Ct. 992. Here, the allegation that an identified coworker received a higher salary gives Defendants fair notice of the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims. If this assertion is inaccurate—if the comparator is not paid any more than the plaintiff—the complaint can be disposed of quickly on summary judgment after minimal discovery.

The two cases Defendants cite from this District—which require that allegations “upon information and belief’ be “accompanied by a statement of the facts upon which the belief is founded”—are not to the contrary. (See Defs.’ Reply at 5 n. 10 (citing JBCHoldings NY, LLC v. Pakter, 931 F.Supp.2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (quoting Prince v. Madison Square Garden, 427 F.Supp.2d 372, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))).) Tracing the citations in these cases, one sees that the initial authority for this position is a Second Circuit case, Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir.1974), which addressed the sufficiency of allegations of fraud under the heightened pleading standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The primary authority on which Schlick relied—aside from two other Circuit court decisions, both of which also addressed Rule 9(b)— was the treatise of Professors Wright and Miller. See Schlick, 507 F.2d at 379. The current version of the treatise still explains that “[allegations of the circumstances of a fraud based on information and belief, which are commonplace and often a necessity in many litigation contexts, usually do not satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), unless accompanied by a statement of the facts upon which the pleader’s belief is founded.” 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1298 (3d ed.2008). With respect to non-fraud claims under Rule 8, however, the treatise says just the opposite:

Some cases suggest that when allegations are made on the basis of information and belief, the facts on which the pleader’s belief is founded also should be alleged. Such supporting allegations seem to be unnecessary and inconsistent with the philosophy of the federal pleading rules,- except when the stricter pleading requirements of Rule 9, which relate to such matters as fraud and special damages, are involved or the matter pleaded in some way casts aspersions on the defendant’s moral character.

Id. § 1224 (footnote omitted). In view of this authority, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ allegations made “upon information and belief’ are sufficient at this stage.

Defendants next assert that Plaintiffs’ claims fail because they have not alleged facts supporting their claim that their male comparators engaged in similar work. This argument is similarly unpersuasive.

Each of the ten Plaintiffs who claims discrimination in base pay alleges that an identified “male colleague” was paid a higher base salary, “even though he did not have superior qualifications” and even though he and Plaintiff “held jobs requiring the same skills, efforts and responsibilities, which they performed under similar working conditions.” Of the ten Plaintiffs, four allege no additional facts in support of their allegation that their male comparators performed similar work. (SAC ¶¶ 30 (Barrett), 156 (Clinton), 263 (Avila), 349(Le).) Three others add that their male comparators held the same title as they did. (Id. ¶¶ 60-63 (Houser), 291-293 (Harley), 312-15 (Lowder).) Plaintiff Smyth describes specifically why she believed her qualifications were superior— noting that her male comparator had been hired four months after her and had no prior sales experience, whereas she had three years’ experience (id. ¶ 228)—and Plaintiffs Eckenrode and Jones allege that their comparators held the same title and worked in the same (or a neighboring) territory (id. ¶¶ 104, 106, 109 (Jones), 198, 221 (Eckenrode)).

Although “job content and not job title or description” is the ultimate “standard for determining whether there was a violation of the anti-discrimination laws,” Chepak v. Metro. Hosp., 555 Fed.Appx. 74, 77 (2d Cir.2014), the six Plaintiffs who identify a male comparator who held the same title have at least plausibly alleged that he performed similar work. In Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 925 F.Supp.2d 453, 471 (S.D.N.Y.2013), the Court concluded that plaintiffs allegations—which identified a male “comparator,” stated his title, and asserted that his “qualifications, experience, and responsibilities were no great er” than plaintiffs—stated a plausible claim. Id.; see Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 277-83, Kassman v. KPMG LLP, No. 11-cv-3743(LGS), 2012 WL 11229563 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2012), ECF No. 35. Here, the six Plaintiffs who make nearly identical allegations also state a claim.

The Court also concludes that the four Plaintiffs who did not identify their male comparator’s job title nonetheless state a plausible claim. In Downes v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 03 Civ. 8991(GEL), 2004 WL 1277991, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2004), plaintiff alleged that her employer “discriminated against her because it compensated male employees, who had jobs that required equal skill, effort and responsibility and were performed under similar working conditions as [plaintiff’s] job, at a higher rate than [plaintiff].” Judge Lynch denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Citing “the liberal notice-pleading standards of Rule 8” and “the Supreme Court’s recent admonition to heed this standard in employment discrimination cases” in Swierkiewicz, the Court explained that the “complaint gives [defendant] adequate notice of the essence of [plaintiffs] claim: that similarly-situated male employees received higher wages than she did.” Id.

Similarly, in Chepak v. Metro. Hosp., 11 Civ. 9698(TPG), 2013 WL 1285270, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013), pro se plaintiff alleged that she was paid less than males even though she did “the exact same job” and “performed the same job with equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions.” The District Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, id. at *3-*4, but the Second Circuit reversed in a summary order. Citing Smerkiewicz, the Circuit explained that plaintiffs “complaint, on its face, was sufficient to give [defendant] fair notice of her claims and the grounds upon which they rested.” Chepak v. Metro. Hosp., 555 Fed.Appx. 74, 76 (2d Cir.2014). Although Chepak addressed the allegations of a pro se plaintiff, and Judge Lynch’s decision in Downes predated Twombly and Iqbal, the Court concludes that these opinions’ discussions of Swierkiewicz and Rule 8 apply equally here.

The majority of cases Defendants cite in response are distinguishable because they addressed complaints in which the plaintiff alleged, in conclusory fashion, that male employees received more compensation, without identifying any comparators or providing additional salient facts. (See Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 8-9 & n. 11 (citing Frasier v. Gen. Elec. Co., 930 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (2d Cir.1991); Akinfaderin v. W.P. Carey & Co. LLC, 11 Civ. 3184(LBC), 2011 WL 6961403, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2011); Emmons v. City Univ. of New York, 715 F.Supp.2d 394, 413-14 (E.D.N.Y.2010); Black v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 94 Civ. 9074(SS), 1996 WL 280802, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1996)).) Indeed, one of the cases Defendants cite suggests that the plaintiffs failure to “offer a male counterpart with a higher salary” was one reason why she had failed to state a claim. Bass v. World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc., 129 F.Supp.2d 491, 503 (E.D.N.Y.2001). Although the Court does not hold that plaintiffs must necessarily identify a male comparator to state a plausible [Title VII wage discrimination claim, doing so will certainly strengthen the complaint’s allegations. Here, where all of the Plaintiffs have identified a male comparator, their allegations are sufficient.

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations of unequal base salaries fail because “nothing in these allegations suggests intentional gender-based discrimination.” (Defs.’ Reply at 7.)

It is well-established that a showing that female employees were treated “less favorably” than “similarly situated” male employees gives rise to an inference of discrimination. E.g., Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 229-30 (2d Cir.2014). Fa